Spouses Yu vs.

Pacleb
G.R. No. 172172,
Feb. 24, 2009

FACTS:
Baltazar Pacleb and his late first wife Angelita Chan are registered owners of an 18,000-
square meter parcel of land in Barrio Langcaan, Dasmariñas,Cavite, covered by TCT No. T-
118375 (Langcaan Property).

On Feb. 27, 1992, Spouses Baltazar Pacleb and Angelita Chan sold the property to
Rebecca del Rosario.
On May 7, 1992, the lot was thereafter sold to Ruperto Javier.

On Nov. 10, 1992, a Contract to Sell was entered into between Javier and Spouses Yu
wherein petitioner spouses agreed to pay Javier P200,000 as partial payment and P400,000 to be
paid upon execution of the contract, and Javier undertook to deliver possession of the Langcaan
Property and to sign a deed of absolute sale within 30 days from execution of contract.
All the aforementioned sales were not registered.

In 1993, spouses Yu filed a complaint with the RTC for specific performance and damages
against Javier, contending that Javier represented to them that the Langcaan Property was not
tenanted, but after they already paid P200,000 as initial payment and entered into the agreement
of sale on Sept. 11, 1992, they discovered that it was tenanted by Ramon Pacleb, son of Baltazar
Pacleb. Subsequently, spouses Yu demanded for the cancellation of the agreement and for the
return of their initial payment.

On March 10, 1995, spouses Yu, Ramon, and the latter’s wife executed a “Kusangloob na
Pagsasauli ng Lupang Sakahan at Pagpapahayag ng Pagtalikod sa Karapatan, where spouses
Yu paid Ramon P500,000 in exchange for the waiver of his tenancy rights over the subject
property. But on Oct. 12, 1995, Baltazar Pacleb filed a complaint for annulment of the deed of sale
to Javier, alleging that the deed of sale executed between him and his late first wife Angelita was
spurious as their signatures were forgeries. Meanwhile, on Nov. 23, 1995, spouses Yu filed an
action for forcible entry against respondent with the MTC alleging that they had prior physical
possession of the Langcaan Property through their trustee Ramon until the latter was ousted by
respondent in Sept. 1995. MTC ruled in favor of spouses Yu, affirmed by the RTC, but set aside
by CA.

His first action for annulment of deed of sale having been dismissed, respondent filed
action for removal of cloud from title on May 29, 1996, contending that the deed of sale between
him and his late first wife and Rebecca del Rosario could not have been executed on Feb. 27,
1992, because on said date, he was residing in the U.S. and his late first wife died 20 years ago.
During pendency of the case, respondent died, succeeded by his surviving spouse and
representatives of children with his first wife. RTC held that spouses Yu are purchasers in good
faith, but on appeal, CA reversed and set aside lower court’s decision and ordered for the
cancellation of the annotation in favor of spouses Yu on the TCT of Langcaan Property.

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 ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner spouses are innocent purchasers for value and in good
faith.

HELD: Petitioner spouses are not innocent purchasers for value, and they are not in good
faith. Several facts should have put petitioner spouses on inquiry as to the alleged rights of their
vendor, Javier, over the Langcaan property.
First, the property remains to be registered in the name of respondent despite the 2 Deeds
of Absolute Sale from respondent to Del Rosario then from the latter to Javier, and both deeds
were not even annotated in the title of the subject property.

Second, the 2 deeds of absolute sale were executed only 2 months apart containing
identical provisions.
Third, the fact that the Langcaan Property is in the possession of Ramon, son of the
registered owners, this should have made petitioner spouses suspicious as to the veracity of the
alleged title of their vendor, Javier. Petitioner spouses could have easily verified the true status of
the subject property from Ramon’s wife, since the latter is their relative.

The law protects to a greater degree a purchaser who buys from the registered owner
himself. Corollarily, it requires a higher degree of prudence from one who buys from a
person who is not the registered owner, although the land object of the transaction is
registered. While one who buys from the registered owner does not need to look behind the
certificate of title, one who buys from one who is not the registered owner is expected to
examine not only the certificate of title but all factual circumstances necessary for him to
determine if there are any flaws in the title of the transferor, or in his capacity to transfer
the land.

Therefore, petitioner spouses cannot be considered as innocent purchasers in good faith,

and respondent has a better right over the Langcaan Property as the true owner thereof.

ALEJANDRO MILLENA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FELISA JACOB

Facts;

The subject land herein was owned by Gregoria listana after the cadastral proceedings
filed by her and her sister, Potenciana Maramba and the children of the latter. Gregoria is
seriously ill which compel her to execute special power of attorney to sell his land in favor of the
father of the respondent, Gaudencio Jacob. On the same date of the sale, Gregoria Listana also
died.
After that sale, Gaudencio immediately take the possession of the said lot and proceed in
harvesting the crops therein including the coconut. Potenciana Maramba filed ejectment case
against Gaudencio. The court ruled in favour of Gaundencio. The latter possess the land for
almost 40 years. After the death of the wife of Gaudencio, he and his daughter extrajudicially
settled the said lot.
Sometimes in November 1981 Felisa Jacob, discovered that one of the children of
Potenciana acquired free patent certificate from the bureau of land including the subject land.
Thereafter immediately filed an opposition and the certificate be annulled as she is the lawful
owner of the land.

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 Notwithstanding of ownership by listana and the possession of the respondent of the said
land, Potenciana’s son sold the subject land to the herein petitioner. The lower court rendered
decision in favor of the respondent which was affirmed by the CA. Hence this petition

Issues:
(a)
Whether prescription has now barred the action for reconveyance;
(b)
Whether the respondent appellate court correctly affirmed the order of reconveyance by
the trial court.

Ruling:
At the first issue, an action for reconveyance can indeed be barred by prescription. When
an action for reconveyance is based on fraud, it must be filed within four (4) years from discovery
of the fraud, and such discovery is deemed to have taken place from the issuance of the original
certificate of title.] On the other hand, an action for reconveyance based on an implied or
constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years from the date of the issuance of the original
certificate of title or transfer certificate of title. For the rule is that the registration of an instrument
in the Office of the Register of Deeds constitutes constructive notice to the whole world and
therefore the discovery of the fraud is deemed to have taken place at the time of registration

The petitioner cannot claim the prescription because it must be stressed that prescription
cannot be invoked in an action for reconveyance when the plaintiff is in possession of the land to
be reconveyed. In view of this, can it be said that Felisa Jacob was in possession of the contested
portion of Lot 1874? Article 523 of the Civil Code states that possession is the holding of a thing
or the enjoyment of a right. In order to possess, one must first have control of the thing and,
second, a deliberate intention to possess it. These are the elements of possession

In the second issue, the basic rule is that after the lapse of one (1) year from entry, a
decree of registration is no longer open for review or attack, even though the issuance thereof
may have been attended by fraud and that the title may be inherently defective. The law
nevertheless safeguards the rightful parties or the aggrieved party’s interest in the titled land from
fraud and improper technicalities by allowing such party to bring an action for reconveyance to
him of whatever he has been deprived as long as the property has not been transferred or
conveyed to an innocent purchaser for value. The action, while respecting the decree as
incontrovertible, seeks to transfer or reconvey the land from the registered owner to the rightful
owner. Land registration proceedings cannot be made a shield for fraud or for enriching a person
at the expense of another. The inclusion of an area in a certificate of title which the registered
owner or successful applicant has placed no claim on and has never asserted any right of
ownership thereof is void and of no effect.

The petitioner likewise cannot invoke that he is purchaser for value, because he lived right
beside the contested portion of Lot 1874. We are hard-pressed to believe the claim of petitioner
that he purchased Lot 1874 in good faith. Having lived adjacent to the contested lot six (6) years
prior to his purchase of Lot 1874 in 1986, petitioner Alejandro Millena would have seen and
noticed the crops and fruit trees planted by Jaime Llaguno on the land. Thus, contrary to his
asseverations, petitioner was not a purchaser in good faith since there were circumstances
sufficient to arouse his curiosity and prod him to inquire into the real status of his sellers title.

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Samtos vs. Manalili
GR No. 157812,
Nov. 22, 2005

Nature of the case: Petition for review on certiorari

Doctrine: A sale of a piece of land appearing in a private deed cannot be considered
binding on third persons if it is not embodied in a public instrument and recorded in the Registry of
Deeds.

Facts:
At the core of the controversy is a 4,608 square-meter parcel of land which originally
formed part of the “Furukawa Plantation” situated in the District of Toril, Davao City. After the war,
the land was turned over to the Philippine government and administered by the National Abaca
and Other Fibers Corporation, and thereafter by the respondent Board of Liquidators (BOL).

On August 6, 1970, Reynaldo Manalili filed with the BOL an application to purchase the
subject property, attaching therewith his Occupant’s Affidavit. The application was granted. BOL
required Manalili to pay the downpayment of 10% of the purchase price or P1,865.28. Thereafter,
Manalili declared the land for taxation purposes.
After the lapse of nine (9) years and even as the BOL had already issued a Certification of
Full Payment endorsing the approval of the sale of the land in question to applicant Reynaldo
Manalili, herein petitioner Rodolfo Santos wrote an undated letter to the BOL protesting Manalili’s
application.

TC ruled in favor of Manalilis. CA Affirmed.

Issue
(detailed): WHETHER THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE SALE
OF THE LOT TO THE RESPONDENT WAS NOT FRAUDULENT AND THAT THE
PETITIONER’S PROTEST WAS DULY INVESTIGATED.

Held:
Petition denied.
Petitioner’s claim of having bought the land from a certain Ernesto Abalahin who, in turn,
bought it from one Col. Agsalud, allegedly a guerrilla veteran who occupied the lot from 1956 to
1959, is without basis.
For one, no proof has been presented by petitioner as to the alleged title of Col.
Agsalud or the transfer of any rights from the latter to Ernesto Abalahin, petitioner’s alleged
immediate transferor.
For another, the supposed Deed of Absolute Sale between petitioner and Ernesto
Abalahin does not even sufficiently identify the lot which was the subject of the sale. Worse, that
same deed is not notarized and is unregistered. A sale of a piece of land appearing in a private
deed cannot be considered binding on third persons if it is not embodied in a public instrument
and recorded in the Registry of Deeds.
Petitioner’s evidence do not support his allegation of fraud. It is a matter of record that
petitioner’s protest, filed nine (9) years after Reynaldo Manalili filed his application with attached
occupant’s affidavit, and after the BOL had already issued a Certification of Final Payment in
Manalili’s favor, was duly investigated by the BOL, after which it recommended the sale of the
land to Manalili, which recommendation was formally acted upon by the Office of the President
which ultimately approved the Deed of Sale for Manalili. It is well-settled that fraud must be
established by clear and convincing evidence. Petitioner failed in this venture.

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Bukidnon Doctors’ Hospital Inc vs Metropolitan Bank and Trust
GR No.: 161882
July 8, 2005

Bukidnon Doctors’ Hospital, Inc., obtained a loan of P25 million from Metropolitan Bank
and Trust Company to be used for the construction of its hospital. To secure this loan, the
petitioner mortgaged six parcels of land located in Valencia, Bukidnon, registered in the name of
Dr. Rene Facts Sison and Rory P. Roque. Upon petitioner’s default, the mortgage was
extrajudicially foreclosed and the mortgaged lots were sold in a public auction to the bank. The
petitioner failed to redeem the properties within the period of redemption. Forthwith, the
respondent consolidated its ownership over the properties and was issued new certificates of title.
Earlier, in a letter, petitioner expressed its desire to continue staying in the subject
premises so that the operation of the hospital erected thereon would not be disrupted. For that
purpose, the petitioner proposed to pay rent in the amount of P100,000 per month for a period of
three years. The respondent agreed to lease the properties but subject to the following terms: (1)
the monthly rental would be P200,000 with a one month advance rental and a deposit equivalent
to three months rental; (2) the effectivity of the lease contract would be from June 2001; and (3)
the contract would be subject to review every six months. The terms finally agreed upon by the
parties, as culled from respondent’s letter to the petitioner of 30 May 2002, were (1) a monthly
rental of P150,000, and (2) the effectivity of the lease contract in November 2001.
Afterwards, respondent asked the petitioner to vacate the leased premises within
fifteen days. The petitioner refused, invoking the subsisting lease agreement. Respondent filed
with the RTC of Malaybalay City an Ex Parte Motion for a Writ of Possession. The trial court
granted the writ of possession.

Issue:

WON the former mortgagee-buyer is still entitled to a writ of possession as a matter of

right despite the lease agreement between itself and the former mortgagor-seller

Held:

Ratio: The law and jurisprudence are clear that in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings,
an order for a writ of possession issues as a matter of course, upon proper motion, after the
expiration of the redemption period without the mortgagor exercising the right of redemption, or
even during the redemption period provided a bond is posted to indemnify the debtor in case the
foreclosure sale is shown to have been conducted without complying with the requirements of the
law or without the debtor violating the mortgage contract. The rationale for the ministerial issuance
of a writ of possession is to put the foreclosure buyer in possession of the property sold without
delay, since the right to possession is founded on ownership of the property.

However, in the instant case, a writ of possession was not the correct remedy for the
purpose of ousting the petitioner from the subject premises. It must be noted that possession is
the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. It is acquired by the material occupation of a
thing or the exercise of a right, or by the fact that a thing or right is subject to the action of one’s
will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right. “By material
occupation of a thing,” it is not necessary that the person in possession should be the occupant of
the property; the occupancy can be held by another in his name. An owner of a real estate has

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possession, either when he himself is physically occupying the property, or when another person
who recognizes his rights as owner is occupying it.

In the case at bar, it is not disputed that after the foreclosure of the property in question
and the issuance of new certificates of title in favor of the respondent, the petitioner and the
respondent entered into a contract of lease of the subject properties. This new contractual
relation presupposed that the petitioner recognized that possession of the properties had been
legally placed in the hands of the respondent, and that the latter had taken such possession but
delivered it to the former as lessee of the property.

By paying the monthly rentals, the petitioner also recognized the superior right of the
respondent to the possession of the property as owner thereof. And by accepting the monthly
rentals, the respondent enjoyed the fruits of its possession over the subject property. Clearly, the
respondent is in material possession of the subject premises. Thus, the trial court’s issuance of a
writ of possession is not only superfluous, but improper under the law. Moreover, as a lessee, the
petitioner was a legitimate possessor of the subject properties under Article 525 of the Civil Code.
Thus, it could not be deprived of its lawful possession by a mere ex parte motion for a writ of
possession.

Apropos to this case is Banco de Oro Savings and Mortgage Bank v. CA. There, the
spouses Nery were not able to redeem the property they mortgaged to the bank; hence, the latter
was able to consolidate the title to the property in its name. The Nerys requested the bank for
more time to repurchase the subject property, obligating themselves to pay monthly rentals or
reasonable compensation for the continued occupation of the premises on the ground that they
had leased portions of the building to tenants. Since neither the Nerys nor their tenants vacated
the subject premises nor paid reasonable compensation for the use thereof, the bank instituted
three separate ejectment suits against them before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Parañaque.

The Nerys argued that the proper remedy that should have been taken by the bank as
mortgagee was to obtain a writ of possession and not an action for ejectment. We rejected Nerys’
argument and ruled that it was proper for the bank to sue for ejectment. Thus: “The Nerys forget,
however, that they had asked the Bank for a grace period within which to repurchase the
mortgaged property and to be allowed to pay monthly rentals or reasonable compensation for the
use of the premises. In fact, they did pay rentals for several months. Their continued stay in the
property was thereby converted to one by tolerance or permission. The Nerys refused to vacate
upon demand, the last of which was made by letter, dated 25 July 1984, as found by the Trial
Court, and not 9 September 1983 as the Nerys allege. An ejectment suit, therefore, was proper,
with the legally prescribed period to institute the same having been complied with. Significantly,
too, with the consolidation of title in the Bank, it had become the owner of the subject premises.
As such, it could bring an action for ejectment to obtain possession and occupation. Thus, Section
1, Rule 70 provides “an action for unlawful detainer may be brought by a landlord, vendor,
vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully
withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession xxx.

It is indeed, correct that in ordinary extra-judicial foreclosure cases, the mortgagee’s

remedy is to apply for a Writ of Possession. As already intimated, however, the stay of the Nerys
in the premises had been converted to one by permission with a corresponding commitment to
pay rentals. An implied lease was thereby treated between the parties. “Where the question
relates to the relation between landlord and tenant, the nature of the lease premises involved, the
reasonableness of the rentals demanded, the right or lack of right of the tenant to continue
occupying the premises against the will of the landlord, the applicability of the rental law, etc., a
case for ejectment is proper. Notably, too, there were other tenants in the premises who were not
privy to the foreclosure proceedings but had to be rejected as well.”

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 In a nutshell, where a lease agreement, whether express or implied, is subsequently
entered into by the mortgagor and the mortgagee after the expiration of the redemption period
and the consolidation of title in the name of the latter, a case for ejectment or unlawful detainer,
not a motion for a writ of possession, is the proper remedy in order to evict from the questioned
premises a mortgagor-turned-lessee. The rationale for this rule is that a new relationship between
the parties has been created. What applies is no longer the law on extrajudicial foreclosure, but
the law on lease. And when an issue arises, as in the case at bar, regarding the right of the
lessee to continue occupying the leased premises, the rights of the parties must be heard and
resolved in a case for ejectment or unlawful detainer under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.

REPUBLIC VS. REV. CLAUDIO CORTEZ

GR No.197472,
Sept. 07, 2015

FACTS:
Respondent Cortez is a missionary by vocation engaged in humanitarian and charitable
activities. He established an orphanage and school in Punta Verde, Palaui Island. He claimed that
since 1962, he has been in peaceful possession of about 50 hectares of land located in the
western portion of Palaui Island with the help of Aetas and other people under his care, cleared
and developed for agricultural purposes in order to support his charitable, humanitarian and
missionary works.
President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 201 reserving for military purposes a parcel of
the public domain situated in Palaui Island. Pursuant thereto, the southern half portion of the
Palaui Island were withdrawn from sale or settlement and reserved for the use of the Philippine
Navy, subject, however, to private rights if there be any.
Thereafter, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Proclamation No. 447 declaring Palaui Island
and the surrounding waters situated in the Municipality of Sta. Ana, Cagayan as marine reserve.
Again subject to any private rights, the entire Palaui Island was accordingly reserved as a marine
protected area.
Rev. Cortez filed a Petition for Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against Rogelio C. Biñas, commanding officer of Phil. Naval
Command alleging that the latter disturbed his peaceful and lawful possession of the said 50-
hectare portion of Palaui Island when they commanded him, through the use of force and
intimidation, to vacate the area.
RTC – The Survey Map allegedly prepared by DENR personnel is only a sketch map and
not a survey map. Likewise, the exact boundaries of the area are not specifically indicated. The
sketch only shows some lines without indicating the exact boundaries of the 50 hectares claimed
by Rev. Cortez. As such, the identification of the area and its exact boundaries have not been
clearly defined and delineated in the sketch map. Therefore, the area of 50 hectares that Rev.
Cortez claimed to have peacefully and lawfully possessed for the last 38 years cannot reasonably
be determined or accurately identified.
The RTC held that Rev. Cortez has lawfully possessed and occupied at least five (5)
hectares of land and held that the affected community belongs to the group of indigenous people
which are protected by the State of their rights to continue in their possession of the lands they
have been tilling since time immemorial.
CA – upheld RTC’s issuance of final injunction.

ISSUE:
WON Rev. Cortez is entitled to a final writ of mandatory injunction

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HELD:
No, the Court finds that Rev. Cortez failed to conclusively establish his claimed right over
the subject portion of Palaui Island as would entitle him to the issuance of a final injunction.
Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is directed either to do a
particular act, in which case it is called a mandatory injunction, or to refrain from doing a particular
act, in which case it is called a prohibitory injunction
Two requisites must concur for injunction to issue:
(1) there must be a right to be protected; and
(2) the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right.
Rev. Cortez argues that he is entitled to the said writ based on the right of possession (jus
possesionis) by reason of his peaceful and continuous possession of the subject area since 1962.
Jus possessionis or possession in the concept of an owner is one of the two concepts of
possession provided under Article 525 of the Civil Code. Also referred to as adverse possession
which can ripen into ownership by prescription. A possessor in the concept of an owner has in his
favor the legal presumption that he possesses with a just title and he cannot be obliged to show or
prove it. In the same manner, the law endows every possessor with the right to be respected in
his possession.
In this case, there is no such proof showing that the subject portion of Palaui Island has
been declared alienable and disposable when Rev. Cortez started to occupy the same. Hence, it
must be considered as still inalienable public domain, cannot be appropriated and therefore not a
proper subject of possession under Article 530 of the Civil Code. Rev. Cortez’ claimed right of
possession has no leg to stand on. His possession of the subject area, even if the same be in the
concept of an owner or no matter how long, cannot produce any legal effect in his favor since the
property cannot be lawfully possessed in the first place.
Respondents had to prove that the subject properties were alienable or disposable land of
the public domain prior to its withdrawal from sale and settlement and reservation for military
purposes under Presidential Proclamation No. 265. The question is primordial importance
because it is determinative if the land can in fact be subject to acquisitive prescription and, thus,
registrable under the Torrens system.
Respondents failed to prove that, before the proclamation, the subject lands were already
private lands. They merely relied on such ‘recognition’ of possible private rights. In their
application, they alleged that at the time of their application, they had been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the subject parcels of land for at least thirty (30) years and
became its owners by prescription. There was, however, no allegation or showing that the
government had earlier declared it open for sale or settlement, or that it was already pronounced
as inalienable and disposable.
Petition is granted.

Dizon vs. Suntay

47 SCRA 160
September 1972

FACTS:

Respondent Lourdes G. Suntay and one Clarita R. Sison entered into a transaction
wherein the Suntay’s three-carat diamond ring, valued at P5,500.00, was delivered to Sison for
sale on commission. Upon receiving the ring, Sison executed and delivered to the receipt to
Suntay. After the lapse of a considerable time without Clarita R. Sison having returned to the ring
to her, Suntay made demands on Clarita R. Sison for the return of said jewelry. Clarita R. Sison,

8
however, could not comply with Suntay’s demands because on June 15, 1962, Melia Sison, niece
of the husband of Clarita R. Sison, evidently in connivance with the latter, pledged the ring with
the petitioner Dominador Dizon's pawnshop for P2,600.00 without Suntay’s knowledge. When
Suntay found out that Clarita R. Sison pledged the ring, she filed a case of estafa against the
latter with the fiscal's office. Subsequently, Suntay wrote a letter to Dizon on September 22, 1962
asking for the return of her ring which was pledged with the latter’s pawnshop under its Pawnshop
Receipt serial B No. 65606, dated June 15, 1962.

Dizon refused to return the ring, so Suntay filed an action for its recovery with the CFI of
Manila, which declared that she had the right to its possession. The Court of Appeals likewise
affirmed said decision.

ISSUE:

Who has the right title over the subject property?

:
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower courts. The controlling provision is
Article 559 of the Civil Code which provides that “[T]he possession of movable property acquired
in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been
unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from the person in possession of the same. If the
possessor of a movable lost of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in
good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid
therefor.” The only exception the law allows is when there is acquisition in good faith of the
possessor at a public sale, in which case the owner cannot obtain its return without, reimbursing
the price. Hanging on to said exception as his basis, Dizon insisted that the principle of estoppel
should apply in this case but the Supreme Court ruled otherwise.

In the present case not only has the ownership and the origin of the jewels
misappropriated been unquestionably proven but also that Clarita R. Sison, acting fraudulently
and in bad faith, disposed of them and pledged them contrary to agreement with no right of
ownership, and to the prejudice of Suntay, who was illegally deprived of said jewels and who, as
the owner, has an absolute right to recover the jewels from the possession of whosoever holds
them, which in this case is Dizon’s pawnshop. Dizon ought to have been on his guard before
accepting the pledge in question, but evidently there was no such precaution availed of and he
has no one to blame but himself. While the activity he is engaged in is no doubt legal, it is not to
be lost sight of that it thrives on taking advantage of the necessities precisely of that element of
our population whose lives are blighted by extreme poverty. From whatever angle the question is
viewed then, estoppel certainly cannot be justly invoked.

Gabriel Elane vs. CA

GR No.:80638,
April 26, 1989;

Facts:

respondent Inocencio V. Chua filed an action for forcible entry

City Court of Olongapo City

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 Gabriel Elane from a portion of a parcel of land... permit to occupy issued to private
respondent by the Bureau of Forestry on August... etitioner was constructing a semi-concrete
building on a portion thereof, without his knowledge and consent... rder made by private
respondent upon petitioner to desist therefrom was ignored by the latter.

demand letter of March 1, 1980 to stop said construction was refused, private respondent
filed an action for forcible entry. [5]... petitioner Elane claims that he was granted a permit by the
Bureau of Forest Development over a parcel of lan... certification from the said bureau... n
possession and occupation of that parcel of land continuously and uninterruptedly since 1970,...
riginally erected a hut... thereon... and has been declared for taxation in his name

Municipal Trial Court of O... longapo City rendered a decision dismissing the complaint...
on appeal, was affirmed in toto by the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City.

petition for review to respondent court which reversed the decisions of the two courts a
quo... rdering therein respondent Elane to remove or demolish the residential... house or building
that he constructed on that part of the land in question... to vacate and return possession of said
parcel of land to therein petitioner Chua

Ordinary Residence Permit No. 1675 was issued by the Bureau of Forestry authorizing the
petitioner to occupy four hectares of public forest land... warehouse and a gasoline station...
petitioner wrote to the respondent advising him to stop construction of the building that he was
putting up within the parcel of land

Issues:

respondent court gravely erred in adjudicating the case on the basis of priority of physical
possession instead of legal possession.

Ruling:

Private respondent was granted a residence permit over a lot with... and a permit to
construct a warehouse and gasoline station thereon by the then... municipal government of
Olongapo... residence permit, which was renewable every year, was not renewed after June 30,
1969... private... respondent declared the warehouse and gasoline station for taxation purposes
and paid taxes thereon in 1970 and 1971.

Petitioner claims that he entered into and took possession of the contested lot in 1970
pursuant to a permit granted to him by the Bureau of Forest Development, as supposedly
evidenced by a certification from the latter

"Said permits (Annexes A, B and C to answer) were not actually introduced in evidence...
certification (Annex A to answer) do (sic) not attest to the issuance of any permit to occupy the
parcel of land in question in favor of the respondent Elane

It merely certified to the fact that the... parcel of land in question 'was found to be Alienable
and Disposable Land.

building and sanitary/plumbing permits (Annexes B and C to answer) could not have
established his possession of the parcel of land since 1970 because aside from the fact that they
bear no date of... actual issuance, they were accomplished by the applicant whose residence
certificate appears to have been issued only on January 5, 1979.

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 Survey of the parcel of land in question was prepared for the respondent Elane only on
February 25, 1979... miscellaneous sales application was filed in the Bureau of Lands only on
March 26, 1979

Respondent Elane's possession based on those documents cannot, therefore, retroact as

of 1970."... private respondent has priority of possession over petitioner whose entry into the
subject lot may be reckoned only as of 1979... ursory examination of said document readily shows
that it is a mere certification that the lot claimed by petitioner is part of the alienable and
disposable land of the... public domain.

Nowhere is it stated therein that petitioner is allowed to take possession of the subject lot.
Furthermore, it is uncontroverted that private respondent was issued a residence permit way back
in 1961 which... entitled him to possession of the disputed land starting in the same year.

Expiration of private respondent's permit in 1969, and its non-renewal, deprived the latter
of his possessory right over and the corresponding right to eject petitioner from the subject lot.

while private respondent's permit to occupy the land may have expired in 1969, he
remained in physical possession thereof.

"it is of no moment that petitioner's right to occupy said parcel of land by reason of the
permit issued to him by the Bureau of Forestry has already expired. For, it is not whether he has
a legal... right to possess it that is in issue; it is whether he is in actual physical possession of it
that is decisive in the instant case for forcible entry."... private respondent was in earlier
possession of the contested lot; his sales application preceded that of petitioner; his warehouse
and gasoline station already existed long before petitioner took possession of the parcel of land in
question; and he has been paying... taxes and rental fees thereon since 1968.

"Art. 538. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different
personalities except in the case of co-possession. Should a question arise regarding the fact of
possession, the present... possessor shall be preferred; if there are two possessors, the one
longer in possession

Having been in prior continuous possession, private respondent is preferentially entitled to

occupy the land.

Petitioner's intrusion upon the disputed premises can properly be categorized as one
effected through stealth.

Atok-Big Wedge Mining Co. v. CA

G.R. No. 88883 (1991)
Paras, J. / Tita K

Non-registrable properties

In 1930, AI Reynolds filed a Declaration of Location of Fredia Mineral claim in accordance with the
Law. Atok the purchased Fredia Mineral Claim from AI Reynolds in 1931. Since then, Atok has
been in continuous and exclusive ownership and possession of the land. In 1964, Consi
constructed a nipa house on the land claiming no one prohibited him from doing so. But when he
repaired the house in 1984, people informed him that the land was owned by Atok. Atok filed a
complaint for forcible entry and detainer. MTC dismissed the case. RTC reversed the dismissal.

11
CA again ruled in favor of Consi when it dismissed the forcible entry case. WON an individual's
long term occupation of land of the public domain vests Consi with such rights over the same as
to defeat the rights of the owner of that claim, the SC ruled in the negative. The SC held that Atok
had a better right because it had faithfully complied with all the requirements of law regarding the
maintenance of the mineral claim. The perfection of the mineral claim removed the land from the
public domain and converted it into private property.

Doctrines:
The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to segregate the area from the
public domain, but to grant to the locator the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a
patent therefor upon compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law.

In this case, Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by
virtue of their respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the 1935
Constitution prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public domain except
agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at the time of its adoption.

Facts:
▪ December 1930 – A 9-hectare of Fredia Mineral claim in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet was
located by A.I. Reynolds in accordance with the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
The Declaration of Location was duly recorded in the Office of the Mining Recorder.
▪ 2 November 1931- A.I. Reynolds sold Fredia mineral claim, with other mineral claims,
to Big Wedge Mining Company (now Atok Big Wedge Mining Company, Inc.) in a Deed
of Sale. Since then Atok has been in continuous and exclusive ownership and
possession of said claim up to the present.
o Atok has paid the realty taxes and occupation fees for the Fredia mineral claim.
o The Fredia mineral claim together with other mineral claims owned by Atok has
been declared under Tax Declaration No. 9535 and that in view of PD 1214, an
application for lease was filed by Atok covering the Fredia mineral claim.
▪ On the other hand, Liwan Consi has a lot below the land of a certain Mr. Acay at Tuding
Slide, Itogon, Benguet.
▪ 1964 - Consi constructed a house thereon. When he first constructed his house below
the lot of Mr. Acay he was told that it was not necessary for him to obtain a building permit
as it was only a nipa hut.
o Consi has been paying taxes on said land which his father before him had
occupied.
▪ January 1984 - When Consi repaired the said house, people came to take pictures
and told him that the lot belongs to Atok.
▪ Atok filed a complaint for forcible entry and detainer against Consi.
▪ MTC dismissed case.
▪ RTC reversed the MTC decision and ordered Consi and all those claiming under him to
vacate the premises of the Fredia Mineral claim immediately, and to restore possession to
Atok . Consi is further ordered to remove and demolish his house constructed in the
premises of the land of Fredia mineral claim.
▪ Consi filed a petition for review before the CA. CA ruled in favor of Consi.
o It held that pending the decision of the Secretary of Natural Resources on whether
the subject lot is mineral land or agricultural, there is a chance that the subject
property may be classified as alienable agricultural land. At any rate, the mining
company may not so readily describe Liwan Consi as a "squatter" he also has
12
 possessory rights over the property. Such rights may mature into ownership on the
basis of long-term possession under the Public Land Law.
o It further ruled that both Consi and ATOK are of equal legal footing with regards the
subject lot. Both hold possessory titles to the land in question — Consi through his
long term occupancy of the same; the mining firm by virtue of its being the claim
locator and applicant for a lease on the mineral claim within which the subject lot is
found. But it was established that Consi has been in actual and beneficial
possession of the subject lot since before the Second World War in the concept of
owner and in good faith.
▪ MR was denied.
Issue: WON an individual's long term occupation of land of the public domain vests him
with such rights over the same as to defeat the rights of the owner of that claim. (NO)
Ratio:
NO– an individual's long term occupation of land of the public domain does NOT vest him
with such rights over the same as to defeat the rights of the owner of that claim.
➢ It does not matter whether Benguet and Atok had secured a patent because for all
physical purposes of ownership, the owner is not required to secure a patent as long as he
complies with the provisions of the mining laws. His possessory right, for all practical
purposes of ownership, is as good as though secured by patent (Republic v. CA, 1988).
o Atok has faithfully complied with all the requirements of the law regarding the
maintenance of the said Fredia Mineral Claim.
➢ The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and,
under the laws then in force, removed it from the public domain. By such act, the
locators acquired exclusive rights over the land, against even the government, without
need of any further act such as the purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent over
it.
o As the land had become the private property of the locators, they had the
right to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok.
o The lot in question was acquired through a Deed of Sale executed between Atok
and Fredia Mineral Claim.
➢ Furthermore, the legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to
segregate the area from the public domain, but to grant to the locator the beneficial
ownership of the claim and the right to a patent therefor upon compliance with the
terms and conditions prescribed by law. Where there is a valid location of mining claim,
the area becomes segregated from the public and the property of the locator. When a
location of a mining claim is perfected it has the effect of a grant by the United States of
the right of present and exclusive possession, with the right to the exclusive enjoyment of
all the surface ground as well as of all the minerals within the lines of the claim, except as
limited by the extralateral right of adjoining locators; and this is the locator's right before as
well as after the issuance of the patent. While a lode locator acquires a vested right by
virtue of his location made in compliance with the mining laws, the fee remains in the
government until patent issues. (St. Louis Mining & Mineral Co. v. Montana Mining Co.)
o Thus, Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by
virtue of their respective mining claims which they validly acquired before
the 1935 Constitution prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public
domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at the time
of its adoption.
o The land was not and could not have been transferred to Consi by virtue of
acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be shared simultaneously by them and
the mining companies for agricultural and mineral purposes.
13
RE: Possession
Consi argued that his predecessor-in-interest has been in possession of said lot even before the
war and has in fact cultivated the same.
➢ In Republic v. CA, the SC ruled that even if it be assumed that the predecessor-in-interest
of the de la Rosas had already been in possession of the subject property, their
possession was not in the concept of owner of the mining claim but of the property as
agricultural land, which it was not. The property was mineral land, and they are claiming it
as agricultural land. They were not disputing the rights of the mining locators nor where
they seeking to oust them as such and to replace them in the mining of the land.
o Since the subject lot is mineral land, Consi's possession of the subject lot no
matter how long did not confer upon him possessory rights over the same.
➢ Furthermore, NCC Art. 538 provides:
Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities
except in the cases of co-possession. Should a question arise regarding the fact of
possession, the present possessor shall be preferred; if there are two possessors, the one
longer in possession; if the dates of the possession are the same, the one who presents a
title; and if all these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit
pending determination of its possession or ownership through proper proceedings.
o Since 1931 up to the present, Atok has been in continuous and exclusive
possession of the Fredia mineral claim while Consi's possession started only
sometime in 1964 when he constructed a house thereon.
o Clearly, ATOK has superior possessory rights than Consi, the former being "the
one longer in possession."

It was really Atok who was in actual physical possession of the property. Having been
deprived of this possession by Consi, Atok has every right to sue for ejectment.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is GRANTED.

RODOLFO EUSEBIO,vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ROHIMUST SANTOS,

G.R. No. 72188
September 15, 1986

FACTS:

The subject LOT under controversy was occupied by Philip Zinsineth as a lessee of GA
Inc. in 1924. Zinsineth had constructed a house and garage thereon. After his death, his
"leasehold rights" were inherited by his two daughters, Mary, the mother of petitioner ROHIMUST,
and Isabel, the deceased mother of defendant RODOLFO's wife.

On April 15, 1974, the parties concerned agreed that the leasehold rights will be placed in
the name of RODOLFO to the extent of 383 sq. m., and in the name of FERNANDO J. Santos,
Jr., a son of Mary, to the extent of 428.30 sq. m.

On that same date, a contract to sell the LOT on installment was executed by GA, Inc. in
favor of RODOLFO. FERNANDO was not included in the contract because GA, Inc. wanted to
deal only with one person. However, on July 2, 1974, RODOLFO and FERNANDO signed an
affidavit stating that: “the property was bought by us jointly and the monthly installments shall be
paid by us pro-rata to the area which we are presently occupying", which is as follows:
14
 "Rodolfo Y. Eusebio ---- 383.00 sq. m. at P49,790.00, of which the amount of P9,958 was
paid as down payment, shall pay a share in the monthly installment corresponding to P1,048.94
monthly;

"Fernando J. Santos, Jr. ---- 428.30 sq. m. at P55,679.00, of which the amount of
P11,135.80 was paid as down payment, shall pay a share in the monthly installment
corresponding to P1,173.01 monthly;

By August 5, 1976, installment payments under the Contract to Sell had not been kept up
to date. RODOLFO and FERNANDO then made an agreement: “that all overdue monthly
installment arising from the monthly share of Fernando J. Santos, Jr. will be advanced by Rodolfo
Y. Eusebio and the corresponding payment will be charged an interest rate of 1% per month”

In 1978, full payment was made to GA, Inc and a TCT was issued solely in the name of
RODOLFO. For the full payment of the amount paid to GA, Inc., FERNANDO was not able to
contribute his full share. In 1980, FERNANDO transferred his rights to ROHIMUST who is his
brother.

RODOLFO instituted an action for partition in 1981. The RTC found that, as a result of
RODOLFO's payments made to GA, Inc. on behalf of FERNANDO, his share in the LOT had to
be increased from 383 sq. m. to 611.30 sq. m., with the participation of ROHIMUST being
decreased to 200 sq. m.

The RTC also held that the expenses for the survey of the lot to define the metes and
bounds of the portions appertaining to plaintiff and defendant shall be equally shared by both
parties. After which any improvement existing thereon which encroached on that portion
appertaining to the other party shall be demolished so that the party affected may fully enjoy and
exercise his right over said portion. No mention of compensation was made.

ROHIMUST appealed the said decision. On Motion for Reconsideration, the CA ruled that
ROHIMUST "has the legal right to retain the house together with its improvements and the
possession thereof until full payment of the value thereof” being a possessor in good faith. The
CA cited par. 2 of Article 546 of the Civil Code which reads:

"Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right
of retention, the person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding
the amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired
by reason thereof.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the modification by the CA is erroneous and should be set aside (in other
words, whether or not ROHIMUST is a possessor in good faith entitled to be reimbursed for useful
expenses)

RULING:

The CA was in error in invoking Article 546 which prescribes the rights of the possessor in
good faith as regards useful expenses.

15
 Article 546 presupposes, but does not establish, possession in good faith, the requisites of
which are laid down in Article 526, thus:

"ART. 526. He is deemed a possessor in good faith who is not aware that there exists in
his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.

"He is deemed a possessor in bad faith who possesses in any case contrary to the
foregoing.

"Mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith."

Prior to April 15, 1974, the possession of the parties was in the concept of lessees of the
LOT, which was not possession in good faith for purposes of Article 546.

Conceding, for the sake of avoiding immaterial complications, that the parties became co-
owners after April 15, 1974, when the contract to sell was executed, neither co-owner can claim
possession in himself of any particular identified part of the LOT. As stated in Cabello v. Cabello,
37 Phil. 328, 336, "the possession held by a co-heir of the undivided estate is understood to be
enjoyed in the name of the rest of the heirs." An undivided estate is co-ownership by the heirs.
The ownership of the physically undivided thing pertains to more than one person, thus defined as
"the right of common dominion which two or more persons have in a spiritual part of a thing which
is not physically divided" (Sanchez Roman).

The provision of the Civil Code which should be applicable is Article 543, which provides:

"ART. 543. Each one of the participants of a thing possessed in common shall be deemed
to have exclusively possessed the part which may be allotted to him upon the division thereof, for
the entire period during which the co-possession lasted. Interruption in the possession of the
whole or a part of a thing possessed in common shall be to the prejudice of all the possessors.
However, in case of civil interruption, the Rules of Court shall apply."

Under the foregoing provision, after the LOT is actually partitioned, ROHIMUST would
be "deemed to have exclusively possessed" since April 15, 1974, the part which may be
allotted to him upon the division thereof" consisting of the definite 200 sq. meter area
assigned to him, together with all buildings and parts of buildings erected therein (Section
11, Rule 69). RODOLFO can have no claim over such buildings or parts of a building, which
improvements ROHIMUST can keep or demolish without paying any compensation thereof
to RODOLFO. For the same reason, if there were buildings or parts of a building, found in the
definite 611.30 sq. m. area assigned to RODOLFO, he will be deemed to have been in exclusive
possession thereof since April 15, 1974, and he can keep or demolish these improvements
without paying any compensation therefor to ROHIMUST.

WHEREFORE, the Resolution of June 14, 1985 of respondent Court promulgated in its
case AC-G.R. CV No. 02022 is hereby set aside, and its Decision of September 19, 1984 in the
same case, affirming the judgment of the Trial Court in toto, shall stand without modification. Let
this case be remanded to the Trial Court for actual partition of the LOT between its co-owners
under the provisions of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.

CATHOLIC VICAR vs. CA

GR. No. 80294-95,

16
September 21, 1988,

TOPIC: Loan

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Catholic Vicar Apostolic of the Mountain Province (VICAR for brevity) filed an application
for registration of title over Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4, said Lots being the sites of the Catholic Church
building, convents, high school building, school gymnasium, school dormitories, social hall,
stonewalls, etc. The Heirs of Juan Valdez and the Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano filed their
Answer/Opposition on Lots Nos. 2 and 3, respectively, asserting ownership and title thereto since
their predecessors' house was borrowed by petitioner Vicar after the church and the convent were
destroyed.. After trial on the merits, the land registration court promulgated its Decision confirming
the registrable title of VICAR to Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4.

The Heirs of Juan Valdez appealed the decision of the land registration court to the then
Court of Appeals, The Court of Appeals reversed the decision. Thereupon, the VICAR filed with
the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals
dismissing his application for registration of Lots 2 and 3.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner questions as allegedly erroneous the Decision dated August 31, 1987 of the
Ninth Division of Respondent Court of Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. No. 05148 [Civil Case No. 3607
(419)] and CA-G.R. No. 05149 [Civil Case No. 3655 (429)], both for Recovery of Possession,
which affirmed the Decision of the Honorable Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Baguio and Benguet in Civil Case No. 3607 (419) and Civil Case No. 3655 (429),

ISSUE:
Whether or not the failure to return the subject matter of commodatum constitutes an
adverse possession on the part of the owner?

RULING

No. The bailees' failure to return the subject matter of commodatum to the bailor did not
mean adverse possession on the part of the borrower. The bailee held in trust the property
subject matter of commodatum. Petitioner repudiated the trust by declaring the properties in its
name for taxation purposes.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE AND BY REASON OF THE FOREGOING, this petition is DENIED for lack
of merit, the Decision dated Aug. 31, 1987 in CA-G.R. Nos. 05148 and 05149, by respondent
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioner.

ARSENIO OLEGARIO and Heirs of ARISTOTELES F. OLEGARIO, vs. PEDRO C. MARI.

G.R. No. 147951
December 14, 2009

17
Factual antecedents

As early as 1916, Juan Mari, the father of Pedro Mari, declared his ownership over a
parcel of land in Nancasalan, Mangatarem for tax purposes. He took possession of the same by
delineating the limits with a bamboo fence, planting various fruit bearing trees and bamboos and
constructing a house thereon. Tax Declaration No. 8048 for the year 1951 specified the subject
realty as a residential land with an area of 897 square meters and as having the following
boundaries: North - Magdalena Fernandez; South - Catalina Cacayorin; East - Camino Vecinal;
and West - Norberto Bugarin. In 1974, the subject realty was transferred to respondent, Pedro
Mari, by virtue of a deed of sale.
In 1947, Wenceslao Olegario, the husband of Magdalena Fernandez and father of
petitioner Arsenio Olegario, filed a new tax declaration9 for a certain 50-square meter parcel of
land, then on May 1961, he executed a "Deed of Quit-Claim of Unregistered Property"10 in favor
of Arsenio transferring to the latter the aforementioned 50-square meter property. The subject
realty was identified as Lot Nos. 17526, 17553 and 14356.
In 1988, respondent filed with the DENR a protest against the petitioners because of their
encroachment into the disputed realty. DENR decided in favor of the respondent and found the
latter to be the owner of Lot Nos. 17526, 17553 and 14356. Petitioners did not appeal and the
said decision became final and executory.
In 1989, Arsenio caused the amendment of his tax declaration12 for the 50-square meter
property to reflect an increased area of 341 square meters. In 1990, after discovering the
amended entries in Arsenio’s Tax Declaration, respondent filed a complaint14 with the RTC for
Recovery of Possession and Annulment of Tax Declaration. RTC rendered judgment in favor of
the petitioners. CA reversed the trial court's findings.

Issues
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in its decision in adjudicating ownership
of the said lots in favor of the respondent;
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in its failure to declare the action as
barred by laches;

Ruling:

The petition has no merit.

1. Circumstances clearly show that Juan Mari was in possession of subject realty in the
concept of owner, publicly and peacefully since 1916 or long before petitioners entered the
disputed realty sometime in 1965.Based on Article 538 of the Civil Code,26 the respondent is the
preferred possessor because, benefiting from his father's tax declaration of the subject realty
since 1916, he has been in possession thereof for a longer period. On the other hand, petitioners
acquired joint possession only sometime in 1965.

Petitioners' acts of a possessory character - acts that might have been merely tolerated by
the owner - did not constitute possession. No matter how long tolerated possession is continued,
it does not start the running of the prescriptive period.30 Mere material possession of land is not
adverse possession as against the owner and is insufficient to vest title, unless such possession
is accompanied by the intent to possess as an owner. There should be a hostile use of such a
nature and exercised under such circumstance as to manifest and give notice that the possession
is under a claim of right.31

18
 Open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period
prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite
period - ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and
becomes private property. Ownership of immovable property is acquired by extraordinary
prescription through possession for 30 years.35 For purposes of deciding the instant case,
therefore, the possession by respondent and his predecessor had already ripened into ownership
of the subject realty by virtue of prescription as early as 1946.

2. Petitioners cannot find refuge in the principle of laches. It is not just the lapse of
time or delay that constitutes laches. The essence of laches is the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, through due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier, thus giving rise to a presumption that the party entitled to assert it
had earlier abandoned or declined to assert it.

The essential elements of laches are: (a) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one
under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation complained of; (b) delay in asserting
complainant's rights after he had knowledge of defendant's acts and after he has had the
opportunity to sue; (c) lack of knowledge or notice by defendant that the complainant will assert
the right on which he bases his suit and (d) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event the
relief is accorded to the complainant.

In the instant case, the second and third elements are missing. Petitioners had notice and
knew all along the position of the respondent and his predecessor Juan Mari - they were standing
pat on his ownership over the subject realty. On the other hand, it was petitioners who suddenly
changed their position in 1989 by changing the area of the property declared in their name from
50 square meters to 341 square. Upon discovery of this clear and unequivocal change in status of
petitioners’ position over the disputed land respondent immediately acted. He filed in 1990 the
complaint for recovery of possession and nullification of tax declaration. Hence, we find no laches
in the instant case.

MIGUEL ESCRITOR, JR. vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and SIMEON ACUNA
GR No. 71283
November 12, 1987

Facts

• Lot No. 2749, located at Atimonan, Quezon, was the subject of cadastral proceedings in the Court
of First Instance. Miguel Escritor, as claimant, filed an answer thereto declaring his ownership over
the lot alleging that he acquired it by inheritance from his deceased father. The lot having become
uncontested, only Miguel Escritor appeared in order to adduce his evidence of ownership.
• The Court rendered a decision in the abovementioned case, Cadastral Case No. 72, adjudicating
the lot with its improvements in favor of claimant Escritor and confirming his title thereto.
Immediately thereafter, Escritor took possession of the property.
• The Court directed the Chief of the General Land Registration Office to issue the decree of
registration in favor of Escritor, the decision in Cadastral Case No. 72 having become final.
• Simeon S. Acuna, the herein respondent, filed a petition for review of the above-mentioned decision
contending that it was obtained by claimant Escritor through fraud and misrepresentation. The
petition was granted and a new hearing was set. While the proceedings were going on, claimant
Escritor died. His heirs, the petitioners in the case, took possession of the property.
• Thirteen years after the disputed decision was rendered, the Court adjudicated Lot No. 2749 in
favor of respondent Acuna, ordering petitioners to vacate the land. A writ of possession was later
issued and petitioners voluntarily gave up their possession.
19
 • More than four years later, respondent Acuna filed with the same Court a complaint for recovery of
damages against petitioners for the fruits of lot No. 2749 which was allegedly possessed by the
latter unlawfully for thirteen years. According to the respondent, the registration of the said lot was
effectuated by the deceased claimant Escritor through fraud, malice, and misrepresentation.
• The lower court rendered a decision dismissing Acuña's complaint for damages, finding that though
petitioners enjoyed the fruits of the property, they were in good faith possessing under a just title,
and the cause of action, if there was any, has already prescribed.
• On appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court reversed the decision of the lower court ordering
petitioners to pay the fruits received for the 13 years they have been in unlawful possession of the
property.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner should be liable for damages? No.

Ruling:
It should be remembered that in the first decision of the cadastral court dated May 15, 1958, Lot
No. 2749 was adjudicated in favor of claimant Escritor, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. In this
decision, the said court found to its satisfaction that claimant Escritor acquired the land by
inheritance from his father who in turn acquired it by purchase, and that his open, public,
continuous, adverse, exclusive and notorious possession dated back to the Filipino-Spanish
Revolution. It must also be recalled that in its Order for the issuance of decrees dated July 15,
1958, the same Court declared that the above-mentioned decision had become final. Significantly,
nowhere during the entire cadastral proceeding did anything come up to suggest that the land
belonged to any person other than Escritor.

On the basis of the aforementioned favorable judgment which was rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction, Escritor honestly believed that he is the legal owner of the land. With this
well-grounded belief of ownership, he continued in his possession of Lot No. 2749. This cannot be
categorized as possession in bad faith.

As defined in the law, a possessor in bad faith is one in possession of property knowing that his
title thereto is defective. Here, there is no showing that Escritor knew of any flaw in his title. Nor
was it proved that petitioners were aware that the title of their predecessor had any defect.

Nevertheless, assuming that claimant Escritor was a possessor in bad faith, this should not
prejudice his successors-in-interest, petitioners herein, as the rule is that only personal knowledge
of the flaw in one's title or mode of acquisition can make him a possessor in bad faith, for bad faith
is not transmissible from one person to another, not even to an heir.

Under Article 527 of the Civil Code, good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges
bad faith on the part of a possessor rests the burden of proof. If no evidence is presented proving
bad faith, like in this case, the presumption of good faith remains.

Respondent Acuna, on the other hand, bases his complaint for damages on the alleged fraud on
the part of the petitioners' predecessor in having the land registered under his (the predecessor's)
name. A review of the record, however, does not indicate the existence of any such fraud. It was
not proven in the cadastral court nor was it shown in the trial court.

Lot No. 2749 was not awarded to Escritor on the basis of his machinations. What is clear is that in
the hearing of January 22, 1958, the Court permitted Escritor to adduce his evidence of ownership
without opposing evidence as the lot had become uncontested.

20
MARK SOLEDAD y CRISTOBAL, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 184274,
February 23, 2011

FACTS:

Henry Yu received a call from Rochelle Bagaporo offering a loan assistance at a low
interest rate. Private complainant then invited her to go to his office. Bagaporo then indorsed
private complainant to a certain Arthur, herein petitioner. In their telephone conversation,
petitioner told private complainant to submit documents. Private complainant submitted various
documents, such as his Globe handyphone original platinum gold card, identification cards and
statements of accounts. Subsequently, private complainant followed up his loan status but failed
to do so.

Private complainant then received his Globe handyphone statement of account where he
was charged for two mobile phone numbers which were not his. Upon verification with the phone
company, private complainant learned that he had additional five mobile numbers in his name,
and the application for said cellular phone lines bore the picture of petitioner and his forged
signature. Private complainant also checked with credit card companies and learned that his
Citibank Credit Card database information was altered and he had a credit card application with
Metrobank. You then lodged a complaint with NBI which conducted an entrapment operation.

During the entrapment operation, NBIs Special Investigator posed as delivery boy of the
Metrobank credit card. The agent reached the address written on the delivery receipt and asked
for Henry Yu. Petitioner said he was Henry Yu and presented two identification cards with the
name and signature of Henry Yu, while the picture showed the face of petitioner. Petitioner signed
the delivery receipt. Thereupon, the investigator introduced himself as an NBI agent and
apprehended him. Petitioner was then charged with violation of Section 9(e), R.A. No. 8484 for
possessing a counterfeit access device or access device fraudulently applied for.

Petitioner avers that he was never in possession of the credit card because he was
arrested immediately after signing the acknowledgement receipt thus he did not yet know the
contents of the envelope delivered and had no control over the subject credit card. In RTC,
petitioner was found guilty. The conviction was affirmed in CA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner was legally in possession of the credit card subject of the case.

HELD:

YES.

The trial court convicted petitioner of possession of the credit card fraudulently applied for.
The law, however, does not define the word possession. Thus, the term was used as defined in
Article 523 of the Civil Code, that is, possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a
right. The acquisition of possession involves two elements: the corpus or the material holding of
the thing, and the animus possidendi or the intent to possess it. Animus possidendi is a state of
mind, the presence or determination of which is largely dependent on attendant events in each
case. It may be inferred from the prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the
surrounding circumstances.

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 In this case, prior to the commission of the crime, petitioner fraudulently obtained from
private complainant various documents showing the latter’s identity. He, thereafter, obtained
cellular phones using private complainants identity. Undaunted, he fraudulently applied for a credit
card under the name and personal circumstances of private complainant. Upon the delivery of the
credit card applied for, the messenger (NBI agent) required two valid identification cards.
Petitioner thus showed two identification cards with his picture on them, but bearing the name and
forged signature of private complainant. As evidence of the receipt of the envelope delivered,
petitioner signed the acknowledgment receipt shown by the messenger, indicating therein that the
content of the envelope was the Metrobank credit card.

Petitioner materially held the envelope containing the credit card with the intent to possess.
Contrary to petitioners contention that the credit card never came into his possession because it
was only delivered to him, the above narration shows that he, in fact, did an active part in
acquiring possession by presenting the identification cards purportedly showing his identity as
Henry Yu. Certainly, he had the intention to possess the same. Had he not actively participated,
the envelope would not have been given to him. Moreover, his signature on the acknowledgment
receipt indicates that there was delivery and that possession was transferred to him as the
recipient. Undoubtedly, petitioner knew that the envelope contained the Metrobank credit card, as
clearly indicated in the acknowledgment receipt, coupled with the fact that he applied for it using
the identity of private complainant.

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