Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: BRITISH AND AMERICAN ARMY

COUNTERINSURGENCY LEARNING DURING THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY AND THE

VIETNAM WAR
Author(s): JOHN A. NAGL
Source: World Affairs , SPRING 1999, Vol. 161, No. 4 (SPRING 1999), pp. 193-199
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.

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 Vol. 161
Learning to
BRITISH AND AMERICAN A
DURING
By JOHN
F rom 1948 through 1960, the British army
fought a counterinsurgency campaign in
what was then called Malaya. Although its ini
tial efforts were not particularly successful, the
British army adapted over time, changing both
its counterinsurgency doctrine and practice. In
contrast, the American army was unable to
change its counterinsurgency doctrine or prac
tice during twenty-five years of fighting in
Southeast Asia, from 1950 through 1975. I have
argued elsewhere that it was the organizational
culture of the British army that allowed it to
learn counterinsurgency principles effectively
during the Malayan emergency, whereas the or
ganizational culture of the U.S. Army blocked
organizational learning during-and after-the
Vietnam War. In this article, I attempt to place
these conclusions in the wider context of inter
national relations as a discipline, evaluating the
current literature on military innovation, exam
ining the effectiveness of organizational learn
ing theory as a tool with which to analyze orga
nizational change, and discussing the impact of
varying organizational cultures on the learning
abilities of different organizations.2 I will then
discuss directions for future research into the
impact of organizational culture on institutional
learning and will conclude with a theoretical
examination of how to make military forces
adaptable in the light of changes in warfare. I
will also look at the question of how to over
come institutional culture when necessary in
building learning institutions.
IDEAS AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
This article is a look inside the "black box
es" that represent "realism" and "game theory"
models of state behavior to examine a factor
that affects the ability of states to achieve their
103.18.3.232 on Tue, 22 Mar 2022 09:08:19 UTC
No. 4 SPRING 1999 193
THE MALAYAN EM
goalsA. NAGL
and preserve their positions in the state John A. Nagl is a captain in the
United States Army and an
system. It also affects those states on which assistant professor of interna
they exercise their power.3 The organizational tional relations at the United
culture of military forces is a decisive determi States Military Academy at West
Point. He is solely responsible
nant in the decisions of whether to apply and of for the contents of this article,
how to apply force in international politics, but which does not represent the
it is a factor that to date has not been ade position of the United States
Military Academy, the Depart
quately examined. ment of the Army, or the Depart
The ability of military organizations to adapt ment of Defense.
to change-whether that change occurs in mil
itary technology, in the structure of the interna
tional system, or in the nature of war itself (or
of our understanding of the nature of war)-is
not an unimportant component of a state's abil
ity to guarantee its own security and that of its
allies. In short, military institutions that are
"learning institutions" add to the influence of
their states in the international system, as was
the case for the United Kingdom in the wake of
the Malayan emergency. Military organizations
that are unable to learn can substantially dam
age the ability of their states to influence the in
ternational system, as was the case for the Unit
ed States during and after the Vietnam War.
Understanding the organizational culture of
military institutions, and the effects of that cul
ture on their ability to learn, increases our abil
ity to understand how states act and react in the
international system.
EVALUATING THE LITERATURE
ON MILITARY INNOVATION
- Current literature on military innovation fo
cuses on the question of whether forces internal
to armed services can modify military doctrine
to deal with changes in their external environ
ment,4 or whether civilian leadership external to
the military must exert pressure to force innova
tion.5 Some authors have found that civilian re
formers and members of the military combine
to create changes in doctrine, an integrative
model of military innovation.6 Most of that re
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 1949Worl Affairs

search has [C]ivilian

been donelea
on
peacetime tional
rather incent
than
time agreein
engaged in conflict. It
sight options
however, that
thesethe pro
goals. U
the necessity
armyto innovat
reacted
in wartime.ian leaders'
Rosen note g
in the Unite
exist in order to fight
centives to aa
not execute this function
agree on po
time, the countries
complex theyover
Instead of being
always
routin
induc
learning from
to ongoing
change.'2 e
anticipate wars that may

According t
responded d
How the services
the
pe
Cabinet
and missions
thanhelps
the Am t
will preparehadforthe the
abili
the Congres
will be in respondi
sa. There ar
when that in
war occ
institution
ferences in t
of voters, th
system, and
There have been few
differences
novation nizations
under the an
pr
war. One of the few
explain isd
the
Dynamics This
of Doctrin
study
man Tactical Doctrine
arguing alon
War.8 Although
Murray it exa
that
innovations,
ofthe study
bureaucr
for its description
tary iden
leaders
or cause-and-effect
studies lin
sugg
Another examination
outside o
leade
interface as an
ture explanat
war on
innovation heart
in wartime
rema
ical Institutions and
fighting is,M
from Peripheral Wars.1
pendent var
grative model of
governmentmil
comparison of
pact British
on whi
the Boer War and
adopt; itthe
is M
i
American army
the innov
military
than innovation
focusing on thes
armies as the variable e
patterns ofEVALUAT
innovation
different OF LEARN
political syst
and FOR
Britain led ANA
the tw
create INNOVATION
different militar
The roots Given the
of lack of a consensus
the in the litera
variatio
ian leaders chose to set
ture on causes of military innovation, I have at
armies. . .. [C]ivilian lea
military
tempted elsewhere to explain why one military
organizations i
their force successfully
ability to adapted to change and an
maintain
difference otherin
failed to do so by tracing the process of
electoral
countries, organizational
then, was
learning through case studiesan
of
development of differen
the British army in the Malayan emergency and
Avantconcludes her
the American army in the Vietnam War. Using ex
American a theory
army innov
of organizational learning first devel

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Vol. 161 No. 4 SPRING 1999 195

oped from observations

by those whoofdirect
busines
an
ment, the and
study future-is
focused essential
on the proce
which changethe
developed or failed
organization to
will ada
found that the organizational
vironment. cu
U.S. Army
"persistent, Parker concurs:
patterned way of thinking
central tasks of, and the human rel
In brief, information is pr
within, an organization"5-played
down based on preconce a k
allowing an organization to create
tured to organize and expa
than the harsh realities of
either in favor of or in opposition to
of barriers change is slow
for change. Changes that conflict with
best. Individuals may go s
of the dominant group in the organiza
the evaluation process and
the best roles and missions
mental "closure" for the
rather th
tion-the essence
plexof the organization
decisions.19
be adopted; leaders of the organizat
tioned by
To understand how an
the culture that they have
through will
years of change, examine
service in it will
failure-and those of th
changes in the core mission and roles.
trol the institution.
variable explaining when militaries
to changes in warfare
THE is the creation
IMPACT OF OR
sensus among the organization
CULTURE ON leaders
ORGA
innovation is in the long-term
LEARNING interes
organization itself.16 This study thus
Richard Downie'sThe conclusion,
organizationaldevelo
cul
examining peacetime changes
army, developed in U.
over m
Low-Intensity colonial
Conflict wars-and
Doctrine, just
that
venting
doctrine is not colonial
likely to change, wars t
despi
presence of external
trationpressures, until w
in conjunction th
tary institution
andis able to identify
colonial and a
administr
consensus on both the problems that ma
ences in more than me
past performance unsuccessful, and ap
flict
ate solutions to thoseon the continent
problems, or tho
of the British army
ones. Conversely, case study findings hig sh
tion
that doctrine will that the
change whenessence of
the milit
stitution's level
edof learning
colonial permitsand
policing an
priate organizational response to these ex
influences. "7
conventional tactics a
Malaya, the British army
ating
Unfortunately, an internal
organizational cons
learnin
needed,
is not a succinct and that
explanation politi
for wh
itary forces military
innovate solutions
while others
were d
An technique
cause it uses the innovative and
of varied
process
learning theoryamenable
demandsto the chang
in-depth stud
vidual cases of innovation
complex or failur
opponent in a n
The organizational
vate, often requiring cul
internal organiz
sion papers that
army,may remain clas
conversely, allo
unavailable to army's leadership
the researcher for abou
year
ganization;
phasis on organizational its core
culture andcom
pr
conventional enemy
of the "essence of the organization" b arm
cision makers The organization
within never
the organization
demands a high degree
that of in
change familiarity
its proced
definition
organization under of its respo
examination, as ne
identities of the dominant
by the naturemembers
of the rev o
nization nor fronted
their views on its core
in Vietnam. An
missions are essence
always ofimmediately ap
the organizat
"a remembered past
tional has always
learning mo
and has
consensus
constricted both action inon the
the "lesso
present
required changes
ing about the future,"'8 in th
then understan
past-and understanding
the present how
day. it is re
Words

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196 World Affairs

Soviet system
in the also
cour
the time: "The pers
ganization
chical system was
effective i
was given that
bility pow
that
use it in deficienci
a way wh
tion of debilitatin
the system."
Even under the
culture pre
th
ed by much mili
ongoing less
nizational culture
The implic
lessons of the prese
impossibl
organization
formfrom
effe
policies are not
cause com
the
Most effective
people so i
restr
ence, or in accomp
context, for
ing that little
tionschang
shou
such a routine with
cal missio
virtually all problem
to all mission
problems fo
looki
have is a suitable
hammer.b C
to change matters,
leadership
confined and "single loo
equipm
they can only do "
and flow
same thing because o
face grave
The "get a bigger
challengesh
organizations
nam mor
is a c
not only that
when arm
the v
but when that
and conf
Frenc
the past war have
high-techn
ized. As Carl H.
conflict Bu
i
How the also be
services no
pe
they mustArguably
fight is an
the types of forces t
should dev
trine they develop, an
for the mid-inten
use of those f
the low-in
How theStates
services
Ma
roles, and missio
tional cult
mands
determine not of
onl
the next war,
seen but
the h
n
spondingalto unexp
raison d
war occurs.
ing Chief
since t
al Staff, General
rine madeSi
paraphrased Michae
Gerald Te
"in structuring and
The sad par
you can be clear t
pacification
cisely right,
my but
old the
Co
that is perience fa
not too it
an
it right matters
quickly."24of
army and in
encouragesNi
s
show-if n
sponses to changed
actual defa
American army
and d
militar
situation falls
lectedwithi
offi
of war it actually
has be
defin
The the
demandscountr
of c
and would
tional warfare diff
the district
zation optimized t
great difficulty
Surprisingin
adapting the U.S.
itself to A
m

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 Vol. 161 No. 4 SPRING 1999 197

ganizational DePuy
General William culture, developed overnoted
many in retro
have always felt
years of colonialthat
policing, not only regular
encouraged US Arm
units are but actively expected innovation.
peculiarly ill suited For years, in for the pu
formally developed "doctrine" where
'securing' operations was disseminat they mus
close contact ed with
by word of mouth andthe people. They c
through the unofficial
writing of participants
course, conduct 'clearing' in the campaigns; the operations,
fact that it is for
perfectly suited now official and'Search
prescribed from and Destr
the new Doctrine and
closer one moves toward the political Training Directorate in
chological endWiltshire
of may the
be the first step toward discour
spectrum, the mor
aging innovation
propriate is the use in theof
British army. Organiza
foreign troops w
tional culture is hard to change,
speak the language, and however; Gen
who may wel
negative effect on pacification efforts."2
The British army, with its tradition of
nial policing, The vast majority of armedshould
arguably conflict today occurs
focus it
the peacekeeping and other types of low
inside states rather than between them. "For many
sity conflict for
which its history and s
and countries in the
organizational world simmering internal
culture render war is a it f
capable.30 permanent condition."
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
This study presents no overarching explana
tion for why some military forces are better at
adapting to the demands of change in warfare
than are others, but does provide a framework eral Sir Frank Kitson's belief that "No one
for tracing the process of military innovation would read it if they did write it down"34 may
and highlights one variable within the organiza yet preserve the institutional flexibility that
tional culture, and particularly within the con played such an important role in defeating the
cept of the essence of the organization that ap communist insurgency in Malaya. As the assis
pears to explain variations in learning outcomes. tant under secretary (programmes) recently
The evidence suggests that other cases of mili said to the Defence Committee in the House of
tary innovation or failures to innovate could Commons, "We have structured our forces pre
profit from study along the same lines, focusing cisely to deal with the unexpected."35
on the organizational culture while tracing the Is it possible for the U.S. Army to develop
organizational learning process. The response of such a culture? Williamson Murray suggests
the French army to insurgency in Indochina and that some improvements can be made, given ef
Algeria is one such case;3' there are many oth forts to "push cultural changes to encourage
ers, responses to conventional tactical and oper rather than discourage the process of innova
ational changes as well as to those in revolu tion." Chief among these is a new "approach to
tionary warfare. The technique could also be military education that encourages changes in
applied to other questions of why states behave cultural values and fosters intellectual curiousi
as they do, helping to explain both why states al ty" in order to "foster a military culture where
ter their policies in response to changes in the those promoted to the highest ranks possess the
international system and, often even more inter imagination and intellectual framework to sup
esting, why they do not.32 International organi port innovation."36
zations such as the United Nations could also In the rapidly changing world of the
profitably be studied in terms of the impact of post-cold war era, such flexibility is critical to
organizational cultures on propagating or pre the ability of military forces to meet the securi
venting changes to procedures such as the cre ty demands that their governments will place
ation and employment of peacekeeping forces. on them. The Persian Gulf War of 1990-91
may well have been an aberration, the last of
BUILDING LEARNING INSTITUTIONS: the conventional industrial age conflicts; it was
MAKING MILITARY FORCES certainly a lesson to the states and nonstate ac
ADAPTABLE IN LIGHT OF EVOLVING tors of the developing world not to confront the
CHANGES IN WARFARE West in conventional combat. There are many
"Building learning organizations entails pro other ways to use force to achieve political
found cultural shifts."33 The British army's or goals: terrorism, subversion, insurgency. The

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198 World Affairs

Cornell University Press, 1991).

much-heralded rev
will not 5. See Barry R. Posen, The Sources
alter this of Military
Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between
Just as nuclear
the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornellweap
University
tional Press, 1984).
power obsolet
render guerrilla
6. Kimberly Martin Zisk, Engaging the Enemy: tac
of mass Organization
destructio Theory and Soviet Military Innovation,
verse may be
1955-1991 (Princeton, true:
NJ: Princeton University
passes Press, 1993).
to conventio
any country 7. Rosen, Winning theconfron
Next War 8. Rosen dis
seek them
cusses wartime out.38
innovation on 22-24.
8. (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute,
The vast
1981). majorit
occurs inside
9. Alexander George, "Case Studiesstates
and Theory
"For Development:
many The Method of Structured, Focused
countri
ternal Comparison," in Diplomacy:
war is New Approaches
a in per
History, Theory, and Policy, Paul Gordon Lauren, ed.
van Creveld
(New York: MacMillan, 1979), 40. pred
states exits throu
10. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994).
volving 11.door,Avant, Political Institutions and Military low
Change, 21. organiza
different
12. Ibid., 130-31.
other."40 Sharing t
13. Ibid., 139.
officer recently
14. Barry Watts and Williamson Murray, "Innova
challenges, America
tion in Peacetime," in Military Innovation in the In
warm and
terwar Period, Murraywell-d
and Alan R. Millett, eds.
Gulf (Cambridge: Cambridge University
victory Press, 1996),
and e
410.
business of regula
15. James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy (New York:
world of 'savage
Basic Books, 1989), 91.
Kipling 16. "I'mcalled
not going to destroy the traditions and th
In this new climate
doctrine of the United States Army just to win this
which lousy war." An anonymous army officer quoted in
political an
and theBrian M. Jenkins, The Unchangeable War. (Santa
objective
Monica, CA: RAND, 1972), 3; in Guenter Lewy,
ing"than the destr
America in Vietnam (New York: Oxford University
abilityto
Press, 1978), 138. learn qu
create an 17. Richard Downie, organi
"Military Doctrine and the
ways ofLearningwaging
Institution: Case Studies in LI," Ph.D. dis w
then tosertation, University of Southern California, 1995,
impleme 354.
more importance
18. John Shy, "The American Military Experi
tions than ever
ence: History and Learning," Journal of Interdisci bef
institutions to
plinary History I (Winter 1971): 210. acce
19. Jay M. Parker, "Change and the Operational
organizational cul
this Commander,"conflict
new Joint Forces Quarterly (Winter
1995/96): 92.
"learning institutio
20. These results parallel those of Richard E.
Neustadt and Earnest R. May in Thinking in Time:
NOTES The Uses of History for Decisionmakers (New York:
1. "To make war upon rebellion is messy and The Free Press, 1986), especially Chapter 9, "Plac
ing Strangers," and Chapter 12, "Placing Organiza
slow, like eating soup with a knife." T. E. Lawrence,
Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph (London: Pen tions." For more insight into how early experiences
guin Books, 1971), 132. condition cognition in decision makers, see Yuen
2. See Theo Farrell, "Figuring Out Fighting OrFoong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich,
ganisations: The New Organisational Analysis in Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965
Dien
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992).
Strategic Studies," Journal of Strategic Studies 19
(March 1996): 122-35. 21. Professor Archie Brown, on Mikhail Gor
3. See Charles Powell, James Dyson, and Helenbachev, Oxford, 28 October 1996.
Purkitt, "Opening the 'Black Box': Cognitive Pro 22 Bob Garratt, The Learning Organization
cessing and Optimal Choice in Foreign Policy Deci (London: Harper Collins, 1994), 42-43.
sion Making," in New Directions in the Study of For 23. Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War: American
eign Policy, Charles Herman, Charles Kegley, and Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis (Baltimore:
James Rosenau, eds. (Boston: Allen & Unwin, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 128.
1987), 203-20. 24. General Sir Charles Guthrie, "The British
Army at the Turn of the Century," RUSI Journal 141
4. See Stephen P. Rosen, Winning the Next War:
Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca, NY:(June 1996): 6. The original citation is Michael

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 Vol. 161 No. 4 SPRING 1999 199

Howard, "Military Science

tions of 'Learning' in Counterinsurgency," Compar in the Age
RUSI Journal ative
(March
Strategy 11 (January-March 1974):
1992): 30-33. 3-4.
25. The "conventionalization"
32. George W. Breslauer and Philip E. Tetlock, of U.S. A
eds., Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign
cial Forces throughout their Policy history by
more pervasive(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991) adopt such a
organizational culture of
tional army shows
perspective withoutthis
a definite focusprocess
on the impor at work; s
Adams, "Military Doctrine
tance of organizational culture as a key factor in in and the Or
Culture of the United
fluencing learning. States Army," Ph
Syracuse University, 1990.
33. Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art
and Practice
26. Among the of the Learning Organization (Newmutually
generally and
gratulatory York: Doubleday, 1990), xv.on the war, see Rick
literature
Crusade (New York: Random
34. General Sir Frank Kitson, interview in Devon, House, 199
erences to the 12training,
December 1995. planning, and es
gistical problems 35. Session
of 1991-92, Third Report, question
these two armies in t
ports that a banner 1190, 16, quoted in Eric Grove, The Army and
proclaiming "We only d
appeared on the Pentagon
British Security After the Cold War: Defence thePlan day of the
recognize the fact ning for a New Era (London: Strategic
that the and Combat
Gulf War was e
war the United Studies Institute/HMSO, 1996),
States would 10. have chosen to
could have scripted the
36. Murray, "Past and Future," in scenario:
Military Innova mid-inte
bined arms warfare tion in the Interwar Period,
on 326-27.
a battlefield gener
civilians. 37. The so-called "revolution in military affairs"
27. For proposals on restructuring U.S. ground results from the application of digitized information
forces, see Douglas A. Macgregor, Breaking the Pha to warfighting theory and weaponry. For a good sum
lanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Cen mary of the current state of thinking on the "RMA,"
tury (Westport, CT: Praeger/CSIS, 1997). see "The Future of Warfare," The Economist, 8
28. Letter from Edward C. Noden, HQ KMAG March 1997, 23-26.
(DCSPER), to Field Marshal Templer, 6 April 1968. 38. Eliot Cohen, "A Revolution in Warfare," For
Templer Papers, Box 30. eign Affairs 75 (March/April 1996): 51.
29. General William E. DePuy, in Romie L. 39. Steven Metz, "Insurgency After the Cold
Brownlee and William J. Mullen III, Changing an War," Small Wars and Insurgencies 5 (Spring 1994):
Army: an Oral History of General William DePuy, 63.
U.S. Army Retired, (Washington, DC: U.S. Govern 40. Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of
ment Printing Office, 1988), 133. War (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 224.
30. John Hillen, "Rethinking the Bosnia Bargain," 41. Daniel P. Bolger, "The Ghosts of Omdurman,"
Backgrounder No. 1096 (Washington, DC: The Her Parameters (Autumn 1991): 31-32. The U.S. Army
itage Foundation, 15 October 1996). is resisting this call, as this study of its organization
31. Christopher C. Harmon notes that the French al culture would predict; there are proportionally
"forgot all too well" their counterinsurgency suc more armored and mechanized divisions in the U.S.
cesses of the nineteenth century in Indochina, but Army today (as compared to light infantry forma
does not trace the learning process nor discuss the or tions, more suitable for low-intensity conflicts) than
ganizational culture of the French Army, in "Illustra there were during the cold war.

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