Steven Miles HIST 5080.001 Prof. D. Paz April 27.

2011 The Cambridge Spies and the Special Relationship

The Cold War witnessed many instances of espionage throughout its history. Though both the CIA and the FSB (the Russian successor to the KGB) understandably still keep their Cold War operations a secret, both intelligence agencies parade traitors to the public once they capture them in order to send a message to the public, as well as to their enemies. One of the most famous acts of treason in the twentieth century was the case of the Cambridge Spies. This paper attempts to analyze how the treason of these spies affected the Special Relationship1 between the United States and the United Kingdom that was cemented after the end of World War II. The two leaks that were the responsibility of the Cambridge Spies that I will examine include Operation Valuable (a joint CIA-MI6 operation in Albania) and the attempted sabotage of American uranium supply lines in the Belgian Congo; though other leaks that will need investigation to a lesser extent in order to illustrate the aims of the Soviet intelligence establishment. These issues will be covered because they represent examples of how the Cambridge Spies, through their powerful positions in the British government, frustrated attempts to counter the Soviet Union; and finally, how this espionage affected US-UK relations, especially when it came to intelligence sharing.
1

The Special Relationship is a cornerstone of the foreign policies of both the United States and Britain during the Cold War that continues to this day. Important aspects of the relationship include the sharing of intelligence and military technology. During the Cold War, signals intelligence and nuclear weapons technology were at the forefront of this sharing arrangement.

Steven Miles It is common knowledge that there were five men in the Cambridge spy ring. While covering the exploits of John Cairncross, Anthony Blunt, and Guy Burgess would make for a fascinating line of inquiry, this paper will focus on Kim Philby and Donald Maclean. The reason for this choice is that these two men had the most access to American intelligence and strategic matters after World War II and in the early days of the Cold War. Blunt and Cairncross, by contrast, passed most of their intelligence to the NKVD during World War II 2; before the Special Relationship was cemented, especially in regards to intelligence sharing. The exploits of Guy Burgess are still a mystery and government documents pertaining to his activities are difficult to obtain. About the Cambridge Spies Before one can have a full understanding of the impact that Philby and Maclean had, it is essential to explore the background of the spy ring and the environment in which they developed their ideology. Harold Adrian Russell Kim3 Philby was born first in January, 1912 in Amballa, India. He was the son of the noted Arabist St. John Philby and Dora Philby. In 1929, he entered Trinity College, Cambridge and graduated with a degree in economics in 1933. At the behest of his NKVD handler Otto Deutsch, he traveled to Spain in 1937 during the Civil War under cover as a journalist.4 After he returned from Spain he was recruited by the SIS.5

.A perusal of Blunts contributions during WWII indicates a preponderance of military intelligence. For example, one document reports the replacement of the Swedish naval attach at the request of the British government. Cairncross contributions concern civil intelligence and explore such matters as the bureaucratic organization of MI5. Nigel West, Oleg Tsarev.TRIPLEX: Secrets from the Cambridge Spies, [Yale University Press: New Haven, 2009], 5-26, 189-248. 3 Phillip Knightly, The Master Spy: The Story of Kim Philby, [New York City: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989], 24. This nickname is from the Kipling novel of the same name was given to him because he spent his time among the house servants during his time in India and even learned a bit of Punjabi. 4 Kim Philby, My Silent War: The Autobiography of a Spy, [New York City: The Modern Library, 2002 (1968)], 203. 5 Ibid.

Steven Miles Donald Duart Maclean was born on May 24th, 1913 to Sir Donald Maclean, a Liberal cabinet minister, and Gwendolen Margaret Maclean. In 1931 Maclean entered Trinity College as well, and pursued a degree in Modern Languages, and graduated in 1935. The Foreign Office recruited him that same year.6 Philby and Maclean were at Trinity during a time of intense social and political upheaval that engendered active socialist, as well as communist, organizations on campus.7 The economic crisis of 1931 and the resulting high unemployment rate triggered sympathy among the students for Leftist causes. At the same time, the emergence of fascism across Europe drove the students towards communist causes because the Soviet Union presented itself as the only power capable of combatting people such as Mussolini, Franco and Hitler.8 By this time, Philby had developed socialist tendencies, but was not a communist. As Yuri Modin, the rezibentura9 who translated all of their dispatches and was also their handler, argues, Kim Philby was much drawn to socialist ideas, though communism rather scared him, as it did other young men of his generation. His militant posture took a while to develop.10 His initial forays into Leftist politics included joining the Cambridge University Socialist Society, of which he became treasurer in 1930.11

Yuri Modin, My Five Cambridge Friends: Burgess, Maclean, Philby, Blunt and Cairncross, Translated by David Leitch, [New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1994], 95 7 Andrew Sinclair, The Red and the Blue: Cambrige, Treason and Intelligence, [Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1986], 22. 8 Ibid., 32 9 A rezidentura is the Soviet/Russian equivalent to a CIA station chief in an American embassy. 10 Yuri Modin, My Five Cambridge Friends: Burgess, Maclean, Philby, Blunt and Cairncross, Translated by David Leitch, [New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1994], 48 11 Ibid.

Steven Miles Philby became a communist on the day he left Cambridge in 1933.12 His decision to become an agent occurred shortly after that. He was encouraged to go to Austria by Teodor Maly13, another NKVD handler, to struggle against fascism. He witnessed the rise of the fascist government in Vienna and how the socialists were treated under said government.14 He was given the location of a safe house in Vienna by Maly where he met his first wife, Alice. Her burning passion for the cause of Communism15 inspired him--inspired him to move from mere socialism to communism.16 Upon his return to Britain, he met with Maly again and pledged

himself to the cause. Because he was an ideologue, and wanted the Revolution to spread worldwide, he considered himself an agent for the Comintern.17 In contrast to Philby, Maclean was a true believer from the beginning. However, his membership in the Party was clandestine because his father was the education minister under Ramsey Macdonald. Burgess, who was recruited by Philby, recruited him in 1934 while they were members of the Apostles society, a Cambridge secret society and dining club that had recently become dominated by communists and other Leftists.18

12

Kim Philby, My Silent War: The Autobiography of a Spy, [New York City: The Modern Library, 2002 (1968)], 23. Phillip Knightly, The Master Spy: The Story of Kim Philby, [New York City: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989] 36 13 At this time Otto Deutsch was recalled to Moscow. 14 Dr. Dollfuss, of the extreme right of the Christian Social Party in Austria, suspended the constitution and dissolved parliament in order to prevent the socialists from coming to power and gaining control of the government. Knightly, 40. 15 Alices first husband, Karl Friedman, was a socialist who moved to Vienna after the First World War. He established a socialist-leaning Zionist organization there and attempted to indoctrinate her into socialism. She was not interested because she leaned towards to Communist party because she saw excitement in its revolutionary nature. Phillip Knightly, The Master Spy: The Story of Kim Philby, [New York City: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989], 41. 16 Ibid., 40. 17 Yuri Modin, My Five Cambridge Friends: Burgess, Maclean, Philby, Blunt and Cairncross, Translated by David Leitch, [New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1994], 51. The Comintern (also known as the Third International) was the arm of the Soviet government charged with spreading the Revolution worldwide. 18 Andrew Sinclair, The Red and the Blue: Cambrige, Treason and Intelligence, [Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1986], 34, 41.

Steven Miles Philby and Maclean were what are now called sleeper agents. Their NKVD masters advised them to seek employment in the Foreign Office and the SIS.19 The Soviets needed people who could attain powerful government positions and whose backgrounds were at odds with their politics.20. While Maclean had been secretive in respect to his politics, Philby and Burgess had not been so wise. Therefore, they were encouraged to join the Anglo-German Fellowship and adopt fascist views in order to cleanse themselves of their leftist past so that employment in the government would be more likely once the war ended.21 As an additional measure, Burgess and Blunt were sent on a tour of Russia so that they would return and publically repudiate communism.22 Philby and Operation Valuable In 1940 Philby was employed in MI6. Section D23 and Burgess was his superior24. His

time in Section D was spent passing intelligence along to the NKVD concerning what MI6 knew about the communist movement within Britain. A 1943 cable Philby passed on to Moscow Center25 states, Vivian26 said that the type of people in whom the Russians took an interest were those who belonged in university Communist clubs and societies, subscribe to Labour Monthly, and so on.27

19 20

Burgess encouraged the recruitment of Philby into the SIS. Knightly, The Master Spy, 37. 21 Phillip Knightly, The Master Spy: The Story of Kim Philby, [New York City: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989], 51 22 Yuri Modin, My Five Cambridge Friends: Burgess, Maclean, Philby, Blunt and Cairncross, Translated by David Leitch, [New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1994], 72 23 Section D is concerned with Soviet intelligence organization 24 Kim Philby, My Silent War: The Autobiography of a Spy, [New York City: The Modern Library, 2002 (1968)], 10 25 The NKVD ( and later KGB) headquarters. 26 Col. Valentine Vivian. The Deputy Chief of the Secret Service 27 Nigel West, Oleg Tsarev,TRIPLEX: Secrets from the Cambridge Spies, [Yale University Press: New Haven, 2009], 106.

Steven Miles The years 1940 to 1944 saw many cables from Philby; most of them pertain to the history and internal organization of MI6.28 However, there was only so much that information could do. In 1944, Philbys handler would encourage him to apply for and obtain the position of head of Section IX29, the counterintelligence section primarily concerned with communist spies at that time. Philby would untimely win that position and eventually go on to represent MI6 at the British Embassy in Washington, DC; a job that allowed him to be close to the top of the administration of the Central Intelligence Agency. Concerning the American posting, Philby wrote:
But the lure of the American post was irresistible for two reasons. At one stroke, it would take me right back into the middle of intelligence policy-making and it would give me a close-up view of the American intelligence organizations.30

This close-up view would give the Soviets a coup in Albania. After Josip Titos split with the Soviet Union31 Enver Hoxhas32 Albania oriented itself towards the Soviet Union. Hoxha greatly admired Stalin and once said about his first meeting with him, The day of my first meeting with Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin will remain unforgettable this occasion, in the name of the Albanian people, our Communist Party and in my own name personally, I laid a wreath of many-coloured flowers at the entrance to the Mausoleum of the immortal Lenin. 33 The relationship between the USSR and Albania had a political, as well sentimental, aspect. The

28 29

Ibid., 104-183 Philby, My Silent War, 94. 30 Kim Philby, My Silent War: The Autobiography of a Spy, [New York City: The Modern Library, 2002 (1968)], 145. 31 Tito split with the Soviet Union due to Stalins move to make Yugoslavia a satellite of Russia after WWII. Tito claimed that, It is a hostility of a caste towards a socialist country and not the hostility of the people of the Soviet Union. That caste became infuriated when a socialist country resisted its attempts at economic subjugation. The domination by this caste is not a class phenomenon as yet. The USSR is a socialist country regardless of the mistakes its leadership is making. Josip Broz Tito, Interview by Kalamesh Banergi. Interview with Marshal Tito (October 1950). 32 Pronounced Hodzha. Enver Hoxha was the communist ruler of Albania from 1945 until his death in 1985 33 With Staliin: Memoirs from my Meetings with Stalin,.[Tirana: "8 Nentori" Publishing House,1981], Page unknown, republished online at http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hoxha/works/stalin/meet1.htm

Steven Miles Soviets needed Albania because Albania had minerals and a strategic value; Stalin could keep pressure on Tito through military bases in Albania.34 A section of the Foreign Office called the Russia Committee35 viewed this situation with optimism. Albania was isolated from the Eastern Bloc by Yugoslavia and Greece; which was at this time fighting a civil war. It was the weakest link in the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact due to its location and economic and political weakness. The Russia Committee believed that overthrowing Hoxha would be a push back against the Soviets. The recent crisis in Czechoslovakia and political uncertainties in France and Italy made the Russia Committee, and the Foreign Office in general, nervous and an operation in Albania was seen as a way to inspire counterrevolutionaries in the Eastern Bloc, especially those in Greece. 36 To implement this goal, a plan was devised. The name of the plan was Operation Valuable. The directive of Operation Valuable was the employment American and British Albanian immigrants in order to land them in Albania and mount an insurrection that would overthrow the Hoxha regime using the principle of plausible deniability 37. The British, and to a lesser extent the Americans, thought the agents would encourage an uprising among the Albanian people through the techniques of sabotage and subversion. Britain played a leading
34

James A ODonnel, A Coming of Age: Albania Unider Enver Hoxha, [New York City: Columbia University Press, 1999], 37., Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates. The Current Situation in Albania. (Langley, VA, 1949), 1. ORE 71-49 35 The Russia Committee was a part of the Foreign Office during the Cold War that was tasked with analyzing Soviet foreign policy. Merrick, Ray. "The Russia Committee of the British Foreign Office and the Cold War, 19461947." Journal of Contemporary History, 20, no. 3 [April 2005], 458.
36

During this time communist political parties were gaining strength in Italy and France. Richard J Albirch The Hidden Hand: Britian, America, and Cold War Secret Intelligence. [New York City: Overlook Press, 2002], 152153 37 Plausible deniability is when a state takes actions against another state through a third party, such as exiles and immigrants, in order for the first state to deny that the action was its responsibility. This was a way for intelligence agencies to carry out operations that would not lead to war. Yuri Modin, My Five Cambridge Friends: Burgess, Maclean, Philby, Blunt and Cairncross, Translated by David Leitch, [New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1994],186

Steven Miles role in the operation because of her experience in Albania during the WWII, 38 while the United States was used because it would give the appearance of a multi-national operation and not an imperialist exercise.39 On the night of October 3, 1949, the schooner Stormy Seas sailed from Malta to the Karaburan peninsula on the coast of Albania. The schooner carried forty-three American and British trained Albanians refugees from the United States and Britain who were ready to stage an guerrilla-style assault. Unfortunately, the Albanian guerrillas were betrayed and they were greeted by Albanian security forces. They also failed to impress the peasants of the Albanian countryside. Twenty-nine of them were killed for resisting arrest, and the remaining fourteen were given show trials and sent to prison for terms ranging from seven years to life40

Figure 1. Map of Albania. Notice the insertion point on the Karaburan Peninsula. Map Courtesy of the UNT Willis Library Map Collection

38 39

Nicholas Bethell, Betrayed, [New York City: Times Books, 1984], 37. Ibid., 39. 40 Phillip Knightly, The Master Spy: The Story of Kim Philby, [New York City: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989]. 160.

Steven Miles Due to his position in the British Embassy, Philby was privy to this plan. Modin claims that Philbytook part in the planning and in due course sent us all the details in a letter to Burgess41 However, Philby claims in an interview with Knightly that I only claim credit on a much reduced scale for having played a part in frustrating a scheme thought up by others.42 I think that the difference is explained by Modins detachment from the situation at this point. As the handler, he would not have direct dealings with the spies and would only analyze their cables. Nevertheless, Philbys role did upset the plan. By betraying the location, intent and time of the assault, he ensured the capture of the guerillas. Enver Hoxha gave his own opinion on the assault in his book, The Anglo-American Threat to Albania:
In a word, they came and we were waiting for them. We put them on trial, and after all their filthy deeds had been exposed, we gave them the punishment they deservedOur famous radio game, the wisdom, justice and the revolutionary vigilance of the Albanian brought about the ignominious failure of the plans of the foreign enemy, and not the merits of a certain Kim Philby, as some have claimed.43

Clearly, this is nationalist bluster. However, it gives insight into Hoxhas attitude towards the British. He discussing this in beginning pages of his book. He describes how the British and the Americans supported King Zog I44 before the outbreak of World War II45. Being a

communist, Hoxha would naturally be opposed to the British and he used their past support of Zog I to boost his propaganda .

41

Yuri Modin, My Five Cambridge Friends: Burgess, Maclean, Philby, Blunt and Cairncross, Translated by David Leitch, [New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1994], 186. 42 Phillip Knightly, The Master Spy: The Story of Kim Philby, [New York City: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989], 160. 43 Enver Hoxha, The Anglo-American Threat to Albania. [Tirana: "8 Nentori" Publishing House, 1982], 430. 44 Ruler of Albania from 1928 to 1939. 45 Enver Hoxha, The Anglo-American Threat to Albania, 12-13.

Steven Miles This episode illustrates how Philbys actions frustrated the special relationship. The CIA suspected Philby of having leaked the information; and he was subsequently recalled to London and expelled from British intelligence.46 This would have put a strain on the

relationship because the Americans would have lost confidence in the British if they (rightly) believed that British intelligence was infested with communist moles.

Maclean and Atomic Espionage In 1946, the United States Congress passed an act called the Atomic Energy Act of 194647. There were several factors that led to the creation of the Act. One of these concerned atomic scientists. The scientists at Los Alamos, Hanford and other facilities were political; some of them even had communist sympathies. Recognizing this, Congress, though unaware of the secret alliance between the United States and Britain, passed the Act with a section that would have short-term effect on US-UK relations.48 Section 10 of the Act proposed restrictions on the export of nuclear technology and expertise. Section 10, entitled Control of Information, states:
That until Congress declares by joint resolution that effective and enforceable international safeguards against the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes have been established, there shall be no exchange of information with other nations with respect to the use of atomic energy49

This frustrated the British. British scientists had been instrumental in the development of the atomic bomb, and FDR had even urged the pooling of scientific resources between the
46

Verne W. Newton, The Cambridge Spies: The Untold Story of Maclean, Philby and Burgess in America, [New York: Madison Books, 1991], 249. 47 Also known as the McMahon Act after the sponsor, Brien McMahon (D-CT) 48 Miller, Byron S. "A Law is Passed: The Atomic Energy Act of 1946." The University of Chicago Law Review, 15, no. 4 [1948], 800. 49 Atomic Energy Act of 1946

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Steven Miles nations for developing the weapon and urged Churchill to move his scientists to America so they would be out of range of the Germans.50 To rectify this, the British sent Maclean to Washington to be the First Secretary of the embassy in 1947. His responsibilities were to salvage the relationship and get the Americans to reconsider their position. 51 He sat on two committees at the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC): the Combined Policy Committee (CPC) and the Combine Development Trust (CDT). The purpose of the CPC was to resolves disputes between the United States and Britain concerning the atomic bomb. The purpose of the CDT52 was to initiate a buying program of uranium around the world because it was believed then that the element was finite and that the earth would run out.53 A cable dated June 21, 1951 from the British embassy in Washington to the Cabinet Office confirms that Maclean sat on the Committee:
Mr. Maclean also had knowledge of the transactions, during the same period, of the Combined Development Agency [these cables called CDT different names throughout: trust, agency, committee], of the arrangements for securing raw materials, and of the estimates of future productions which are made at that time54

Maclean had extensive access to the AEC. Normally, a visitor to the facility would be escorted by armed guards; but he was unescorted for the time he was there, February 1947 to September 1948.55
50

Verne W. Newton, The Cambridge Spies: The Untold Story of Maclean, Philby and Burgess in America, [New York: Madison Books, 1991]: 152 51 Ibid., 147. 52 The preamble of the CDT charter states: Whereas it is an object vital to the common interests of those concerned in the successful prosecution of the present war to insure the acquisition at the earliest practicable moment of an adequate supply of uranium and thorium ores Nuclear Files: Project of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, Anglo-American Declaration of Trust, June 13, 1944, August 11, 2009. http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/keyissues/nuclear-weapons/history/pre-cold-war/manhattan-project/declaration-of-trust_1944-06-13.htm (accessed April 21, 2011). 53 Newton, The Cambridge Spies, 148. 54 Prime Minister's Office: Correspondence and Papers, 1945-1951, Disappearance of Foreign Office officials, Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess, [June 21, 1951], PREM/8/154-2. This source is a collection of diplomatic cables that is available on the National Archives website in a multipart document. Therefore, there is no volume of pagination detail. 55 Newton, The Cambridge Spires,149.

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Steven Miles After the leaks were revealed, the AEC claimed that Maclean was a mere diplomat with no scientific knowledge. However, the secrets he leaked reflect a different reality.56 Newton argues that Maclean stole two types of secrets. The first type is scientific. The Russians and the British had the scientists that would be necessary to develop the atomic bomb. Their problems were technical; they did not have the engineering capability to build it. The second type of secret was political. He revealed the existence of the Hyde Park and Quebec Agreements57. Most damaging of all, however, Maclean revealed to the Soviets the fact that the United States had a limited supply of uranium and the diplomatic maneuvering that was used to solve that problem. On February 4, 1947 the ambassador to Belgium, Alan Goodrich Kirk, cabled the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson. The cable stated:
Uranium questions is being more and more actively discussed in Belgian press and political circlesIt is furthermore evident that public opinion is now aware of fact that our entire uranium production is sold to the U.S. As far as immense majority of public is concerned there has until now been no difficulty but few days ago in mixed commission considering further organization of Army, its President and PSC [Christian Social Party] Senator asked me quite blank if secret treaty exists between US and Belgium.58

The secret treaty mentioned in the cable is the Memorandum of Agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Belgium Regarding Control of Uranium.59 Section 10 of the treaty states, This Memorandum of Agreement shall be treated as military secret in keeping with its purposes.60Since Maclean was at the meetings of the CDT and the proceedings of that committee and its purposes were meant to be kept secret, it is highly likely that he leaked the details concerning Americas low supply of uranium to the Soviets, and they in turned leaked
56 57

Ibid., 147. The Quebec Agreement outlined nonproliferation between the United States and the United Kingdom. The Hyde Park Agreement prided for full cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdome in the development of nuclear weapons. 58 United States Department of State. Telegram: The Ambassador of Belgium (Kirk) to the Secretary of Sate, February 5. 1947, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947,Vol. I, [Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1947], 792-793 59 For evidence the treaty mentioned above is noted in the footnotes of the February 4, 1947 cable. 60 United States Department of State. Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Belgium Regarding Control of Uranium , in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944,Vol. 2, [Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1944], 1029-1030

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Steven Miles details of that to the Christian Social Party of Belgium. The CSP could use that information to gain votes with their American imperialism in Belgium angle. If Moscow knew about the state of Americas uranium supply, it could buy up the supplies and limit Americas ability to produce nuclear weapons. The USSR would then have an advantage. In a situation where the Soviet Union would have significantly more nuclear weapons than the United States, deterrence would not have an effective instrument for countering the threat of annulation with the atomic bomb. The Trials of Philby and Maclean On September 4, 1945 a NKVD rezidentura61 in Istanbul, Turkey, approached the British consulate and requested asylum because he wanted to defect. A rezidentura would have certainly been a valuable defector, thus C.H. Page, the Vice-Consul, listened to him. In return for 50,000 and asylum for him and his wife, he would give the British very valuable information.62 He brought many documents with him, but one of the most interesting concerned Soviet moles in the Foreign Office and the intelligence establishment. There were two inside the Foreign Office and seven inside the British intelligence system including one fulfilling the function of head of section of British counter-intelligence in London.63Andrew,and Metrokhin64 argue that he was referring to Maclean, Burgess and Philby.

61

62 63

Christopher Andrew, Vasili Metrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, [New York: Basic Books, 1999], 138-139 Christopher Andrew, Vasili Metrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, [New York: Basic Books, 1999], 138-139 64 Metrokhin was a high-level KGB archivist who defected to the British after he brought a trove of KGB documents to the embassy in Riga, Latvia in 1993

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Steven Miles Philby confirms this because he was the person assigned to review the documents. 65 He quickly realized the danger he and the rest of the Soviet intelligence establishment was in. He contacted his handler in Moscow and Turkish visas were issued to two men in Moscow. These men were diplomatic couriers and they kidnapped Volkov and took him back to Moscow.66 This was a narrow escape and almost caused the Cambridge spy ring to collapse. The downfall of Maclean and Burgess would be the VENONA Project. VENONA was a signals intelligence project between the U.S. Armys Signal Intelligence Service and the British GCHQ.67 A VENONA report dated October 11, 1951 gives details as to how Maclean was caught. The report mentions a GOMER68, Macleans cryptonym. The report further states that between the 29th and the 31st of March, 1945 two Soviet cables were sent from New York to the NKVD 8th Section; the section that handles political intelligence. Another cable listed in the reports states that, To Victor [Viktor]. According to advice from Homer [Gomer], Capitan and Boar [?] will meet about 9 September in Quebec to discuss questions connected [4 groups missing]. A detailed exposition of Homers resume is following.69 Philby learned of this and warned Burgess over dinner. He also realized that GOMER had to be Maclean because he had a wife in New York who he visited on weekends. In addition
65

Kim Philby, My Silent War: The Autobiography of a Spy, [New York City: The Modern Library, 2002 (1968)], 119-120. He was stationed in Ankara, Turkey at this time. Turkey was an important country out of which to run intelligence operations during the Cold War due to its proximity to Transcaucasia. 66 Christopher Andrew, Vasili Metrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, [New York: Basic Books, 1999]: 138.; Andrew, Christopher. Defend the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5, [New York City: Vintage Books, 2009], 342. 67 National Security Agency,VENONA, [January 17, 2009], http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/declass/venona/index.shtml (accessed March 13, 2011). Government Communications Headquarters. The British equivalent to the American NSA. 68 GOMER=HOMER, MacLeans cryptonym. The Russian language does not have an h sound; thus, all words of foreign origin that have an h sounds are assigned to the g sound 69 National Security Agency, VENONA Documents, October 11, 1951, [Fort Mead, MD: 2007]. Brackets are the NSAs. Capitan= FDR, Boar= Churchill

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Steven Miles to visiting his wife on the weekends, he also met with a NKVD contact. Of course, Philby knew this and he made the connection. The next day, Burgess caught the Queen Mary back to London. He warned Maclean about his predicament and they fled from England on May 25th, 1951 to Russia.70 Within the British cabinet itself, there were conflicting ideas about how the security should be improved. Lord Portal and his successor Lieutenant-General Morgan71 both insisted on the introduction of positive vetting for Foreign Office and intelligence employees. Attlee, however, was hesitant to introduce such measures. In a cabinet minutes document dated September 4, 1951 the Prime Minister was , in some doubt about whether the new procedure should be adopted, particularly as, in his view, United Kingdom security precautions were as effective as American72 Attlee only accepted the introduction of positive vetting during one of his last cabinet meetings in October, 1951.73 In light of Attlees preposterous views on British security and his reluctance to consent to the revamping of security procedures, it can be argued that the British government was entirely unprepared for dealing with communist moles. This affected Britains relationship with the United States, particularly in matters of defense and intelligence sharing, as we shall see later. Four years after the flight of Maclean and Burgess they were still being discussed in Parliament. The reaction of Prime Minister Eden was slow and it showed a reluctance to act and believe that Philby was complicit in the affair. Eden had not established an investigative committee to look into the third man theory; a theory that postulated that Philby tipped off
70

Yuri Modin, My Five Cambridge Friends: Burgess, Maclean, Philby, Blunt and Cairncross, Translated by David Leitch, [New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1994]: 198-199 71 Both of these men held the Cabinet position of Controller of Atomic Energy. 72 Records of the Cabinet Office, Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing, S.W. 1, on Tuesday, 4th September, 1951, at 3 p.m., [September 4, 1951], CAB 128/20 73 Richard J. Aldrich, The Hidden Hand: Britian, America, and Cold War Secret Intelligence, [New York City: Overlook Press, 2002], 425.

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Steven Miles Burgess and Maclean before their flight to Russia because he was known to have close ties to them. This parliamentary debate dated October 24, 1955 is an example of Attlees dithering:

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton74 asked the Prime Minister whether he will move to appoint a Select Committee to investigate the circumstances of the disappearance of Burgess and Maclean in particular and the efficiency of Civil Service security arrangements in general. The Prime Minister No, Sir. Lieu1.-Colonel Lipton Has the Prime Minister made up his mind to cover up at all costs the dubious third man activities of Mr. Harold Philby, who was First Secretary at the Washington Embassy a little while ago; and is he determined to stifle all discussion on the very great matters which were evaded in the wretched White Paper, which is an insult to the intelligence of the country? The Prime Minister My answer was "No" to the hon. and gallant Member's Question, which was not about all that but asked for the appointment of a Select Committee. My answer remains "No." So far as the wider issues raised in the supplementary question are concerned, the Government take the view that it is desirable to have a debate, and an early debate, on this subject, in which I as Prime Minister will be glad to take part. Mr. Robens Has the Prime Minister made any investigation as to the reason why briefs supplied by Foreign Office officials to Ministers answering Questions in this House have been at so much variance with the facts of the case? The Prime Minister That seems to be one of the matters which might well be raised in the debate.75

Outcry over the Burgess-Maclean scandal was even present among Edens own party. Viscount Astor of the Torreys pulled no punches when speaking about them and his lack of confidence in the government during a debate dated November 22, 1955:
I am aware that on our own side the Whip apparently considers disappearing diplomats less important than reappearing rabbitsThat this matter gone as long as it has is largely the Governments own fault. In the early stages of this sad affair they seemed concerned more to hide the truth than to uncover itThe question I want to ask
74 75

Labour Party politician Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Former Foreign Office Officials (Disappearance), [HC Deb 07 November 1955 vol 545 cc1483-611]

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Steven Miles
is: Did the Foreign Office know of know of this conduct and tolerate it, or were they ignorant? If they are ignorant, it is hard to believe that they live in such an ivory tower.76

The reaction in the United States was decidedly more concerned. In a cable dated June 8, 1951 from the Washington embassy to the Foreign Office the ambassador quoted the United Press, the Central Intelligence agency and the State Department are highly disturbed over the disappearance of Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess77 and ...the Foreign Office should clean house regardless of who it hurts.78 At this time, there were movements afoot to reform the McMahon Act in favor of Britain. However, those hopes were temporarily squashed. Senator Brewster (R-Maine) was questioning Dean Acheson concerning the matter and said, If these men prove to be Soviet sympathizers it would, I assume, be a quite serious matter in foreign relations? Acheson said: That is correct79 There were also problems getting an amendment to the McMahon Act for the purpose of allowing Britain to conduct weapons testing on American soil. During an exclusive meeting of the American members of the CPC, Deputy Secretary of Defense of the United States Lovett expressed reservations about permitting such a test because he perceived weaknesses in British security due to the Maclean defection.80
76

Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Disappearance of Burgess and Maclean, [HL Deb 22 November 1955 vol. 194 cc708-31] 77 Prime Minister's Office: Correspondence and Papers, 1945-1951, Disappearance of Foreign Office officials, Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess, [June 21, 1951], PREM/8/154 78 Ibid. . 79 Ibid. 80 United States Department of State. Minutes of Meeting of the United States Members of the Combined Policy Committee, Washington, August 24, 1951, 2:50 p.m. , in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951,Vol. 1, [Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1951], 755-763

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Steven Miles Acheson did not have the reservations that Lovett had. However, he was not willing to permit the weapons test without consulting Congress. The mood of Congress at that time was not conciliatory towards the British and Acheson did not feel that he could persuade the legislative body to modify the McMahon Act, even for a test. He was told by Dr. Oppenheimer himself that the numbers of the test were not enough information for atomic scientists. Further information, Oppenheimer continued, would give the British information about the American atomic weapons program that could be compromising.81 The CIA was especially discouraged by these events. A cable dated June 8, 1951 stated, ..Elliot reports that that Bedell Smith especially asked to see him yesterday (7th June) to inform him that at any rate for time being he would have to withdraw C.I.A support for improved intelligence cooperation82 Conclusion Philby and Maclean undoubtedly did damage to the Special Relationship. Their actions temporarily hurt Britains ability to combat the Soviet Union during the early Cold War. During this period, Britain was in dire economic straits. The war had left her economically broke and it did not have the resources to build more nuclear weapons and it needed the resources of the CIA to complement its, albeit excellent, intelligence community. A temporary loss of intelligence sharing would be catastrophic. If a defector walked into an American embassy with information on Soviet spies working against England, the United States would have to be cautious about sharing that information with England. If the defector
81

United States Department of State. Minutes of Meeting of the United States Members of the Combined Policy Committee, Washington, August 24, 1951, 2:50 p.m. , in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951,Vol. 1, [Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1951], 755-763 82 Prime Minister's Office: Correspondence and Papers, 1945-1951, Disappearance of Foreign Office officials, Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess, [June 21, 1951], PREM/8/154

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Steven Miles had genuine, valuable information, the Americans would want to protect such an asset and would want to think twice about sharing with the British for fear of a mole exposing the defector. It was well known by the Americans that Philby was a close associate of Maclean and Burgess. The fact that the CIA was reconsidering its intelligence sharing agreement with the British is evidence of how they viewed their past relationship with Philby. Burgess and Maclean worked in the Foreign Office, but Philby worked for MI6. The CIA would have understandably been nervous about Philby because of his relationship with those men. In response to this crisis, the Americans demanded that the British reform their vetting processes for prospective employees of the Foreign Office and the intelligence services. Maclean entered the Foreign Service by simply taking a civil service exam and was only admitted to a lower position. He was not given a psychological examination nor even had his background seriously checked.83 Philby entered the intelligence service with the help of Burgess and even admitted to being a former Leftist. He told the interviewers that he no longer was a Leftist and they believed him. Upon learning this, the United States had a decidedly negative response. A diplomatic cable from Washington to Whitehall quoted a Washington Post editorial:
the validity of British screening and security procedures is evidently questionable and the United States Government which has itself been very cautious in this matter has a right to expect His Majestys Government to pay careful attention to it in the interest of Anglo-American relations.84

83

Prime Minister's Office: Correspondence and Papers, 1945-1951, Disappearance of Foreign Office officials, Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess, [June 21, 1951], PREM/8/154 84 Prime Minister's Office: Correspondence and Papers, 1945-1951, Disappearance of Foreign Office officials, Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess, [June 21, 1951], PREM/8/154

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Steven Miles Aldrich argues85 that in 1950 the Attlee administration wanted to limit vetting because they were afraid that the knowledge of its existence would be a jealously guarded secret and would expose the system. The public would learn about it and there would cries of civil rights violations. However, the Philby and Maclean affairs changed that and vetting was introduced; and after it was introduced relations between the two countries would heal as evidenced by the 1954 amendment to the McMahon Act that was in Britains and the continued acts of intelligence sharing throughout the rest of the Cold War.

85

Richard J. Aldrich, The Hidden Hand: Britain, America, and Cold War Secret Intelligence, [New York City: Overlook Press, 2002], 426.

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Steven Miles

A Note on Sources

First of all, I would like to thank the people of the University of North Texas government archives department for their patients in helping me find obscure items. I would also like to thank my friend in the library Peter Kaiser who took an interest in my topic and send me suggestions. A very useful primary source from the National Archives is entitled Disappearance of Foreign Office officials, Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess. It provided insight into the American response to this affair and also some back ground on Maclean. My Silent War, Kim Philbys memoir, was also used extensively. Its an interesting that is obviously biased; however, it is useful for providing a basic background. My Five Cambridge Friends by Yuri Modin is also useful because it provides a Soviet perspective. For background information on Tito and Enver Hoxha I used the Marxist Internet Archive (www.marxists.org). This is an excellent resource that provides primary sources in the form of writings by major Marxists such as Hoxha, Stalin, Marx himself, Tito and Rosa Luxemberg. It is available in several languages and it is invaluable for doing research on Russian history or the history of socialism. For information on the VENONA project, the National Security Agency website was most helpful. It has a large collection of documents pertaining to Maclean and Burgess. The Central Intelligence Agency website was also useful for finding the intelligence estimate on Albania. Also, the website of the Nuclear Regulatory Agency helpfully provided a copy of the McMahon Act.

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Steven Miles For secondary sources I used several books. Phillip Knightleys The Master Spy is very good resource on Kim Philby. It relies on interviews with Philby and has information that is not available in My Silent War. Andrew Sinclairs The Red and the Blue is an excellent book about communism at Cambridge during the 1930s. an interesting and useful book is The Sword and the Shield by Andrew and Metrokhin that gives detailed information about intelligence operations during the Cold War using smuggled KGB documents. Finally, Betrayed by Nicholas Bethell is an excellent book about Operation Valuable. There were several documents on the British National Archives website that I was not able to obtain. A potentially useful document that I found listed was the minutes of a Russia Committee meeting. This document, and several others, is listed on the website; however, a patron has to submit a request and have it Xeroxed and sent through the mail. I did not have the time, nor the financial resources, to pay for this service. There is also a memoir by Donald Maclean that is unpublished and available in British Library. Unfortunately, I was not able to peruse this document due my limited chronological and financial resources.

Primary Sources

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Steven Miles

Sources from the British National Archives

Records of the Cabinet Office. Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing, S.W. 1, on Tuesday, 4th September, 1951, at 3 p.m,. September 4, 1951. CAB 128/20. Prime Minister's Office, Correspondence and Papers, 1945-1951. Dissappearance of Foreign Office Officials, Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess, June 21, 1951. PREM/8/154.

Hansard
Hansard Parliamentary Debate. Disappearance of Burgess and Maclean. HL Deb 22 November 1955 vol. 194 cc708-31. Hansard Parliamtary Debate. Former Foreign Office Official (Disappearence). HC Deb 07 November 1955 vol 545 cc1483-611.

United States Government Document

Senate Special Committee on Atomic Energy. Atomic Energy Act of 1946. 79th Congress, 1946. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates. The Current Situation in Albania. Langley: Central Intelligence Agency, 1949. National Security Agency. "VENONA Documents - October 1951." National Security Agency . October 11, 1951. http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/declass/venona/oct_1951.shtml (accessed March 17, 2011). Nuclear Files: Project of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. Anglo-American Declaration of Trust, June 13, 1944. August 11, 2009. http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/keyissues/nuclear-weapons/history/pre-cold-war/manhattan-project/declaration-oftrust_1944-06-13.htm (accessed April 21, 2011). Records of the Cabinet Office. "Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing, S.W. 1, on Tuesday, 4th September, 1951, at 3 p.m." September 4, 1951. CAB 128/20. United States Department of State. Memorandum of Agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Belgium Regarding Control of Uranium. Vol. II, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1029-1030. Washington, DC: GPO, 1944. United States Department of State. "Minutes of a Meeting of the United States Members of the Combined Policy Committee, Washington, August 24, 1951, 2:50 p.m." In Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, vol. 1, 755-763. Washington, DC: GPO, 1951. 23

Steven Miles

Memoirs and Interviews

Hoxha, Enver. The Anglo-American Threat to Albania. Tirana: "8 Nentori" Publishing House, 1982. . With Staliin: Memoirs from my Meetings with Stalin. Tirana: "8 Nentori" Publishing House, 1981. Modin, Yuri. My Five Cambridge Friends: Burgess, Maclean, Philby, Blunt and Cairncross. Translated by David Leitch. New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1994. Philby, Kim. My Silent War: The Autobiography of a Spy. New York City: The Modern Library, 2002 (1968). Tito, Josip Broz, interview by Kalamesh Banergi. Interview with Marshal Tito (October 1950).

Secondary Sources

Aldrich, Richard J. Espionage, Security and Intelligence in Britiian, 1945-1970. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999. . The Hidden Hand: Britian, America, and Cold War Secret Intelligence. New York City: Overlook Press, 2002. Andrew, Christopher. Defend the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5. New York City: Vintage Books, 2009. Andrew, Christopher, and Vasili Metrokhin. The Sword and the Shield. New York: Basic Books, 1999. Bethell, Nicholas. Betrayed. New York City: Times Books, 1984. Knightley, Phillip. The Master Spy: The Story of Kim Philby. New York City: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989. Merrick, Ray. "The Russia Committee of the British Foreign Office and the Cold War, 19461947." Jornal of Contemporary History 20, no. 3 (July 1985): 453-468. Miller, Byron S. "A Law is Passed: The Atomic Energy Act of 1946." The University of Chicago Law Review XV, no. 4 (1948): 799-821. Newton, Verne W. The Cambridge Spies: The Untold Story of Maclean, Philby and Burgess in America. New York: Madison Books, 1991. 24

Steven Miles O'Donnell, James S. A Coming of Age: Albania Unider Enver Hoxha. New York City: Columbia University Press, 1999. Records of the Cabinet Office. "Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing, S.W. 1, on Tuesday, 4th September, 1951, at 3 p.m." September 4, 1951. CAB 128/20. Sinclair, Andrew. The Red and the Blue: Cambrige, Treason and Intelligence. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1986. West, Nigel, and Oleg Tsarev. TRIPLEX: Secrets from the Cambridge Spies. Yale University Press: New Haven, 2009.

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