Untitled

Japanese Strategic Thought toward Asia
Strategic Thought in Northeast Asia

Gilbert Rozman, Series Editor
Russian Strategic Thought toward Asia

Edited by Gilbert Rozman, Kazuhiko Togo, and Joseph Ferguson
Japanese Strategic Thought toward Asia

Edited by Gilbert Rozman, Kazuhiko Togo, and Joseph Ferguson
Strategic Thinking about the Korean Nuclear Crisis: Four Parties Caught
between North Korea and the United States
By Gilbert Rozman
Korean Strategic Thought toward Asia

By Gilbert Rozman, In-taek Hyun, and Shin-wha Lee
Chinese Strategic Thought toward Asia

By Gilbert Rozman
Japanese Strategic Thought
toward Asia
Edited by
Gilbert Rozman, Kazuhiko Togo,
and
Joseph P. Ferguson
JAPANESE STRATEGIC THOUGHT TOWARD ASIA
© Gilbert Rozman, Kazuhiko Togo, and Joseph P. Ferguson, 2007.
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2007 978-1-4039-7553-9
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any
manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief
quotations embodied in critical articles or reviews.
First published in 2007 by
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Japanese strategic thought toward Asia / Gilbert Rozman, Kazuhiko
Togo, Joseph P. Ferguson, eds.
p. cm.—(Strategic thought in Northeast Asia)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Japan—Foreign relations—Asia. 2. Asia—Foreign relations—Japan.

3. Japan—Strategic aspects. 4. National security—Japan. I. Rozman,
Gilbert. II. Togo Kazuhiko, 1945– III. Ferguson, Joseph P.
JZ1745.A55J37 2007
327.5205—dc22 2006048205
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India.
First edition: January 2007
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Contents
Acknowledgments vii
1 Overview 1
Gilbert Rozman, Kazuhiko Togo,
and Joseph P. Ferguson
Part 1 Chronology
2 Japanese Strategic Thought toward Asia in the 1980s 35
Takashi Inoguchi
3 Japan’s Strategic Thinking toward
Asia in the First Half of the 1990s 57
Tsuyoshi Hasegawa
4 Japan’s Strategic Thinking in the Second Half
of the 1990s 79
Kazuhiko Togo
5 Japanese Strategy under Koizumi 109
T.J. Pempel
Part 2 Geography
6 Changing Japanese Strategic Thinking toward China 137
Ryosei Kokubun
7 Japanese Strategic Thinking toward Taiwan 159
Ming Wan
8 Japanese Strategic Thinking toward Korea 183
Cheol Hee Park
vi ● Contents
9 Japanese Strategic Thinking toward Russia 201

Joseph P. Ferguson
10 Japan’s Strategic Thinking toward Central Asia 225
Akio Kawato
11 Japanese Strategic Thinking on Regionalism 243
Gilbert Rozman
Contributors 269
Index 271
Acknowledgments
T
his volume is the second in a series on Strategic Thought in Asia.
With support from the Princeton Institute of International and
Regional Studies (PIIRS), directed by Miguel Centeno, the over-
all project began in 2004 and is expected to continue until 2008.
Without encouragement from PIIRS this project would not have been
possible. Former Japanese diplomat, Kazuhiko Togo, after serving as
Director General for European Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and as Ambassador to the Netherlands, came to Princeton to work with
Gilbert Rozman, Professor of Sociology, on both Russian and Japanese
strategic thought toward Asia. Joseph P. Ferguson also arrived in the fall
of 2004 as a postdoctoral fellow expert on both Japanese and Russian
foreign relations. Together the three of us organized a conference in
Princeton in May 2005, where each of the authors presented an initial
version of his chapter and critiqued an early draft of the overview.
We are grateful to the East Asian Studies Program at Princeton, directed
at the time by Martin Collcutt, for providing additional support for the
two visitors to Princeton and the conference. A number of specialists
who attended the conference or joined the organizers at workshops in
Princeton also played a role in shaping the contents of this volume, and
we appreciate their contributions.
Production of this volume was facilitated by Anthony Wahl at
Palgrave. We are thankful to all at Palgrave who have contributed to this
publication.
CHAPTER 1
Overview
Gilbert Rozman, Kazuhiko Togo, and
Joseph P. Ferguson
J apan being part of Northeast Asia had been directly influenced

through the first thousand years of its recorded history by just two
countries, China and Korea. For the past 150 years one of its great-
est foreign policy dilemmas has been how to balance the West, coming
from afar and representing modernity, and Asian neighbors, long behind
in the pursuit of modernization and power but temptingly close at hand.
Since the mid-1980s this dilemma has acquired new poignancy as the
power differential between these two poles has rapidly changed. At stake
are Japan’s position in the global balance of power and also its identity in
an age of globalization accompanied by rising regionalism and reemer-
gent nationalism. The challenge of strategic thinking toward Asia is to
assess how ties to the United States and others in the West can best serve
policies in nearby areas of Asia and how Japan’s own internal needs and
national interests are best pursued as these areas become transformed.
Our study examines how strategically have Japan’s leaders over the past
two decades viewed Asia, especially Northeast Asia. We identify criteria
for strategic thinking, assess how well they were met across four periods
(the 1980s, the first half of the 1990s, the second half of the 1990s, and
the Koizumi era through 2005), and separately focus on China, Japan, the
Korean peninsula, Russia, and Central Asia as well as providing a broad
look at perceptions of regionalism.
It is essential to avoid the pitfalls of judging what is strategic through
the frame of preferred relations with one or another country. For some,
positive strategic thinking is linked to associating more closely with the
2 ● Rozman, Togo, and Ferguson
United States; for others it comes from balancing the United States with
partners in Asia. Our criteria are independent of this dichotomy. We ask
to what extent was thinking targeted at making Japan more secure, pros-
perous, and respectable. Also, we consider to what degree was it directed
toward reassuring the Japanese public rather than rousing them, solving
recognized problems instead of postponing or exacerbating them, and
putting in place a process of careful deliberation at home and consulta-
tion abroad. These criteria stress the pursuit of long-term aims, balanc-
ing the expansion of Japan’s influence with success in winning greater
trust abroad and avoidance of excessive dependency with recognition of
the need for increased interdependence.
We note some recurrent priorities for Japan in Asia, the pursuit of
which provides grounds for evaluating strategic thinking. First, there is
the goal of balancing or limiting the country deemed to be ascendant or
threatening to Japan’s aspirations for influence. In the 1980s the Soviet
Union remained the foremost barrier; through the first half of the 1990s
leaders seemed most concerned about gaining more equality with the
United States in Asia; and afterward it is increasingly China that looms
as the constraining power. Second, Japanese cling to the objective of
legitimizing their country’s position in Asia, ending the abnormal legacy
of a defeated and repudiated power. China, South Korea, and now North
Korea are the targets for this strategic objective. Third, Japan has been
positioning itself for diplomatic maneuvering over the Korean peninsula
and Taiwan, matters of divided countries at the two main gateways to the
Japanese islands. Finally, leaders sought a path to leadership in Asia,
through various approaches such as plans for regionalism. Our compar-
isons of success in strategic thinking rely heavily on how well we
consider these priority goals to have been conceptualized and addressed.
Japan’s emergence from postwar humility and passivity in Asia
occurred over a quarter century, marked by the dual book-ends of the
five-year administrations of Nakasone Yasuhiro (1982–87) and Koizumi
Junichiro (2001–06). Each of these leaders deepened the alliance with
the United States, while projecting the image of a resurgent Japan inside
Asia. Nakasone strove to end the lethargy of a weak Japan whose eco-
nomic power was not matched by the lingering reticence of a defeated
power’s postwar diplomacy. Koizumi aimed to halt Japan’s growing
marginalization in Asia by defiantly repulsing further criticism of its
historic behavior regarding issues that he considers domestic or personal.
Though the two leaders took contrasting approaches to close East Asian
neighbors, they wrestled with similar challenges in broadening Japan’s
role in the region: how independent of the United States to be in
Overview ● 3
asserting nationalism and preparing for breakthroughs in Asia; how

compromising to be with China and South Korea in order to establish a
strong foothold nearby in Asia; how hard to work to overcome the terri-
torial dispute with Moscow and the lack of normalization with
Pyongyang in order to pursue a new strategic balance; and how much
attention to pay to Southeast Asia in order to forge an expansive hinter-
land with potential for regionalism.
As his time in office drew to an end, Nakasone faced a radical trans-
formation in U.S.–Soviet relations, both raising hope for new diplo-
matic opportunities and casting doubt on long-standing assumptions.
A new premium was placed on strategic thinking following insistence
early in Nakasone’s tenure that intensification of the cold war would
raise Japan’s strategic profile. Similarly, Koizumi, triumphant after elec-
tions to the Lower House of the Diet in September 2005, faced a water-
shed in Asia. After drawing closer to the United States in partnership
with George W. Bush, he stood at the threshold of a far-reaching strug-
gle in Asia due to: a renewed U.S. push for a comprehensive approach
that would stop North Korea’s capacity to pose a threat and limit China’s
rise as a political power; a strengthened Sino-Russian strategic partner-
ship with growing inclusion of Central Asia; a deepening North Korean
nuclear crisis with reverberations in the troubled six-party talks where
Japan found only the United States like-minded on security; the break-
down of trust in bilateral ties with China and South Korea; and the
bifurcation of thinking on regionalism in the face of the back-to-back
meetings of ASEAN ⫹ 3 and the East Asian Summit (EAS). While
drawing ever closer to the United States, Koizumi struggled to articulate
a diplomatic strategy to deal with dramatic changes in Japan’s Asian
environment.
In the 14-year interval between Nakasone and Koizumi we observe
three distinct periods of groping with rapid changes without a firm
strategic anchor. First, without major adjustment in the strategic out-
look set by Nakasone, came strategic overconfidence under shortlived
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) prime ministers hesitant to respond to
the end of the cold war and abrupt reorganization in Asia. Second, Japan
was beset by strategic weakness as the LDP could not exert power and no
alternative strategic planning center could replace it in an environment
of multiparty coalitions and weakly centralized authority. Third, after
the LDP regained foreign policy control we observe strategic pragmatism.
In contrast to the cautious assertiveness in Asia of Nakasone and the
defiant assertiveness of Koizumi, these three periods produced an incon-
sistent record with some promising initiatives mixed with many lost
opportunities. Koizumi left behind weakness and pragmatism in favor of

bold rebalancing of the United States and Asia, letting opportunities for
Japan in Asia pass.
Though the focus below is strategic thought toward Northeast Asia, it
would be a mistake to overlook three other orientations that operate in
the background. First is the sense of national identity on which all strate-
gic thinking is anchored. Having been shaken by the devastating defeat
of 1945, this identity is still in flux in ways that bear heavily on thinking
toward the nations of Northeast Asia. After all, some of these nations
view Japan through a historical prism, and the Japanese cannot avoid
reciprocating with their own search for the meaning of past conduct. Yet,
we should avoid single-mindedly associating national identity with a
complex centered on the history of the first half of the twentieth century.
Appeals for becoming a “normal state” point no less to assuming the full
responsibilities of the international community, including military
cooperation to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) and support of terrorism. Japan’s quest to become a permanent
member of the United Nations (UN) Security Council should be seen in
this light too. Converting economic power into political status and
expanded “soft” power are aspects of the drive for a new international
identity.
A second orientation that stands squarely in the background of views
toward Asia is strategic thinking toward the United States. With power
relations in Asia in great flux and Japan’s early postwar aspirations there
unrealized, solidifying relations with the United States has become ever
more important. Although this book does not directly assess this part of
Japanese strategic thought, we do not hesitate to conclude that the level
of consistency, coordination, and long-term calculus has been generally
higher in thinking about the United States. We do not doubt that a care-
ful evaluation of strategic thinking toward the United States would yield
strikingly different results from our coverage of thinking toward Asia.
Moreover, the two are not independent of each other. In putting priority
on close ties with the United States for many years ahead, Japanese lead-
ers have prepared a more solid foundation for “reentry into Asia.” Along
with revitalizing national identity, this has potential to bolster confi-
dence for addressing foreign policy complexities with reduced emotional
nationalism and idealistic pacifism—the two extremes that bedeviled
Japanese strategic thinking in the twentieth century.
Third, we must acknowledge that the geographical range of our cover-
age of Asia largely omits areas that are now becoming more closely
intertwined. Whereas through the 1990s few included India in calculations
Overview ● 5
of the great power balance facing Japan, the situation is changing.

Moreover, Australia and New Zealand have joined with India as newly
invited members at the first EAS, adding to the core of 13 states in
ASEAN ⫹ 3 that first convened in 1997. Above all, it is Southeast Asian
states and ASEAN as a whole that remain important objects of Japanese
strategic calculations. Below we consider Southeast Asia and ASEAN in
some chapters, such as the one on regionalism, but we concentrate
further north where the greatest challenges face Japan. As in the lack of
separate focus on national identity and the United States, our restricted
geographical emphasis in Asia limits our capacity to generalize about
Japanese strategic thinking as a whole. Our justification is that Northeast
Asia is the core of Japan’s strategic interests in Asia, and it poses enough
challenges to deserve our primary and intense attention.
Some may argue that success that might be identified through the
above three orientations should be interpreted as counterbalancing
whatever shortcomings we find in the geographical core of our coverage.
We do not recognize this tradeoff as some kind of zero–sum game.
Indeed, we see no alternative to strategic thinking centered on Northeast
Asia. Distracting unresolved identity discussions toward revisionist
rationalizations does not clarify critical historical identity questions that
center on past ties in this region. Nor do certain US efforts to swing Japan
behind goals that separate it from Northeast Asia leave Japan well
positioned to strike a balance by looking in both directions. Finally, in
Southeast Asia and beyond, Japan has been scrambling to counter
China’s initiatives on a playing field that transfers their rivalry. The other
orientations matter, but they do not make the case that relative success
in strategic thinking outside of Northeast Asia means that Japan has pre-
pared itself to face its greatest challenges.
Comparing the strategic thinking toward Asia in Japan over four peri-
ods, we find more success in some periods than others. In the 1980s we
note some success, especially in Nakasone’s time, with dwindling success
in the overconfident period that followed. In the first half of the 1990s
we see much less success as strategic weakness overtook forward-looking
calculations. In contrast, the pragmatic period in the second half of the
1990s strikes us as the most successful; serious efforts were made to
achieve a strategic understanding of Japan’s difficulties in Asia. Finally,
we rank Koizumi’s defiantly assertive period even below the period of
strategic weakness in addressing Japan’s strategic challenges in Asia.
After a quarter century of low-key continuity in which strategic think-
ing was often set aside as an untimely source of discord at home and
abroad, the Japanese political elite entered the 1980s in a mood to
advance expediently toward normalcy. They understood the need to make

progress on three fronts: (1) to transform ties with the United States, the
country’s postwar occupier and protector, with the goal of gaining ade-
quate balance in Asia; (2) to reestablish regional influence, especially in
Northeast Asia as the country’s backyard from which it had been igno-
miniously ousted in 1945, with the goal of reconciliation; and (3) to
restore pride at home in the Japanese nation, after an embarrassing silence
marked by a virtual stalemate between leftist and rightist notions of
national identity, with the goal of normal nationalism. The shared drive for
strategic thinking required more than a rising consensus that opportunities
for pursuing these three broad objectives were approaching. The challenge
was to balance these goals, to set priorities, and to resolve inconsistencies
in the means available for a combined strategic approach.
In the 1970s Japan had concentrated on Southeast Asia with consid-
erable success. It would continue to promote ties with many countries
in this region. Yet, the key sites of reconciliation were concentrated in
Northeast Asia. After relations with the Soviet Union had deteriorated in
the second half of the 1970s, Japan set its sights on both using the Soviet
threat to boost its regional standing and normalizing ties with that country
as a step toward reshaping its regional role. In contrast, relations
with China were moving forward after Beijing’s shift to reform and
openness; reconciliation seemed within reach through massive Official
Development Assistance (ODA) and other economic cooperation. The
logic of dual U.S. alliances with Japan and South Korea dictated that an
upturn in relations with Seoul should occur, securing the most logical
beachhead on the Asian continent. As Japan’s economic power rose, the
potential was growing to take advantage of Soviet stagnation, Chinese
reform, and South Korea’s widening industrial dependency. Strategic
thinking offered a means to fit together the pieces of this complex region
into an overall program of reasserting Japan’s leadership in a region
poised for transformation.
The 1980s
The 1980s marked the height of Japan’s economic power. Japan had suc-
cessfully overcome the two oil shocks in the 1970s and become a member
of the G-7, and through the 1980s its economy kept growing, leading to
the “bubble” in the latter part of the decade. Japan’s economic ascen-
dancy in this period coincided with the emergence of Gorbachev in the
Soviet Union; his unprecedented “new thinking” led to the end of the
cold war. The dissolution of the Soviet Union inevitably highlighted
Overview ● 7
Japan’s incontestable economic weight among the Western powers.

Japan’s aspiration that its growing position in the international eco-
nomic, and hence, political world should be recognized, and that it
should play a more responsible and proactive role became an underlining
motive of this decade. In reality, Japan’s policy choices were limited by
the external restraints of the cold war and the unresolved post–World
War II (WWII) syndrome, and its policy objectives did not produce as
much success as it anticipated. But the overall strategic thinking toward
greater proactiveness and autonomy was clearly seen. Nakasone became
the symbolic leader of this direction.
Some foreign leaders fueled rising expectations too. Ronald Reagan
gave Japan a green light to assert itself more politically and militarily
against the Soviet threat, relaxing concern that it should do more to
address public opinion in South Korea. Following the lead of Mao
Zedong and Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping and then Hu Yaobang led many
in Japan to believe that China was preoccupied first with the Soviet
threat and then with economic modernization, ready to set aside historical
enmity and downplay nationalism. Finally, Leonid Brezhnev aggressively
put in place new weapons that targeted Japan, sponsored invasions in
Vietnam and Afghanistan, and unleashed a stream of invectives against
so-called Japanese militarism. These leaders helped define strategic
options for Nakasone, who became prime minister with strong inclina-
tions to advance all three of Japan’s broad normalizing goals. The shared
Soviet threat led Washington to beckon Tokyo, giving hope that more
alliance equality could accompany more regional leadership.
The United States stayed the focal point of Japan’s strategic thinking.
Since Japan’s economic development and the growing U.S.–Japan trade
deficit (over $50 billion in the middle of the 1980s) were central themes,
the political and economic task “to overcome the economic and trade
frictions” became the immediate strategic agenda. First, the United
States pressured and then Japan reacted, but Japan’s willingness to coop-
erate in the devaluation of the dollar (hence, revaluation of the yen) at
Plaza (1985) and Louvre (1987) did succeed in reducing its trade
surplus. Nakasone’s own initiatives to change Japan so that it becomes
better attuned to the international community, embodied in the
Maekawa Report (1986), cannot be considered as just reactive and pas-
sive. Outside pressure was there, but equally there was a willingness on
the Japanese side to utilize this pressure for enhancing Japan’s strategic
position in the international community. Kokusaika (internationalization)
was a key word to describe Japan’s policy; toward the end of the 1980s
this motto developed into a symbol of Japan’s willingness to implement
drastic changes: daisanno kaikoku (the third opening). The enormous

bureaucratic energy directed toward the Structural Impediments
Initiatives (SII) (1989–90) also represented Japan’s willingness to change
the internal texture of the society to make it more harmonious with the
outside world. Asia was secondary, but as the decade proceeded it rose in
prominence.
In the politico-security area, drastic changes took place. The confu-
sion during the Suzuki cabinet (1981) that he could not acknowledge
the military implications of the “alliance” reflected a lack of leadership
by a weak prime minister, but it was also a structural problem of passive
pacifism. Nakasone took an assertive position, and the key notion he
floated at the Williamsburg Summit (1983) that “Western security is
indivisible” and that the SS-20s east of the Urals have to be dismantled
together with those west of the Urals (zero-option in INF or Intermediate
Nuclear Forces negotiations to be incorporated into the INF Treaty of
1987) was probably the first initiative that Japan took in international
defense-security matters of that magnitude. Admittedly, proactiveness
in economic and politico-security areas did not bring clear recognition;
Japan “bashers” insisted that change was excessively difficult or slow in
Japan. Even Nakasone could not send mine sweepers to the Persian Gulf
because of the pacifists’ internal power (1987–88). The FSX contro-
versy (1989) threatened the advent of security conflicts in addition to
the trade conflicts. Growing economic strength and the disappearance
of the Soviet Union as the rival power resulted in several years when
Japan almost acquired the image of a major threat in the United States.
The end of the cold war resulted in such views as “The Japan that Can
Say ‘No’ ” by Ishihara and Morita (1989), but psychological tensions did
not last long. Strategic thinking as manifested by Nakasone paved the
way to a proactive orientation from the mid-1990s. A parallel rise in
confidence toward Asia supported a more autonomous and energetic
foreign policy.
Aspiring strategic thinkers and officials had the most freedom of
action in dealing with Northeast Asia. Washington remained the driving
force in bilateral relations that would be difficult to challenge; Tokyo’s
hope for equality rested largely on maneuvering in triangular contexts
involving other Asian states. At home, voters, public opinion, and
entrenched bureaucratic turf left only narrow parameters for nationalism.
To overcome these narrow parameters required breakthroughs in foreign
relations rather than some new political ploy by the Right or the Left
within the scope of domestic politics. All could notice that the Asian
continent was astir, opening new room for Japan to become more
Overview ● 9
actively engaged and, perhaps, to accomplish all three of its paramount

strategic goals: adequate balance with the United States in Asia, regional
influence and reconciliation, and pride marked by normal nationalism.
Nakasone cultivated personal ties with four leaders who could help
realize Japan’s goals in Asia. Overcoming a downturn in relations with
South Korea at the start of the decade and recognizing that the United
States would appreciate a Japanese initiative, he went to Seoul in January
1983 bearing economic assistance of $4 billion and setting in motion
preparations for a return visit of Chun Doo-hwan in 1984. Just the
occurrence of summits between these two wary nations gave the appear-
ance of a strategic advance. The second leader critical to Nakasone’s aspi-
ration was Hu Yaobang, whose country in 1982 was facing a shift in the
strategic triangle, as U.S. relations tottered under the Taiwan issue and
Soviet relations began to move ahead after Brezhnev’s Tashkent speech.
Though China had begun to show some nervousness about Nakasone’s
assertion that Japan was becoming an unsinkable aircraft carrier in its
military alignment and intimations that it was intent on becoming a
political great power, Hu’s visit to Tokyo in November 1983 brought
new emphasis on achieving mutual trust and suggested a new maturity
to relations. Nakasone’s most trumpeted success came in the “Ron–Yasu”
relationship, which at least gave the semblance of greater equality. The
Williamsburg Summit with the notion of the “indivisibility of security
among the West” and the removal of Soviet SS-20 was also a symbolic
achievement of the Ron–Yasu personal relationship. At mid-decade
Japan had a “presidential” leader boosting ties with critical partners and
riding an economic boom backed by the confidence of his nation, but
not with strategic thinking sufficient for long-term challenges. Only
when Nakasone returned from the funeral of Konstantin Chernenko in
1985 optimistic about doing business with the new Soviet leader
Mikhail Gorbachev did he seem ready to forge another tie and make the
jump to a strategic role that could reorient Northeast Asia.
From 1985 to 1988 weaknesses in Japan’s pursuit of separate goals in
Northeast Asia became clearly exposed. Nakasone’s visit to the Yasukuni
shrine set back relations with China and South Korea. Hu Yaobang was
ousted as party secretary in China, being blamed even for being
pro-Japan. As South Korean democratization burst forth, popular
resentment of Japan and past autocrats’ dealings with it complicated
relations. After a promising start in 1986 in exchanges of officials with
Moscow, whose diplomacy was transformed by Gorbachev’s “new
thinking,” one security problem after another set the clock back as Japanese
nervously watched Reagan embrace arms control with Gorbachev. With
Takeshita Noboru as prime minister from the end of 1987, Japan still
had pretences about converting its economic weight into new political
power, but the personal relations and leadership were weaker while new
strategizing was not keeping pace with rapid regional change.
Japan’s relations with the Soviet Union after Gorbachev came to
power in 1985 were characterized by notable ups and downs. They began
with a speedy improvement in the first half of 1986 with Shevardnadze
and Abe’s reciprocal visits but then faced a sharp downturn for nearly
two years. Resumption of the negotiations in the second half of 1988
was followed by a second downturn in the first half of 1989. Then slow
but steady negotiations led to Gorbachev’s belated visit to Japan in April
1991. Why these ups and downs, and more importantly, why did it take
six years until Gorbachev made his first visit to Japan? Soviet displeasure
against Japan joining the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) (autumn
1986), the Toshiba submarine technology leak (spring 1987), and
mutual expulsion of diplomats and trade representatives (1987) all
exacerbated relations. So too did a disconnect between the two sides in
1989 in the process of the negotiations. Whatever the direct reasons for
the downturn in relations, on the Japanese side, albeit slow and fragile,
there was growing recognition that a clear opportunity for drastic
improvement had emerged: Resolution of the thorny territorial problem
and a fundamental improvement in relations would consolidate Japan’s
strategic position. These limited and unsuccessful attempts were lessons
for Japan’s policymakers on how to develop relations in the 1990s.
Japan–Korea relations proceeded in the same direction with the same
limitations as Japan–China ties. Suzuki and Chun Doo-hwan assumed
power from 1980, and relations between the two countries entered into
difficulty around the issue of Japan’s ODA to Korea. Knowing the strategic
importance of resolving this issue, Nakasone acted swiftly after becoming
prime minister. Chun visited Japan in 1984 and relations between the
two countries seem to have stabilized. But in addition to the issues
related to a 1982 textbook and Nakasone’s 1985 visit to Yasukuni, a
1986 article in a monthly magazine by Fujio Seiko, minister of culture
and education, deepened the rift. Nakasone’s decision to dismiss Fujio
from his cabinet post saved the relations from further rupture, but the
issue of historic recognition stayed alive.
As China continued the fundamental changes begun under Deng
Xiaoping in 1978, Japan saw an opportunity and the necessity of
encouraging “reform and opening” because modernization would enable
China to become a harmonious partner in the region. Japan took a con-
sistent policy of “engagement,” starting from Ohira’s visit to China in
Overview ● 11
1979 and the beginning of the first ODA package. These packages
punctuated the 1980s: the second package with Nakasone’s visit in 1984,
and the third during Takeshita’s visit in 1988. Engagement of China was
further exemplified in the reaction after the Tiananmen Square
repression, when Japan, while denouncing human rights infringements,
advocated a policy of “not isolating China.” China showed appreciation,
which paved the way to the imperial visit in 1992.
Japan failed to understand another side of Deng’s “reform and opening.”
Economic liberalization and political pressures made it necessary for
China to face uncertain identity issues. An enhanced nationalism and a
newly targeted Japan as a national enemy began spreading in China, in
the party ideology and education. Zhou Enlai’s definition, “Japanese mil-
itarism is a common enemy of the Chinese and Japanese people,” which
emphasized the friendship of the two nations, faded from sight. Ironically
and tragically, at a time when new sensitivity over the issue of historic
recognition emerged in China, a completely opposite reaction emerged in
Japan. The majority of Japanese by this time came to realize that their
pre-WWII policy toward China had been marked by something imper-
missible, but more than 30 years of sincere endeavor to become a peace-
ful nation, a substantial amount of ODA going to China, and rapid
development of economic relations and people-to-people exchanges gave
them an impression that the road to reconciliation was near. At the same
time, those who felt that the post–WWII settlement had somehow
infringed on Japan’s prewar honor and righteousness decided that the
time had come to speak their views more openly. But the textbook
controversy, the visit to Yasukuni, and statements by politicians justifying
Japan’s prewar activities could not result in constructive mutual under-
standing. Rather they demonstrated the extreme sensitivity of these issues
in Asia, Japan’s ultimate willingness to switch course in the face of those
Asian views, and some disarray among Japanese politicians unable to
convey their views to the outside world. Although each incident was tem-
porarily overcome, the issue of historic recognition stayed on the agendas
of Chinese internal politics and Japan–China bilateral relations.
The political Right and Left overwhelmed the nascent centrist think-
ing in official circles, the media, and academia. The Right did not wel-
come a debate about reconciliation through fuller and deeper apologies
to China and South Korea; some branded as traitors the few who dared
to propose a compromise or staggered approach on the four islands in
dispute with the Soviet Union as a means to normalization of relations.
With the Left clinging to pacifism and ignoring the importance of work-
ing in tandem with the United States to take responsibility for a world
still filled with uncertainty, many who might have moved to the center
hesitated to confront the firm positions to the Right. As U.S.–Soviet ties
and Sino-Soviet ties no longer permitted Japan to pursue its goals as
Nakasone had assumed and South Korean change demanded a new
approach, there were only glimmers of a strategic debate linked to such
objectives as reentering Asia and forging regionalism. Even under cold
war restraint, the 1980s had opened an opportunity for Japan to develop
strategic relations with its Asian partners, notably China and Korea, but
internal constraints, notably from the unresolved post-WWII issues, and
inability to perceive how these relations could be renewed in neighboring
countries, prevented Japan from grasping it.
Various explanations can be suggested for a dearth of strategic think-
ing in the midst of rapid transformation of the regional and global
strategic environment. First is the lack of institutionalization in govern-
ment, academia, and the media of security expertise. The fields of
international relations, area studies, and security studies had been slow
to evolve. Economics had dominated Japan’s approach to the world, and
the voices of those in the Foreign Ministry and the universities in favor
of more vigorous steps to understand elite opinion in Asian countries
and to achieve reconciliation were trumped by LDP politicians once
political relations gained priority. Second is continued preoccupation
with the United States, exacerbated by rising trade friction in the 1980s
and by contradictory calls to stand up to U.S. pressure by carving more
independent space for Japan and to ride the U.S. coattails in solidifying
ties in Asia. The contradictory goals of the early Reagan years of con-
taining the Soviets and supporting Taiwan and the concentration on
Europe in the later years without much attention to Russia in Asia did
not prepare Japan for engaging Gorbachev and reconciling with Chinese
or even South Korean leaders. The message was similar to that in
2001–05: China matters little compared to Japan and even in Europe
only Great Britain is so well trusted and so vital; the United States
counts on Japan’s increased military role; and Japan can count on loyal
ties to the United States putting it on top of Asia. This may have aroused
excessive expectations. Third, the rise of nationalism in China to replace
discredited Maoist communism and in South Korea along with democ-
ratization raised historical consciousness in ways that Japan could not
easily diffuse with fuller apologies. Relations were becoming subject to
mass consciousness and no longer were amenable for a few leaders,
however well intentioned, to resolve.
Most Japanese did not recognize the need for a far-reaching strategic
reevaluation because of reassuring messages suggesting breakthroughs
Overview ● 13
around the corner. The bubble economy instilled confidence in Japan’s

growing economic clout, which, most assumed, would bring dividends
before long. Nakasone repaired relations with China, promising no more
Yasukuni visits, and the decade ended with Japan gaining favor by insist-
ing that China should not be isolated despite sanctions after the
Tiananmen state brutality. After hopes for an early Gorbachev visit in
January 1987 faded, the countdown for his arrival had at the end of
1989 resuscitated expectations of a dramatic breakthrough. Security
from the U.S. alliance gave Japanese the luxury of unrealistic hopes that
forces on the Left were quick to embrace and many on the Right did not
refute since the outcome could have been more talk of compromise.
Economic overconfidence combined with foreign policy optimism left
strategic thinking in the shadows.
The dearth of strategic thinking must be considered a reason why suc-
cessive windows of opportunity were lost in Japanese relations with
neighbors in Northeast Asia. Over six consecutive years bold break-
through chances were missed. In 1984 South Korea was reeling from
the shooting down of KAL flight 007 over the Russian Far East and the
bombing of its leadership in Burma, whereas Japanese ties were improv-
ing and a strongman in power could have led his nation further on the
path of reconciliation. This was a time for bold action over the history
issue, not satisfaction over incremental summits. In 1985, Hu Yaobang’s
friendly leadership under Deng Xiaoping’s direction before nationalism
had intensified, offered another chance following rejection of the anti-
spiritual pollution campaign and a sharp acceleration of reform now
centered on urban areas and drawing on Japanese ODA. As a model and
vital partner, Japan could have pressed to resolve distrust still deeply
rooted in the Chinese population instead of Nakasone going to the
Yasukuni shrine. It was the Soviet Union’s turn in 1986 to beckon with
new thinking on global relations under a vigorous new leader able to
initiate a sharp shift in direction. During the first half of the year relations
thawed fast, but Japan’s approach should have been bolder and its
handling of potential setbacks over SDI and technology leakage more
reassuring. Another opportunity presented itself in 1987 as South Korea
democratized before nordpolitik turned its attention to China and the
Soviet Union. By embracing this new face of Korea with appreciation for
public opinion, Japan could have put relations on a new footing. In 1988
China again was on track toward more openness and more need for eco-
nomic support in the face of inflation. In addition to offering a new ODA
package, Japan could have turned China’s cultural fever into a joint search
for historical trust putting the years of aggression into a context of
centuries of shared tradition. Finally, the first half of 1989 was a fitting
time for a far-reaching initiative toward Gorbachev, whose needs were
mounting. The hiatus in relations after Moscow decided that Tokyo
pressed it too hard contrasted to the stunning successes in Moscow’s other
great power bilateral relations. Year after year an opportunity arose to
pursue a fundamental change in Japan’s ties with Asia, but the year 1990
began with Japan still looking for a breakthrough.
It is not beyond imagination to envision a pattern of snowballing suc-
cess in diplomacy, as one breakthrough led to another. After all, Japan
mostly enjoyed an image of efficient management, social harmony, and
benign diplomacy reliant on economic ties. If it had parlayed
“Ron–Yasu” ties in 1983 into a sharp improvement in ties with the
South Korean leadership in 1984, then a notable upturn in ties with
the Chinese leadership in 1985, and finally a clear understanding with the
Soviet leadership in 1986, Japan could have positioned itself for further
boosts in bilateral relations broadening to the public. In a second round
of advances, it could have grasped Korean democratization, Chinese cul-
tural fever, and Soviet glasnost with further initiatives. Flush with money
and a global image of a rising but nonthreatening power, Japan faced a
region where it needed to do a lot of convincing and had unprecedented
opportunities to succeed.
The decade of the 1980s saw progress mostly in relations with the
United States, accepting Japan as a partner in Asia and finding growing
satisfaction from Japan’s “forward defense strategy” of protecting sea
lanes and coping with newly deployed Soviet aircraft, next with China
relying on Japan for economic change and seeing it as a model, and to
some degree with South Korea and the Soviet Union as long-sought
negotiating partners now ready to conduct more normal diplomacy.
These were significant advances and met expectations for step-by-step
improvement in Japan’s Asian environment. Yet, the gains fell far short
of aspirations and the needs of the time. They suggest that leaders and
elite opinion paradoxically both set their sights too low, focusing on nar-
row progress, and expected too much, assuming that deep-seated histor-
ical issues could be resolved on the basis of economic diplomacy and
little compromise. Only strategic thinking would have prepared leaders
and the public for tough choices at home and rapid responses abroad.
Dramatic events at the end of the decade could not but give new
impetus to the quest for breakthroughs in relations. In June 1989,
Sino-U.S. relations abruptly deteriorated; instead of nervousness about
the United States drawing too close to China, Japanese saw a gap that
might be bridged. In autumn the cold war was ending, leaving Japanese
Overview ● 15
worried that they were isolated from new currents and very sensitive to
talk in the United States that their country was becoming the foremost
strategic competitor. South Korea’s nordpolitik and North Korea’s new iso-
lation created unprecedented postwar flux around the Korean peninsula.
The search for a strategic response to this torrent of change would lead
Japanese discussions in new directions as the 1990s began.
The First Half of the 1990s

With the end of the cold war the decisive turn in post-WWII
international relations gave opportunities for all major nations to adopt
new strategic thinking. For Japan, on the one hand, the cold war iron
umbrella was lifted, exposing it to the reality of the world. This com-
pelled its leaders, after initial hesitation, to take a more realistic and
proactive security policy. On the other hand, for geopolitical leverage
Japan’s response turned out to be slow and unimaginative in grasping the
fundamental changes occurring in the region. With a lot of potential at
the start of the 1990s, toward the middle of the 1990s the political land-
scape changed dramatically. As the 1990s began with the international
environment fundamentally changed, many in Japan anticipated
dramatic advances. Hopes rose after China was isolated, leaving a wedge
in U.S. relations for Japan to fill, and after the collapse of the Soviet
Union when Yeltsin became dependent on the G-7. Talks with North
Korea were frequent in 1991–92 with some hope for a breakthrough.
Election of a new South Korean president late in 1992 led to signs of a
new spirit of cooperation. Even Central Asia, a region left for grabs,
came into play in 1992. Instead of a sustained strategy for utilizing this
environment, we observe a pattern of excessive expectations and insuffi-
cient boldness in anticipating other nations’ needs. A competitive atmos-
phere with the United States cast doubt on old ways of thinking, but
optimism about Japan’s autonomous rise in Asia was not an answer. If
specialists in the government strove to understand the ways their coun-
terparts were thinking and made progress toward realistic programs, this
could not substitute for decisive and forward-looking leadership from
the top and a candid debate in the media over possible tradeoffs.
The first half of the 1990s was the most important period in the
transformation of Japan’s strategic environment and outlook, both at
home and abroad, after the restoration of sovereignty in the early 1950s.
Because the party in power (the LDP) lost its exclusive grip and the long-
time major rival power (the Japan Socialist Party) collapsed along with
its worldview, barriers to new thinking should have fallen. Japan’s place
in the world was tested by the most troubled relations with the United
States, which aroused new doubts in public opinion, as well as the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union, the enemy that bound together Japan and the
United States throughout the cold war. Moreover, Japan’s place in Asia
became for the first time in the postwar era a matter of intense concern,
mixing new opportunity in the face of flux in all directions with rising
alarm as events did not unfold as expected. This was a time for maximal
strategic anticipation and adjustment, but the results were disappointing
due to a mixture of excessive pessimism toward the United States and
excessive optimism over “reentry into Asia.” Tensions over trade cast a
shadow that left Japan less securely anchored in its alliance and less
prone to a steady hand in dealings in Asia.
With the United States more concerned about Yeltsin’s success with
the Russian public than Japan’s territorial satisfaction and hesitant to
endorse Japan’s handling of the history issue with its neighbors, Japan
was on its own. Missing was a broad framework for interpreting how to
“reenter Asia” without compromising with one or another of the region’s
states. The year 1992 brought a cascade of opportunities with only short
intervals to make bold decisions that defied the logic of the 1980s. The
response to new Russian flexibility on the disputed islands proved inad-
equate to meet the needs of a reform leadership that only months later
would face mounting nationalist pressure. China’s full-scale market
opening led to increased Chinese interest in Japanese investment and an
invitation to the Japanese emperor to visit. After hesitating to send him,
the sincere message that he was able to deliver not only did not boost
relations it did not succeed in calming the continuous resentment
against Japanese historic atrocities. Still expecting that economic lever-
age would work, the Japanese were slow to grasp the message that the
hopes of 1992 were not likely to reappear. China’s necessity of maintain-
ing its national ideology for unity found no reason to abandon a rigor-
ous attitude to prewar Japanese atrocities, and its growing geopolitical
assertiveness increasingly collided with Japan’s enhanced sense of realism.
China’s nationwide campaign on the Nanjing massacre in 1995 and its
nuclear testing from May, at a time when Prime Minister Murayama
expressed with political courage his statement of “deep remorse and
heartfelt apology,” symbolized this change.
On the Korean peninsula, President Roh Tae-woo’s swift nordpolitik
in establishing ties with the Soviet Union (September 1990) and China
(August 1992) must have shocked Kim Il-sung, who sought equivalent
relations with Japan and the United States. After a flurry of negotiations,
talks fell into a long stalemate from early 1992. But Japan’s effort during
Overview ● 17
negotiations with North Korea to alleviate South Korean anxiety and the
shared threat from the North due to its nuclear crisis brought Japan and
South Korea somewhat closer. Japan’s effort in resolving the comfort
women issue under the three cabinets (Miyazawa, Hosokawa, and
Murayama, 1992–95) paved the way to development of relations in the
second half of the decade, but it was far from resolving the deep-rooted
mistrust felt by Koreans against Japan. Kim Young-sam’s election as the
first civilian leader in 1993 does not seem to have been much exploited
by the Japanese leadership.
In 1991–92 during a fleeting period of euphoria in Russia, a narrow
window of opportunity to resolve the territorial issue between the two
countries emerged. After a brief interlude following Gorbachev’s visit in
April 1991 through the abortive coup in August, in dealings with Yeltsin
as head of the Russian government serious efforts began to resolve
the territorial issue. Russia moved fast toward the spring of 1992, but
Japan’s intransigence prevented it from grasping this opportunity. Yeltsin
cancelled his visit in September 1992, and the window of opportunity
was closed.
The regional situation deteriorated from 1993. Writings in all four of
the region’s countries became more nationalistic toward Japan. The
Chinese grew confident, whereas the Russians vented their frustrations,
South Korean democracy rediscovered Japan as the national nemesis,
and North Korea accompanied its nuclear brinkmanship with more
heated rhetoric against Japan. Meanwhile, the crash of the bubble econ-
omy and the political turmoil of divided government damped Japanese
hopes. It took effort to stabilize ties with all parties. Yet, unrealistic
interpretations were attached to the new arrangements. If the Tokyo
Declaration patched up ties with Yeltsin and gave some hint of potential
for talks on the disputed islands, it did not justify the insistence of some
that a major advance had occurred that indicated Yeltsin would seriously
consider transferring all four islands. At the fiftieth anniversary of the
end of the war the steps taken by non-LDP leaders to reassure China and
Korea on history were undermined by the Diet and prefectural assem-
blies that tried to offer certain justifications for Japan’s past activities.
The KEDO agreement gave the Japanese some taste for cooperating with
the United States and South Korea to address troubling behavior by
North Korea through compromise, but many dwelt on Japan’s weakness
in the crisis and absence of a place in four-party talks rather than plan-
ning for coordination to face new assertiveness by the North. Japanese
nationalism had no answers for the upsurge of nationalism around
Japan’s borders except blaming others. Critical appraisals of diplomacy
came largely from the Right complaining of weakness, as the Left was
fading quickly. Asian-centered reasoning remained mostly in the mold of
seeking friendship rather than solving problems.
The regional environment in the mid-1990s did not offer many
opportunities for strategic breakthroughs; expectations had to be
lowered. Jiang Zemin was boosting nationalism that strengthened his
hold on power but was damaging for relations with Japan. Seeking reelec-
tion, Boris Yeltsin catered to nationalists and gave new preference to part-
nership with China, while doing little to stem rampant demagoguery and
corruption in the Russian Far East. Kim Jong-il replaced his father with
cautious steps to solidify his position and little openness despite severe
famine in the North. Before the Asian financial crisis, South Koreans may
have been too confident to make it easy for Japanese leaders to ease
tensions. The voices of prime ministers, especially Murayama, attuned to
Asian sensitivities may have obscured the deteriorating climate for Japan.
After an interlude in 1989–93 of focusing on China’s need for Japan
because of its isolation from the United States and its loss of the social-
ist camp, the Japanese started to recognize that they were unlikely to
become a bridge between China and the United States or a sponsor of
China’s entry into regionalism. Beginning in 1994–96 the strategic chal-
lenge became clear of an assertive China, gaining economic clout and
actively pursuing early Taiwan reunification, regional predominance,
and global multipolarity. Japan had four main options. First, it could
draw closer to the United States strategically and put pressure on China.
This Japan did, but it was largely seen as a temporary expedient, not as a
return to dependency such as had been accepted as a necessary tradeoff
when Japan was weak in the 1950s–70s. The reality was not much
acknowledged, limiting strategic explanations of its impact. Second,
Japan could build up its own nationalism and independent foreign
policy as a strategy to hold its own against China. This has been done to
some degree, but there is little discussion of how far this should go.
Third, Japan could forge close ties in Asia, outflanking China. Though
there were some indications of reactive politics in order to match China’s
initiatives, policies toward Russia, South Korea, and Southeast Asia
lacked a sustained strategic rationale. Finally, Japan could try to find an
accommodation with China, making an appeal to public opinion there
and working to achieve mutual restraint. Steps in this direction were
quite paltry. Expedient ties to the United States and recourse to nation-
alism without discussing its long-term prospects took precedence over a
regional approach or a search for joint efforts with China. This is not
a strong strategic orientation.
Overview ● 19
A period that had begun with Japan’s highest expectations and a flurry
of initiatives, if not bold moves, ended with stunning disappointments.
In 1995 the Japanese public had no confidence in relations with any
country in Northeast Asia; opinion toward China in particular was
declining. Adding to the pessimism was the impression that Japanese
politics lacked the capacity to redirect foreign relations as well as a trou-
bled economy. By now, many assumed that first Tokyo would have to
transform thinking and coordination toward Asia and only then could it
expect to do more than staunch the downturn in relations. The eco-
nomic integration of Northeast Asia was accelerating amid growing need
for new forms of cooperation. There was ample reason to expect new
opportunities ahead and to prepare for them.
Overoptimism in the late 1980s had not led to far-reaching strategic
adjustments, and deepening pessimism in the mid-1990s did not do so
either. The depth of the setbacks was not well acknowledged. As primary
attention went to reinvigorating ties with the United States, Clinton did
not give consistent priority to the partnership and Japanese leaders did
not sufficiently recognize that the United States too faced a troubling
environment in Northeast Asia and might have been drawn closer with a
joint search for a coordinated approach. Instead of strategically focusing
on either Japan’s return to the West in dealing with its region or a realis-
tic approach to reentering Asia, incremental steps were chosen.
Japanese faced a difficult balancing act due to an insufficiency of
realism holding back U.S. ties and an excess of idealism mixed with
nationalism complicating relations in Asia. The two were not isolated
from each other. Both closer and more troubled U.S. ties led to renewed
search in Asia for international success. Closer ties brought reminders of
dependence. Worsening ties led to fears of abandonment. Either way,
Asia symbolized normal, multisided relations as well as the unrealized
promise of Japan’s leadership. The end of the cold war led many to
expect idealism to flourish, drawing Japan closer to Asia. The political
Left embraced the idealism most fully, downplaying any realist
challenges in the region. Even the political Right with warnings of some
difficulties shared some of the idealist logic: assuming that “friendship”
with China and others would be driven by economic ties and
development assistance. There was a shortage of calculations of the cost
of policies that tied Japan’s diplomatic hands. Gradually, the idealism
faded: the Left suffered a steep decline, and the Right became more
assertive toward neighbors deemed unreasonable or too nationalistic.
Meanwhile, realism in ways supportive of the United States was
becoming critical before Japan’s leaders and the Diet were prepared to
embrace it fully. Having begun the period hopeful of moving beyond the
U.S. orbit in Asia, Japanese ended it with reaffirmation of U.S. ties and
cautious steps toward advances into Asia; however, there was no
acknowledgment of the depth of setbacks in the region.
The Second Half of the 1990s

The late 1990s was a period when Japan had to face a new reality in
international politics, particularly the impact of a rising China. When
tension rose between China and the United States in the Taiwan Strait
crisis in 1996, Japan felt an acute security danger, reshaping thinking
about the nature of the post–cold war era. When the United States
“passed” Japan in making overtures to China in 1998, Japan was exposed
to the reality of “abandonment.” Meeting these challenges, Japan
reshaped its foreign policy toward greater realism, which proved to be
successful in strengthening defense-security policy and reaffirming its
security ties with the United States. But Japan also tried to reshape its
relations with China as well as its overall position in East Asia.
Japanese strategic thinking became more “realist,” attuned to the
potential for strategic instability in Northeast Asia. Realist thinking
would denote the necessity of enhancing security ties with the United
States, while reshaping Asian policy in order to manage relations with
rising China and give a new place to South Korea, Russia, and regional
institutions that could enlarge Japan’s foreign policy leverage. No efforts
in Asia succeeded in producing a breakthrough on a sustainable basis,
but none proved a failure either in this period.
The three prime ministers who led Japan in this period—Hashimoto,
Obuchi, and Mori—sought internally to overcome the economic malaise
and introduce a fundamental restructuring of the social and economic
system in Japan in the face of institutional obstacles and divisions within
the LDP, and externally where they had more scope for action to play a
greater leadership role. Hashimoto’s major achievement was the reaffir-
mation of security relations with the United States in 1996 and adoption
of a new defense guideline in 1997. The reaffirmation had already been
prepared by his predecessor seeking to overcome “Japan’s defeat” in the
first Gulf War and facing North Korean adventurism, but Hashimoto’s
own international experience may have convinced him that the country’s
fundamental security interests lie with the United States, whose closer
ties would consolidate Japan’s strategic position for involvement in
East Asia. Obuchi and Mori maintained this policy without any oscil-
lations. The Japanese government also became actively involved in the
Overview ● 21
TMD (Theater Missile Defense) initiative, taking the first steps to help
the United States develop and build a regional missile defense system.
Hashimoto’s approach to China was basically realist, and he painfully
endeavored to narrow the differences between the two countries. Having
experienced the Taiwan Strait crisis and further rattling of relations: such
as in his own Yasukuni visit and Chinese nuclear testing in 1996,
Hashimoto’s reaction was not alarmist as seen in his withdrawal from
further Yasukuni visits in 1997 and the resumption of suspended ODA
grants in 1998. Whether his thinking was largely based on realist
instincts (exacerbation of relations with China would not help in
strengthening Japan’s strategic position in East Asia) or was more due to
liberal-idealist desires (a legacy of the Tanaka faction to keep friendly ties
with Beijing), his policy succeeded in moderating tensions.
Obuchi maintained Hashimoto’s basic policy, as he crystallized his
own sense of balance. He left a legacy in Japan’s Asia policy, ranging
from South Korea to China, and regional cooperation. In relation to
China, when Jiang Zemin resorted to aggressive preaching about Japan’s
past sins during his November 1998 visit, Obuchi’s self-assertive and
non-compromising approach received wide support from Japanese
public opinion. Given the rise of Chinese power, one-sided bowing was
not supported by either realists who called for adequate balance in bilat-
eral relations or liberal-idealists who sought further reconciliation. At
the same time, Obuchi’s approach was not alarmist either, and in his visit
to China in July 1999 against the backdrop of deteriorating U.S.–China
relations after the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, he
expressed support for China’s participation in WTO, advancing concrete
projects for cooperation as agreed in Jiang’s visit to Japan while calling
for improved U.S.–China relations.
At the time of the Asian financial crisis in 1997–98, Hashimoto
showed leadership in assisting South Korea, but it was Obuchi who
marked history in Japan–South Korea relations. Ironically, the North
Korean Taepodong missile test in September 1998 was a “shock” beyond
any other in Asia in recent times, giving the nation more determination
and intensifying preparations for warming relations with South Korea.
The South had a new president, Kim Dae-jung, and he was favorably
disposed toward strengthening the relationship with Japan. No doubt,
Obuchi’s success in receiving Kim in October was greatly due to the
impact of Kim’s own preparations for a bold range of policies, leading to
the sunshine policy, but Obuchi was also helped by the missile
launching, which brought Japan–South Korea–U.S. security relations
closer, as was proven in the Perry process and the establishment of
Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) in April 1999.

Obuchi’s readiness for “a deep remorse and heartfelt apology” and Kim’s
resolve to “overcome history with a forward-oriented relationship” were
well received in Japan, breaking the ice in relations. Around this time
it was announced that Japan and South Korea would cohost the 2002
World Cup soccer matches, and this added to the good feeling. By
Obuchi’s death in 2000, Japan–South Korean relations were on a
sounder and more equal footing than they had been since Japan’s
annexation in 1910.
The Sunshine Policy in 2000 presented Japan with some challenges.
It changed South Korean internal politics and relations with the United
States, and it created an uncertain dynamic for regional ties as North
Korea reemerged as an active force. Japan had reason to become a major
force in shaping the process, but it was slow to figure out how to
respond. The search for a voice through talks with North Korea would
not yield results until well after Koizumi’s selection as prime minister.
Notwithstanding China’s widely acclaimed policy to maintain the
value of the yuan in the face of the Asian financial crisis in 1997–98,
efforts by Japan resulted in a total of $80 billion in assistance together
with some imaginative schemes for cooperation (the Asian Monetary
Fund (AMF) that failed and the Chiang Mai Initiative, which was suc-
cessfully launched cannot be viewed as insignificant). These assertive
moves for regional leadership, as the decision to work closely with
ASEAN, led to the formation of the ASEAN ⫹ 3. Obuchi played a lead-
ing role in convening a Japan–China–South Korea tripartite meeting on
the fringe of the ASEAN ⫹ 3 meeting in Manila. His proactive policy in
enhancing cooperation in Asia was further manifested by organizing a
conference for “intellectual dialogue for the future of Asia” highlighting
“human security” cooperation and choosing Okinawa as the location of
the 2000 G-8 Summit as he sought to have China represented.
Hashimoto distinguished himself in manifesting strategic thinking
toward Russia. He saw an opportunity for expanding Japan’s leadership
role in East Asia through improved relations with Russia, reacting to
Yeltsin’s second term as president and Russia’s interest in looking east after
NATO’s eastward expansion. Hashimoto moved resolutely in strengthen-
ing his personal ties with Yeltsin and took a series of bold initiatives. The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ intelligence and support were at its best, and
Hashimoto did not hesitate in using them. Japan’s heightened initiatives
did not bear fruit, however, as Yeltsin backed away because of ailing health
and rising difficulty from the Russian financial crisis, and Hashimoto had
to resign after the unsuccessful 1998 Diet election.
Overview ● 23
Although in general, Japan’s foreign policy during Mori’s period may

best be remembered as a year that bridges Obuchi to Koizumi, the notable
exception was his Russian policy. Mori happened to be located at the
threshold year for realizing Yeltsin’s promise “to make his best efforts to
conclude a peace treaty” with Putin providing considerably stronger gov-
ernance inside Russia. In this important year of transition, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs had a supportive line-up for Mori’s Russian policy. Political
support and advice also came from Suzuki Muneo, who was then rising
fast on the LDP power-ladder and had gained influence over relations with
Russia. In addition to the fact that Mori was one of the four musketeers of
Abe Shintaro, who had been strongly inclined to improve relations with
the Soviet Union under Gorbachev, he also had personal ties from his
father’s long-standing friendship with the Soviet Union. Meetings between
him and Putin took place five times in a year, and at Irkutsk in March
2001 they brought relations to their peak in the postwar period.
The Koizumi Era

Japanese strategic thinking took an abrupt turn in the spring of 2001.
There was no clear precipitating factor. Domestic politics offer the most
convincing explanation. The struggle for partisan support in the ranks of
the LDP opened the door to a more populist leader whose defiant
embrace of nationalism was symbolized by the promise to pay annual
visits to the Yasukuni shrine regardless of the outcry in Asia. A turn
toward unilateralism in Asia did not appear very abrasive because of
three additional factors: (1) the new Bush administration left no doubt
about its enthusiasm for upgrading the alliance, which privileged Japan
above all other countries in Asia; (2) initiatives led by ASEAN reaching
for partners in Northeast Asia and South Korea with its sunshine policy
premised on joint efforts across Northeast Asia suggested a gradual
process of region-building in which Japan’s role would be necessary; and
(3) China’s rise and its assertive behavior had already created uneasiness
and discomfort among many Japanese who had been fundamentally
China friendly until the mid-1990s. With a focus on reform inside Japan
coupled with revitalizing national identity, Koizumi acted precipitously
with little debate within or beyond his administration on what might be
the new course toward Asia. There is little sign that he and other leaders
anticipated a deterioration of relations with the four states geographically
closest to Japan by 2005.
Actions taken essentially in isolation from each other reflected a
general redirection of policy but not a new strategic calculus. Indeed,
some had been set in motion years earlier and just happened to come on
the eve of or just after Koizumi’s assumption of power. A textbook
commission after years of labor approved eight options for new middle
school history books, but China and Korea, which still recalled the yoke
of Japanese aggression and colonialism, expressed their indignation.
Faced with the fallout from this perceived provocation, Koizumi in
contrast to past prime ministers stood firm. Also sensitive was the strug-
gle within Japan’s bureaucracy over whether to grant a visa to former
Taiwan president Lee Teng-hui, which was settled just days before
Koizumi took office with the decision to defy China. Gradually, restrain-
ing forces, especially the China school in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
which at crucial junctures had kept bilateral relations with Beijing from spi-
raling downward, were forced into retreat and eventual marginalization.
Most assertively, Koizumi and Foreign Minister Tanaka Makiko brushed
aside those who had been striving to boost relations with Russia through
methods of gradualism for addressing the territorial dispute. Reasoning
that good Russian ties are not urgent and that the national symbol of the
four disputed islands might be appropriated against any leadership that
relaxed Japan’s long-standing demands, Koizumi hardly took into con-
sideration the process that had led to the Irkutsk Summit of March
2001; a year later the clash between Tanaka Makiko and LDP politician
Suzuki Muneo and unprecedented turmoil in the Foreign Ministry
resulted in general repudiation of the process. All of these steps in quick
succession were not couched in some overall framework; there was
nothing but an overarching claim to acting firmly in the national inter-
est by no longer abiding those in the bureaucracy who supposedly were
following established patterns of accommodating other countries as if
Japan were still a “weak” defeated nation.
In the first months of the Koizumi era regional relations were sacri-
ficed for nationalist support at home. Recent problems in ties with
China and South Korea were strained rather than addressed. Ties with
Russia deteriorated. The new Bush administration’s toughening posture
toward China and North Korea and beckoning approach to Japan gave
Koizumi some leeway; yet his quick foreign policy moves without coordi-
nation in the Foreign Ministry at a time of growing chaos under Tanaka
Makiko’s divisive leadership did not suggest strategic calculations. After
9/11 Koizumi was quick to voice support for the U.S. war against terror
on his own decision, not just following others. Although there was con-
cern that Japan would lose some of its special importance for the United
States given the new military priorities and breadth of the coalition,
Koizumi stayed his course and took the opportunity in the fall of 2001
Overview ● 25
to patch up relations with China, Russia, and South Korea to some

degree. No genuine change of course followed; the basic problems of
Koizumi’s handling of Asian relations only faded into the background.
Meanwhile, most eyes centered on decisive steps that raised Japan’s pro-
file as taking proactive and assertive defense and security policy, making
Japan a responsible partner of the United States.
For a time in late 2002 and early 2003 Koizumi showed signs of
greater diplomatic initiative. After pursuing Kim Jong-il since early in
2002 in the face of Bush’s condemnation of North Korea as part of the
“axis of evil,” September was filled with debate about the prospects and
consequences of the Pyongyang Summit. Dwelling on the abduction of
some Japanese citizens, the Japanese public, after the Pyongyang Summit
of September 2002 and again after brief hopes accompanying the second
visit of Koizumi to Pyongyang in May 2004, was fixated on the injustice
done to Japanese citizens and the Japanese nation. This sentiment inclined
them to support the Bush administration’s often uncompromising stance
along with its pledge to retain multilateralism through six-party talks
that gave Japan a seat at the table. The other three parties, apart from
North Korea and foreign policy elites in the United States, debated
compromise approaches, accusing Bush of seeking regime change and of
failing to make an offer that would shift the onus of inflexibility to the
North. In contrast, the Japanese were most hopeful that sanctions could
be invoked against the North and least attentive to prospects for a
multistage process that might strengthen China’s hand as mediator and
move the Northeast Asian region toward long-term multilateralism.
Reliance on the United States may have been called into question by
both visits to Pyongyang, but in lieu of a direct deal with the source of
the threat Japan was not weighing another option.
Having won Chinese gratitude for lending legitimacy to the new
Boao forum in the spring of 2002 for informal discussions among lead-
ers from many spheres of life, Koizumi met again with a Chinese leader
at APEC in October, where there was an upbeat mood although he was
asked by Jiang Zemin not to continue visiting the Yasukuni shrine. With
Hu Jintao succeeding Jiang and much talk of “new thinking” toward
Japan in early 2003, Koizumi had a chance for a fresh start with China,
but he remained insistent on Yasukuni.
Likewise, when Roh Moo-hyun was elected president of South Korea
in December 2002 amid suspicions that he knew little about Japan and
could be leading a younger generation into political office without the
deep ties and Japanese language skills of older politicians, Roh quickly
signaled that he wanted close ties with Japan, and Koizumi could benefit
from Japanese opinion that relations were now securely on an ascending

trajectory. He had inherited a favorable trend in relations, and they were
perceived on the Japanese side to be reasonably good, because of
economic development leading to talks for an FTA in 2005, cultural suc-
cesses due to the 2002 joint hosting of the World Cup soccer, fascination
over Korean TV programs such as “Winter Sonata,” and increased secu-
rity cooperation in the face of uncertainty over North Korea. In
September 2002 the Pyongyang Summit had raised hopes that Japan’s
promise of financial assistance would convince the North to give it a spe-
cial place in plans for overcoming famine and isolation, but by
November the pendulum had swung toward outrage against the North
over unsettled questions linked to abductions as well as anxiety over
nuclear weapons programs without international constraints. In each
case, Japanese did not feel isolated but part of a region-wide process.
Through 2003 and into 2004 the aftermath of these developments con-
tinued to suggest that Japan was positioned to reassert itself in Asia,
especially as a close partner of the Bush administration in its determined
diplomacy. Yet, Koizumi should have been aware that the situation in
South Korea was moving in a new direction: greater sympathy toward
North Korea, rising economic interests linked to China, and increasing
antipathy toward the United States, which might have affected the deci-
sion to withdraw 12,500 U.S. troops. All these moves were not con-
ducive to enhancing Japan’s strategic position on the Korean peninsula.
Japan failed to identity with South Korean strategies for dealing with the
North and was insensitive on history issues. Even before relations
suffered in 2005, opportunities were not seized.
In anticipation of a summit in Moscow in January 2003, Koizumi
also showed strong interest in a rerouted oil pipeline across eastern
Russia to the Nakhodka area that would supply Japan but would require
large investments. Since discussions between Russia and China had
already settled on a pipeline route to Daqing in Heilongjiang province,
Koizumi’s appeal was widely seen as a strategic move. Also, a December
2003 conference in Tokyo with the leaders of ASEAN was seen as a cal-
culated, if belated, step to match China’s initiatives in Southeast Asia. As
the United States was preoccupied with Iraq, Japan appeared to be
asserting itself in Northeast Asia, even taking a more positive approach
to talks with North Korea than the United States.
Appearances in 2003–04 were deceptive. The flurry of activity
yielded little. Koizumi could throw Japan’s weight in the spring of 2003
behind U.S. preparations for sanctions against North Korea and then
have Japan recognized as one of the participants in the six-party talks,
Overview ● 27
but its role was little more than a backup to the United States with no
room for a voice of its own. Koizumi could stand firm as Hu Jintao
countenanced advocates of “new thinking” toward Japan, suggesting that
China needed to win its neighbor’s confidence, but soon the Chinese
were disappointed by another Yasukuni visit and no counteroffer to “new
thinking.” Instead, anti-Japanese emotions of young Chinese at the
Asian soccer games in the summer of 2004 left their footprint on public
opinion in the two countries. Likewise, Koizumi could also take
advantage of Roh’s pursuit of good relations after anti-Americanism in
his election left him in a precarious position. The South Koreans had no
choice but to join the United States and Japan in trilateral coordination
from May 2003, but they objected to the Japanese stress, along with that
of the United States, on using pressure against the North and the
insensitive handling of the Roh visit to Tokyo in June 2003. When
Russians became upbeat that Japan would proceed with the pipeline,
leading figures in Japan warned that Koizumi must not send a message of
progress in bilateral relations without resolving the territorial dispute,
and there was no sign of strong resistance to this message threatening to
set back relations. In the spring of 2004, Koizumi took another initiative
toward North Korea, but it served narrowed domestic objectives and
quickly faded from memory. By 2004 there was little sign left of any live-
liness in diplomacy toward Asia. In fact, Koizumi made no strategic
adjustment in Asia, and there was no national debate making clear why
he should.
The outcome of the course selected in 2001 finally was exposed in
late 2004 and 2005. As the impasse over North Korea intensified, Japan’s
further signs of nationalism became an outlet for the frustrations of the
region. Koizumi’s inspection of the disputed islands by ship and signs
that Japan was not eager to proceed with the pipeline may have caused
Putin to postpone a visit to Japan expected early in 2005 until year end
and both sides to fear a sharp downturn in relations. In March, Roh led
Koreans to view Japan’s moves as provoking confrontation as the history
issue along with the unresolved status of Dokdo/Takeshima Island took
centerstage. The prospect of Japan becoming a permanent member of
the UN Security Council drew the ire of Chinese, who in the tens of mil-
lions signed an Internet petition against it and then took to the streets in
April with some destruction of property. New textbooks in April 2005
inflamed already heated passions. China’s human rights and some eco-
nomic or social problems caught attention in America, Europe, and
other part of Asia; Japan could not gain sympathy anywhere with only its
strong U.S. ties as reinforcement.
We find evidence for multiple explanations for the malaise in Japan’s

Asian strategy. First, we must assign responsibility to Koizumi himself,
who abandoned the caution of prior prime ministers in managing Asian
affairs attuned to regional sensitivities under the professional advice of
bureaucrats well positioned to alert the leadership to fallout from policy
choices. Koizumi’s repeated expression of remorse for Japan’s past con-
duct, his unambiguous statement of apology in Bandung in April 2005
confirming forcefully Murayama’s statement a decade earlier, and his
often pronounced readiness to improve relations with Asia might have
been genuine, but his insistence on visiting Yasukuni evoked indignation
and mistrust in China and Korea, while it gave satisfaction to some
nationalist feelings inside Japan. Second, we should, thus, acknowledge
that Koizumi was not acting out of step with many in the LDP and the
media. He was part of a generation of politicians concerned with
asserting national pride by overcoming Japan’s historical legacy in Asia,
which increasingly meant standing up to Asian use of the “history card.”
Third, it is necessary to recognize that the popular mood was supportive
of a heightened degree of autonomous decision-making and national
self-assertion. This applies to Koizumi’s approach to domestic reform,
defense-security policy, and U.S. and Asia policy, but, above all, to
nationalism. Many still lived in the shadow of the defeat of 1945, which
had left a spiritual void filled only to some degree by the embrace of
democracy and peace but never reconciled with the ambivalent manner
in which Japanese history was taught. In place of the guilt earlier felt
toward Asia and the optimism that time would heal historical wounds
there was no guiding framework for reconceptualizing Japan’s historic
place in Asia. No consensus exists, but in the tilt toward greater nation-
alism, it might well be tempting for a leader to gain temporary advantage
from nationalist responses.
A second set of explanations directs our attention to the international
environment facing Japan. Strategic thinking toward Asia cannot be
divorced from strategy toward the United States. Underneath this Asia–U.S.
dichotomy, Japanese leaders had long faced the challenge of becoming a
responsible and autonomous power in regional and global security.
Although some interpreted this goal as meaning more active support of
the UN and peacekeeping forces, the predominant understanding was
that Japan’s responsible action may best lead to more support of U.S.
global leadership with troops and a willingness to commit itself to multi-
lateral security in dealing with threats to peace. On four occasions Japan
was tested by the United States, and each time Koizumi determined that
responsible action for Japan means offering strong support to the United
Overview ● 29
States. Newly in office, Koizumi faced a recently configured Bush foreign

policy team determined to boost the alliance with Japan and to put Japan
well above China and others at the center of American policy across most
of Asia. After 9/11 Japan successfully met U.S. expectations and found
general understanding in Asia for its active logistical support of U.S.
forces in Afghanistan. It seemed as if facing in both directions was within
reach. Yet, when in late 2002 and the first half of 2003 Japan threw its
weight behind the Bush administration in the war in Iraq, the North
Korean nuclear crisis tradeoffs could not be avoided. Ties to most of
Europe and internationalism through the UN suffered by the tilt to the
Bush administration, and ties to South Korea became frayed by the incli-
nation to sanctions with almost no distance from the Bush approach
except for a harder line associated with the abduction issue. Finally, in its
sympathy with Bush’s reelection and its lack of anxiety over the impact of
continued visits to Yasukuni, Koizumi, hence Japan, was seen as choosing
the United States at the expense of Asia.
The strategies of other Asian leaders often did not make it easy for
Japan to find a balance in Asia along with improving U.S. ties. In early
2005, Hu Jintao gave precedence to preventing Taiwan independence
and to a national security law that promised war if this should occur.
Moreover, China showed signs of wanting to forge the new East Asian
community regionalism based on ASEAN ⫹ 3 under its sole leadership.
Fear of Chinese hegemonism doubtlessly led Japan toward greater
inclusiveness in EAS, incorporating Australia, New Zealand, and India,
whose eventual membership in December 2005 finally provided a degree
of reassurance to Japan. Roh Moo-hyun indulged in extreme rhetoric in
suddenly reversing two years of conciliatory words toward Japan with
March 2005 harangues. His disturbingly soft line toward the North and
shift toward China complicated Japan’s task. Also, North Korea made
nuclear weapons its priority while failing to meet Japanese concerns over
abductees, including the remains of ten abductees declared to be dead.
Finally, Putin’s slowness in dealing with obstacles to investment and in
reassuring the United States and others of his cooperation on security
problems such as Iran left a breakthrough with Russia in doubt as a step
toward global responsibility. Putin’s public posturing at the end of 2004
that the transfer of the two smaller islands is Russia’s final offer paralyzed
Japanese negotiators, whose intention was to seek the reversion of the
two larger islands as well. The case for solidifying ties with the United
States was stronger than the case for taking an independent posture in
Asia, but Japanese leaders allowed it to reinforce reasoning that
distanced it from others in the region. Mutual antipathy was heightened
after provocations and failed efforts to take initiatives that might have
limited the damage.
The year 2005 saw Japan’s position in Northeast Asia plummet to its
lowest point in several decades. Koizumi had opportunities to forestall or
at least limit the troubles, but no initiative was seen. When Roh Moo-
hyun and he met in December 2004, he had to see Roh’s anguish over a
renewed hard-line U.S. stance in the six-party talks and over Japan’s tight
support of U.S. strategy without reassuring Asian countries on matters
of regionalism and history. Instead of working to reinforce ties with
South Korea and searching for a way to win its backing for Japan’s plans
for United Nations Security Council reform, Koizumi stayed in the
background as Shimane prefecture rekindled a territorial dispute with
South Korea. Relations deteriorated in March, ending the possibility
that Roh and Koizumi could cooperate during their remaining time in
office. This was a sharp reversal after more than six years of high hopes
in Japan for South Korean partnership.
The long awaited visit by Putin finally took place at the end of the
year, but the Japanese negotiating position on the territorial issue was in
disarray due to a total inability to find common ground for a mutually
acceptable solution, hence even a communiqué could not be adopted.
There was no strategic agenda except for further vague discussions about
cooperation for energy security. The drift of Russia to China continued,
and Koizumi and the Foreign Ministry never found a way to overcome
the blow to bilateral relations that was inflicted when Japan’s position in
territorial negotiations was hardened in the early 2000s.
In March as Chinese leaders were discussing how to resuscitate ties
with Japan and limit damage from an Internet petition drive against
Japan becoming a permanent member of the Security Council and again
in May when Wu Yi came calling to quell the anger over Chinese demon-
strations in April, Koizumi did not show any sensitivity to take initia-
tives to bring the relationship to a positive spiral. Even after he won a
resounding mandate through calling an election in September to the
Upper House and Chinese leaders were searching for a way to give a
fresh start to relations, Koizumi responded by visiting the Yasukuni
shrine in October, leaving little hope that business as usual, let alone
bilateral summits, could resume.
Time after time, Koizumi vowed that he was remorseful of the pain
that Japan inflicted in prewar years and made it clear that he was
prepared to improve relations with Asian countries, including China and
Korea, and that he took a rising China not as challenge but as opportu-
nity. But his visit to Yasukuni, which he defines as a domestic and
Overview ● 31
personal matter, in reality has created havoc with China and Korea, and
Koizumi’s defiant refusal to show understanding toward positions taken
by Japan’s closest neighbors while refuting their approach as “playing the
history card” has not gained understanding and sympathy in the region
or worldwide. Instead of responding to setbacks in bilateral relations
with clear signals of his interest in finding a way forward, Koizumi
seemed to take satisfaction from cultivating an image of defiance against
Japan’s neighbors, each of which was blamed. Public opinion in Japan
was divided, but increasingly it found the leaders of other countries at
fault. Cabinet choices gave voice to those with more negative views on
Asian neighbors. Koizumi may well be leaving a legacy of mutual distrust
in Northeast Asia, not a strategic foundation for reviving Japan’s pursuit
of partners in the area, not to mention the achievement of its long-term
goal of reentering Asia to enhance its strategic calculus.
At the end of 2005 there was little prospect for an upturn in Japan’s
ties with any state in Northeast Asia before the end of Koizumi’s term in
office in September 2006. In December at the ASEAN ⫹ 3 and EAS
meetings in Kuala Lumpur, Hu Jintao and Roh Moo-hyun refused to
meet with Koizumi. In November, Putin’s visit had raised economic
goals but done nothing to bridge the territorial divide; the split between
North Korea and the United States had widened, jeopardizing the six-
party talks even as separate bilateral meetings between Japan and North
Korea did not look promising. Those in Japan who called for a different
approach to Asia based on strategic thinking encountered a more assertive
leadership, including Foreign Minister Aso Taro, who insisted that Japan
was succeeding in Asia as the thought leader, the stabilizer for the region,
and the country respecting other nations as peers and equals. Aso’s
December 7, 2005 speech, discussed later in chapter 11, presented Japan
as leader among optimists in Asia. Aso’s “visionary” thinking, however
forward looking some of the arguments he displayed, still fails to
understand the prevailing mood in the region and gives an impression of
unilateralism in place of strategic thinking. Japan’s comfort in leading
the EAS with its greater inclusiveness (with Australia, New Zealand, and
India) and value-oriented approach (democracy, human rights, and
shared ideals of middle-class prosperity) may not become a real sign of
its leadership, unless it succeeds in resolving the most serious underlying
problem: to find common ground with leading regional countries,
notably with China.
In dealing with many issues, symbols preoccupy the Japanese people
more than the diverse substance that makes relations strategic.
“Yasukuni” symbolizes troubles with China and South Korea, the
“Northern Territories” with Russia, “abductions” with North Korea, and,

of late, fear of “community” with Asian regionalism. Such themes dom-
inate news coverage and distract public vision from far-reaching strategic
choices. Even if the strengthened U.S.–Japan alliance and the newly
growing Japanese economy provide some foundation for new initiatives
in Asia, a new leader and renewed pragmatism of the sort demonstrated
in the 1980s and the second half of the 1990s appear essential to develop
a more strategic outlook to Asia. Ending his term with a visit to
Yasukuni on August 15, the most sensitive date marking the war’s end,
Koizumi left his successor Abe Shinzo with troubled ties in Asia despite
behind-the-scenes efforts to chart a new course.
Abe’s first month in office offered opportunities to visit Beijing and
Seoul. His policy of ambiguity of “no confirmation, no denial” of a
Yasukuni visit, sudden confirmation of Murayama’s apology, and new
conceptualization of advancing Sino-Japanese relations with “politics
and economics as two wheels” marked a fresh start. Furthermore, North
Korea’s test of a nuclear weapon gave Abe a unique opportunity for
regional cooperation. A unanimous United Nations resolution con-
demning the test called for sanctions; implementation depended above
all on China and South Korea. Thus, the U.S. became focused on win-
ning their cooperation. As comprehensive as Japan’s own sanction mea-
sures were, it now became part of a regional security dynamic that
balanced threatening moves to prevent another nuclear test with further
assurances to bring the North back to the six-party talks. Given this
momentum for regional cooperation, there was new urgency to find
common ground with leaders in the region. The North Korean threat
could bring the region together, and China and South Korea were intent
on steering first the United States and then Japan toward a strategic
compromise.
PART 1
Chronology
CHAPTER 2
Japanese Strategic Thought

toward Asia in the 1980s
Takashi Inoguchi
J apanese strategic thought in the 1980s faced a major transition from

being a free rider to becoming a systemic supporter. This transition
is predicted by the Lake scheme of foreign policy roles determined
by the size and labor productivity of an economy.1 It also can be antici-
pated as part of the historical evolution of Japanese foreign policy roles
in tandem with the adjusted needs of the alliance with the United States
Focusing on Asia, Japanese strategic thought might have missed an
opportunity of articulating a more autonomous and multilateral foreign
policy line embedded within the framework of the alliance with the
United States due in part to the moderate success of the transition in
foreign policy roles in three dimensions: (a) the successful “defensive
internationalism” of the G-5 (G-8); (b) the sway of developmental
authoritarianism in East and Southeast Asia in which the Japan-led fly-
ing geese pattern looked real; and (c) the appealing image of a “golden
triangle” of Japan–the United States–China.
To understand post–cold war Japanese foreign policy we should look
back to the 1980s as a time of unprecedented opportunity that required
far-reaching reassessment of how best to find an expanded diplomatic
standing in Asia. David Lake has postulated that the size (GNP) and
labor productivity of an economy (the ratio of GNP over national labor
hours) determine a major power’s foreign policy role. If both represent
the highest level in the world, it tends to play a hegemonic role. Most
major powers, however, play an opportunistic role, and some play the
36 ● Takashi Inoguchi
role of spoiler or free rider. Lake’s purpose in postulating the politico-

economic determination of foreign policy roles is to see how the United
States had been changing its foreign policy roles in tandem with other
changes for the half-century ending in 1939, especially in relation to
those of Great Britain. I applied this postulate to Japan in the 1980s.2
Instead of measuring labor productivity, I used annual economic growth
rate and overall industrial competitiveness in relation to those of the
United States,3 while characterizing Japan’s foreign policy role in the
1980s as a supporter, neither a spoiler nor a challenger. As the 1980s was
a period of intensifying trade and economic disputes between Japan and
the United States, this characterization itself was contested. For instance,
Stephen Krasner treated Japan as a selfish, opportunistic, and protec-
tionist state, and thus a spoiler in the world free trade regime.4 By focus-
ing on opportunities in Asia, we can clarify this difference of opinion
and point to additional ways to evaluate Japan’s role.
Having experienced new challenges in a short period of time during
the first half of the 1970s, that is, the end of the Vietnam War, the
Middle East War, and the oil crisis, Japan faced even more serious adjust-
ments at the end of the cold war in 1989–91. The image of Japan as
opportunist or autonomy seeker arose in the 1970s. The search for
energy supplies and overtures to Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) and the Soviet Union by Prime Ministers Tanaka and
Miki are oft-cited examples. In contrast, in the mid-1980s Prime
Minister Nakasone’s clear opposition to the Intermediate Nuclear Forces
of the Soviet Union and his security linkage with Western Europe are
examples of a supporter’s role. The framework I developed for character-
izing Japan’s foreign policy roles for the entire period 1945–2005 and
beyond helps to locate strategic thought in the 1980s in a broad
perspective.5 It constitutes an essential exercise because Japan’s foreign
policy has revolved around its alliance with the United States. Only by
elucidating this broader framework can Japanese strategic thought
toward Asia be understood more deeply.
Japan’s foreign policy roles since 1945 (table 2.1) have been heavily
determined by its defeat in 1945 and its concomitant constraints,
historical debt, and war renunciation.6 Henry Kissinger expounded a
15-year theory of Japanese decision-making,7 arguing for delayed responses
as seen, for instance, to three tumultuous events: Commodore Matthew
Perry’s visit to Japan in 1853; the complete defeat of Japan by the Allied
Powers in 1945; and the collapse of the huge bubble economy in 1991.
It took 15 years for the Japanese to put an end to seemingly endless
debates and strife before they started de novo in 1868. It took 15 years
The 1980s ● 37
Table 2.1 Japan’s foreign policy roles
Role Principal Author Period Features
1. Pro- and anti-alliance 1945–60 Constitution vs.

Security Treaty
2. Free rider (De Gaulle) 1960–75 Yoshida doctrine
in action
3. Systemic supporter Inoguchi 1975–90 Supporter vs.
spoiler
4. Civilian power Maull, Funabashi 1990–2005 Civilian power vs.
conventional power
5. Global ordinary power Ozawa, Inoguchi 2005–20 Ordinary power vs.
extraordinary
power
(Westphalian vs.
Philadelphian)
for them to make up their minds as to whether they would get along
with the Americans or not before they announced the income-doubling
plan in 1960 whereby they indicated that they would stick with the
United States, focusing on wealth accumulation. Now after about 15
years since the collapse of the bubble, the Japanese appear to have
reached a consensus on economic transformation, including how to lay
off employees and deal with bad loans. As the economy picks up at long
last, Kissinger’s views may ring true even if some remain skeptical of his
theory as to what factors lead the Japanese repeatedly to make such
delayed, but long-lasting decisions.
Chronological Overview
The Battle between Pro-Alliance and
Anti-Alliance, 1945–60
To appreciate the critical opportunities for change toward Asia in the
1980s, we should start with the first postwar period, 1945–60, the
with-or-without-the-United States period. Though vastly different from
Iraq after the Iraq War of 2003, Japan, 1945–60, was conducting a debate
about whether it should continue to work closely with the United States or
not, and, by implication, how seriously it should pursue an independent
diplomacy to restore ties with Asia. The die was cast in 1960 when Prime
Minister Kishi Nobusuke passed the revision of the Japan–United States
security treaty in the National Diet against vigorous resistance and

submitted his resignation to the National Diet. The Yoshida line,
announced almost a decade earlier, that happiness is keeping the security
treaty with the United States as the Japanese focus their energy on wealth
accumulation actually was solidified on the day of Kishi’s resignation.
Prior to this the terms of the alliance had not been settled, and the line was
vigorously contested at home. Many Japanese were not able to come to
terms with the humiliation of delegating national security to a foreign
country and with the uneasiness with which they had to allow the
cohabitation of the security treaty and the Constitution. For a limited
number of Japanese, revision of the security treaty brought about greater
equality between Japan and the United States that made it easier to swal-
low the Yoshida doctrine, but for the many who protested against the revi-
sion, equitable relations meant nothing but greater entanglement in U.S.
militarism. They were still not prepared to accept the Yoshida doctrine.
Only gradually in the 1960s did many come to realize that there was little
problem from entanglement. With the income-doubling plan of 1960–70
announced by Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato in 1960 the Yoshida line was
enshrined.
In the first period the two themes, historical debt and war renuncia-
tion, were most apparent, debilitating Japanese foreign policy. The United
States was still very adamant about both themes. Japan was occupied by
them for nearly the first half of the period. A war tribunal was held. Some
were hanged. Many high-ranking leaders were politically purged. Okinawa
was occupied by the United States, with the northern half around Amami
Oshima returned in 1953 whereas the rest was returned only in 1972.
After the war, the war dead were buried at the Yasukuni shrine, but war
criminals were not. Anti-alliance forces were very strong in Japan through-
out the period. Anti-Self Defense Forces (SDF) sentiment was no less
strong. In order to placate public opinion, the government kept the SDF
busy with disaster relief and economic reconstruction.
Strategic thinking toward Asia was often paralyzed in this atmosphere
of deciding how to deal with the United States. Even normalization with
South Korea, another U.S. ally, took until 1965. In the wake of the San
Francisco Peace Treaty diplomatic relations were realized with the
Republic of China on Taiwan, leaving aside the People’s Republic of
China. Only in the uncertain process of forging diplomatic ties with the
Soviet Union in 1955–56 was there serious exploration of an autonomous
approach, but that failed, resulting in no peace treaty and a lingering
territorial dispute that made it harder for Japan to consider balancing its
ties with the United States.
The 1980s ● 39
Yoshida Line or Free Rider, 1960–75

In the next period Japan’s income level went up so steadily that Japan
became the target of envy first and then of enmity. Internally as well,
rapid economic, and social changes undermined the political basis of the
governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). President Charles de Gaulle’s
nasty comment that Japan is a mere salesman of transistors was a carica-
ture of Japan with the Yoshida line stripped of the visionary politician’s
valor and pride. De Gaulle called Japan a free rider that had no sense of
responsibility about how to run the world even when it had become the
second largest economy. The free rider line prevailed more or less during
the period 1960–75, and it had profound implications for Asian policies.
In the second period two themes dominated Japan’s relationship to
Asian events: the Vietnam War (1965–75) and diplomatic normalization
with neighbors, notably Korea (1965) and China (1972). With Korea,
normalization negotiations were bitterly opposed in both countries. The
historical debt was paid in the form of a $300 million grant and a $200
million loan; Japan did not accept any claims for war reparations, insist-
ing that there had been no war between it and Korea. With China, diplo-
matic normalization took place in the wake of the diplomatic
normalization between the United States and China in 1971–72. China
did not demand war reparations. Instead it wanted Japan to extend
official development assistance to help China modernize. Complicating
Japan’s foreign relations afterward was the fact that Prime Minister Miki
Takeo’s (1974–76) second visit to the Yasukuni shrine took place on
August 15, 1976, with the focus on the war dead during World War II.
Nakasone did so on August 15, 1985, saying that Japan’s postwar period
must be put to an end. Then China for the first time argued that a
Japanese prime minister’s visit to the Yasukuni shrine must be avoided as
high-ranking war criminals such as Tojo Hideki were also enshrined
there (which took place in 1978). Nakasone stopped going to Yasukuni
after his 1985 visit.
Till the mid-1970s, Japan counted on its economic prowess to
normalize relations with the countries of Asia, but it was limited in how
far it pursued mutual understanding and all-around ties. On the one
hand, a tight embrace with the United States restricted independent
diplomacy even after the end of the Vietnam War saw the United States
retreat to some degree in the region. On the other hand, assertive views of
the limits of apology and compromise in interpreting historical events
left Japanese diplomats with little room to yield to nationalist demands
in neighboring states. Instead, Japan relied on a kind of checkbook
diplomacy, taking advantage of its economic dominance in the region as

other states began desperately seeking to revitalize their own economies.
Systemic Supporter, 1975–90

Toward the end of the second period, the oil crisis erupted and the Middle
Eastern war was waged. Japan wavered between pro-American and pro-
OPEC positions, as both sides accused Japan of being a free rider. This
prompted Japan to shift its position slowly but steadily from free rider to
systemic supporter,8 an actor that gives a helping hand to maintenance of
the U.S.-led international system. It is important to note that Japan’s sup-
port was mostly of an economic nature, as exemplified by Japan’s positions
on free trade and energy security but that in the 1980s it took on a politi-
cal and military nature as well, as exemplified by Japan’s support on the
SS-20 issue concerning the placement of Soviet missiles and warheads.
The period 1975–90 is aptly called the period of a systemic supporter role.
It recalls Niccolo Machiavelli’s “armed support to friends, neutrality to
enemies,” albeit without teeth. Despite all the difficulties associated with
the constitutional ban on the use of force for the settlement of interna-
tional disputes, rhetorical freedom was not in short supply. Nakasone went
so far as to characterize Japan as “an unsinkable aircraft carrier.”9
In the third period the historical debt issue was somewhat subdued in
part because Korea was under military rule most of the time and in part
because China was under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping who ordered
that territorial issues be left to a later generation. Public opinion seeking
more from Japan in compensation and recognition of past behavior was
effectively contained. Even when Nakasone visited the Yasukuni shrine
and China and Korea protested, his assurances of no further visits helped
to keep the war renunciation issue from becoming serious. During this
period China indicated that Japan’s alliance with the United States had
better be retained rather than terminated, which would have been bound
to bring a much more powerful SDF.
Global Civilian Power, 1990–2005

The steady decrease of war occurrence among major powers,10 and the
end of the cold war,11 set the stage for what some call global civilian
powers to play a not-insignificant role.12 Having been a revisionist power
and heavily militarist and expansionist power before 1945, and yet since
1945 exemplarily in deemphasizing military power, Japan and Germany
were more than delighted to be recognized for this role.13 Both countries
The 1980s ● 41
became active in peacekeeping, international rescue and relief, and

economic reconstruction largely on the basis of the notion of human secu-
rity. As the United Nations (UN) became most proactive in the 1990s,
Japan assumed a larger role, especially in Asia, in exercising its civilian
power. By the late 1990s, however, dark clouds started to prevail in many
parts of the Third World. Global market integration deepened the predica-
ment of poverty stricken and strife riddled countries; and the end of the
U.S.–Soviet confrontation meant their reduced stake in the Third World.
The world became concerned about failed states and bankrupt economies,
well beyond what self-claimed global civilian powers, the UN or non-
governmental organizations were able to handle. Under such conditions
the events of September 11 took place, as if calling for the United States to
make its might felt and act decisively. That put an end to the fourth period
of global civilian power, paving the way to an era of global power with
“justice,” a single power that makes judgment about what is more just and
what is a lesser evil. Japan preferred to side closely with the United States
than to be sidelined as it was losing its earlier role.
The Asian financial crisis and the second North Korean nuclear crisis
were landmark events that revealed the limits of Japan’s civilian power.
Having optimistically set new goals for shaping international relations in
Asia in the first half of the 1990s, Japan’s government found that its
influence was limited. Its new role in contributing peacekeeping forces
was soon taken for granted. Even more, its ambitious guidelines for link-
ing large-scale official development assistance (ODA) to restraint in such
behavior as environmental pollution and rising military budgets had lit-
tle effect. In 1997 Japan found that its own strategy for dealing with the
Asian financial crisis through creation of an Asian Monetary Fund did
not win support from the United States or China. Likewise, offers to
North Korea to provide large-scale assistance failed, as in the Koizumi
visit to Pyongyang of September 2002, to prevent threatening provoca-
tions through nuclear weapons development.
In the fourth period ending in 2005 differences over history also rose
to the forefront. The historical debt issue became more salient thanks to
the disappearance of cold war–related issues and the subsequent rise of
nationalism. The war renunciation issue also came up because of new
threats facing Japan as well as the United States and other developed states.
It also arose because of new means to respond to those threats, most
importantly the Revolution in Military Affairs and the transformation of
U.S. Armed Forces and their ramifications. The United States turned to
Japan for a new strategic role in Asia, as it moved to reduce its troops
abroad to a minimum and to augment them by repositioning its superior
weapons and intelligence systems. By the end of the 1990s Japan was dis-
cussing cooperation on missile defense with the United States, despite
China’s and Russia’s protests. In 2005 Japan and the United States agreed
on a major restructuring of their alliance, constraining China and North
Korea above all. As the third party to the U.S. alliance system in East
Asia, South Korea for a time drew closer to Japan in strategic coopera-
tion, but by 2005 it was torn by its growing ties to China and its accom-
modating approach to fellow Koreans north of the 38th parallel. Pursuit
of civilian power was fading even before the sharp deterioration of polit-
ical relations with China in 2005, whereas military ties to the United
States were being upgraded.
Global Ordinary Power, 2005–20

Japan has chosen the emerging role of a global power with justice.14 It
implies that Japan is becoming an ordinary power in a number of senses.
First, the use of force is becoming more accepted. The SDF as early as
1991 have been allowed to use force, more specifically rifles, if attacked
or if it is detected that an enemy is about to attack in the context of UN
peacekeeping operations. Without any reproach from public opinion, the
Maritime Safety Agency used force in 2002 against an unidentified,
presumably North Korean, vessel that fiercely resisted the Japanese
coastguard’s attempts to investigate what it was carrying. And in 2003
the SDF have been allowed to use force, more specifically person-to-tank
weapons, in the context of their peacekeeping operations in Iraq. The
notion of “assertive defense”15 pursued by the United States since the
9/11 attack, which allows for preemptive war, is not to be accommo-
dated, however. Furthermore, there is recognition in Japan that terrorism
can only be reduced with concomitant efforts to eradicate extreme
poverty, to terminate discrimination, and to enhance the involvement of
a wider population in running a society.
In the fifth period both the historical debt issue and the war renunci-
ation issue come up as part of an increasingly visible Japanese self-
assertive nationalism. They come up, however, on the basis of a solid
record of antimilitarism that had not substantially waned over the pre-
ceding 60 years. Japan’s bid in 2005 for permanent membership in the
UN Security Council combines the two elements. It reflects a new level
of self-assertive nationalism as well as claims to a time-tested peace
orientation. Two of the major platforms in Japan’s campaign for the UN
are the slogan of “no taxation without representation” and a call for the
complete abolition of nuclear weapons. By 2005 constitutional revision
The 1980s ● 43
is envisaged by both the main governing party, the LDP, and the largest
opposition, the Democratic Party of Japan.
Through the above review of the evolution of Japanese strategic think-
ing, we observe that relations with the United States have remained in the
forefront whereas Asian ties since the end of World War II have been sec-
ondary. The 1980s, however, were characterized by increasing efforts to
find a new balance facing both directions. Looking to the Soviet Union
for a breakthrough after the advent of Gorbachev’s “new thinking” was
one focus. Another was envisioning a special friendship with China
nurtured through ample development assistance and burgeoning
economic ties. South Korea also became the target of new overtures. The
strategic thinking behind these and other moves deserves attention
against the background of Japan’s long-term strategic reorientation.
Contexts and Actors Triggering Strategic Thought

toward Asia in the 1980s
Japanese strategic thought flourished in the 1980s for a number of
reasons. First, some of the foundations of American hegemony started to
erode.16 The Vietnam War of 1965–75 took a heavy toll. In 1973 the
United States withdrew its troops there. Also, in 1972 the United States
and China made a breakthrough in relations leading to full normaliza-
tion in 1979 with their eyes set on the Soviet Union. The Soviet military
buildup was most menacing to both. Japan followed the United States in
switching from the Republic of China to the People’s Republic of China.
The dollar-gold convertibility was abandoned in 1971 and the Japanese
yen was forced to be reevaluated from 1 dollar equals 360 Japanese yen
to as high as 100 Japanese yen to the dollar during the 1980s in the
course of a free floating exchange rate system. Unabashedly protectionist
legislation passed in Congress, some of which hit Japan hard. OPEC’s
restriction on oil exports in 1973 was another shock. Just the American
perception of leadership decline would have been sufficient enough to
lead Japanese leaders to grope for new options into the 1980s.
Second, temporary setbacks to the American leadership position led
actors in Western Europe and Pacific Asia to launch their own creative and
vigorous initiatives. It was Giscard d’Estaing who took the initiative in cre-
ating the G-5 (later the G-7 and then G-8), which was assigned the mis-
sion of revitalizing the oil crisis–hit core economies of the world.17
Similarly, it was Okita Saburo and John Crawford who first envisioned a
Pan-Pacific economic zone. The flying geese pattern of development in the
Western Pacific, enveloping Japan and the four dragons (Korea, Taiwan,
Singapore, and Hong Kong) and then members of ASEAN should be

understood as a way of grouping the whole Pacific economy into an open
but self-defined economic region.18 The rise of Japan’s economic power
became a driving force in the 1980s propelling new approaches to regional
leadership and political activism.
The history issue gathered momentum in the mid-1980s; not only in
China and Korea but also in the United States, the United Kingdom, and
the Netherlands.19 With Japan’s rise in the world economy, Japan’s nation-
alistic voice became much stronger. With Nakasone’s accession to power,
expectations rose since Nakasone was first elected to the Diet for his patri-
otism directed against the U.S. occupation. Nakasone’s visit to the
Yasukuni shrine in 1985 caused uproar in China and Korea since war
criminals were buried there along with all others killed in wars. Emperor
Hirohito’s visits to the United Kingdom and the Netherlands elicited
sensational reports and a sizable number of protesters. The history issue
was perhaps inevitable as the Japanese construction of memory, history,
and identity stresses the continuity between prewar and postwar periods in
terms of its steadfast pursuit of modernization with the temporary derail-
ment in the 1930s and 1940s. The standard versions of World War II as
democracy fighting against fascism and anticolonialism winning over
colonialism were all accepted by Japan when Japan signed the Peace Treaty
with the Allied Powers and when it entered the UN.20 Yet, underneath the
official acceptance lay the construction of modern Japanese history to the
effect that the war was after all a war among imperialist powers with Japan
being one of them, one of the vanquished, and therefore Japan was guilty
along with many others, which was mitigated by the fact that it had been
genuinely committed to the liberation of colonies from the Western powers.
The Japanese quietly believed that Japan’s frontal attacks on the colonies in
East and Southeast Asia critically devastated the military foundation of
Western colonialism in Asia. These two components sometimes lurk in
their minds along with the standard versions of World War II.
To appreciate the dynamism of the 1980s, we need to focus on the
main actors and strategic thinkers in Japan.21 First, there was Ohira
Masayoshi, the prime minister who passed away during the election
campaign in 1980. Sensing that he lived in an era of transition, he
organized intellectuals and other leaders to come up with visions for
such subjects as postindustrial economic management, pastoral cities,
Pan-Pacific regionalism, governability in industrial democracies, and
international security after hegemony. The notion of Pan-Pacific region-
alism took concrete form as an agreement between him and Australian
prime minister Malcolm Fraser in January 1980, which developed into
The 1980s ● 45
the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in 1989. The

core of this strategic thinking was that regionalism must be forged to
further accelerate the region’s underutilized developmental momentum.
Ohira chaired the G-5 Summit in Tokyo focusing on petroleum in June
1979 and decided on Japan’s nonparticipation in the Moscow Olympic
Games after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan.
Suzuki Zenko, prime minister after Ohira, was a socialist when he was
first elected to the Diet in 1947. His first meeting with President Ronald
Reagan went well as far as it went, but when asked about the word “alliance”
that had been slipped into the joint communiqué, Suzuki replied, “Alliance
does not have a military dimension.” To which Takashima Masuo, deputy
administrative foreign minister, retorted, “That’s nonsense.”22 Takashima
was a diplomat who at the time of the negotiations over the peace treaty
between Japan and China in 1978 had been called by the Chinese a
“fafei,” a legalistic bandit, meaning that Takashima was a self-righteous,
rigidly legalistic diplomat. Minister for Foreign Affairs Ito Masayoshi
resigned to take responsibility for the confusion within the Cabinet. This
episode shows that even in a decade when Japan largely played the role of
supporter for the U.S.-led international system it was a zigzag process.
Nakasone Yasuhiro, prime minister after Suzuki, was a patriot who
first campaigned in 1946 bicycling with the Japanese national flag
in front of him and calling for retaining national pride and dignity in
protest against the U.S. occupation. One of his close advisers, Sato
Seizaburo of the University of Tokyo, told me that if Nakasone tried to
do anything somewhat unorthodox in foreign policy, he was aware that
he had to chant the value of the alliance with the United States one
hundred times before he mentioned his object, say Korea or the Soviet
Union. Nakasone turned from a proud patriot in the anti–United States
camp of 1946 to a proud patriot in the mostly pro–United States camp
of 1982, pursuing the pro-alliance policy to its limit. When he first-
visited Ronald Reagan in January 1983, he authorized technological
cooperation in weapons. He was said to have told the Washington Post,
“The Japanese archipelago should be like an unsinkable aircraft carrier
facing the invasion of Soviet Backfire bombers.”23 In May 1983 at the
Williamsburg G-7 Summit, he rescued Reagan, who faced the reluctance
of other Western leaders to demand the eradication of Soviet intermedi-
ate nuclear forces targeted at Europe and the Far East. The State
Department wanted to delink the Intermediate Nuclear Forces targeted
at the Far East from those targeted at Europe, but Reagan rejected this.
Instead the complete eradication of intermediate nuclear forces targeted
at both areas was proposed. Nakasone supported Reagan on this matter
against the State Department and all the rest at the Williamsburg
Summit. The joint communiqué endorsed this action.24
On September 1, a Korean Airlines aircraft was shot down by the
Soviet Air Force. When the Soviet government did not immediately
admit its action, the Japanese government disclosed Soviet air communi-
cations at the UN Security Council on September 7, which attested to
who had fired on the plane. This boosted the solidarity of the West. On
September 22, 1985, the Plaza Accord was signed. Japan was not only a
strong supporter of the accord but also its vigorous implementer. The
purpose was to strengthen the competitiveness of the U.S. dollar in rela-
tion to other currencies by massively purchasing treasury bonds from
abroad, especially from Tokyo and Bonn. The exchange rate for dollars
subsequently rose visibly. One effect was to stimulate Japanese invest-
ment in Asia, leading to a sharp jump in manufacturing abroad and a
more pronounced Japanese presence in the region. This increased focus
on Asia was seen also in leadership actions. Nakasone was the first post-
war Japanese prime minister who did not visit the United States first
upon accession to power. He instead visited South Korean president
Chun Doo-hwan in January 1983.25 Chun, whose legitimacy at home
was in doubt, appreciated Nakasone’s decision, and the bilateral political
relationship notably improved.
Although Nakasone largely avoided the subject of the suppression of
dissidents, his diplomacy with South Korea was widely regarded as a big
success. Nakasone’s China diplomacy was also hailed as heralding a new
era in Japan–China friendship. Hu Yaobang and he got along very well.
Nakasone’s initiative of bringing 100,000 Chinese students to Japanese
universities over the succeeding decade was made with high hope and
widespread support in both countries. Although when the history issue
flared up in China, it was not sufficiently understood in Japan for its
extremely divisive impact; when Nakasone saw how his Yasukuni visit
eroded the position of Hu and his reformist comrades and thus under-
mined the Japan–China friendship, he stopped going there. Nakasone
also intensified diplomacy toward Southeast Asia on the basis of the
steady development of the flying geese formation pattern of regional
economic development and the track two institutionalization of regional
meetings. All this was to culminate in the formation of APEC.
Takeshita Noboru, prime minister after Nakasone, was a man of
perseverance and mindfulness. The same man severed ties with Tanaka
Kakuei, the don of the LDP, after serving him for some 30 years. He con-
tinuously tried to consolidate the U.S. alliance although the issues were
tough.26 The rise of Japan invited criticism from abroad. The inflationary
The 1980s ● 47
economy after the Plaza Accord heated up excessively and in tandem with
inflation voices against the government from below increased. New
thinking was gaining some ground, challenging the main approach of this
era. A flirtation with the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) initiative
made by Mohammad bin Mahathir at the end of the decade was
extremely limited in duration and scope as it did not reflect overall
Japanese strategic thinking in the 1980s, that is developing and
enhancing Japan’s role as supporter of the U.S.-led global system.
The configuration of forces among the United States, Japan, and
China in the 1980s served the need for Japan to move slowly in the
direction of a systemic supporter’s role.27 The triangle was best charac-
terized as cordial and stable. With the Soviet Union sitting on the other
side, the triangle was likened to an entente cordial. All were anti-Soviet.
Japan was on its peaceful rise. China was on the road of reform and
opening to the rest of the world. The United States challenged the Soviet
Union with tough words and the Space Defense Initiative (SDI). Yet
China’s shift in 1982 toward equidistance with the Soviet Union and the
implications of Gorbachev’s new thinking for global and regional
realignment were slow to be absorbed. Also, China’s tough words to
Japan on the history issue and the tough negotiations by the United
States over the Structural Impediments Talks were not sufficiently taken
to heart by the Japanese government. The transition Japan is making to
become a normal power in the 2000s has become more difficult because
of the difficulties associated with history-related issues.
Japan’s Asian Policy in the 1980s as Seen

from the Vantage Point of 2006
In a clear contrast to Japan’s steady evolution as a supporting player to the
U.S.-led system in the 1980s, Japan’s Asian policy did not evolve in a
manner that would have paved the way to be followed beyond the 1980s.
Three major factors were important. First, what is called the flying geese
formation of regional trade and industrial development looked very
real.28 Conceptualizing itself as the leading goose, Japan was somewhat
oblivious to the foundation of increasing stability and prosperity of the
region, the United States. Second, the transition to democracy in China
and Korea was so bumpy in the 1980s that Japan was able to deal com-
fortably with their authoritarian regimes. Although Japan was a democ-
racy, it was a kind of bureaucratic dominant regime, thus ironically
finding authoritarian regimes in Korea and China easier to deal with than
more democratic regimes under which nationalistic voices from below
would have been more vociferous.29 Third, the global system that the
United States led was in a quandary. Capital flows were insufficient from
abroad, whether they came from direct investment or the purchase of
treasury bonds, since the U.S. economy was beset by twin deficits—
government and external balance deficits—for which the Plaza Accord
had been concluded in 1985 to encourage the purchase of U.S. dollars in
the form of treasury bonds by G-7 countries, most notably Germany and
Japan. Also, the “second cold war” in the form of the military buildup
and ideological offensive by the United States put the Soviet Union on
the defensive but at the same time further accelerated the twin deficits.
Sensing newly created leeway for leadership in the region, Japan did
take an initiative to institutionalize the region. Japan took the lead in
establishing APEC in 1989 along with Australia and the United States.
It was a child of the flying geese formation pattern in the sense that
Japan, good at manufacturing, and Australia, strong at mining and
finance, each with greater leadership potential in the region, sandwich-
ing between them much lower income countries into the 1980s, wanted
to raise them up and integrate more closely with them by facilitating
trade and market liberalization in the region. APEC was also a child of
the U.S.-led global system in the sense that unlike the European Union it
did not aim at institutionalizing itself very deeply or in a self-standing
fashion. In other words, Japan’s Asian policy in the 1980s was a derivative
of Japan’s newly found supporting role for the U.S.-led global system.
The key aim was developmental. The key policy instrument was to prod
trade and market liberalization in the region with policy incentives in the
form of removing trade barriers, giving ODA, and encouraging direct
investment. Thus, Japan’s Asian policy remained underdeveloped in the
1980s, as seen in the emergence or exacerbation in Asia one by one in the
1990s and 2000s of a series of policy agendas that could have been
addressed in more favorable circumstances. They include history, identity,
territory, energy, confidence building, and military buildup.
Japan’s flying geese formation strategy dominated other aspects of
Japan’s Asian policy in the 1980s. Japan was preoccupied with adapting to
what it considered the post-hegemonic age when the United States had
become somewhat enfeebled by the Vietnam War, the Middle East War,
the oil crisis, and expanded political participation at home; Japan found
its role in the flying geese formation writ large to Pacific Asia quite befit-
ting its enlarged cognitive map of its place in the world in relation to its
supporting player’s role to the U.S.-led global system. Its strategy had two
origins. First, the idea lingered from the 1930s and 1940s experience
demonstrating that growing influence of Japan in its vicinity came as
The 1980s ● 49
regional integration took shape through the diffusion of industrial pro-

duction step by step and Japan remaining as the leader in the spreading
formation of economic development. The war suspended the process, but
as it was revived in the 1950s and 1960s the idea of a flying geese pattern
returned. Second, in the 1960s and 1970s a similar idea emerged in
Australia as well, which found a need to develop the vast area of East and
Southeast Asia and regarded as attractive cooperation by the other high
per capita national income country in the area. Given the region’s high
developmental momentum that had been already become obvious by the
1980s, it was quite reasonable for Australia and Japan to take the initia-
tive in liberalizing trade and markets in the region by creating a regional
forum. Since economic integration proceeded rapidly amidst confidence
in the new broad-based regional groupings, Japan allowed wishful think-
ing to persuade it that its Asia policy was essentially taken care of by its
regional economic liberalization and integration strategy.
Japan’s Korea policy also was interpreted with excessive optimism.
Based on the normalization approved in 1965 by Park Chung-hee and
reaffirmed in 1983 by Chun Doo-hwan, Japan pledged to provide a vast
sum of developmental assistance assuring the military dictatorship
support for its developmental authoritarianism. After Park was assassi-
nated in 1979 and power fell into the hands of Chun, who killed the
assassin, Chun suppressed dissidents most vigorously and brutally,
culminating in the massacre of students at Kwangju in 1980. This set the
stage for Korean politics in the 1980s, whereby those who experienced
the antigovernment struggles in the 1980s socialized themselves as
antimilitary, antigovernment, anti-American, and anti-Japanese. A tick-
ing time bomb was planted whereby Japan as well as the United States
would have to face, especially after the advent of democracy, a genera-
tion with a radically different outlook. Japan sided with the military
dictatorship throughout the 1980s, making it more difficult to handle
Korea once the ghost of the pre-1945 days was revived by Prime Minister
Koizumi’s annual visit to the Yasukuni shrine.
In 1986 the people power coupled with the U.S. government’s dis-
tancing itself from President Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines forced
Marcos to resign from his office and to flee to Honolulu. This triggered a
tide of democratization in East and Southeast Asia as part of the Third
Wave democratization, especially in Taiwan where Jiang Jingguo moved to
allow other political parties to participate in elections, and in Korea
where democratic protests forced Chun to accept other parties’ partici-
pation in direct presidential elections in 1987. Roh Tae-woo became the
first democratically elected president in this new wave, and the Japanese
should have been alerted by the rising voice of demonstrations for

populist causes as well as by shifts in foreign policy aimed initially at the
Soviet Union and China that they would face new challenges from
Korean thinking.
In China, Deng Xiaoping’s reform and open door policy led to the
appointment of Secretary General Hu Yaobang and Prime Minister Zhao
Ziyang in the early 1980s. Both were more democratically leaning than
Deng. Eventually, Hu was deemed to be too lenient toward democratic
reform in China and too soft on Japan, especially when Nakasone visited
the Yasukuni shrine despite Hu’s warning that the visit would augur ill
for the friendship between the two countries. Hu was dismissed from
office in 1987, and when mourning for him brought democratic demon-
strations in 1989, Secretary General Zhao Ziyang was torn between two
forces—those sympathetic with the goals of the demonstrations, and
those determined to suppress the protesters as long as they were
anti-communist. Zhao’s dismissal and the repression on June 4, 1989,
may have led some in Japan to expect that they would be spared a pop-
ulist outcry that had marked protests in 1986 against Hu Yaobang as soft
on Japan and even raised calls for reviving demands for war reparations.
Yet, the fact that China did not turn democratic in contrast to South
Korea would not spare Japan from becoming a target of nationalist sen-
timent in the 1990s. New circumstances after the end of the cold war,
the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the June 4 suppression would also
make China’s leaders prone to a more nationalist response toward Japan.
Throughout these and other democratization tides, Japan showed its
sympathy and its welcome as a democratic veteran in Asia. At the same
time, the Japanese government was mildly disturbed by what it saw as a
potential destabilizing force in the region in which the flying geese for-
mation pattern might not proceed as smoothly. When Japan’s bubble
economy began to burst, the conditions for holding the region together
and keeping a lid on long-suppressed criticisms of the way normalization
had been managed deteriorated.
Japan’s China policy was based on the 1972 joint communiqué and
the 1978 peace and friendship treaty, which achieved normalization
through Japan expressing its remorse over past aggression and pledging to
help China to modernize its country with ODA on a massive scale.
China accepted Japan’s remorse without demanding war reparations and
agreed to leave territorial issues to be tackled a generation later. With
Deng Xiaoping taking the reins of Communist Party power, the reform
and openness policy started off with his well-orchestrated visits to the
United States and Japan and then with his military intervention to
The 1980s ● 51
“punish Vietnam for invading and occupying Cambodia in 1979.”

Deng’s pragmatism was supplemented in the 1980s by Hu Yaobang and
Zhao Ziyang’s eagerness to keep ties advancing smoothly. Thus, Japan
was slow to foresee a nationalist turn that could target it. Indeed, in 1989
it became apprehensive about chaos engendered by protests undermining
China’s stability. Though it agreed along with others in the G-7 to impose
economic sanctions after China’s brutal suppression of the demonstra-
tions and maintained them until 1991, it also took the lead in ending
them. In the background was the image of Chinese prime minister Li
Peng warning Japan not to kill more Chinese by the economic sanctions
than those Chinese killed by Japanese in its war during the 1930s and
1940s. There was also the thought that if Japan befriended China
through its economic policies and influence with the United States and
others, it could leave a solid foundation for an extension of the improv-
ing state of relations in the 1970s and 1980s. The potential for a back-
lash was not well anticipated.
Throughout the 1980s Japan was eager to help China to achieve its
reform and openness and yet mildly apprehensive of China beset with
turmoil. China was in a twin transition: one from autarchic socialism to
open capitalism with Chinese characteristics; the other from authoritarian
party dictatorship to more democratic party dictatorship. The Japanese
penchant to separate politics from economics by downplaying China’s
transition to more democracy might have blinded it from grasping the
transition in the dynamics of patriotism. Once protesters’ patriotism was
dangerously channeled into an antigovernment direction, as we saw in
the slogans among the Tiananmen protesters, Li Peng and later Jiang
Zemin would be tempted to channel protesters’ discontent into an
anti-Japanese direction.
Japan’s U.S. Policy and Asia

Japanese strategic thought in the 1980s evolved around the idea of how
to stem the seeming tide of U.S. hegemonic decline by giving a helping
hand to them and, in the process, boosting Japan’s rise as an increasingly
equal partner. The flying geese formation was an idea that justified a
loose, open regionalism through which regional trade and market
liberalization and integration would be guided. It was spatially a catch-all
and temporally a step-by-step way of raising the region upward in terms
of economic development. This would suit the U.S. scheme of enhancing
the self-sustainability of each region within the broad framework of a
U.S.-led global system. It would also give Japan a chance to more fully
share leadership in Asia, assuming a division of labor where security

remained centered in the United States but economics and, to some
degree, culture too became a more equal partnership.
The United States was seriously apprehensive of the sustainability of
the American-led global system especially since 1971 when the gold-
dollar convertibility was abandoned, changing the basic canon of the
Brettons–Woods system of the international monetary system installed
in the wake of the Allied victory in 1945. Without sustaining U.S.
credibility and reputation in running the global system a replacement
monetary system would be difficult to maintain. The United States sought
new allies in forestalling the Soviet Union’s quest for global power.
Normalization of ties with China enhanced its position. It welcomed the
French initiative to enlist the major allied industrial democracies as the
G-5 to consult and coordinate with regard to energy, missile threats,
exchange rates, inflation, unemployment, government deficits, and
other matters affecting the global system. This can be “defensive inter-
nationalism” in light of such possible symptoms of hegemonic decline as
the military setback in Vietnam, the occasionally doubted credibility
of the dollar as the key global currency, the challenge of the Soviet
Union’s thrust into Western Europe through intermediate range nuclear
missiles, the inability to co-opt or suppress self-assertion in the Third
World, and so on. In Asia, the Soviet push into Afghanistan and support
for Vietnam’s move into Cambodia as well as lingering concern over
North Korea were security matters for which Japan’s role was limited,
but the looming question of new high-tech weapons and militarization
of space raised Japan’s profile. Even more vital was Japan’s role as a financial
partner, located in the region with greatest economic dynamism.
Reagan’s solution to the gold-dollar inconvertibility was to conclude
the Plaza Accord in 1985 , which, contrary to plans, weakened the dollar
vis-à-vis the yen and the Deutsche mark. Japan’s purchase of U.S.
treasury bonds did not mean that the dollar was stronger, but resulted
from the trade surplus with the United States, lower interest rates in
Japan, and government guidance. This enabled the dollar to remain the
world’s principal currency, while relying on other major powers to act as
stakeholders in the U.S.-led global system. The impact of the Plaza
Accord was enormous. Within a year after the Accord, the amount of
trade in goods and services was exceeded by the amount of trade in cur-
rency by a factor of 50 : 100. Until 1985 the former had always exceeded
the latter. The Plaza system had apparently resolved the twin deficits
dilemma of the United States. In the latter half of the 1980s Germany ad
Japan were acknowledged as global actors in a new way. As the European
The 1980s ● 53
integrative processes deepened, the role of the German mark within

Europe notably grew, presaging the advent of the euro as a common
European currency. Japan’s role was also significant. It kept purchasing
treasury bonds on a massive scale, as it provided the vital financial lead-
ership to keep the Asian economic boom alive. Yet, the Japanese econ-
omy of the 1980s was built on a bubble, and it lacked the regional
institutionalization that would ensure sustained integration in Asia of
the sort possible in Europe. As Japan entered a long recession from 1991,
China was poised in the aftermath of economic sanctions to accelerate
its steep ascent. Not only Japanese but also Chinese became massive pur-
chasers of treasury bonds in the mid-1990s. Given the shifting balance
between the Japanese and Chinese economies, it was not surprising to
see the U.S. government start thinking about China as an important
global partner too. In this context Deputy Secretary of State Robert
Zoellick prodded China to act as a responsible stakeholder in December
2005 as the World Trade Organization was meeting in Hong Kong.
Japan had proven itself, especially through the 1980s, as a partner of
the United States in managing the global system. Its role in Asia was still
evolving, but it was committing itself to work closely with the United
States in favor of stability and continued integration into the world
economy. Missing, however, was a clear strategy for facing the rapid
transformation of Asia. Neither in its own response to Gorbachev’s unex-
pected shifts in Moscow’s policies nor in its handling of sharp changes in
China and South Korea domestic and foreign policy by the end of the
1980s do we detect much preparation for new challenges. Moreover,
Japan and the United States were working together for global objectives
rather than for regional strategizing. This was a period of no serious mis-
steps but many missed opportunities for a strategic outlook in Asia and
timely anticipation of problems to come.
Notes
1. David Lake, Power, Protection and Free Trade: International Sources of U.S.
Commercia Strategy, 1887–1939 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1988).
2. Takashi Inoguchi, “Japan’s Images and Options: Not a Challenger, but a
Supporter,” Journal of Japanese Studies, Vol. 12, No.1 (1986), pp. 95–119.
3. Angus Maddison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics (Paris:
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2004).
4. Stephen Krasner, “Asymmetries in Japanese–American Trade: The Case for
Specific Reciprocity,” Policy Papers in International Affairs, No.32.
5. Takashi Inoguchi, “Nichibei kankei kara mita Nihon gaiko rosen,” Kan, 2004.
6. Takashi Inoguchi, Kokusai seimino mikata (Tokyo: Chikuma shobo, 2005);
Thomas U. Berger, Cultures of Anti-Militarism: National Security in
Germany and in Japan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998);
Jennifer Lind, “Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing Theories of Japanese
Security Policy,” International Security, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Summer 2004),
pp. 92–121; Peter Katzenstein, Norms and National Security: Police and
Military in Postwar Japan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996);
J.J. Suh, Peter J. Katzenstein, and Allen Carlson, eds., Rethinking Security in
East Asia: Identity, Power, and Efficiency (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 2004).
7. Henry A. Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy
for the 21st Century (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001).
8. Inoguchi, “Japan’s Images and Options,” pp. 95–119.
9. Maki Taro, Nakasone seiken. 1806 Days, 2 vols. (Tokyo: Gyosei kenkyujo,
1988).
10. John E. Mueller, The Remnants of War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
2004).
11. Francis Fukuyama, End of History and the Last Man (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1992).
12. Hanns Maull, “Germany and Japan: A New Civilian Power?” Foreign Affairs,
Vol. 69, No.5 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 91–106.
13. Hans-Peter Schwarz, Die Gezähmten Deutschen: von der Machtbesessenheit
zur Machtvergessenheit (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verglas-Anstalt, 1985).
14. Takashi Inoguchi, “Japan’s Ambition for Normal Statehood,” in Jorge
Dominguez and Byung-Kook Kim, eds., Compliance and Conflict (London:
Routledge, 2005), pp. 135–64.
15. Stanley Renshon, In His Father’s Shadow: The Transformations of George W.
Bush (New York: Palgrave, 2004).
16. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (London: Unwin
Hyman, 1988); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1981).
17. Robert D. Putnam and Nicholas Bayne, Hanging Together: The Seven-Power
Summits (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984).
18. Oba Mie, Ajia Taiheiyo chiiki eno dotei (Kyoto: Minerva shobo, 2004).
19. Kosuge Nobuko, Sengo wakai: Nihon wa kako kara kaihosarnainoka (Tokyo:
Iwanami shoten, 2005).
20. Takashi Inoguchi, “How to Assess World War II in World History: One
Japanese Perspective” (Unpublished paper, 2005).
21. Watanabe Akio, Sengo Nihon no saisho tachi (Tokyo: Chuo koronsha, 2001);
Iokibe Makoto, Sengo Nihon gaikoshi (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1999).
22. Watanabe, Sengo Nihon no saisho tachi.
23. Maki, Nakasone seiken. 1806 Days.
24. Watanabe, Sengo Nihon no saisho tachi.
The 1980s ● 55
25. Kimiya Masafumi, Kankoku: Minshuka to keizai hatten no danamizumu

(Tokyo: Chikuma shobo, 2001).
26. Funabashi Yoichi, Nichibei masatsu (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1987).
27. Ezra Vogel, Ming Yuan, and Akihiko Tanaka, eds., The Golden Age of the
U.S.–China–Japan Triangle, 1972–1989 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Asia Center, 2000); Gilbert Rozman, Northeast Asia’s Stunted
Regionalism: Bilateral Distrust in the Shadow of Globalization (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004).
28. Takashi Inoguchi, “Shaping and Sharing Pacific Dynamism,” Annals of
American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 505 (September
1989), pp. 46–55.
29. Zhukou Xiao (Takashi Inoguchi), “Cong Ribende jiaodu toushi Zhongguo
de minzuzhuyi,” Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi, No.11 (2005), pp. 49–50.
CHAPTER 3
Japan’s Strategic Thinking toward

Asia in the First Half of the 1990s
Tsuyoshi Hasegawa
T
he first half of the 1990s was a crucial period for Japan’s strategic
thinking. It started with the Persian Gulf crisis and the Gulf War
in 1990–91, which tested Japan’s commitment to international
peace and stability under the emerging new international environment;
however, the most crucial event was the collapse of the Soviet Union. It
was during this period that the world made a drastic transition from the
cold war into the post–cold war period, and began the process of search-
ing for a new international order.
Although the shape of the international order that was being formed
in the first half of the 1990s was still murky and fluid, three basic trends
were discernible. The first was the intention to create a unipolar order
dominated by the only remaining superpower. Exploiting its unequaled
military power, the United States would unilaterally forge a framework
for a unipolar international order, Pax Americana. The second possibil-
ity was to return to a balance of power and Realpolitik. Having lost the
stable ballast of the cold war structure, states would depart from
the rigid alliances that it had dictated in search of alignments to maxi-
mize their national interests to prevent other powers from gaining dom-
inance. The third was an attempt to create a multilateral international
system that would resolve conflict through international consultation in
support of peace, stability, and cooperation. All three possibilities existed
in a nascent stage, with none yet emerging as the decisive trend. This
fluid situation could have been a golden opportunity for Japan to shed
cold war strategic thinking and fashion a foreign policy that would
58 ● Tsuyoshi Hasegawa
accurately assess the new reality of international relations and raise

Japan’s role. With its still enormous economic power, Japan could have
played a large part in forging a new international order.
Unfortunately, Japan’s policies in the first half of the 1990s are a story
of missed opportunity, failing to take advantage of a fork toward a future
direction that would be unavailable later. This failure would have a
lasting negative impact that was destined to haunt Japan. It also
contributed to the inability of East Asia as a region to create a multilat-
eral cooperative regional order. This does not mean that Japan did not
react to the changing international environment. It was the first major
country to restore normal relations with China after the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) had been ostracized by the international com-
munity. It began negotiations with North Korea for normalization of
diplomatic relations, while it enhanced cooperation with South Korea
through mutual visits by the heads of state. Yet, these constructive moves
were made without overreaching strategic thinking that asked the funda-
mental questions: what international order should Japan strive to
establish—acceptance of Pax Americana, a balance of power system, or a
multilateral cooperative system—and what role should Japan play in
creating such an order?
This period also saw a gradual shift in Japan’s strategic thinking to
something new—amorphous, confusing, conflicting, and unsettling.
Japan was caught between conflicting expectations—the demand from
the United States that Japan should be more actively involved in global
peacekeeping missions and the apprehension of China and South Korea
over Japan’s assertion of a political and military great power status.
Japan’s financial power remained ineffective as leverage for creating an
international system beneficial to its interests. As cold war paradigms
were gradually disappearing, right-wing nationalism was beginning to
impede the search for new regionalism.
Impact of the Gulf War on Japan’s

Strategic Thinking
As Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August 1990 and U.S.-led
multinational forces pushed him back in January 1991, Japan reacted
slowly. Although Japan’s financial contribution at later $13 eventually
was large, its refusal to commit human resources to international peace
provoked rebuke, especially when Japan’s economic well-being depended
on the secure flow of Middle East oil.1 Long accustomed to the comfort-
able cold war framework, supported by a U.S. security guarantee, Japan
First Half of the 1990s ● 59
was slow to recognize the requirements of the new international

environment. Japan’s Left had long enjoyed the luxury of standing for
“Pacifism in One Country” (ikkoku heiwashugi), arguing for Japan’s
sacred obligation, dictated by its Peace Constitution, not to resort to
military action or even to join in keeping international peace. Afraid to
provoke a divisive domestic debate, policymakers had opted not to con-
front the fundamental issue of Japan’s strategy, bowing to the restrictions
of the Constitution, the three non-nuclear principles, and limitations in
the military budget. When it became necessary to change this policy, the
government explained such changes as being caused by pressure from
outside (gaiatsu), not a new strategic rationale. This resulted in the absence
of strategic thinking shared by a wide spectrum of public opinion.
When the Persian Gulf crisis began, a powerful adviser to the cabinet,
Seshima Ryuzo, commented that there were three options for Japan:
money, sweat, or blood.2 Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki and Deputy
Foreign Minister Kuriyama Takakazu ruled out the option of dispatch-
ing the Self Defense Force (SDF) in any capacity. Use of Japan’s ships for
logistical support was impossible because of objections by the powerful
shipping workers trade union. The only way that Japan could show its
cooperation with the world community threatened by Iraq’s brazen inva-
sion was with “money.”
Japan’s inaction in the Gulf War provoked an outcry from Japan’s
realist critics. In his scathing attack on Japan’s reaction to the Gulf War,
Sato Seizaburo pointed out five fundamental flaws that stemmed from
the inertia in strategic thinking: (1) postwar antimilitarism; (2) worship
of a peaceful solution to conflict (plus refusal to accept military means as
a viable option) and escape into anti-Americanism; (3) avoidance of
responsibility by self-denigration; (4) hiding behind the Constitution
and anti-SDF arguments; and (5) immaturity of public opinion and lack
of leadership.3 Kitaoka Shinichi criticized Japan’s choice of providing
only financial assistance without sacrificing humans as the most inept
policy that would endanger America’s trust in Japan as an ally.4 Tanaka
Naoki decried the absence of strategic thinking during the Gulf War,
which led to marginalization of Japan as a global power.5 After the war,
the Diet belatedly enacted the PKO law, enabling the SDF to join in
peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the United Nations
(UN). This was a crisis management measure—a continuation of the old
pattern of patching things up while maintaining the old framework
rather than questioning the framework itself. The government had to
cajole the opposition Komeito, while assuaging the concerns expressed
by China and South Korea. Opposition from its neighbors to its pursuit
of great power status would revive history as a major issue, which, in

turn, would rouse Japan’s own nationalism.
The linkage between the Gulf War and Japan’s historical past provides
an interesting glimpse of Japan’s strategic thinking, or lack thereof.
Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait should have been likened to
Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931, which ushered in the war with
China. The great powers’ tacit acceptance of Japan’s invasion and the
League of Nations’ weak response encouraged Japanese militarists to
embark on a path of foreign adventures. Yet, parallels were not drawn.
The left-wing portrayed the U.S.-led intervention in Kuwait as Western
intrusion into Arab nations; and the right-wing, though supporting
Japan’s military role, refused to accept any connection.
The Gulf War took Japan by surprise. The decision-making process
proved dysfunctional. Parliamentary opposition paralyzed foreign policy.
A lack of leadership from the Prime Minister’s Office left decision-making
with the bureaucracies, but rivalry between the Foreign Ministry and the
Finance Ministry hampered the formation of a unified policy. Most
detrimental was the paucity of strategic thinking.
The End of the Cold War and the

Challenge of Russia
The collapse of the Soviet Union took away the ballast that anchored
international relations. The superpower rivalry disappeared. The United
States actively supported Russia’s transition to democracy and a market
economy, as the two powers cooperated to remove nuclear weapons from
Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Soon, however, the new Russian state
was plunged into continuous political and economic crisis, diminishing
its influence in the international arena, despite its possession of a formi-
dable nuclear arsenal. The end of the cold war also meant that conflicts
that were previously kept within limits by the framework of the
East–West global contest lost their moorings. Ideology and allegiance to
alliances were no longer the powerful driving forces. Instead, national-
ism was on the rise. This meant that hostility between Japan and its
neighbors—China and two Koreas—that had been kept within limits,
had the potential to develop out of control.
The Sino-Soviet conflict that had lasted more than a quarter of a
century had already ended when Gorbachev visited Beijing in 1989. This
put an end to the U.S. strategy to confront the Soviet threat with the tri-
angle of the United States, Japan, and China. The collapse of the Soviet
Union also meant that the “China question” became a crucial factor in
East Asia. With its dynamic economic growth, increased military power,
and revisionist foreign policy, China emerged as a force for tipping the
regional power balance. How to approach it, containment or integra-
tion, became crucial for Japan as well as the United States. Also, the
Korean Peninsula reemerged as a point of conflicting strategies. South
Korea’s more varied foreign policy options raised the stakes for Japanese
diplomacy, and the North’s greater desperation made multilateral
cooperation more imperative for all who faced it. Sharp adjustments
were needed in strategies to deal with this changing environment.
The most urgent challenge for Japan was how to respond to changes
emanating from Moscow. The sea change in international relations did
not suddenly take place with the collapse of the Soviet Union in
December 1991; it had been occurring gradually in the Gorbachev
period. Japan was slow to recognize this. Claiming that the cold war in
Asia was not over, and making concessions on the Northern Territories
the precondition for Japan’s normalization of relations with the Soviet
Union, Japan missed its chance to respond. While Japan stood alone in
its intransigence, the United States concluded a series of arms control
agreements with the Soviet Union, the Berlin Wall fell, leading to
unification of Germany, one East European satellite country after
another deserted Moscow’s camp, and the Soviet Union and South Korea
opened diplomatic relations.
While all these cataclysmic changes were taking place around them,
the Japanese withheld large-scale economic assistance to the Soviet
Union in the name of the principle of inseparability of politics and
economy. Without taking into account that Gorbachev’s position had
weakened by the time of his visit to Japan in April 1991, Tokyo insisted on
his acceptance of Japan’s territorial demands beyond the 1956 Joint
Declaration. The Gorbachev–Kaifu Summit did not produce historic
rapprochement, neither did it bring major improvement to bilateral
relations. Indeed, refusal to extend large-scale economic assistant to
Gorbachev did not help to avert his fall from power later in the year.6
In the midst of the failed August coup against Gorbachev, a leading
Sovietologist in Japan commented that a government under the coup
leaders might serve Japan’s interests better since, isolated from the inter-
national community, it would be more likely to agree to return the
Northern Territories in exchange for Japan’s recognition. Such a myopic
view indicated the depth of the “Northern Territories syndrome.”7 After
the coup failed, however, the Kaifu government took a new approach
under Nakayama’s Five Principles, in which support for Soviet reforms,
endorsement of economic assistance, and the effort to integrate the
Soviet Union into the Asia-Pacific community were all placed above the
resolution of the territorial dispute. For the first time in the postwar
period, repairing relations with the Soviet Union was given priority.
Nakayama also announced Japan’s first substantial assistance to the
Soviet Union/Russian Federation of $2.5 billion.
These positive developments suffered a setback when the Miyazawa
government took over and Watanabe Michio became foreign minister. In
December 1991 the Soviet Union dissolved, as the Russian Federation
and 14 independent states were formed. This had a profound impact on
the geopolitical landscape of Western Europe, the Caucasus, Central
Asia, and China, where borders were drastically altered. But in the Far
East the border between Japan and Russia remained the same. In the
minds of many Japanese, the Soviet Union was merely replaced by
Russia, and there were no fundamental changes in the problems that
existed between the two countries. Instead of new strategic thinking, the
Japanese government was eager to exploit the situation to achieve its
long-cherished goal of regaining the Northern Territories.
Initially, the newly formed Russian government proclaimed its inten-
tion to depart sharply from Soviet foreign policy. Foreign Minister
Andrei Kozyrev listed democracy, human rights, and rejection of imper-
ial expansion as foreign policy goals and asserted that Russia shares the
same values as the West. Boris Yeltsin visited Germany, Italy, Britain, the
United States, Canada, and France from November 1991 to February
1992, declaring a new partnership with the West. This approach contin-
ued at the Munich G-7 Summit in July, to which Yeltsin was invited.
Yeltsin intended to culminate his Western-oriented foreign policy with a
visit to Tokyo in September. Deputy foreign minister Georgy Kunadze
enunciated the principle of “law and justice,” on which to resolve the
thorny territorial dispute. Yeltsin’s close identification of new Russian
national interests with those of the West, however, provoked a profound
sense of resentment not merely from conservative patriotic elements, but
also from many who had previously supported democratic reform. The
loss of republics that had been acquired over centuries deeply wounded
Russian pride. Kunadze’s policy of settling the territorial dispute by
conceding to at least some of Japan’s territorial demands rubbed salt into
this humiliation. The Kuril question soon became a lightening rod of the
frustration over the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
Oblivious to the sea change resulting from the collapse of the Soviet
Union as well as to the profound domestic backlash in Russia provoked
by the Kuril question, the Miyazawa government continued to adhere to
the policy of inseparability of politics and economy, making the
resolution of the Northern Territories question the precondition of

large-scale economic assistance. Watanabe rejected Kozyrev’s proposal
made in March 1992 to accept the Joint Declaration of 1956 and
postpone resolution of the two bigger islands, Kunashiri and Etorofu, for
further negotiations. He further made it clear in April that Russia’s
recognition of Japan’s sovereignty over all four islands was the precondi-
tion for the anticipated economic assistance. At the Munich Summit,
Tokyo lobbied hard and succeeded in convincing other powers to
include in the G-7 political statement a call for the resolution of the
territorial dispute as a precondition of full normalization of relations
with Russia. Faced with Japan’s intransigence as well as the mounting
opposition to any concessions on territory, Yeltsin canceled his visit to
Japan in September. Russo-Japanese relations suffered a huge setback.
Only after this failure did the Japanese government gingerly begin to
change its policy toward Russia. Under strong pressure from the United
States, it finally altered its policy of inseparability of politics and econ-
omy, and adopted a new policy to extend economic aid to Russia. This
new approach was made under pressure from other nations, not as a
result of fundamental change in Japan’s strategic thinking. The sudden
adoption of a flexible response to Russia finally resulted in Yeltsin’s visit
to Tokyo in October 1993, only one week after government troops
stormed the Russian White House to quell the insurgents against the
president. By this time, the Miyazawa government was gone, and a non-
LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) prime minister Hosokawa Morihiro
hosted Yeltsin. The Tokyo Declaration was issued, in which both sides
pledged to strive for resolution of the dispute over four islands. Mindful
of his domestic opposition, however, Yeltsin declined to acknowledge the
validity of the 1956 Joint Declaration, and thus refused to commit him-
self to the return of the two smaller islands, Shikotan and the Habomai
group. Perhaps, Yeltsin planned to make this concession at the next
summit in Moscow after he won a majority in the Duma election.
Instead, in December 1993 he suffered a serious setback in the election.
Foreign Minister Hata Tsutomu visited Moscow in March 1994, but
Yeltsin refused even to see him.
Fishing negotiations designed to allow Japanese fishermen access to
Russian waters in exchange for fees began in 1994, but the talks, which
remained the only thin thread for potential improvement in Russo-
Japanese relations, soon stalled because of the issue of sovereignty over
the islands. When a devastating earthquake of 8.1 magnitude struck the
Kurils in October 1994, Tokyo hastened to extend humanitarian aid, but
refused to extend aid for the much damaged infrastructure. It became an
uphill fight for Tokyo even to get Moscow to acknowledge the validity of
the Tokyo Declaration. When Kozyrev visited Japan in March 1995 he
clashed with Foreign Minister Kono Yohei over Russia’s war in
Chechnya. Kozyrev refused to implement the promise in the Tokyo
Declaration to move the territorial question forward toward ultimate
solution, and rejected Kono’s proposal for demilitarization of the Kurils.
In turn, Kono refused to commit himself to Kozyrev’s request that Japan
support Russia’s membership in APEC. Russo-Japanese relations again
found themselves in a stalemate.8
Japan’s approach to the Soviet Union and later Russia exposed the
same affliction that was revealed during the Gulf War: an inability to
refashion strategic thinking to correspond to the new international envi-
ronment. Few asked the fundamental questions: Where should Japan
place Russo-Japanese relations in its overall foreign policy? Could Tokyo
afford to let its relations with Moscow slide in the changing global
environment? How should it integrate the Northern Territories dispute
into its overall policy? Instead of asking these questions, it placed the terri-
torial dispute in the forefront of relations, thereby making rapprochement
impossible. Without repairing its relations with Moscow, Tokyo could not
possibly forge a new international order based on multilateralism or gain
leverage in a balance of power game. The existence of the economically
and ecologically devastated Russian Far East could pose a threat to
regional stability. Even if Tokyo were to accept Pax Americana, it should
have reconsidered relations with Moscow once there was a U.S.–Soviet
rapprochement. Whatever Japan’s new strategy might be—support of
Pax Americana, a balance of power option, or multilateralism—failure to
achieve rapprochement with Russia was clearly detrimental to Japan’s
own national interests.
Japan always seemed to be one step behind in approaching Russia. It
abandoned the policy of inseparability of politics and economics only
after the shock of Yeltsin’s cancellation of his trip to Tokyo, and when
Yeltsin’s political credit was being severely weakened. Behind this lack of
timing lurked Japan’s hubris: it arrogantly assumed that its capital and
technology would be essential for Russia’s transformation into capital-
ism. Japan supposedly had nothing else but the Northern Territories to
gain from Russia, whereas Russia needed Japan’s economic assistance for
its survival.
Miyazawa faced three challenges in 1992: passing the PKO bill in the
Diet, sending the emperor to China, and settling the Northern
Territories dispute with Russia. He had to overcome opposition from the
Left, especially from the Komeito to pass the PKO bill, and he faced
opposition from the Right over the emperor’s trip to China. He was in
no position to compromise on the Northern Territories, and standing
firm gained support from both sides. Strategic thinking was sacrificed
for domestic politics.
A New Era in East Asia and the

Challenge of China
In contrast to its reconciliation with the Soviet Union, the United States
became alienated from China from the end of the 1980s. It no longer
needed China to counter the Soviet threat. With an emphasis on human
rights, it spearheaded the policy of isolating China after June 4, 1989.
By the middle of the 1990s, the United States even came to recognize a
looming threat from China as a regional great power with dynamic eco-
nomic development and potential military power. Japan’s reaction
to China was markedly different. After June 4 it still considered China to
be a linchpin for regional stability. Not known as terribly sensitive to
human rights issues, prompted by the desire to put the painful past
behind, ready to fill the gap left by U.S. hesitation in the vast Chinese
market, and eager to play a regional great power role in East Asia in the
absence of Russia and the United States, Japan embarked upon a con-
scious policy to bring China back to the international community.9 In
turn, China’s approach to Japan was motivated by a desire to break out
of its isolation. By decoupling Japan from the United States, China
would escape the danger of the U.S.–Japan condominium, and, perhaps,
even create a regional bloc against the United States.10
In 1991–92, the interests of both countries converged. Japan’s active
policy to restore relations began with Foreign Minister Nakayama’s visit
to Beijing in April 1991. China’s foreign minister Qian Qichen visited
Japan in June, and requested the emperor’s visit to China. When Prime
Minister Kaifu visited Beijing in August, Li Peng too called for the visit.
Yet, this was resisted by the right wing. Conservative Sankei shimbun and
its monthly journal, Seiron, launched a campaign against it. Some on the
Left also opposed the trip as the political use of the emperor. When Jiang
Zemin visited Tokyo in April 1992 and requested Prime Minister
Miyazawa’s formal acceptance of the emperor’s visit, Miyazawa replied
that this issue remained under consideration. Similar to Nakasone’s
desire to end the postwar occupation legacy, Miyazawa focused on ele-
vating Sino-Japanese relations as a means to forge a new environment.
He wanted to accomplish this by sending the emperor to China, thereby
putting an end, once and for all, to the nagging history issue that had
plagued Sino-Japanese relations in the past. Miyazawa and the Foreign

Ministry sought to achieve this breakthrough while Deng Xiaoping was
still active and influential. Furthermore, the emperor’s visit would
extract concessions from China about Japan’s effort to adopt the PKO
bill.
China became the centerpiece in Japan’s new strategy. Marginalized
during the Gulf War and downgrading Russia’s role in its strategic
calculations, Japan placed its hopes on China for boosting its regional
and global status. East Asia was emerging in the forefront of the global
economy. While the United States was experiencing a recession, Japan
would assert unquestionable leadership in forging Asian economic inte-
gration by bringing China into the emerging regional system. Japanese
public opinion and most of the newspapers, including the conservative
Yomiuri shimbun, supported the emperor’s trip, and negotiations with
China resulted in its muted response to the PKO bill and the assurance
that it would not raise embarrassing questions about history during the
visit. In October 1992 the emperor of Japan for the first time in history
set foot in China, and expressed his “deep sorrow for Japan’s having
caused great pains to the Chinese people.”
Japan’s approach to China was based on questionable assumptions.
Contrary to expectations that China would be grateful for Japan’s massive
developmental assistance and investment, China accepted Japan’s
economic assistance with marked lack of appreciation; even treating it as
a form of reparations for the wartime damage that Japan had caused. The
Chinese resented Japan’s tacit assumption that China was bound to
remain backward for the foreseeable future, incapable of challenging
Japan’s economic power, and that Japan should serve as a model for
Chinese economic modernization. In fact, despite China’s muted
response to Japan’s PKO law, China’s leaders would not accept Japan’s
political great power status, let alone Japan’s leadership in the regional
order. The most important mistake, however, lay in Japan’s erroneous
expectation that with the emperor’s trip to China and his words of “deep
sorrow” Japan would be able to put the history issue behind it once and
for all. The resentment to Japan’s transgressions had deep roots, permeating
deep into Chinese popular consciousness. When the Marxist–Maoist ideol-
ogy could no longer unite the nation, it was inevitable that nationalism
would serve as the driving force to unite Chinese behind a great power
status. Leaders would manipulate the force of nationalism by turning it
on and off for political convenience, but nationalism could not be
controlled at will, contrary to the assumptions in Japan.11 As nationalism
in both countries was on the ascendancy, managing bilateral relations was
destined to become difficult. Buoyed by the emperor’s visit, Japan

neglected to consider how to cope with the rise of nationalism both in
China and at home. Even as trade boomed, 12 close economic interactions
did not lead to closer political relations.
While Japan held on to rosy expectations of integrating China into a
Japan-led regional system, China began to play its ruthless Realpolitik.
After failing to achieve rapprochement with Japan, Yeltsin was openly
courting China and South Korea against Japan. He visited Beijing in
December 1992. After much indecision, the Clinton administration,
too, realized the need to mend fences with China. As soon as China
succeeded in regaining status in the international arena, Japan ceased to
be the only means for China to overcome diplomatic isolation. A differ-
ent tone was already set in 1993 when Prime Minister Hosokawa and
Foreign Minister Hata began pressing Beijing for greater military
transparency, reflecting Japan’s growing concern with China’s arms
acquisitions from Russia and its increased military power. History issues
arose again. In May 1994 Justice Minister Nagano Shigeto stated that
the Nanjing Massacre was a “trumped up story,” and in August 1995
Education Minister Shimamura Yoshinobu said that Japan’s culpability
for the war was “a matter of personal interpretation.” Although Nagano
was forced to resign and Shimamura was reprimanded, the Chinese
would not overlook these statements. In contrast to the handling of his-
tory during the emperor’s visit, Li Peng loudly denounced Japan’s weak
official apology on the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the war.13 The
history issue returned to haunt bilateral relations.
The territorial dispute between China and Japan also became a poten-
tially explosive issue during the first half of the 1990s. In 1991, right-
wing LDP politicians planned to hoist the Japanese flag on the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, but the prime minister and Foreign Ministry
were able to pressure them to stop. Then in 1992, China passed a terri-
torial waters law and threatened to use force to protect China’s sover-
eignty over these same islands, as Chinese oil exploration began nearby.
This provoked a nationalist reaction from Japan.14 By 1995 neither the
Japanese government nor the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was strong
enough to restrain nationalist forces in Japan over the territorial issue.
Within Japan in the post–cold war context, the territorial disputes with
China and South Korea were becoming joined to the Northern
Territories dispute as nationalist causes.
The greatest shock to bilateral relations came in May 15, 1995, when
China conducted an underground nuclear test in Lop Nur. Coming on
the heels of Prime Minister Murayama’s plea to Li Peng for a moratorium
on testing, this was perceived by the Japanese as an open challenge,

provoking fierce debate as to whether Japan should continue ODA aid to
China. The Right and the Left converged into a force that advocated
cutting it off. Under this intense pressure, the government and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs were forced to suspend $75 million in grant
assistance. The Chinese conducted further tests in August and
September 1995, aware that they would soon sign the test ban treaty and
could no longer test to reach the level of the United States and Russia,
and they protested Japan’s decision to suspend aid, strongly indicating
that it was a form of reparations.
If the beginning of the 1990s began with optimism for the future of
Sino-Japanese relations, the situation had deteriorated sharply by 1995.
Japan’s strategy to use China as a major vehicle for its rise was totally
derailed. On the contrary, it was China that ruthlessly exploited Japan’s
miscalculations to enhance its military status and political leverage. At
the halfway point of the 1990s, there emerged in Japan something that
did not exist in 1990: Japan’s growing concern with China’s power, both
economic and military. China was no longer Japan’s student to tutor, but
a rival for leadership in the region. Containment of China became for
the first time a strategic concern for Japan.
Rapid Rise in Korea’s Significance for

Japanese Foreign Policy
The end of the cold war provided another opportunity for Japan to assert
leadership for regional stability: an attempt at normalization with North
Korea. As in the case of China, Japan and North Korea’s interests coin-
cided at the beginning of the 1990s. Marginalized in decision-making
during the Gulf War, Japan saw normalization with North Korea,
together with its approach to China, as boosting its great power status.
North Korea, in turn, faced an unprecedented crisis. The collapse of the
Soviet Union and East European communism, the Soviet Union/Russia’s
rapprochement with South Korea, and China’s recognition of South
Korea left North Korea isolated. Along with the pursuit of nuclear
weapons, Kim Il-sung attempted to normalize relations with Japan. If
Japan had a strategic rationale to pursue normalization with North
Korea, it was not clearly stated. Its approach began as the personal
initiative of one powerful LDP politician, Kanemaru Shin, who, accom-
panied by Japan Socialist Party (JSP) vice chairman Tanabe Makoto vis-
ited Pyongyang in September 1990, and signed a three-party declaration
(LDP, JSP, and the North Korean Workers Party) urging their respective
governments to begin normalization talks and calling for Japan to

apologize for the occupation and to pay reparations.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs took over the normalization talks,
which were held eight times between January 1991 and November 1992,
partly to prevent Kanemaru from conducting personal diplomacy detri-
mental to Japan’s interests. It sought to ensure that normalization with
North Korea would not jeopardize the interests of South Korea and the
United States, presenting four principles as guidelines: no damage to
South Korea; no reparations to North Korea; North Korean acceptance
of IAEA inspections; and no effect on the ongoing negotiations between
North and South Korea. North Korea did not accept these conditions,
especially no reparations and the IAEA inspections. Kim Il-sung relied
on Kanemaru’s stance on the reparations issue and considered the
nuclear issue a matter to be settled with the United States. After the
Japanese raised the Kim Hyon-hui issue (a captured North Korean agent
on a terrorist mission) and kidnappings of Japanese citizens, the negoti-
ations were suspended in November 1992.15
Drastic changes in Japan’s political landscape also impeded the
normalization process. Kanemaru fell from power due to a political scan-
dal, and the JSP suffered a huge election setback. As the protectors of
North Korea’s interests lost their clout, a sharp outcry to change Japan’s
approach could be heard from the Right. North Korea’s military threat
was increasing. In March 1993, North Korea withdrew from the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, signaling its intention to develop nuclear weapons.
In May, it launched a Nodong-1 missile with the capability of striking
Japan. In December the United States leaked information that the North
had already developed one or more nuclear weapons. These develop-
ments shocked many into the realization that Japan was suddenly
vulnerable to nuclear attack from North Korea. The Clinton administra-
tion was prepared to impose sanctions and a military blockade, and
requested Japan’s full cooperation. But just as in the Gulf War, Japan’s
reaction, even though directly threatened by the North, was torpid,
provoking dissatisfaction in the United States. Japan was saved, however,
by Jimmy Carter’s intervention to avoid nuclear confrontation.
Eventually Japan agreed, though reluctantly, to join the Korean
Peninsula Energy Development Organization, KEDO.16
While Japan gingerly began its approach to North Korea, it simulta-
neously sought to strengthen relations with South Korea, allaying fear
that ties with the South would diminish. When Roh Tae-woo visited
Tokyo in March 1990, the emperor expressed “painful regret” for Japan’s
colonization of Korea, as did Prime Minister Kaifu. Roh said that the
apology question was over. When Prime Minister Hosokawa visited Seoul
in November 1993, he too made a clear apology for Japan’s colonial rule
over Korea, and President Kim Young-sam in response emphasized the
necessity of developing a “future-oriented partnership.”17 Nevertheless,
Japanese and South Koreans saw each other as the most disliked people.18
Positive developments tended to be eclipsed by negative events. In
November 1992, for instance, Miyazawa visited Seoul in the hope of
improving ties in tandem with his China policy. Yet, South Korean sen-
timent against Japan was suddenly aroused over the issue of comfort
women who had been forced to serve as sex slaves for the Japanese mili-
tary during the war. Instead of launching his Asian initiative, Miyazawa
found himself apologizing for Japan’s exploitation of comfort women,
and no invitation to the emperor to visit South Korea ensued in the wake
of his visit to China.19
Korean distrust of Japan became more politicized after the democra-
tization of South Korean politics. A long list of contentious issues
included: treatment of Japan’s colonial rule, reparations, assistance to the
Koreans left in Sakhalin, assistance to those injured in the American
atomic bombings, Japan’s government-approved textbooks, comfort
women, treatment of the Koreans within Japan, and Japan’s military role
in its peacekeeping operations. The more emotionally the Koreans
brought up their resentment to the Japanese, the more it provoked
Japan’s nationalism. The Asian Women’s Fund was established in 1995
and comfort women began receiving atonement with an official letter of
apology signed by the prime minister; however, any positive develop-
ments in the first half of the 1990s rested on a fragile foundation. In
addition, there emerged a balance of power game in the post–cold war
period. After canceling his trip to Tokyo in 1992, Yeltsin ostentatiously
visited South Korea, delivering the black box recording of the KAL
airplane downed by Soviet pilots in 1983, which he had pointedly
refused to give to the Japanese. Seoul was more than willing to play
Moscow against Tokyo. In another incident of joining a neighbor to put
Japan in a bad light, Kim Young-sam at a 1995 joint news conference
with Jiang Zemin denounced Japan’s distortions of history.
Although Japan made some attempts to improve relations with each
of the Koreas in the first half of the 1990s, the results were meager.
Policies toward the peninsula were not part of a comprehensive strategy
to meet a changing environment in East Asia. The failure to cultivate
new relations with South Korea, and perhaps North Korea as well,
stemmed from the lack of an overall strategic approach.
Reconsideration of the U.S.–Japanese

Security Alliance and East Asia
For Japan, the Persian Gulf crisis and Desert Storm were a wake-up call
regarding the over-reliance on the U.S.–Japanese security alliance.
Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet foreign minister Edvard
Shevardnadze issued a joint statement on August 1990 denouncing the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait; Baker was seen as being contemptuous of Japan
during the crisis.20 The rigid cold war framework was unraveling as the
United States and the Soviet Union were collaborating to resolve a
regional conflict, and Japan was left on the sidelines. With the disap-
pearance of the Soviet Union as a potential enemy, the U.S.–Japanese
alliance had to change its character. The question about what was the
potential danger against which the security alliance was directed became
murky. If it were against North Korea, it would provoke resentment by
China or even Russia. If it were against China, not only would it prevent
China from being integrated into a system of regional cooperation, but
also it would divide Japan. If the alliance had meaning only as a “cork in
the bottle” to prevent Japan from becoming a military great power that
would threaten its neighboring countries, this would provoke resent-
ment among Japanese nationalists. And if the alliance were to serve as an
open-ended instrument of the American global mission for whatever
military contingencies would occur, utilizing American bases in Japan as
U.S. forward bases, supported by Japanese financial backing, what role
was Japan to play in that mission? Were their respective global interests
identical? To what extent would Japan continue these arrangements?
Those were the issues left for Japan to confront.21
Neither the United States nor Japan was quick in reexamining the
nature of the alliance in the changing circumstances of the post–cold war
era. The United States became more interested in pursuing economic
interests, concentrating on economic friction with Japan. Matters
changed only after Prime Minister Hosokawa appointed a blue ribbon
advisory panel headed by Higuchi Hirotaro to reexamine the future of
Japanese defense policy and revise the National Defense Program Outline
(NDPO) adopted in 1976. The Higuchi Report, submitted in August
1994, advocated a “coherent and comprehensive security policy,” moving
from a “cold war defense strategy” to a “multilateral security strategy.”
This outlined Japan’s changing strategic thinking after the cold war,
clearly indicating that Japan’s future security policy should aim at the
formation of a multilateral regional security system. The report emphasized
more active participation in peacekeeping operations under the UN,

more vigorous efforts in arms control and in the conduct of regional
security dialogues.22 Though the new orientation was not incompatible
with the U.S.–Japanese security alliance, it placed that alliance within the
larger framework of a multilateral security system. It could have signaled
a new push to develop security ties with Asian countries.
At the same time the Pentagon was reexamining the U.S.–Japanese
security alliance, which culminated in the Nye initiative for bilateral secu-
rity dialogue with Japan. The United States was interested in encouraging
Japan to have more active security collaboration that would go beyond
financial contributions, preventing Japan from pursuing an autonomous
defense policy, as feared from the Higuchi Report, and integrating Japan
in any defense activities that might be directed against the rise of China.23
In the course of bilateral negotiations between the Pentagon and
Japan’s Defense Agency, the importance of the U.S.–Japanese security
alliance was upgraded to a higher priority than in the Higuchi Report.
As a result, the major thrust of the Higuchi Report that emphasized mul-
tilateral regional security cooperation was diluted. The same process led
to expanding the geographic scope of national defense, not merely to
Japan proper, but also to the “areas surrounding Japan.” In the words of
Mochizuki, “The new program outline was a breakthrough that permit-
ted not only bilateral studies about how to respond to regional contin-
gencies, but also eventual coordination of military operations.”24
The new defense arrangement was supposed to be approved in
advance of the APEC meeting in Osaka in November 1995; but uproar
over an American serviceman raping an Okinawa schoolgirl led both
governments to scramble to resolve that issue. The redefinition of the
alliance and the resolution of the Okinawa base issue were to be
postponed; yet the direction of Japanese security thinking was shifting
back to the United States after some uncertainty with implications for
relations with other Asian states.25
The security deliberations that occurred in 1994–95 indicate some
unsettling problems. There was a marked contrast in the general
approach to the future of Japan’s security policy between the Higuchi
Report and the Defense Agency’s new NDPO. Whereas the Higuchi
Report emphasized the goal of creating a multinational regional security
framework, the Defense Agency wanted to expand the realm of Japan’s
military actions under the framework of the U.S.–Japanese security
alliance. The latter course would be favored by Japan’s nationalists who
considered it more promising for Japan to become an independent
military great power and escape existing constitutional limits.
Why Did Japan Fail to Develop New

Strategic Thinking?
In the middle of the 1990s, Japan was left with no reliable friends. China
was poised to compete with Japan for great power status in East Asia, pre-
pared to utilize ruthless Realpolitik and Japan’s historical past as its instru-
ments of diplomacy to prevent Japan’s ascendancy. North Korea rattled
nuclear weapons backed by missiles threatening Japan’s security. South
Korea preferred to keep its distance from Japan. Spurned by Japan, Russia
was consciously cultivating ties with the United States, South Korea, and
China to isolate Japan. Finally, even the United States showed a distinct
inclination to downgrade Japan’s influence, treating Japan as a not com-
pletely trustworthy ally. By 1995 Japan had lost confidence in its foreign
policy options and reverted to the approach of the 1980s.
With the formidable economic leverage that it could utilize to
enhance its national interests, this outcome was not inevitable.
Economic power not only did not enhance Japan’s international stature,
it may even have damaged it. Economic frictions were a constant irritant
in U.S. relations. Despite massive economic assistance and investment in
China, the latter was becoming a fierce competitor, unwilling to accord
to Japan a political great power status. Likewise, increasing economic
interaction with South Korea did little to assuage the Korean people’s
resentment and even hostility toward the Japanese. Putting excessive
stress on resolution of the territorial dispute soured Japan’s relations with
Russia. And North Korea opted to choose the path to develop nuclear
weapons rather than to try to lure Japan’s capital. Japan’s “checkbook
diplomacy” was not achieving the expected results, but it continued to
be overrated. Below I discuss several other causes for failing to grasp the
new strategic realities.
Domestic Politics
Change in the international environment coincided with the transitional
period in the Japanese political system. The Recruit scandal took its tolls
on the LDP’s succession process, derailing Abe Shintaro’s chance to
become the prime minister after Takeshita. After a short tenure of pre-
miership by Uno Sosuke, Kaifu Toshiki became prime minister in 1989.
Kaifu was succeeded by Miyazawa Kiichi, whose government became
bogged down with the PKO issue. Hit by another scandal, Miyazawa
resigned. Then the 1955 political system that maintained the LDP’s
monopoly ended. The first non-LDP government led by Hosokawa
Morihiro, and composed of six small parties, was formed. But this
government was shortlived, again struck by political scandal. This led to

Hata Tsutomu’s government that lasted for only two months. After
Hata’s fall, a new coalition government composed of the Socialist Party,
the LDP, and the small Japan Harbinger Party (Sakigake) was established
with socialist Murayama Tomiichi as prime minister. Only in 1996 was
the LDP government and more stable leadership restored.
The quick turnover of political power was not conducive to the for-
mulation of a new strategic approach. In fact, absorbed by the immediate
political tasks at hand, these politicians had no time to devote their
attention to foreign policy, let alone develop a creative new strategy. In
addition, the more the political power changed hands, arguably the less
qualified the holders of power became. Miyazawa, a disciple of the
Yoshida school, reputed to be endowed with formidable intellectual
capacity, turned out to be a disappointingly unimaginative leader. He
was assisted as foreign minister by another powerful politician,
Watanabe Michio, who was known for his skills in domestic politics, but
who did not display the strategic thinking necessary in the critical year
of 1992. James Baker lamented the absence of serious intellectual
dialogue with Japanese politicians, noting that whenever he sat at the
negotiating table with one of them, they had to forgo preliminary
exchanges of ideas and proceed straight to horse-trading.26 Thus, the
management of foreign policy during this transitional period was
entrusted to the professionals in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This
was a divided institution with little coordination between departments
and desks and no mandate to look boldly at the future and present
politicians with a far-reaching strategic vision.
Poverty of Strategic Thought

The cause for Japan’s failure to formulate new strategic thought went
deeper. Lack of, or even absence of, strategic thinking was the hallmark
of Japanese intellectual tradition throughout the postwar period. Japan’s
security was safely assured by the U.S.–Japanese alliance and the
American nuclear umbrella during the cold war. Precisely because their
voice had no possibility of being realized, the Left had the luxury of
indulging in the daydream of glorifying the Constitution, pacifism,
nonacceptance of the U.S.–Japanese security treaty, and nonacceptance
of the SDF. The conservatives in power also enjoyed the comfort of
American protection, abdicating their responsibility to develop Japan’s
own independent strategy. For instance, everyone knew that the United
States transited nuclear weapons within Japan, but they pretended that
nuclear weapons did not exist, since the Japanese government did not
ask the United States, and the latter did not admit their existence. Nor
was there any tradition to discuss Japan’s strategic choice in a public
debate involving both camps. In fact, the Left and the Right almost
never talked to each other. If this was so among the politicians, it was
also true for intellectuals and journalists. Even worse, it is unlikely that
Japan’s ossified educational system produced young scholars and public
figures prepared to create a new strategy.
Filling the gap in Japan’s emerging intellectual development was a
resurgence of right-wing nationalism. As the presence of the left-wing
intellectuals faded—they had long dominated the intellectual scene in
such outlets as the monthly journal Sekai and the daily newspaper Asahi
shimbun—nationalist advocates began effective campaigns against “self-
denigrating historical interpretations,” glossing over Japan’s militarist
past, aggression, colonialism, and atrocities during the Pacific War. Some
began to look for examples to glorify parts of Japan’s military past, while
attacking the government’s weak-kneed Asian policy kowtowing to China
and South Korea. Little attention was given to the prospect that the
nationalist strategy would lead Japan into a collision course with China,
North and South Korea, and Russia. Although these nationalists identify
their security policy closely with that of the United States to the extent
that U.S. policy was to encourage Japan’s more active military role, their
deep-seated aspiration was to free Japan from U.S. dominance. The
marriage of convenience between Japanese nationalists and the United
States might hold for some time, but it appears destined to break.
During the first half of the 1990s, the left-wing proved to be inca-
pable of coping with the changing circumstances, providing no coherent
and effective strategic vision other than adhering to the old cliché of
pacifism. The only promising strategic vision was provided by Japan’s
realists such as Sato Seizaburo, Tanaka Akihiko, Kitaoka Shinichi, and
Inoguchi Takashi, who advocated Japan’s continuing cooperation with
the United States, but emphasized Japan’s special role in East Asia in
creating an integral, interdependent regional economic and security order.
In order for Japan to contain emerging nationalism, the role of these
intellectuals will become more important in coming years.
Refusal to Atone for Past Historical Transgressions

Japan cannot expect to be accepted by its neighbors as a constructive
member of the new security system in East Asia until it honestly atones
for its past historical transgressions against its neighbors. The Japanese
government actually took some decisive steps toward this end in the first
half of the 1990s: in March 1990 when Roh Tae-woo visited Japan; in
1992 when the emperor traveled to China; in August 1993, when
Hosokawa became the first Japanese prime minister to refer to the
Pacific War as a war of aggression perpetrated by Japan and expressed his
regret for its victims to Japan’s Asian neighbors; in October 1993 when
Hosokawa visited Seoul and apologized for Japan’s colonial rule; and
finally on August 15, 1995, at the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the
Pacific War, when Murayama admitted that Japan, “through its colonial
rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the
people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations.”
He further declared: “In the hope that no such mistake be made in the
future, I regard, in a spirit of humility, these irrefutable facts of history,
and express here once again my feelings of deep remorse and state my
heartfelt apology.”27 Murayama’s 1995 statement was the clearest state-
ment of the Japanese government’s atoning for its past.
Thus, two non-LDP prime ministers took a decisive step toward
accounting for Japan’s past. But these statements themselves were not
enough. The problem was how to implement this sense of “remorse and
apology” as a national policy in the face of strong, contradictory
messages delivered by cabinet members and other politicians. As soon as
Hosokawa’s statement on Japan’s war of aggression was made, the hawk-
ish deputy minister of education, Abe, rejected the notion of “aggressive
war.” The director of the environmental agency, Sakurai, also stated that
Japan did not fight the war as “a war of aggression.” When this statement
provoked international protest, especially from South Korea, Sakurai
was forced to resign. These were not isolated incidents. Many nationalist
Japanese disapprove of the statements made by Hosokawa and Murayama,
and criticized the government that approved the emperor’s China trip,
obliging him to make the statement about his feelings of “sorrow.” Even
in the period of maximum apologies of the first half of the 1990s, Japan’s
Asian neighbors were left with the impression that there was little
sincerity behind them and that they would not have any binding effect
on those who were likely to rise to power in the coming years. Above all,
they doubted that there was any effort to convey to a younger generation
the reasons why atonement is needed.
The statements of “regret” and “apology” were contradicted by
repeated visits by government officials to the Yasukuni shrine, and the
Ministry of Education’s approval of the textbooks that minimized,
ignored, or even appeared to justify Japan’s war of aggression and its
colonial rule in Korea. Although Chinese and Koreans may use the
textbook issue and the government officials’ visits to the Yasukuni shrine
for political purposes, their protests that Japan’s atonement was not
sincere can be justified.
The issue of history is integrally connected with the territorial dis-
putes. During the cold war, the Japanese government could separate its
territorial disputes with South Korea over Takeshima/Dokdo Island and
with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, from the Northern
Territories/Kuril dispute with the Soviet Union. In the post–cold war
period, these territorial disputes appear to be merging into one. Insisting
on Japan’s exclusive sovereignty over these contested territories would
inevitably lead Japan into a collision course with China, South Korea,
and Russia, rousing their nationalism. What is required is strategic think-
ing that places the territorial disputes in the larger context of Japan’s over-
all strategy and comes up with imaginative solutions that would turn each
dispute from a zero–sum game into a positive–sum game.
The first half of the 1990s was the turning point from the cold war to
a new world environment. Japan failed to react proactively to this fun-
damental change. New strategic thinking that was required to adjust to
the new environment did not emerge. New approaches were attempted
in an ad hoc fashion without coordination and without comprehensive
strategic thinking at their foundation. Japan drifted, without asking fun-
damental questions about the future direction of foreign policy. Should
Japan follow the path of Pax Americana, and accept the unipolar world?
Should Japan play a balance of power game? Or would Japan’s interests
best be served by moving in the direction of establishing a multilateral
mechanism? These questions remained unanswered.
Notes
1. For Japan’s reaction to the Gulf War, see Teshima Ryuzo, 1991 nen Nihon no
haiboku (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1993).
2. Teshima, 1991 nen Nihon no haiboku, p. 22.
3. Sato Seizaburo, “Sengo ishiki no dasei to tatsu toki,” Chuo koron, November
1990.
4. Kitaoka Shin’ichi, “Kyocho no daika,” Chuo koron, November 1990.
5. Tanaka Naoki, “Nihon gaiko no kijuku wa nanika,” Chuo koron, April 1991.
6. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, “The Gorbachev–Kaifu Summit: Domestic and Foreign
Policy Linkages,” in Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Jonathan Haslam, and Andrew C.
Kuchins, eds., Russia and Japan: An Unresolved Dilemma between Distant
Neighbors (Berkeley: International and Area Studies, 1993), pp. 49–82;
Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, The Northern Territories Dispute and Russo-Japanese
Relations, vol. 2, Neither War Nor Peace. 1985–1998 (Berkeley: UC Berkeley
IAS Publications, 1998), pp. 368–407.
7. Kimura Hiroshi, “Shintaisei de ‘Hopporyodo’ wa zenshin suru,” Asahi

journal, August 30, 1991, p. 21; also see Hasegawa, The Northern Territories
Dispute and Russo-Japanese Relations, vol. 2, pp. 417–20.
8. For Russo-Japanese relations from 1991 to 1995, see Hasegawa, The
Northern Territories Dispute and Russo-Japanese Relations, vol. 2, pp. 420–97;
Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, “Why Did Russia and Japan Fail to Achieve
Rapprochement in 1991–1996?” in Gilbert Rozman, ed., Japan and Russia:
The Tortuous Path to Normalization, 1949–1999 (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 2000), pp. 175–205.
9. Gilbert Rozman, “Japan’s Images of China in the 1990s: Are They Ready for
China’s’ Smile Dipomacy’ or Bush’s ‘Strong Diplomacy?’ ” Japanese Journal
of Political Science, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2001), p. 102.
10. Gilbert Rozman, “China’s Changing Images of Japan, 1989–2001: The
Struggle to Balance Partnership and Rivalry,” International Relations of the
Asia-Pacific, Vol. 2 (Winter 2002), p. 304.
11. Rozman, “Japan’s Images of China in the 1990s,” pp. 99–102, 104–05, 116.
12. Richard Drifte, Japan’s Security Relations with China since 1989: From
Balancing to Bandwagoning? (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), p. 135.
13. Michael J. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an
Era of Uncertain Power (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 95–96.
14. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism, pp. 85–86.
15. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism, pp. 117–19; Shigemura Chikei, “Soredemo
tebanasenai Kitachosen kaado,” Chuo koron, June 1992, pp. 149–54.
17. Gilbert Rozman, “Japan and Korea: Should the US Be Worried about Their
New Spat in 2001?” The Pacific Review, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2002), p. 5.
18. Rozman, “Japan and Korea,” p. 2.
19. Wakamiya Yoshifumi, “Kensho: Tenno hochu,” Chuo koron, September
1993, pp. 126–40.
20. Teshima, 1991 nen Nihon no haiboku.
21. Mike M. Mochizuki, “A New Bargain for a Stronger Alliance,” in Mike M.
Mochizuki, ed., Toward a True Alliance: Restructuring U.S.–Japan Security
Relations (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), pp. 5–6.
22. Mochizuki, “A New Bargain for a Stronger Alliance,” pp. 8–9.
26. “Reisen go Nihon to Amerika: Gaiko gishi,” Asahi shimbun, November 14,
1991.
27. Quoted in Kazuhiko Togo, Japan’s Foreign Policy 1945–2003: The Quest for
a Proactive Policy (Leiden: Brill, 2004), p. 170.
CHAPTER 4
Japan’s Strategic Thinking in the

Second Half of the 1990s
Kazuhiko Togo
T
he end of the cold war opened a new strategic environment for
Japan. But Japan was ill prepared for this change, and its inabil-
ity to act responsibly in the Gulf War of 1991 inflicted a deep
blow against its relations with the United States. In East Asia, at the
time the Soviet Union was losing its influence, China was rising,
guided by Deng Xiaoping’s concept of “peace and development” from
the early 1980s. 1 Based on its “engagement” policy, Japan revealed an
unusually autonomous policy of “not isolating China” after the
Tiananmen incident in 1989. But the “artificial honeymoon” 2 brought
about by the imperial visit in 1992 did not last long and Japan had to
face China’s nuclear weapons tests (1995–96) and the revival of history
issues in 1995. 3 Japan’s North Korean overture in 1990–92 proved to
be abortive, and relations with South Korea did not improve much
either, despite efforts to recognize and apologize for the comfort
women, and 1995 became a difficult year symbolized by the destruc-
tion of the prewar Japanese governor’s office. In relation to Russia,
Japan missed an opportunity opened during the short period of eupho-
ria in 1992 after the demise of the Soviet Union. Thus, heightened
expectation in the wake of the cold war in 1991–92 was followed by
general disappointment in the middle of the 1990s for all the missed
opportunities.
80 ● Kazuhiko Togo
Strategic Environment in the Second

Half of the 1990s
The strategic environment affecting Japan in the second half of the

1990s can be described from the following three perspectives: geopoli-
tics, geo-economics, and history. In geopolitics, the first and probably
the most important factor was the rise of China in the Asia-Pacific
region. After the difficulty China faced after the Tiananmen crackdown,
Deng Xiaoping emphasized economic construction, as underlined in his
“lectures in the southern inspection tour” at the beginning of 1992. In
order to harmonize China’s external policy with this objective, he put
forward a four-dimensional concept of the world: “one region (regional
countries), one line (industrialized countries), one side (developing
countries), and one point (the United States).” Each dimension had a
specific mission within the overall objective of achieving economic
construction. U.S. policy was specifically expressed with a “20-word
directive,” asserting a cautious, nonprovocative but principled approach,
which was made public only at the end of 1995.4 How to manage the
relationship with the United States, the sole superpower, was a difficult
and much debated issue, the answer of which was left unclear in China.
Japan was an important “regional” and “industrialized” country, but as a
close ally of the United States, its position within the East Asian power
balance could easily be seen as interfering with China’s interests. In
1996, China’s success in economic construction and modernization
since the beginning of the policy of “reform and opening” and “peace
and development” could not be doubted, but maintenance of an inter-
national environment conducive to economic development was not
considered an easy task.
For Japan, the United States was not only the sole superpower, but a
close ally. China was an important neighbor with long historic ties and
developing economic relations, but with which political relations were
complex. Facing a China rising in all spheres was totally a new experience
for Japan. Considered by many to have a special negative feeling toward
Japan, Jiang Zemin was not an easy interlocutor. How U.S.–China
relations would develop was unclear. In such a situation, Japan’s strategic
thinking was left with little imagination: first, to strengthen trustworthy
alliance relations with the United States; second, to maintain and
consolidate as friendly relations as possible with China; and third, to
avoid two possible nightmares, “U.S.–China hostility” and “U.S.–China
passing of Japan,” by way of helping to improve those relations in case of
hostility, and impressing both with Japan’s presence in case of “passing.”
Second Half of the 1990s ● 81
On the Korean Peninsula, Kim Dae-jung’s sunshine policy and

changes occurring in the external relations of North Korea created
another strategic challenge for Japan. Russia became an important
factor; one that had the potential to create a new power balance in
Japan’s favor in East Asia as well.
In geo-economics, the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis, which affected
Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, and Malaysia, became the major
factor to gauge Japan’s proximity with Asia. Japan itself was mired in its
own financial crisis in overcoming nonperforming loans and introducing
structural reforms. Efforts could not be spared to launch a new round of
the WTO,5 but as the largest economy in Asia, Japan was expected to
show effective leadership to overcome the crisis. Japan’s credibility was at
stake. And through this process emerged another challenge to create a
regional cooperative economic structure in which Japan might play
a leading role as well.
In history, Japan struggled to seek further reconciliation and establish
its identity in Asia. China increasingly did not hide its concern about
Japan’s past and that contemporary Japan was not cognizant enough
about past atrocities. Such concerns were not stilled in South Korea
either. Several important exchanges of top leaders were made in this
period with mixed results. Furthermore, two fundamental issues for
Japan to overcome linked to World War II history—the conclusion of a
peace treaty with Russia and the normalization of relations with North
Korea—were under continuous attention. In particular, normalization
of relations with Russia became a weighty agenda at the turn of the
century. Inasmuch as these issues were important from the point of view
of regaining identity for Japan, identity was also a crucial issue for Asian
neighbors. As Muthiah Alagappa argues, the three major security issues
in Asia—Taiwan, Korea, and Kashmir—are “identity cum sovereignty
conflicts.”6 In these circumstances, Japan’s struggle for identity became a
complex issue. Thus, from the point of view of international relations
theory, an analysis of this period could be made based on three
approaches: realism, focusing on geopolitics, power relations, hegemony
and balance of power; liberalism, accentuating the formation of an inter-
national structure to govern relations among states, including regional
economic cooperation; and constructivism, emphasizing the importance
of a search for identity in a state’s behavior.7
Three prime ministers led Japan in this period: Hashimoto
(1996.1–98.7), Obuchi (1998.7–2000.4), and Mori (2000.4–01.4).
Internally, their primary task was to overcome the economic crisis
stemming from the nonperforming loans and introduce a fundamental
restructuring of the social and economic system. They tried without real
success; however, it was not clear whether they had real scope for leader-
ship in the face of institutional and party obstacles. But in external
policy, each period under the respective prime minister had its distinct
characteristics.
Hashimoto: Strategic Thinking in Relation to the

United States, China, and Russia
Born in 1937, son of a parliamentarian, Hashimoto Ryutaro was elected
as a member of the Diet in 1963 at the age of 26. He served as minister
of welfare, transportation, finance, and international trade and industry
and became prime minister at the age of 59. First a member of the Sato
faction and then becoming an influential member of the Tanaka–
Takeshita faction, he was known to be a “lone wolf ” and a seisakutsu
(well versed on policy), strong in his policy articulation without resorting
to human networking in LDP politics. Hashimoto played a major role as
minister of finance during the Gulf War in preparing $13 billion in assis-
tance. While in the opposition, he seriously studied the North Korean
nuclear crisis of 1993–94 as the LDP chairman of the Policy Affairs
Research Council. In June 1994, under the extraordinary coalition of
LDP and JSP, Hashimoto became the minister for international trade
and industry under Prime Minister Murayama. In this capacity, he
served as chief negotiator on automobile disputes with the Clinton
administration and faced the Okinawa outcry over the rape of a primary
schoolgirl in early September 1995. In late September 1995 Hashimoto
became the president of the LDP also assuming the post of deputy prime
minister. This position paved the way to becoming prime minister in
January 1996 upon Murayama’s resignation.
Analyzing Hashimoto’s policy initiatives, one cannot but fail to
notice that in the economic sphere his decisions created fundamental
problems in managing the Japanese economy in the 1990s. First, as the
minister of finance the introduction in 1990 of the restriction of asset
trading to overcome the bubble economy successfully exploded the
bubble, but created impossible nonperforming loans that brought down
the Japanese economy for more than a decade. Second, his decision as
prime minister to increase the consumption tax to five percent stifled the
barely recovering Japanese economy, taking it back to its deflationary
cycle. In each case he had to resign from this post, minister of finance or
prime minister. One should observe though that Hashimoto’s bad
decisions were also based on the recommendations of the Ministry of
Finance (MOF)’s officials, thus not only the prime minister but also the
whole bureaucracy was responsible for these policy failures.
Hashimoto’s foreign policy experience must have given him an
understanding of the precarious ground on which international relations
were poised after the end of the cold war and the necessity for Japan to
strengthen its strategic position in the region. As in internal policy, all
his external policy decisions were the results of combined efforts of the
prime minister and supporting bureaucracies such as the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MOFA), MOF, the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI), and the Japan Defense Agency (JDA).
Relations with China and the United States

Hashimoto became the first prime minister who dealt with the dual
challenge that Japan had to face in the post–cold war period: to maintain
and to develop sound political and security relations with the United
States and to face squarely the enormity of issues connected with a rising
China. The U.S. decision to send two carriers to the Taiwan Strait in
March 1996 after China’s missile tests on the eve of Lee Teng-hui’s elec-
tion seemed to justify Deng’s cautious “20-word” directive. For Japan
and Hashimoto, this crisis was the first real exposure to the reality of
East Asian security danger. The 1993–94 nuclear crisis was somehow left
for the security experts to mull over, but the Taiwan crisis in 1996
became an open concern for the prime minister and the nation. The cen-
tral issue that Japan had to face was “what should Japan do if hostility
breaks out between the U.S. and China?” Omori Yoshio, director of the
Cabinet Intelligence Office, 1993–97, recalled that “the Taiwan crisis
was the greatest security danger which Japan faced during my tenure.
Japan was going to be involved in the great power geopolitics between
the United States and China in 21st century Asia, and Japan had to take
a position on this issue.”8 According to journalist Funabashi Yoichi, “the
first nightmare for Japan, the hostility between China and the United
States, emerged.”9 For Hashimoto the answer was clear. Drawing on his
own foreign policy experience, he knew well that Japan’s security was
deeply dependent on the United States. “If ultimately Japan was asked to
choose, there was no doubt for Hashimoto to opt for the alliance with
the United States.”10 But at the same time, China was not a country that
Japan could discard. Thus, what Hashimoto did was to consolidate
security ties with the United States, to do his best to improve relations
with China, and in facing the “U.S.–China hostility” nightmare, to be
careful so that Japan would not further aggravate the hostility.
Hashimoto explained his thinking to President Clinton in his April

summit: he emphasized the necessity to consolidate Japan–U.S. security
ties and added that “If Japan and the United States jointly approach
China, China would not accept it. Japan and the United States should
coordinate our policies, but should endeavor [to implement] respective
policies [separately].”11
For Hashimoto, the first task of consolidating the alliance proceeded
smoothly. As a matter of fact, the format for consolidation of Japan–U.S.
security relations had already been prepared by the spring of 1996 by the
two administrations. After the discovery in the North Korean nuclear
crisis of 1993–94 that Japan was almost incapable of effectively assisting
U.S. operations against North Korea, the two administrations had
worked out an important document to reaffirm their security relations,
which failed to be adopted at the Osaka APEC Summit in 1995 because
of Clinton’s absence there. The Taiwan Straits crisis made the tone of
that document even stronger,12 and in April 1996, when Clinton visited
Japan, “The Japan–U.S. Joint Declaration on Security-Alliance for the
21st Century” was adopted.
China launched a wave of criticism against the consolidation of
Japan–U.S. security ties. Its academics raised serious concerns that the
security alliance was a mechanism of containment, which could seriously
damage China’s strategic position in the world.13 Voices of those con-
cerned with the “egg shell” role of the U.S. troop presence in Japan to
foster Japan’s military power grew louder than of those who stressed the
“bottle cap” of keeping the Japanese military genie in the bottle.14 China
argued that the “Japan–U.S. security treaty changed into a tool to
contain China. Japan and the U.S. were afraid of the future military
power of China and were implementing an adversarial policy against
China. The U.S. should withdraw its forward deployment system from
the Asia-Pacific region.” It sought to drive a clear wedge between Japan
and the United States: the danger of Japanese militarism was amply
emphasized in talks with the Americans. Minister of Defense Chi
Haotian in his visit to Washington in December 1996 did not hide his
view of Japan as “a country that cannot be trusted.” Meanwhile, Japan
was told by the Chinese that just being obedient to the Americans lacks
a proactive quality necessary for a leadership role in Asia. 15
In addition to the security rift, Hashimoto faced a rocky agenda with
China in 1996 regarding power and identity. Japan’s bewilderment about
China’s nuclear weapons tests in May, August, and September 1995,
which resulted in a partial suspension of ODA, still affected the psy-
chology of the relationship. The Senkaku Island issue emerged when
several patriotic Japanese youth, in an anti-Chinese mood, went ashore

and constructed a lighthouse and a war memorial in July–August 1996.16
Tensions escalated after Hashimoto’s visit to the Yasukuni shrine on
July 29, 1996, his birthday.
For Hashimoto, the year 1997 tested his strategic sense in East Asia:
how to remedy relations with China, while consolidating relations with
the United States. First, on the security rift, the Japanese government
went out of its way to explain to China that it was not its intention to
gang up with the United States to threaten China. The fourth round of
the Japan–China security dialogue held in March 1997 became an
unusually long and detailed session to explain the essence of Japan–U.S.
security relations to China.17 The new defense guidelines, adopted in
September 1997, formalized a new notion of the “surrounding situation”
for the defense cooperation between Japan and the United States, and
the new notion was understood as being “situational” and “not geo-
graphical.” The two administrations have kept this position since then,
and the political decision to be silent about the implications that the
guideline might have vis-à-vis Taiwan helped to take some heat away
from China’s reaction.18 This position was thoroughly explained by
Hashimoto to Jiang Zemin in his September visit to Beijing and MOFA
ascertained that “Japan succeeded in getting a fair amount of under-
standing from the Chinese side.”19
Second, the thorny issue of nuclear weapons tests was resolved when
China declared a moratorium after its last test in July 1996 and signed
the CTBT in September. Japan lifted its ODA sanctions in March 1997.
Third, concerning the Senkaku Islands, Hashimoto reached an agree-
ment with China in September 1997 to create a 200-mile-wide “joint
management zone” to allow fishing by both nations.20 Fourth, in the
summer of 1997, Hashimoto had to decide whether to continue visiting
Yasukuni or not. In October 1994, Hashimoto made a revealing state-
ment about his thinking on history before a committee of the Diet
Lower House:
I still continue to think about when Japan’s policy began to change to,
what is generally called, aggression against the Chinese continent. It
might have been some point during WWI. In relation to Korea, our
seniors chose an action which cannot but be called colonialism. But when
I restrict my thinking to WWII, where Japan fought a war against the
United States, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, there remains
some doubt whether we can call it aggression. At least, I have no intention
to state that Japan waged a war of aggression against the Soviet Union,
which began the attack on Manchuria.21
Speaking cautiously, as is typical in parliamentary debate,

Hashimoto, in essence, acknowledged that Japan needs a humble
approach to Asia, where it has committed aggression and ruled as a
colonial state. With this recognition, Hashimoto decided not to repeat
his Yasukuni visit. Thus, Hashimoto on the whole successfully navigated
through 1997 to rebuild relations with China, while continuing to
strengthen U.S. relations, particularly through the defense guidelines.
While Hashimoto was busy improving ties with China, U.S.–China rela-
tions were also overcoming the 1996 crisis. From the latter half of 1996,
and particularly when his second term began in 1997, Clinton took the
initiative in improving U.S.–China relations. This culminated first in
Jiang Zemin’s October 1997 visit to Washington and the establishment
of a “cooperative strategic partnership,”22 after Jiang stopped over in
Honolulu and placed a wreath at the Pearl Harbor Memorial, “remind-
ing all of the WWII alliance between China and the United States
against Japan.” Clinton reciprocated this visit with a “nine-day grand
tour” bypassing Japan and Korea in June–July 1998, an omission that
was then bitterly criticized in Congress as a “strategic miscalculation.”23
Furthermore, in Shanghai, Clinton announced the famous “three no’s”
on Taiwan that the United States does not support “independence for
Taiwan, two Chinas or one Taiwan one China, and Taiwan’s membership
in any organization for which statehood is a requirement.”24
Improvement of U.S.–China relations accompanied by “Japan passing”
was the second “nightmare” that Japan could face in this strategic
triangle.25 Bad memories linger from Nixon’s announcement of his visit
to China in 1971 without sufficient prior notification, the so-called
Nixon-shokku. Ironically, Hashimoto had to face the first nightmare of
“U.S.–China hostility” at the outset of his activities and the second one of
“U.S.–China passing of Japan” at the end of his career as prime minister.
Hashimoto later narrates his feeling:
It was not pleasant to observe impassionately the visit to China while being
bypassed by President Clinton. But I would have said: “please.” I made up
my mind that we are not in a position to insist that President Clinton come
to Japan. But mixed feelings remained. The U.S. might have two faces: the
Straits crisis and Clinton’s China visit. What would be Japan’s position?26
Hashimoto’s unanswered question was probably all the more bitter,

because Japan had just undergone a complicated and strange adjustment
in the implementation of the defense guidelines, fully taking into
account China’s sensitivity. After the adoption of the guidelines in
September 1997, Hashimoto, upon advice by MOFA, made the decision

in the spring of 1998 that the cooperation in accordance with the new
guidelines will be confined within the scope of cooperation based on the
1960 U.S.–Japan security treaty. This limitation was clearly prescribed
in the Surrounding Situation Law, which was formulated in April 1998.
It was a strange order of determination that this point, whether the scope
of cooperation is wider than the narrowly defined Japan–U.S. security
cooperation or not, was left somewhat ambiguous in the guidelines and
that Japan’s internal law to support implementation unambiguously
specified it. But whatever the reason for this anomaly, when Hashimoto
and MOFA sharpened the interpretation of the guidelines to be cooper-
ation strictly under the 1960 security treaty, a logical dilemma occurred:
the cooperation under the 1960 security treaty cannot be conducted out-
side the area that may affect the security of the “Far East,” whereas the
geographical interpretation of the term “Far East” in accordance with
Article VI of the 1960 treaty was abundantly defined in the parliamen-
tary debate in 1960 to include Taiwan. Once one enters into a definition
related to the 1960 treaty, it would become rather difficult to stick to the
definition that the cooperation may be exclusively “situational” and not
“geographical.” Thus, pushed by the force of logic, a MOFA official
touched upon such a “geographical” interpretation at the Diet in May
1998. Hashimoto not only insisted on sticking to the “situational” inter-
pretation, but eventually removed that official from his post. Thus,
Hashimoto did his best not to provoke China. Japan’s sense of balance
that it is unwise to provoke China on such an issue was the legal expla-
nation for the new guidelines that prevailed in this period.
The Asian Financial Crisis

In addition to his geopolitical thinking and based on his long-time
experience as minister in the MOF and MITI, Hashimoto had confi-
dence in understanding the logic of international economics, finance,
and trade. When a financial crisis of unprecedented magnitude befell
Asia starting with Thailand in July 1997, Hashimoto’s government was
ready to take a leadership role to overcome it. Japan’s initiative to estab-
lish an AMF was launched in August 1997.
What was Japan’s motivation? It was a combination of three factors:
First, the crisis occurred in Asia, to which Japan belongs, and where Japan
is the greatest economic power. In Asia, Japan has tried to create long-
standing relations based on economics, trade, and investment, if not polit-
ical relations. Should Japan be unable to take an effective role to overcome
the crisis, how can it claim an honorable leadership role in the region?
Second, practical and tactical considerations such as the low profile of
U.S. activities, some dissatisfaction with the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) scope of assistance, and ASEAN’s support for Japan’s leadership role
made policymakers think that a new AMF would genuinely contribute to
better resolve the crisis. Third, personality factors played a role. Sakakibara
Eisuke, vice minister for international affairs in MOF, powerfully led the
negotiations. Given Hashimoto’s confidence on such crucial matters of
international finance, it is more than natural to assume that Sakakibara’s
initiative was fully supported by Hashimoto’s thinking.27
By the end of September, the initiative had essentially failed. It was
partly due to the generality of the proposal; apart from proposing a fund
of $100 billion of which Japan was prepared to finance half, such
important issues as conditionality and relations with the IMF were left
vague. But primarily it was due to a lack of coordination with the United
States. A lineup of the United States, the IMF, Europe, and, strikingly,
China emerged to oppose this scheme, which was formally rejected in
November.28 Not only from the point of view of Japan’s leadership in
international finance and geo-economics in Asia, but also in terms of
geopolitics and identity in Asia, it was a costly defeat. Japan again faced
the second “nightmare” of being opposed both by the United States and
China. ASEAN’s expectations could not be met.
In the fall when the crisis spread to Indonesia (in October) and South
Korea (in November), Hashimoto’s government had no choice but to
coordinate with the United States and IMF. Its international assistance
package harmonized with that of the IMF: $10 billion to South Korea,
$5 billion to Indonesia, and $4 billion to Thailand. Primarily under the
Hashimoto cabinet, Japan’s assistance totaled $44 billion, including
funds for private investment, trade financing, help to the socially vul-
nerable, and support for economic structural reforms.29 In his ASEAN
trip in January 1997, Hashimoto proposed a regular summit between
Japan and ASEAN, which triggered ASEAN’s invitation of Japan, China,
and South Korea.30 Amidst the financial crisis, it invited the three to the
December 1997 Kuala Lumpur Summit, commemorating 30 years.
Hashimoto therefore became the first prime minister to attend the
ASEAN ⫹ 3 summit meeting.
Relations with Korea, India, and Myanmar

In relations with South Korea, Hashimoto’s major task became the
implementation of Japanese assistance for the Korean financial crisis.
Although Kim Dae-jung was elected to the presidency in December 1997

and inaugurated in February 1998, Hashimoto did not face the full
impact of his sunshine policy. With North Korea, though, Hashimoto’s
era was characterized by relatively warm relations: efforts to resume
negotiations for normalization, the home return of former spouses, and
continuous implementation of humanitarian assistance. It coincided with
the general warming up of North Korea’s relations with the outside, such
as KEDO and four-party talks, but at the same time, “as the backdrop of
these developments, there were positive directions from Hashimoto.”31
When India tested a nuclear weapon in May 1998, Japan immediately
froze all grant aid and subsequently new loans. “Hashimoto was gen-
uinely concerned about the danger of proliferation and the fate of the
NPT.”32 Purnendra Jain points out that Japan’s action was “swift and
severe,” “out of proportion,” and “unnecessary,” and there was a lack of
geopolitical calculation that India might act as a useful balancer to a
rising China.33 Indeed, although there was long-term security concern
about the risk of proliferation in East Asia, nothing indicates that
Hashimoto had any strategic calculation to include India in the geopol-
itics of East Asia against a rising China.
In relation to Myanmar, however, Hashimoto was very aware that
isolating Myanmar just because of human rights issues would lead it to
drift toward China, and this would not be conducive to the strategic
interests of Japan and the United States. Despite American criticism, he
gave the green light to an emergency repairs project for airport safety.34
Relations with Russia

Hashimoto’s geopolitical thinking toward Asia was on the whole sound
and balanced, but, apart from the abortive AMF initiative, it was reac-
tive and lacked dynamic initiative. The exception was “Russia, other
than the United States, and in that context Okinawa, where Hashimoto
really worked with personal enthusiasm and leadership.” 35 Most con-
spicuously, Hashimoto’s leadership toward Russia was not only based on
his aspiration to achieve a breakthrough in a bilateral context but also on
his geopolitical calculation that improved Japan–Russia relations would
strengthen Japan’s position in East Asia against a rising China.
Hashimoto’s own words tell this:
We must make Russia an Asian player. We have to make Russia a friend

for Japan. We do not want in the 21st century China and India to strug-
gle for hegemony in Asia. In order to achieve this objective, we need to
have Russia included in the region.36
When Hashimoto was preoccupied with the Taiwan Strait crisis and
the consolidation of the U.S. alliance in the first half of 1996, Yeltsin
was preoccupied with his election campaign to bring him a second term.
But Hashimoto and Yeltsin had their first encounter in April 1996 at the
nuclear summit in Moscow, and it was a success. Hashimoto made a
specific comment that he would not press on the difficult territorial issue
and would wait for Yeltsin’s victory in the elections. Yeltsin responded
with appreciation. In the area of security exchanges, two important ini-
tiatives were taken by the Japanese side in this period: to send the head
of the Defense Agency in April, for the first time in history, and to dis-
patch a Maritime Self Defense escort vessel Kurama to Vladivostok in
July, after an interval of 71 years.
But Hashimoto had to wait another year for his next encounter with
Yeltsin; Yeltsin came back to lead Russian internal and external policy in
March 1997 after his reelection and health problems. Hashimoto recalls:
“The turning point was President Clinton’s phone call just before his
departure to Helsinki. He asked me whether I have any objection to
including Russia in the G-8, because the U.S. needs some triggering fac-
tor to let Russia accept NATO’s eastward expansion. I told him that
I have no disagreement, provided that Russia would not join discussions
on their own economy or Chernobyl, but simultaneously, I asked
President Clinton to tell Yeltsin that Hashimoto was genuinely inclined
to conduct in-depth talks [on a peace treaty]. Clinton reassured me that
he would convey that message. I asked the same of Chancellor Kohl.”37
The bilateral meeting in Denver proceeded successfully; Hashimoto pro-
posed to expand Japanese investment in Russia and to hold an informal
“no necktie” meeting in the Russian Far East.
“We got along well in Denver, but I felt that some concerns remained
on the Russian side. I thought that highlighting Japan’s policy as
‘Eurasian foreign policy’ may resolve Russian concerns and I sent a new
message through my July speech at the Keizai doyukai.”38 Hashimoto
emphasized in the speech that after the conclusion of “Eurasian policy
from the Atlantic Ocean” by the formation of an expanded NATO,
Japan was ready to embark on “Eurasian policy from the Pacific Ocean,”
adding that the weakest link that needs to be strengthened among the
four countries (Japan, Russia, China, and the United States) is Japan–
Russia; further, he called for enhancement of the bilateral relationship
based on the principles of trust, mutual interest, and a long-term per-
spective to be applied to the territorial problem. The speech also
reflected Hashimoto’s geopolitical instinct to improve relations with
countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The Russian side was deeply
impressed by the dynamic worldview and the nondogmatic approach to

the territorial issue. A “no-necktie” meeting was planned for November
1997 in Krasnoyarsk.
“President Yeltsin moved faster than I anticipated. He confirmed the
target year of 2000 and proposed to work together.” Hashimoto, on his
part, prepared a detailed program for economic cooperation, named the
“Hashimoto–Yeltsin Plan,” emphasizing cooperation for an open
economy, a market economy, and energy.39 After Krasnoyarsk, a MOFA
team led by Tamba Minoru, deputy foreign minister for political affairs
and an expert on Russia with a strong personality and definite views on
Russia, began tackling Japan–Russia relations in a most energetic manner.
The purpose was to drastically improve Japan–Russia relations in all
spheres and make this overall improvement connected to conclusion of a
peace treaty by 2000.
Hashimoto and Tamba first showed leadership by inviting Russia to
the APEC summit in Vancouver, which was held immediately after the
Krasnoyarsk meeting. “Japan introduced Russia to APEC. There was
some feeling of a mismatch in APEC. But it had merit for Japan to
remind others that Russia has an Asian face. APEC is an ideal place
where Japan, China, the U.S., and Russia can meet in a natural manner.”
Thus, Russia became a member of APEC at the Kuala Lumpur summit
in 1998.40
As concrete proof of economic cooperation, Foreign Minister Obuchi
announced a financial assistance package of $1.5 billion to be jointly
implemented with the World Bank in February 1998. This was the first,
and it turned out, the last “un-tied” financial package that Japan
declared toward Russia.41 Another step that helped to strengthen mutual
trust was the successful signing of an agreement on fishing around the
four islands in February 1998. The compromise formula that allowed
Japan the right to fish within the territorial waters around the islands
without infringing the legal position of the two sides was the product of
three-year negotiations between the two administrations. A shared spirit
of mutual trust that characterized the Krasnoyarsk meeting became the
basis of that agreement.
Finally, Hashimoto launched the first concessionary proposal on the
territorial issue in April 1998 at the second round of “no-necktie” meet-
ings in Kawana. The content of the proposal was not formally disclosed
but numerous reports emerged since then indicating that it was a com-
bination of drawing a border line between Urup and Etorofu (assigning
sovereignty over the four islands to Japan) and leaving the current status
of the islands for some time to come (with all administrative rights to
Russia).42 The proposal seemed to have impressed Yeltsin, but no clear

conclusion emerged in Kawana.
“At the Birmingham summit in May, I did not expect much progress.
We also had to deal urgently with the nuclear weapons tests by India and
Pakistan. After that, several factors contributed to the derailing of the
negotiations. My resignation in July was one of the reasons.” Whatever
Hashimoto’s own evaluation may be, the financial crisis in Russia,
Hashimoto’s resignation due to the LDP’s defeat in the July elections, and
Yeltsin’s declining health, all contributed to the closure of a shortlived
Japan–Russia “honeymoon.” A new page in the relationship had to be
opened under Prime Minister Obuchi with Yeltsin ailing.
Obuchi: In Search of Reunification with Asia

Obuchi, as Hashimoto, was born in 1937, as a son of a parliamentarian,
and was first elected to the Diet in 1963. He was known as hitogarano
Obuchi (a man of personal warmth) and built his career through party
work, in contrast to Hashimoto, establishing a solid personal network
among LDP and opposition parliamentarians. He became the chief
cabinet secretary in the Takeshita cabinet from 1987 to 1989 when Japan
moved from Showa to Heisei. Having gone through major party and fac-
tional work during the political reforms of the 1990s, he became the
minister for foreign affairs in the second Hashimoto cabinet in July 1997
and succeeded Hashimoto as prime minister in July 1998 at the age of 61.
Because of his humble and nonflamboyant character, Obuchi was
nicknamed first “cold pizza” or bokyahin (poor in vocabulary), but this
low-key image was soon replaced by an impression that he was a man
who had long prepared for the post of prime minister.
Relations with China and the United States

Probably it was in his Asia policy, from China to South Korea to regional
cooperation, that Obuchi left his name in history. As Hashimoto,
Obuchi faced a rising China, and his response was similar in reducing
geopolitical tension and introducing a broad range of cooperation with a
future orientation. On history, he made efforts to close the gap with
China, but also sought a more self-assertive position to express Japanese
views.
Jiang Zemin’s visit to Japan in November 1998 became the first cru-
cial occasion for Obuchi to deal with China. History, Taiwan, and
Japan–U.S. defense guidelines were the three difficult issues. Obuchi’s
position on history was not confrontational but self-assertive, in contrast

to his predecessors in the first half of the 1990s and to Clinton’s stand on
Taiwan. On history, Obuchi took a clear position that Japan was not
going to include the word “apology (owabi)” in the written joint
declaration. China, which did not ask in particular to include this point in
the early preparatory stage, began to strongly request its inclusion after
the Obuchi-Kim Dae-jung Declaration issued a month earlier. But
Obuchi’s position was firm, and so was the position of MOFA in Tokyo.
The consensus was that the postwar process of reconciliation with
China, including the 1972 joint statement and the imperial visit in
1992, should have brought the relationship to a point where it does not
require another written owabi. Inclusion of owabi without an expression
of reconciliation was considered unacceptable.43 A great majority of the
LDP leadership supported this position. Ultimately, Tokyo agreed to
include for the first time in a Japan–China official document the word
“aggression” and Obuchi expressed verbally “heartfelt apology” at the
summit meeting on November 26, but that was as far as Japan went.44
Obuchi’s position was reciprocated by Jiang Zemin’s full deployment of
the history card. But the preaching tone of his statements at the summit,
the imperial dinner, Waseda University, and the press conference did not
invite sympathy even among those who deemed friendship with China
to be of utmost importance. Obuchi’s approach was justified and appre-
ciated by most Japanese media and opinion leaders.45
On Taiwan too, Obuchi’s position was cautious. The “three no’s”
expressed by Clinton in his visit to China were neither confirmed in
writing nor stated verbally. The Joint Declaration declared that Japan
“continues to maintain its stand” from the 1972 Joint Communiqué,
“reiterated Japan’s understanding that there is one China,” and asserted
that “Japan will continue to maintain its exchanges of a private and
regional nature with Taiwan.”46 In the summit, Obuchi went to the extent
of expressing that “the position of not supporting Taiwan’s independence
will not be changed henceforward,” while emphasizing that he “hopes that
the issue will be resolved peacefully through dialogue of the parties
concerned.”47 At the same time, on the Japan–U.S. defense guidelines,
Obuchi confirmed the position that “the surrounding situation is not a
geographical concept,” and also that “Japan–U.S. security cooperation is
not targeted against any specific country.”48 During the parliamentary
scrutiny of the internal law to back up the Japan–U.S. defense guidelines
in the spring of 1999, Obuchi firmly maintained this position.49
But Obuchi and MOFA officials also put a lot of effort into making
Jiang’s visit an occasion for future-oriented cooperation. The new
declaration was entitled “Building a Partnership of Friendship and

Cooperation for Peace and Development.” By accepting Deng’s key
notion of “peace and development,” Japan meant to encourage China
toward positive engagement not only in economic matters but also in
peace and security.50 Thus, the accompanying press statement comprised
33 projects for cooperation, including the construction of a high-speed
railway between Beijing and Shanghai, the preservation of cultural her-
itage in the Silk Road area, human rights, nonproliferation, and
exchanges on security and police activities.
While Obuchi was struggling to establish his policy on China, an
important change of tone was occurring in the U.S.–China relationship.
In the second half of 1998 after the cooperative strategic partnership
appeared to be established by Clinton’s visit to China, a series of diffi-
culties occurred: congressional attacks against the “three no’s” (summer
1998), a crackdown on the China Democracy Party and on human
rights issues (late 1998), a nuclear technology spy scandal (March 1999),
and finally U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade (May
1999).51 Tense debates on “peace and development” accelerated in
China, and those who warned of a “U.S.–China cold war” got the upper
hand.52
Japanese concern was shifting from the broad spectrum of the second
nightmare “U.S.–China passing of Japan” to the first “U.S.–China hos-
tility.” But Obuchi was unusually proactive in bridging the gap between
the United States and China in an area where Japan found itself with
greater room to maneuver—economics—namely, on the question of
China’s participation in the World Trade Organization (WTO). By early
1999, Clinton was favoring China’s entry. China was no less enthusiastic
and sent Zhu Rongji in April to gain U.S. approval. But the U.S.
Congress was not prepared, and after the Belgrade bombing in May,
China’s internal hard-liners began to voice caution, as did the U.S.
Congress, which sent a letter to Clinton asking him not to accept China’s
accession to the WTO.53 In talks with Clinton at the Kern Summit in
June, Obuchi asserted that “friendly China–U.S. relations are important
for the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region; I sincerely hope for
the improvement; China’s early participation in the WTO is impor-
tant.”54 Toward China, Obuchi took concrete action in his July 8–10
visit to Beijing by giving consent to China’s membership. It was the first
agreement reached with China among the G-7, and Obuchi advised Zhu
Rongji to improve U.S. relations.55 Iokibe Makoto argues that Obuchi’s
encouragement of China’s membership to the WTO in 1999 was the
third symbolic gesture of Japanese policy of engagement toward China,
after Ohira’s launching of ODA in 1979 and Uno-Kaifu’s nonisolation

policy after June 4, 1989.56
On history, Obuchi acknowledged in his July visit that common recog-
nition was confirmed during Jiang Zemin’s visit the year before, and inter-
estingly, the Chinese side withheld any further demands from Japan.57 The
negative impact of the absence of a written apology and the playing of the
history card in November 1998 was kept to a minimum by China against
the backdrop of the emerging rift between China and the United States.
With Japan’s encouragement, the United States agreed in November on
China’s entry into WTO. Geopolitics, identity, and economics were com-
ing together in a favorable circle in Obuchi’s China policy.
Relations with Korea

Kim Dae-jung, elected as president in December 1997, declared immedi-
ately a new policy to radically improve North–South relations as well as
cooperation with the United States, China, Japan, and Russia for peace
and stability on the peninsula.58 This thinking later was defined as the
“sunshine policy,” and Obuchi was fully exposed to it. Kim visited Japan
in October 1998, and encouraged by his policy of reconciliation, Obuchi
and MOFA agreed to write “deep remorse and heartfelt apology” in the
Joint Declaration, in return for Kim’s statement calling upon both coun-
tries “to overcome their unfortunate history and to build a future-
oriented relationship.”59 Obuchi overcame hard-liners in the LDP by
reiterating almost word-for-word in the Declaration Murayama’s
statement of August 1995. Kim followed by taking the first step toward
the liberalization of Japanese cultural imports into Korea. A new fishery
agreement for cooperation under the 200-mile fishery zone system was
also concluded in October with a mutually acceptable approach to waters
around the disputed island Takeshima/Dokdo.60 Japan’s Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) reached a historic high in 1999. It should be noted,
however, that although the Joint Declaration was a landmark achieve-
ment in Japan’s search for reconciliation, Obuchi and MOFA missed an
important point: In the perpetrator–victim relationship between Japan
and Korea, after crossing the Rubicon, Japan should have taken the lead
in dealing with history, and sought greater understanding on what really
happened in the past to make the reconciliation take an irreversible char-
acter. Despite Obuchi’s wish to reenter Asia, this did not really happen.
In contrast to relations with the South, Obuchi’s relations with the
North were strained. The Taepodong missile shooting in August 1998
deeply shocked Japanese politicians. Japan suspended its aid to North
Korea and KEDO financial support. Through tense consultations with

the United States, Japan eventually agreed to resume its support of
KEDO, but in March 1999, an unidentified vessel, known to be from
North Korea, intruded into Japanese territorial waters and was chased
away by the Maritime Safety Agency’s gunfire. Ironically, North Korea’s
increased threats resulted in strengthening security coordination among
Japan, South Korea, and the United States and involved Japan more
directly in security around the Korean peninsula.
First, Japan and South Korea began closer defense and security
coordination. The 1998 Obuchi–Kim Dae-jung Joint Declaration “welcomed
the security dialogue as well as the defense exchanges.” Naval exercises and
training for search-and-rescue exercises began in August 1999. Second, the
United States took the initiative to improve Japan–U.S.–Korean coordination,
and former defense secretary William Perry was appointed as the senior
coordinator for Korea in November 1998. After tense coordination among
the three countries, the TCOG was established in April 1999 and began to
play an important role for coordination on North Korean security policy.
Third, Japan decided to participate in research on TMD (Theater Missile
Defense) with the United States in October 1998 and also develop an
indigenous Japanese surveillance satellite system in November 1998. Thus,
although relations with the North did not improve largely due to North
Korean erratic behavior, Obuchi’s relations with the South improved from
the point of view of security, history, and economic relations, creating a
second positive circle in his Asian policy.
East Asian Regional Initiatives

Obuchi’s emphasis on Asia was not limited to China and Korea. In
October 1998, the so-called Miyazawa Initiative of $30 billion was
announced in dealing with the Asian financial crisis. This decision
brought Japan’s total contribution to the financial crisis to $80 billion.61
It was based on the political leadership of Obuchi and Miyazawa, former
prime minister in 1991–93, and the MOF bureaucracy’s continued inter-
est in exerting leadership in the crisis. This was proof of Japan’s proac-
tiveness after Clinton’s “Japan passing” in June, when he also applauded
China’s constructive approach to the Asian financial crisis and criticized
Japan’s lack of economic reform in that context.62 The MOF continued to
seek a more effective structure of crisis management, and in May 2000,
the Chiang Mai initiative of currency swapping was approved.
In October 1998, Obuchi took another decision more delicate in
nature. At the APEC Kuala Lumpur meeting, Japan faced U.S. pressure
for the liberalization of fish, fish products, and forestry products. But
internally, Obuchi was under pressure from a powerful agricultural

lobby, which categorically rejected concessions outside the framework of
the WTO. He did not find compelling reasons to introduce a compul-
sory liberalization process in APEC. His gradual approach was sup-
ported by his Asian colleagues from Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia,
whom Japan helped in their financial crisis and even from China.63 But
as a result of Japan’s determination not to let APEC become another
forum for trade liberalization and many Asian leaders siding with this
“Asian consensus approach,” U.S. interest in APEC waned. It was as if
Mahatyr’s position a year earlier in Vancouver to “dilute APEC’s impor-
tance and strengthen the prospects for an Asians-only grouping in the
future” came true,64 although there is no evidence that “weakening
APEC” was Obuchi’s intention.
In striking contrast, in November 1999, Obuchi played a leading role
in convening a Japan–China–South Korea tripartite breakfast meeting
on the fringe of the ASEAN ⫹ 3 meeting in Manila. Obuchi tried to
hold such a gathering in Hanoi in 1998, but China was reluctant to
attend. This time China accepted: improved bilateral relations in 1999
might have softened Zhu Rongji’s position. On the eve of the breakfast,
Obuchi said to the accompanying Japanese press corps: “I feel much
obliged to ASEAN which gave us this occasion, but I simply cannot miss
this opportunity.”65 The first meeting concentrated on trade and eco-
nomic matters, avoiding any political matters such as North Korea. But
whatever the central theme of the talks, for Obuchi, the tripartite break-
fast was a significant step toward establishing closer relations with the
two closest Asian neighbors. It was seen as a golden path for reentering
Asia through regionalism and even regaining national identity.
Obuchi sustained a proactive policy in enhancing cooperation in
Asia. In September 1998 during his trip to the United States, he pro-
posed holding six-party talks instead of four-party talks on Korea’s
future.66 In December 1998, he called for a conference for an “intellec-
tual dialogue for the creation of Asia’s future” highlighting “human secu-
rity” as a possible area for cooperation.67 The choice of Okinawa, a
security hub and symbol of Japan’s history in World War II (WWII), as
the location of the 2000 G-8 Summit was a decision made by Obuchi
himself, a rare case of top–down leadership.68

Obuchi was as enthusiastic as his predecessor Hashimoto or his successor
Mori in improving relations with Russia. When he assumed the post of
prime minister, Obuchi confirmed the continuity of Japan’s policy
toward Russia and expressed his willingness to activate the relationship

based on the agreements thus far reached under his predecessor.69But it
was evident that the Hashimoto–Yeltsin personal friendship, which was
crucial in 1997–98, could not be sustained. The Russian financial crisis
was gradually overcome in September, but Yeltsin’s health stayed at its
nadir. Russia’s counter proposal, made during Obuchi’s trip to Moscow
in November 1998, was received with disappointment in Japan. The
proposal to conclude two treaties, the first treaty legally obliging Russia
to conclude a second treaty to demarcate the border and to create a joint
“special legal regime” on the four islands,70 was not supported by MOFA
nor by opinion leaders: the dual treaties were perceived as procedural
and avoiding any decision on sovereignty; and the “special legal regime”
was considered legally too complicated and creating too many practical
difficulties; Yeltsin’s positive reaction in Kawana in April and Russia’s
cautious approach in November left an impression of unexplainable dis-
crepancy. Returning from Moscow on November 14, Obuchi stated,
“I did everything I could. A final conclusion has to be decided later, but
I will continue to do my best.”71 In the course of 1999, however, Obuchi
had no internal basis to do his best based on the Moscow proposal, and
Russia did not show any interest in the Kawana proposal. The only
Obuchi–Yeltsin meeting in 1999 occurred during the Munich G-8
Summit in June and lasted only ten minutes, with warm words of
encouragement for the development of relations but without any
tangible direction.72
Obuchi’s renewed enthusiasm after Putin’s nomination as acting-
president was reciprocated by an encouraging response, and his special
envoy, Suzuki Muneo, met Putin in Moscow on April 4, 2000. Obuchi’s
stroke, however, just two days before that meeting, left it to his successor
to pursue this relationship.
Mori: Short-Term Prime Minister with a

Passion toward Russia
Mori, also born in 1937, was the son of a village chief of Negoro in
Ishikawa prefecture and joined the Diet in 1969 after spending three
years as a correspondent of Sankei shimbun. He became an influential
member of the Fukuda-Abe faction, and assumed key LDP posts,
including twice secretary general and minister for culture and education,
MITI, and construction. Although his career was impressive as a leading
parliamentarian, he had never been considered a serious candidate for
the post of prime minister, and it was due to Obuchi’s unexpected brain
coma that he took that post in April 2000 at the age of 63. During his
one-year tenure to be succeeded by Koizumi in April 2001, Mori’s rat-
ings were low and he was constantly exposed to press criticism for a lack
of legitimacy in the process of his selection as prime minister.
Relations with Asia

Under Mori, relations with China and Korea were marked by relative
calm, but several points require analysis. U.S.–China relations in 2000
oscillated between tension and relaxation. Lee Teng-hui’s statement of
“state to state relations” in July 1999 created considerable tension
between China and Taiwan, and it was reflected in U.S.–China relations.
The February 2000 Chinese White Paper met with severe criticism, par-
ticularly by the U.S. Congress and media. Chen Shui-bian’s victory in
the March elections kept cross-Strait relations, and hence U.S.–China
relations, on tender hooks. At the same time, economic relations moved
onto a more solid foundation. As Robert Suettinger observes, “establishing
a constructive relationship with China became one of President Clinton’s
legacy issues.”73 The agreement reached in November 1999 on China’s
accession to WTO led Congress to approve permanent normal trade
relations (PNTR).
At a time when U.S.–China relations were in flux, the Chinese gov-
ernment essentially kept its “soft” approach toward Japan, continuing
from 1999. A key statement was made in May 2000 by Jiang Zemin,
emphasizing the importance of friendly relations with Japan to a
Japanese culture-tourism delegation of 5,000 persons headed by the
minister of transportation. The statement was published in major
Chinese media as “important discourse.”74 It was confirmed at the Jiang-
Mori meeting at the United Nations Millennium Summit in September.75
In October, Zhu Rongji made a visit, which emphasized friendly rela-
tions and economic cooperation, deemphasizing history. Mori and
Japanese public opinion greeted China’s approach with passive enthusi-
asm and guarded optimism.
In fact, tensions rose over Taiwan. In the winter of 2001, Lee Teng-
hui, already retired from the government, sought entry into Japan for a
medical checkup. In April, just before his retirement, Mori finally
decided to grant it on the condition that the visit be confined to medical
treatment and not include any political activities. Nevertheless, China
reacted with indignation, canceling Li Peng’s scheduled visit. China’s
decision to “bash” Japan for this humanitarian decision roused little
sympathy in Japan, and Mori’s last decision as prime minister was ironi-
cally supported by the majority of Japanese public opinion.
The year 2000 was a great year of opportunity on the Korean
Peninsula with the North–South summit held in June. It was a reflection
of Kim Dae-jung’s sunshine policy combined with Kim Jong-il’s
calculated approach to regime preservation and normalization of relations
with the outside world. Japan was slow in responding to this huge change
in the political dynamics of the region. Particularly with the South, Japan
was happy to enjoy the fruits of the 1998 Joint Declaration. In relation to
the North, Mori’s government made efforts to warm up the relationship.
Three rounds of negotiations for normalization of relations took place in
April, August, and October, and Japan continued humanitarian assis-
tance. But no concrete results emerged; progress had to await the next
phase of negotiations under Koizumi. One incident tells us the way pub-
lic opinion was becoming extremely sensitive on the issue of abductions.
At the ASEM (Asia-Europe) meeting in Seoul in October, Mori had a
meeting with Prime Minister Blair and explained his efforts to resolve the
abduction issue, and as an example of a past effort made by a LDP dele-
gation to North Korea, described a “flexible idea” to arrange a reunion
with abductees to be presented as missing persons, somewhere in a third
country. When the content of Mori’s statement to Blair was disclosed to
the media, it led to public outrage. Mori was criticized for disclosing sen-
sitive ideas for negotiations (although it was just an idea already conveyed
to the North several years earlier and made public then) and deviating
from the “principled position” to pursue the abductors.76
Mori’s visit to India and Pakistan in August 2000 became an impor-
tant turning point in bringing relations back to normalcy after the
Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests and Japan’s economic sanctions in
1998. In particular, given the rising geopolitical importance of India, it
is worthwhile to note that Japan and India established a “global partner-
ship in the 21st century” and agreed on enhanced cooperation in the area
of Information Technology.77

It was, above all, in his Russian policy that Mori left his mark on Japan’s
foreign policy. He happened to be in office in the threshold year for
realizing Yeltsin’s promise “to make the utmost efforts to conclude
a peace treaty by 2000.” Yet, he had to negotiate with Putin, a new leader
whose international stature was unknown, but considerably younger and
with much greater support in Russia than Yeltsin had had. Mori did not
have the special geopolitical flare that characterized Hashimoto, but he

had sufficient understanding that enlarging the scope of Japan–Russia
relations and taking a flexible and realistic approach on the territorial
issue would serve Japan’s interest. MOFA’s views were streamlined by
Kato Ryozo, deputy foreign minister for political affairs who succeeded
Tamba. Kato was strongly supported by Russian experts from the
European Affairs Department. Political support and advice also came
from Suzuki Muneo, who was then rising fast on the LDP power-ladder
and had gained influence over Japan’s policy toward Russia. Mori
himself, (in addition to the fact that he was one of the four musketeers
of Abe Shintaro, who had shown strong leadership to improve relations
with the Soviet Union under Gorbachev) had personal ties from his
father’s long-standing friendship with the Soviet Union. Mori’s father
opened a sister-city relationship for several decades between his village
Negoro and Shelekhov, close to Irkutsk, and in his will stipulated that
part of his ashes were to be buried in the graveyard in Shelekhov, hoping
that his son would regularly visit the Soviet Union to establish someday
a solid friendship with this country. Mori had already honored his
father’s will several times.
Mori and Putin met five times in one year, starting in April 2000 with
Mori’s visit to St. Petersburg. After this visit of familiarization with the
broad political and economic issues facing the two countries, the second
meeting took place in July in Okinawa, where Mori, as the host country’s
representative, warmly greeted the debut of a newly elected Russian
leader in the G-8 forum. But the real negotiations began in September
with Putin’s official visit to Tokyo, when Putin acknowledged verbally
the validity of the 1956 Joint Declaration. This was a contentious
position that neither Gorbachev nor Yeltsin (although he indirectly
approved it in 1993) dared to take. Mori and his team recognized that
with this statement, peace treaty negotiations entered a new stage.
Though expressing due respect for the position taken by Russia’s new
leader, Japanese negotiators insisted that not only must the fate of the
two smaller islands be resolved, as prescribed in the 1956 Joint
Declaration, but also that the fate of two larger islands be addressed. The
Japanese side showed preparedness to talk about the fate of the larger
islands “without preconditions.” Intense talks continued at the fringe of
the APEC meeting in Brunei in November, and were concluded by the
Irkutsk meeting in March 2001. Mori proposed parallel negotiations on
the two smaller islands, prescribed in the 1956 Joint Declaration, and
the two larger islands, the sovereignty of which was undetermined. Putin
did not accept Mori’s proposal, but he did not negate it, and negotiators
of the two ministries became convinced that the approaches by the two
sides were converging more than ever.
At the same time, from the summer of 2000, severe criticism against
Mori and his team were raised by opinion leaders, the mass media, and
even from within the Foreign Ministry that they were not following the
traditional approach to resolve this issue by “four islands in a bunch.”
One reason for this criticism was the various clashes of personalities
among policymakers and opinion leaders related to Russia; nationalistic
feeling that did not allow room for any deviation from the established
“principled approach” was also roused.78
Conclusion
To what extent could Japan have demonstrated its strategic thinking in
the second half of the 1990s? In this period, geopolitics fundamentally
changed in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States, the sole super-
power in the post–cold war era, and rising China were contending for
power in the region. Japan’s strategic agenda was to avoid the two
nightmares of “U.S.–China hostility” and “U.S.–China passing of
Japan.” The general guideline was to maximize solid alliance relations
with the United States while minimizing tension with China. By and
large, three prime ministers followed this line: Hashimoto, very con-
scious about the importance of the alliance but eager to avoid the two
nightmares; and Obuchi with his long-term objective of stabilizing
Japan’s position in Asia. Changes occurring on the Korean peninsula
under Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il were also substantial. Despite
many limitations, North–South rapprochement proceeded on an
unprecedented scale. Japan succeeded in strengthening its relations with
South Korea and the democratic triangle of the United States–
Japan–South Korea, but relations with the North stagnated despite
efforts for a breakthrough. Strengthened relations with Russia seemed to
be giving Japan geopolitical advantage in East Asia, and the two countries
drew closer in their bilateral relationship than at any other point in
post-WWII history.
In geo-economics, Japan did try to take a leadership role in the
1997–98 Asian financial crisis. Japan’s endeavor to create an AMF did
not materialize, but Japan poured in economic assistance of $80 billion
and the Chiang Mai swap accord was realized in 2000 under Japan’s
initiative. Amidst the financial crisis, Japan, China, and Korea were
invited to the ASEAN summit, resulting in the establishment of
ASEAN ⫹ 3 from 1997, and the start of annual meetings of the three
under there own auspices from 1999. Japan participated eagerly in this
process and played the role of initiator of the meeting of the three.
All these moves helped to advance Japan’s agenda to strengthen its ties
with Asia.
The third issue with which Japan struggled through this period was
related to history and identity. No small efforts were made from the
Japanese side to overcome the past, but with mixed results. President
Kim Dae-jung’s visit in October 1998 was generally welcomed as a his-
toric breakthrough because of the mutual willingness for reconciliation.
President Jiang Zemin’s visit a month later did not achieve the same
result, but many Japanese thought that it was China’s unwillingness to
accept reconciliation that prevented the same outcome as with South
Korea. In this context, showing leadership for enhancing regional
cooperation was welcomed in Japan as a step for regaining its Asian
identity. A series of improvements in Japan–Russia relations brought
some expectations that the long-waited resolution of the territorial
problem, a wound in Japan’s national consciousness, might be near.
The overall record for this period was rather positive from all perspec-
tives, whether geopolitics, regional economics, or overcoming history.
The U.S. alliance certainly became stronger. Japan’s proactive and more
responsible policy succeeded in overcoming the loss of confidence in the
early 1990s. Chinese relations were clearly not easy, but they were under
control and Japan even took some initiatives to improve U.S.–China
relations. South Korean relations seemed markedly improved. Russian
relations were at their peak. East Asian regionalism seemed to have
found its place for the first time in post-WWII history.
In reality, none of these achievements rested on a sufficiently solid
basis to have secured Japan’s strategic position in East Asia. Responsible
and proactive security policies and efforts to bring U.S. relations closer
needed constant renewed attention; yet, in the first half of the following
decade, only U.S. relations were destined to develop along that direction.
But in Japan’s policies in Asia, all successes achieved during the second
half of the 1990s were replaced by self-assertive policies that failed to take
into account sufficiently positions of others and resulted in mismanage-
ment of relations. Retrospectively, such policy symptoms that we saw
under Prime Minister Mori as the lack of visible outcome to meet China’s
“smile diplomacy” while taking the decision to issue a visa to Lee Teng-
hui (that humanitarian decision was genuinely supported by a large num-
ber of Japanese); rising emotions about North Korean abductions instead
of strong interest in capitalizing on the “sunshine policy”; and calls for a
“principled approach” on the territorial problem with Russia rather than
earnest preparations for a new stage of negotiations based on Putin’s

interest in improving relations, all prepared the ground for public opinion
formation and policy decisions in the first half of the 2000s.
Notes
1. “Peace and development” was Deng Xiaoping’s key concept contrasting to
Mao’s “war and revolution.” See Gilbert Rozman, Northeast Asia’s Stunted
Regionalism, Bilateral Distrust in the Shadow of Globalization (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 44. In more precise terms, Deng’s
thinking could be summarized as “continue to oppose hegemony and strive to
preserve world peace; reunite Taiwan; and step up economic construction and
the drive for China’s four modernizations—industry, agriculture, defense,
and science and technology–.” See: Jiangwei Wang, “Adjusting to a
‘Strong–Strong Relationship’: China’s Calculus of Japan’s Asian Policy,” in
Takashi Inoguchi, ed., Japan’s Asian Policy, Revival and Response (New York:
Palgrave, 2002), pp. 104–05.
2. Michael Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism (New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 78.
3. In 1995, after a Nanjing Massacre campaign was resumed in all primary
schools even “pro-China” MOFA officials were in a desperate mood. See
Yoichi Funabashi, “How to End the Issue of War Responsibility,” Chuo koron,
February 2003, p. 59. People’s Daily on September 9, 1995, criticized the
“noisy clamour in Japan against China under the guise of protest against
nuclear testing” when “Japan ought to be making a deep self-examination of
the criminal act of aggression it committed and learn some serious lessons
from history.” Kamiya Matake describes Japanese reaction to this article, say-
ing that “China’s way of bringing up the history issue in this way is unwar-
ranted and unfair.” in “Japanese Foreign Policy toward Northeast Asia,” in
Takashi Inoguchi and Jain Purnendra, eds., Japanese Foreign Policy Today
(New York: Palgrave, 2000), p. 236.
4. The division into four groupings was as follows: one region (yiquan), one line
(yilieh), one side (yipian), one point (yidian). The 20-letter directive was to
“observe calmly, strengthen the basis, react with caution, hide the spirit, and
achieve the results.” See Aoyama Rusa, “Reisengo Chugoku no taibei inshiki
to Beichu kankei,” in Kokubun Ryosei, ed., Chugoku seiji to Higashi Ajia
(Tokyo: Keio University Press, 2004), pp. 241–52.
5. The ministerial meeting in Seattle in December 1999 collapsed, and the
Doha round was finally launched in November 2001.
6. Muthiah Alagappa, ed., “Introduction: Predictability and Stability Despite
Challenges,” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Order, Instrumental
and Normative Features (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 4.
7. For eclectic analyses of realism, liberalism, and constructivism, see: J.J. Suh,
Peter J. Katzenstein, and Allen Carlson, eds., Rethinking Security in East
Asia: Identity, Power, and Efficiency (Stanford: Stanford University, 2004);
Samuel S. Kim, ed., The International Relations of Northeast Asia ( Lanham:

Rowman & Littlefield, 2004); and John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno,
eds., International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2003).
8. Funabashi Yoichi, Domei hyoryu (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1997), p. 439.
9. Funabashi, Domei hyoryu, pp. 438, 478.
10. Interview with an informed MOFA source, August 3, 2005.
11. Funabashi, Domei hyoryu, p. 474.
12. Funabashi, Domei hyoryu, p. 463, referring to a statement by Winston Lord,
Assistant Secretary of State.
13. Aoyama, Reisengo Chugoku no taibei inshiki to Beichu kankei, pp. 252–53.
14. Thomas Christensen, “China, the U.S.–Japan Alliance, and the Security
Dilemma in East Asia,” in Michael Brown, Owen Cote, Sean Lynn-Jones,
and Steven Miller, eds., The Rise of China (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
2000), p. 148.
15. The danger of Japanese militarism was repeatedly stated by the Chinese side
during Samuel Burger’s visit to China in August 1997 and in March 1996
the Chinese foreign minister expressed his bewilderment at Japan’s concern
about missile tests in March 1996 that “other than the US, it is only Japan
which is making a fuss about it.” See Funabashi, Domei hyoryu, pp. 457–61
and 482.
16. Michael Green says that despite China’s protest, the Japanese government
did not back away to prohibit the right-wing youth from implementing
their legal rights, Japan’s Reluctant Realism, pp. 84–86.
17. Japan–China security talks were held on February 25, 1999; January 13,
1995; January 15, 1996; and March 15, 1997. See Funabashi, Domei horyu,
p. 467.
18. Michael Green, “Defense or Security? The US–Japan defence guidelines and
China,” in David M. Lampton, ed., Major Power Relations in Northeast Asia:
Win–Win or Zero–Sum Game? (Tokyo: Nihon kokusai koryu senta, 2001),
pp. 81–83.
19. ⬍http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/98/1st/bk98_1.html#1-2-2⬎.
20. Green, “Defense or Security?” p. 87.
21. October 24, 1994, statement at the Special Committee on Tax Reform of
the Lower House, Iwami Takao, Jitsuroku Hashimoto Ryutaro (Tokyo: Asahi
sonorama, 1995), p. 286.
22. Robert Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of US–China Relations
1989–2000 (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2003),
pp. 264–327; M. David Lampton, Same Bed Different Dreams, Managing
US–China Relations 1989–2000 (Berkeley: University of California Press,
2001), pp. 46–56.
23. Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen, pp. 322, 344–45.
24. Lampton and Suettinger concur that the three no’s newly included “no to inter-
national organizations for which statehood is a requirement,” in comparison to
the Kissinger–Zhou talks in 1971 (Lampton, Same Bed: Different Dreams,
p. 302) or Clinton’s letter to Jiang in July 1995 (Suettinger, Beyond

Tiananmen, p. 348).
25. Funabashi, Domei horyu, p. 478.
26. Funabashi Yoichi, “Shusho Hashimoto gaiko o kataru,” Asahi shimbun,
July 30, 1998.
29. ⬍http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/asia/crisis0010.html⬎.
30. Nakanishi Hiroshi, “Reisen shuryogo no Nihon no henyo,” in Soeya
Yoshihide and Masaaki Tadokoro, eds., Nihon no Higashiajia koso (Tokyo:
Keio University Press, 2004), p. 289.
33. Purnendra Jain, “Japan and South Asia: Between Cooperation and
Confrontation,” in Inoguchi and Jain, Japanese Foreign Policy Today,
pp. 267–69.
34. Interview with an informed MOFA source, August 3, 2005. On Japan’s
dilemma over Myanmar and the limited decisions taken in this period to
continue projects that meet basic human needs, See Yutaka Kawashima,
Japanese Foreign Policy at the Crossroads, Challenges and Options for the Twenty-
First Century (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2003), p. 122.
36. Funabashi Yoichi, Asahi shimbun, July 30, 1998.
37. Asahi shimbun, September 3, 2000; all Hashimoto’s quotes below are from
this interview.
38. For the full text of the speech, see: ⬍http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/
0731douyukai.html⬎.
39. ⬍http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/kiroku/s_hashi/arc_97/russia97/
hyoka.html⬎. The plan outlines six pillars for cooperation: (1) investment
cooperation; (2) Russia’s participation in a multilateral international
economy; (3) enhancing assistance to Russia’s reform; (4) cooperation in a
managers’ training program; (5) energy dialogue and cooperation; and
(6) cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
40. Tamba has left a detailed account of how Hashimoto and he prepared the
groundwork with Clinton to accept Russia as a member of APEC. See
Tamba Minoru, Nichiro gaiko hiwa (Tokyo: Chuo koron, 2004), pp. 20–23.
41. Sato Kazuo and Komaki Yoshiaki, Nichiro shuno kosho (Tokyo: Iwanami,
2003), pp. 133–36.
42. The Japanese government disclosed only in September 2000 that the
proposal contained (1) a border demarcation between Urup and Etorofu
and (2) maximum concessions to be made by the Japanese side. In January
2005, Yachi Shotaro, vice minister for foreign affairs, at a press conference
stated that the content of maximum concessions is to “acknowledge for
some time to come Russian administrative rights.” See Asahi shimbun,
January 5, 2005.
43. In fact, the November 26, 1998, Joint Declaration included the following:
“The Chinese side hopes that the Japanese side will learn lessons from history.”
44. All these points are based on my interview with an informed Japanese
MOFA source on June 26, 2005. Asahi shimbun of November 29, 1998, car-
ries a detailed article on how the negotiations on history were conducted,
and it practically confirms all the points mentioned by the informed source.
45. Some argued that “it would have been wiser for Japan to make a written
apology and agree in principle that China would not further take up the his-
tory issue,” Amako Hajime, Sankei shimbun, November 28, 1998. But it
remains unclear whether China was prepared to accept Kim Dae-jung’s
“future oriented formula,” should Japan have agreed to a written apology. At
any rate, given the language of the declaration to include “learning lessons
from history” and Jiang Zemin’s repeated statements that the issue was not
resolved, this question was overridden by events.
46. From the “Japan–China Joint Declaration on Building a Partnership of
Friendship and Cooperation for Peace and Development,” November 26,
1998.
47. Yomiuri shimbun, November 27, 1998.
48. Asahi shimbun, November 27, 1998.
49. Foreign Minister Komura Masahiko defended the law backed by MOFA and
JDA officials. Hitogarano Obuchi kept a relatively low profile in that
debate.
50. Kojima Tomoyuki, “Sogo hokan no Nitchu kankei,” in Kokubun Ryosei, ed.,
Chugoku seiji to Higashi Ajia (Tokyo: Keio University Press, 2004), p. 206.
51. Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen, pp. 347–77.
52. Aoyama, Reisengo Chugoku no taibei inshiki to Beichu kankei, p. 253.
53. The Chinese representative at the WTO negotiations with the United States
declared on May 27 that “China is not in a hurry; until satisfactory expla-
nation is given by the U.S. on the Belgrade bombardment, the negotiations
would not be resumed.” See Asahi shimbun, May 28, 1999.
54. Mainichi shimbun, June 19, 1999.
55. Yomiuri shimbun, July 19, 1999.
56. Iokibe Makoto, “Hanchu genrishugiha yugai mueki dearu,” Chuo koron,
May 2004, p. 87.
57. Sankei shimbun, July 10, 1999.
58. Asahi shimbun, December 19, 1997.
59. From the “Japan-Republic of Korea Joint Declaration: A New Japan-
Republic of Korea Partnership towards the Twenty-First Century,” October 8,
1998. An informed Japanese MOFA source (June 26, 2005) said that there
was a consensus between Obuchi and MOFA officials that unlike the case of
China where the history of reconciliation had engendered results, there was
good reason to express an apology in writing in the case of Japan–Korea,
where no such achievement had been made yet.
61. ⬍http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/asia/crisis0010.html⬎.
62. Soeya Yoshihide, “Higashi Ajia anzen hosho shisutemu no naka no Nihon,”
in Soeya Yoshoihide and Tadokoro Masaaki, eds., Nihon no Higashi Ajia koso
(Tokyo: Keio University Press, 2004), p. 197.
63. John Ravenhill, APEC and the Construction of Pacific Rim Regionalism
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 184.
64. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism, p. 212.
66. Nakanishi, Reisen shuryogo no Nihon no henyo, p. 290.
67. ⬍http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/culture/koryu/bunka_4.html⬎.
68. Obuchi Keizo no 615 nichi (Tokyo: Koshinsha, 2000), p. 326.
69. Based on the Obuchi–Yeltsin telephone conversation of July 31, 1998. See
Kyodo tsushin, July 31, 1998.
70. Alexander Panov, Kaminari nochi hare (Tokyo: NHK, 2004), pp. 107–09.
71. Obuchi Keizo no 615 nichi, p. 64.
72. Sato and Komaki, Nichiro shuno kosho, pp. 261–71.
73. Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen, pp. 392, 400.
74. Mainichi shimbun, May 22, 2000; Sankei shimbun, June 13, 2000.
75. Jiang stated that “the rise of Asia was only possible with friendship and
cooperation between Japan and China, and the two countries must take a
long and broad view of bilateral relations.” See Akio Takahara, “Japan’s
Political Response to the Rise of China,” in Ryosei Kokubun and Wang Jisi,
eds., The Rise of China and a Changing East Asia Order (Tokyo: Japan Center
for International Exchange, 2004), p. 166.
76. Asahi shimbun, October 21, 2000.
77. ⬍http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/kiroku/s_mori/arc_00/asia4_
00/gh.html⬎.
78. The Mori–Putin negotiations could be followed through newspaper and
other media reports, but this synthesis is based on my personal involvement
as director general of european affairs, August 1999–April 2001.
CHAPTER 5
Japanese Strategy under

Koizumi
T.J. Pempel
S
trategic thinking within the Koizumi administration, not surprisingly,
reflected far more elements of continuity with past policies than
stark adventures into unexplored territory. In particular, Japan con-
tinued to base much of its strategic thinking on a “comprehensive” notion
of national security—a conceptualization transcending any exclusive
focus on overt military security of national borders and domestic security
from terrorism. Instead, it has been expansive enough to weave in con-
cerns about economic security, security from illicit migration and drugs,
energy and food security, protection from the worst forms of environ-
mental pollution, and the like. This broader orientation can be traced to
the early 1980s, and remains largely in place.
Furthermore, Japan continues to abjure unilateralism in preference to
bilateral arrangements. Generally, Japan seeks to forge its policies in
accord with multilateral organizations such as the United Nations, the
WTO, or the IMF. In recent years, Japan has also worked within regional
bodies. It eschews unilateral actions or aggressive efforts to forge new
regional or global arrangements. As a consequence, its strategic thinking is
typically concentrated on its individual relationships with other nation
states, while continually seeking to prove itself an upright member of the
international community. Japan’s bilateral security arrangement with the
United States remains the keystone in Japan’s arch of foreign policies; rela-
tions with the Asian region are important supplements.
Nevertheless, distinctly new ideas and surprisingly new directions
were introduced, particularly with regard to military and external security,
110 ● T.J. Pempel
many of which appear unlikely to be reversed, taking Japanese strategic

policies into new directions. In some instances these changes grow out of
shifts in domestic politics; in others they reflect adaptations to altered
regional and global conditions. Understanding these deep structural
changes is prerequisite to examining the specific strategic actions and
policies under Koizumi per se.
Changing Structural Conditions Facing

Japan under Koizumi
The Koizumi administration’s strategic thinking and behavior were
deeply affected by the intersection of conditions at three different
analytic levels—national, global, and regional.
Changes in Japanese Domestic Political Structures

Domestically, Japan has been going through a fundamental regime shift.
By “regime shift” I mean the establishment of a new equilibrium among
political institutions, public policies, and the socioeconomic roots of
power.1 Japan’s so-called 1955 system rested on an equilibrium among
institutions, policies, and socioeconomic blocs that has now been
upended. The deep predictabilities of that earlier system have been
replaced by considerable political fluidity as the country moves toward
establishing a new system based on new relationships that are likely to
shape and structure Japanese politics for several decades.
The end of the old regime and the transition to a new one began with
the bursting of Japan’s asset bubble in 1990–91 and the subsequent 1993
splintering of the LDP. In their wake came powerful political and eco-
nomic breaks with the past plus fundamental, albeit slow moving, struc-
tural readjustments in who holds power and how that power is
exercised.2 Most fundamental in influencing Japan’s strategic thinking
and behavior have been the following three items.
First, Japan’s electoral and party systems are now fundamentally dif-
ferent from those that prevailed from 1955 until 1993. The electoral
Left, once an undeniable and frequently strident voice constraining con-
servative governments on a wide number of security fronts, has all but
vanished. The demise of the Left followed the decision of the Social
Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) to enter government in the eclectic
seven-party coalition of 1993–94 and then later in its “strange bedfel-
lows” alliance with the LDP. Socialist leader Murayama Tomiichi took
over the prime minister’s office and proceeded to renounce virtually all
Strategy under Koizumi ● 111
of the party’s prior security planks, among other things endorsing the
constitutionality of the SDF and the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty,
effectively undercutting the party’s raison d’etre. The electoral response
included a massive renunciation by long-standing supporters, an
internal party split, and the socialists’ overall marginalization. Since the
mid-1990s, party and electoral politics in Japan have moved security
debate and public opinion substantially to the Center–Right.
The new electoral system, meanwhile, has lessened the need for parlia-
mentary candidates to appeal to established interest group constituencies or
to rely heavily on factional endorsements to gain their party’s nomination.
The current system puts a premium on media-savvy populist candidates
who can attract individual voters. Not a few successful parliamentarians
have taken advantage of the diminished Left, winning office through
appeals around a new mixture of populism and nationalism.
A second important domestic change concerns economics. For most
of the postwar era, Japan’s approach to foreign policy rested predomi-
nantly on its ever-expanding economic muscle. Political and business
leaders from a host of countries in developing Asia looked to Japan as the
logical model for emulation in pursuing their own economic strategies.3
Meanwhile, Japanese foreign assistance, trade, production networks, and
bank loans became increasingly pivotal in advancing the economic
fortunes of much of Asia. The combination long reinforced Japan’s
position as the undisputed leader of Asia’s region-wide development,
a model known widely in Japan as the “flying geese model.”
Japan’s once unchallenged regional economic leadership was eroded
by the country’s economic slowdown plus the simultaneous successes of
other Asian countries including South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia,
and eventually and most significantly, China. Japan’s relative inability to
stymie the pandemic Asian economic crisis of 1997–98 further undercut
its own national confidence, as well as that of many of its neighbors, in
Japan’s ability to rely on its economic powers to shape regional events.
Although Japan remained by far the most economically sophisticated
and industrially advanced country in Asia, its position at the unchal-
lenged center of regional economic developments was no longer
automatic.4
Still a third element in Japan’s regime shift has been the change in
policymaking powers within Japan’s ruling coalition. Under the 1955
regime, policymaking had been characterized by a high degree of func-
tional separation—what the Japanese call tatewari gyosei, what von
Wolferen labeled the truncated pyramid, and what others have labeled
iron triangles.5 Most characteristic of this system was the development
112 ● T.J. Pempel
and implementation of specific policies through close coordination

among individual bureaucratic agencies, the interest groups they
allegedly were responsible for regulating, and LDP politicians with a
demonstrated interest and expertise in the policy areas involved. The
predominant arenas where policy was formulated were the agencies
themselves and the relevant functional committees of the LDP’s Policy
Affairs Research Council. Highly marginalized by these silo-like deci-
sions were the interests or influence of other ministries, interest groups,
or opposition politicians. Equally diluted was any strong initiating or
coordinating role for top policymakers such as the cabinet or the prime
minister.
This has changed radically. Particularly under Koizumi, bureaucratic
and LDP party powers were reduced whereas both the Cabinet and the
Prime Minister’s Office gained enhanced powers to generate policies,
many of which involve trampling on hitherto sacrosanct bureaucratic or
LDP turf. In January 2001, Japan’s 20 odd ministries were recombined
into 14, with an important redistribution of functions and powers in
many of the most important. Previously tight links between agency and
constituent interest groups were weakened, and the long-standing sys-
tem of vertical administration was altered. Previous powers of bureau-
cratic officials were checked. The number of political appointees in each
ministry, which had previously been limited to only the top two posts,
was more than tripled for most agencies, providing additional layers of
political control over earlier agency autonomy.
Perhaps most importantly, a new and well-staffed Cabinet Office,
plus a bolstered Cabinet Secretariat, gained substantial muscularity in
initiating and coordinating policies. At the end of 1999 the Prime
Minister’s Office had a staff of only 582 and the Cabinet Secretariat had
184. By the end of 2001, the new Cabinet Office had nearly 2,200 staff
and the Secretariat had more than tripled to 487.6 Under 1999 legisla-
tion, the prime minister was also given explicit authority to engage in
policy planning and to initiate legislation. A new Council on Economic
and Fiscal Policy (CEFP) gained considerable leeway to generate a mix-
ture of policies aimed at addressing the country’s extensive economic and
financial problems.
Collectively, these measures altered the previous balance of power
between elected officials and senior bureaucrats. Agency autonomy
declined whereas the power of elected politicians, and particularly politi-
cians in the executive branch, rose. Relatedly, the power of individual
LDP leaders, including the once formidable faction leaders, was reduced
as the prime minister and the Cabinet gained in policymaking oversight
and strength at the expense of party institutions and individuals. All of

these bolstered Prime Minister Koizumi’s predisposition toward taking a
“presidential” and personal leadership role in key decisions as well as to
his efforts to undermine long-standing practices and power holders in
the LDP. Nowhere was this more visible than in Koizumi’s masterful
purge of his intra-party opponents in the September 11, 2005 election.
Without question, Koizumi lacked a strong background in diplo-
macy. Moreover, his political attention was concentrated principally on
Japan’s long-standing and truculent financial and economic problems.
Nevertheless, he also demonstrated a strong personal predilection for
shaping national security policy, often taking the lead in overseas
diplomatic missions such as those to the DPRK (Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea), to the United States, or to ASEAN. He has explicitly
and regularly campaigned to enhance Japan’s political, diplomatic, and
military influence to a level commensurate with its economic heft.
The previously powerful role played by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs was also eclipsed, in part as a result of the general trends noted
above, but accelerated by a series of scandals that made it clear that
Japan’s “best and brightest” diplomats were less than exceptional when it
came to resisting the temptations of mind-numbing greed and arrant
stupidity. The tenure as foreign minister of the popular but frequently
erratic Tanaka Makiko, and the sticky fingered ODA policies of former
foreign vice minister Suzuki Muneo did little to bridge the widening gap
between bureaucrats and politicians and nothing at all to enhance the
strategic and policymaking influence of the Ministry.
Finally, and of particular importance in shaping strategic policy, the
LDP saw the rise within the party of a vastly more nationalistic or revi-
sionist leadership cadre. The combination of North Korea’s nuclear pro-
gram, China’s steady rise, and anti-Japanese rioting in China enabled
Japan’s conservative nationalists to advance their own strategic and mili-
tary goals while aligning the country more closely than ever with U.S.
goals across Asia. Anxious to make Japan “a normal nation,” conservative
politicians and opinion leaders such as Abe Shinzo, Nakajima Mineo,
Nakamura Katsunori, Hiramatsu Shiego, Okazaki Hisahiko, Hasegawa
Keitaro, and Kase Hideaki moved into more prominent policymaking
roles within the party.7 A bipartisan group of young Turks pushed as well
for a rekindled national pride and a more activist pursuit of their vision
of Japan’s national interest. Koizumi himself was a foremost champion of
this shift to revisionism and heightened nationalism, embodied most
notably in his various visits to the Yasukuni shrine. Undoubtedly, much
of Koizumi’s ideological orientation had deep and long-standing roots;
114 ● T.J. Pempel
but not coincidentally, his overt nationalism served the tactical purpose
of appealing, through the flourishes of flags and trumpets, to long-standing
party supporters such as agricultural interests, local financial institutions,
the postmasters, and others that approved portions of his economic
program.
Meanwhile, erstwhile “pragmatists” and adherents of the long-standing
Yoshida line—with its predominantly economic focus and limited for-
eign policy role—were eclipsed, men such as Kato Koichi, Miyazawa
Kiichi, and Kono Yohei. So was the Heisei Kenkyukai, the factional
organization of Hashimoto Ryuichiro, a group with numerous individu-
als having close ties with China.8 As Richard Samuels has phrased it:
“The consolidation of party power behind revisionist leadership has . . .
worked to marginalize pragmatists and unify the LDP around revisionist
goals to [a] heretofore unprecedented degree.”9
The ideological shift and the rise of nationalism were evidenced as
well by the fact that Japan reopened parliamentary discussions about
constitutional revision, with a particular focus on Article 9, the role of
the emperor, and the importance of spiritual education. New domestic
political conditions have released Japan from some of the long-standing
taboos surrounding such issues.10 The Research Commission on the
Constitution was established by the Diet in the House of Representatives
and submitted a progress report in November 2002. A series of proposed
revisions followed in June 2003, which, among other things, called
explicitly for change in Article 9 and the creation of explicit provisions
for the maintenance of armed forces. In December 2004, the LDP put
forward its explicit proposals for change. These were formalized in
celebration of its fiftieth anniversary on November 22, 2005.11
Unlike earlier efforts at constitutional revision, this series of moves had
support both among the opposition parties and the general public.
A Yomiuri poll of Diet members in 2002 showed that 71 percent favored
revising the Constitution up 11 points from 1997 with 55 percent favoring
revision of Article 9. This last figure was up 14 points from the prior poll.12
As late as 1986, only 23 percent of the general public had supported
revision; since 1998 this figure has consistently exceeded 50 percent.13
A Yomiuri poll released in April 2005 showed that support was up to 61 per-
cent of respondents, the second-highest figure since the opinion poll was
first taken in 1981 and the second consecutive year that support for consti-
tutional revision exceeded 60 percent, with 65 percent reported in 2004.
In addition to opening up discussions on constitutional revision,
Japan’s Ministry of Education gave voice to the enhanced nationalism. In
2005 it approved the middle school textbooks that reduced overt
discussion of Japan’s actions in World War II (WWII) on such matters as

comfort women, the Nanjing Massacre, and Unit 731. Moreover, maps
in the new books were redrawn to make explicit Japanese claims on
hitherto disputed islands, notably Dokdo-Takeshima and the Senkakus.
In and of themselves, such domestic changes, important though they
were, did not lead directly to some new and clear-cut national strategic
framework. But they set in motion undeniable moves away from long-
standing presuppositions critical to the continuation of the Yoshida line,
for example bureaucratic autonomy, economic primacy, and checks on
unabashed nationalism. Equally less in evidence were the occasional one-
man adventures in foreign policy by politicians such as those of
Kanemaru Shin to press normalization with the DPRK in 1990 or
Ozawa Ichiro to cut an aid-for-islands deal with Russia in March 1991.
Changes in the Global Balance of Forces

The end of the cold war, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and China’s
tentative embrace of quasi-capitalist economics, along with the increased
importance of so-called rogue regimes, failed states, and nonstate terror-
ist networks changed the broad configuration of regional politics in East
Asia, as well as many of the premises underlying Japanese strategic think-
ing. Gone were the certainties about friends and enemies so deeply
entrenched during the long era of bipolarity. So too was the near state-
monopoly on the instruments of violence and the formulation of
national policies. By the time of Koizumi’s accession to office the threat
of nuclear warfare between superpowers had virtually disappeared, as
had any serious threat of invasion of Japan, only to be replaced by the
increased number of relatively small, often failed, states, some with a
limited nuclear capacity giving them a newfound capacity to play an
enhanced role in global and regional politics. In particular, North Korea
took on a much more forbidding character for Japanese policymakers
with its 1998 launch of a Taepodong missile over Japan, its April 23,
2003 declaration that it was pursuing a nuclear weapons program, and
its unprecedented decision to end its adherence to the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Nonstate groups, from terrorist networks
to NGOs, demonstrated enhanced ability to shape regional events, fur-
ther complicating Japanese strategic thinking.
By the time Koizumi acquired the prime ministership, the United
States, Japan’s most significant ally and its major military guarantor, had
become the world’s only remaining superpower. As of the early years of
the twenty-first century the United States was spending about five times
116 ● T.J. Pempel
more on its military than its next closest competitor and its total military
budget was greater than that of the next twenty countries combined. Its
military capabilities in a host of military systems vastly exceeded those of
most other countries.14
This uncontestable military prowess was put to new uses under
George W. Bush in a series of unilateral strategic and foreign policy
actions designed to reshape the global status quo. These moves were in
direct contrast to the prior 50 years of a predominantly multilateral and
status quo–oriented U.S. foreign policy.15 The Bush administration also
articulated a “for us, or against us” dichotomy that obliterated the
nuances by which states had long shaped their foreign policies.
In keeping with its new unilateral and preventative military actions,
U.S. military and strategic thinking also underwent comprehensive over-
haul with the move from a “threat-based” to “capabilities-based” mili-
tary. The new U.S. doctrines were laid out in the Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR) of 2001, the Bush speech at West Point June 2002, and
the National Security Strategy (NSS) of September 2002. The new
doctrine called for the United States to take on three major goals—“[to]
defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants . . . [to] preserve the
peace by building good relations among the great powers . . . [and to]
extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every
continent.”16 New were Bush’s elevation of the terrorist threat to the
level of that posed by tyrants, the explicit notion of preemptive warfare
to achieve his goals, and the aim of actively removing the causes of
terrorism and tyranny though military action.
The QDR argued that new, post–cold war challenges would require
massive changes in the existing U.S. basing system. Forces would need to
be closer to what the United States identified as the “arc of instability”
stretching from Northern Africa to Southeast Asia. America’s new focus
would be on mobility to conduct expeditionary operations in distant the-
aters against adversaries armed with WMD, rather than on the fixed bases
designed to ward off, or respond to, conventional attacks from well-
identified adversaries. The United States plans to close many bases in
Western Europe and Northeast Asia pulling back some 60,000–70,000
troops along with 100,000 civilian employees and family members. But it
also plans to require additional bases and stations in the Middle East and
Central Asia. 17
Certain “bedrock” allies such as Japan and probably Australia
would be home to central U.S. basing hubs. These hubs would be
supplemented by a large number of “lily pads” holding prepositioned
equipment to which rapidly deployable forces can deploy and/or “leap
to and from” in response to contingencies in a wide variety of

geographical locations.
Thus, the United States requested that Japan allow for the transfer of
U.S. military command functions for the U.S. Army I Corps (now based
in Fort Lewis, Washington) to Camp Zama in Kanagawa Prefecture.
Such a transfer would underscore and enhance Japan’s role in broader
U.S. global military strategy as well as deepening ties between the U.S.
military and the Ground SDF. Since the sphere of action of the
Army I Corps reaches to the Middle East, however, the relocation of
headquarters from Fort Lewis to Camp Zama would also expand consid-
erably the geographic scope of the current U.S.–Japan Security Treaty
beyond its current focus on “the Far East.” This in turn opens up the
possibility that Japan will shift from its long-standing support of “col-
lective defense” to the more activist doctrine of “collective security.” The
former stresses the defense of Japanese territory through the alliance
with the United States, but is seen as purely “defensive defense.” In con-
trast “collective security” is a broader conception, holding that Japanese
security requires the country to consider engaging in collective actions to
enhance its overall security in ways that require a broader geographical
sweep. Included would be peacekeeping actions under UN auspices, or
activities that expanded Japan’s defense perimeter well beyond the
Japanese homeland.
Meanwhile of equal salience to East Asia, the new doctrine calls for a
substantial reduction and repositioning of U.S. forces in the Republic of
Korea (ROK). This would remove the U.S. tripwire at the DMZ
(Demilitarized Zone) allowing U.S. forces in the ROK to conduct more
than just one task, that is, its traditional defense of the ROK from
DPRK attack.
Changing Regional Dynamics

The Asian region became far more integrated and regionally cohesive
during the past two decades or so. This integration involved a mixture of
formal, top–down, governmentally driven regional institutions along
with more important but less formal, bottom-up linkages driven primarily
by the economic activities of corporations and financial institutions.18
Pan-regional ties were far more numerous and vastly more significant in
the economic sphere than in security. Moreover, Southeast Asia has
shown more signs of cooperation and integration than Northeast Asia.
In the north, nationalist competition, unresolved territorial disputes,
and ghosts from the historical past continue to work at cross purposes
118 ● T.J. Pempel
with efforts to reduce the predilections for unchallenged sovereignty

through deeper regional cooperation and connection.
Over and above any normal nationalist competition in the region,
two particular problem areas loom large and have risen in relative
importance—the Cross-Strait problem of Taiwan and the DPRK’s deci-
sion to remove itself from the NPT and to assert that it has become, and
deserves to be treated as, a nuclear power. Cross-Strait relations took a
negative turn with the Chinese shelling across Taiwan prior to the 1996
elections and the subsequent U.S. positioning of forces from the Seventh
Fleet in defensive positions in the Straits. The election of the nominally
pro-independence DPP’s presidential candidate, Chen Shui-bian, in
2000 and his close and contested reelection in March 2004 worsened ties
across the Strait. Equally problematic were threats of military action by
the PRC in the event that Taiwan went too far in testing precisely where
the “red line” lay between “one China” and Taiwanese statehood. Early
in 2005 China passed an anti-secession law that called for the forceful
repatriation of Taiwan in the event of unspecified Taiwanese moves
deemed provocatively pro-independence by the PRC.
The ongoing challenges stemming from North Korea’s actions were
even more destabilizing to Northeast Asian security and challenged
Japan directly. A mixture of bilateral Japanese–DPRK negotiations plus
Japanese participation in the six-party talks was the result.
Japan has played an ambivalent role in Northeast Asia’s ongoing
tension between regionalization and nationalism. For a long time the
country was an ardent supporter of closer Asian ties, particularly when
these involved economic links, “open regionalism,” and no overt threat
to Japan’s close ties with the United States. Thus, Japan opposed the East
Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) advocated by Malaysia’s prime minister
Mahathir but was a strong proponent of APEC and is a regular partici-
pant in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), for example, while at the
same time using ODA and private sector investment to bolster economic
links between Japan and the region. It unsuccessfully proposed an AMF
to deal with the liquidity problems in the Asian economic crisis and has
supported the ASEAN ⫹ 3 process.
Support for enhanced Asian regionalism was easier for Japan when
its economic prowess afforded it unchallenged leadership ideologically,
technologically, and financially. Things became more problematic with
the bursting of Japan’s asset bubble, a decade of domestic economic
torpor, and the country’s demonstrable inability to head off the sweep-
ing devastation of the Asian economic crisis. The economic achieve-
ments of South Korea, Taiwan, much of Southeast Asia, and eventually
the hyper-growth of China also reduced the relative influence of Japan’s

regional economic muscle.
As Japan’s enthusiasm for the Asian region was overwhelmed by
events in Iraq and North Korea, and as China gained an enhanced appre-
ciation for the benefits of regional leadership, Japanese leadership of the
region has been challenged by China. The latter has increasingly used
regional forums to advance its influence throughout the neighborhood,
in many cases in ways that proposed a challenge to Japan. Perhaps its
most notable came in 2001. At the ASEAN ⫹ 3 meeting in Brunei that
year, China dramatically proposed an ASEAN-China Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) to be come into effect within ten years. Challenged to
do the same, and to demonstrate a continued Japanese capability to “lead”
within East Asia, the best that Japan could muster was the promise to
consider freer trade with its Southeast Asian neighbors. In the years
since, China has become an active player in formal and informal
(e.g., Track II) regional bodies whereas Japan more often remained pas-
sive. In the recent race to create a series of bilateral FTAs, China again
has moved at far greater speed within the region than Japan, as has been
most recently seen by active negotiations between Australia and China
toward an FTA compared to Japanese unresponsiveness to Australian
efforts to initiate similar talks.
China’s position in the Asian region was further enhanced, and com-
plicated Japan’s security position, because of its close cooperation with
the Bush administration’s “war on terror.” Although the Bush adminis-
tration came into office in 2001 with strategic presumptions that China
would be its next major “strategic competitor,” that predisposition was
muted by China’s nominal opposition to Muslim fundamentalism (par-
ticularly as manifested in its Western province of Xinjiang) as well as its
active (if less than fully pro-U.S.) role in the six-party talks aimed at
resolving the issue of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program.
Overall, therefore, Japanese strategic thinking under Koizumi was
compelled to deal with an Asian region that in the early years of
the twenty-first century showed less openness and easy receptivity to
Japanese leadership, as well as a region in which China continued to press
for, and to acquire, greater relative importance. Meanwhile, however,
once somewhat peripheral trouble spots such as the Korean peninsula and
the Taiwan Strait took on greater significance in Japanese policy and
planning.
In summary, during Koizumi’s premiership Japanese domestic politics
was going through a major transformation characterized by enhanced
nationalism and prime ministerial power whereas bureaucratic autonomy,
120 ● T.J. Pempel
the power of the Left, and functional specificity were in decline. The
United States has moved into a position of unchallenged military
supremacy and the Bush administration pursued unilateralism and pre-
ventative wars while also beginning to reconfigure its long-time basing
strategies. Within Asia, intra-regional rivalry between Japan and China
rose as did the significance of once marginal areas of potential dispute,
particularly Taiwan and the DPRK. Japanese strategic thinking and
actions under Koizumi reflected, responded to, and sought to exploit
these deep changes.
Japanese Strategic Thinking and Behavior under Koizumi

The most important aspects of Japanese strategic thinking and behavior
during the Koizumi administration were played out at two different levels.
Certain general trends characterized Japanese strategic activities more or
less across the board. These largely supplemented Japan’s long-standing
focus on economic diplomacy by expanded uses of the Japanese military.
The second shift involved a tilt from Japan’s developing ties to the Asian
region and embracing the United States more closely than at any time in
the recent past.
Embrace of a More Active Military Role

in Support of the United States
The single most striking feature of the Koizumi administration’s
approach to the country’s foreign policies and its national strategic
activities was the rather clear-cut break from Japan’s earlier “passive
pacifism,” “pacifism in one country,” or “culture of antimilitarism.” 19 In
its place has come what, was an expanded geographical scope for Japan’s
security and a stepped-up role for its military. These changes were most
explicit with the Koizumi administration’s active support for U.S.
military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, but they resonated far more
broadly.
The base line from which these changes began was the overt U.S. dis-
dain for what Japan saw as its generous $13 billion contribution in sup-
port of U.S. actions in the 1991 invasion of Iraq. Among Japan’s foreign
policy and strategic elite, the take-away message was that “boots on the
ground” rather than “checkbook diplomacy” were vital to maintaining
close ties with the United States. The redefinition of the U.S.–Japan
Security Treaty in 1996–97, Japan’s willingness to commit to a broader
geographical scope for the treaty that included the Far East generally
(and Taiwan at least implicitly), and Japan’s decision to allow its SDF
troops to participate in UN peacekeeping operations all represented
tangible markers along this shifting strategic path. Overcoming prior
political and popular taboos inhibiting such moves was also congruent
with the rising nationalism among many politicians and their desire for
Japan to strengthen its defense and security posture and to enhance its
global and regional weight.
Japan was also aware of its easy marginalization at the time of the
1994 DPRK nuclear problems. The United States settled the issue with
North Korea on a strategic level, but then passed on the bill for the key
portion of the solution (KEDO) to nonparticipants, South Korea and
Japan.
When the Bush administration came to power it clearly envisioned a
much more active and cooperative role for Japan. This had been
articulated in the election-year report, “US and Japan: Toward a Mature
Partnership,” generated in October 2000 by Richard Armitage (subse-
quently deputy secretary of state) and a half dozen Japan specialists most
of whom joined the administration.20
For many in Japan, especially within the military and within the rul-
ing LDP, American demands for such an enhanced security role were
hardly unwelcome; rather they provided an excuse to bolster ties to the
United States and to pursue more activist military policies long on
the shelf. Particularly under Prime Minister Koizumi’s administration,
Japan embraced the strategy of overt bandwagoning with the super-
power, giving few signs that it ever considered alternatives such as
balancing with other nation-states against the rise in U.S. power or
embracing exclusively Asian regional institutions. The result was the
rapid and wholehearted embrace of closer U.S.–Japan security ties. For
most Japanese prime ministers before Koizumi, Kishi’s political eviscera-
tion over the renegotiation of the security treaty in 1960 had stood as a
warning to any politician becoming too overtly supportive of U.S.
foreign policies.21 Koizumi moved to become in Asia what Tony Blair
was in Europe—an unabashed adherent of U.S. foreign policies.
Unlike Japan’s collective foot dragging in 1991, Koizumi moved
quickly to coordinate Japanese actions with those of the United States
following the attacks of September 11. Just two weeks after the event,
Koizumi visited the United States to express his active support for the
war against terrorism. Following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, on
October 29 of 2001, the Japanese Diet enacted the “Special Anti-
Terrorism Measures Law” and “Amendment to the Self-Defense Forces
Law.” These provided the legal justification that allowed Japan to send
122 ● T.J. Pempel
three convoy vessels to the Indian Ocean on November 26, 2001, in

support of the United States in Afghanistan and represented the first dis-
patch of Japanese military forces out of the “areas surrounding Japan”
since 1945. Japanese tankers serviced not only U.S. and British vessels
but also those of a variety of European navies as well as ships from
Australia and New Zealand, moving Japan closer to “collective security”
than ever before.
Koizumi also proved to be one of the industrial world’s few strong
supporters of U.S. actions in Iraq. Japan went so far as to provide SDF
ground troops in support of the American-organized “coalition of the
willing,” despite vociferous domestic opposition to the war and to
Koizumi’s actions and the absence of any UN legitimization of those
actions, a step long taken as mandatory for Japanese commitment of its
military forces to overseas operations.
Sending troops to Iraq rested on various legal changes. In June 2003,
Japan passed three laws—the Bill Concerning Measures to Ensure
National Independence and Security in a Situation of Armed Attack; the
Bill to Amend the Security Council Establishment Law; and the Bill to
Amend the Self-Defense Forces Law and the Law Concerning
Allowances, and the like of Defense Agency Personnel. Overwhelming
majorities in both houses of parliament supported these bills, in striking
contrast to prior, highly contentious debates over even the minutest SDF
activities. The new laws gave Japan a legal foundation for expanding the
prime minister’s authority and for building a rapid response system in
cases of emergency (in contrast, for example, to the disastrous lack of
such capabilities at the time of the 1994 Kobe earthquake). Japan also
pledged a $1.5 billion grant to Iraq for aid and $3.5 billion in loans at
the Madrid donors’ conference in October 2003.
In July 2003 another law was passed—the Law Concerning Special
Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq. This
law, followed up with a December 19 general order from Minister Ishiba
to the SDF, led to Japan sending troops for reconstruction activities
including medical services to local inhabitants, long-term repair and
construction of infrastructure, school rehabilitation, and the like.
These laws explicitly removed many long-standing constraints on the
SDF thereby authorizing them to take part in a range of new activities. By
mid-2003, Japan had pledged to send some 500 troops in support of the
United States. They arrived in Sarawah Iraq in January of 2004, and even
though they were restricted from combat actions—indeed they required
military protection, first by the Dutch and then by the Australians—their
mission was one that would have been unthinkable a decade or two
earlier. Authorization for these forces to continue was extended in

December 2004 and December 2005, even as many other countries in the
dwindling “coalition of the willing” were pulling troops out. As Robert
Uriu argued, “. . . Koizumi seems intent on using this unique opportu-
nity to fulfill his long-term desire to move Japan toward a more active for-
eign policy role.” That role hewed closely to U.S. preferences.22
Furthermore, in October 2005, Japan agreed that the U.S. Kitty
Hawk aircraft carrier based in Yokosuka would be replaced by the
nuclear-powered USS George H.W. Bush in 2009. This would be Japan’s
first time hosting a nuclear aircraft carrier.23
Koizumi’s support for the United States had economic as well as
strategic rewards. It was not clear whether or not the U.S. decision to cut
out France and Germany from development of oil fields in Iraq would
explicitly benefit Japan; allocations of drilling rights remain quite confi-
dential. But without a doubt Japan’s strategic support for the United
States made it much easier to go forward in developing the Azadegan oil
field in Iran for an estimated $2.8 billion, a deal likely to have been
opposed by the United States had Koizumi not been so close on Iraq.24
Beyond expanding Japan’s support of the United States in the Middle
East, Japan under Koizumi began to devote more explicit attention to the
country’s own strategic situation. Six governments in East Asia have
deployed or possess ballistic missiles—China, ROK, Russia, Taiwan,
Vietnam, and North Korea. Of these China, North Korea, and Russia
have missiles capable of reaching Japan. Most immediately worrisome for
strategic thinkers in Japan, the DPRK’s Nodong has a range of about
1,300 km. enabling it to reach most parts of Japan; its Taepodong travels
even further. Japanese thinkers and policymakers became more overtly
sensitive to this situation and were less quick to assume that the U.S.
nuclear shield would “solve” any consequent security problem for Japan.
As a consequence, Japan began to consider a more active military role
in and around the home islands as well as in the Middle East. This was
clear in Japan’s new NDPO of December 2004.25 That document laid
out the country’s mid-term defense buildup plan for the fiscal 2005–09
period. Among the most important elements, the document broke
precedent by identifying China and North Korea as potential security
concerns. It also explicitly stressed the country’s need to deal with both
ballistic missile and guerrilla attacks as well as traditional invasion
threats involving Japanese airspace and territorial waters. Japan’s security
interests were overtly expanded from defense of the home islands
to include international security, international peacekeeping, and coun-
terterrorism as key targets of Japan’s overall national defense strategy.
124 ● T.J. Pempel
To meet the newly characterized threats, Japan, it was argued, needed a

new “multifunctional military capability with a centralized SDF
command and a rapid reaction force.”
The overall thrust of the new NDPO was to strengthen air and naval
capabilities, including the capability for force projection. It also wove
into Japanese strategic thinking explicit cooperation with the United
States on missile defense, arms exports, export by Japan of technologies
developed in that project, as well as enhanced interoperability of
weapons systems. Japan explicitly considered the purchase and deploy-
ment of a U.S.-made missile system as early as 2006 along with missiles
that would be launched by Aegis-equipped destroyers and a ground-
based Patriot missile system as backup. Japan ordered PAC-2 Patriot
interceptor missiles and announced plans for the subsequent purchase of
PAC-3 Patriots to be delivered in FY 2006. The expanded SDF role was
also reflected in an August 2003 request for a tenfold increase in spend-
ing on missile defense to $1.2 billion and an expected outlay of
$1 billion for missile defense from 2004 through 2007.
Japan was also one of eleven charter members of the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI) in May 2003. The PSI drew Japanese support,
including a September 2003 exercise with the United States in the Coral
Sea designed to practice interception of ships suspected of smuggling.
(Interestingly, however, Japan insisted that the exercise not be built
around a hypothetical DPRK smuggler so as not to antagonize North
Korea.) In October 2004, Japan for the first time hosted a PSI interdic-
tion exercise in Tokyo Bay involving nine naval and coastguard ships
from four countries. Japan also engaged in increased naval exercises
during an August 2003 joint exercise with the Russian and South Korean
navies. In September 2003, Japan and China agreed to accelerate their
own bilateral defense exchanges including reciprocal naval ship visits.
Important as all of these changes have been in Japan’s overall strategic
posturing, the country by no means abandoned other legs of its “compre-
hensive security policy.” Nor did its moves toward closer links with the
United States mean abandoning Japanese efforts to enhance cooperation
across Asia. Most particularly, Japan remained active in a number of new
or recent regional institutions particularly the ASEAN ⫹ 3 process and
the currency swap arrangements set out in the Chiang Mai Initiative of
May 2000. Japan also supported moves toward the development of an
Asian bond initiative. And though it has moved far more slowly than
many other Asian countries, including China and the ROK, Japan has
been active in pursuit of various bilateral FTAs.26 Furthermore, in the
quasi-competitive race to be the nice neighbor to the North, China and
ASEAN countries reached agreement on the “Code of Conduct in the

South China Sea” so as to avoid military conflicts. And in 2003, China
acceded to ASEAN’s 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). But
Japan quickly followed suit acceding to the Treaty on July 2, 2004.27
Japan was a participant in the East Asian Summit of December 2005 that
included the ASEAN ⫹ 3 countries, India, Australia, and New Zealand,
but not the United States. Yet there was no doubt that strengthening ties
with the United States remained a vastly higher priority for Japan than
improving ties to the rest of Northeast Asia.
Overall, Japan’s strategic thinking under Koizumi took on an explicitly
more important role for traditional security concerns, including an
enhanced role for Japan’s military and moved Japan into a much closer
and more explicit overlapping with U.S. strategic planning. Asia and the
tentative embrace of Asian regionalism were by no means abandoned,
but they began to take on a secondary importance behind the heightened
focus on remaining quite close to the United States. Bilateral ties were
revitalized and expanded at the diplomatic level and personally close ties
were fostered between Bush and Koizumi, most overtly manifested in
Koizumi’s visit to Bush’s Crawford “ranch” on May 22–23, 2003. There,
and in subsequent Diet speeches he set out to “globalize” the bilateral
ties, also referring explicitly to them as an “alliance,” a term previously
taboo.28 To critics, once-pacifist and passive Japan suddenly appeared
willing to play an enhanced and active role in support of U.S. military
policies, serving even as America’s “deputy sheriff ” in various parts of
East Asia,29 most notably vis-à-vis North Korea.
East Asian Manifestations of Japan’s New Strategic Thinking

The general features of Japanese strategic thinking and behavior outlined
above were manifested in several important cases involving Japan’s links
in East Asia. Of greatest importance were relations with the PRC and
with the DPRK.
Historical memories continued to cast a long shadow over relations
between Japan and China. These played out on a host of ad hoc issues from
Koizumi’s regular visits to the Yasukuni shrine, the revision of Japanese his-
tory textbooks, anti-Japanese protests at soccer matches in China, ongoing
competitive claims to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, Chinese intrusions into
the Japanese consulate in Shenyang in pursuit of North Korean asylum
seekers, and the like. Just as historical legacies lay beneath the surface of
many problems, so too was the psychological perception that China seemed
to be “rising” whereas Japan was at best “stagnant.”
126 ● T.J. Pempel
Japan’s bilateral ties to China had long been kept close through
economic assistance. Japan has provided about $35 billion in economic
assistance since the normalization of relations between the two coun-
tries. Furthermore, bilateral trade and investment ties between the two
moved forward at a rapid pace, and China now outstrips the United
States as Japan’s major trade partner. At the same time, concerns within
Japan have expanded about the potential strategic and diplomatic
implications of an economically stronger China, particularly as its rapid
economic growth allows it to expand its military budget geometrically.
Thus, Japan announced in October 2001 that it would reduce and redi-
rect its ODA to China in recognition of the country’s rising economic
success and diminished need. The result was an overall reduction com-
bined with a shift from multi-year pledges of ODA to China in favor of
a single-year pledge system and a shift in focus away from infrastructure
and construction to environmental protection, increased living stan-
dards, education, institution building, and technology transfer. This nat-
urally irritated bilateral ties.
As was noted above, China, following the Asian economic crisis and
following its accession to the WTO, began to demonstrate a renewed
interest in Asian regional diplomacy. Mentioned above were China’s
efforts to generate an FTA with ASEAN. Within Northeast Asia, China
also normalized relations with the ROK and expanded trade and
economic relations so that by 2001 China was the ROK’s number one
target of investment. In 2002, China–Hong Kong became South Korea’s
largest export market.30 Seoul also began cooperating with the PRC on
military matters. In some instances, their closer ties tilted them against
Japan. For example, both China and Korea issued declarations indicating
their opposition to Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security
Council (Korea’s President Roh actually came out explicitly in favor of a
seat for Germany, making even more striking his unwillingness support
Japan’s claims). Then in April 2005, President Roh announced that his
country would seek to be a “balancer” in the Asian region, a role that
implied a new proximity to China at the expense of Korea’s prior ties to
the United States and Japan. All of these actions created frustrating
diplomatic problems for Japan, which had traditionally taken for
granted its own leadership role in Asia, but particularly among ASEAN
and with the ROK. And as a demonstration of hostility to Koizumi’s
continued visits to Yasukuni, both President Roh and Chinese prime
minister Wen Jia-bao cancelled a normal three-way meeting with
Koizumi and shunned bilateral meetings with him during the following
East Asia Summit.
China also began exploring the waters near Japan and periodically
broaching areas that Japan claimed were within its national economic
zone. In one such instance, on November 10, 2004, the Japanese Navy
discovered a Chinese nuclear submarine in Japanese Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ) near Okinawa. Although the Chinese apologized and called
the sub’s intrusion a “mistake,” Defense Agency Director Ono gave it
wide publicity, further inflaming Japanese public opinion against China.
From that point on, relations between Beijing and Tokyo went steadily
downhill, culminating in the Japanese–American announcement on
February 19, 2005 that Taiwan was of special military concern to both of
them, which China in turn denounced as an “abomination.”
Tensions soured as a result of China’s expanding its blue water navy
and its increased activities in search of enhanced energy resources both
in the Middle East and in West Africa. These worsened further in the
spring of 2005 when both China and Japan announced plans to explore
for natural gas in waters contested by the two countries.
Bilateral tensions were also exacerbated by the situation in Taiwan.
Japan’s official position on the Taiwan issue has long involved mutedly
ambiguous support of the long-standing “one China” policy, but increas-
ingly Japan has aligned itself with the United States in suggesting that it
would provide overt support to U.S. actions designed to fend off any
enhanced Chinese military pressures against Taiwan. Such overt support
contrasted with the actions of such close U.S. allies as Singapore and
Australia, who indicated they were not willing to help Taiwan in any
cross-Straits conflict with China.
Without a doubt, Taiwan has great strategic importance to Japan. On
average, there is one Japanese vessel passing the Bashi Channel located at
the southern tip of Taiwan heading for Japan every 15 minutes. This
makes the Strait of Taiwan immediately important to Japan’s national
security. But beyond sea lanes, Taiwan is an economically successful
democracy with long historical ties to Japan and increasingly anxious to
demonstrate its autonomy from the PRC. Perhaps even more impor-
tantly, as a potential thorn in the side of an increasingly worrisome
China, Taiwan has appeal to many Japanese policymakers.
Furthermore, Taiwan has been an increasingly important fulcrum in
Japan’s developing stronger ties to the United States. This was made clear
in the 1996 rearticulation of the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty. Coming as
it did on the heels of the Chinese missile tests across the Taiwan Straits
in March 1996, and explicitly stating that Japan’s security was linked to
that of the “Asia-Pacific” (implicitly at least including Taiwan), the
Chinese saw the actions as explicitly aimed at them, rather than at a
128 ● T.J. Pempel
reinforcement of the status quo (as it was interpreted by both the United
States and Japan).31
Soon after Koizumi came into office, former Taiwan president Lee
Teng-hui was granted a visa to visit Japan for medical treatment. A sec-
ond visa for touring was given in 2004. On April 4, 2005, members of
Lee’s Taiwan Solidarity Union made a very public visit to Yasukuni in
memory of Taiwanese who had served in the Japanese military during
WWII. Then on February 19, 2005, Japan and the United States signed
a new military agreement in which, for the first time, Japan joined the
administration in identifying security in the Taiwan Strait as a “common
strategic objective.” As Chalmers Johnson noted, “Nothing could have
been more alarming to China’s leaders than the revelation that Japan had
decisively ended six decades of official pacifism by claiming a right to
intervene in the Taiwan Strait.”32
It was clear by the middle of 2006 that relations between Japan and
China had plummeted to one of their worst levels since relations had
been normalized some 30 years earlier. Competing nationalisms boiled to
the surface and were most manifest in Chinese popular demonstrations
against Japan, first at soccer matches and then on the streets. These
demonstrations came with the clear support of the Chinese government,
but it was also clear that Japan was not particularly anxious to take steps
to reduce tensions, as some 85 legislators made a collective (if long
planned) visit to Yasukuni in April 2004, and Koizumi made a highly
publicized visit on August 15, 2006—a symbolically important date—
further enflaming bilateral and regional relations. As a tangible manifes-
tation of these declining bilateral ties, Chinese vice minister Wu Yi in
May 2005 abruptly cancelled a scheduled visit with Koizumi, presum-
ably because of his continued Yasukuni shrine visits.
Japanese relations with North Korea were perhaps the single most
problematic set of bilateral ties faced by the country. By 2005, North
Korea occupied a position within Japanese strategic thinking as the most
probable and immediate military threat to the country. Relations had
ebbed and flowed over the postwar period, but like relations with China,
those with the DPRK were continually affected by the legacy of Japan’s
colonial history, overlaid with the equally important vestiges of the cold
war and the often problematic actions of pro–North Korean residents
within Japan.
Nevertheless, Japan and the DPRK began normalization talks at the
end of January 1991, and five rounds took place between then and 1992.
A long break of seven years followed, but Japan’s participation in KEDO
and the apparent resolution of the 1994 nuclear threats kept relations on
a generally positive note. Then in August 1998, North Korea fired a long
range Taepodong right over Northern Japan—“a brazen act that shook
the Japanese out of their remaining complacency about North Korea the
way Sputnik shook the United States in 1957.”33
In addition to the threat posed by its missiles, the DPRK remains the
only country in Northeast Asia that has not signed the Chemical Weapons
Convention. And North Korea has been a continuous irritant to Japan
domestically. Pro–North Korean residents in Japan contribute as much as
¥4 billion to the DPRK every year, much of the money moving on ships
between Niigata and Pyongyang. DPRK transfers of illegal drugs, most
especially metaamphetamines, to Japan pose an additional problem within
the country (and unlike the situation with drugs from China, lacking
normal diplomatic relations with the DPRK, Japan has found it impossible
to engage in bilateral efforts to curtail illegal exports).34
Also contributing to poor relations were the Japanese Coast Guard’s
sinking of a North Korean spy ship on December 22–23, 2001; the fail-
ure of five North Koreans to obtain asylum within the Japanese consulate
in Shenyang, China, in May 2002; Japan’s decision to salvage the wreck
of the spy ship from China’s EEZ in June and July of 2002, and eventu-
ally to put it on public display in downtown Tokyo, well-marked as it was
with signs indicating the threats the ship (and the DPRK) posed to Japan.
In the face of such longstanding irritants, Koizumi sought to improve
bilateral relations. A year of quiet negotiations led to an apparent break-
through visit by Koizumi to Pyongyang on September 17, 2002. Though
allegedly briefed by U.S. officials before the visit on what the United
States allegedly claimed was North Korea’s moves toward a nuclear
weapons program, Koizumi attempted to normalize relations between
Japan and the DPRK. Koizumi extracted an explicit confession from
Kim Jong-il that his country had abducted various Japanese citizens over
the preceding decades as had long been claimed by Japanese officials.
While the acknowledgment itself could have served as a positive step
toward improved relations, Kim also announced that a substantial
number of the abductees had died (often under mysterious and hard-to-
believe circumstances). Japan had been putting forward 11 cases involv-
ing 16 Japanese citizens. Only 5 allegedly remained alive; the DPRK
claimed that of the remainder 8 had died and 3 had never entered the
country. The 5 who were alive were permitted to return with Koizumi to
Japan on the promise that they would subsequently return to North
Korea after a short visit to see relatives. The public outcry in Japan
against the North, however, combined with mass media sympathy for
the abductees made their return to the North politically impossible.
130 ● T.J. Pempel
Normalization of bilateral Japan–DPRK relations was even more

implausible.
Then in October 2002 during a visit by assistant secretary of state for
the Far East, James Kelly, the DPRK acknowledged having a highly
enriched uranium program. This declaration and the subsequently tough
policies of the United States toward the DPRK, combined with the
abductees issue and the North’s growing missile arsenal presented Japan
with a dilemma: improved ties with the DPRK or adherence to U.S.
policies?
The question of how to move toward denuclearization of the Korean
peninsula has been the overarching issue for the countries of Northeast
Asia since the Kelly visit. Following unsuccessful demands by North
Korea for bilateral talks with the United States, the six-party talks were
begun in Beijing in August 2003, but they met little success. A second
round in February 2004 led to agreement by all parties on several princi-
ples, most notably the desire to denuclearize the Korean peninsula issue
through peaceful dialogue. Koizumi made a second visit to Pyongyang in
May 2004 in an attempt to advance the talks, but the third session of the
six-party talks in June was a stalemate. But Koizumi, in part because of
his close ties to the Bush administration, was able, during his second visit,
to stress the need for a U.S. initiative. This apparently convinced the
United States to table a concrete proposal at the next meeting of the six-
party talks. Still, U.S. negotiators (hemmed in by a deep internal division
between neoconservatives and pragmatists in the Bush administration)
were restricted to simply reading the official position paper, refusing to
elaborate or negotiate. Not surprisingly, the DPRK refused to agree to
future talks. Throughout the process, Japan, with U.S. support, contin-
ued not only to press for denuclearization but also for a resolution of the
kidnapping issue. The United States, alone among the remaining five par-
ties, supported Japan in pressing the abductees issue.
On February 10, 2005, the DPRK issued a statement saying that it
already owns nuclear weapons and that the six-party talks would be post-
poned indefinitely. On March 31, the DPRK Foreign Ministry proposed
that the six-party talks be switched to a disarmament conference, in light
of its claim that the country is itself a nuclear power.
Only after the Bush administration began to soften its hostile tone
about the DPRK being an “outpost of tyranny,” about the need for
“regime change,” and to hint at a willingness to put some serious pro-
posals on the table did the talks resume. And it was not until September
2005 that they finally reached some measure of agreement. This was
essentially on a statement of principles with few tangible timetables
concerning concrete steps to be taken by the DPRK and other parties.

But following a U.S. decision to freeze North Korean assets in a Macao
bank, the DPRK broke off talks completely. Meanwhile, the DPRK
moved to a much more potentially ominous posture with missile tests in
July 2006 and a nuclear test in October. Throughout the process, Japan
largely supported the U.S. while also seeking to advance its own security
against potential DPRK conventional or nuclear threats. Among these
have been measures to restrict North Korean shipping from entering
Japan and talks of an economic blockade by Japan of the DPRK.
Certainly, public opinion in Japan remains skeptical of immediate
normalization while the issue of nuclear and missile development makes
it highly unlikely that the Japanese parliament would approve any eco-
nomic assistance to the DPRK, an obvious requirement of any normal-
ization agreement.
In summary therefore, as Japan moved to strengthen its bilateral ties
to the United States and to increase its own military posture, relations
between Japan and the Asian region though close economically became
progressively more tense in the military and diplomatic arenas between
Japan and China, the ROK, and the DPRK.
Conclusion
Japan under Koizumi substantially challenged past guideposts of the
country’s security thinking and began to advance new policies. Most
importantly, Koizumi responded to changes in domestic, regional, and
global conditions by advancing Japan’s close ties to the United States,
creating an enhanced military role for the SDF and the Coast Guard,
and expanding the country’s efforts to take on a vague but increasingly
tolerated role as a “normal” country. As Japan moved more closely into
security collaboration with the United States it expanded its own defin-
ition of “security” in ways that strengthened its bilateral ties across the
Pacific while at the same time creating conditions that as at least a resid-
ual factor have worsened Japan’s ties with other counties in Asia, most
notably China and the DPRK.
Notes
1. T.J. Pempel, Regime Shift: Comparative Dynamics of the Japanese Political
Economy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).
2. Steven Vogel, Japan Remodeled: How Government and Industry Are Reforming
Japanese Capitalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006).
132 ● T.J. Pempel
3. Meredith Woo-Cumings, The Developmental State (Ithaca, NY: Cornell

University Press, 1999).
4. Andrew MacIntyre and Barry Naughton, “The Decline of a Japan-Led
Model of the East Asian Economy,” in T.J. Pempel, ed., Remapping East
Asia: The Construction of a Region (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
2005), pp. 77–100.
5. Karel van Wolferen, The Enigma of Japanese Power (New York: KNOPF, 1989).
6. ⬍http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/tokino-ugoki/9909/pdf9_18.pdf⬎.
7. Chien-min Chao and Szu-shen Ho, “Hegemonic Stability or China Threats?
A Debate over Japan’s Foreign Policy in the Post–Cold War Era,” (Taipei:
unpublished paper, 2004), p. 8.
8. Hiroshi Nakanishi, “East Asian Security Conditions and Japanese Policy
Responses” (Kyoto: Unpublished paper, 2005).
9. Richard J. Samuels, “Constitutional Revision in Japan: The Future of Article 9”
(Washington, DC: Talk given at the Brookings Institution, December 15,
2004) ⬍http://www.brookings.edu/fp/cnaps/events/20041215.htm⬎.
10. Yoshihide Soeya, “Japanese Security Policy in Transition: The Rise of
International and Human Security,” Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 12, No. 1
(2005), p. 103.
11. Nikkei Weekly, November 28, 2005 at ⬍http://www.nni.nikkei.co.jp/
AC/TNW/Search/Nni20051128EE1LDP01.htm⬎.
12. Samuels, “Constitutional Revision in Japan.”
13. Changsu Kim, “Security Relations among Major Powers in Northeast Asia:
Views from Seoul,” in Security Cooperation in East Asia (Beijing: Peking
University Press, 2004), pp. 170–71.
14. Michael O’Hanlon, “The ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ and Security in
Asia,” in G. John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi, eds., Reinventing the
Alliance: US–Japan Security Partnership in an Era of Change (New York:
Palgrave, 2003), p. 172.
15. Ivo Daadler and James M. Lindsey, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution
in Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2003),
p. 13; G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and
the Rebuilding of Order after Major War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2001).
16. John Lewis Gaddes, Surprise, Security, and the American Experience
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), p.83.
17. Peter J. Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American
Imperium (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), p. 213.
18. T.J. Pempel, Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2005).
19. Thomas Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany
and Japan (Washington, DC: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1998).
20. Institute for National Strategic Studies, The United States and Japan:
Advancing toward a Mature Partnership, Special Report (Washington DC:
INSS, 2000).
21. Robyn Lim, The Geopolitics of East Asia: The Search for Equilibrium
(London: Routledge, 2005), p. 138.
22. Robert Uriu, “Japan in 2003,” Asian Survey, Vol. 44, No. 1 (January/
February 2004), p. 178.
23. Nikkei Weekly, October 31, 2005, p. 4.
24. Mike Mochizuki, “Japan: Between Alliance and Autonomy,” in Ashley J.
Tellis and Michael Wills, eds., Strategic Asia 2004–2005: Confronting
Terrorism in the Pursuit of Power (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian
Research, 2004), p. 116.
25. This full report can be found at ⬍http://www.jda.go.jp/e/index.html⬎. For
analysis, see David Fouse, “Japan’s FY 2005 National Defense Program
Outline,” Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3 (March
2005); “Highlights of New Midterm Defense Buildup Plan,” December 10,
2005, and “Editorial: Defense Plan Marks 1st Step toward Structural
Reform” both at ⬍www.nni.nikkei.co.jp⬎.
26. Urata Shujiro and Japan Center for Economic Research, eds., Nihon no FTA
senryaku (Tokyo: Nihon keizai shimbunsha, 2002); T.J. Pempel and Shujiro
Urata, “Japan: A New Move toward Bilateral Free Trade Agreements,” in Vinod
Aggarwal, ed., Bilateral Trade Arrangements in the Asia-Pacific: Origins,
Evolution, and Implications (London: Routledge, 2005).
27. ⬍http://www.aseansec.org/16234.htm⬎.
28. Recent discussion of Japan’s approach to Asia can be found in Yoichiro Sato
and Satu Limaye, eds., Japan in a Dynamic Asia: Coping with the New
Security Challenges (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006). On globalzing
the alliance, see Richards J. Samuels, Securing Japan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, forthcoming), ch.8.
29. Simon Tisdall, “Japan Emerges as America’s Deputy Sheriff in the Pacific,”
The Guardian, April 19, 2005. Accessed at Japan Focus, April 21, 2005
⬍http://japanfocus.org/260.html⬎.
30. “China becomes South Korea’s Number One Investment Target,” China
Daily, February 2, 2002.
Era of Uncertain Power (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 90–91.
32. Chalmers Johnson, NAPSNET, March 23, 2005. This paper was also pub-
lished by the Japan Policy Research Institute. A version with citations and
references included can be found at ⬍http://www.jpri.org/publications/
workingpapers/wp105.html⬎.
33. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism, p. 22.
34. Keiichi Tsunekawa, “Why So Many Maps There? Japan and Regional
Cooperation,” in Pempel, ed., Remapping East Asia, pp. 115–24.
PART 2
Geography
CHAPTER 6
Changing Japanese Strategic

Thinking toward China
Ryosei Kokubun
O
n October 17, 2005, Japanese prime minister Koizumi Junichiro
embarked on his fifth visit to the Yasukuni shrine. However, it
was one made in a style somewhat different from before. The
prime minister turned up outside the shrine in his official car, wearing a
casual suit not a traditional Japanese garment nor a mourning dress,
walked up to the shrine, picked some money out of his pocket that he put
in the offertory box, and without even entering the shrine walked back to
his car and was on his way again. The prime minister no doubt did this
with the intention of showing himself visiting the shrine just like any
ordinary citizen. It was presumably the ultimate display of his concern
over the response from China, South Korea, and other Asian countries,
yet it bore no fruit whatsoever. On the contrary, China only voiced even
stronger criticism. To be precise, the Chinese government’s reaction was
relatively subdued at first, but turned sterner along with the relentless
attacks that abounded in tabloid papers and on the Internet. Since then,
China has maintained that abandonment of the Yasukuni visit is a condi-
tion for resuming summit meetings between Japan and China. Looking
back, however, China still showed a rather open attitude toward Japan
until the anti-Japanese demonstrations in April 2005.
On the last day of the National People’s Congress (NPC) held in March
2005, Chinese prime minister Wen Jiabao stated that Sino-Japanese rela-
tions are the nation’s most important bilateral relations and pointed out
prerequisites for improving them: (1) top-level talks; (2) strategic study
138 ● Ryosei Kokubun
on China–Japan friendly relations; and (3) proper handling of historical

issues.1 In his speech, he referred to the historical issues last, not specifying
any concrete solution for the Yasukuni problem, a critical issue between the
two countries, and suggested possible “strategic relations” for the first time in
the history of China–Japan relations. It is assumed that China’s policy toward
Japan was discussed during the NPC with President Hu Jintao and that some
conclusions were drawn. Clearly, China had the intention to improve its
relationship with Japan; however, contrary to the government’s intentions,
the Chinese people developed their own view, taking steps opposite to the
direction set by the government. What does this tell us about Chinese
strategic thinking and the inputs that shape it? More important for this
volume, what do the responses in Japan tell us about the strategic thinking
inside the Japanese government and the inputs that are shaping it?
Sixty years have passed since the end of World War II (WWII) and the
Japan–China relationship is faced with unprecedented difficulties following
anti-Japan demonstrations throughout China in April 2005. Historical
processes have accumulated to reach this point; however, the direct causes
that triggered the anti-Japan demonstrations are Japan’s bid to become a
permanent United Nations (UN) Security Council member and new his-
tory textbook issues. In March 2005 when Security Council reform
became an international issue, Secretary General Kofi Annan’s comment
that Japan should be a permanent UN Security Council member seemed
to have offended many Chinese, and a massive signature-collecting cam-
paign against this proposal started, spreading through websites such as
SINA.com, SOHU.com, and WNGYI ⫽ 163.com. More than ten mil-
lion signatures were said to have been collected.2 In addition, news about
the possibility of approval for a history textbook for middle schools, devel-
oped by the same group that caused controversy in 2001, gave rise to a call
on the Internet for boycotting Japanese products.3
During the weekend of April 2, 2005, the first anti-Japan demonstra-
tions broke out in Chengdu, Zhongqing and Shenzhen. Several thou-
sand protesters participated, according to reports. Some called for a
boycott of Japanese products and some angry protesters attacked a
Japanese department store. Just about the same time, an anti-Japan
mood was mounting in South Korea due to the dispute over
Takeshima/Dokdo and the Japanese textbook. South Korea objected to
Annan’s proposal that the UN Security Council reform be completed by
September 2005. As if he were keeping step, Wang Guangya, China’s
ambassador to the UN, expressed opposition to Annan’s proposal on
April 6 to contain the influence of states favoring the reform such as
Japan.4 Later, even the United States objected to the proposal.
China ● 139
On April 9, larger-scale anti-Japan demonstrations were held in

Beijing and other cities in China. “Boycott Japanese products,” “Oppose
Japan becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council,” and
“Object to Japanese history textbooks” were the main slogans. Some
10,000 people took to the streets just in Beijing, and it is believed that a
substantial number of people demonstrated throughout China. The final
destination of protesters in Beijing was the Japanese Embassy. Although
Chinese law enforcement officers were guarding the embassy, protesters
turned into a mob, threw stones, destroyed official vehicles, and tore
down signs and billboards of Japanese corporations. Japan strongly
protested and asked for an official apology by China and compensation
for damages. However, the Chinese government maintained its position
that Japan should be blamed in the first place. On April 16, even more
massive demonstrations with approximately 20,000 participants took
place in Shanghai as well as smaller-scale demonstrations in Tianjin and
other cities. Preceding these demonstrations, Chinese authorities tight-
ened their control in Beijing by reminding the public that unauthorized
demonstrations were against the law and nothing happened there.
Although the government is said to have tightened its control in
Shanghai, large-scale demonstrations broke out.
The Japanese government sent Foreign Minister Machimura to
China, officially protested, and asked for an apology and compensation.
The only agreement reached was to review the bilateral relationship and
to hold a meeting between Koizumi and Hu Jintao during the fiftieth
anniversary of the Asia-Africa Summit in Jakarta, Indonesia, that started
on April 22. The Chinese government initially refused to apologize;
however, as it may have sensed that the international spotlight had
shifted from the Japanese history textbooks to China’s unruly demon-
strations, it quickly tried to reverse the situation. On April 20 a special
meeting was held to explain China’s policy toward Japan, summoning
3,500 leading members of the Propaganda Department, the Ministry of
Education, and the General Political Department of the People’s
Liberation Army as well as related governmental agencies. Li Zhaoxing,
minister of foreign affairs, reaffirmed the importance of China–Japan
relations and appealed for calm and sensible measures,5 a sign that the
authorities had started to recognize the seriousness of the disturbances.
In Bandung, Koizumi began his speech by stating, “In the past, Japan,
through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and
suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian
nations. Japan squarely faces these facts of history in a spirit of humility.
And with feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt apology always engraved
in its mind, Japan has resolutely maintained—consistently since the end

of World War II—of never turning into a military power but into an
economic power, as well as the principle of resolving all matters by
peaceful means, without recourse to the use of force.”6 This part basi-
cally repeats the content of the speech Prime Minister Murayama made
in 1995 on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the war.
Koizumi’s speech was made in consideration of anti-Japan demonstra-
tions that had continued for three consecutive weeks in China,
territorial issues, and history textbook issues.
Koizumi and Hu met in Bandung to discuss ways to mend relations.
Until then, Japan was asking for apologies and compensation for damages
caused to its embassy and consulates as well as to Japanese corporations
and restaurants, and China was insisting that Japan was at fault in the first
place for the demonstrations. At the meeting, both avoided disputes and
agreed on further communication and promoting exchanges. Koizumi
asked for proper handling of anti-Japan demonstrations, emphasizing
positive future Japan–China relations, and Hu expressed five points to
be observed in future relations between the two nations: (1) to observe the
three basic documents including the China–Japan Joint Communiqué;
(2) not to hurt the feelings of the Chinese people in Japanese handling of
history; (3) to keep the “One China” principle on the Taiwan issue and not
to support Taiwan’s independence; (4) to solve problems through dialogue;
and (5) to expand exchanges and cooperation.7
April 23 was the third week after the first anti-Japan demonstrations.
China mobilized law enforcement personnel throughout the country to
suppress demonstrations completely. The authorities enforced their con-
trol of the Internet. Ironically, such steps proved that China could
suppress any demonstration in advance. At the Asian Soccer Cup held in
the summer of 2004, similar anti-Japan behavior was observed; however,
the incidents unfolded differently in April. They were definitely orga-
nized systematically under a clear anti-Japan banner. The main slogans
were opposing Japan’s bid to become a permanent member of the UN
Security Council, objecting to Japanese history textbooks, and, eventually,
calling for a boycott of Japanese products. The atmosphere deteriorated
so far that Japanese exchange students and businessmen in China were
hiding their identities and taking care to be aware of their surroundings.
In 1999, similar demonstrations took place and some demonstrators
threw stones at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing after NATO forces had
bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, causing a loss of several lives.
Chinese refused to believe that it occurred by mistake during the Kosovo
dispute. This happened just before the tenth anniversary of the
China ● 141
Tiananmen crackdown and Beijing was tense. It seems that the

authorities made use of the incident to relieve the tension, mobilizing
the demonstrators. Students were transported back to campus by char-
tered buses after the demonstrations and several weeks later they gave up
and resumed their study of English.8 Although the United States and
China disagreed over compensation, the matter was settled by the former
compensating the victims first, followed by China compensating for
damages at the U.S. Embassy. Despite continuous problems that the
United States and China have in their relationship, their ties are based
on a general strategic perspective and not on emotions. In contrast, no
hotline exists between the top leaders in Japan and China.
In April 2005, it is assumed, specific anti-Japan groups called on stu-
dents, notified the authorities in advance, and gained authorization for
the demonstration with certain restrictions. The government may not
have been behind the demonstration; however, the fact remains that it did
not aggressively restrain violent acts. It has been said that protesters were
loaded on buses arranged by the authorities after the demonstrations,9
apparently to avoid being criticized for being faint-hearted toward
Japan. Concerned about protesters turning into a mob if they were left
alone, the authorities took an evasive attitude. Many in Japan describe
the context as one of fear inside China that a spillover into anti-regime
activities would follow. China’s growth seems brilliant; however, protest
actions are breaking out all over the country and the situation is gloomy
to the extent that half of all new college graduates are unemployed. The
government controlled Japan-related news in the official media to
restrain a chain reaction.
The demonstration that took place in Shanghai has many incompre-
hensible aspects. The activist groups were supposed to be under tight
control due to the incidents that had occurred in Beijing during the pre-
vious week. Websites were supposed to be frozen. Although the munici-
pal authority said that there would be no demonstrations, large-scale
demonstrations took place. The demonstrators actually tried to restrain
protesters from turning into a mob by sending detailed cautions on the
Internet ahead of time. “Do not carry Japanese products. No stones or
metal items to be taken. Take tomatoes and eggs. Take photos of Prime
Minister Koizumi, Japanese flags and lighters. Wear sneakers.”10 However,
the protesters turned into a mob after all, throwing stones and other
objects at the Japanese Consulate General building. Based on these fac-
tors, there has been speculation in Japan of a power struggle within the
party. Shanghai is known to be the political base for the Jiang Zemin
faction, which may have used different organizations to mobilize
demonstrators to shake up the Hu Jintao administration. Although Jiang

is officially retired, many close associates are at the center of power in the
party and are seen as resisting consolidation of Hu Jintao’s power. Jiang’s
group escalated the demonstrations. Afterward, Hu Jintao appeared rel-
atively quiet in dealing with China’s policy toward Japan. Instead, Zeng
Qinghong, Huang Ju, and others seem to be mentioned more often in
this context. Although many things remain unclear about the demon-
strations, they revealed the complexity of Japan–China relations.
The image with respect to each other has worsened. The incidents
gave the Japanese an image of “Violent China,” and the Chinese grew
even more convinced of the image of Japan of “not reflecting on its past
conduct.” At a given point in time, various persons who served as
liaisons existed in both countries, who could act quickly to calm frictions
and solve problems. Now such people have disappeared. Although most
Japanese recognize the urgency of improving relations with China, the
country’s biggest trade partner, it has become more difficult to step for-
ward as the image toward China has worsened. That leaves no other
channel but the official diplomatic route.
Since the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and
China in 1972, relations had developed under the slogan “Friendship,”
which now appears empty. China seems to be alarmed by Japan’s diplo-
matic relations toward China shifting from “friendship” to “hard line.”
Setting aside whether it should be called “hard-line” or not, there is no
doubt that Japan has been acting more on its own initiative toward
China. Does this phenomenon mean that Japan’s strategy toward China
has changed? If so, what is behind it? Below I analyze how Japanese
strategic understanding of relations has been transformed.
Japan that Can Say “NO” to China

It is not that Japan has never said “no” to China. At such times as the
normalization of diplomatic relations, the negotiations over the
Japan–China Aviation Agreement and the Japan–China Peace and
Friendship Treaty, and the flare-ups over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands,
Japan essentially kept to its determined position. However, when it
comes to history issues, Japan has often compromised, for instance over
the 1982 history textbook problem when it promised to be sensitive to
the reactions of neighboring countries, and in 1985 when Prime
Minister Nakasone stopped visiting the Yasukuni shrine to avoid stirring
up controversy in neighboring countries. In other cases, whenever cabi-
net members made comments justifying Japan’s invasion of China and
China ● 143
Chinese leaders responded with irritation, they were forced to resign or

be replaced.
Sankei shimbun, Bungei shunju, and other conservative media repeat-
edly criticized this as Japan’s “kowtow diplomacy”; however, it was not
the mainstream opinion of Japanese media. What changed things was an
overall transformation in attitudes toward China, influenced by such
developments as: the outcry over China’s conduct at Tiananmen on
June 4, 1989; a different strategic outlook after the end of the cold war,
the new way of thinking about China after its remarkable economic growth
from the 1990s; and the shock over Jiang Zemin’s repeated comments on
Japan’s war responsibility during his visit to Japan in 1998 in the midst
of China’s rapid emergence as a rival power. In place of a presumption of
“friendship” to at least gloss over differences, the general attitude of
Japanese shifted to resistance against the habit of compromise with
China in favor of taking a firm stand not only toward historical
problems, but also to various matters such as national security and Taiwan.
This becomes clearer when we examine the situation over the past
several years. The most controversial issue has been Koizumi’s visits to
the Yasukuni shrine. Nakasone stopped official visits to the shrine after
1985, Miyazawa Kiichi is said to have visited the shrine secretly once
while prime minister, and Hashimoto Ryutaro visited the shrine while in
office in 1996 without making any announcement; however, when it
became public knowledge, he stopped. One of Koizumi’s campaign
pledges was to visit the Yasukuni shrine on August 15. Although he did
not visit it on the day he promised until 2006, he went every year. An
advisory panel of well-informed independent personages was established
in 2002 to study the possibility of building a national memorial; how-
ever, its opinions have not been made public. Furthermore, there has
been talk of removing the 14 Class A war criminals entombed at the
shrine who were held responsible for the war by the Tokyo War Crimes
Tribunal. Objections persist, and the shrine itself considers it impossible.
Whenever China or South Korea objected to his visits, Koizumi repeated
his refutation that “I visit there so that we do not start a war again,” or
“Other countries should not interfere with my own beliefs.”11
A similar tendency can be seen concerning the textbook issue. When
it first arose in 1982, the Japanese government resolved the difficult
situation by issuing a statement that it would take the concerns of neigh-
boring countries into consideration in the future. Textbooks used
in middle schools and high schools in Japan must be authorized by the
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (here-
after the Ministry of Education). There are no government-designated
textbooks in Japan. Private publishers ask experts to write the textbooks,

which are then submitted for the Ministry to review, then recommend
revisions and, after several rounds of these, to give its authorization. The
problem occurred in 2001 and 2005. In the 2001 incident, China firmly
protested that a history textbook for middle schools edited by the
“Group to Create New History Textbooks” was approved even though
137 items should have been corrected. In the 2005 incident, the text-
book written by the same authors and published by the Fusosha
Publishing Company, a company under Sankei shimbun, had many cor-
rections to make and it was eventually authorized despite containing
many more assertions disturbing to China. China compared these books
to others previously published, stressing the subjectivity on topics such
as Japan’s invasion of China in the modern era. The Japanese government
refuted China’s criticism by stating both that corrections had been made
and that the textbooks do not necessarily represent the government’s
position.12
The Japanese people cannot forget the incident at the Consulate
General of Japan in Shenyang in 2002. On May 8, China’s armed secu-
rity police entered the compound and detained five North Korean asy-
lum seekers. Since the entire incident was videotaped by the media and
became public, Japan’s public sentiment toward China became leery.
Even though the Japanese government insisted on an apology, China did
not respond although the five were allowed to go to South Korea via the
Phillipines.13 The incident greatly damaged the Japanese people’s image
of China.
Regarding the oceanographic surveys in the East China Sea, there
have been constant disputes. Japan’s attitude toward China is becoming
increasingly firm. Until 2000, China’s oceanographic research vessels
conducted surveys off Japan, to which Japan protested. In order to
improve the situation, it was agreed that they would notify each other
prior to surveys. Two months prior notice is now required.
Oceanographic surveys without notice have decreased; however, in the
undetermined territorial waters in the East China Sea, China hired a
company to start building a mining facility of natural gas on the Chinese
side of the middle line between Japan and China in international waters.
In June 2004, Nakagawa Shoichi, minister of economy, trade and indus-
try at an ASEAN ⫹ 3 meeting of energy ministers, emphasized the dan-
ger that resources on the Japanese side could be drained by the
Chinese.14 The issue is under discussion through diplomatic channels,
where Japan has repeatedly asked for all related data to no avail. As a
result, Japan carried out its own survey on its side of the demarcation
China ● 145
line, and in 2005 it granted partial mining rights to development

companies to allow them to conduct test drilling in the region. This
issue has a direct impact on national interests in both countries. China’s
energy sector is closely related to its military, and Japanese are concerned
that accidental conflicts may occur. Both countries realize that joint
development is the only solution; however, they have not agreed on a
way to proceed.
As security incidents become more frequent, Japan is showing new
firmness. In November 2004, a Chinese nuclear-powered submarine
entered Japanese territorial waters, to which Japan protested strongly.
The maneuver seemed to be part of a drill in preparation for possible war
with Taiwan and China explained that the trespassing “was due to tech-
nical reasons.” To clear the air in advance of a meeting between Koizumi
and Hu Jintao at the APEC Summit in Santiago, Chile, Foreign Minister
Li Zhaoxing expressed “regret.”15
It is the Taiwan issue that concerns China most. Former Taiwanese
president Lee Teng-hui visited Japan twice on a tourist visa, once in
April 2001 and again from late December 2004 to early January 2005,
first for a cardiology examination and second for sightseeing. His
speeches and behavior were restrained; however, China was offended by
the fact that Japan approved his entry. Japanese public opinion and
media supported each visit, and the Japanese government ignored
China’s accusations, saying that Lee visited Japan as a private person.
The Japan/U.S. diplomatic and defense agencies, the so-called two
plus two (2⫹2), in February 2005 reached agreement on common
strategic objectives in the region to encourage “the peaceful resolution of
issues concerning the Taiwan Straits through dialogue” and China
to improve transparency in its military affairs. The two sides sought to
“develop a cooperative relationship with China, urging the country
to play a responsible and constructive role regionally as well as globally.”16
When Beijing took offense that Tokyo and Washington referred to Taiwan
for the first time at this security meeting. Tokyo ignored its objection by
insisting that the reference was nothing new. One month later, China
adopted the “Anti-Secession Law” at the NPC, which suggested that
China would use “non-peaceful means” if Taiwan took obvious actions
for its independence. The so-called 2 ⫹ 2 meeting might have influenced
China’s actions.
When the EU tried to lift the ban on arms exports to China that had
been imposed in 1989, Japan and the United States protested. Shortly
afterward in April 2005 when anti-Japan demonstrations raged across
China, the EU countries had little choice but to postpone lifting the
ban. China depends heavily on Russia for the supply of arms. In August
2005, the two conducted joint military drills. Observing such develop-
ments, Japanese have hardened their attitude toward China. The 2005
National Defense Program Guidelines adopted by the Japanese Cabinet
in December 2004, stated, “China, which has a major impact on
regional security, continues to modernize its nuclear forces and sea-
borne missiles. We will have to remain attentive to its future actions.”17
The White Paper on Defense published in August 2005 stated that the
Taiwan issue could be the “security issue that may threaten the peace and
safety of the region” and “China with great political and economic influ-
ence as a major nation is the country that should be watched for its mil-
itaristic moves.”18
Japan’s growing assertiveness led Chinese to argue that “As Japan’s
economy is on the decline and China is gaining power, Japanese society is
becoming increasingly conservative in its mental state and is trying to be
politically influential by borrowing U.S. power. Although Japan is taking
a firm stand toward China regarding visits to the Yasukuni shrine and the
textbook issues, the essence of the issue is political and Japan is trying to
become directly involved in the Taiwan issue by containing China mili-
tarily. The final objective of Japan is to be internationally prominent with
U.S. help and eventually to sail out to the ‘independent sea.’ ”19
It is not clear whether Japan’s firm stance toward China is a strategic
policy of Japan based on the consensus of the Koizumi government. At
least, the government has never stated it clearly or even hinted at it. It is
more realistic to consider that this policy is not based on strategic con-
sensus, but rather reflects public opinion and politics in dealing with
each situation after years of smoldering over Japan’s “passive” policy
toward China. However, based on general political thinking in China, it
is only natural that the Chinese view the series of movements as part of
a “conspiracy theory” that the Japanese government is proceeding with
consolidated intent. A different conclusion might be reached by concen-
trating first on changes in the popular image of China inside Japan as
one cause of the shifting Japanese government stance.
The Beginning of a Psychological Cold

War with China?
Public opinion surveys have been carried out by the Secretariat of the
Japanese Cabinet since 1978.20 According to a survey carried out in
October 2004 (covering 3,000 people randomly selected), 37.6 percent
China ● 147
of Japanese felt “friendly” toward China and 58.2 percent did not. Those
who thought that the Japan/China relationship was going well were
28.1 percent, and over 61 percent did not agree. The survey was taken
soon after the Asian Soccer Cup was marred by anti-Japan behavior of
Chinese spectators. The mood never improved as news followed of the
alleged gas siphoning in the East China Sea, the incursion of a Chinese
nuclear-powered submarine into Japan’s territorial waters, and finally the
anti-Japan demonstrations in 2005. The same survey showed 56.7 per-
cent of Japanese felt “friendly” toward South Korea and 39.2 percent did
not; and 55.5 percent described the relationship with South Korea as
“good” versus 34.9 percent as “not good.” Despite the disputes in 2005
over territory and a textbook and growing distrust of the South Korean
government under Roh Mov-hyun, the South Korean boom in Japan
continued.
A worsening image of China is also apparent in polls. According to
the December 2004 results of the poll conducted by Yomiuri shimbun
and the Gallop Company, only 16 percent of Japanese felt the
relationship with China was “good” and 59 percent felt it was “not
good,” whereas in the United States 31.9 percent felt the relationship
was “good” and 16 percent not good.21 Similarly, only 16.5 percent of
Japanese indicated that they can trust China, in contrast to 40.7 percent
in the United States. Those who do not trust China number 71.2 percent
in Japan and 56.9 percent in the United States.22 The center of the
dispute has been the annual visit by Koizumi to the Yasukuni shrine.
Even among readers of Asahi shimbun, which maintains its position of
opposing the visit, a survey in November 2004 found that 38 percent
supported it and 39 percent opposed it; and when it came to the demand
of China to stop the visits, 30 percent thought it reasonable, whereas
57 percent did not agree.23 Perceptions of China are changing, as can be
seen in the annual surveys conducted since 1978 by the Secretariat of the
Japanese Cabinet.
In 1981 the image of China among the Japanese reached its peak:
78.6 percent felt “friendly” and only 14.7 percent did not. The results
were slightly higher than the 77.2 percent of Japanese who felt “friendly”
toward the United States and 14.7 percent who did not.24 By 1978
China’s modernization policy had taken a firm hold and the
Japan–China Peace and Friendship Treaty and the Japan–China Long
Term Trade Agreement were signed. Ahead of the normalization of
diplomatic relations between the United States and China on January 1,
1979, the Japan–China relationship had been expanding. At the end of
1978, many contracts in the steel and chemical industries were signed
and there was a kind of “China Fever” with the prospect of market
development. In addition, an extremely popular NHK TV documentary
program called “Silk Road” gave a considerable boost to the romantic
feelings of Japanese toward the continent.
The image toward China did not change very much until June 1989,
when “friendly feelings” declined to 51.6 percent and “not friendly” ones
increased to 43.1 percent as nostalgia started to be crushed by images of
the reality of China. To shake China free from isolation from the world
and to avoid becoming another Soviet Union after its break-up, Deng
Xiaoping set a goal of establishing a market economy, and foreign invest-
ment rushed into the Chinese market lifting the growth rate beyond
10 percent a year. Yet, the image of China among the Japanese people
did not improve. In 1995, “feeling friendly” and “not feeling friendly”
toward China were both 48.4 percent and in 1996, the rates of “feeling
friendly” dropped to 45 percent and “not feeling friendly” 51.3 percent,
reversed for the first time. One reason behind this negative image may
have been the perception of China continuing to gain power and inter-
national status from rapid economic growth. Another is that Japan was
suffering from psychological damage after the collapse of the bubble
economy. Also, we cannot forget that the “China Menace Theory” was
spreading due to China’s military exercises and the Taiwan Strait Missile
Crisis in 1996. At any rate, the nostalgic feelings toward China among
the Japanese faded before the reality of the present-day situation.
As interdependence between Japan and China deepened, images
toward each other worsened. In the 1980s, the total trade volume was
less than $10 billion; however, in 2004, including Hong Kong, it
exceeded $200 billion, which is more than the total trade volume with
the United States. Direct investments reached $8 billion worth of con-
tracts in 2003, as the actual figure approximated $5 billion. Why was
deepened interdependence accompanied by expanded friction and a
kind of psychological cold war? One explanation is a “power shift theory.”
Japan enjoyed economic prosperity in the 1980s; however, it became
psychologically weak and introverted after the collapse of the bubble
economy in the 1990s. In contrast, China’s rapid rise led to mixed feel-
ings, warning that China does not know proper manners and how to
behave as a great nation in the world community, which gives Japanese
the impression of China being overbearing. In a long-term version of the
power shift theory, we see a picture of Chinese having a sense of superi-
ority for their great civilization until the nineteenth century followed by
an inferiority complex from their failure in modernization, and Japan
having a cultural inferiority complex until the nineteenth century and
China ● 149
then a sense of superiority by succeeding in modernization. At the start

of the twenty-first century, Japan and China are on equal terms for the
first time in history and are struggling with a complex sense of rivalry.25
Increased interdependence has a high possibility of creating frictions,
as noted in many textbooks on international relations. The more inter-
dependence deepens, the more conflicts of interest occur; however, these
frictions cannot easily destroy fundamental relationships, according to
the textbooks. The worsening image of Japanese people toward China
was due at various times to: China’s military maneuvers, as during the
Taiwan Strait crisis; economic strains from wrongdoings; nondemocratic
images; and violent crimes committed by Chinese in Japan (in 2003, there
were 16,708 cases committed by 8,996 criminals, of which 41 percent of
the cases and 45 percent of the criminals were foreigners, mostly Chinese).
The above factors cumulatively gave rise to a negative image of China;
however, the current situation of mutually deteriorating images can also
be traced to a structural element.
The End of the 1972 System—the

International Context
Normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China was
based on three major elements known as the “1972 System” for the year
when their impact was registered.26 These were the cold war, a common
awareness of China, and the Taiwan issue. After signing the San
Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan faced two Chinas, the PRC and the
Republic of China (ROC) and was forced to select one. Although
Yoshida Shigeru sought relations with the PRC, under U.S. pressure and
the reality of the cold war, Japan acknowledged Taiwan’s ROC in 1952.
Having forged a U.S. alliance marked by the US–Japan Security Treaty,
Japan had no other choice. As the Soviet Union and China were allies,
the PRC considered the United States an “imperialist power” and Japan
its “follower.” In order to improve relations with the PRC, U.S. approval
and recognition of the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty by the PRC were the
indispensable conditions. What made it possible was the U.S.–China
détente after 1971, a process to counterbalance the Soviet Union.
Although Japan was shocked at the sudden change, the rapprochement
between the United States and China made it possible for Japan to seek
an autonomous foreign policy.
Freed from the restrictions, Japan under Tanaka Kakuei normalized
diplomatic relations with China without delay, and it concluded various
agreements concerning trade, aviation, fishery, shipping, and so on.
Where to position the Soviet Union was complicated; however, Japan

and China managed to agree on the Japan–China Peace and Friendship
Treaty by 1978 as it pursued China aggressively. When Deng Xiaoping
visited Japan to exchange ratification documents for the Peace and
Friendship Treaty, he was surprised at the high level of modernization
and upon his return to China, he set the growth of Japan as the model
for modernization and was positive toward receiving funds from Japan.27
Immediately after his visit, Japan decided to provide loans in yen and
grants ODA, a sign of its acknowledgment of that country. In studies on
the decision to provide ODA to China by the Ohira administration,
three views can be found: (1) postwar consideration of China relin-
quishing its demand for war reparations from Japan; (2) potential
economic benefits from the promising Chinese market; and (3) expres-
sion of autonomous diplomatic relations toward the United States or,
conversely, keeping step with the U.S. strategy toward Asia, both related
to U.S. policies. Recently Suh Seungwon, on the contrary, has pointed
out that the decision was due mainly to strong concern for preventing
China’s retrogression after it had just emerged from the Cultural
Revolution and had launched its modernization policy. In other words,
Japan’s biggest concern was how to pull China back into the interna-
tional community. Suh calls it Japan’s “Economic Diplomacy,” a sign of
seeking power in international politics.28
Under the 1972 System, there was agreement on two aspects of the
Taiwan issue. One was that official diplomatic relations should not be
established with both the PRC and the ROC simultaneously, and Japan
should choose one, that is, the “One China” principle. The other was
that Japan should “fully understand and respect” Beijing’s position that
“Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People’s Republic of
China.” As Japan had diversified interests in Taiwan that had developed
since 1952, especially economic ties, it was able to get China’s tacit con-
sent for maintaining the relationship through the private sector even
after breaking off diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Not many Japanese
demanded maintenance of diplomatic relations with Taiwan or were
even sympathetic toward Taiwan, except a pro-Taiwan group and some
staunch anti-communists. After all, Taiwan was under the dictatorial
control of the Kuomintang.
The international context that supported the 1972 System has
changed drastically. The cold war ended in 1989, the Soviet Union
ceased to exist in 1991, and the mutual hypothetical enemy that sup-
ported the virtual alliance of Japan, the United States, and China
disappeared. When both Japan and the United States were concerned
China ● 151
about the direction China would take after June 1989, Japan took the
lead in appealing not to isolate China and resuming ODA assistance. At
this point, Japan may have been still exercising its economic diplomacy
under the 1972 System.29 Only after 1992 when China reached a
remarkable annual growth rate while Japan was engulfed in the Heisei
Great Recession after the collapse of the “bubble economy” did the eco-
nomic logic change. As for security, only from 1995–96 with the Taiwan
Straits missile tests and the “China Menace Theory” as well as agreement
on “redefining the US–Japan Security Treaty” was another element of the
1972 System seriously reconsidered. Meanwhile, Japan began to question
whether China should be considered as a “developing country” under
the framework of the 1972 System since it had achieved remarkable
economic growth.
The stance toward ODA for China—once considered the symbol of
Japan/China friendship—had changed. Whereas Japan’s economic situa-
tion had worsened, China’s economy had grown rapidly. When China
increased military spending and space development expenditures and
offered more financial assistance to developing countries, Japan started
to question why it should continue providing ODA to China. Moreover,
one of the criticisms was that ODA was not acknowledged by the
Chinese people. Reflecting public sentiment, the Koizumi administra-
tion started to decrease ODA for China each year. On November 28,
2004, Koizumi hinted at China’s “graduation” from ODA, which
became official in 2005 with the announcement that ODA for China
would end as of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games.30 How to perceive a
more powerful China and to position China in Japan’s diplomacy are
points of discussion that have just started, but providing ODA and
retaining the 1972 System is no longer considered strategic for Japan.
The “One China” principle in dealing with the Taiwan issue has not
formally changed, but perceptions inside Japan of how to deal with
Taiwan have. Since 1986 democratic measures have transformed Taiwan
into a multiparty political system. Under Lee Teng-hui mainlander
control broke down, democratization accelerated, and transformation of
the ROC into Taiwan advanced abruptly. Chen Shui-bian of the
Democratic Progressive Party won the presidential election in 2000,
ending the control of the Kuomintang. Reelected in 2004, Chen toler-
ated economic unification with China; however, politically he took steps
toward independence and made severe confrontation with the PRC
inevitable. Although both Japan and the United States made it clear that
they would not support Taiwan’s independence that could lead to war,
they also took great interest in the future of Taiwan. Thus, the 1972
System concerning Taiwan was not fundamentally changed; however,

due to enormous internal changes in Taiwan, any solution without the
consent of its residents had become more difficult.
The End of the 1972 System—the

Domestic Context
Examining the domestic context of the 1972 System provides back-
ground for grasping changes in Japanese strategic thinking. First, the
1972 System was backed by a specific generation with its own world-
view, that is, the sentiments of the war generation not to repeat the
miserable history of war. For them, “Japan–China Friendship” had
significant meaning; no matter what problems existed, they sought to go
back to the original stand of “Japan–China Friendship.” Dealing with
Chinese leaders such as Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Liao Zhengzhi,
who were responsible for diplomatic relations with Japan, Tanaka Kakuei
and Ohira Masayoshi, who played the major role in the normalization of
diplomatic relations, as well as business leaders, such as Inayama
Yoshihiro and Okazaki Kaheita, all had a certain sense of atonement
toward the war particular to their generation. They seemed to have had
a mission to pursue friendship with China. Regarding historical views of
war and aggression, some still try to justify Japan’s actions to this day;
however, under the 1972 System, their opinions could not be heard
much because of the war generation and its strong influence. The Joint
Communiqué issued at the time of normalization of diplomatic relations
stated, “The Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for
the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people
through war, and deeply reproaches itself.”31
Chinese materials concerning Japan–China relations do not refer in
detail to historical issues. They seem to indicate that China had in mind
strategic thoughts in the context of its international relations with the
Soviet Union and the United States. On the other hand, even though his-
torical issues are not expressed directly, it is rather evident that Japan always
had war and aggression in mind. Simply put, China viewed Japan-related
policies in the context of its international strategy, whereas Japan had a ten-
dency to view the relationship with China as one between two nations.32
The 1972 System was backed by the political structure of Japan led by
the LDP. At the time of diplomatic normalization, Tanaka, who headed
the largest faction of the LDP, had great influence over Japanese politics.
Tanaka regarded the relationship with China as highly important and
used it to the maximum. After Tanaka’s downfall because of the Lockheed
China ● 153
scandal, his faction was eventually taken over by that of Takeshita

Noboru. Yet, before Takeshita became prime minister in 1987, Prime
Minister Nakasone developed personal ties of mutual trust with Hu
Yaobang. Hu’s fall damaged this connection. Nakasone explained in his
memoirs that Hu was forced into a tight corner due to Nakasone’s visit to
the Yasukuni shrine in 1985, and Nakasone agreed to stop such visits,
responding to a personal request by Hu.33 Relations seemed to remain
stagnant, despite Japan’s continued adherence to the System. Around this
time, more troublesome issues arose, including a lawsuit over property
rights regarding a dormitory in Kyoto for Chinese exchange students,
Japan’s defense spending exceeding one percent of its GDP, and a trade
imbalance favoring Japan. Yet, after succeeding Nakasone, Takeshita vis-
ited China in August 1988 in commemoration of the tenth anniversary of
the Peace and Friendship Treaty and agreed on a huge loan of 810 billion
yen to China, reaffirming the status quo in relations.
The elements that supported the 1972 System changed greatly. New
generations, changed historical awareness, and domestic politics altered
Japanese thinking. Sixty years have passed since the end of the war, and
the only generation that recalls the war is the elderly. No longer does this
generation have social influence. In politics, Nakasone is still somewhat
active; however, he has, for the most part, retired. Sentiments of
“Japan–China Friendship” have faded along with both atonement and
romanticism, replaced by unsentimental criticism of the “real” China
after the turning point in 1989 and then the emperor’s visit to China in
1992 that ended any complex toward historical issues. Anticipation of
the emperor’s trip caused a great deal of controversy over whether he
should visit China or not; however, his successful visit gave many a feel-
ing of relief that Japan could finally put to rest the wartime animosity.
The emperor who is not allowed to make any political remarks expressed
his own thoughts delicately at the welcome reception banquet. His
remark was, “In the long history and relations of two nations, there was
a time when my country caused a great deal of suffering to the people of
China. It is my grave sorrow.”34 With this remark Emperor Akihito
brought to an end an entire epoch.
In China, on the other hand, history issues linked to Japan surfaced
around the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the war in 1995. Chinese
authorities claimed that it was just a patriotic movement, not an anti-
Japan campaign; however, as long as winning the war against Japan is the
basis for the legitimacy of the ruling party’s control, patriotism and anti-
Japan sentiments are naturally inseparable. As China’s growth has
accelerated since 1992 under a market economy and people have been
increasingly weaned away from the Communist Party and from the
socialist ideology, leaders have seen a need to put a brake on the situa-
tion. Around the same time, the Taiwan issue, the other element that
backs the legitimacy of the Chinese Community Party’s rule, became
prominent and China was worried that Japan might get involved as new
guidelines for the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty were established.
A gap in understanding between Japan and China became obvious dur-
ing Jiang Zemin’s visit to Japan in 1998, with friction over history issues.
On the surface, his visit seemed to be successful when a joint communiqué
was issued under the new slogan of “Friendly Cooperative Partnership.”
Yet, for the Japanese, Jiang’s visit failed due to his incessant criticisms,
including remarks about Japan’s militarism during the imperial banquet.35
He tried to have Japan include an apology for what it did in the past in the
joint communiqué; however, Japan explained that historical problems
were mentioned clearly in the 1972 Joint Communiqué and refused.
We can see the end of the 1972 System even in Japan’s domestic polit-
ical context. Traditionally, the LDP was the political pipeline with
China; however, the Miyazawa administration resigned in August 1993
and the Hosokawa coalition government was born, ending what was
labeled Japan’s 1955 Political System. Since 1994, the LDP has not been
able to sustain single-party control. Currently it maintains political
power by forming an alliance with the Komei Party. Prime Ministers
Hashimoto and Obuchi used to be part of the Tanaka faction; however,
there were some signs of Japan’s relationship with China declining even
when they were in power, especially due to Jiang Zemin’s visit to Japan.
When Koizumi became prime minister, the LDP’s factionalism, due par-
tially to strict regulations on political ethics, lost some of its force. After
the birth of the Koizumi government in 2001, the prime minister con-
tinued his visits to the Yasukuni shrine, and frictions with China
increased. The Hashimoto group insisted on improving relations with
China; however, Hashimoto was no longer influential, especially after a
political contribution scandal that came to light and the resignation of
Nonaka Hiromu, a central figure in the faction. Weakening of human
networks in Japanese politics has reverberated in Japan–China relations.
Conclusion
Japan–China relations are growing more complicated as seen in the anti-
Japan demonstrations that occurred across China in the spring of 2005.
This is the consequence of accumulated gaps in communication between
the two nations and expanded friction since the 1990s. The slogan
China ● 155
“Japan–China Friendship” has lost its effect. Japan’s attitude toward

Japan–China relations changed from keeping a low profile to being
assertive and autonomous.
Matters worsened after June 1989 despite closer and deeper interde-
pendence between Japan and China. A psychological factor arose from
the contrast between China’s economic growth and growing power on
the international scene and Japan’s economic recession after the collapse
of the bubble economy. At any rate, those Japanese who used to have
nostalgic and romantic feelings as well as admiration toward China were
brought back to the reality of China gaining power with uncertain goals
in the future. The end of the 1972 System in both its international and
domestic contexts has left Japan pondering how to approach China
anew. The end of the cold war, the rise of China’s power, and the
democratization of Taiwan all undermined the existing system after
1972. The “One China” principle has not changed to date, even if the
nature of the Taiwan issue and the international environment surround-
ing it have changed a great deal and the way Japanese see Taiwan has also
changed drastically. Members of the war generation that supported
Japan–China relations, backed by feelings of atonement and a sense of
mission, have retired. The postwar generation focuses on the reality in
China and is tired of the history issue and China’s endless criticism. The
Japanese thought the history problem ended with the visit of the
emperor in 1992 and were irritated when China kept raising it, as in
Jiang’s visit of 1998. Dominance by the LDP and the Tanaka faction
ended with LDP single-party control in 1993. The Hashimoto faction,
heir to Tanaka’s normalization strategy, weakened, especially after
Koizumi took office in 2001, causing a breakdown in the network of
people who worked on Japan–China relations.
It took much time and effort to build up Japan/China relations. After
normalization in 1972, the Peace and Friendship Treaty in 1978, and the
emperor’s visit to China in 1992, the momentum has turned from build-
ing stronger relations to trying to keep relations from deteriorating. For
many years when problems arose, important people in different fields
worked to settle disputes. Japan dealt with history problems relatively
promptly, and China acted maturely in order to contain them. In other
words, both Japan and China tried to keep them under wraps and made
efforts to maintain friendly relations by respecting each other. It may have
been the Asian-style of operating through a tacit understanding. Now,
such wisdom is not always available. In Japan, there are many who call the
Japanese diplomacy of recent years the “kowtow diplomacy” giving in to
“Chinese Thought.” In reference to the Chinese policy toward Japan,
people have a tendency to consider that China has constantly used the
“history card” to promote “anti-Japan education” at the grassroots level.
In China, on the other hand, people consider that Japan is neglecting his-
tory education and is assuming an “Anti-China” policy intentionally,
calling it the “leaning right” tendency or “containing China” jointly with
the United States. China is quite alarmed. Thus, the history problem
became a political issue and, as a result, Japan/China mutual mistrust has
been growing. There may be random prescriptions or specific remedies
such as top-level exchanges; however, considering historical circum-
stances, the problem lies in more essential and structural factors and
treatment with long-term awareness and attitude is needed.
After the turbulent anti-Japan demonstrations of 2005, scholars and
the press discussed the matter very actively, aware that the main theme in
Japan–China relations become the issue of Koizumi’s visits to the
Yasukuni shrine. Unprecedented, heated debates are taking place among
political circles, journalists, and the academic world in Japan concerning
the Yasukuni shrine itself and many public opinion surveys have been
taken. All show arguments both for and against the visit to the shrine;
however, as to the question whether the visits should be stopped thus
meeting the demands of China and Korea, the answer was predominantly
negative reflecting a poverty of thinking in political circles, journalists,
and the academic world on the subject, as a worsening Japan/China rela-
tionship has been evident for some time. In any case, we should consider
it positive that Japanese society is actually discussing the issue. Such
debates should be carried out thoroughly and focus on finding a balanced
approach, keeping strategic objectives clearly in mind.
Considering the mutually dependent and even unavoidably close rela-
tionship, it is inconceivable to have a decisive, prolonged confrontation
between Japan and China. However, we humans do not always act logically.
At times, one accidental incident touches off nationalistic attitudes in
both countries, and critical situations may occur especially if there is a lack
of communication between the two governments or other unfortunate
circumstances develop. It is dangerous to subconsciously think optimisti-
cally that such a confrontation could never occur or to act out of force of
habit. Efforts must be made to establish mutual exchanges of different
expertise and networks in order to develop a system for firmer interdepen-
dence and to raise levels of trust that would put a floor on any downward
spiral. That requires strategic thinking. On the Japanese side, this means
paying renewed attention to reciprocal ways to improve the atmosphere in
bilateral relations and to why they would serve the national interest.
China ● 157
Notes
1. Renmin ribao, March 15, 2005.
2. Sankei shimbun, March 30, 2005.
3. Asahi shimbun, April 1, 2005.
4. Asahi shimbun, April 7, evening edition, 2005.
5. Li Zhaoxing’s report, Renmin ribao, April 20, 2005.
6. ⬍http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/meet0504/speech.html⬎.
7. See major newspapers on April 24, 2005.
8. Interviewed students who participated in a demonstration.
9. Photo of a bus waiting for demonstrators was taken by a Japanese residing in
Beijing and was put on the Internet.
10. Obtained some internal Internet texts distributed before demonstrations.
11. Special issue on the Yasukuni problem, Yomiuri shimbun, June 9, 2005. Also
see, ⬍http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/pm/koizumi/observe0204.html⬎
(Koizumi’s statement).
12. Asahi shimbun, April 4, 2001 and April 6 and 7, 2005.
13. Asahi shimbun, May 23 (evening edition) and 24, 2002.
14. Asahi shimbun and Nihon keizai shimbun, June 10, 2004.
15. ⬍http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/g_machimura/apec_g8_04/
j_ china_gh.html⬎ (Foreign Ministers meeting summary).
16. ⬍http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0502.
html⬎ (Joint Statement document).
17. ⬍http://www.jda.go.jp/e/policy/f_work/taikou05/e01_02.htm⬎.
18. ⬍http://jda-clearing.jda.go.jp/hakusho_data/2005/w2005_00.html⬎.
19. Liaowang, August 19, 2005.
20. Naikakufu daijinkanbo seifu kohoshitsu, Gaiko ni kansuru seron chosa,
2004: ⬍http://ww8.cao.go.jp/survey/index-gai.html⬎.
21. Yomiuri shimbun, December 16, 2004.
22. Yomiuri shimbun, December 16, 2004.
24. Gaiko ni kansuru seron chosa.
25. See Keio University’s symposium records on Japan–China relations in
Ronza, May 2005, pp.172–81, for related discussions.
26. Kokubun Ryosei, “Reisengo no Nitchu kankei: ‘Nanajuninen taisei’ no
tenkan,” Kokusai mondai, January 2001, pp. 42–56; and Kokubun Ryosei,
“Beyond Normalization: Thirty Years of Sino-Japanese Diplomacy,” Gaiko
Forum English Edition, winter 2003.
27. Asahi shimbun, October 26, 1978.
28. Suh Seungwon, Nihon no keizai gaiko to Chugoku (Tokyo: Keio University
Press, 2004), chapters 1 and 2.
29. Suh, Nihon no keizai gaiko to Chugoku, chapter 4.
30. ⬍http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/pmv0411/press.html⬎
(Koizumi’s press conference speech). Also see Yomiuri shimbun, March 3 and
18, 2005.
31. ⬍http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/joint72.html⬎.
32. Ishii Akira, Zhu Jianrong, Soeya Yoshihide, and Lin Xiaoguang, eds., Kiroku
to kosho: Nitchu kokko seijoka to Nitchu heiwa yuko joyaku teiketsu kosho
(Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2003).
33. Nakasone Yasuhiro, Jiseiroku (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 2004), pp. 135–39.
34. ⬍http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/⬎.
35. Kokubun Ryosei, “Shiren no jidai no Nitchu kankei: Kotakumin honichi
kijitsu,” Hogaku kenkyu, January 2000.
CHAPTER 7
Japanese Strategic Thinking

toward Taiwan
Ming Wan
J apan’s strategic thinking toward Taiwan should tell us much about

Tokyo’s overall strategic thinking. Strategic thinking is often
narrowly defined as thinking about a country’s national security.
More broadly, it may be seen as a calculated approach to advance a coun-
try’s core national objectives. Security thinking toward Taiwan has
become important to Japan since the mid-1990s. It is viewed in the con-
text of relations with the PRC and the world. The United States, Japan’s
security ally, has taken on the responsibility of defending Taiwan against
unprovoked attacks from the PRC. Taiwan is strategically located on
Japan’s shipping lanes to Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Taiwan has
become a high-stakes issue. To know a country’s strategic thinking, it is
crucial to see how it views high-stakes issues.
The chapter also examines Japan’s general attitude toward Taiwan as well
as the PRC. On the one hand, public sentiment in Japan often exerts a
major impact on policy. Thus, anyone who studies Japanese foreign policy
has to pay close attention to Japanese public opinion. On the other hand,
one should not confuse sentiment with strategic calculations. Similar to
other countries, much of Japanese writing about the Taiwan issue is a reflec-
tion of public sentiment rather than strategic thinking, as the term strategy
normally means. Thus, to identify what is public sentiment is to sharpen
our understanding of what is strategic in Japanese thinking.
Japanese views on Taiwan have been diverse and evolving. Broadly
speaking, the Japanese have become more sympathetic to Taiwan since
160 ● Ming Wan
the outcry over the PRC’s handling of the 1989 Tiananmen

demonstrators, and they have become worried about the security impli-
cations of the Taiwan issue since the Chinese military exercises in the
Taiwan Strait in the mid-1990s. Some Japanese have become verbally
supportive of Taiwan’s separation from China in the past few years, view-
ing Taiwan as more strategically important for Japan than for the United
States.
Japanese sympathy for Taiwan and concern over the PRC’s rise have
translated into upgraded official exchange with the government in Taiwan
and stronger public support for Taiwan’s security. In a highly publicized
joint statement issued on February 19, 2005, the Japanese foreign minis-
ter and defense agency director general along with the U.S. secretaries of
state and defense minister declared that Japan and the United States have
a common security objective to “encourage the peaceful resolution of
issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue.” At the same time,
the Japanese government remains committed rhetorically to the One
China Principle in the 1972 Joint Statement.1 Japan remains convinced
that U.S.–China relations rather than Japan–China relations are central
to the Taiwan question. Japanese know that Japan will side with the
United States if conflict occurs in the Taiwan Strait but would rather not
face that stark scenario and that Japan is in no position to fight for
Taiwan at this point without the United States taking the lead.
Japan is being defensive rather than offensive at this point, but the
possibility exists of Japan taking a stronger stance depending on what
China does and how international politics evolve. Taiwan is not the only
worst-case scenario for a possible Japan–China conflict: territorial dis-
putes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu and the East China Sea and competition
over energy, being other scenarios. The Taiwan issue complicates Japan’s
relations with China. Conversely, the state of the relationship with
Beijing affects Tokyo’s strategic thinking toward Taiwan; a bad relation-
ship with China would make the “loss of Taiwan” a far more significant
security concern for Japan than would be the case if relations were
friendly.
The chapter includes six sections. The first section provides a brief
historical overview of Japan’s relations with Taiwan through the 1980s.
History provides a reference point to determine where current Japanese
thinking toward Taiwan comes from and it is also a present issue in
Japan’s relations with China. The next three sections examine Japan’s
public sentiment and strategic thinking toward Taiwan in three periods:
from 1989 to the mid-1990s, from the mid-1990s to 2001, and from
2001 to the present. The fifth section offers a focused discussion of the
Taiwan ● 161
current triangular dynamic among Japan, Taiwan, and the PRC. The last
section concludes the chapter.
Historical Overview
Meiji Japan launched its first overseas military expedition to Taiwan in
1874. Annexation of Taiwan from China in 1895 was the beginning of a
Japanese colonial empire. In the early days after Meiji, Korea was viewed
as Japan’s lifeline, a dagger pointed at its heart, and was thus far more
important strategically than Taiwan. Japan fought a war with China in
1894–95 over Korea, not Taiwan. Nevertheless, once Taiwan became
Japan’s colony, it acquired strategic importance as a Japanese territory
and as a support base for Japan’s rivalry with the West. Also,
Taiwan would later become an important strategic launching platform
for Japan’s invasion of southern China and Southeast Asia in the
1930s–40s.
Today many Taiwanese endorse the view that Japan’s colonial rule in
Taiwan improved human and institutional resources and facilitated
economic progress, self-serving though it might have been. They see
China unfavorably by contrast.2 Japanese opinion of China has wors-
ened continuously since 1989. Thus, we see a triangular dynamic in
terms of public sentiment among Japan, Taiwan, and the PRC. A favor-
able view of Japan among Taiwanese and an unfavorable view of Japan
among Chinese contribute to reciprocal positive sentiment toward
Taiwan among the Japanese, which only serves to increase China’s
suspicion of Japanese intention toward Taiwan and Chinese distrust of
Taiwanese “traitors” to the motherland.
Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru was initially interested in making
diplomatic gestures to the PRC. The ideal situation for Japan would
have been to have official relations with both China and Taiwan to
secure resources, markets, and diplomatic status wherever available.
However, under U.S. pressure Japan established a diplomatic relation-
ship with the Nationalist government in Taiwan in April 1952.
Throughout the 1960s, Japanese public sentiment toward the PRC was
generally favorable, but that alone was not enough to overcome Japan’s
paramount strategic interest in maintaining a security alliance with the
United States.
Taiwan was not central to Japan’s strategic thinking during the cold
war. Taiwan should have been important for Japan’s security. Americans
certainly saw a clear connection between defense of Japan and defense of
its other allies in Asia including Taiwan. But like other security issues,
162 ● Ming Wan
Japan could avoid acknowledging Taiwan’s strategic importance because

it was shielded by the Japan–U.S. security alliance. Through the 1960s,
Japan made accommodating gestures to the United States over the
Taiwan issue, but it had no strategic planning for Taiwan per se.
Taiwan was important in Japanese domestic politics. In 1965, 160
LDP Diet members formed the “Asian Problems Study Group,” which
supported relations with Taiwan and opposed China’s membership in the
United Nations (UN). Some of the anticommunist Japanese politicians
such as Kishi Nobukuke and Sato Eisaku wanted to maintain a good
relationship with Taiwan. There was also a smaller, 100-member group
“Asian-African Problems Study Group” within the LDP that supported
expanding ties with China. Furthermore, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP)
and other progressive groups and parties supported better relations with
China. The Japanese business community was interested in the China
market, but they also had significant economic ties with Taiwan. That
division in Japanese domestic politics explains why Japan sought to
establish diplomatic ties with Beijing while maintaining a substantive
relationship with Taiwan in its negotiations with China in 1972.
In September 1972, Japan and China established diplomatic relations
and issued a joint communiqué. Article Two of the Communiqué states
that Japan “recognizes the Government of the People’s Republic of
China as the sole legal Government of China.” Article Three says: “The
Government of the People’s Republic of China reiterates that Taiwan is
an inalienable part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China.
The Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand of
the Government of the People’s Republic of China, and it firmly main-
tains its stand under Article 8 of the Postsdam Proclamation.” Taiwan
was a main negotiation issue during Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei’s visit
to Beijing, which centered on Premier Zhou Enlai’s “Three Principles”
for diplomatic normalization, namely that the PRC is the sole legitimate
Chinese government, that Taiwan is a province of China, and that Japan
must abrogate its illegal peace treaty with Taiwan.
Japan made a cleaner break with Taiwan than the United States. It
took six more years for the United States to establish diplomatic
relations with Beijing, and even then the Congress enacted the Taiwan
Relations Act to authorize arms sales to Taiwan. At the same time, Japan
succeeded in maintaining unofficial ties with Taiwan and ensuring its
economic interests in Taiwan, and the Japanese model would later be
adopted by the United States to handle the Taiwan issue.
Negotiations for the Sino-Japanese Civil Aviation Agreement, signed
April 1974, were complicated by the Taiwan issue. China wanted Japan
Taiwan ● 163
to sever its state-to-state arrangement with the Nationalist government

in Taiwan. Japan met Beijing’s demand by creating a “separate airline”
for Taiwan flights and letting the Taiwan airline land in a different
airport (Haneda) from the PRC airline (Narita). In essence, Japan
maintained substantive relations with Taiwan while allowing Beijing to
save face.
For the rest of the 1970s, China was content with Japan’s position on
Taiwan, which explains why Taiwan was a nonissue in the difficult
negotiations for the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, signed in 1978. In
fact, as Chinese understood it, the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty now no
longer covered Taiwan, given the changing nature of Sino-Japanese
relations and the common security interest namely the Soviet Union.3
In the 1980s, Beijing voiced concerns over Japan’s policy toward
Taiwan. In particular, the Chinese government turned a lawsuit on a
student dorm in Kyoto into a major diplomatic dispute. The Kyoto
district court ruled in February 1986 that it belonged to the Taiwan
government. The Chinese government protested that the property
should be transferred from the Nationalist government to the PRC
government and characterized the civil suit as a political issue involving
the legal rights of the PRC and the nature of Sino-Japanese relations. So
the real issue was Beijing’s concern that the Japanese government was
offering the Nationalist government de facto recognition in the court
decision. In the scheme of things however, Taiwan was largely a nonissue
between Beijing and Tokyo, sharply different from Sino-U.S. relations.
Chinese analysts admit now that Japan was largely faithful to the terms
of the 1972 Joint Communiqué through the early 1990s. In a way,
Beijing did not appreciate how good it had it before the end of the cold
war. The fact that China belatedly appreciates Japan’s past efforts in this
regard reflects concern that Japan may adjust its strategic thinking
toward Taiwan, which is indeed the case now.
Japanese Strategic Thinking toward Taiwan

in the Early 1990s
Japan had limited strategic space in policymaking toward Taiwan after
World War II. First, Japan’s imperialist strategic thinking was discredited
by its total defeat. Second, the Japan–U.S. security alliance since 1952
provided a strong constraint on Japan’s ability to maneuver on the
Taiwan issue independently, which suited Japan just fine. Third, the
1972 Sino-Japanese Joint Statement added yet another constraint on
164 ● Ming Wan
Japan. Logically, limitations on strategic action should limit strategic

thinking in the core of a country’s policy community. It would be a waste
of time to think about issues beyond one’s control. Factually, there was
not much strategic discussion about Taiwan in Japan through the 1980s.
The world changed after 1989. The removal of the Soviet threat as a
common strategic interest, combined with the 1989 Tiananmen crack-
down, led to heightened tensions in U.S.–China relations in the early
1990s. At the same time, the democratization and Taiwanization process
in Taiwan that had begun before the end of the cold war accelerated.
Japan was in an improved strategic position in the early 1990s. It was
a rising economic superpower vis-à-vis both the United States, perceived
to be in decline, and China, isolated due to Tiananmen. The mounting
U.S. pressure on Japan in trade negotiations eroded the Japan–U.S.
security arrangement, leading to greater Japanese interest in the UN and
in East Asia. China’s isolation from industrial countries potentially also
allowed Japan to play a brokerage role, which would enhance Tokyo’s
diplomatic prestige. Thus, there was much discussion about Japan’s role
in the world. One school of thought urged Japan to “reenter” Asia. Some
wanted Japanese foreign policy to be centered on the UN. A few com-
mentators wanted to say “no” to the United States. Yet another view-
point emphasized the importance of maintaining a strong U.S. alliance.
But a common denominator in the debate was a strong yearning for
greater Japanese influence in Asia and in the world, which would have
significant implications for Japan’s view of China and Taiwan.
In the context of becoming a great power again, Japan reached out
to China out of self-interest.4 The Japanese government now sought to
situate the Japan–China relationship in the global context, which essen-
tially meant the end of a special relationship perceived by many Japanese
to be disadvantageous to Japan; further, some Japanese wanted to utilize
its closer relations with China to advance Japan’s influence in the world.5
Moreover, since Japan was helping China after Tiananmen, its bargain-
ing position vis-à-vis China improved. Both developments meant that
Japan had the desire and confidence to end the special relationship with
China. It follows then that taboo issues such as history and Taiwan
became less salient for Japanese.
There was always a reservoir of goodwill for Taiwan in Japan, but
Japanese public affinity for Taiwan has grown across the political spectrum
since 1989. There are no tracking surveys on Japanese public opinion
toward Taiwan; as a result, we do not have a precise picture of trends in
public opinion. But a broad consensus among Taiwan and China watchers
in Japan and Japan watchers in China exists regarding such a trend.
Taiwan ● 165
There are different explanations for this. First, Taiwan’s democratization

that had begun in the late 1980s accelerated in the early 1990s and
inevitably led to Taiwanization of the ruling elite given the fact that
Taiwanese are the absolute majority in the island.6 Critics of China often
start by contrasting the repressive communist regime in China and the
vibrant democracy in Taiwan. Many Japanese hold it as an article of faith
that the difference in political regimes explains why the view of Japan is
worsening in China whereas the Taiwanese are friendly toward Japanese;
the anti-Japanese propaganda by a communist government in order to
divert public attention from domestic problems is the root cause of
recent Japan–China tensions. In fact, Taiwan’s democracy explains why
the Japanese appeared calm in a dispute with Taiwan over fishing rights
near Senkaku/Diaoyu in June 2005, unlike their more emotional
reaction to Chinese demonstrations a few weeks earlier.7
Second, an improved image of Taiwan virtually mirrors the worsening
image of China in Japan. The events of June1989 on Tiananmen Square
changed the public perception of the PRC and Taiwan. Observing
Chinese government repression of dissent with regular army units in the
nation’s capital, Japan’s public sentiment toward China began a steady
decline while becoming more accepting of some Taiwanese’s desire for
independence. There is a triangular dynamic among Japanese, Taiwanese,
and Chinese public opinion; worsening Chinese perception of Japan and
warming Taiwanese views of Japan help to improve Japan’s opinion of
Taiwan and worsen its view of China.
Third, the favorable view of Taiwan held by the Japanese stems in a
major way from the warm reception given to Japanese officials, scholars,
and opinion leaders by the Taiwanese government.8 President Lee Teng-
hui, in particular, was willing to talk to Japanese visitors on all levels and
was sensitive to Japanese concerns. Japanese visitors would leave meet-
ings content and appreciative of Taiwanese concerns. Lee continues to
engage Japanese visitors. He is often compared to Zhou Enlai in his ability
to relate to the Japanese. Like Zhou, Lee spends much time cultivating
relations with the Japanese and knows what buttons to push. This reversal
of roles partly reflects the fact that China was isolated diplomatically
before and Taiwan is now. Chinese officials now simply have more foreign
visitors to meet. Nonetheless, it is no secret that Taiwanese politicians
tend to have a favorable view of Japan whereas Chinese leaders generally
distrust Japan.
Fourth, Japan’s colonial rule in Taiwan serves as a basis for sympathy.
This is not a case in which the Japanese are interested in reclaiming the
island; rather, it is part of general Japanese nostalgia about their past
166 ● Ming Wan
experience.9 More significant, Japan’s 50-year colonial rule in Taiwan

contributes to a general sense that Taiwan is different from China, thus
making a good case that it should shape its own destiny. According to
Japanese perceptions, prior to Japan’s colonization Taiwan was an un-
civilized place the Dutch helped to cultivate, frequented by Chinese and
non-Chinese pirates, connected in an East Asian regional trade network,
ruled passively and briefly by Qing emperors all of which makes Beijing’s
claim over Taiwan problematic.10 This Japanese view coincides with
Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) own view of
Taiwanese history as distinct from that of China.11
Japanese analysts understood that Taiwan’s democratization meant
the end of the Chinese civil war, which had been the foundation of the
One-China principle underlying the 1972 System that favored Beijing. Put
simply, once a large segment of Taiwanese society no longer wanted to be
part of China, the logic for recognizing one China began to disintegrate.12
Taiwan’s new political reality posed a challenge to Japan’s policy.
Japan had to balance between Taiwan and the PRC. Japan wanted to
upgrade ties with Taiwan while remaining sensitive about Beijing’s reac-
tion. But it was not unreasonable to believe that Japan now had some
policy space because China now needed Japan more and Beijing itself
had shown flexibility toward Taiwan for peaceful unification.
Japan’s search for greater maneuver room on Taiwan fit nicely with
Taiwan’s effort to expand its international space. Taiwan eagerly reached
out to Japan.13 Tokyo accommodated Taiwan by allowing Vice Premier
Hsu Li-The to attend the Asian Games opening ceremony in Hiroshima in
September 1994 even though China had protested strongly. At the same
time, Japan remained cautious and tended to retreat somewhat when
Beijing protested. After all, Japan was also trying to maintain a good rela-
tionship with China, knowing well that Taiwan mattered to China.
Japan’s security concerns about China emerged with the end of the
cold war. In the early 1990s China began to increase military spending
and asserted its territorial claims. Some Japanese, particularly defense
specialists, voiced concerns about China’s potential military threat to
Japan. Tomohide Murai, a professor at Japan’s National Defense
Academy, wrote an article about China as a potential threat in the May
1990 Shokun magazine. His colleague Kawashima Kozo saw China
expanding into a maritime power and argued that China would view
Japan as its principal enemy.14 Hiramatsu Shigeo, formerly of the
National Defense Agency, published a book on the emerging Chinese
navy in 1991.15 Japan’s worry increased after the Standing Committee of
the Chinese National People’s Congress adopted the Law on the
Taiwan ● 167
Territorial Waters and Their Contiguous Areas (Territorial Waters Law)

on February 25, 1992. The new law said that the PRC’s territorial islands
include Senkaku/Diaoyu, Taiwan, the Penghu Islands and the Spratly
Islands in the South China Sea. The Japan government protested.16
Taiwan was principally a political challenge for Japanese thinkers at
this stage, however. The Japanese security thinking discussed in the
previous paragraph was largely a minority view on the margin of
Japanese policy thinking. Japan had a stronger interest in contributing to
international peace after the experience of the first Persian Gulf War, but
there was little interest in taking on bilateral security challenges. The
1992 Chinese territorial waters law did not cause immediate tension
with China. After all, 1992 was a good year in Japan–China relations,
with Chinese party chief Jiang Zemin’s visit to Japan in April and the
Japanese emperor’s visit to China in October. Some contemporaries
actually considered 1992 the best period in Japan–China relations. If the
Chinese Territorial Waters Law had been enacted in a time of tensions
between China and Japan as it is now, it would have surely caused far
more serious tensions between the two nations.
Japan’s security concerns about China would increase, as is shown in
the following two sections. In that context, Taiwan would shift from a
diplomatic and political issue to a security one. China’s growing military
strength contributed to a renewed U.S. interest in strengthening the
U.S.–Japan alliance. The March 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis helped to illus-
trate the strategic importance of the alliance.
Japanese Strategic Thinking toward

Taiwan in the Late 1990s
Japanese began to be seriously concerned about the security dimension
of their relations with China during the 1995–96 Chinese military
exercises aimed at Taiwan.17 Japanese now realized that their country
could be dragged into a U.S.–China military conflict. Japanese had
previously ceased to consider security to be an important issue in relations
with China and in the cross-Strait relationship because the last crisis
took place in 1958 when the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) shelled two
islands controlled by the Nationalist government in Taiwan and because
Japanese thought China had changed with economic reform and
opening. A dominant view in the Japanese policy community is that the
Taiwan Strait crisis was a wakeup call for Japan.
Japanese attitudes toward Taiwan became more favorable and views of
China worsened still after the mid-1990s. Beijing’s military intimidation
168 ● Ming Wan
tactic made the Japanese more sympathetic to Taiwan and more negative
about China. Also, due to fatigue over the history issue, more
Japanese began to feel, based on exchange with Taiwanese, that many
Taiwanese express affinity for Japan, in turn making them feel close to
the Taiwanese.18 The Japanese media, both reflecting and shaping
Japanese public opinion, also became more critical of China.
Critics of China became more energetic after the mid-1990s. They
wrote a large volume of books, journal articles, and editorials advocating
a tougher policy toward China and an improved official relationship
with Taiwan. The leading thinkers along this line include Hiramatsu
Shigeo, Hasegawa Keitaro, Ishihara Shintaro, Kase Hideaki, Nakajima
Mineo, Nakamura Katsunori, Nakanishi Terumasa, and Okazaki
Hisahiko.19 The thrust of their arguments is that China is trying to
revive the Chinese world order in Asia and Japan must resist it. In that
context, Taiwan shares a common destiny with Japan. Taiwan is a
democracy, and the most pro-Japan country in Asia. Thus Taiwan’s
survival is essential for Japan’s defense of sea lanes. On the other end of
the political spectrum, some Japanese still advocated good relations with
China and urged Japan to be sensitive to Beijing’s concern over history
and Taiwan, but their influence began to decline.
The mainstream view in Japanese policymaking sought a compromise
position. On the one hand, Japan strengthened the alliance with the
United States beginning in 1995, with direct security implications for
the Taiwan issue. Japan also paid greater attention to its defense doctrine
and capabilities. On the other hand, Japan tried not to attract attention
to its role in Taiwan in this period and tried to be vague about whether
its expanded security arrangement with the United States would cover
Taiwan. Japanese officials emphasized the legal obligation of the 1972
Joint Statement. They also recognized that Taiwan was a sensitive issue
that needed to be dealt with carefully. Though the Japanese might con-
front China over the history issue, they knew the importance of Taiwan
for China. Tokyo’s strategy worked to some extent as China protested
over the strengthened Japan–U.S. alliance but continued to cooperate on
other issues.
It made sense strategically for Japan to tread lightly in the Taiwan
issue. The United States, the world’s sole superpower with a security
treaty with Japan, was committed to Taiwan’s defense by law if China
used force against the island. Beijing was asserting its claim to take
Taiwan by force if necessary. China’s military exercises in 1995–96
increased the danger of a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait.
Moreover, China was a rising economic and military power. In this
Taiwan ● 169
situation, Japan had little incentive to take rash actions, particularly

when the two principals themselves had yet to come to the point of an
explicit military confrontation. Instead, Japan continued to use its tried
and true approach of coping in foreign relations.
This coping strategy became difficult to maintain due to develop-
ments in Taiwan. Taiwan became a direct democracy and was moving
further away from China politically and psychologically. Thus, Taiwan
would force the issue. Moreover, Japan–China relations had also
changed. Japan’s relations with Beijing continued to deteriorate, which
would put the Taiwan issue in a different light. The second half of the
1990s was dominated by frequent disputes and repairs. The 1998 visit to
Japan by Jiang Zemin furthered this negative trend of worsening
Japanese opinion of China. Jiang was viewed as unreasonably pressuring
the Japanese over the history issue to keep Japan down and to advance
China’s own great power ambitions. Taiwan was one of the underlying
sources of growing tension between Beijing and Tokyo. In fact, one of
Jiang’s principal objectives for his 1998 trip to Japan was to have the
Japanese government accept the principle of “Three Nos,” namely no to
Taiwan’s independence; no to one China, one Taiwan or two Chinas; and
no to Taiwan’s membership in the UN or other international organiza-
tions that include only sovereign nations. Even though President Bill
Clinton had just verbally accepted the principle during his visit to
China, the Japanese government soundly rejected the Chinese demand.
Japanese Strategic Thinking toward

Taiwan since 2001
Japan’s strategic thinking toward Taiwan since 2001 maintains a clear
continuity with its previous thinking. What has changed is that security
thinking regarding Taiwan has been fleshed out and has become more
salient in Japanese discourse in the context of a worsening top-level
political relationship with China; Taiwan is now a security concern for
Japan, not just as a derivative of the U.S.–Japan alliance; and Japan has
become more explicit in its policy position on Taiwan and is taking
precautionary measures in case of a Taiwan contingency.
Japan’s policy toward Taiwan began to shift in 2001 with former
Taiwanese president Lee Teng-hui’s visit to Japan in April. Lee had tried
to attend the Asia Open Forum in Matsumoto in October 2000 but
failed due to Beijing’s protest. Support in Japan for Lee’s visit in 2001
grew. Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro asked the Foreign Ministry to
grant Lee a visa. Concerned about Japan–China relations, the Foreign
170 ● Ming Wan
Ministry decided against it initially. However, on April 20, the Japanese

government allowed Lee to come to Japan for medical treatment.20 Lee
visited Japan on April 22–26, a major breakthrough for Taiwan and
a major setback for China. Significant for future handling of China, the
Japanese felt that Japan survived this test of political will with China
with little damage. In fact, some critics of China simply called China a
“paper tiger” since it did not carry out retaliations as moderates in Japan
had feared.21
Koizumi Junichiro, who assumed office the day Lee left Japan, did
not make the decision on Lee’s visit. What has been significant about
Sino-Japanese relations since Koizumi became prime minister is political
coolness on the top level. Koizumi’s annual visits to Yasukuni have
meant a suspension of mutual visits by government leaders since 2002.
Taiwan emerged as a top political issue between the two nations in that
context. Japan began to talk about the security of Taiwan in an open
fashion around 2004, which reflected worsening Japan–China political
relations and, in turn, further strained the relationship.
Japan’s public sentiment toward Taiwan continues to improve and has
come to exert an unusually large impact on Japanese foreign policy
toward China. As an often-cited example of Japan’s broad sympathy for
Taiwan, even Asahi shimbun, the most pro-China newspaper in Japan,
supported granting former president Lee Teng-hui a visa to visit Japan as
a private citizen.22 In a more recent case, virtually all Japanese
newspapers criticized China’s anti-secession law enacted in March 2005
as destabilizing.
Japanese public opinion also has a major effect on politicians who
have become ever more important in decision-making in Japan at the
expense of elite bureaucrats since the mid-1990s. In Japan’s relations
with China, there is a larger tendency of the public and politicians to
feed off each other in a way that is unfavorable to China. The Japanese
public has urged the government to be firmer over a number of issues,
particularly over territorial disputes. Such sentiment has made a number
of policy changes possible. For example, while the Ground SDF consid-
ered plans to strengthen the defense of Okinawa and other southwestern
islands in the mid-1990s in light of China’s 1992 territorial waters law,
they did not carry out the plans due to concern over negative public
reaction from Okinawans. But by the end of 2004 Japanese defense
officials were planning to replace F-4 fighters with more powerful F-15s
in Okinawa and to upgrade the GSDF troops to a brigade, anticipating
little public negative reaction or protests from the ruling parties.23
For the past two years some Japanese have come to support Taiwan’s
separate path from China, converging with pro-independence Taiwanese
Taiwan ● 171
activists.24 For example, 47 junior Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)

parliamentarians reportedly expressed support at a meeting held in
November 2004 for the right of Taiwanese to revise the constitution and
to correct the name of the state based on public will.25 Support for Taiwan
has also grown within the ruling LDP, particularly among younger politi-
cians many of whom have built strong personal ties with Taiwanese
leaders.26 Beijing considers revision of the constitution and correction of
state names as moves toward independence. There is even greater support
in Japan for Taiwan’s effort to seek greater international space.
The idea of geopolitics has come back in Japan. When reading
Japanese publications and news stories or talking with Japanese officials
and analysts, one reads or hears frequently the analysis that if China takes
Taiwan, the Taiwan Strait would become China’s internal waters and can
thus control Japan’s shipping lane. And if the United States and China
ever fought over Taiwan, Japan would be dragged into the conflict.
Japan’s defense community now more openly expresses security con-
cerns about China. Retired SDF officers, who are presumably freer to
talk about issues than active-duty officers, express alarm over China’s
apparent maritime expansion and increasing military spending. They
typically use geopolitics, Chinese history as the Middle Kingdom, and
Chinese Communist Party rule to explain China’s behavior.27 Gomi
Matsuyoshi, a retired vice admiral of the Maritime SDF, sees China as
positioning itself to seize natural resources in Japan’s economic zones
down the line and urges Japan to acquire the independent defense capac-
ity in case of military clashes with China based on the argument that
Japan needs the maritime resources in the disputed areas for survival and
prosperity in the twenty-first century and that the United States might
not come to Japan’s assistance over disputes in the East China Sea. 28
Furusawa Tadahiko, another retired vice admiral, sees China as shifting
from a continental country to a maritime one and as seeking to recreate
a Chinese world order in which neighboring countries are obedient to
the Chinese.29 In this context, he sees Taiwan as central to China’s objec-
tive to establish a Chinese empire and to seek maritime resources. He
argues that it is far better to see Taiwan maintaining the status quo than
becoming part of China since the island is strategically located along
Japan’s sea lanes. China’s seizure of Taiwan would mean that the South
China Sea and the East China Sea would become Chinese waters, which
would restrict traditional maritime states in the region. Besides, Taiwan
is a fellow maritime democracy that would serve as a check on China’s
maritime expansion. He also recommends that Japan formulate its own
defense strategy to deal with security threats while improving its alliance
with the United States.30
172 ● Ming Wan
Japanese government officials and politicians seem to share security

concerns over the Taiwan question. Not surprisingly, more serious
discussion takes place under the surface, which one can only infer by
examining media-reported government studies and documents. For
example, Tokyo shimbun, a paper considered to be close to the defense
policy community, reported on November 8, 2004, that in a report
completed in September in preparation for the new National Defense
Program Outline, to be issued by the end of November, Japanese
Defense Agency officials had established three scenarios in which China
might decide to attack Japan.31 The first scenario is that China might
attack American bases in Japan if American troops use bases in Japan to
assist Taiwan in a serious military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait.
The second scenario is that China might seize Diaoyu/Senkaku, trigger-
ing a military conflict with Japan. The third is that China might resort
to force over the territorial dispute in the East China Sea. The new
national defense strategy issued on December 10, named North Korea
and China as Japan’s potential security concerns, the first time China
was named as such by the Japanese government.
A Chinese nuclear submarine trespassing in Japanese territorial waters
on November 10, 2004, only enhanced Japan’s security worries. The
action of the Chinese navy is interpreted as seeking domination over
Taiwan and testing Japan’s capacity to respond to a military conflict.
Sankei shimbun reported on November 14 that a top secret simulation-
based analysis had recently been submitted to the Prime Minister’s
Office by the Japanese Defense Agency.32 The report predicts China’s
comprehensive military domination over Taiwan by 2009.
A series of Japanese actions, including U.S. alliance enhancement,
adjustment of Japan’s defense priorities, and greater defense capabilities
reveal the fear of a belligerent China as an important motivating factor
in Japanese strategic thinking. The 2004 Defense White Paper issued on
July 6, 2004, emphasized that Japan’s SDF should play a role commen-
surate to Japan’s international standing. The paper also expressed
concern over China’s military modernization and Chinese research ship
activities in waters close to Japan. There are also reports of shared intel-
ligence regarding Chinese submarines among the American, Japanese,
and Taiwanese military forces.33 Japan’s new National Defense Program
Outline approved by the cabinet in December 2004 mentioned China’s
name, calling attention to China’s military modernization and maritime
activities. Japanese officials emphasize that their February 2005 joint
statement with the United States to express a common security interest
in the Taiwan Strait does not amount to a dramatic shift in its Taiwan
Taiwan ● 173
policy. In fact, they argue that Japan’s position on a peaceful solution to

the Taiwan issue has been consistent since 1972. However, Japan was
clearly much more explicit and bolder in expressing its position on
Taiwan, which has been perceived by China as a major hostile move. The
2005 East Asia Strategic Review, issued by the National Institute for
Defense Studies of the Japan Defense Agency in March 2005, expressed
concern over the PLA’s intense training for attacking Taiwan and pre-
venting American intervention as well as Chinese ship activities in the
disputed waters in the East China Sea.34 Also in March, Moriya
Takemasa, the deputy director general of the Defense Agency, raised the
issue of the anti-secession law during his security discussion with Xiong
Guangkai, a deputy PLA chief of staff.35 On April 29 Foreign Minister
Machimura Nobutaka said that the Japan–U.S. alliance covers Taiwan
when answering questions at a speech in New York City.36
While there is shared concern about China’s rise and some hedging
moves, there does not seem to be a consensus on how Japan should deal
with the situation. Japanese scholars and officials generally do not
believe that Japan is that strategic about the Taiwan question. The gap
between positive public opinion on Taiwan and a cautious policy not to
rock the boat is often used as an indication of such a lack of strategic
vision.
Japan’s cautious policy toward Taiwan at this point reflects two major
strategic calculations. First, the Japanese recognize U.S.–China relations
as central to the Taiwan question. In a way, the U.S.–Japan alliance is
now really about Taiwan (not to diminish the strategic importance of the
Korean peninsula). It makes strategic sense for Japan to let Americans
deal with this very difficult question. There has been a basic dynamic of
entrapment and abandonment in Japan’s U.S. alliance. Specifically over
Taiwan, there is mainly fear of entrapment since Japanese recognize that
the United States is not going to hand Taiwan to China even if
U.S.–China relations improve.
Second, the Japanese understand that overt support for Taiwan would
aggravate the situation, creating a self-fulfilling effect. Tokyo should play
it cool diplomatically while taking precautionary moves in alliance
formation and defense capabilities. In fact, the Japanese often see the
Taiwan issue as one involving Chinese and Taiwanese nationalisms,
which means that the issue will take a long time to resolve.37
As of now, Japan is still largely reactive rather than taking things into
its own hands, based on the strategic calculations behind Japan’s largely
faithful adherence to the one China principle in its relations with
Beijing. Despite their strong interest in the outcome of the Taiwan game,
174 ● Ming Wan
the Japanese believe they have limited ability to influence how the game
plays out. Awareness of Japan’s own limitations has constrained their
strategic thinking; some policy elites do not want to think about things
that they have no control over. Nevertheless, there are people in Japan
who are thinking about this issue, and if the situation in the Taiwan
Strait and China–Japan relations change, Japan’s thinking and action
regarding Taiwan may change quickly.
What is important overall about Japan’s strategic thinking is a revealed
strong preference to compete with China. Unlike other East Asian coun-
tries, Japan is competing and will compete for regional leadership with
China. This is a reflection of an identity as a proud country that has
always been largely outside the Chinese world order politically, as the first
non-Western nation to modernize, as a first-rate economic power, and
now as a country that should take its rightful place in the international
community and step out of the shadow of other major powers.
Taiwan, China, and Japan

Taiwan has been trying to entrap Japan, an approach that makes obvious
strategic sense to secure an ideal trilateral alliance including the United
States. Taiwan benefits from worsening Sino-Japanese relations. China’s
military pressure will create more room for Japan–Taiwan cooperation.38
The Taiwan government has periodically expressed support for Japan,
supporting its candidacy for a permanent seat at the UN Security
Council. At a forum of Taiwanese and Japanese thinktanks held in
Taipei in October 2004, Taiwan’s premier Yu Shyi-kun stated that “the
security of the Taiwan Strait is closely linked with the security of Japan.”
Taiwan’s National Security Council Secretary General Chiou I-jen sup-
ported Japan’s revision of the Peace Constitution to participate in peace-
keeping missions abroad.39 Chen Shui-bian told visiting Japanese that
Taiwan had alerted Japan about China’s submarine entering Japanese
waters.40 He has also urged Japan to say “no” to Beijing and act as a nor-
mal state.41 Taiwan is particularly interested in lobbying for the Japanese
Diet to pass a law similar to America’s “Taiwan Relations Act.”
The Taiwan government has been successful in cultivating relations
with influential Japanese, but sympathy has its limits. Japan’s policy
toward Taiwan is realpolitik to the core. Neither Lee nor other leaders
can change Japan’s fundamental policy, which is constrained by the
alliance with the United States. Japan wants to create more room for its
diplomacy, but it operates within constraints that it remains happy to
respect.
Taiwan ● 175
Taiwan stands little chance of entrapping Japan. Since Japan is in a

strengthened U.S. alliance that covers Taiwan, the basic dynamic between
security and autonomy in an alliance is extended to its relations with
Taiwan. Taiwan now wants to have greater security and autonomy to walk
its own path, which has enhanced the danger of insecurity for the United
States, and for Japan by extension. That position has logically caused
some distancing from the United States. Japan is behaving similarly to the
United States, another indication of clearheaded strategic calculations.
Japan would enhance official relations with Taiwan in an ideal world.
A major foreign policy document produced by a task force on foreign
policy for Koizumi stated matter-of-factly that changes in Japan–Taiwan
relations were “natural” given China’s economic reform and opening
and Taiwan’s democratization and participation in the APEC forum and
WTO.42 Japan has done more for Taiwan. Former prime minister Mori
visited Taiwan in December 2003. Japan cast its vote for the failed reso-
lution to invite Taiwan to the World Health Organization as an observer
in May 2004. Tokyo mayor Ishihara Shintaro visited Taiwan in October
2004. Lee Teng-hui came to Japan as a tourist in late December 2004.
Japan was also critical of China’s anti-secession law in March 2005.
At the same time, China views Japan’s warming ties with Taiwan as
anything but natural. Beijing has reacted quickly and strongly over
Tokyo’s periodic attempts to upgrade official ties with Taiwan. Japan
generally retreats in reaction to China’s objection. After all, China is a
rising political and economic power, and Japan has interest in avoiding
unnecessary tensions. Japan also has a huge economic stake in China. Its
trade with China and Hong Kong combined surpassed its trade with the
United States in 2004. Japan’s trade with China was almost three times
its trade with Taiwan in 2004.43
Thus, the cost of Taiwan’s entrapping depends on how far the
Taiwanese government pushes for independence and on how hard the
PRC is prepared to fight to prevent such a movement. Chen Shui-bian’s
narrow victory for a second term in March 2004 increased the danger of
cross-Strait conflict when Chen continued to take measures toward inde-
pendence while giving inadequate attention to U.S. concerns. The danger
was partially eased when Chen’s DPP failed to win a majority position in
the December 10, 2004, parliamentary election, a surprising setback due
to high expectations before the election and a sign of Taiwanese voters’
wariness of causing conflict with the Mainland.44 Beijing clearly saw a
welcome setback for the Pan-Green forces in Taiwan, reflected in the state-
ments by the spokesman of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council
and Chinese media analysis. The election lowered the danger of immediate
176 ● Ming Wan
military conflict. The PRC has shown greater flexibility in early 2005 as
revealed by its invitation for Lien Chan, the chairman of the Kuomintang,
to visit in late April. With his party winning an overwhelming victory in
municipal elections on December 3, 2005, a more confident Chinese gov-
ernment under Hu Jintao now feels vindicated by its strategy of demon-
strating resolve to prevent Taiwan’s independence while not reacting every
time to Chen’s particular moves. But Beijing will continue to watch closely
Taiwan’s relations with major powers such as Japan.
Chinese and Japanese were deadlocked politically over Koizumi’s
annual visits to the Yasukuni shrine. The Yasukuni dispute has become a
test of wills. Even those in Japan who did not approve of Koizumi’s visits
to Yasukuni do not want to send a signal that China can dictate what a
Japanese leader can do in what is considered a domestic issue. On the
other side, China also does not want to show weakness. Even Japan-
knowledgeable moderates do not want to make concessions for fear that
such a weak move would only encourage Japanese assertiveness elsewhere
while triggering a major public backlash in China. This situation reflects
a combination of both confidence and insecurity on both sides. It also
reveals the basic nature of an emerging strategic rivalry between the two
nations. The anti-Japan mass demonstrations in Beijing and several other
major cities in China in April 2005 marked the lowest point in
Japan–China relations since 1972. With Koizumi’s Yasukuni visit on
October 17, Japan’s relationship with China deteriorated further. Chinese
leaders no longer wanted to meet with Koizumi for bilateral talks even at
multilateral summits as they did for the previous three years.
From a political perspective, a worsening relationship with China
means that Japan will need more allies. Since South Korea and Southeast
Asian nations have largely indicated neutrality in Japan–China disputes,
Japan shares common interests with Taiwan. From a strategic perspec-
tive, a hostile relationship with China would enhance Taiwan’s strategic
value. As a senior Japanese diplomat summarized it succinctly, “Taiwan
is a strategic asset between the East China Sea and the South China
Sea . . . Japan of course does not want to see Taiwan seized by a hostile
power.”45 The explicit expression about Taiwan in the joint statement
with the United States in February 2005 should be seen as a warning to
Beijing that Japan has a stake in the Taiwan issue. Whether Japan will
stand more firmly for Taiwan’s defense depends on China’s relations with
Taiwan and with Japan. But in a vicious cycle, Japan’s Taiwan policy shift
would contribute to a worse relationship with China. Conversely,
Taiwan may also act as a check on China, making it less willing to
confront Japan in order to prevent driving Japan and Taiwan together.46
Taiwan ● 177
Conclusion
Japan’s strategic thinking toward Taiwan has been a product of a complex

interaction of transformations in Japan, Taiwan, the PRC, and the world
as well, including the perceived security environment and national
objectives. Diverse opinions about the Taiwan issue exist in Japan. In a
market of ideas, the salience of a particular view is contingent upon
domestic developments and international politics.
The Japanese public has become increasingly sympathetic to a
democratic, pro-Japan Taiwan since 1989. By contrast, the Japanese view
of a nondemocratic, rising China has declined sharply. While the mar-
ginal improvement in views of Taiwan is now leveling, Taiwan benefits
from a continuous decline of China’s image due to a series of
Japan–China disputes in recent years. Public sentiment alone has been
insufficient to push Tokyo to change its Taiwan policy dramatically, but
it matters. It exerts pressure on the government to take a firmer stand
over disputes with China, which creates more room for Taiwan’s
diplomacy. It explains partly why the Japanese government has slowly
but surely upgraded its official exchange with the government in Taiwan.
Ultimately, Japan’s assessment of the international environment after the
cold war and its desire to become a normal, great power explain why
Japan is interested in situating its relations with China in the global
context and seeking greater room to engage with the government in
Taiwan. Though public opinion is not the same as hard-nosed strategic
calculations, growing public sympathy for Taiwan and resentment
toward China open up public space for discussion on more sensitive
security issues. Security discussion is no longer an impolite topic.
Japan’s security thinking about Taiwan has become increasingly based
on geopolitics. For some defense thinkers, Taiwan’s survival in separation
from China is central to Japan’s future security and prosperity. Thus,
Japan shares common security interest in Taiwan as the United States.
Security concerns about China as a military threat have moved from the
margin of the policy community in the early 1990s to close to the center
at present. Japan’s growing security concerns and worsening public view
of China have allowed right-wing critics of China to have greater
influence in policy debates.
At the same time, guided by mainstream views, Japan is still being
defensive in security thinking at this stage. Much of Japanese strategic
calculation is contingent upon China’s future actions and development.
Japan’s thinking toward Taiwan shows that the Japanese remain cautious in
high-stakes issues. They tend to be reactive to the changing environment
178 ● Ming Wan
and take half measures. However, this pattern of behavior should not be
interpreted as Japan’s inability to think strategically or to act assertively.
Rather, it reflects the fact that the Taiwan issue is extremely complex.
Moreover, one can equally question how strategic and smart the three
principals, China, Taiwan, and the United States, have been. In such a
fluid situation, it is unproductive or even counterproductive for Japan to
spell out clearly what its strategic objectives and approaches should be.
The Japanese care about the security ramifications of the Taiwan
issue. It makes a major difference for Japan’s security whether Taiwan is
taken over by a China hostile or friendly to Japan. If current
Japan–China relations continue to deteriorate, one should expect Japan
to become more proactive and offensive over the Taiwan question.
Simply put, Japan has its own strategic reasons to be involved in the
Taiwan issue independent of its U.S. alliance obligations. Territorial
disputes with China and its strategic interest in Taiwan’s future will
increasingly determine its terms for the alliance with the United States.
Notes
1. In an important speech on Japan’s Asian strategy delivered on December 7,
2005, Foreign Minister Aso Taro stated, “Japan will keep the position that
was stipulated in the Japan-China Joint Communiqué, in the understanding
that there is but one China.”
2. One finds many titles in Japanese bookstores. For samples, see Ko Bunyu,
Taiwan wa Nihonjin ga tsukutta (Tokyo: Tokuma shoten, 2001); Kin
Birei and Shu Eimei, Nihon yo Taiwan yo (Tokyo: Fusosha, 2001). See also
Kobayashi Yoshinori, Taiwanron (Tokyo: Shogakukan, 2000). For a critique
of this view, see East Asian Network of Cultural Studies, Kobayashi Yoshinori
Taiwanron o koete (Tokyo: Sakuhinsha, 2001).
3. Liu Jiangyong, Panghuang zhong de Riben (Tianjin: Tianjin renmin
chubanshe, 2000), p. 271.
4. For a detailed study of Japan’s relations with China after 1989, see Ming
Wan, Sino-Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic and Transformation (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2006).
5. Nakai Yoshifumi, “Nitchu kankei,” in Takagi Seiichiro, ed., Datsu reisenki no
Chugoku gaiko to Ajia Taiheiyo (Tokyo: Japan Institute of International
Affairs, 2000), pp. 105–33; Kokubun Ryosei, “Reisen shuketsugo no Nitchu
kankei 72 taisei no tenkan,” Kokusai mondai, January 2001, pp. 42–56.
6. Much has been written in Japan about Taiwan’s democratization and
Taiwanization. For a representative book, see Wakabayashi Masahiro, Taiwan
bunretsu kokka to minshuka (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1992).
7. The Japanese coastguard chased out some Taiwanese fishing boats from
the disputed area in early June 2005. Dozens of Taiwanese fishing boats
Taiwan ● 179
subsequently massed in the area in protest, creating a standoff with Japanese

ships. On June 21, two Taiwanese warships were dispatched, having senior offi-
cials and legislators aboard. The ships did not enter what Japan claims to be its
exclusive economic zone. As a senior Japan Defense Agency official put it five
days later, Taiwan’s action “was a political show” common in a democracy and
there was simply no reason to be concerned about it. (Conversation with the
official, June 27, 2005.) Still, a senior Japanese diplomat expressed surprise at
the Taiwanese action and criticized it as dangerous. The Japanese government
privately complained to the Taiwanese government. (Conversation, July 15,
2005.) Japan and Taiwan held negotiations over fishing on July 29, but did not
reach any consensus. Arguably sending a signal that Taiwan worries about
China rather than Japan, President Chen visited the Dongsha islands, in
dispute with the PRC in the South China Sea, on the same day.
8. In interviews in Tokyo in October 2004, Japanese officials and scholars
familiar with China and Taiwan all emphasized this factor.
9. One sees a good number of books published in Japan in this regard.
10. Izumi Taro, Nichibeitai sangoku no jidai Beichu reisen no Ajia shudan ampo
taisei (Tokyo: Tendensha, 1998); Nakamura Katsunori, Yo Gogi, and Akino
Kazuo, Nichibei domei to Taiwan (Tokyo: Waseda shuppan, 2003).
11. In fact, some Western historians agree as well. See, for example, Tonio
Andrade, “Pirates, Pelts, and Promises: The Sino-Dutch Colony of
Seventeenth-Century Taiwan and the Aboriginal Village of Favorolang,”
The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 64, No. 2 (May 2005), pp. 295–321.
12. Wakabayashi Masahiro, “ ‘Taiwan mondai’ no atarashii naijitsu,” in Takagi,
Datsu reisenki no Chugoku gaiko to Ajia Taiheiyo, pp. 297–317.
13. Kojima Tomoyuki, Chugoku no yukue (Tokyo: Jiji tsushinsha, 1997),
pp. 138–44.
14. Kawashima Kozo, Gekido suru To Shohei go no Chugoku: Nihon wa kakubuso
Chugoku no “shuyoteki” ni naru (Tokyo: Daiichi kikaku shuppan, 1990).
15. Hiramatsu Shigeo, Yomigaeru Chugoku kaigun (Tokyo: Keisoshobo, 1991).
16. Hiramatsu expressed concern about China’s new territorial waters law and
its maritime strategy in his 1993 book Chugoku no kaiyo senryaku (Tokyo:
Keisoshobo, 1993).
17. For Japan and the Taiwan Strait crisis, see Funabashi Yoichi, Alliance Adrift
(New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999), pp. 351–445; Ijiri
Hidenori, ed., Chutai kiki no kozo: Taiwan kaikyo kuraishishisu no imisuru-
mono (Tokyo: Keiso shobo, 1997).
18. Amako Satoshi, Toshindai no Chugoku (Tokyo: Keisoshobo, 2003),
pp. 212–13.
19. For sample works of these prolific writers, see Nakamura Katsunori, Unmei
kyodotai to shite no Nichibei soshite Taiwan: nijuisseiki no kokka senryaku
(Tokyo: Tendensha, 1998); Hasegawa Keitaro and Nakajima Mineo, Iatsu
no Chugoku Nihon no hikutsu (Tokyo: Bijinesusha, 2001); Izumi,
Nichibeitai sangoku no jidai; Nakajima Mineo and Komori Yoshihisa,
Chugoku bohatsu (Tokyo: Bijinesusha, 2004).
180 ● Ming Wan
20. For Japanese domestic politics over the visa issue, see Okada Takashi,
Chugoku to Taiwan: tairitsu to kyozon no ryogan kankei (Tokyo: Kodansha
gendai shinsho, 2003), pp. 221–25; Hasegawa and Nakajima, Iatsu no
Chugoku Nihon no hikutsu, pp. 14–47.
21. Critics of China frequently make this point in their writings. A senior
Japanese journalist who had been posted in China used the expression
“paper tiger” in an interview I conducted in Tokyo in June 2001. The
Chinese government postponed a planned visit by Li Peng, and Japanese
officials and analysts with whom I talked expressed the feeling that they did
not consider the cancellation a serious retaliation.
22. Several Japanese journalists I interviewed in Tokyo in June 2001 all empha-
sized this trend, whatever their attitudes toward China.
23. “China Syndrome: Tensions Rise,” Asahi shimbun, December 29, 2004.
24. Interview with a leading Taiwan specialist in Japan, Tokyo, October 26,
2004.
25. Taiwanese media coverage reported in China, November 25, 2004
⬍http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2004-11-25/14275031117.shtml⬎.
26. Taiwanese media coverage reported in China, November 25, 2004
⬍http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2004-11-25/14275031117.shtml⬎.
27. See also Ishizuka Isao (retired General ASDF), “21 seiki wagakuni no anzen
hosho kankyo,” Defense Research Center (DRC) (Japan), DRC Annual
Report 2000; Yoshida Akiji (retired MG GSDF), “Anzen hosho senryaku o
kangaeru kihon yoken, DRC Annual Report 2001; and “Senryakuchiseigakuteki
ni mita wagakuni no boei tokucho,” DRC Annual Report 2004, October 15,
2004.
28. See, for example, Gomi Matsuyoshi, “Chugoku no kaiyo shishutsu,” DRC
Annual Report 2004, October 15, 2004.
29. Furusawa Tadahiko, “The Chinese and the Sea,” DRC Annual Report 2001.
30. Furusawa Tadahiko, “Nihon no kokueiki to Taiwan,” DRC Annual Report
2004, October 15, 2004.
31. Tokyo shimbun, November 8, 2004; The Japan Times, November 9, 2004.
32. Sankei shimbun, November 14, 2004; Asahi shimbun, December 29, 2004.
33. Xinhua News Agency, November 26, 2004.
34. Yomiuri shimbun, March 28, 2005.
35. Guoji xianqu daobao, April 1, 2005.
36. Asahi shimbun, April 30, 2005.
37. A senior Japanese diplomat who has been handling the Japan–US alliance
differentiates the Taiwan issue from the North Korean crisis. He sees the
Taiwan issue as political in nature, which can turn military, because it is
about nationalism. By contrast, he sees the Korean situation largely as mili-
tary. Thus, the Taiwan dispute would last a long time with the United States
as the main player. Interview, Washington, DC, March 22, 2005.
38. Chien-min Chao and Szu-shen Ho, “Riben waijiao zhong youguan
Zhongguo huo Meiguo youxian zhi zhenglun,” Wenti yu yanjiu, Vol. 43,
No.1 (January–February 2004), pp. 83–104.
Taiwan ● 181
39. “Taiwan, Japan Ties Need More Realism,” Taiwan News.com, October 5,
2004.
40. “Chen Claims Taipei Told Japan about Chinese Submarine,” Taipei Times,
November 20, 2004, p. 3. However, as a senior Japanese diplomat pointed
out, Japan had not heard from the Taiwan government about the submarine
beforehand. (Conversation with the official, July 15, 2005.) This was con-
firmed by others who were familiar with the case.
41. China News Agency, March 3, 2005. He said so in the context of complain-
ing about his inability to make a transfer stop in Japan.
42. Task Force on Foreign Relations for the Prime Minister, 21 seiki Nihon gaiko
no kihon senryaku—aratana jidai, aratana bijon, aratana gaiko, November
28, 2002.
43. For the trade data see ⬍http://www.customs.go.jp/JCWSV08/servlet/
JCWSV08⬎.
44. The DPP interpreted the setback as resulting from executing a vote reallo-
cation plan to channel votes from popular incumbents to new candidates,
but Chen had used the independence theme heavily in his election
campaign.
45. Interview, Washington, DC, March 22, 2005.
46. As a sign that the Chinese government is worried about this connection, in
the aftermath of the anti-Japan demonstrations leading media outlets
emphasized the importance of the Taiwan issue as well as economic coope-
ration in Sino-Japanese relations. On May 1, 2005, Xinhua News Agency
issued a commentary urging Japan to keep its commitment to China over
the Taiwan issue.
CHAPTER 8

toward Korea
Cheol Hee Park
D
espite geographical proximity that requires only two hours for
flights from Tokyo to Seoul, Koreans often argue that Japan is a
geographically near but emotionally distant country. Recent
developments in Korea–Japan relations show that even as relations have
improved through “kanryu” (Korea fever) in Japan,1 bilateral ties can be
shattered at any time by any move that is deemed provocative. When
Shimane prefecture declared Takeshima day on March 17, 2005, rela-
tions were frozen abruptly.2 Though overall ties may be characterized as
alignment despite antagonism as Victor Cha notes, antagonism despite
alignment can arise.3 How to deal with Korea, which for decades has
served as a virtual ally strategically yet retains historical animosity
against Japan, has been a critical concern for Japanese strategic thinking.
Japanese strategic thinking toward the Korean peninsula fits into
a larger geostrategic context. First, there exists a long-standing search
for strategic balance between the United States and Asia. At times,
Japan relied one-sidedly on the United States, but, more often, it oscil-
lated between the United States and Asia. These strategic moves affected
Japanese strategic thinking toward Korea in a profound way. Second,
Japanese strategic thinking cannot be properly grasped without
considering conflict and cooperation between South and North Korea
on the peninsula. In the cold war era, Japan’s strategy focused mostly on
184 ● Cheol Hee Park
making friendly ties with South Korea while antagonizing North Korea
in order to build a bulwark against communist expansion, but afterward
Japan had to design a strategy for the entire peninsula, including North
Korea as a potential partner. In the post–cold war period, North Korea
has been a major factor in Japan’s strategy toward South Korea. Third,
the domestic political context in Japan must be considered in order to
figure out Japanese strategy toward Korea. The shared historical legacy in
modern times often became the cause of politically contentious issues.
Japan’s political context, especially the relative weight of conservatives
and liberals, contributed much to shaping a distinct style of strategic
thinking toward Korea.
The postwar era can be divided into five periods in Japanese strategic
thinking toward Korea, the first of which is not separately covered and
the second is only briefly covered below. First, from the immediate post-
war period to diplomatic normalization in 1965, Japanese strategy
toward Korea was virtually absent. Mutual antagonism and suspicion
prevailed. Diplomatic relations were slow to be normalized as Japan kept
its distance from a country determined for it to acknowledge the histor-
ical injustice of its conduct during the first half of the century. Second,
from normalization through the 1970s, Japanese strategy toward Korea
was mostly about cultivating the market by boosting the economy for
the purpose of building a bulwark against any potential communist
threat from the Soviet bloc. Economic pragmatism was the backbone
of the strategy. Third, in the 1980s, Japan added the element of security
subsidies to South Korea against the background of the newly unfolding
cold war situation.4 Building a strong market in close alliance with the
United States worked in the interest of Japan. Fourth, after the end of
the cold war, especially after the Gulf War, Japan showed signs of oscil-
lation between the United States and Asia. In addition to South Korea,
Japan showed intermittent interest in improving relations with North
Korea. In this sense, Japan’s Korean peninsula policy became more seri-
ous only in the 1990s. In 1997 the Asian economic crisis awakened
Asian identity among the Japanese, which led to extensive efforts to
expand its sphere of influence in East Asia. Korea emerged as a key
strategic partner. At the same time, by strengthening the US–Japan
alliance, Japan tried to keep a balance between Asia and the United
States. Fifth, after September 11, 2001, and the North Korean nuclear
crisis from October 2002, Japan began singlemindedly strengthening its
alliance with the United States while closing its eyes to Asia. Korea
remains a zone of ambiguity or ambivalence since 2001.
Korea ● 185
From Uneasy Neighbor to

Virtual Ally, 1965–79
Japan in the immediate postwar period was preoccupied with remaking

itself under democratic rule led by the United States. Japan embraced
defeat, accepting American-style democracy and the punitive order of
demilitarization.5 During the American occupation, Japan had no
luxury of developing its own strategy toward Korea, or Asia in general,
except coping with the United States. Within Japan the voices of the
“repentant intellectual community” dominated the discourse.6 Mutual
antagonism between Japan and Korea, as the latter under Rhee Seung-
man took a strong stand, blocked any potential rapprochement.
As the Japanese economy rebounded from the mid-1950s, Japan
began actively exploring opportunities to expand its markets other than
the United States, especially in Asia.7 In the early 1960s, the United
States also tried to reduce its burden from propping up anticommunist
regimes in Asia.8 At this time President Park Chung-hee, after assuming
power in a military coup, desperately sought funding to promote
economic growth. Pushed by the United States and pulled by South
Korea, Japan normalized diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1965.
Together with Japan’s strategic entry to Southeast Asia, Korea provided
Japan with a chance to invest its money and expand its market.
Pragmatism based on economic gains constituted the core of Japanese
strategic thinking in those times. In a desire to strengthen a bulwark
against the communist threat, Japan helped Korea to achieve heavy and
chemical industrialization.9 South Korea became the best student of
Japanese style state-guided development in the 1970s.10 Korea outgrew
the status of underdeveloped country to reach successfully the status of
newly developing country.11
In this period Japan kept its distance from North Korea. Officially,
there was no contact between Japan and North Korea. However, in real-
ity, Japan could rely on two extraordinary channels to communicate with
the North. One was the Korean residential community (chosensoren) in
Japan that was sympathetic to North Korea. Though Japan knew that
significant amounts of money were channeled to North Korea through
this community, it closed its eyes in a desire not to antagonize the
North. The other channel was the JSP, the main opposition party to the
LDP. The JSP, due to its critical stance against the brutally authoritarian
Park Chung-hee regime and because of ideological sympathy, got along
with the North Korean Labor Party.12 Hence, after diplomatic
normalization with South Korea, Japan maintained a dual-track strategy

toward the Korean peninsula: It formally was a partner for South Korea,
while informally it kept ties with North Korea to stabilize the region
through the Korean community in Japan as well as the JSP.
Korea as a Member of a Triangular Alliance

in the Asia-Pacific, 1980s
Increasingly in the 1970s, Japan discovered the geostrategic significance
of Southeast Asia and Korea; however, its approach to these areas was
confined to economic activities such as developmental assistance and
technological transfer. At the end of the 1970s, Japan acquired
confidence as an economic power after successfully overcoming two oil
shocks. The national goal of catching up to the West was deemed already
attained. With increased confidence in its economy, Japan began search-
ing for a possibility to extend its regional strategy. The concept of a pan-
Pacific strategy arose in the Ohira cabinet.13 Also the concept of
comprehensive national security (sogo anzen hosho) was newly developed
as a way to encompass not only military but also nonmilitary means of
securing the nation.14 In the new approach, the geographical extension
of the strategy reached Australia and New Zealand, extending much
beyond Southeast Asia. Together with Australia, Japan took strong
initiatives to establish APEC in 1989 after forming PECC (Pacific
Economic Cooperation Council). At the center of Japanese strategic
thinking was the United States, which maintained a dominant presence
in the Asia-Pacific. In this sense, Japan was a faithful U.S. supporter in
the region.15
Prime Minister Nakasone had a keen sense of the need for embracing
South Korea to build a community of nations in the Asia-Pacific. The
new cold war situation, which was sparked by the Soviet intrusion into
Afghanistan, helped Japan approach South Korea from a strategic angle.
Nakasone was a unique Japanese politician in that countering the Soviet
threat was squarely in the mindset of his strategic thinking. In order to
effectively deal with the communist threat, Nakasone built strong
personal relations with President Chun Doo-hwan, as well as President
Ronald Reagan.16 Nakasone also did not hesitate to give security subsi-
dies to South Korea. In this sense, Japan, for the first time in postwar
history, added the politico-military dimension to its Asian strategy. This
kind of move was possible because the main opposition party, the JSP,
lost its drive to grasp power. From the 1980s, it was satisfied with the
Korea ● 187
role of defending the peace constitution rather than presenting itself as

an alternative party of power.
The Japanese strategy toward Korea in the 1980s was deeply integrated
into the scheme of building a triangular alliance among the United States,
Japan, and Korea. North Korea was an enemy to deter. When South
Korea became the victim of bombings—by North Korean agents in
Burma and Soviet missiles against a KAL flight that had strayed into the
Russian Far East air space—Japan showed its clear support for South
Korea while at the same time working closely with the United States.
Oscillation between the United

States and Asia, 1990–97
The end of the cold war made it possible for Japan to explore new-style
strategic thinking that was unavailable during the cold war period. First,
Japan began approaching North Korea as a potential partner for
diplomatic normalization. Seoul’s diplomatic drive called “nordpolitik,”
which focused on normalization of relations with Moscow and Beijing
and using them to draw Pyongyang into talks, awakened Tokyo to the
need to deal with Pyongyang in a different way. As the Roh Tae-woo
regime grew more energetic in its diplomacy, Tokyo approached
Pyongyang, offering to alleviate its sense of isolation. The domestic
political situation was a factor. In 1989, the LDP for the first time lost
its majority in the Upper House and was seeking ways to gain coopera-
tion from the JSP. As the JSP was close to North Korea, Kanemaru Shin,
a powerful LDP leader, organized a group of politicians to visit
Pyongyang together with Tanabe of the JSP. This visit opened a new
horizon on strategic thinking toward the Korean peninsula, widening
the scope beyond relations with South Korea. Japan began negotiating
with North Korea, putting diplomatic normalization on the agenda;
however, with revelation of the North’s nuclear program in 1992 and
controversy over a Japanese woman who had been revealed as a language
teacher for a North Korean terrorist, talks came to an end. Adding to the
complexity, the South Korean government was reluctant to give consent
to the idea of Japan normalizing relations with North Korea before inter-
Korean relations had matured.
Second, Japan came to have doubts about its unilateral reliance on the
United States. The period when the cold war ended coincided with the
peak of Japanese economic expansion. With its “miraculous” economic
growth, Japan came to be perceived as a threat to the United States.17
Confidence in the Japanese style of management and continued upward
movement in the world economy led to the increasing confidence in

designing a strategy autonomous from the United States, in a Japan “that
could say ‘no.’ ”18
Unexpectedly, Japan was entrapped in the Gulf War, reluctantly
paying a huge financial contribution, which amounted to $13 billion,
without feeling that this was appreciated.19 The policy at the end of
George H.W. Bush’s presidency to reduce the American presence in Asia
further aroused Japanese concern about where U.S. relations were
headed. Two types of responses emerged. One was the move to make
Japan a normal country that Ozawa Ichiro spearheaded.20The other was
growing skepticism over U.S. relations and an effort to turn to Asia.
A senior diplomat wrote in a monthly journal that it was time for Japan
to come back to Asia.21
Reflecting this mood, Japan responded to the Korean outcry to apol-
ogize over newly discovered comfort women issues. Chief Cabinet
Secretary Kono made a sincere apology to the comfort women in 1992,
and Prime Minister Miyazawa also confirmed this stance. The JSP, which
had made defense of the peace constitution its primary identity, began
giving extraordinary attention to history issues after its stance against the
overseas dispatch of the SDF became wildly unpopular. The LDP also
turned defensive after it lost power in 1993. After regaining a share of
power in 1994, it gave the premiership to Murayama, head of the JSP.
Deepening Japan’s Asia-oriented diplomacy, Murayama showed his
sincere apology to Asian countries that were victimized before the end of
the war. The JSP-led Japanese government also took strong initiatives to
establish the Fund for Asia Women and to have the Diet pass a resolu-
tion in 1995 to apologize for the war, which failed.
When Murayama stepped down and Hashimoto became prime
minister in 1996, the LDP reversed its course. Instead of returning to
Asia, Hashimoto tried hard to reaffirm the U.S.-Japan security alliance.
The result was change not only in the domestic political environment,
but also in regional political dynamics. As North Korea was isolated
from neighboring countries after South Korea normalized relations with
Russia and China, North Korea had begun to develop nuclear weapons
as a last resort to secure regime survival. The first North Korean nuclear
crisis, which started in 1992, continued until 1994 with dangerous
twists and turns. Ultimately, the United States and North Korea
concluded the Geneva Agreed Framework in 1994, where the United
States and other countries promised to provide North Korea with light
water reactors in return for giving up its nuclear program. In the course
of the crisis, the United States had seriously thought of the possibility of
Korea ● 189
making a surgical strike.22 That taught a lesson to the United States and
Japan that closer cooperation was necessary to cope with regional
contingencies.23 After the first North Korean nuclear crisis, the United
States felt a need to strengthen its alliance with Japan to deal with
possible contingent situations surrounding Japan.24 The United States
reconfirmed its security commitment in Asia, as seen in the Nye
Initiative.25 The Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996 confirmed the importance
of strengthening the U.S.–Japan alliance intact, resulting in the redefin-
ition of the security treaty as a regional alliance in 1996.
In early 1996 the LDP remained in a coalition with the Left—the
SDPJ was the new name for the JSP—and it again tried to normalize
relations with North Korea with LDP politician Kato Koichi taking a
lead in proposing humanitarian food assistance to North Korea. Along
with other LDP doves, Kato sought almost equal balance between Asian
diplomacy and steps to improve U.S. ties. In contrast, hawks in the LDP
gave almost unilateral weight to strengthening the bilateral alliance with
the United States. Also the latter moved assertively to denounce the JSP-
led repentance to Asian countries. They played an instrumental role in
mobilizing groups of intellectuals to promote a revisionist perspective on
Japanese history. Hawks also brought the abductees issue to the political
forefront, which served as a stumbling block to better the relationship
with North Korea.
Japanese strategic thinking toward Korea in the mid-1990s is
characterized by oscillation between historical compromise with Asia
and strengthening the U.S.–Japan alliance. Also it is from this period
that North Korea came into sight in Japanese strategic thinking toward
Korea. Even though Japan made a move to ameliorate ties with North
Korea, the South Korean government showed its reluctance. Until that
time, North Korea was still perceived as an enemy of South Korea.
From the Asian Economic Crisis to the

Pyongyang Declaration, 1997–2002
Korea as a Key Strategic Partner in East Asia
The unexpected advent of the Asian economic crisis awakened a new
regional consciousness on the part of Japan. The ensuing financial crises
in Asia, starting from Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea, produced an
Asian identity in opposition to Westerners, especially the United States.
Signs of East Asian regionalism emerged.26 Japan made assertive moves
to help Asian countries as well as to integrate Asian markets. When the
idea for an AMF was suggested by Japan in 1997, it faced negative

appraisal from the United States. In 1998, the Miyazawa Initiative
generously supported countries hit by the crisis. As Japan had discovered
Southeast Asia as a region in the 1970s and the Asia-Pacific in the 1980s,
it discovered East Asia anew after the Asian economic crisis.
At this time, Japan’s ambassador to Korea, Ogura, proposed an FTA
between Korea and Japan. It is clear that Japan had tight economic inte-
gration with Korea in mind in addition to the general upgrading of
cooperation among East Asian countries after the economic crisis. The
ASEAN ⫹ 3 framework emerged when ASEAN invited leaders from
Korea, Japan, and China to join its annual summit in December 1997.
Then the three Northeast Asian leaders began to hold annual breakfast
meetings from 1999 on the occasion of ASEAN ⫹ 3 meetings. The three
leaders agreed to launch a study group for facilitating a trilateral FTA
among Korea, Japan, and China. But at the same time, Japan and China
entered into a competitive bidding to ASEAN countries to conclude an
FTA with them. Knowing that concluding a trilateral FTA among the
three Northeast Asian countries would be very difficult, Japan became
much more enthusiastic about FTA negotiations with South Korea.
The Asian economic crisis brought about another unintended
consequence. South Korea, which had not avoided pursuing the collapse
of the North Korean regime, came to the conclusion that the sudden
collapse of the Kim Jung-il regime would impose an enormous financial
burden on it. At the same time, President Kim Dae-jung sincerely
wanted to dismantle the cold war structure on the Korean peninsula.
Engaging North Korea and pursuing long-term gradual change of the
North Korean regime was in the interest of Korea. In order to achieve
this goal, South Korea had not only to engage North Korea but also to
persuade neighboring countries to join this move. This strategic consid-
eration facilitated a bold initiative to ameliorate relations with both
Japan and China.27
The Obuchi–Kim Dae-jung codeclaration in 1998 was an outcome of
coinciding strategic interests after the Asian economic crisis. Japan
sought a chance to strengthen strategic partnerships with Asian
countries. South Korea needed Japanese cooperation not only to overcome
economic hardship as soon as possible but also to push for the sunshine
policy toward North Korea.28 Both Obuchi and Kim favored turning
Korea–Japan relations into a future-oriented partnership. As a gesture to
confirm strengthening ties, both governments opened their cultural
doors to each other. Accelerating the mood for Korea–Japan cooperation
was the plan to cohost the 2002 World Cup. Though there was a history
Korea ● 191
textbook controversy in the year 2001, overall relations between Korea

and Japan were favorable, which was confirmed by the increasing
positive images of Korea among the Japanese people. Cultural openings
softened the image of each other and the number of tourists increased
around the year 2002. Though in 1965 only about 10,000 persons a year
had crossed the border, by 2003, the number of Koreans and Japanese
visiting each other had risen to 10,000 people a day. Korea–Japan
relations seemed to be making smooth progress with no concerns over
historical animosity.
Unlike the amelioration of relations with South Korea, Japan’s
relations with North Korea fluctuated wildly from 1998. Voices of criti-
cism against North Korea grew louder, as the abductee issue became a
focal point of political attention around 1998. This was actually a
counter-political move against a stream of thought among liberal LDP
members that Japan should improve relations with North Korea.
Conservative hawks in the LDP tried to put a brake on efforts to
improve relations with North Korea.
A missile launch by North Korea drastically aggravated the situation.
On August 31, 1998, North Korea launched a Taepodong missile over
Japanese territory, which was a tremendous shock to the Japanese who
had not experienced an actual security threat from a neighboring state
since the end of the war. All of a sudden, Japanese public opinion
supported the idea that Japan should be prepared against a potential
threat from North Korea. At a cabinet meeting in December 1998, a
decision was made to introduce intelligence satellites by the year 2003 as
well as to participate in research and development for TMD with the
United States. Preparations to deal with a North Korean threat became a
major topic of discussion in the security community in Japan from
1998, a realist turn in response to a perceived threat. To prepare for
contingencies, Japan continued to strengthen the U.S.–Japan alliance. In
1997, the Cabinet passed new guidelines for U.S.–Japan defense cooper-
ation. In 1999, a law to cope with regional contingencies was enacted.
In 2000, a law that enables Japan’s maritime security guard to check and
investigate suspicious ships in the sea areas around Japan was passed.
A realist turn to equip Japan with modern military technology was
not the only option under consideration. A few Japanese strategists
began designing a scheme for normalizing relations with North Korea as
the ultimate solution for the security threat. This move was in line with
South Korea’s initiative to dismantle the cold war structure on the Korean
peninsula with a view to replacing mutual confrontation with peaceful
coexistence. On June 15, 2000, Kim Dae-jung visited Pyongyang for
a summit with North Korean leader Kim Jung-il, which was a historic
event for the divided Korean people. Inter-Korean relations have shown
signs of advancing in many areas. Mt. Kumgang was opened for South
Korean tourists, roads crossing the DMZ were built, military tension
reduction measures were introduced, and humanitarian aid was
increased. It looked as if Japan would lag behind unless it took an initia-
tive to join the South Korean efforts to improve ties with North Korea.
Japan wanted to gain some influence over North Korean issues.
Japan experienced nightmares of diplomacy in the 1990s with regard
to the North Korea question. First, when the first North Korean nuclear
crisis broke out between 1992 and 1994, Japan did not play a significant
role. All deals were made between the United States and North Korea,
which produced the Agreed Framework, which obliged Japan to pay
for constructing light-water reactors through KEDO. Second, when
four-party talks were in progress, Japan was not a participant and felt
excluded. Third, when the summit meeting between the two Koreas was
realized, Japan was not informed fully in advance. As a result, Japan felt
a need to develop its own leverage with North Korea to get involved in
the Korean peninsula issue.
Unlike in the past, the South Korean government led by Kim Dae-
jung urged Japan to normalize relations with North Korea. Tanaka
Hitoshi at the Japanese Foreign Ministry played a key role in designing a
bold initiative to try to normalize relations. After several rounds of secret
negotiations, they reached an agreement that Koizumi would visit
Pyongyang. On September 17, 2002, he did so and signed the
Pyongyang Declaration with Kim Jung-il. At that moment, Japan was
ready to embrace Pyongyang as a legitimate member of the East Asian
community; however news that eight abductees had died and only five
had survived shocked Japanese public opinion, turning it very negative
to North Korea. Also, the disclosure of the secret North Korean nuclear
program by James Kelly in October 2002 drastically aggravated the
situation.
The above record makes clear that from the late 1990s for about four
years, Japan showed a dual response to North Korea. On the one hand,
after the missile launch by North Korea, Japan perceived it as an imme-
diate and tangible military threat and introduced measures to strengthen
military preparedness against it. This may be called realist readiness. On
the other hand, Japan also tried to engage North Korea as a way to over-
come mistrust and reduce the danger. An effort to normalize relations
with North Korea may be termed an idealist engagement approach. This
Korea ● 193
combination reveals an unusually fertile time in Japanese strategic

thinking. The same applies to Japanese thinking on South Korea.
Between 1998 and 2002, it may be said that Japan placed importance
on improving relations with South Korea in a comprehensive manner,
regarding it as a strategic partner for building an East Asian community.
It is noteworthy that the entire Korean peninsula was within the range of
Japanese strategic thinking at least by the summer of 2002. Though Japan
upgraded its efforts for realist preparedness against a North Korean
threat, it also designed a strategy to upgrade relations with North Korea.
Strategic partnership between Japan and Korea reached a point that
Japan took an autonomous initiative to normalize relations with North
Korea.29 It is also characteristic of this period that Japan tried hard to
keep a balance between its alliance relationship with the United States
and its forthcoming stance toward Asian neighbors, especially South
Korea.
Korea as an Ambivalent Partner, after 2002

The year 2002 proved to be another turning point in Japan’s strategic think-
ing toward the Korean peninsula. After Koizumi returned from his summit
meeting with Kim Jung-il unable to manage the abductee issue, North
Korea was depicted as a true rogue state that killed innocent Japanese civil-
ians after kidnapping them unlawfully. The Japanese media continued to
feature North Korea as an unreliable terrorist state ruled by a dictator. The
image of North Korea as a rogue state was strengthened by North Korea’s
assertive responses to U.S. accusations about a highly enriched uranium
(HEU) program and the tense showdown of the nuclear crisis.
After the unprecedented terrorist attack on the United States on
September 11, 2001, the U.S. security strategy focused on fighting
against terrorism and stopping the proliferation of WMD.30 In January
2002, President Bush singled out three countries as an axis of evil: Iraq,
Iran, and North Korea. In this connection, North Korea drew worldwide
attention, not just regional concern, as a failing rogue state. Japanese
Prime Minister Koizumi also shared the same security concern and iden-
tified Japan as a core member of the coalition of the willing. Already at
the beginning of the Bush administration, the United States had
designed a new policy toward Asia and Japan, which was revealed in the
so-called Armitage report in 2000.31 Japan was regarded as the key
alliance partner in the trans-Pacific area as the United Kingdom played a
cornerstone role for the transatlantic alliance.
Knowing the American strategy to empower Japan in the Asia-Pacific

region, the Koizumi administration tried its best to establish tighter coop-
erative ties with the United States. When the Iraq war broke out in March
2003, the Koizumi cabinet immediately declared its support for the war
and promised to dispatch the SDF to Iraq. When the Defense Department
initiated its military transformation project, Japan followed the policy line
set by the United States, in recognition that the transformation would ulti-
mately strengthen the politico-military role of Japan in the Asia-Pacific
region. Compared with the Koizumi cabinet, the newly born Roh Moo-hyun
regime in Korea looked in 2003 as if it were a hesitant coalition partner to
the United States. With the political background of growing anti-American
sentiment triggered by the death of two students caused by American sol-
diers in 2002, the Roh government raised its voice against U.S. moves on
several fronts. Roh took a more conciliatory stance toward North Korea
whereas the United States and Japan were inclined to take a hard-line
policy. Also with regard to the relocation of American bases as a part of the
military transformation, the South Korean regime did not faithfully accept
the American request. These moves, in the eyes of Japanese strategists, were
seen as estrangement from the traditional ally. Because of an increasing per-
ception gap between South Korea and Japan, especially with regard to
North Korea, Japanese cast suspicious eyes on the South Korean govern-
ment. Though Japan kept promoting increased exchanges at the mass level,
at the elite level “ambivalence” may be the term that best characterizes the
reality of South Korea–Japan strategic relations.
From the fall of 2002, Japan devoted much political energy to North
Korea bashing. Since that time the Japanese people have been addicted to
finding fault with North Korea–related things. This extraordinary
situation did not change even after Koizumi made a second visit to North
Korea in May 2004 and brought home surviving family members of the
abductees. Moreover, because of the advancement of its nuclear develop-
ment program, North Korea remained the immediate threat to Japan.
From the beginning of the Koizumi administration, Japan turned a
deaf ear to Chinese requests to stop Koizumi’s Yasukuni visits, which
were regarded as an act of glorifying the past war. Despite repeated
Chinese and Korean requests, Koizumi never gave up his Yasukuni
visits.32 Throughout his tenure, Koizumi did not show serious interest in
improving relations with China. Compared to the troubled relationship
with China, Japan under the Koizumi cabinet seemed as if it could man-
age relations with South Korea well despite Koizumi’s Yasukuni shrine
visits. At a summit meeting in Jeju island in July 2004, President Roh
Moo-hyun even spoke publicly that he would not raise the history issue
Korea ● 195
again during his tenure; however, at the beginning of 2005 the situation
changed. In February 2005 the Shimane prefectural assembly decided to
celebrate the hundredth anniversary of annexing Dokdo/Takeshima.
Japan’s ambassador in Seoul remarked in a public setting on February 23,
2005, that the island is historically and legally Japanese territory,
provoking an emotional reaction on the Korean side. But the Japanese
Foreign Ministry took the position that it could not meddle into local
government affairs. This sounded like an irresponsible excuse to
Koreans. The announcement of the results of the regular middle school
textbook review on April 5, 2005, only aggravated the situation, because
on the front page of one of the textbooks were photos of the disputed
island. Books approved in the review also contained phrases that hurt
Korean pride. In addition, Koizumi turned a deaf ear to the Korean
request that he stop going to the Yasukuni shrine.
Japan’s situation in Asia has deteriorated. Japanese–Chinese relations
are troubled by the Yasukuni shrine and textbook issues. Japanese–
North Korean relations are worse than ever before. Japanese–South
Korean relations are, in essence, frozen after several years of the best
mood in modern times. At the end of Koizumi’s time in office, it is no
exaggeration to conclude that Japan lacks any concrete strategy to deal
with Asian countries, including South Korea.
Conclusion
Before Japan normalized relations with South Korea, Korea remained an
uneasy neighbor to Japan. Because of resentment and historical animosity
pervasive among Koreans, Japan failed to establish even diplomatic rela-
tions, let alone design a strategy toward Korea. The development of the
cold war situation enabled Japan and Korea to share a minimal accord.
Both nations, under the security umbrella provided by the United States,
had to confront the communist threat. Though historical animosity
remained, both Japan and Korea were urged by the United States to draw
closer as security allies in East Asia. When relations were normalized in
1965 Korea badly needed funds for economic growth and Japan wanted
market expansion. Constructing an integrated economic system stood at
the core of Japan’s strategy. Under the cold war context, Japanese strategic
thinking was designed solely toward South Korea, a U.S. ally and a
state that shared an interest in containing North Korea. Korea and Japan
became virtual allies through triangular ties with the United States. Though
the JSP and Korean residents in Japan continued contacting North Korea,
there was no plan for a strategic initiative toward that country.
The end of the cold war bewildered Japan. Signs of oscillation

between the United States and Asia became visible. After the Gulf War,
a group of strategists initiated a drive to make Japan a normal country
with a view to strengthening U.S. ties, whereas other strategic thinkers
called for a “return to Asia.” In the early 1990s, Japan looked as if it were
tilting toward Asia. Prime ministers from Miyazawa to Murayama
showed sympathy to Asian neighbors’ concern about the past, which sig-
naled that Japan would strategically approach Asian countries after
resolving the history issues. But after Hashimoto became prime minister,
Japan made a conservative shift to stand firm against Asian requests
while trying to reaffirm and strengthen the U.S.–Japan alliance. With
some exceptions noted earlier in this book, the Hashimoto period should
be considered as “back to the US” after a short break, but under the
Obuchi cabinet there were new endeavors to strike a balance between
the United States and Asia, especially focusing on South Korea. The
Obuchi cabinet continued to pursue empowering the U.S.–Japan
alliance, but at the same time it made a bold initiative to make
Korea–Japan relations cooperative. The Mori cabinet basically inherited
the Obuchi line, but added a more conservative tone on history issues.
Conservative backlash was gathering steam in the Mori period.
Hence the 1990s can be characterized as a period when Japanese
strategic thinking oscillated between giving primacy to the United States
and making historical compromises with Asian neighbors. Japan main-
tained its distance from China, especially after 1998 when Jiang Zemin
provoked Japan with history questions. At the end of the 1990s, how to
make strategic partnership with South Korea in the changing geopoliti-
cal context was at the heart of Japanese strategic thinking even if
Japanese strategic thinkers did not doubt the primacy of U.S.–Japan
relations.
After September 11, 2001, terrorism and proliferation of WMD
constituted a new major security threat. After assuming power, Koizumi
strongly committed himself to the cause of making the U.S.–Japan
alliance a global partnership. He drew close to Bush, whose primary
cause was to fight terrorism. After Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang did not
bring fruitful results, Koizumi put most of his energy into constructing
the global partnership. Roh Moo-hyun looked like a hesitant U.S. ally.
Also his approach to North Korea was perceived as being too conciliatory.
Accordingly, from the Japanese strategic viewpoint, Korea was thought
of as an ambivalent partner. In contrast to South Korea’s closer ties to
China, Koizumi had little intention to improve relations with Beijing.
Japan’s strategy after 2002 is characterized by standing by the
Korea ● 197
United States as a strong ally while remaining relatively aloof from Asia.
Under the Koizumi cabinet it has no clear and visible Asian strategy.
Despite the current troubled relations, Japan’s relations with South
Korea have a possibility of getting better soon. The territorial dispute
between Korea and Japan can be submerged, even if no complete
solution is found. Both parties have come to understand that changing
the status quo of the island is neither easy nor feasible in the near
future. The textbook issue selection process is over, and both parties
understand that the selection rate for the history textbook published by
Fusosha, which stood at the center of the debate, was only 0.4 percent.33
While the Yasukuni shrine visit remains an unresolved matter, if we look
back to the period between 2001 and 2004, Korea–Japan relations
remained under control despite Koizumi’s Yasukuni visits. Also North
Korea promised to give up its nuclear program at the fourth round of the
six-party talks in September 2005, which may open the possibility for
Japan–North Korean rapprochement. One can cautiously say that South
Korea–Japan relations have a fair chance of entering into a phase of
stabilization after a year of political turmoil.
Regardless of whether some stabilization occurs in relations with
South Korea or some positive spillover occurs through progress in the
six-party talks, there is little evidence that Japan is designing any grand
strategy to deal with Northeast Asian countries, including Korea. It
appears to be coping, but in a situation that leaves it falling well behind
the rapid pace of change.34 There is no sign of coherent strategic debates
to face the question of history or to weigh various approaches for regain-
ing a strong foothold in Asia. On some occasions Koizumi publicly made
a deep apology with regard to the history issues.35 Yet, he also repeatedly
reaffirmed his priority for relying on U.S. ties abroad and strong nation-
alism at home. His legacy is unlikely to make it easy for a successor to
resume the promising steps seen primarily in the period 1998–2002 for
advancing strategic thinking toward the Korean peninsula.
Notes
1. Since 2003, when Japanese TV stations first featured a Korean drama
“Winter Sonata,” a Korean actor, Bae Yongjoon, known as “Yong-sama,” has
gained great popularity among Japanese housewives.
2. Fishermen in Shimane prefecture had been dissatisfied with Korean fisher-
men’s encroachment into their fishing grounds. Instead of appealing to the
Korean or Japanese government, which keep a low profile on such matters,
the Shimane Prefectural Assembly took a provocative action on February 22
of declaring a day of for celebrating the hundredth anniversary of annexing

what Japanese call Takeshima. Since the island called Dokdo is under the vir-
tual control of the Korean government, this ignited strong reactions in Korea.
3. Victor Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The US–Korea–Japan Security
Triangle (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).
4. After President Chun Doo-hwan assumed power, he stressed a special
relationship with Japan. He claimed that South Korea was facing the threat
of a massive North Korean army; the South Korean military buildup was
contributing to regional security; a country like Japan could not be secured
if South Korea fell to communism; and hence Japan should play a larger role
by providing aid to South Korea. The U.S. administration under Reagan
was positive to the proposal and several rounds of negotiations were held
between Korea and Japan. In 1983 when Nakasone visited Korea, he agreed
to provide a four-billion-dollar security loan. This was a new development
in Korea–Japan relations in acknowledging security ties between the two.
See Chong-Sik Lee, Japan and Korea: The Political Dimension (Stanford:
Hoover Institution Press, 1985), pp. 105–39.
5. John Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II
(New York: The New Press, 1999).
6. Sakamoto Takao, Chishikijin (Tokyo: Yomiuri shimbunsha, 1996).
7. Takashi Inoguchi, Nihon no Ajia seisaku (Tokyo: NTT Publications, 2003).
8. Robert Packenham, Liberal America and the Third World: Political
Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977).
9. Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun (New York: Norton, 1997).
10. Alice Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Woo Jung-en, Race to the Swift:
State and Finance in Korean Industrialization (New York: Columbia
University, 1991).
11. Stephen Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1990).
12. Shin Jung Hwa, Nihon no Kita-chosen seisaku 1945–1992 (Tokyo, Ph.D.
Dissertation, Keio University, 1999).
13. Nagatomi Yuichiro, “Kantaiheiyo rentai koso,” in Ohira Masayoshi
Memorial Foundation, ed., Ohira Masayoshi seijiteki isan (Tokyo: Ohira
Masayoshi Memorial Foundation, 1994).
14. Sogo anzen hosho kenkyu grupu, ed., Sogo anzen hosho kenkyu grupu
hokokusho (Tokyo: Sogo anzen hosho kenkyu grupu, July 2, 1980).
15. Takashi Inoguchi, “Japan’s Images and Options: Not a Challenger but a
Supporter,” The Journal of Japanese Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Winter 1986),
pp. 95–120.
16. Nakasone Yasuhiro, Tenchi yujo (Tokyo: Bungei shunju, 1996).
17. Richard Samuels, “The Myth of the Independent Intellectual,” in Myron
Weiner and Richard Samuels, eds., The Political Culture of Foreign Area
Studies (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1992); Robert Uriu, “The Impact of
Korea ● 199
Policy Ideas: Revisionism and the Clinton Administration’s Trade Policy,” in

Gerald Curtis, ed., New Perspectives on US–Japan Relatons (Tokyo: JCIE,
2000).
18. Ishihara Shintaro, Japan that Can Say No (New York: Simon & Schuster,
1991).
19. Kunimasa Takeshige, Wangan senso toiu tenkanten (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten,
1999).
20. Ichiro Ozawa, Blueprint for a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation (Tokyo:
Kodansha International, 1994).
21. Ogura Kazuo, “Asia no fuken no tameni,” Chuo koron, July 1993,
pp. 60–73.
22. Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas (New York: Basic Books, 2002).
23. Akiyama Masahiro, Nichibei no senryaku taiwa ga hajimatta (Tokyo: Aki
shobo, 2002).
24. Funabashi Yoichi, Domei hyoryu (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1997).
25. Joseph Nye, “Coping with Japan,” Foreign Policy 89 (Winter 1992/1993),
pp. 96–115.
26. T.J. Pempel, “Regional Ups, Regional Downs,” in T.J. Pempel, ed., The
Politics of the Asian Economic Crisis (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1999).
27. Park Cheol Hee, “The Development of Korea’s Regional Strategy in
Northeast Asia,” in Hoon Jaung and Yuichi Morii, eds., Cooperation
Experiences in Europe and Asia (Tokyo: Shinzansha, 2004).
28. Kim Dae-jung’s sunshine policy should be understood as an extension and
revision of Nordpolitik. Under Roh Tae-woo, South Korea aggressively
approached Russia and China, former enemies, to normalize diplomatic
relations and succeeded in isolating North Korea. The sunshine policy was
an effort to gain support from Japan and the United States for pursuing
gradual regime transformation of North Korea.
29. It is reported that Japan gave very short notice to the United States about
Koizumi’s scheduled visit to Pyongyang in September 2002. This was
regarded as an aberration from the usual practice of consulting in advance
before Japan takes important steps. Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang was looked
upon as an autonomous action because it was designed independently from
the United States and kept secret until the very last moment. Gilbert
Rozman, “Japan’s North Korea Initiative and US–Japan Relations,” Orbis,
Vol. 43, No. 7 (Summer 2003), pp. 527–39.
30. Morimoto Satoshi, “Reisengo ni okeru Beikoku no kyoi ninshiki to anzen
hosho senryaku henka,” Kokusai mondai, October 2002, pp. 18–32.
31. The official title of the Armitage report is the INSS Special Report,
The United States and Japan: Advancing toward a Mature Partnership
(Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National
Defense University, October 2000).
32. Takahashi Tetsuya, Yasukuni mondai (Tokyo: Chikuma Books, 2005).
33. Compared with the selection rate of 0.039 in 2001, the number rose 10
times, but still it is below 1%.
34. Gerald Curtis, “Introduction,” in Gerald Curtis, ed., Japan’s Foreign Policy
after the Cold War: Coping with Change (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993).
35. In April 2005 at a Bandung conference Koizumi made a speech where he
showed deep regret regarding the past war. Also, on August 15, 2005,
Koizumi made an apology almost equivalent to the Murayama speech in
1994.
CHAPTER 9

toward Russia
Joseph P. Ferguson
I
f the twentieth century exhibited a cyclical pattern in which
Japanese–Russian relations alternated between long periods of dis-
trust and enmity, punctuated by fleeting periods of rapprochement
marked by a common strategic outlook, then the 20-year period between
1986 and 2005 could be said to be a microcosm of the previous 80 years.
This period saw moments of intense mistrust and mutual acrimony
between Moscow and Tokyo, but it also witnessed moments of warm
relations, in which some saw the promise of normalized relations. As in
the earlier periods of the twentieth century, Japanese leaders, policymak-
ers, and analysts saw in Russia the embodiment of a potential strategic
partner, but also a nation that was far from Japan psychologically
(although it is geographically the closest neighbor). The unresolved
issues of World War II (WWII) that have clouded Japan’s relations with
its other neighbors in Northeast Asia have been the bane of
Japanese–Russian relations since the end of the cold war. The Northern
Territories not only represent lost territory for Tokyo, but in the minds
of most Japanese also a sense of having been victimized in a dastardly
fashion by the Soviet Union. Although Russia is viewed much more
benignly than the Soviet Union, the obstacle that this issue poses has
been much more difficult to overcome than anyone may have guessed
60 years ago.
This chapter examines the evolution of Japanese strategic thinking
toward Russia, covering four periods as well as the major Japanese
202 ● Joseph P. Ferguson
players in the formulation of policy toward Russia. Additionally, it

examines international structural factors that influenced the Japanese
outlook toward Northeast Asia, and hence toward Russia. These were
not only about balance of power, but also a wholesale changing of sys-
tems and ideologies, which had a tremendous influence on how the
actors of the region formulated strategy.
Gorbachev’s Ascension and the End of

the Cold War, 1986–91
Mikhail Gorbachev became secretary general of the Communist Party
of the USSR at a time when Japanese–Soviet relations were at perhaps
their worst since August 1945. The late 1970s and early 1980s were a
time of intense East–West confrontation, as U.S. and Soviet troops
faced one another in a number of potential hot spots—including in the
Soviet Far East and the North Pacific—while American and Soviet
proxies did battle in Southeast and Southwest Asia. Japanese and U.S.
strategic planners were extremely concerned about the build-up of
Soviet forces in the Far East, particularly air and naval assets. Soviet air
and naval incursions in Japanese territorial airspace and waters were
increasingly frequent. Indeed, in 1976 a Soviet pilot flying a MiG
fighter actually defected by landing his plane in Hokkaido. In the late
1970s Soviet force levels on the disputed islands were increased,
and Soviet SS-20 missiles were redeployed to the Far East from
Soviet territory in Europe. 1 It was during this time that the
American–Chinese–Japanese triangle emerged in direct response to
Soviet machinations across Asia. The mistrust that pervaded the
Japanese–Soviet relationship was reflected in the lack of high-level vis-
its during this period. Following the visit to Tokyo of Soviet foreign
minister Andrei Gromyko in 1976 and to Moscow of Japanese foreign
minister Sonoda Sunao in 1978, there were no official high-level visits
to either capital until 1986, when Gromyko’s successor Eduard
Shevardnadze visited Tokyo.
One of the first non-Soviet bloc statesmen to visit with Gorbachev
upon the death of Konstantin Chernenko in 1985 was Prime Minister
Nakasone Yasuhiro. Although his impressions were favorable, the
Japanese leadership (particularly after Nakasone stepped down in 1987)
was the slowest among the G-7 nations to accept at face value the ideas
the Soviet leader was espousing.2 For Tokyo and for the Japanese people,
no matter how intriguing Gorbachev may have been, the benchmark for
his sincerity was the status of the four disputed islands. Despite the
Russia ● 203
distrust, bilateral trade reached a high of $6 billion in 1989, but by 1992

it had fallen again to $3.4 billion.3
Shevardnadze’s visit to Tokyo in January 1986 was relatively successful
as he indicated a willingness to discuss the territorial issue amid hints of
the viability of the 1956 Japanese–Soviet Joint Declaration.4 A follow-up
visit to Moscow by Foreign Minister Abe Shintaro in May 1986 was
rather pro forma, just succeeding in resuming graveyard visits on the four
islands by former islanders. The July 1986 speech by Gorbachev in
Vladivostok signaled new Soviet intentions in East Asia, but it was aimed
more toward the Chinese and leaders in Japan remained skeptical.5
The U.S.-proposed Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, or “Star Wars” as it
was known popularly), which the leadership in Japan backed, contributed
to the continued chill in bilateral relations. The Toshiba incident of
April 1987—in which the Japanese trading company was found to have
violated export regulations and to have sold sensitive submarine tech-
nology to the Soviets—also held back relations. It worsened Japan’s
image in the United States at a time when trade frictions were threaten-
ing to undermine bilateral security relations. A tentatively scheduled
visit by Gorbachev to Japan in 1987 was cancelled.
By 1988 leaders and analysts in Japan began to rethink their views of
Gorbachev and the Soviet Union.6 They recognized that he was prepared
to back up words with actions (such as withdrawing from Afghanistan
and permitting more freedom in Eastern Europe). Japanese leaders no
doubt also saw U.S. efforts to bolster relations with Gorbachev and did
not want to be left out, particularly given U.S.–Japanese trade frictions.
In July 1988 former prime minister Nakasone visited Moscow and met
with Gorbachev. Shevardnadze made a second visit to Tokyo in December,
which was followed in May 1989 by the Moscow visit of Foreign
Minister Uno Sosuke, who touted a new policy of “balanced expansion”
(kakudai kinko) in relations with Moscow. This entailed improvement in
all areas without reducing the paramount importance of the territorial
dispute.7 In 1989 Shevardnadze announced that Gorbachev would visit
Japan, but only in 1991.
For the next year domestic issues (including successive scandals that
brought down two prime ministers) halted all attempts at creative diplo-
macy in Japan. Certain leaders in the ruling LDP were eager to cement a
rapprochement with the Soviets and several efforts were made to secure an
agreement. The most high-profile effort was led by Ozawa Ichiro, who
on a visit to Moscow in March 1991 reportedly offered the Soviets
$26–28 billion in economic aid for the return of the disputed islands.8
The visit only managed to whip up nationalist opposition in both
countries. The motivations behind the politician’s desire to cement

an agreement with the Soviets were probably more vainglorious than
strategic.
Gorbachev’s Japan visit finally came about in April 1991. In meetings
with Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki he officially recognized the four
islands as the objects of the territorial dispute, which could be seen as a
coup for the Japanese side, but all in all the visit (Gorbachev’s last state
visit before the August 1991 coup attempt against him) led to few
results. Japanese leaders were still first and foremost concerned about the
territorial dispute and notions of strategic compatibility with the Soviet
Union were almost nonexistent.
The Early Yeltsin Years

The reaction in Tokyo to Yeltsin’s rise to power in the fall of 1991 was
much like the reaction during the Gorbachev years. Tokyo took a wait-
and-see attitude, and again the benchmark for the new Russian leader-
ship’s sincerity was based on how quickly it was prepared to return the
Northern Territories to Japan. Although leaders in Tokyo were hesitant
in their denunciation of the coup plotters in August 1991, and Japan was
criticized by other G-7 nations in not moving fast enough with Russia,
it responded to the coup and the threat of chaos in Russia by announc-
ing an aid package totaling $2.5 billion.9 Ruslan Khasbulatov, the new
chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, visited Tokyo
in early September 1991 along with the new deputy foreign minister,
Georgy Kunadze. In Tokyo, Khasbulatov passed along a letter to Kaifu
from Yeltsin, which promised to approach the territorial dispute with the
guiding principal of “law and justice,” leading to a relationship in which
there were no “victors or vanquished.” Foreign Minister Nakayama Taro
visited Moscow in October 1991, and for a few fleeting months there
was hope that the two sides could reach a settlement of the territorial dis-
pute, but this window quickly closed as domestic events and opposition in
Russia prevented the new government from taking serious action.
During the crucial summer of 1992 (for the new Russian government)
Japan again faced pressure from the West to provide more aid to Russia.
This pressure was acute and public during the G-7 summit meeting in
Munich in July, but the government insisted that any additional aid be
contingent on a statement issued by the G-7 leaders supporting Japan’s
territorial claims. This was done, but like the hesitant Japanese denunci-
ation of the coup the previous year, this event put further strain on rela-
tions with the new government in Moscow while it also demonstrated the
Russia ● 205
lack of a strategic vision in Tokyo. Though leaders in the West were

wondering how a new, democratic Russia could be propped up in a dire
situation, leaders in Japan pressed the new Russia to yield.
A visit to Moscow by Foreign Minister Watanabe Michio in August
1992 was meant to be a last-minute preparatory meeting to sort out the
details of Yeltsin’s upcoming Japan trip. Instead, it provided further neg-
ative publicity for both sides, as each responded with acrimony to the
other’s views on the territorial dispute.10 Four days before Yeltsin was
due to arrive in Tokyo in September, he called to postpone his visit.
Although he promised to visit in the first half of 1993, this last-minute
cancellation was the height of diplomatic effrontery, especially since the
Japanese had arranged an audience with the emperor.
At the April 1993 summit of G-7 foreign and finance ministers in
Tokyo (the site of the upcoming G-7 heads of state summit in July), the
Japanese government announced a bilateral aid package for Russia as part
of a larger G-7 package. It would extend $1.5 billion in credit, much of it
tied once again to export credits and trade insurance. This was a concilia-
tory gesture given Yeltsin’s behavior the previous fall. Yeltsin thereupon
announced he would visit Japan in May, but again cancelled and resched-
uled for October. Yeltsin did visit Tokyo to attend the G-7 summit as an
observer and met there cordially with Prime Minister Miyazawa.
As the fall 1993 summit approached, Japan was caught in domestic
crossfire, and hence unable to ponder a strategic partnership with
Russia. For the first time in 38 years the LDP was excluded from power,
and a new coalition government was formed with the head of the New
Japan Party, Hosokawa Morihiro, as prime minister. The strategic ratio-
nale for the two leaders resolving the issues dividing them was not strong
enough. Both sides were still enjoying amicable relations with China,
and the idea of a “China threat” lacked the effect that it might have had
at the end of the decade.11 Hosokawa and Yeltsin ended the summit by
signing the Tokyo Declaration in which the two sides promised to abide
by all legal and historical precedents (i.e., treaties and agreements) in
pursuit of a peace treaty and resolution of the territorial dispute, and
that all agreements would be based on the principles of “law and jus-
tice.” Furthermore, the names of the four disputed island groups were
specified, and Yeltsin orally affirmed that past agreements included the
1956 Joint Declaration.12 Following the Hosokawa–Yeltsin summit,
it was revealed that the Russian government had been dumping
nuclear waste into the Sea of Japan for several years. This only added to
Russia’s “out-of-control” image in Japan, which originated largely with
Yeltsin’s last-second cancellation of his trip in 1992.
Strategic factors were still not strong enough to force a change in

thinking among the Japanese leadership. Despite China’s rise and the
strategic ambiguity of the United States, Japan was not concerned yet
about its position in East Asia. Officials from both the Bush and Clinton
administrations urged Japan and Russia to put their differences behind
them for political, economic, and strategic reasons, but these entreaties
fell on deaf ears.13 In fact by 1992 there were already early indications of
a split in thinking toward Russia within the Japanese Foreign Ministry.
Some officials favored moving forward quickly in order to shore up
Japan’s strategic position in East Asia; others favored the status quo,
demanding territory before any political or strategic rapprochement. The
former group represented the deguchi-ron, or the “exit-point” strategy
that insists on better relations first, which will eventually lead to the
return of the islands. The latter group represented the iriguchi-ron, or the
“entry-point” strategy insisting on the return of the islands as the key to
improved relations.14 This split would become more public in 2001–02.
Meanwhile, the political situation in Japan was such that little room
existed for creative diplomacy. The reformist Prime Minister Hosokawa
was forced to resign in the spring of 1994 in the wake of yet another cor-
ruption scandal. His weak successor Hata Tsutomu was forced to resign
after several months, and a patchwork coalition uniting the LDP with
the JSP came to power. In 1994 the waters around the disputed islands
saw a dramatic increase in the number of incidents at sea. Japanese fish-
ing boats and their crews were often stopped by Russian coastal patrol
boats in disputed waters and sometimes arrested and taken into Russian
custody while their boats (and catches) were impounded. Sometimes the
boats were fired upon, resulting in casualties. Known as the “fishing
wars,” these incidents significantly increased the level of public hostility
toward Russia.15
Japan’s New Eurasia Diplomacy

A confluence of events abroad and at home forced a change in the think-
ing of the leadership in Japan beginning in 1996. The difficulty of fol-
low-up to Yeltsin’s visit of 1993, the “fishing wars” of 1994–95, and the
Russian decision to refuse Japanese aid after the two earthquakes on
Shikotan and Sakhalin in 1994 and 199516 were felt through 1995. By
1996 a new line of thinking toward Russia was emerging. It was to be
seen as a potential partner, both in an economic and a strategic sense.
This line of thinking had existed, to be sure, at many levels of the
government for years. However, now those that favored a more open
Russia ● 207
approach to Moscow were supported from the very top. Hashimoto

Ryutaro became prime minister in early 1996. As minister of MITI from
mid-1994 to January 1996, Hashimoto had been a strong proponent of
expanding Japanese trade and investment relations with Russia. As
president of the LDP from 1995, Hashimoto had made it known that he
also favored stepped-up political relations with Russia, cultivating a
strong personal relationship with Russian First Deputy Prime Minister
Oleg Soskovets.17 In March 1996 Hashimoto dispatched Foreign
Minister Ikeda Yukihiko to Moscow to meet with new Foreign Minister
Yevgeny Primakov. Ikeda handed Primakov a letter for Yeltsin from
Hashimoto, which expressed Japan’s support for Russia’s ongoing democ-
ratization and economic reforms. Primakov announced that Russia
would continue the demilitarization of the disputed islands.
Hashimoto met with Yeltsin for the first time in Moscow in April
1996 at an international summit on nuclear safety, convened on the tenth
anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster. He did not bring up the territorial
issue during the meeting, and this undoubtedly was received favorably.
After Yeltsin’s victory in the presidential election that summer Hashimoto
phoned him with congratulations. Yeltsin invited Hashimoto to Russia at
the earliest opportunity. For the first time in the history of bilateral rela-
tions the leaders of Japan and Russia were forming a good bond. This was
perhaps the extra something needed to jumpstart the relationship. Also,
in April 1996 Minister of State for the Japan Defense Agency Usui Hideo
visited Moscow, the first such visit by a JDA chief. He and his Russian
counterpart Pavel Grachev signed a military cooperation protocol calling
for advance notice of military exercises and providing for exchanges of
information, training missions, and naval port visits.18
In November 1996 Primakov visited Japan and suggested that the two
nations jointly develop the disputed islands. His Japanese counterpart
Ikeda agreed to study the proposal, provided that the new idea would
not detract from the basic legal positions of the two sides. It was a much
more positive attitude for the Japanese leadership in comparison to years
past. Along with France and Germany, it pledged to help Russia with the
reprocessing of nuclear materials. The relationship was now more than
about just territory. In the Foreign Ministry the chief of the Russia
division, Shinoda Kenji, had advocated a “multi-layered approach”
( jusoteki apurochi), and the Japanese government was beginning to act
along these lines. Formerly all aspects of the bilateral relationship had
been tied to the territorial dispute.19
Although some gaffes by both sides in early 1997 momentarily stalled
the positive momentum, by the spring of 1997 the pleasant atmospherics
returned. Russian Defense Minister Igor Rodionov visited Tokyo in May

(the first visit by a Russian defense minister in over a century), and called
for more bilateral and trilateral cooperation, among Japan, Russia, and
the United States. Rodionov also voiced support for the U.S.–Japan
security relationship. But the major events of the first half of 1997
occurred at the G-7 summit meeting in June in Denver, and a July speech
Hashimoto gave to the Japanese Association of Corporate Executives
(Keizai doyukai). At the Denver summit, Yeltsin and Hashimoto in their
bilateral meeting discussed plans for promoting Japanese investment in
the Russian Far East, particularly in the energy sector. Yeltsin also
pledged to support Japan’s bid to become a permanent member of the
UN Security Council.20 In his July speech, Hashimoto outlined a strat-
egy for Japan’s new “Eurasia Diplomacy.” He promised that Japan would
steer a “new course” in developing relations with Russia to be based on
three principles: trust, mutual respect for each other’s interests, and
building relations proceeding from a long-term perspective.21
These two events paved the way for the Krasnoyarsk informal summit
meeting in Siberia in November 1997. There the two leaders greeted one
another in Krasnoyarsk like old friends. As they sailed up the Yenisei River
on a fishing expedition, the two promised to increase political and defense
cooperation. Hashimoto announced that Japan would officially support
Russia’s APEC membership, and he unveiled a six-point economic plan
(known as the Hashimoto–Yeltsin Plan).22 To everyone’s surprise, Yeltsin
went a step further and declared that Russia and Japan would do their
utmost to sign a peace treaty by the year 2000. Although most experts in
Japan doubted that this goal could be attained, it showed the excitement
that the relationship was beginning to engender on both sides.
Japan’s interest in Russia was more than just about goodwill
diplomacy and economics. A big rationale for a rapprochement was the
fluid international environment in Northeast Asia. Most remarkable in
this regard was the disappearance almost overnight of the Soviet Union,
which had posed the greatest security threat to Japan for the previous
five decades. Russia was now a benign player in Northeast Asia that
posed little direct threat. At the same time, because of the collapse of the
Soviet Union, many in Japan considered that the United States was
exhibiting some strategic ambiguity in East Asia, complete with the
downsizing of troop levels across the region and the closing of long-
existing air and naval bases in the Philippines. Japanese leaders were
growing nervous about the U.S. commitment to the region, seeing its
leaders as acting unilaterally and often not in Japan’s interests.23 Neither
of these events would have caused undue alarm had not there been
another factor weighing in: the rise of China.
Russia ● 209
China’s rise as an economic, military, and political giant in the region

had been clear to many in Asia for years, but it was in the1990s that the
trajectory raced markedly upward. Not only was the Chinese economy
accelerating beyond ten percent annual GDP growth, it was now
beginning to modernize its military, and acquire the types of weapons
systems that were oriented toward a maritime strategy rather than the
earlier focus on a land-war with the Soviet Union. Disconcerting to the
Japanese was the 1995–96 series of missile crises in the Taiwan Strait,
when war between the United States and China suddenly seemed possi-
ble. Japan pondered the decision it would be forced to take in the event
of such a conflict, supporting its ally at the cost of damaging irreparably
its relations with its large neighbor, whose power in the twenty-first
century would be immense.
One of the reasons the JDA took a sudden interest in improving rela-
tions with their Russian counterparts was in fact the concern about
China’s dramatic emergence. There was concern not only about China’s
military and economic performance, but how it was achieving this.
Economic growth was helped along by Japanese largesse, military mod-
ernization was being fostered by large acquisitions of hardware from
Russia. Part of the reason the JDA wanted to promote cooperation with
Russia was not only as a potential balancer, but also to come to a better
understanding of Russian defense systems. In August 1996 it was
announced that pilots from Japan’s Air Self Defense Forces (ASDF)
would be invited to train in Russia. Articles published later in the Asahi
shimbun revealed that two veteran Japanese pilots from the ASDF had
been training at the Gromov air base just south of Moscow, learning to
fly the Su-27, one of Russia’s most advanced fighter jets and, as point-
edly noted, being sold to China. The ASDF was in fact interested in
learning more about these planes, not just because potential enemies
might be flying them, but also to carry out research for Japan’s own indige-
nous fighter program.24 This revelation was surprising because not only
was Russia allowing Japanese pilots unfettered access to platforms of
the latest technology and to Russian bases, but also because the Japanese
ASDF (and the JDA) was studying equipment that would be used by
the People’s Liberation Air Force in China.
China was only part (albeit, a major part) of the reason for Japan’s
concern about the strategic situation in East Asia. The Korean peninsula
posed a danger to the Japanese archipelago, and this was highlighted by
the first Korean nuclear crisis of 1993–94, and North Korea’s ballistic
missile program. It test fired its first Nodong-1 missile into the Sea of
Japan, halfway between the Korean peninsula and the Japanese coast in
1993, and in the summer of 1998 tested a Taepodong missile in a
trajectory over the Japanese archipelago. North Korean boats made

repeated incursions into Japanese waters during the 1990s, prompting
an armed Japanese response (the first since WWII).
During the first half of 1998 two major events transpired that helped
along the Japanese–Russian rapprochement. The first was an agreement
signed in the first weeks of 1998 that allowed Japanese fishing boats to
catch a quota of fish and shellfish in the waters off the disputed islands,
in exchange for cash and fishing equipment to be paid by the Hokkaido
Fisheries Association. This was seen as a coup by many Japanese who felt
that this could considerably strengthen the basis for resolving sover-
eignty over the disputed islands.25 The second event was the follow-up to
the Krasnoyarsk summit in Kawana in April 1998.
During the Kawana summit both Yeltsin and Hashimoto repeated
their pledge to do their utmost to sign a peace treaty by the year 2000.
Hashimoto also floated a proposal for the disputed islands, which report-
edly called for Russia to recognize Japan’s sovereignty in return for
putting off any handover until future years. The two leaders also dis-
cussed concrete economic plans, agreeing to maintain the engagement of
their defense establishments. Yeltsin invited Hashimoto to visit Moscow
in the fall, and he proposed a Tokyo visit sometime in 1999. He
promised that before the next meeting he would study Hashimoto’s pro-
posal. Although the two shared an amicable visit, already the positive
momentum of the second half of 1997 was clearly wearing off.26
Momentum was lost when in July 1998 Hashimoto resigned after an
electoral defeat by the LDP (on the very day that the Russian prime
minister, Sergei Kirienko, was visiting Tokyo).
Hashimoto’s successor Obuchi Keizo had served as foreign minister
under Hashimoto and was well-versed in Russia issues. He shared
Hashimoto’s vision about the importance of furthering the rapprochement
with Russia, but his connection with Yeltsin was not as strong as his
predecessor. This was reflected in his visit to Moscow in November
1998. Obuchi hardly met with Yeltsin who was sick and incapacitated,
and instead met with the new prime minister, Yevgeny Primakov. The
Russian answer to Hashimoto’s proposal was tepid (Russia asked first
for a peace and friendship treaty and then resolution of the islands). The
so-called November 1998 Moscow Declaration repeated the same
platitudes about joint economic development, discussions on border
demarcations, and the like, but it was an empty document from the
point of view of the sovereignty of the islands, and Obuchi’s visit was a
source of great frustration for the Japanese leadership.27
Russia ● 211
The year 1999 was essentially a dead year in Japanese–Russian rela-

tions. The promised Yeltsin visit never came off. Trade was still stagnant at
only $4.2 billion, and investment was meager (cumulative private invest-
ment through 1999 was close to $340 million, or 1.3 percent of all foreign
investment in Russia).28 Additionally, it was clear to most seasoned
observers in Japan that no peace treaty would be forthcoming by the end
of 2000. On the bright side, defense contacts did continue to rise, and the
Japanese government followed through on its far-sighted decision in the
early 1990s to assist Russian nuclear clean-up efforts in the Far East by
extending $200 million to help dismantle 50 aging nuclear submarines.29
Japanese decision-makers had begun to think pragmatically about
Russia in light of the evolving strategic situation in Northeast Asia.
There was a confluence of thinking with Russia, as both responded to
the rise of China while also striving to maintain good relations with
Beijing. Unfortunately for the Japanese, domestic events in Russia put a
cap on how far Japan could move forward with its newfound friend. By
the end of 1999 Yelstin had resigned, and the Japanese leadership was
forced to deal with an entirely different figure in Vladimir Putin.
The Irkutsk Interlude and the Suzuki

Scandal, 2000–02
When Yeltsin resigned on December 31, 1999, Japan’s leaders—like the
rest of the world—scrambled to understand what exactly Vladimir Putin
represented. The immediate conclusion was that Putin was a strong
leader, and the erroneous corollary was that this would be the kind of
man with whom a deal could be cut. A number of top Russian officials
were invited to Japan in the first months of Putin’s presidency, including
Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov and Deputy Prime Minster Mikhail Kasyanov
(soon to be named prime minister). An invitation was issued for Putin to
visit Japan after the presidential elections in Russia in March 2000
(when Putin was officially elected to office), and again in July when the
G-8 summit was to take place in Okinawa. Obuchi even offered to visit
Russia, even though the last official visit took place in Moscow at the
end of 1998 (and thus it was ostensibly the turn of the Russian leader to
visit Japan). The Japanese leadership seemed very keen to find a spot for
itself on Putin’s agenda.
Despite Obuchi’s untimely coma in April 2000, the new prime
minister Mori Yoshiro was undaunted and pushed for a meeting with
Putin, which finally came about in St. Petersburg at the end of April.
The two leaders established rapport, probably because Mori touched

upon the territorial issue as a factor within the broad strategic perspec-
tive of the necessity of improving the overall relationship, rather than
from the more traditional, narrow perspective. During the summer of
2000 Putin and Mori met two more times in Japan, first at the G-8
Summit on Okinawa in late July. Shortly after that Nonaka Hiromu, the
secretary general of the LDP, shocked the Japanese public and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by stating that the territorial dispute should
not stand in the way of a peace treaty between Japan and Russia.30 Soon
Nonaka seemed to be embroiled in an intergovernmental spat involving
both the LDP and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Several LDP leaders
(including former deputy chief cabinet minister Suzuki Muneo, who was
chosen in April 2000 as Obuchi’s and, consequently, as Mori’s special
envoy to Russia) and a few members of MOFA, unhappy with the direc-
tion of Japan’s Russia policy, had been looking for a more “gradual”
approach to resolve the territorial question. The old guard of the Foreign
Ministry’s Russia school was quick to quash this experiment, with the
support of influential opinion leaders. All major Japanese dailies quickly
joined in the criticism of Nonaka’s statement.31 This event reflected the
existing split in thinking toward Russia not only within the LDP, but
also within MOFA. Nonaka’s statement, however, was not given prior
approval by anyone in MOFA, and many MOFA officials were shocked
by it and asked for clarification. Nonaka’s response was that he just
wanted to shake up the “traditional, stereotyped” approach to Russia.32
The second meeting in the summer of 2000 was the summit held in
Tokyo in early September, where Mori and Putin signed 15 documents
encompassing trade, investment, security, the environment, and military
cooperation, and they reaffirmed the Tokyo (1993) and Krasnoyarsk
(1997) Declarations. Putin declared that relations were “at their highest
level since the end of World War II,”33 affirming the validity of the 1956
Joint Declaration, which ceded to Japan the two southernmost and
smallest of the disputed islands in exchange for a peace treaty, but
insisted that the meaning of the 1956 Joint Declaration be carefully
studied by experts on both sides. In spite of the pleasant atmospherics no
further initiative emerged, as some on the Japanese side had hoped. Mori
and Putin met one more time at the APEC summit in Brunei on
November 15, as Mori expressed his desire to meet with Putin in Siberia
late in the year or early in 2001.
The Siberia meeting did take place on March 25, 2001, in the city of
Irkutsk along the shores of Lake Baikal. Mori apparently broached
the idea of a “two-track” policy that envisioned two sets of talks: one
Russia ● 213
focusing on the 1956 agreement (and the handover of Shikotan and the
Habomai group), and the other on the sovereignty of the two additional
islands (Kunashir/i and Etorofu/Iturup). This was a substantial shift in
Japanese policy. To this point MOFA and the LDP had always insisted
on the return of all four islands at the same time. Attempts to separate
the islands, even in the process of the negotiations, had been consistently
refuted since 1956. This shift in policy brought the Japanese closer to
the Russian perspective and could be seen as a dramatic compromise.34
Behind the idea was reportedly former chief cabinet secretary Suzuki
Muneo, who had allies within MOFA, and most importantly was close
to Prime Minister Mori, through his wide power network inside the
LDP including Secretary General Nonaka.35 Soon thereafter the discord
between the “gradualists” and the “traditionalists” spilled into the public
arena and caused a shake-up in personnel at the Foreign Ministry. The
reaction in the press to the Irkutsk summit expressed serious concern at
Japan’s “retreat.”36
Despite these circumstances, the Japanese proposal did reflect prag-
matic thinking (especially in MOFA) in line with the strategic angst that
was present in Japan. The Russian side was apparently quite receptive to
the Japanese proposal, but the uproar in Japan was such that all avenues of
discussion were soon to be shut off. Mori was forced to step down at the
end of April 2001 (for different reasons). His successor Koizumi Junichiro,
at first announced that he could be flexible on the territorial issue, sug-
gesting tacit support of the results of the Irkutsk meeting, but Foreign
Minister Tanaka Makiko immediately let it be known that she was
opposed to the “two-track” policy outlined by Mori. Soon Koizumi also
called publicly for the return of all four islands simultaneously. There was
much public criticism of the “two-track” policy in the press.37 Tanaka also
said in a Diet address that she felt that there had been no true achievement
in Japanese–Russian relations since the 1973 Moscow Summit, attended
by her father, Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei. With one statement she had
brushed over the accomplishments of Japanese politicians and diplomats
in 1991, 1993, 1997, and 1998. Suzuki publicly blasted Tanaka’s com-
ments, saying that they invited a return to the days of the cold war.38 These
were the opening salvos of the “war” between these two strong-willed
politicians, which set back relations with Russia.
Koizumi seemed to back track from his hard-line position when he
met with Putin at the October 2001 APEC summit in Shanghai and
acknowledged that the “two-track” negotiating strategy could be effective.39
This change reflected the still unsettled situation in the Japanese Foreign
Ministry as well as the influence that Suzuki still exerted over Japan’s
Russia policy. But by the end of 2001 the situation, which had seemed
somewhat promising as recently as the spring, was as muddled as ever.
Though the political situation in Russia had become somewhat settled and
the Russian economy was actually showing signs of life, the “Makiko vs.
Muneo” war was a sign that the political situation in Japan was no longer
conducive to creative diplomacy.
Although defense contacts continued to proliferate during the
2000–01 period, Russian military officials began expressing serious con-
cern about Japan’s stepped up role in the framework of the U.S.–Japan
security relationship. Of particular concern was Japan’s role in the devel-
opment of a missile defense system and Putin reportedly relayed this
concern to Mori in April 2000.40 But this was asking Japan to put aside
a program that was designed to allay Japan’s fears of perhaps what was
now the greatest threat to the security of the Japanese homeland: North
Korean missiles. Additional irritants included a spy scandal in the fall of
2000, and violation of Japanese airspace by Russian warplanes on several
occasions in the spring of 2001.
Former Prime Minister Mori visited Moscow in a private capacity in
January 2002, suggesting that the “two-track” policy was not entirely
dead. In a meeting with Putin, Mori reportedly spoke of the need to return
Shikotan and the Habomai group, but on the status of Etorofu/ Iturup
and Kunashir/i Mori spoke merely of the recognition of sovereignty.41
Suzuki accompanied Mori on his trip, leading the Russian press to argue
that his influence on Russia policy was still strong.42 Japanese observers
continued to insist on the danger of the “two-track” approach, saying
that all Russia wanted was to “eat and run” (kuinige suru—take two
islands and leave the table).43
Suzuki received some help from the top when Koizumi relieved
Tanaka of her post in late January 2002, a decision unrelated to Russia
policy. Tanaka’s constant warring with Diet members, such as Suzuki,
and her diplomatic blunders forced his hand. Russian foreign minister
Igor Ivanov arrived in Tokyo on an official visit only hours after Kawaguchi
Noriko was asked to replace Tanaka. The two discussed the territorial
dispute and the peace treaty, but there was little substance to the rushed
meetings. As one press report said, “the cast of characters continues to
change but the results remain largely the same.” 44
Suzuki’s “victory” over Tanaka was fleeting. From MOFA began
leakage of documents, which caused media fury about his excessive
influence on foreign policy, in particular on Russian policy. Reports
flourished about receiving bribes on several occasions, including from
construction companies that had been contracted to build facilities on
Russia ● 215
the disputed islands, as well as in Africa. Suzuki was finally arrested on

June 19, 2002, on suspicion of receiving illegal contributions in return
for political favors. His arrest, in effect, put a damper on any diplomatic
efforts toward Russia, no matter how strategically sound they may
have been. Meanwhile the Japanese government announced that it was
halting all aid projects in the Northern Territories.
Post-9/11 Japanese Foreign

Policy and Russia
Japan’s strong stance in support of its U.S. ally in the global war on
terrorism had no direct bearing on its relationship with Russia, other
than the fact that the leadership of both nations understood clearly that
support for the United States should be a cornerstone of each nation’s
national strategy. The reasons for their support of the United States were
quite different. Russia’s was more nuanced, with an understanding not
only of the threats of terrorism, but also the role that the United States
could play in Central Asia, as well as a tacit agreement with the United
States over Chechnya. Japan, on the other hand, made a decision that
was in no way as difficult as the one made by Putin. Being a U.S. ally and
faced with uncertainty in Asia, it calculated that the best course would
be unwavering support.
Although many top-level diplomatic channels to Russia were shut
down after 2002, Japanese–Russian relations maintained a semblance of
normalcy, which actually grows with each year. Japanese–Russian trade
has surpassed the all-time high levels attained in the late 1980s (reach-
ing $8.8 billion in 2004), and Japanese interest in the Russian market
and Russian energy sources, in particular, has grown tremendously in
the last few years. Energy is perhaps the key strategic motivating factor
driving Japan’s Russia policy since 2002. By early 2003 it began making
serious overtures for a stake in the development and transportation of
oil and gas resources from Eastern Siberia. Of particular interest is the
proposed oil pipeline the Russians are planning to build, originally
from the Siberian oil depot Angarsk and later from Taishet, northwest
of Lake Baikal. China’s interest in this project has been well docu-
mented. As oil prices climbed in the world markets from 2003 (partially
because of the war in Iraq, but also because of growing Chinese con-
sumption), Japan’s interest in the pipeline project grew. Previously
Japanese investment had been limited to the Sakhalin shelf, where there
was a multinational presence, including a strong commitment by U.S.
oil majors.45
The Sino-Japanese competition over the pipeline involves the planning

of the terminus of the project. Originally in October 2002 Russia
and China agreed for the pipeline to be constructed from Angarsk to the
Chinese city of Daqing in the northeast. The initial estimates for
the cost of the project ran to about $2.5 billion. China was unable, how-
ever, to secure a firm pledge from Putin during his state visit to Beijing
in early December 2002.46 Japan jumped squarely into the picture with
Koizumi’s visit to Moscow and the Russian Far East in January 2003,
when he urged Putin to build a pipeline instead to the Pacific port of
Nakhodka, from whence oil could be shipped directly to Japan. It was
prepared to offer up to $8 billion initially for the so-called Pacific route,
which would include $1 billion in investment in the infrastructure of the
beleaguered Russian Far East.47 The Chinese reacted testily to the
Japanese overture at the eleventh hour, to which the Russian government
responded by announcing that a branch line could easily be built to
China.48 Over the next several months the announcements coming from
Moscow varied about what was to be done, normally according to who
gave the commentary. But it was clear that Putin himself was reluctant to
put all of his eggs in one basket, so to speak, by building a pipeline
directly into China where all the energy would be consumed. The Pacific
route offered access to all of the markets of the Asia-Pacific region,
including China and Japan.49
Through the summer of 2003, Japanese government and business
delegations visited Russia as part of an intense lobbying campaign to see
the Pacific route realized. This included a trip by Foreign Minister
Kawaguchi to Vladivostok in late June. Japanese leaders were now per-
haps less concerned about a Chinese military threat than about China
gobbling up energy supplies and forcing oil prices through the roof.
China, after all, presents Japan with more of an economic threat, than it
does a military threat, especially as long as U.S. military forces remain in
the region. The lobbying campaign for the pipeline was more than just
between the Chinese and Japanese governments. There was also a large
Russian domestic component at this point, involving the Russian oil
company Yukos, and the state-owned pipeline firm Transneft. The CEO
of Yukos Mikhail Khodorkovsky had political ambitions that ran counter
to Putin. He also favored the China pipeline, arguing that it made the
most sense economically. Transneft wanted to build a pipeline to the
Pacific. When Khodorkovsky was arrested and imprisoned indefinitely in
October 2003, the China route lost a big ally.50 The following spring a
tentative decision was made by the Japanese and Russian governments to
go ahead with the Pacific route, pending feasibility studies.51
Russia ● 217
Meanwhile there was a pulse in political relations between Moscow

and Tokyo, as well. Partially this was due to the reemergence of a nuclear
crisis on the Korean peninsula in 2002–03. Japan and Russia had been
excluded from the political negotiations around the 1993–94 crisis
much to their mutual chagrin. This time, both sides made sure they
would be included in any political settlement surrounding the penin-
sula. Moscow and Tokyo supported one another’s participation in six-
party talks, and they were indeed both invited to the table when talks
commenced in August 2003. Leaders in both countries still shared a
concern about China’s emerging power, and amicable relations gave
both countries more latitude in dealing with Beijing. Nevertheless, peace
treaty negotiations went nowhere during this period. Koizumi stuck ever
more tightly to his call for the return of all four islands in one batch
( yonto ikkatsu). Even as Putin made it clear that Russia would be
amenable to a 1956-based agreement, the Japanese government and
the Japanese public would not budge. No major leader in Japan was pre-
pared to expend the political capital necessary to compromise. Creative
diplomacy and strategic thinking were stifled. This prompted Putin to
cancel a trip to Japan, which had been tentatively scheduled for some
time in the fall of 2004.52
On the heels of his successful visit to China in October 2004, Putin
and his new foreign minister Sergei Lavrov again offered the Japanese
two islands and a peace treaty along the lines of the 1956 Joint
Declaration. In Beijing Putin had reached an agreement with Chinese
leader Hu Jintao, which had effectively put an end to the Sino-Russian
border dispute that had divided the two nations for decades. In doing
so Putin had agreed to the partial transfer of the last three disputed
islands in the Amur and Ussuri Rivers (against local opposition). 53 In a
press conference on November 16, Putin offered the Japanese a com-
promise. Putin demonstrated that he was able to push through an
agreement with the Chinese, and that he was prepared now to deal
with Tokyo. It was unclear whether this was Russia’s final position or
the beginning of a bargaining process. It made little difference, as the
official Japanese response was an immediate call for the return of all
four islands. 54 At their meeting less than a week later in Santiago,
Chile, at the APEC summit, Koizumi and Putin were unable to come
to any sort of agreement; they were also unable to finalize the dates of
the Putin visit to Japan in 2005. 55 The Japanese press was uniformly
against any compromise, and only one outlet suggested a strategic part-
nership with Russia—on the condition that Moscow return all four
islands first. 56
The year 2004 ended on a positive note for Japanese–Russian

relations when the Russian government announced that it had given the
final approval for the go-ahead for the construction of the Angarsk (now
Taishet)–Nakhodka (now Perevoznaia) pipeline. The state-owned com-
pany Transneft was given the task.57 The goal was for the pipeline to
pump 80 million tons of crude oil annually, but the cost estimates con-
tinued to balloon, reaching $11–14 billion.58 Upon the announcement,
however, the Japanese government was oddly quiet. Not much was made
of the decision in the national press. This was probably in part due to the
territorial impasse, but also to the need to temper enthusiasm about a
costly project that was still far from being commenced. It was also later
reported that the project was to be divided into two stages, the first of
which would lead to the Chinese border and transmission of oil through
a possible connecting pipeline to Daqing and the second was still not
scheduled. This created the possibility that the Chinese would benefit
most and even that if oil supplies were not expanded the extension
would not even be built.
In a January foreign ministerial meeting between Lavrov and
Machimura Nobutake, Lavrov bluntly told his Japanese counterpart that
two islands were the final offer. Again, the date for the Putin visit was
left undecided.59 Meanwhile, the Upper House of the Japanese Diet
passed a nonbinding resolution in March calling for Russia to return the
Northern Territories lost in the war. The resolution was somewhat
vaguely worded to appeal to all parties in order to get a unanimous vote,
but this had been the practice in the past and for the Japanese it was
nothing out of the ordinary. But the Russian press interpreted it as call-
ing for all of the Kuril Islands, giving it extensive coverage.60 Putin
announced that he would not be visiting Japan in the spring. There was
even a growing concern in both capitals about the viability of the
pipeline project.61 The Russian ambassador, Aleksandr Losyukov, gave
an interview in which he stated that Japanese–Russian relations were in
their worst state.62 Although Koizumi went to Moscow to join the May
celebration of the sixtieth anniversary of the victory over fascism, Japan’s
political relations with Russia seemed to be drifting toward the chill and
indifference during the cold war.
Putin’s long-anticipated visit to Tokyo, the first in five years, finally
came about on November 20–21, 2005, when he met Koizumi. The
two-day trip failed to produce any common approach on the territorial
issue; hence no communiqué could be adopted. It was a situation that
reminded some observers of the cold war chill in bilateral relations. Yet,
the trip did have significance in several ways. Putin was escorted to
Russia ● 219
Tokyo by a large delegation of business executives (over 100 people),

primarily drawn from the energy industry. The East Siberian oil pipeline
was still a pending issue—no final decision had been made—and this
was obviously a major point of discussion among business and govern-
ment executives from both sides. This marked by far the largest Russian
business presence at a bilateral summit. Normally, if outside the context
of summit meetings, it has been the Japanese side that brings large busi-
ness delegations to Russia. As two-way trade reached $10 billion in
2005, ten documents on economic cooperation held out hope that it
would rise substantially.
Where Japan once seemed to possess the carrots in the relationship,
Russia now seems to have the upper hand economically, due to energy.
Tokyo could once threaten to withhold economic assistance and invest-
ment if Moscow skirted the territorial issue. At one time, particularly in
the early 1990s and again after the 1998 economic crisis in Russia, the
later was desperate for Japanese investment, particularly in the Russian
Far East. But Russia is now cash rich thanks to the all-time high price for
oil and gas. Additionally, Russia now has other suitors for investment
and economic cooperation, having found half a dozen nations besides
Japan to invest in energy projects in the Russian Far East and Siberia,
particularly on Sakhalin. This marks a fundamental shift in the bilateral
relationship that was markedly apparent during Putin’s visit. Japanese
businesses are moving more rapidly into Russia, no matter how the gov-
ernment in Tokyo feels about the situation. One of Japan’s flagship
corporations, Toyota Motors, is building an assembly plant near
St. Petersburg. Large trading houses, including Mitsubishi and Mitsui,
are deeply involved in energy projects from the Caspian to the Pacific.
Some strategists in Japan among politicians, opinion leaders, and in
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the 1990s saw the development of rela-
tions with Russia as an important factor to strengthen Japan’s diplomatic
leverage in the changing international power balance in Northeast Asia,
notably facing the rising China. But they also clearly recognized that
Japan’s leverage in resolving the territorial issue, be it economic or oth-
erwise, was diminishing. Some kind of “gradualism” and compromise
approach on the territorial problem was inevitable, if, as an overwhelm-
ing majority of Japanese people requested, the resolution of the territor-
ial problem needed to be achieved to meet Japan’s desire to recover its
honor and identity. The Japanese government withdrawal of this policy
line by 2002 led to a complete impasse in the territorial negotiations;
however, recognition of the importance of improved relations with
Russia has not disappeared.
It could, therefore, be argued that the time in which Japan could

realistically expect to recoup all four islands has passed, and that the
territorial dispute can no longer hold up the development of the Russian
Far East or sound security relations with Russia. If so, then this could
mark an important change in Japanese policy from the search for a grand
strategic breakthrough characteristic of the 1990s to moderate policy
satisfaction to realize lukewarm but realistic relations between the two
countries.
Conclusion
One of the primary strategic drivers behind the change in Japanese
thinking toward Russia in the mid-1990s was clearly China. The percep-
tion of a “China threat” arose in the mid-1990s and kept growing, espe-
cially over the past two years. Similarly, a sense of threat from North
Korea emerged by 1998 and intensified over the past several years. In
fact, the strategic situation in Northeast Asia (including Taiwan) is at its
tensest point since the cold war. Yet, another factor has reduced the
urgency of turning to Russia in response. Japanese perceptions of the
strategic ambiguity of the United States have changed. Over the course
of the past decade Japan and the United States have significantly shored
up their security relationship, and Japanese forces support the United
States in Iraq, Afghanistan, and East Asia, including participation in the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Contingency planning and joint
maneuvers continue apace.
In this regard, a strategic rapprochement with Russia is seen as some-
thing less vital than it may have been a decade ago. Additionally,
energy and trade relations with Russia have generally experienced
positive trends over the past few years, in spite of the chilly political
relationship. If anything, the changing mood in Japan over the last
15 years after the end of the cold war now gives energy-economic and
security relations with Russia much greater legitimacy without resolu-
tion of the territorial problem. A grand strategic vision of fundamental
development of relations in three spheres—economics, security, and
territorial—now often invites apathy (i.e., the intransigence of Putin,
which makes all efforts on the territorial problem futile), frustration (it
is not in Japan’s interest to hold economics and security hostage to the
territorial problem), or even fear (i.e., the fate of those who tried to
work creatively). All these factors contribute to tepid relations with
Russia being satisfactory to political leaders, MOFA officials, and the
public in general.
Russia ● 221
This is not to say that one day in the not too distant future Japanese
leaders will not rethink Japan’s relationship with Russia. China’s new
role in Asia causes much greater anxiety in Tokyo (and in Moscow, as
well). There may be a point when Tokyo decides it needs a strong
strategic relationship with Russia. Certain exogenous shocks may force
them to come to such a conclusion (such as a war over Taiwan or Korea,
maritime incidents in the East China Sea, or a considerable spike in the
price of oil). The concrete structure of this newly born Japan–Russia
strategic relationship would also depend on how Moscow would look at
the global and regional power balance (such as their evaluation of China,
the nature of U.S. unilateralism and U.S. human rights policy, and
Japan’s readiness to accept a gradual or compromise solution on the
territorial issue). But in the meantime, Tokyo seems assured of its
relationship with Washington, giving strategic leaders less reason to seek
a partnership with Moscow.
Notes
1. Joachim Glaubitz, Between Tokyo and Moscow: The History of an Uneasy
Relationship, 1972 to the 1990s (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press,
1995), pp. 181–98. See also Hiroshi Kimura, Distant Neighbors (Vol. I):
Japanese–Russian Relations under Brezhnev and Andropov (Armonk, NY: M.E.
Sharpe, 2000), p. 211.
2. Gilbert Rozman, Japan’s Response to the Gorbachev Era, 1985–1991: A Rising
Superpower Views a Declining One (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1992), p. 151. See also Kazuhiko Togo, Nichiro shinjidai e no joso: Dakai no
kagi wo motomete (Tokyo: Saimaru, 1993), pp. 42, 182.
3. Statistics from the Japanese Ministry of Finance cited in Okada Kunio,
“Nikkei kigyo shinshutsu no koki wa?” Gaiko forum, No. 149 (December
2000), pp. 56–61.
4. The 1956 Joint Declaration had stated that upon the signing of a peace treaty
the Soviet Union would return the island of Shikotan and the island group of
Habomai to Japan. See Nobuo Shimotomai, “Japan–Soviet Relations under
Perestroika: Perceptions and Interactions between Two Capitals,” in Gilbert
Rozman, ed., Japan and Russia: The Tortuous Path to Normalization,
1949–1999 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), p. 112.
5. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, The Northern Territories Dispute and Russo-Japanese
Relations (Berkeley, CA: International and Area Studies, University of
California Press, 1998), pp. 246–49. See also Rozman, Japan’s Response to the
Gorbachev Era, p. 151; and Togo, Nichiro shinjidai e no joso, pp. 42, 182.
6. Both Rozman and Hasegawa date the change to thinking among Japanese to
1988. See Hasegawa, The Northern Territories Dispute, pp. 285–89; Rozman,
Japan’s Response to the Gorbachev Era, p. 112. Shimotomai dates the change
to 1989, “Japan–Soviet Relations under Perestroika,” p. 113.
7. Togo, Nichiro shinjidai e no joso, pp. 17–19, 24–25.
8. Andrei Kozyrev, Preobrazhenie (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnie otnosheniia,
1995), p. 295. Also see Edamura Sumio, Teikoku kaitai zengo (Tokyo:
Toshishuppan, 1997), p. 143.
9. Of the aid dispensed, $1.8 billion was in the form of trade insurance for
Japanese companies doing business in Russia (most used for energy projects),
$500 million for humanitarian assistance distributed through loans by the
Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), and $200 million in
JBIC export credits (source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan’s Assistance
for the Russian Federation, April 2000).
10. Edamura, Teikoku kaitai zengo, pp. 268–69, 282.
11. In 1992 Japanese private investment in Russia reached just over $40 million;
the same year Japanese private sources invested over $1 billion in China,
The Wall Street Journal, October 13, 1993.
12. Edamura, Teikoku kaitai zengo, pp. 346–50; Hiroshi Kimura, Distant
Neighbors (Vol. 2): Japanese-Russian Relations under Gorbachev and Yeltsin
(Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), pp. 166–71.
13. Raymond Garthoff, The Great Transition: American–Soviet Relations and the
End of the Cold War (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994),
p. 468. See also Andrei Markov, Rossiia i Iaponiia: V poiskakh soglasiia
(Moscow: RAN, Institut Dal’nego Vostoka, 1996), pp. 78, 93.
14. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, “Why Did Russia and Japan Fail to Achieve
Rapprochement in 1991–1996?” in Rozman, Japan and Russia: The Tortuous
Path to Normalization, pp. 184–85, 200. See also Joseph Ferguson, Continuing
Patterns in Japanese–Russian Relations, 1996–2002 (Ph.D. Dissertation, The
Johns Hopkins University, 2004), p. 159.
15. Stepan Pesh, “Zapretnyi paltus: Iaponskie brakonery stanut rybolevami
posle uregolirovaniia spora o severnykh territoriiakh,” Novoe vremia, No. 35
(September 1994), pp. 24–25.
16. Hasegawa, The Northern Territories Dispute (Vol. 2), pp. 491–93.
17. Nishimura Yoichi, “Yurashia gaiko no butaiura,” Sekai (January 1998),p. 143.
18. “Boeicho ga tsuini Roshia-sei sentoki o konyu ka,” Foresight (June 1996),
p. 22. Also see RFE/RL?, April 29, 1996.
19. Nishimura, “Yurashia gaiko no Butaiura,” p. 142.
20. Nishimura, “Yurashia gaiko no butaiura,” pp. 138–47. Also see Hakamada
Shigeki, “Aratana Nichiro kankei kochaku e no teigen,” Foresight (August
1997), pp. 6–9.
21. “Address by Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto to the Japan Association of
Corporate Executives” (Washington, DC: Translation issued by The
Embassy of Japan, July 1997), pp. 5–6.
22. “Kurasunoyarusuku ni okeru Nichiro shuno kaidan (gaiyo to hyoka)”
(Washington, DC: The Embassy of Japan, November 1997). The
Hashimoto–Yeltsin Plan called for: (1) an initiative for joint investment;
Russia ● 223
(2) Russia’s integration into international economic organizations;

(3) expanding assistance for Russian reforms; (4) Japanese training of young
Russian business managers; (5) a strengthening of the energy dialogue; and
(6) cooperation toward the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
23. Michael Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism (New York: Palgrave, 2001),
pp. 6, 23–24.
24. Asahi shimbun, March 30, May 23, 1998.
25. See Jamestown Monitor, January 6, 1998. I have also drawn on interviews
with correspondents from the Hokkaido shimbun in 1997.
26. Mori Shinjiro, “Nichiro shuno ‘Kawana kaidan’ no butaiura,” Sekai
(June 1998), pp. 126–32.
27. Asahi shimbun, Yomiuri shimbun, November 14, 1998.
28. Sugano Tetsuo, “Russia’s Economy and Development of the Far East,” in
Koji Watanabe, ed., Engaging Russian in the Asia Pacific (Tokyo: Japan
Center for International Exchange, 1999), p. 85. It should be noted,
however, that large-scale investment in the energy infrastructure of Sakhalin
was on the verge of accelerating.
29. “Roshia gensen 50-ki kaitai e zaisei shien,” Yomiuri shimbun, April 21,
1999; “Roshia kakukaitai ni 2 oku doru shinki shien,” Yomiuri shimbun,
June 16, 1999.
30. Yomiuri shimbun, August 9, 2000.
31. Sankei shimbun, July 28, 2000; Yomiuri shimbun, August 4, 2000. Also see
Wada Haruki, “Sukyandaru to gaiko,” Sekai, May 2002, pp. 71–77.
32. The Nonaka–Foreign Ministry exchange was communicated to the author
in a conversation with a former high-ranking ministry official who wished
to remain anonymous.
33. Napsnet Daily Report, September 5, 2000, as quoted in Peggy Falkenheim
Meyer, “Is Japan’s New Eurasian Diplomacy a Failure?” (Unpublished paper,
2000).
34. The Japanese proposal was outlined several months prior to the summit in a
series of controversial articles published in the Sankei shimbun, December
27–29, 2000.
35. See Toshikawa Takao, “ ‘Muneo Paji’ de miushinatta gaiko-Gaimusho
kaikaku,” Sekai, May 2002, pp. 78–87; Hakamada Shigeki, “Irukutsuku no
genso,” Sekai shuho (May 2001), pp. 6–9.
36. Yomiuri shimbun, April 8, 2001; Hakamada Shigeki, “Irukutsuku no genso,”
Sekai shuho (May 2001), pp. 6–9; Sankei shimbun, March 26, 2001.
37. Asahi shimbun, May 10–11, 2001.
38. Izvestiia, May 19, 2001; Itar-Tass, May 21, 27, 2001; Yomiuri shimbun,
June 21, 26, 28, 2001.
39. Asahi shimbun, Yomiuri shimbun, October 22, 2001.
40. “Moscow Blasts US, Japan for Regional ABM System Plans,” Moscow
Interfax, February 24, 2000, as cited in FBIS-EAS-2000-0224. Also,
Interfax, April 26, 2000, as cited in FBIS-SOV-2000-0426.
41. Asahi shimbun, Nihon keizai shimbun, Yomiuri shimbun, January 19, 2002.
42. Vremya novostei, January 28, 2002.

43. Hakamada Shigeki, “Roshia ni gokai o ataeru yo na Nihonteki ‘kikubari
gaiko’ o aratameyo,” Nihon no ronten, 2001 (Tokyo: Bungei shunju, 2001),
pp. 130–35.
44. Jamestown Monitor, February 5, 2002.
45. Japanese companies have a 30% share in the Sakhalin-1 project, totaling
approximately $4 billion. In the Sakhalin-2 project, they invested 45% of
the total amount of $12 billion. See the interview with Japan’s Ambassador
Nomura Issei in Novoe vremia (January 2005).
46. The Wall Street Journal, December 2–3, 2002.
47. Financial Times, January 14, 2003.
48. “Moscow Testing China’s Patience on Oil Exports,” RFE/RL, February 26,
2003.
49. Putin gave this opinion at a news conference on June 20, 2003. Text of
the news conference was supplied by the official Kremlin website ⬍www.
kremlin.ru.⬎.
50. Asia Times, December 9, 2003.
51. BBC News, March 22, 2004.
52. Kyodo News Service, May 9, 2004.
53. BBC News, October 16, 27, 2004.
54. Nihon keizai shimbun, November 16, 2004.
55. Asahi shimbun, Nihon keizai shimbun, Yomiuri shimbun, November 16–17,
2004.
56. Yomiuri shimbun, November 24, 2004.
57. Nihon keizai shimbun, January 1, 2005.
58. Asia Times, January 4, 2005.
59. Sankei shimbun, February 2, 2005.
60. Kommersant, March 9, 2005; Nezavisimaia gazeta, March 10, 2005.
61. Eurasia Daily Monitor, Issue 2, Vols. 68 and 72, April 7, 13, 2005. Also,
Financial Times, April 29, 2005.
62. Asahi shimbun, February 10, 2005.
CHAPTER 10
Japan’s Strategic Thinking

toward Central Asia
Akio Kawato
T
he Eurasian continent in ancient times consisted of three
major civilizations: China, the Orient (composite of Egypt,
Mesopotamia, and Persia), and the Roman Empire. Today
Oriental civilization, which has probably the oldest origin among the
three and extends from Morocco to the Ferghana Valley and even to
Xinjiang, is mostly ignored, being simply identified with Islam and
backwardness. Its glory as the center of science and art went into obliv-
ion, connections among nations were ignored, and, owing to its critical
geographical location, the history of the Eurasian continent as seen from
East Asia was thereby deformed into a collection of separate civilizations.
The situation is even worse for Central Asia. Although it used to be
one of the centers of Oriental culture, it is today considered to be a mere
desert and backward former colony of the Soviet Union. In fact Central
Asia possesses vast arable land between the Amu and Sir Rivers and peo-
ple originating from this region often played vital roles in the politics
and economies of surrounding countries, such as India and China. The
Mughal dynasty in India was founded by an Uzbek prince, Babur.
Afghanistan used to be an indivisible part of the advanced Oriental civi-
lization. The role of Persians, Central Asian people, and nomad nations
in Chinese history and its economy is not yet fully studied. Central Asia
is a missing link in world history.
Today Central Asia is regaining its independent position in the
world. The fall of the Soviet Union, the rise of Chinese power, and the
226 ● Akio Kawato
stationing of U.S. armed forces—all keep the balance of power in this

region constantly changing. A serious “Great Game” has not yet started,
but it is increasingly becoming important for major powers to have some
stake in this region. For Japan, located in Asia and being a neighbor
of Russia and China, it is vital to have a viable strategy vis-à-vis
Central Asia.
Japan’s Strategy—an Oxymoron?

Strategy in Japan’s foreign policy may sound like an oxymoron, because
in the eyes of many Japanese, deprived of the capacity to project her will
abroad by forcible means since 1945, Japan is not a full-fledged state.
Her dependence on the United States in security strengthens such an
impression.
A unitary government typical of a “nation state” was not intrinsic for
Japan through most of her history. Separated from the continent by
the sea, Japan before the Meiji Restoration almost always enjoyed the
leisure of living under dual or even triple centers of power: Emperor and
aristocrats at one time, emperor and samurai at other times, and even
emperor, samurai, and merchants at certain moments. The absolute
power of the emperor and an articulate self-identification of Japan as a
nation state—all these were new for Japan from 1868, and she adopted
them to cope with the colonialist powers. Thus, Japan in the Meiji
period began to formulate a clear national strategy: to achieve industri-
alization as quickly as possible and build strong armed forces to defend
herself and, subsequently, to acquire overseas colonies. Eventually, she
extended her sway through much of China, but she did not gain control
over western areas that would have inserted her into border relations in
Central Asia or face the Soviet Union’s domination there.
After World War II (WWII), Japan was deprived of military means to
realize her interests overseas. However, this does not mean that postwar
Japan did not possess any strategy. As long as a nation survives, she has
her own interest and will, which can be realized by a “strategy”: a scenario
to achieve one’s own goals. Japan’s foreign policy after WWII was not as
passive as some pundits assume. When Japan’s intention does not go
against U.S. interests, she can pursue her own policy safely. One should
not overlook the fact that Japan possesses a set of peaceful but effective
means to promote her strategy. In fact, Japanese diplomats abroad always
enjoy substantial privileges emanating from the fact that Japan is the
second-largest economic power in the world. Access to the policymakers
is fairly easy, and third country diplomats are always attentive to what
Central Asia ● 227
Japanese have to say. Economic power can be converted into political

power, usually without much fanfare.
Many countries appreciate Japan’s economic assistance program,
because it is not merely donations of money, but a serious attempt to
improve the economic and social infrastructure of developing nations.
These countries do not hesitate in rendering support for Japan’s interna-
tional initiatives. What is more, Japan has a high degree of “soft power”: the
charm of her affluent and free society, and the appeal of her traditional
as well as contemporary culture. Employing these means, Japan is capa-
ble of actively promoting her interests overseas, especially in Asia.
In accordance with the “Fukuda Doctrine,” Japan helped the ASEAN
countries’ economic development, at the same time urging them to unite
in regionalism. Today ASEAN is both politically and economically
a viable entity. Japan established diplomatic relations with North
Vietnam in 1973 even before unification, irritating the U.S. administra-
tion. After imposing sanctions in 1989 Japan was the first country to
resume economic assistance to China, overriding criticism from the West
that Japan neglected the human rights issue. When Cambodia held her
first general election, Japan’s political role was vital. These are some
examples of an active foreign policy, drawing on soft power linked to
substantial economic assistance.
It is true that Japan found it possible to realize her own strategy only
within the confinement of the American grand strategy, but the end of
the cold war and the surge of Chinese power have given the Japan–U.S.
alliance a more relative character. Japan now finds a more urgent need
for strategic thinking on how to ensure a balance of power around her-
self, which would serve her security and prosperity. Her policy in Central
Asia should constitute one of the links in such a strategy.
Japan, however, has been suffering from several constraints in realiz-
ing her own strategy. She could not establish an AMF because of joint
objections by the United States and China, and she was unable to fully
develop ties with Iran and Myanmar because of American objections.
Each case was specific, but at the bottom lies America’s basic considera-
tion: do not allow Japan to take the sole lead in Asia.
Japan has her own home-made limitations, too. For example, the
prime minister and even the foreign minister are usually obliged to stay in
Tokyo while the Diet is in session. When they go abroad, they have to ask
for its consent. So these leaders can only rarely visit those areas of the
world that are not deemed vital for Japan’s interests, for example, Central
Asia, making Japan’s foreign policy an “on-and-off diplomacy.” Visits to
such regions may rouse brief attention and create a false impression of
228 ● Akio Kawato
Japan’s quasi-initiatives, but over the ensuing years the momentum can
hardly be maintained merely by the efforts of Japanese diplomats.
The way of thinking of the majority of Japanese diplomats is such
that changes and new trends in and outside of this country are not
noticed and dealt with in a timely fashion. In their eyes, the order of
importance of each region and country rarely changes. Each regional
department of MOFA acts independently. Usually it takes the interven-
tion of the vice minister to coordinate the activities of the interested
departments for one or another big diplomatic operation. Those diplo-
mats who work on relations with Russia, for example, tend to solve
issues solely on a bilateral basis without fully recognizing the fact that
Japan’s overall position vis-à-vis the United States and Asia greatly affects
Russia’s attitude toward Japan.
Japanese diplomacy suffers from one more snag, too: stereotyped
reporting by the international media. Even when Japan’s initiatives are
politically motivated, the international media often discerns only eco-
nomic motives, thus reproducing the image that Japan is a mere vassal of
the United States and does not possess her own strategy. These con-
straints all apply to strategic thinking toward Central Asia.
Japan’s Diplomacy in Central Asia—the Start

Japan has been very ignorant about Central Asia, although the latter’s
cultural influence was conspicuous in ancient Japan. Under Soviet rule,
Central Asia grew even more remote in the eyes of the Japanese, becom-
ing mixed up with the image of Russia. As the Japanese did not possess
a positive view on the USSR, Central Asia was even more neglected
because it was considered to be a mere “backward” part of the USSR.
When the Soviet Union fell apart in 1991, U.S. Secretary of State
James Baker made a quick tour of the newly independent states of the
CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States), promising support and
announcing the opening of U.S. embassies. Japan opened her first
embassies in Central Asia only in January 1993 (in Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan). Such a slow move reflects yet another drawback in Japanese
diplomacy; the acute shortage of diplomats with a fair command of lan-
guages such as Russian. Also, opening a new embassy takes a long time;
one can be opened only when an old embassy elsewhere is scrapped
to restrain the overall number of embassies. What is more, the new
Japanese ambassadors were left on their own because the officials in
Tokyo did not have the capacity to pay enough attention to these new
countries. The number of personnel and the budget were very limited,
obliging the ambassadors themselves to draft cables to ask for more

resources and attention.
In the first half of the 1990s, Kyrgyzstan drew the largest attention of
the Japanese government. It became the first Central Asian country
which a Japanese foreign minister visited. President Akayev at that time
was considered to be the most reform-oriented among CIS leaders.
It was assumed that because the economy is small, Japan’s assistance
would be more effective, turning Kyrgyzstan into a showcase of Japan’s
ODA, and, thus, greatly enhancing Japan’s position among CIS
countries and Russia. That was the tacit calculation of Japanese officials
at the time. However, it became clear that the Kyrgyz government was
not prepared for implementation of large assistance projects, and gradu-
ally priority was transferred to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the two most
populous Central Asian countries. If Kazakhstan is important due to her
large oil reserves, Uzbekistan occupies a geopolitically vital place at the
center of the Eurasian continent, possessing the largest political influ-
ence. Uzbekistan is regarded as the key country in Central Asia based on
the reasoning that if the situation becomes unstable in this country, it
will easily spread to neighboring states, affecting the balance of power in
the eastern half of Eurasia.
Turkmenistan from an early stage also had drawn the attention of
Japanese business because of its huge natural gas reserves; however, rela-
tions were slow to materialize and only in 2005 did Japan open its offi-
cial liaison office in Ashkhabad. Toward the end of the civil war in
Tajikistan Japan showed interest in the postwar settlement and economic
development in that country. It was a way to lift Japan’s international
position: rendering altruistic help for another state’s well-being. But its
presence never became permanent in Tajikistan before the opening of a
liaison office in 2002.
It is ironic that the less the attention a country draws, the easier it is
to develop a coherent strategy vis-à-vis that part of the world. If a coun-
try has a strong bearing on one’s diplomacy, opinions may differ too
much, making it hard to elaborate an articulate and consistent strategy.
Central Asia for Japan is a case in point. A small number of high-ranking
officials gradually formulated Japan’s policy vis-à-vis Central Asia. For
Uzbekistan the role of MOFA officials is noteworthy. They visited
Uzbekistan many times, not only because they were asked to come by the
Japanese ambassador at the time and they had sympathy toward Uzbeks,
but also because they clearly saw the geopolitical importance of Uzbekistan
and its meaning in Japan’s foreign policy. For them Central Asia, located
between China and Russia, is vital for maintenance of the balance of
230 ● Akio Kawato
power and stability in eastern Eurasia, and if Japan established its foot-
ing there, she would get a card to play with China and Russia. For exam-
ple Chino Tadao, vice minister for financial affairs at that time,
established friendly relations with President Karimov and government
officials, giving frank advice for economic reforms.1 In 1994 Karimov
made his first visit to Japan and by 1997 Japan had given about $500
million in soft loans and grants to Uzbekistan, making the latter a show-
case of Japan’s assistance in Central Asia.
Japan had to be cautious, though, so as not to incur criticism from the
West that Japan provides easy money, ignoring human rights issues and
the need to impose further economic reforms. Japanese society is one of
the most democratic in the world, and human rights are well guarded.
However, Japan was never hasty in spreading the values of democracy
and freedom to other countries. Out of her own historical experience she
knows very well that without economic development real democracy is
hard to achieve. Therefore, her main efforts were directed toward con-
struction of economic infrastructure in developing nations.
Meanwhile, Kazakhstan was always in Japan’s sight. Her oil resources
attracted the attention of Japanese business and her large geographical
size, located between Russia and China, drew the attention of Japan’s
MOFA. Watanabe Michio, Japanese foreign minister, made a visit to this
country already in 1992, and Kazakh President Nazarbayev visited Japan
in April 1994, one month ahead of Karimov. However, rich in oil
resources, Kazakhstan was not enthusiastic about receiving Japanese eco-
nomic assistance, which for Japan is one of the limited means to promote
bilateral relations. It was only toward 1998 that Kazakhstan accepted a
substantial Japanese soft loan. For many Japanese Kazakh officials seemed
“haughty,” leading to preference to the Uzbeks who always received the
Japanese very cordially.
The second wave of Japan’s involvement came with the announcement
of “Silk Road Diplomacy.” By 1997 Togo Kazuhiko, then deputy director
general of the Department of European and Oceanic Affairs, had realized
the geopolitical importance of the Caucasus and Central Asia and pro-
posed that Japan should not fall behind in filling the vacuum in this
region. It was argued that Japan’s clout there would benefit her diplomacy
vis-à-vis Russia, China, and the Middle East, even if there was little speci-
ficity about what benefits actually might be realized. Togo’s department
formulated three principles, which were later named “Silk Road
Diplomacy,”2 and gradually started promulgating them. Toward the end
of June and the beginning of July of 1997 Obuchi Keizo, a member of the
Lower House who became prime minister in 1998, led a large delegation
(approximately 60 people consisting of politicians, government officials,

businessmen, and academics) to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan,
and Uzbekistan. His initiative, undertaken under the name of “Eurasian
diplomacy,” must have been coordinated with MOFA and the Prime
Minister’s Office.
In July 1997 an indication came down from the Prime Minister’s
Office to give MOFA’s comments on a major speech on “Eurasian
diplomacy” drafted by that office.3 The Department of European and
Oceanic Affairs in one night summarized the office’s ideas, including
“Silk Road Diplomacy” and revised the draft. The speech was delivered
by Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro to Keizai Doyukai on July 24.
The speech also launched a new approach to Russia. This is a good
example of how quick and dynamic Japan’s foreign policy can be, when
both the prime minister and the officials in charge happen to be innova-
tive and imaginative, insofar as most major diplomatic policies are
decided by the tandem of the Prime Minister’s Office and MOFA.
“Silk Road Diplomacy” was highly lauded by countries in the
Caucasus and Central Asia. They anticipated not only Japan’s ODA, but
also her political involvement, which would dilute the effect of their
overdependence on either Russia or the United States. However, this was
doomed to become yet another example of the “on-and-off diplomacy”
of Japan. In July 1998 Akino Yutaka, political adviser for the UN moni-
toring operation in Tajikistan and well-regarded academic who toiled for
the repatriation of Tajik refugees from Afghanistan, was murdered by
local fighters. Soon after that Hashimoto had to step down as prime
minister because of a defeat for the LDP in the Upper House elections.
Almost at the same time there was a regular rotation in the MOFA, and
the officials who had initiated the policy toward Central Asia moved
elsewhere. Implementation of “Silk Road Diplomacy” was left to their
successors, who achieved slow progress. In May 1999 Minister for
Foreign Affairs Komura Masahiko visited Uzbekistan. Liaison Offices
were opened in Tajikistan in January 2002 and in Kyrgyzstan in January
2003. JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency) opened its offices
in Tashkent in 1999 and Kyrgyzstan in 2000 respectively, starting active
support for reforms in these countries. VIP visits remained rare, but
Japan’s footing in Central Asia grew (the Caucasus lagged behind, partly
because Japan did not have any embassy until 2000 when she opened
one in Azerbaijan). Japan by then had become the No.1 donor of ODA
for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. She hosted in Tokyo a
Consultative Group Meeting of donors for Tajikistan in 2001, inviting
President Rakhmonov.
232 ● Akio Kawato
The 9/11 terrorist attack in New York and the ensuing battle in
Afghanistan raised international attention for Central Asia. A large part
of the humanitarian aid by the UN went to Afghanistan via Central Asia.
This was largely financed by Japan and was supervised by Oshima
Kenzo, then deputy director general of the UN. Simultaneously, the
Japanese government conferred more than $20 million of urgent grants
to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. They were used for importing capital
goods, which were vital for the economic development and political sta-
bility of these countries. In Tajikistan, for example, combines, tractors,
and other agricultural machinery were imported from Uzbekistan,
Russia, and Ukraine.
In July 2002 Sugiura Seiken, senior vice minister for foreign affairs,
made a tour of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan,
heading an energy mission. This was done on the initiative of the
MOFA, which attempted to draw the attention of Japanese business to
this part of the world. However, economic considerations have been
playing a marginal role in relations with Central Asia. The total volume
of trade in 2003 was merely $446 million (about 0.5 percent of Japan’s
foreign trade), and Japanese companies had not invested much money in
this region because it is landlocked and business there is subject to many
inconveniences, the remnant of the rigid socialist economy. The energy
mission produced few concrete results.
Toward Multilateralism: Central Asia Plus Japan

In late July 2002 President Karimov paid his second visit to Japan.
He had visited Washington D.C. in March and had signed a document
on “Strategic Partnership” with the United States. Having decided to
provide the Hanabad base for use by the American Air Force, he shifted
the pivot of his foreign policy to the United States and Japan. Probably he
calculated that in this way he would be able to thwart the Russian impe-
rialistic intention to subjugate Central Asia again and that thanks to
lucrative financial aid by Japan and the United States Uzbekistan would
be able to accomplish a smooth transformation into a market economy.
Karimov proposed to Japan to agree to a similar “Strategic Partnership”
and a separate document on economic cooperation. In the first document
Japan was urged to contribute to the security of Uzbekistan. As ambas-
sador to Uzbekistan at the time, I had the impression that the initiative to
conclude such a document came directly from Karimov, although most
officials in his government were skeptical whether Japan could make a
real contribution to Uzbek security. Karimov, for his part, was probably
eager to draw political benefit from Japan’s economic assistance, which he

had come to highly esteem by that time.
Japan’s assistance in the construction of infrastructure in Uzbekistan
(Japan’s yen loan was used for laying a vast network of optic fiber lines
across the country, modernization of local airports, opening tens of voca-
tional colleges, construction of a factory to repair old railway wagons,
construction of a huge power plant, etc.) promoted the economy, thus
enhancing political stability. It allowed Uzbekistan to secure her depar-
ture from colonialist subjugation. Karimov was aware that Japan does
not possess any imperialist ambition vis-à-vis Central Asia, seeing it as a
safe and reliable force for avoiding overdependence either on Russia or
the United States. He pursued a political goal even in the economy, ask-
ing for Japan’s yen loan for construction of a new railway, which will
reduce dependence on Russia and Turkmenistan and will open a new
transportation route to the Persian Gulf via Afghanistan.
In Japan, however, the implementation of these agreements was left to
the mercy of diplomats and other government officials. The Central
Asian desk of the MOFA again had to engage in an obstacle course to
gain the attention of higher officials and obtain financial and other
resources. When I replaced Nakayama Kyoko in 2002 as ambassador to
Uzbekistan, I did not possess enough connections. She had come from
the Ministry of Finance and enjoyed the support also of the Japanese
Bank for International Cooperation. I could count only on MOFA for
promotion of my ideas. In the renamed Ministry of Financial Affairs the
situation was changing. A new generation of officials did not share the
passionate view on Uzbekistan of their predecessors, such as Chino.
Their priority was to follow the line of the IMF and the World Bank,
which became increasingly dubious about Uzbek performance in human
rights and economic reforms. The general atmosphere in MOFA too was
not positive toward Central Asia, an unknown newcomer in world poli-
tics and a “mere part of the former Soviet Union.” The Central Asia desk
tried to realize a visit either of the prime minister or the minister of for-
eign affairs to the region, but their attempts were always thwarted by
other departments, which proposed “more urgent and more important”
visits elsewhere. The yen loan for construction of the new railway in
Uzbekistan was finally approved only in August of 2004.
At the same time, a new idea was fermenting among interested
Japanese diplomats. By the autumn of 2003 new people had taken
charge of Central Asia in MOFA and welcomed new ideas. As ambas-
sador, I suggested to Uzbek officials that regional integration such as
ASEAN would serve the interests of all Central Asian countries in
234 ● Akio Kawato
strengthening their political independence and economies. My colleagues

in other Central Asian countries and in the Tokyo home office were also
reaching a similar idea independently. This thinking found a unified,
concrete form when the first Central Asian ambassadorial meeting was
held in Tashkent in September 2003 with the participation of high-ranking
officials from the home office. All participants expressed support when
an idea was floated to establish a forum “Central Asia plus Japan” and to
strengthen multilateralism and regional coordination, if not integration,
in the region. When Uzbek foreign minister Sadyk Safaev paid his first
official visit to Japan in December 2003, this idea was formally conveyed
to him by Foreign Minister Kawaguchi Yoriko. Simultaneously, Japan’s
MOFA started coordination with other Central Asian states to launch a
joint forum “Central Asia plus Japan.”
The future form of Japan’s involvement in Central Asian affairs was
much discussed among Japanese officials at that time. One possibility
was to take part in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). But
the consensus among Japanese officials was that if Japan joined this
mechanism as the only non-socialist country, she might end up being
used by other members, and without the involvement of Western coun-
tries SCO will not become an effective organization. Another possibility
was to hold a joint meeting with the CACO (Central Asian Cooperation
Organization). However, as CACO did not seem a reliable body and,
meanwhile, Russia was accepted as a member in May 2004, the only
choice for Japan was to launch a new forum “Central Asia plus Japan.”
The model was ASEAN ⫹ 3 (Japan, China, and South Korea). This
form ensures flexibility for Japan, because it does not close the door for
others, while for the time being there was no necessity for cumbersome
coordination with a large number of participants. The Department of
European and Oceanic Affairs gradually began lobbying to have the
Minister of Foreign Affairs Kawaguchi go to Central Asia in the summer
of 2004, the typical season for Japan’s diplomacy.
In August 2004 Kawaguchi made official visits to Uzbekistan,
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. In Tashkent she delivered a
major speech in front of the local dignitaries and foreign representatives,
presenting three principles in dealing with Central Asian countries:
respect for diversity, a cooperative rivalry, and openness to the participa-
tion of third parties. Kawaguchi articulately called for further democrati-
zation and economic reforms, cautioning the conservative forces in an
unusually blunt tone from attempting to guard their vested interests
under the guise of “tradition.” On August 28 she held a joint meeting in
Astana, Kazakhstan, with the ministers of foreign affairs of all the Central
Asian countries except Turkmenistan. (These ministers were in Astana for

a regular meeting of the CACO; however, they met Kawaguchi indepen-
dent of this framework.) The ensuing joint statement declared that Japan
and the four Central Asian countries had agreed to launch the new
forum, “Central Asia plus Japan.”
Kawaguchi did not resort to the notorious “checkbook diplomacy”
and did not announce any spectacular aid package. This was a rare exam-
ple where Japan’s working-level officials elaborated a coherent strategy to
create a new international framework. The general lack of interest in
Central Asia brought an opportunity where MOFA officials could create
an articulate new initiative without help from the Prime Minister’s
Office. This was not subject to attentive discussion in the Diet or even
close attention from the mass media. Thus, the initiative was coherent,
but at the same time fragile.
Fundamental Change after the Andijan Incident

On May 13, 2005, a group of armed intruders assaulted a prison in
Andijan to free the inmates. In ensuing events a large number of citizens
were shot to death. The European Union (EU) and the United States, to
different degrees, blamed the Uzbek authorities for shooting the unarmed
citizens, whereas Russia and China openly defended the actions of
the Uzbek government. Japan took a cautious approach and urged the
Uzbek government to provide a more plausible explanation about
the cause and the outcome of the incident. Japan did not publicly
denounce the Uzbek authorities. On July 6 the SCO held its annual
summit in Almaty, and all participants demanded in their joint
declaration that the United States define more clearly how long its
armed forces intend to use the bases in Central Asia, inasmuch as the sit-
uation in Afghanistan was heading toward stability and the mission of
the American armed forces was being fulfilled. Later, on July 29 the
Uzbek government sent a blunt diplomatic note to the American
Embassy in Tashkent, urging it to withdraw all U.S. forces within six
months. By November all U.S. troops and airplanes left the Uzbek
territory, and soon after that Karimov flew to Moscow and signed a
treaty on mutual security. Uzbek foreign policy has made a turnabout.
For some years the world media had been talking about a new “Great
Game” in Central Asia. However, it is noteworthy that no big power
other than Russia has a vital interest in this region. As Russian influence
remained limited after the fall of the Soviet Union, a power vacuum
resulted. Without a serious caretaker Central Asia was becoming an orphan
236 ● Akio Kawato
in world politics. The United States has not been able to formulate an
unequivocal policy toward Central Asia, being unable to synthesize var-
ious considerations: the oil in Kazakhstan, the need to secure the use of
military bases for operations in Afghanistan, and aspirations to spread
democracy and a market economy. China has a burning desire for energy
resources in Central Asia, but her political ambition for dominance is
not yet fully visible. Moreover, China still lacks the capacity to project
her influence to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, which do not share com-
mon borders with China. Her culture and the mentality of the people are
much different from the ones in Central Asia, which is still under the
legacy of past Russian influence.
The EU has a tendency to try to expand its cultural, economic, and
(eventually) political spheres, and Central Asia is no exception. Central
Asia is the only area in the world where both the ADB (Asian
Development Bank) and the EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development) are active. The EU countries have been rendering
substantial economic assistance and advice; yet, they face severe com-
mercial competition, and their hands tend to be tied by public opinion
that denounces assistance to authoritarian regimes. India, Iran, and Turkey
all have strong historical ties with Central Asia and have renewed their
interest in this region; yet their capacity to project influence is still
limited. Japan’s economic assistance plays a substantial role in
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, but her involvement in Central
Asia still lacks general understanding and support in her own society.
She does not possess serious weight in either politics or security affairs in
this region. Therefore, a real “New Great Game” had not started yet in
Central Asia, when the rapprochement between Uzbekistan and Russia
substantially changed the political map in Central Asia. But before going
into this strategic reorientation, we need to take a glance back at the
background of the remarkable shift in Uzbek foreign policy.
One has to note that even before the Andijan incident the United States
and Russia had been gradually changing places in the eyes of the Uzbeks.
If America in the past posed as liberator and generous financier for Central
Asian countries, the authoritarian regimes in the former Soviet Union had
come to fear the United States, which may attempt to topple their regime
for the sake of democracy and reforms. Wary of the intentions of
the Americans, Uzbekistan has been strengthening her tilt toward Russia.
Upset that the United States did not pay them enough for their indepen-
dent policy from Russia and the introduction of economic reforms, the
authorities turned instead to Russia, which could provide some money
from her huge new oil income, and, more importantly, would not attempt
to topple the government. The Uzbek army for the first time after the fall
of the Soviet Union engaged in a joint exercise with the Russian armed
forces in 2005.
Russia gladly took advantage of this situation and even touted herself as
a bridgehead of political freedom and economic reforms. The Uzbek elite,
eager to maintain their position from the days of the Soviet Union, wel-
comed the return of Russia, which they still consider as the center of civi-
lization. Russia looks attractive to the common people in Central Asia as
well. Expectations that someday an American would knock on their door
to offer lucrative help never came true, and what is more the United States
imposes, in their eyes, a foreign culture that is not compatible with theirs.
If in the United States the people from Central Asia are generally not rec-
ognized, in Russia they are still somehow reckoned with and it is easier for
the Uzbeks to do business in Russia. Knowledge of Russian and Russian
mores contrasts with weak knowledge of the English language and
American ways of thinking. The Andijan incident and the conclusion of a
security pact between Uzbekistan and Russia have made this tendency
decisive. If the United States wants to keep her influence in Central Asia,
she will need a more cohesive and consistent policy than up to now.
China’s political role in Central Asia is on the rise too. Shortly after
the Andijan incident Karimov flew to Beijing for an official visit as
scheduled, and China publicly announced her support for the Uzbek
government in its handling of the Andijan incident. China later joined
the joint declaration of the SCO and objected to the location of
American armed forces in Central Asia. In this way, the world was made
to understand that China is a natural player in Central Asia and that the
United States is an outsider.
China has become attractive as a donor of economic assistance, too.
In the 2004 SCO summit, Hu Jintao announced that China is going to
offer Central Asia soft loans amounting to $900 million. Representatives
of Chinese oil and natural gas companies frequently visit Central Asia in
quest of resources, promising to finance a wide range of projects. China’s
status is on the rise in Central Asia, and it is interesting to see how long
Russia can continue its collusion with China against the United States.
A new “Great Game” may well start between China and Russia.
Redefinition of Interests: Toward Establishment

of a Central Asian Version of ARF
After the fall of the Soviet empire, Central Asian countries were urged to
reform themselves to introduce democracy and a market economy, both
238 ● Akio Kawato
of which had been only gradually established in Western Europe and

America, taking much time and bloodshed. Any attempt to achieve these
two goals in a short time would incite total chaos, as was the case in
Russia in the early 1990s. Therefore, Central Asian countries merely vac-
illated between major powers depending upon when and what they pro-
vide. In their eyes there was no country in the world on whose assistance
they can totally rely in order to jump into an unknown world of freedom
and democracy. Now, having seen that the United States does not possess
a coherent strategy for the benefit of the current leaders in the region,
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have made decisive their tilt toward Russia.
Kyrgyztan may soon follow suit. The lacuna created by the break-up of
the Soviet Union is now being filled by Russia, which raises the follow-
ing questions.
First, the Central Asian countries will have to discuss really well what
their true interests are. Their dependence on Russia entails a danger of
renewed subjugation in view of the unchanged attitude of the majority
of the Russians toward Central Asia as their legitimate outpost. The
absence of American influence might someday allow a wanton rivalry
between Russia and China, which would harm security in this region. In
any case, Central Asian states have to achieve democratization and a
market economy for their own sake.
Second, Japan, the United States, and the EU need to redefine their
interests and goals in this region. They may well leave this region at the
mercy of the rivalry among major regional powers, but then their influ-
ence in the eastern half of the Eurasian continent will be substantially
reduced. China may possess some political weight in Kyrgyztan, but in
other Central Asian countries her influence is largely limited to economics.
Most Chinese experts today cannot speak Russian, the common language
in the ex-Soviet sphere, and their mentality is different in spite of some
racial resemblance. China will be accepted in Central Asia as long as and
as much as it pays money to them. Russia, too, although she gladly
accepted the overture of Karimov, will not be able to shoulder all the
expenses that are needed to maintain stability and develop economies in
Central Asia.
All these facts indicate the necessity for serious international cooper-
ation. In Europe the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe) greatly contributed to securing the status quo and security in
the region. In Southeast and East Asia, on a more tentative basis, the
ARF has been addressing similar questions with the participation of
Japan, China, the United States, Russia, South Korea, North Korea, and
other countries. Central Asia has the SCO, but its terms of reference are
mainly economic and its main financier is China Russia might not be so
happy about China’s growing stake in Central Asia. Therefore to embark
upon more rapid construction of economic infrastructure and to ensure
security, solving the dilemma of the Sino-Russian rivalry, Central Asia
would need either to enlarge the SCO to include Japan, the United
States, and the EU or to establish a new international framework like
ARF with more than security considerations. Obviously such an initia-
tive should originate from the Central Asian countries themselves.
Until recently the Japanese government was considering initiating a
broad program of infrastructure building, the effect of which would
encompass the territory of several Central Asian countries. It would be
started with small-scale technical assistance and with a view to incorporat-
ing Afghanistan into regional cooperation. Such an undertaking would
accelerate the tendency to deeper integration among Central Asian
states, an outcome to be welcomed in Japan. The Central Asian version
of ARF, which so far remains the author’s personal idea, might incorporate
such a Japanese initiative under its umbrella.
The Central Asian countries should resume their efforts for genuine
democratization and economic reform, and the industrialized countries
should continue to help them, keeping in mind the following specifics in
Central Asia. In ex-socialist states, namely countries where all (but lim-
ited) resources were monopolized by the state, there is no real basis for
a democratic opposition. The medieval despotism augmented by Russian
and Soviet autocracy engendered an atmosphere in which both the elite
and the masses do not listen to a “democratic” leader. They tend to con-
sider such a leader to be weak, an invitation to unhampered fighting to
extract as much as possible. Some intellectuals aspire to freedom and
democracy, but the common people do not support them, suspecting,
often correctly, that the intellectuals are concerned only with their own
liberty and well-being. In the opinion of the masses the national wealth
should not be monopolized by private persons. Only public ownership of
property would guarantee the people’s well-being, they believe.
Under these circumstances, any opposition leaders, after toppling an
authoritarian regime, may well end up establishing yet another authori-
tarian and corrupt government, dividing up property for their own
advantage. Unlike some Americans who assume that these conditions do
not stand in the way of vigorous efforts to impose democracy and a mar-
ket economy, Japanese tend to be cautious in pressing for far-reaching
reforms that do not take these conditions into account.
The world should possess a more exact knowledge about Central
Asian society. The Andijan incident, for example, might have been
240 ● Akio Kawato
caused not by religious extremism (as the Uzbek authorities claim) or by

the “widespread dissatisfaction of the people with the slow pace in eco-
nomic reforms” (as some Western media claim). Islam in Central Asia is
in general moderate, and fanaticism is rare. People are dissatisfied not
with the “slow pace” of economic reforms, but with the early results of
the reforms: a constant rise in communal payments and unemployment
because of the breakup of collective farms. In this vein the background
of the Andijan incident may have been not so much ideological as mate-
rialistic. This area is prone to illegal import of Chinese commodities and
illegal export of Uzbek cotton and oil, and may be involved in narcotics
traffic. The change of the Andijan local governor and the ensuing
attempt to revamp the local economic interests may well have served as a
trigger of the Andijan incident.
All this suggests that the world community should be more careful in
approaching the ex-socialist states. Many reforms, contrary to the gen-
eral understanding in the West, are not welcomed by the local people
who are accustomed to being taken care of by their government. Usually
fewer than ten percent of the total population is eager to start their own
ventures, utilizing newly acquired freedom (and in many cases their ini-
tiative tends to be stymied by envy and suspicion in the society and
extortion by the officials). A hasty attempt to enforce reforms will exac-
erbate the economic hardship, bringing political chaos in which quasi
“opposition” politicians engage in an endless battle for ownership of the
properties. A serious discussion is needed to reexamine the development
strategies of the ex-socialist countries.
Central Asia as one of the centers of world history deserves indepen-
dence, and its people deserve a better and more democratic way of life.
Japan would be willing to help them to achieve these goals inasmuch
as the presence of an integrated power in this region independent of
outside control would serve the interests of Japan. Even if Japan may
adjust her policy to the region now, her long-term objectives are likely to
endure. Japan’s strategy is not limited to trade promotion. She endeavors
to enhance her international position in general, sometimes even in
remote areas. In Central Asia, where the rivalry among big powers may
create a stalemate, Japan could aspire to serve as an impartial balancer in
a multilateral mechanism for security and development of the region.
Earlier its role in the development of ASEAN proved to be a
remarkable showcase for its diplomacy, economic assistance, and direct
investments. Cambodia’s moves toward democratization were facilitated
by Japan’s involvement, too. In Central Asia, where the rivalry among
big powers may turn into a stalemate, Japan may serve as an impartial
balancer and initiator of a multilateral mechanism for security and
development of the region.
In June 2006 the second joint meeting of the ministers of foreign
affairs of “Central Asia plus Japan” was held in Tokyo. Turkmenistan did
not send a delegate, but this time Afghanistan was represented. This
proactive gesture by Japan drew the attention of some foreign media, the
more so because it took place just one week before the SCO’s annual
summit. Shortly afterward Koizumi asked MOFA to arrange an official
trip to Central Asia. A farewell visit to the United States was approach-
ing, and the feud over Yasukuni made a visit to Japan’s direct neighbors
impossible. Central Asia, because of its “freshness” in the eyes of the
Japanese public (there had been no visit by a Japanese prime minister to
this region) and prevalent pro-Japanese attitudes, was a natural choice
for him. The visit was brief (August 28–30 to Astana, Tashkent, and
Samarkand), and Koizumi did not engage in “checkbook diplomacy.”
He reiterated Japan’s interest in energy resources, including uranium,
but did not go beyond giving his blessing to what private companies had
been doing. The visit was the culmination of the policy symbolized by
the forum “Central Asia and Japan,” which appealed to the Central
Asian countries for more unity among themselves, open cooperation
with all interested third parties, and further democratization and
economic reform.
Koizumi’s visit coincided with moves by the United States and EU.
Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher had visited Uzbekistan at
the beginning of August. Soon refugees from Andijan were repatriated
apparently without any repression. The EU also had sent a high-level
delegation to Uzbekistan in late August. These moves are not closely
orchestrated, but they reflect a change in the general atmosphere vis-à-vis
Uzbekistan. Japan does not have any intention to challenge the influence
of Russia and China in this region but wants to have her own voice heard
there, too. Koizumi’s visit coincided with yet another positive move. On
September 2 the leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and
Uzbekistan held an informal summit in Astana and declared that they
were going to accelerate intra-regional cooperation. This group had not
met by itself at least since 2004 when the Central Asian Cooperation
Organization (CACO) admitted Russia as a member. Following this
meeting Karimov switched his visit to Kazakhstan into a bilateral state
visit, overtly demonstrating his friendship with Nazarbayev. Thus,
Koizumi left a legacy of rising hopes in relations with Central Asia.
242 ● Akio Kawato
Notes
1. Author’s conversation with Chino Tadao in November 2003.
2. The three principles were: political dialogue to strengthen confidence and
mutual understanding; economic cooperation and cooperation in the devel-
opment of mineral resources for realizing prosperity; and cooperation for real-
ization of peace through nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, democratization,
and stabilization.
3. Author’s interview with Kazuhiko Togo in March 2005.
CHAPTER 11
Japanese Strategic
Thinking on Regionalism
Gilbert Rozman
A
s the cold war ended in 1989–90, the first rumblings of region-
alism were felt in Japan, both with the establishment of APEC
inclusive of the United States and with talk of the “Japan Sea
economic rim” and of the EAEC (East Asian economic caucus) exclusive
of the United States. In December 2005 the first meeting of the EAS
(East Asian Summit) rekindled Japanese hopes for regionalism, now with
careful attention to preventing China’s dominance. Over more than
15 years we can trace Japanese interest in regionalism,1 transcending
bilateral relations while requiring some delicate balancing of relations
involving first the United States and later China.2 Different assumptions
could be found on the political Right and Left, initially among those
who placed a high future value on U.S. relations and those who were
impatient for “normal” foreign relations that limit the U.S. role, and
eventually among those who sought to forestall China’s leadership in
Asia and those who accepted the need for Japan to “reenter Asia.” This
chapter focuses on the strategic calculations operating in the background
as approaches to regionalism changed.
Critical to Japanese reasoning about Asia are unsatisfied expectations
about the establishment of an organization or community that would
forge regionalism. Already in the late nineteenth century sentiments
were rising that Western powers were bent on making the countries of
Asia their dependencies and preventing them from joining each other
for regional self-interest, and that theme has never fully disappeared.
244 ● Gilbert Rozman
The idea that Japan had been motivated by legitimate pursuit of regional
cooperation later assuaged memories of the half-century of expansion-
ism. By late in the cold war as Japan’s economic clout raised its profile,
talk had resumed of promoting regionalism, now in accord with global
principles of the equality of states and economic interdependence.3
As European nations joined the EU and the United States led the forma-
tion of NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), Japanese
debates intensified over what strategy would be suitable for Asian
regionalism, both an imperative for global competition and a pathway to
realize leadership aspirations.
Enthusiasm for closer relations with Asian countries had led to a
succession of approaches in the cold war era. One essential objective was
to normalize diplomatic relations and conclude peace treaties if a state of
war had existed, which succeeded with all states except North Korea and
the Soviet Union. Another vital step was to forge economic ties, ranging
from trade to developmental assistance, to the degree that Japan became
a vital partner. Third came reassurances that not only did Japan pose no
security problem but also it was uniquely supportive of peace and disar-
mament and, thus, could be trusted. By the end of the 1970s a fourth
goal had been added: to make Japan into a cultural power in Asia, win-
ning friends through educational programs, exchanges, and the export of
cultural products of widespread appeal. Even as these aims were realized
it was well understood that more ambitious targets lay over the horizon,
holding out the prospect of Japan gaining substantial soft power coupled
with political clout in Asia.
One challenge that became obvious in the early debates of 1988–93
was how to persuade the peoples of Asia that they should join Japan.
Some would be reminded of the deceptive slogan of a “co-prosperity
sphere” used to sugarcoat Japan’s historical aggression. Others were still
burdened by the heavy legacy of socialist planned economies and closed
societies, fearing opening unbridled access to an economic giant.
Promises of large-scale development assistance and investment were
tried, but they proved insufficient. Indeed, early signs of interest came
mostly from vested interests seeking a short-term infusion of cash but
lacking any commitment to sustained cooperation. Efforts to start grad-
ually with cross-border exchanges and trade led to criminal networks
gaining economic control such as between Hokkaido and the Russian
Far East.4 The “Japan Sea rim economic sphere” drew champions from
“backdoor Japan” away from the prosperous Pacific Coast, who paid
more attention to winning Tokyo’s support for infrastructure spending
than in rooting out abuse and promoting market forces across Japan’s
Regionalism ● 245
borders.5 The strategy of economics before politics and building reliable

networks by overlooking shortcomings proved inadequate.
A second challenge that was never far from the minds of boosters of
regionalism was concern about U.S. opposition. Having identified
closely with the United States as part of the “West” and supported its
leadership role toward China, South Korea, Russia, and other parts of
Asia, Japan was not clear on how to break the news that it was launching
an independent foreign policy as part of the “East.” It could not be ascer-
tained that the parting, however sweetened by assurances of cooperation,
would not cause economic loss, security uncertainty, and even identity
doubts. In countenancing “Asian values,” Japan failed to provide reas-
surance for universal values. On neither side was there much debate
about how to accomplish the transition to Japan between East and West.
In 1990–91 when Malaysia’s Mahathir called for forming the EAEC,
in 1997 when Japan responded to the Asian financial crisis with a plan for
establishing an AMF, and in 2004–05 as states prepared for the first meet-
ing of the EAS with uncertainty about its membership and objectives, the
United States was known to raise objections to “closed regionalism.” In
contrast, U.S. attempts to make APEC into a powerful force through
annual summits of leaders and ambitious timetables for global economic
integration left some states eager to exclude it from a new regional orga-
nization. Japan yielded to the United States in resisting the EAEC, drop-
ping its call for the AMF, and joined the United States in seeking
membership for Australia and New Zealand amidst shared doubts on the
EAS. Yet, Japan’s role in forming the ASEAN ⫹ 3 and in agreeing to sup-
plant it with the EAS showed that it continued to favor some sort of
regionalism apart from the United States. It never found a strategy to
advance regionalism significantly, in part, because of an inability
to resolve the strategic dilemma of balancing the United States and Asia.
The most serious challenge complicating Japan’s search for regionalism
came from its relations with its neighbors. South Korea was the most log-
ical partner, and Japan made closer economic ties, leading to an FTA, a
priority. Yet, despite their long-standing economic ties and shared back-
ground as capitalist, democratic states, Japanese failed to win the trust of
South Koreans and could only proceed as part of a triangle with China. If
Seoul would have welcomed Japanese support in making the reintegra-
tion of the Korean peninsula a centerpiece of regionalism, Tokyo was set
on first achieving its own normalization with North Korea. It was the
rapid rise of China that left Japan increasingly hesitant about regionalism
from the late 1990s. Fearing that China would gain a dominant place in
a region centering on Northeast Asia and later extending the concern to
one embracing Southeast Asia too, Japanese approved only stuttering

steps forward. Despite the rapid integration of the Japanese and Chinese
economies, trust was deteriorating. Desirous of some sort of regionalism,
Japan had little success in creating a combination of countries that would
guide China’s regional rise. Japan was still pursuing regionalism, but its
approach became defensive in the face of Chinese gains in all directions
whether with Russia and Central Asia, the Korean peninsula, Southeast
Asia, or South Asia.
Thinking about Regionalism in the 1980s

Although trade tensions and long-standing unease about the asymmetri-
cal relationship with the United States gave the Japanese reason to con-
template some sort of balancing force, through the period of Nakasone’s
leadership there were only indirect, long-term images of how this could
be accomplished. Focused more on Japan’s recovery of influence than his
predecessors, Nakasone became associated with various steps that,
together, might have built a foundation for regionalism. First, he cham-
pioned the goal of cooperating closely with the United States even on
security matters to achieve an equal partnership. A kind of division of
labor loomed with the United States, which was predominant militarily,
but Japan ascending through its growing capital accumulation and tech-
nological prowess. Likewise, the United States would retain broad, global
leadership, while it increasingly acknowledged Japan’s rising status as the
economic leader of East and Southeast Asia. Finally, as the global capital-
ist economy became more concentrated into three regions, Japan would
assume its place as first in Asia at the same time as the United States
remained tops in the Americas and the major powers of Europe drew
closer together in their region. Biding its time as national and regional
economic growth continued to favor Asia, Japan would eventually pass
beyond the Yoshida doctrine into a new blueprint for displaying leader-
ship in its region.
Nakasone presided over significant efforts to boost ties with South
Korea by expanding ODA and overcoming obstacles to summit meet-
ings, with China by also increasing ODA and turning attention to
deeper cultural exchanges, and with Southeast Asia as production shar-
ing intensified with a stronger yen. He also made overtures to Mikhail
Gorbachev, whose Vladivostok speech appealed for breaking down barri-
ers in the region. Yet, when Nakasone left office in 1987 Japan was little
prepared for the convulsive changes under way: in U.S.–Soviet relations,
in the Chinese public’s expression of political views including those
Regionalism ● 247
based on nationalism that targeted Japan, and in South Korean democ-

ratization that even more energized demonstrative expressions of nation-
alism. Nakasone’s leap forward in strategic thinking prepared the way for
a world that was disappearing already by the time he relinquished his
post to a string of shortlived prime ministers lacking the worldview or
the mandate to refocus Japan on Asia.
The most direct calls for regionalism in the late 1980s came from eco-
nomic interests linked to MITI, left-leaning political circles, and local
governments eager to draw public infrastructure funds. The economic
forces eyed large projects, such as Sakhalin energy development, Northeast
China farm specialization for exports, and Sea of Japan economic rim
transportation linkages. These entailed long-term commitments that
required political trust as well as a modern business environment. For
the political Left, regionalism was the newest incarnation of the postwar
dream of limiting dependence on the United States and finding new part-
ners for Japan. Responding hesitantly to the end of dictatorship in South
Korea, they held out hope, as in the past, for one or more of the socialist
countries. In addition, prefectural governments on the Sea of Japan and
Hokkaido cast the cause of regionalism as the long-awaited rebalancing
within Japan after four decades of sharp differentiation with the Pacific
Coast. The novelty of these appeals stirred some excitement in Japan and
reverberated in continental Asia as Japanese funding led to conferences,
exchanges, and new publications about regional integration.
Government authorities and corporate headquarters in Tokyo were
less enthused. Recognizing that business opportunities and political
receptivity were not yet ripe, they may have acquiesced to this boosterism
as testing the waters, but they were in no rush. Failure to normalize rela-
tions with Moscow and Pyongyang and the sanctions that had to be
imposed following the harsh repression in Beijing left little serious
challenge to this caution. Moreover, the U.S. Department of Defense let
it be known that even as U.S.–Soviet security ties were rapidly improving
and the Berlin Wall was falling, Japan should not proceed with security
negotiations with the Soviet Union; the United States was not ready to
agree to Gorbachev’s appeal for a multilateral security dialogue in Asia.
Even as voices in favor of regionalism in Japan grew more noticeable,
they had a limited mandate.
Instead of Asian regionalism, in 1989 Japan stayed in the background
as it worked with Australia to establish APEC crossing the Pacific Ocean
and including the United States. This limited economic grouping reas-
sured the United States, but it did not satisfy those focused on Japan
finding its own niche in Asia or others in the region anxious to limit the
American predominance. APEC was not seen as an answer to the quest

for regionalism. When Bill Clinton in the fall of 1993 summoned lead-
ers to Seattle for the first APEC summit and over the next years as his
administration pressed for faster financial globalization through APEC,
the search intensified for a separate Asian organization. Finally, the Asian
financial crisis exposed some fault lines over globalization and gave
Japan a new chance.
Thinking about Regionalism in the First Half of the 1990s

For a few years the balance appeared to tilt in favor of Japan’s relations
with Northeast Asia. Resentment against “Japan-bashing” by the United
States came amidst a mutual downturn in favorable images. Many were
optimistic that Japan could become the pivot of a triangle with the
United States and China, as the United States was fixated on sanctions
from 1989 and then on raising human rights accusations to keep pres-
sure on China. When Deng Xiaoping in January 1992 opened the throt-
tle to market forces, Japanese firms were expected to gain the upper
hand. With China in tow, acceptance in Asia would be assured. Taking
improved South Korean ties for granted and ready for talks with North
Korea to bear fruit, the Japanese more actively championed regionalism
to be shaped by their economic dominance. Whereas a place for Russia
could be opened if it met Japan’s conditions for normalization, it would
be the loser if it let the opportunity slip. To the extent that a process of
regional cooperation in Southeast Asia under ASEAN could complement
efforts in Northeast Asia, Japanese were confident that they were well
anchored in the region without serious challenge. The primary challenge was
to persuade others to accept regionalism in the form of institutionalized
economic cooperation.
Strategic miscalculations occurred. It was a mistake to expect economic
inducements to carry so much weight that the legacy of distrust could be
overcome. Discussions of how to proceed with regionalism became for-
mulaic, failing to assess candidly the real barriers.6 Assumptions rooted in
normalization with South Korea in 1965 and other breakthroughs gave
false hope that desperation for Japan’s support would drive others to the
side of a country flush with capital and prepared to spend generously for
political as well as economic objectives. No serious initiative was taken to
overcome the lack of trust in Japanese leadership, as others agreed mainly
to economic ties.
Loss of confidence in the reliability of the special relationship with
the United States failed to produce a pragmatic turn toward Asia. The
Regionalism ● 249
low point in postwar Japanese–U.S. relations occurred early in the

1990s. This no doubt heightened Tokyo’s active interest in Asia, but it
did not produce new strategies for drawing the region together. In 1992
Japan let slip an opportunity with Moscow, and in the fall of 1993 lead-
ing officials overestimated the significance of Yeltsin’s agreement to the
Tokyo Declaration. In 1993 there was also too much optimism about
Kim Young-sam’s commitment to closer ties, resulting in misjudgments
about relations that culminated in the downturn of 1995–96. Likewise,
excessive hopes for ties with China in the first part of the decade gave
way to disappointment by 1995–96. The failure of North Korean talks
in 1992 to be followed by the fallout from the nuclear crisis of 1993–94
only worsened the picture. This period witnessed the sharpest swings
from confident promotion of regionalism to uncertainty about how to
proceed amidst strategic confusion over why Japan’s position was fading.
Japan was better attuned to rallying weak neighbors by dangling
economic incentives than to winning the confidence of more optimistic
partners. Not much attention was given to South Korea as a critical part-
ner, given the growing assertiveness of that country still benefiting from
high rates of economic growth and now advancing well to democracy
and foreign policy diversification. As China’s sense of isolation and eco-
nomic uncertainty gave way in 1993 to self-assurance of its rapid rise in
comprehensive national power, Japan had no answers about how to win
it over. The theme of Asian values, raised largely in Southeast Asia, was
at a peak in 1993–96, challenging U.S. values and human rights advo-
cacy as if it led to degeneration into unconstrained individualism and a
litigious society with rampant deviance. If the Japanese hesitated to
embrace the anti-Western implications of the theme, it was ambivalent
after having been the leader in the 1980s in championing, to the dis-
comfort of many Americans, an alternative model of a harmonious
society. Disparities in values professed by the states of Northeast and
Southeast Asia left little common ground, notably for Japan, which
prized its bridging role with one foot in the West. It had to distance itself
from civilizational notions of regionalism.
In 1995 Prime Minister Murayama made the fullest apology by a
Japanese leader for wartime and prewar excesses, but there was little
impact on regional cooperation and trust. Although it may have opened
the door to follow-up apologies such as with Kim Dae-jung in 1998, its
effect was muted in the wider context of the fiftieth anniversary of the
war’s end. Failure to pass a Diet resolution that conveyed a similar spirit
undercut the prime minister’s statement. Also reemergence of the Taiwan
and Dokdo/Takeshima issues meant that sparks from the still smoldering
embers of twentieth-century colonialism and aggression drew attention

away from more than a millennium of shared Confucian civilization and
the promise of shared globalization as intra-regional economic ties grew.
Thinking about Regionalism in the Second Half of the 1990s

On the one hand, from 1997 to 1998 regionalism advanced with the
formation of ASEAN ⫹ 3 and the shared response to the Asian financial
crisis. On the other, security problems grew serious, making it important
to face forthrightly the strategic dimensions of power in Northeast Asia.
Japan took care to strengthen its U.S. alliance, positioning itself for a
more robust security presence. It comfortably worked with ASEAN to
add a Northeast Asian component, assuming that it would not be marginal-
ized by China. Support for regionalism became couched in wider contexts.
Given the fact that in 1995 the leaders of China and South Korea had issued
a joint statement critical of Japan’s handling of history, the broader setting
was insurance against Japan’s isolation.
The Asian financial crisis demonstrated continued Japanese optimism
about wide-ranging economic regionalism exclusive of the United States.
Its proposal for an AMF won praise in the region for challenging the
monopoly of the IMF and at least implicitly rebuking the arrogance of
U.S. financial management before and after the crisis began. Even if
Japan retreated in the face of U.S. opposition, it proved its willingness to
stand behind the region. As it proceeded with generous financial assis-
tance, the positive impact was reinforced. This generosity along with the
more desperate situation of South Korea led to a breakthrough not only
in bilateral ties, but also in cooperation in support of regionalism. It was
China that had to play catch up as Japan’s greater financial resources were
brought to bear. In 1999 the three Northeast Asian states formalized their
annual summit at the ASEAN ⫹ 3 meetings. Soon Japan led in joint
measures to stabilize currencies in the event of new financial problems.
On matters of regionalism, Japan did not lose the initiative during the
late 1990s; it succeeded in drawing China and South Korea along.
Security developments from 1997 to 2000, however, left Japanese
feeling less assured. First, no matter how much reassurance came from
new defense guidelines with the United States and steps toward cooper-
ation on missile defense, the Clinton administration’s inclination to
explore a strategic partnership with China set off alarm bells. Japan was
in no mood for a balanced triangle with the United States at the center.
Second, the North Korean missile launching over Honshu left a sense of
vulnerability beyond any experienced in recent decades. Although the
Regionalism ● 251
Perry process in early 1999 brought a freeze in testing, this was not
sufficient for a sense of security. Third, Russian arms sales to China and
the revived interest of Russia in the Korean peninsula brought another
actor into the picture with reminders of decades of threat and the poten-
tial to fortify countries that posed a danger. Finally, South Korea’s shift
to the sunshine policy put the entire Korean peninsula into play with
uncertain ramifications for Japanese security. In the year 2000 Japan’s
prospects with North Korea were doubtful, U.S. support for the sun-
shine policy was worrisome, and the diminished sense of threat in South
Korea all aroused uncertainty. This was not a time for clarity about the
path to regionalism.
In response to a more complex environment, Japan’s leaders remained
active in looking for opportunities. They continued to seek closer ties to
South Korea on the foundation of the October 1998 Kim Dae-jung
summit, initiating talks for forming a bilateral FTA. Efforts were made
to engage North Korea in talks, assuming that the sunshine policy would
lead it toward reform and greater need for Japan’s large-scale assistance.
In 2000 the initiative toward Russia was in full swing. Even Chinese ties
were expected to improve; from the fall of 1999 Chinese leaders spoke of
“smile diplomacy” to assuage public opinion in Japan. However reserved
many in Japan had become about conditions in their region, they still
anticipated a balanced foreign policy with continued close U.S. ties and
newly expanding ties in Asia in which regionalism would help to
overcome lingering distrust.
Triangular analysis provided a strategic backdrop to regionalism, as
many began to recognize the triad of the United States–China–Japan.7
Some in Japan recognized that by forgoing a military build-up the coun-
try was accepting asymmetry or a junior status in the triangle.8 Others
suggested that by siding more fully with the United States and taking a
firmer stand toward China’s growing power, Japan was, however reluc-
tantly, becoming a realist nation.9 Such arguments tended to underesti-
mate the aspirations for a leadership role in Asia that require not only a
strategic approach to keep pace with China but also some distancing
from the United States and efforts to reshape its agenda in the region.
Formation of the ASEAN ⫹ 3 organization along with the impact of
the Asian financial crisis gave a boost to Japanese expectations for
regionalism despite growing ambivalence about the prospects for leader-
ship and emerging fears over China’s strengthening voice.10 Tokyo had
less opportunity to lead and found itself playing catch-up, yet it also
accepted growing momentum for regionalism and a favorable setting for
its emergence. As late as Koizumi’s January 2002 visit to Southeast Asia
with completion of an FTA with Singapore, there was a sense that Japan
“was going regional.”11
Optimism about regionalism substituted for sober calculations about
the tough choices needed to gain leverage. It was not difficult to iden-
tify the general contours of an open, flexible, economically centered
regionalism,12 but just concentrating on its pursuit left in doubt what
measures might resolve the serious political fissures and cultural cleav-
ages in the region. Some who expected Japan to forge an independent
foreign policy toward Asia forecast that bilateral relations with the United
States would become less stable and security relations more contentious.13
In fact, in the Koizumi period stable security ties led in calming relations.
Yet, there remained the question of how persisting Asianism on both the
political Left and the political Right would find its expression.14
Strategic reasoning left little room for boldness toward Asian countries.
Although South Korea’s foreign relations and economic development
were being transformed by a leadership quite different from any Japan
had faced earlier, most assumed that the South would become easier to
manage due to the agreement on history, its financial weakness, and its
need for Japan’s support in addressing reunification matters. Even as
Putin clearly distanced himself from Yeltsin’s weak policies, powerful fig-
ures opposed a negotiating position that might lead to a compromise.
China’s rapid rise led mainly to talk of punishing it by cutting back
ODA or containing it through the U.S. alliance, not to rethinking how
to accommodate it. To the extent that the goal was regionalism in Asia,
Japan lacked a lively debate let alone a strategic consensus cognizant
of realities.
Thinking about Regionalism in the Koizumi Era

From 2000 China has been in the forefront in the pursuit of regionalism.
In November it proposed an FTA with ASEAN, taking the lead in an
area where vested interests hold Japan back and thereafter never relin-
quishing it. This was a time when Chinese leaders also made it clear that
only with friendship and cooperation between China and Japan would
Asia rise and regionalism take shape. Although this echoed a message
long repeated by Japan’s leaders, responses were often hesitant. Koizumi
rejected China’s offer for a joint study group with South Korea of an
FTA.15 A loss of confidence in using economic power, including ODA,
for security objectives made Japan pause.16 Sharp reductions in ODA to
China occurred just as the two sides were searching for a joint approach
to regionalism. The lack of a strategic vision as Koizumi took steps that
Regionalism ● 253
complicated bilateral relations with one Asian state after another left
China with the high ground as the champion of multilateralism in the
region.
Resentment of the United States was an important reason for Japan
not only to deepen its economic ties to its neighbors but also to seek a
regional counterweight. Mike Mochizuki argues that the U.S. veto of the
AMF “prompted Japan to quietly but methodically promote East Asian
regionalism as a check on the so-called ‘Washington consensus’ and US
‘market fundamentalism.’ ”17 Despite closer ties with the Bush adminis-
tration, there were many ill at ease by the unilateral U.S. policies toward
North Korea, Iraq, and other targets that implicated Japan. The inde-
pendent moves by Koizumi when he visited Pyongyang carried hopes for
regional transformation, but the North’s showdown with the United
States proved too serious for him to play a role.18 The search for a
breakthrough in Asia continues; yet, those who see Japan as pragmatic in
combining incipient multilateralism with bilateralism must account for
Koizumi’s defiance toward potential regional partners.19
A paramount objective of Japanese foreign policy became securing
one of a handful of coveted spots as a permanent member of the UN
Security Council. This means, at a time of balancing regional interests,
representing Asia along with China and another aspirant India. Winning
regional backing would matter. South Korea had opposed a Malaysian
proposal along somewhat similar lines in 1997, and Japan had to bide its
time until the issue again rose high on the UN agenda.20 Yet, Japanese
approaches to regionalism failed to keep in mind the need for winning
broad support, especially from Seoul, and in March 2005 Roh
Moo-hyun announced to popular support his country’s opposition.
A month later boisterous Chinese demonstrators shouted similar defiance.
At times Koizumi has shown support for regionalism. He attended
the first Boao forum, organized by China as the equivalent to the Davos
forum for Asian leaders. He kept pace with China’s leaders in supporting
ASEAN ⫹ 3 as it launched various initiatives favored by the Southeast
Asian states. There was no wavering in approval for the goal of economic
integration. Yet, calculations of the pros and cons of regionalism were in
constant flux. There was roughly an inverse relationship between China’s
growing enthusiasm for regionalism, especially from 2001, and Japan’s
declining confidence in it.
Leadership posed a problem. In 2000 Kim Dae-jung was in the
forefront, appealing to North Korea and trying to coordinate four powers
in support of a process of peninsular reintegration that was no less a mech-
anism for addressing the security concerns of the region as well as for
considering some steps toward economic integration. Left largely as a

bystander, Japan nervously awaited the outcome. With progress slow in
its talks with North Korea and uncertainty about how far Bill Clinton
would extend his support, Japanese lost confidence that they were in the
lead in shaping reconfiguration of the region. Yet, the North’s foot drag-
ging and Clinton’s defeat eased Japanese concerns, at the same time as
satisfaction with improving political, economic, and cultural ties with
South Korea cushioned the blow. In 2002–05 China’s ascendancy on all
of its borders grew more apparent. Flexing its market muscle, China
leaped ahead in drawing neighbors into its economic orbit. In Russia,
Central Asia, and Southeast Asia, and, arguably, South Asia, China’s
voice was rising. Most obviously to the Japanese public, Sino-Japanese
economic ties were accelerating rapidly and leaving little leverage in
Japanese hands. After assuming for many years that threatening to
reduce ODA and acting to limit the flow of FDI would assure that
Japan’s voice would be heard, abruptly plans to “graduate” China from
ODA were accepted as a matter of course while the hemorrhaging of
manufacturing to China was oblivious to troubles in bilateral political
relations. Japanese grew alarmed that China was rapidly becoming the
central country in the region, leaving Japan in a marginal position.
One barrier on the path toward regionalism was the mounting effort
to demonize China as a country with which Japan could not find
common ground.21 Chinese actions contributed to this: from military
pressure on Taiwan to demonstrations in April 2005 against Japan,
including its ambition to become a permanent member of the Security
Council in a forthcoming reform. Yet, the conciliatory tone of finding a
path to cooperation through mutual understanding and concessions,22
was fading in the face of intensifying insistence that strategic thinking
requires recognizing China as a threat and standing firm in contrast to
the weak-kneed Foreign Ministry.23 Of course, there were invariably
those who warned that in the new “Chinese century” with the United
States supposedly drawing closer to China the only reasonable strategy
for Japan was to accept this process.24 Some went even further to insist
that only if Japan embraced ideas such as the EAEC or stuck to the
theme of the AMF, the age of Northeast Asia would be within reach.25 They
found support in a variety of sources critical of the hesitancy of foreign
policy that proposed new diplomatic thinking with a strong Asian com-
ponent that would keep Japan from falling hostage to U.S. unilateral-
ism.26 Nonetheless, the voices of the mass media and the political
establishment propelled Japanese public views in a more alarmist direc-
tion. Particularly the North Korean problems with abductions and
Regionalism ● 255
nuclear weapons and the Chinese public hostility toward Japanese at soc-
cer games in 2004 and in demonstrations in 2005 boosted the voices of
opponents of regionalism under current circumstances. Among the most
vocal was Nakajima Mineo, who called for suspending ODA immedi-
ately and abandoning the 30-year pursuit of “friendship.”27 Little could
be expected even by those anxious to salvage the East Asian community
until China made a new effort to calm emotions on its side as both sides
set limits on official acts that might bring another downturn.28
Southeast Asia and Regionalism

Recalling its own failed attempts to reorganize Asia by force and observ-
ing increasingly successful efforts to unite Europe with economic inte-
gration a driving force, Japanese long aspired to play a leading role in
Asian regionalism. Prospects were grim in the communist-run hinter-
land of Asia through the 1980s, but the soft underbelly of Southeast Asia
was tempting. Historical memories of Japanese atrocities or indignities
were generally less intense there than in China and the Korean penin-
sula, and some Japanese convinced themselves that these would be erased
by gratitude from acceptance of the image of Japan’s self-proclaimed role
of liberator from Western colonialism as well as by economic assistance.
The ignominious U.S. retreat in the 1970s after the Vietnam War left a
political vacuum, while US interest in preventing a domino effect
through communism’s spread kept alive a security blanket and a ready
market for locally produced goods. ASEAN’s early success in forging
maritime regionalism gave Japan an opening at its tenth anniversary in
1977 to show its generosity through the Fukuda doctrine, and a decade
later the sharply increased value of the yen added an imperative to trans-
fer production on a large scale to countries with cheap labor. Japan’s
quest for regionalism is inseparable from its pursuit of a leadership role
in Southeast Asia.
Through the 1990s Tokyo perceived itself as still in the lead in work-
ing with the leading states of Southeast Asia and with ASEAN toward a
higher level of cooperation that could turn into regionalism. Its ODA
and investments supported development. Its soft power through growing
cultural ties lavishly funded by Tokyo and at least indirect sponsorship of
Asian values contrasted to the hard edge of U.S. human rights advocacy
and the ambivalence over the onslaught of individualist mass culture.
Japan could take comfort in Malaysia’s “look East” policy, Indonesia’s
satisfaction with Japan’s attentive beneficence, and Singapore’s welcome
for Japanese supportive steps at regional integration and balancing.
As late as 1997–98 the Asian financial crisis offered Japan another

chance to pride itself as the true benefactor of Southeast Asia, and it
accepted ASEAN ⫹ 3 with expectations that its special ties with
Southeast Asia would give it an edge.
Already in the 1990s, however, as ASEAN’s advance toward regional-
ism intensified, the Japanese were noticing four barriers to their coun-
try’s aspirations for regional leadership. First, the United States frowned
on exclusive regionalism and treated the Soviet retreat from the region
and the spread of globalization as conditions for opening the area. Thus,
when Mahathir appealed in 1990–91 to Japan to join in a new regional
grouping—the EAEC—some in Japan felt thwarted by U.S. opposition,
as was the case in 1997 when Japan proposed a separate AMF. Second,
Japan itself was losing its image of teacher model for the countries of
Southeast Asia, as it not only succumbed to economic stagnation but
also its management model and claim to a uniquely homogeneous society
lost their credibility along with Asian values in the financial crisis across
the region. Third, China’s success in normalizing relations with
Southeast Asian states around 1990 and in rallying the overseas Chinese
community to invest in what was fast becoming the Chinese “economic
miracle” gave Japan a formidable rival in the region. Finally, ASEAN
achieved a consensus on broadening its membership and raising its
profile, allowing much less room for the special influence of one outside
power. All of these circumstances obliged Japan to rethink its options in
partnering with an emergent but complicated regional organization. In
the second half of the 1990s its strategy shifted from forging a kind of
ASEAN ⫹ 1, which did not gain favor, to accepting ASEAN ⫹ 3 where
it would compete with China in an ASEAN-led framework and would
leave room for South Korea to play some kind of an intermediate role.
This was a realistic accommodation that gave an important boost to the
drive for regionalism, while changing its dynamics.
The Koizumi era is marked by China seizing the initiative in region-
alism centered in Southeast Asia and Japan hustling to catch up. On
occasions Japan vigorously contested for a leading role, as in January
2002 in a Singapore speech when Koizumi called for deeper regionalism
as well as expansion to include Australia and New Zealand. Generally, in
2003–04 Japan matched China step for step in drawing ASEAN closer.
Yet, by 2005 the image had spread that Japan was nervous about new
moves to boost ASEAN ⫹ 3. In the second half of the year it grasped the
opportunity of the first EAS with its wider membership as preferable to
ASEAN ⫹ 3. Even so, Southeast Asia remained Japan’s primary route
to regionalism, and this goal endured in Japanese planning.
Regionalism ● 257
Japanese Expectations for Regionalism

In 1991 while Japanese were pressing their claim to regional leadership as
well as a leadership role in the G-7, they discovered that U.S. pressure was
intensifying—for more global support, seen in the Persian Gulf War—and
to resist exclusive regionalism, feared from the Malaysian proposal for the
EAEC. In 1997 the Asian financial crisis brought a renewal of U.S. pres-
sure against the formation of the AMF and a distinct Asian approach to
the financial crisis. In 2003 Koizumi faced the full weight of the Bush
administration behind support for the Iraq War and preparing for pressure
against North Korea in opposition to the softer approach preferred
elsewhere in Asia. At critical points the United States prevailed, as Japan
backed away from forging agreements with neighboring states. Although
the circumstances were changing—the rising importance of security in
Asia, the deteriorating state of Sino-Japanese relations, the expanding pace
of regional economic integration—Japan continually sided with the
United States without abandoning the dream of achieving regionalism.
The first lesson learned based on the experience since the late 1980s
of working to establish regionalism is that globalization must take prece-
dence over regionalism. Given the high expectations for “reentering
Asia” and achieving equality by balancing U.S. power, this lesson was not
readily embraced by many circles in Japan. In the early 1990s quite a few
Japanese blamed U.S. pressure against regionalism, reflecting narrow
value preferences and human rights priorities, for holding Japan back
from its chance for equality. In the second half of the decade the U.S.
insistence on fiscal openness and international rather than regional man-
agement of the Asian financial crisis aroused similar distrust. The Bush
administration’s initial Asian policy and its unilateral handling of secu-
rity questions whether directly related to the war against terror or not
also have riled many Japanese, casting globalization in a negative light
for a different reason. Yet, the growing determination to rely on global
more than regional cooperation is less about approval of U.S. policies
than disapproval and nervousness about the regional environment. The
United States offers strong reassurance of its commitment to Japan, even
if this does not translate into Japanese leverage over it. Coordination,
notably over the North Korean crisis, has reached unprecedented levels.
Trade disputes with the United States have faded away, while some may
be looming with China. Calls in Japan for “open regionalism” mean to
bring the United States into the picture.
The immediate challenge in 2005 was how to define the scope of the
East Asian community to hold its inaugural summit at year end. Japan
has called for inclusion of Australia and New Zealand in the community
and for observer status for the United States. These notions of openness
clash with initial Malaysian and Chinese intentions to keep the United
States at a distance and to exclude non-Asian nations. In contrast to
China’s interest in forging a separate regional body with Russia and
Central Asia based on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Japan
was edging toward an expansive notion inclusive of India in which
China’s leadership inclinations could be more readily countered. In con-
trast to 15 years earlier, Japanese thinking had shifted from the small
Japan Sea rim easily put under Japan’s influence to the vast Asian conti-
nent (minus Southwest Asia) difficult for China to lead.
Japan’s approach had become mostly reactive to counter what some
see as Chinese “expansionism.” The idea was spreading that the entire
area from Pakistan to Kamchatka was being reconfigured under Chinese
initiative. By organizing the main holdouts and the weak links in this
still incipient process, Tokyo might lock in place an arrangement that
would give less opportunity to Beijing. Yet, the fact that some Japanese
scrambling was occurring on the eve of the first EAS did not signify
strategic planning.
Clearly, Japan shares with the United States determination not to
allow China to gain dominant standing in Asia. China’s rapid advance in
all directions and its assertiveness, especially through tolerance and indi-
rect support for the anti-Japanese student demonstrations of April 2005
left the Japanese more dependent on U.S. assurances. Only agreement
on a path forward by national leaders and progress toward a regional
security framework is likely to stabilize the situation. Given the growing
tensions over North Korea’s determination to retain nuclear weapons
with the United States inclined to intensify pressure on China to pres-
sure the North Koreans, prospects are high for Japan to stay cautious on
regionalism.
After North Korea defied world opinion by launching multiple mis-
siles in July and testing a nuclear weapon in October 2006, the stakes
rose for regional coordination. Newly in office, Abe Shinzo travelled to
Beijing and Seoul both to restore relations on the highest level and to
seek common ground in responding to Pyongyang. Hu Jintao’s strong
interest in revitalizing ties could be seen in the near absence of history
and Taiwan on the bilateral agenda. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice soon toured the region in search of joint enforcement of UN
approved sanctions against the North. Yet, China’s centrality in this dan-
gerous standoff suggested that it was the deciding voice, determining
Regionalism ● 259
how far the sanctions would go and pressing (with South Korea and
Russia behind it) Japan as well as the U.S. for a regional strategy to
renew the six-party talks. Even as its pariah status made North Korea a
threat to Japan unparalleled since 1945 and Japan’s approach to sanc-
tions severed almost all ties, working in conjunction with the U.S. and
even South Korea more closely with China could lead in a different
direction. After years of deteriorating Japanese ties with its neighbors,
which insisted on more incentives for the North, Japan was preparing for
more cooperation even if it was early to assess Abe’s strategic thinking.
Many Japanese needed greater reassurance that China’s rapid assent
across Asia would not just entrap their country in dependency on an
untrustworthy partner that was intent on keeping Japan from “normalizing”
its history, its political and military power, and its international rela-
tions. They suspected that regionalism was a device to split Japan and
the United States. Already in his Singapore speech at the start of 2002
Koizumi declared his support for Australia and New Zealand to join in
an inclusive region. Even when Chinese leaders appeared to signal their
interest in improving relations, the Japanese were prone to ignore the
message. Kokubun Ryosei observed that in March 2005 there were signs
from China that were overlooked before a wave of Internet postings and
the reaction to Japan’s new textbooks stirred popular emotions. He adds
that only a shift to strategic relations based on diplomatic realism by
Japan is likely to keep such sentiments under control.29 Chinese leaders
would have to help in creating the right environment. The primary test
for China had become its handling of the North Korean WMD crisis.
Outbursts on the streets of Shanghai and in other Chinese cities were a
wakeup call that the entire process of regionalism could be at risk. Talk of a
May boycott of Japanese products caused the Japanese business community
to raise an alarm that the long-term impact on economic ties, investment in
China, and the development of East Asia could be substantial. Though the
tone was not normally accusatory against Japan’s politicians, it did suggest
that the anti-Japanese sentiments were becoming unfavorable to Japanese
firms and were rousing joint interest in finding a solution.30
The demonstrations elicited diverse criticisms from politicians, even
from some in the LDP, toward Japanese policies and the statements of
Cabinet ministers. Although Abe Shinzo warned that it would be a mis-
take to stop visits to the Yasukuni shrine, as it became likely that he
would be the next prime minister he began informal talks with Chinese
representatives on an ambivalent approach. Kamisaki Takenori of the
Komeito feared that there would be an influence on the economy and on
Japan’s plan to become a permanent member of the UN Security

Council, while Hatoyama Yukio of the DPJ called for rapid restoration
of relations of trust through a summit. Other politicians bemoaned the
inflammatory rhetoric of METI head Nakagawa Shoichi on the gas fields
in the East China Sea and of the Minister of Education and Science
Nakayama on the textbook question. Some grounds for a backlash could
be seen, calling for more forthcoming policies toward Asia.
If Japanese strategic thought has been slow to articulate an alternative
to China’s growing commitment to regionalism, U.S. moves to some
degree provide a guide for what lie ahead. In addition to intensifying
pressure on China to act against North Korea’s nuclear intentions, the
United States has stepped up military relations with India and
Indonesia. Along with Australia, these are likely targets for any Japanese
attempt to build some partnerships that may put limits on Chinese
regional influence. Indeed, an inclusive and open approach to regional-
ism with a high priority for security would serve Japan’s interests well as
it cautiously proceeds with regionalism. Yet, it would be short-sighted to
count on the United States to balance the interests of globalization and
regionalism or even to overcome the unilateralism that has failed previ-
ously to rally other nations to its side or to counter China’s rapid rise.
Japan would be well advised to begin its strategic reorientation toward
Asia with a more activist role in shaping U.S. policy in the region. There
is no more urgent place to begin than in the quest for a five-party con-
sensus in managing North Korea. If Japan were to succeed in bridging
differences between the United States and South Korea, this could jump
start its reengagement in Asia. The principle that applied in the 1960s
and should have been recognized in the 1980s and 1990s applies today:
the Korea peninsula is the gateway to Asian regionalism for Japan. The
sharp downturn in relations with South Korea in the first half of 2005
bodes poorly for regionalism, as does the danger that a deepening split
between the United States and China will further damage Tokyo’s rela-
tions with Seoul. Japanese policy that leads the United States to toughen
its posture toward China and South Korea would have very different
consequences for the emergence of regionalism than policy that tries to
bridge the differences. Consultations after the North’s nuclear test left
the outcome unclear.
Idealists in the long-standing tradition of postwar Japanese intellectu-
als voice approval for regionalism without calculating the pros and cons
for security. Conservative nationalists dismiss any compromise on the
symbols of Japanese national identity without concern for the impact on
regional cooperation. The middle ground, characterized by those who
Regionalism ● 261
insist on a strong U.S. alliance and a greater role for Japan in interna-
tional security while striving for accommodation in Asia that accepts
progress toward regionalism if China agrees to meet Japan’s fundamental
requirements, is not well represented. The increasingly buoyant media
on the Right play up the China threat, while the now struggling media
on the Left hold up the banner of regionalism without often acknowl-
edging many of the most serious barriers. An effective strategy for
regionalism does not emerge from either extreme.
The following are promising components of such a strategy.31 First,
Japan should embrace globalization more fully, overcoming vested inter-
ests in order to pursue FTA more vigorously than China, reforming the
economy to draw closer to the United States and the EU, finding more
common ground on human rights with nations in the West, taking a
more active role in international security, and insisting on regionalism
open to globalization. At times China has outflanked Japan in Southeast
Asia because it has more fully endorsed globalization of trade, and Japan
would be well-advised to prevent further repetition. Second, Japan
should play a more active role as a force for compromise on North Korea
that would achieve the most important U.S. objectives while bringing
the other four parties from the six-party talks together on a path that
should be appealing to the North at the same time as it is conducive to
regional security and joint support for gradual Korean integration.
A breakthrough in this crisis holds the most promise of accelerating the
pursuit of regionalism. Third, a compromise over the handling of history
with China should be part of a broad agreement on how to manage dis-
puted waters and the exploration for gas in the East China Sea. In the
process, there should be a joint understanding that both countries can
become regional leaders with intense consultations to resolve problems
that arise. Fourth, Japan’s confidence in regionalism will rise to the
extent that it coordinates closely with the United States and wins its
support. This is more likely in an inclusive region open to Australia,
New Zealand, and India. Fifth, recognition of the critical role of South
Korea as Japan’s regional partner should lead to a new approach to
historical questions and renewed efforts to win the trust of the Korean
people. It should be understood that regionalism begins in the country
with the closest historical ties.
Along with these priorities in developing a strategy for regionalism,
other elements worthy of consideration should not be ignored. Sixth, it
is in Japan’s strategic interests to draw Russia into a region-wide associa-
tion for reasons of security, energy, and inclusiveness. It should not be
left to the advances of China while the territorial claims of Japan cause
continued tensions. Seventh, Japan should take an active role in forging

a regional identity with historic content that turns the clock back before
Japan’s imperialist era and references to values that focus on future trans-
parency and trust. The vision statement for ASEAN ⫹ 3 in 2001 is just
a forerunner to the difficult job of defining what the East Asian commu-
nity represents. Eighth, it is time for Japanese leaders to consider a com-
prehensive approach to territorial disputes, all lingering from 1945.
In pursuit of regionalism as well as bilateral normalization, possibilities
for compromise should be considered. None would involve displacement
of any Japanese citizens. Economic costs could be minimized with
awareness that they are not likely to be great. Let the symbolism be
addressed with awareness that in each case a compromise outcome is
required and that all will share in the future of regionalism that can serve
as an alternative symbol. Ninth, agreement on large-scale undertakings
that serve as engines of regionalism should include some that resonate
well inside Japan, including energy projects. A future orientation
becomes more tangible with some concrete manifestations of the benefits.
Finally, a gradual timetable with cautious optimism is preferable to pre-
senting regionalism as a panacea in an area where difficult problems will
take a long time to resolve. Japan needs to test China’s cooperation,
North Korea’s transformation, and Russia’s rule of law, while staying
close to the United States in a balanced foreign policy. Other states in
the very diverse area to be subsumed in the newly constructed East Asia
will also need to test the waters gingerly. Even with a strategic approach
to regionalism on the part of Japan and other major actors, the coming
decade is likely to be a transitional period with continued doubts that a
threshold has been crossed. Without a strategic approach by Japan,
which has been missing to date, we should not expect the EAS to
advance beyond a facade of regionalism.
The East Asian Summit

In 2004 the Japanese government was preparing for the inaugural meet-
ing of the EAS with concern that this new body could solidify China’s
rise, establishing it as the dominant voice in regionalism. Over the past
few years China had seized the initiative in ASEAN ⫹ 3, not only
advancing an economic agenda welcomed in the region but also gaining
more political leverage. Japan often seemed to lag one step behind, as
when in December 2003 it scurried to host the first ASEAN ⫹ 1 sum-
mit in Tokyo at which it signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
that China had already accepted. In the summer of 2004 when foreign
Regionalism ● 263
ministers met to define the nature of the EAS, the Japanese side cau-
tiously proposed limited, functional objectives and made clear its oppo-
sition to a fully institutionalized regional grouping. After the Laos
ASEAN ⫹ 3 summit in November the image remained of a reluctant
Japan facing an energetic China, leaving ASEAN to manage the dual
summits a year hence.
For the first half of 2005 the situation appeared even less promising.
While Tokyo concentrated on a fruitless mission to gain a permanent
seat on the UN Security Council as part of a larger reform package,
Beijing was consolidating its position in various regions of the world as
the rising challenger to the United States and hardening its stance
toward its East Asian rival. Anti-Japanese demonstrations in April in
China’s major cities not only protested Japan’s handling of sensitive his-
torical issues, but also called into question its claims to political power,
especially the plan for Security Council reform. In March, South Korean
president Roh Moo-hyun assailed Japan’s political ambitions too, start-
ing with denunciation of the provocative move by Shimane prefecture to
declare an annual “Takeshima day” in asserting Japan’s claim to Dokdo
Island and continuing with a vigorous offensive against Japan’s UN
ambitions. Deteriorating relations with Japan’s two partners in the ⫹ 3
of ASEAN ⫹ 3 cast doubt on cooperation in a regional format.
Japan’s isolation in Northeast Asia intensified over the year; yet the
impact on its views of regionalism proved to be the opposite of what was
expected. In May the abortive visit to Japan of the Chinese deputy prime
minister, Wu Yi, and in June the disastrous visit of Koizumi to Seoul (to
listen to a two-hour harangue from Roh in lieu of the shuttle diplomacy
that was planned) continued the downward spiral in ties with Japan’s two
most important regional partners. In November after Koizumi visited the
Yasukuni shrine again and named a cabinet with prominent right-wing
figures, Hu Jintao refused to meet with him at the APEC summit in Busan
and Roh’s short meeting brought another stern lecture. Cooperation in
pursuit of regionalism had collapsed in Northeast Asia. Koizumi turned
instead to the EAS with fresh hope for a different sort of regionalism.
The turning point in Japanese thinking on regionalism occurred in
July when the ASEAN foreign ministers agreed to invite India, Australia,
and New Zealand to join the EAS. Despite the long-standing insistence
by Malaysia on excluding non-Asians from regionalism and an image of
Thailand’s President Thaksin working closely with China, the balance
had shifted toward a more inclusive definition of East Asia. Considering
that Japan had been arguing for inclusion of Australia and New Zealand
in a regional body since at least the mid-1990s, the result was welcome.
Now it was China, which had not tried to challenge the decision making
of ASEAN and damage gains already achieved toward regionalism, that
became cautious about the EAS. It concentrated on strengthening the
ASEAN ⫹ 3 summit without giving much of an agenda to the EAS.
Japan’s renewed enthusiasm for regionalism can be explained by three
factors. First, the redefined scope of East Asia suggested that it could bal-
ance China. Australia’s presence introduced a close U.S. ally certain to
welcome close alignment between global and regional concerns. Within
Southeast Asia, Indonesia’s reassertion of a leadership role under its new
president Sudhayono, Vietnam’s rising voice, and Singapore’s unusually
active support for a new regional framework all gave Japan confidence
that China would not gain a dominant role. Possibly, India would serve
as a credible counterweight to China. Given the active cultivation of
Southeast Asian and Indian leaders by Japan as well as by the United States
and Australia, it was hard to avoid the conclusion that a strategic success
was achieved by the geographical reconfiguration of regionalism. This
ushered in regionalism with Southeast Asia still occupying centerstage
but the weight of Northeast Asia held in abeyance.
Second, the goal of forging an East Asian community acquired a new
meaning in Japan that rekindled interest in regionalism. Often talk
about regional values has revived memories of Asian values, long associated
with resistance to Western values propounded by the United States above
all. The Japanese had come to recognize that close coordination with
the United States would not be served by giving credibility to this sensi-
tive theme. Lately, China and South Korea had focused attention on
treatment of history as the most salient cultural theme. Although pro-
voked by Koizumi’s actions, they had, in effect, placed additional obsta-
cles in the path of finding a consensus on the meaning of community. In
2005 the more assertive SCO had directly challenged the application of
human rights concerns against member states, reinforcing the image of
China as well as Russia intent on regionalism with no interference in
each country’s internal politics. At the same time, the Bush administra-
tion was accelerating its messianic quest for democratizing other states,
including China, and pressing human rights concerns. By joining the
cause of universal values and insisting that it is the crux of a regional
community, Japan deflected the talk about history, boosted coordination
with the United States, and found a weapon to use against China as well
as North Korea in the struggles within Asia.
A third reason for Japan to embrace the EAS is to reenergize its Asian
diplomacy. At APEC in November Koizumi appeared isolated as Hu
Jintao, on the heels of a visit to North Korea, gained lively exposure
Regionalism ● 265
through prominent meetings with host Roh and others concerned about
the fate of the six-party talks. At ASEAN ⫹ 3 there was no escaping more
headlines about Koizumi being shunned. In articulating a vision for the
EAS, however, Japan was reaching for the spotlight. It championed an
Asian community open to the world, especially cognizant of the U.S.
role, and steeped in universal values with a strong security component.
India and Indonesia would serve as two pillars entitled to economic pri-
ority and special political recognition. Regionalism centered in Southeast
Asia and balancing Northeast Asia with other Indian Ocean states would
become the venue for Japan’s new diplomatic initiatives. Having started
its postwar reentry into Asia in Southeast Asia, Japan was again giving
priority to this area as its gateway to Asia.
Foreign Minister Aso Taro’s December 7 speech explained Japan’s
vision of regionalism, beginning by proclaiming that the EAS offers a
common dream for the future. Aso proceeded to stress his pleasure at the
inclusion of three full members who share fundamental values of democ-
racy and at the importance of the middle class around the region as the
standard-bearers for the future. In this way he conveyed Japan’s role as the
thought leader, both the forerunner for postwar optimism in the area and
the leader in universal values. Aso also presents Japan as the stabilizer,
both economically with its generous assistance and through the U.S.
security alliance as well. Finally, Aso presents Japan as an equal partner
respectful of other nations as peers. In this light he calls the countries of
ASEAN the captain of the ship called regional cooperation and appeals to
them for further contributions toward the overarching goal of the East
Asian community. This upbeat speech failed to address the real problems
in the area, only superficially conveying a strategic vision as tense summit
meetings loomed, but it laid a foundation.
Having abruptly changed course on the EAS, Tokyo seemed less inter-
ested in regionalism than in balancing Beijing. There were no signs that
this was planned as a stepping stone to renewed engagement of Beijing
and pursuit of a Northeast Asian community. Japan’s leaders cannot
count on key ASEAN states or even Australia or India to share their
intense suspicions of China’s leadership. If the goals of economic inte-
gration and community building were taken seriously, there would be no
alternative to striving to repair relations in Northeast Asia. The strategic
response is not to concede to Japan’s neighbors, but to look for common
ground that would serve national interests.
As his tightening embrace of the United States, Koizumi’s shift on the
EAS highlighted Japan’s obsession with the rise of China. In comparison
to George W. Bush’s legacy of strategic competition transforming into
strategic accommodation with China, Koizumi appeared to be fixated on

steps associated with countering China’s rise yet without a strategic
framework for Asia. It remains to be seen if preference for the EAS over
ASEAN ⫹ 3 will lead to a struggle that undermines any path forward to
regionalism or somehow under Abe a strategic vision will emerge that
reengages China to a degree as part of a broad and inclusive regionalism
with security on the Korean peninsula an urgent priority.
In December 2005 the debate in Japan over regionalism intensified.
The decisions at the two Kuala Lumpur summits to put the emphasis on
community building in ASEAN ⫹ 3 allowed only a secondary role for
the EAS. This was seen as a win for China, leading some to argue that
Japan must abandon its illusions since the very concept of “community”
is dangerous.32 One critic had warned in Tokyo shimbun that community
means guaranteeing free movement of labor as well as coordination of
macroeconomic policy leading toward a common currency, all of which
serve China’s regional strategy; yet, the newspaper disavowed this mes-
sage, insisting that it was a distortion that puts Japan in danger of reject-
ing Asia.33 Some argue that Japan must not be isolated or that its role is
essential to balance China in regional groupings. Former Foreign
Ministry official Tanaka Hitoshi led in making the case for a desirable
form of community, including accelerated flows for economic integra-
tion, capacity building for infrastructure and personnel, and human
security. Japan could maintain strong U.S. ties and still work to spread
common values in Asia, he insisted.34 After the summits, others argued
in the same vein that it is not constructive to see regionalism just as a
battle between China and Japan; instead of being defeatist, Japan can
press forward with its agenda, which requires improving relations with
China and South Korea.35
Koizumi has articulated three principles for regionalism: open region-
alism, which suggests broad membership and less exclusivity of opera-
tions; a functional approach that imposes fewer obligations than an
institutionalized body; and respect for the values of a liberal democracy.36
These can be seen as challenging China’s alleged intentions and keeping
U.S. ties as strong as possible. They set the bar high for reaching the
stage of a “community,” asserting Japan’s new vision for regionalism
rivaling China’s interest in building communities with neighbors regard-
less of values. While Chinese analysts hope that the process for resolving
the North Korean nuclear crisis through six-party talks will create a
stronger basis for regionalism in Northeast Asia,37 the underlying rivalry
with China may well lead Japan to present its own vision for regional
cooperation in Northeast Asia. Such a vision will only reflect mature
Regionalism ● 267
strategic thinking if it both seeks to create trust with China for a broad
and inclusive regionalism and to persuade the United States that Japan’s
visionary participation in regionalism well serves U.S. global interests.
Notes
1. Gilbert Rozman, Northeast Asia’s Stunted Regionalism: Bilateral Distrust in
the Shadow of Globalization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2004).
2. Ming Wan, Japan between Asia and the West: Economic Power and Strategic
Balance (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2001).
3. Gilbert Rozman, Japan’s Response to the Gorbachev Era: A Rising Superpower
Views a Declining One (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).
4. Brad Williams, “The Criminalisation of Russian–Japanese Border Trade:
Causes and Consequences,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 55, No. 5 (2003),
pp. 711–28.
5. Gilbert Rozman, “Backdoor Japan: The Search for a Way Out via
Regionalism and Decentralization,” Journal of Japanese Studies, Vol. 25,
No.1 (Winter 1999), pp. 3–31.
6. Gilbert Rozman, “Restarting Regionalism in Northeast Asia,” North Pacific
Policy Papers 1 (Vancouver: Program on Canada-Asia Policy Studies,
Institute of Asian Research, 2000), pp. 2–21.
7. Ming Zhang and Ronald N. Montaperto, A Triad of Another Kind: The
United States, China, and Japan (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999).
8. Kamiya Matake, “Japanese Foreign Policy toward Northeast Asia,” in
Takashi Inoguchi and Purnendra Jain, eds., Japanese Foreign Policy Today
(New York: Palgrave, 2000), p. 238.
Era of Uncertain Power (New York: Palgrave, 2001).
10. Edward J. Lincoln, East Asian Economic Regionalism (Washington,
DC: Brookings, 2004), pp. 154–58, 240–41.
11. Takashi Inoguchi, “Introduction: Japan Goes Regional,” in Takashi Inoguchi,
ed., Japan’s Asian Policy: Revival and Response (New York: Palgrave, 2002), p. 30.
12. Peter J. Katzenstein, “Introduction: Asian Regionalism in Comparative
Perspective,” in Peter J. Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi, eds., Network
Power: Japan and Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 40–41.
13. Steven K. Vogel, “Final Thoughts: Whither U.S.–Japan Relations?” in
Steven K. Vogel, ed., U.S.–Japan Relations in a Changing World
(Washington, DC: Brookings, 2002), pp. 262–69.
14. T.J. Pempel, “Transpacific Torii: Japan and the Emerging Asian Regionalism,”
in Katzenstein and Shiraishi, Network Power: Japan and Asia, p. 80.
15. Takahara Akio, “Japan’s Political Response to the Rise of China,” in
Kokubun Ryosei and Wang Jisi, eds., The Rise of China and a Changing East
Asian Order (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2004), p. 167.
16. Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Security Agenda: Military, Economic &

Environmental Dimensions (London: Lynne Rienner, 2004), p. 240.
17. Mike M. Mochizuki, “Japan: Between Alliance and Autonomy,” in Ashley J.
Tellis and Michael Wills, eds., Strategic Asia 2004–05: Confronting Terrorism
in the Pursuit of Power (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2004),
p. 117.
18. Gilbert Rozman, “Japan’s North Korean Initiative and U.S.–Japanese
Relations,” Orbis, Vol. 47, No. 3 (Summer 2003), pp. 527–39.
19. Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, “Japan and Asian-Pacific
Security,” in J. Suh, Peter J. Katzenstein, and Allen Carlson, eds., Rethinking
Security in East Asia: Identity, Power, and Efficiency (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2004), p. 108.
20. Kazuhiko Togo, Japan’s Foreign Policy 1945–2003: The Quest for a Proactive
Policy (Leiden: Brill, 2005), pp. 380–81.
21. Sankei shimbun Chugoku shuzaiban, Yami no naka no Nitchu kankei
(Tokyo: Sankei shimbunsha, 2002).
22. Kokubun Ryosei, ed., Nihon, Amerika, Chugoku: kyocho e no shinario
(Tokyo: TBS Britanika, 1997).
23. Imazato Yoshikazu, Gaimusho “shippai” no honshitsu, (Tokyo: Kodansha,
2002).
24. Samejima Keiji, ed., Chugoku no seiki, Nihon no senryaku (Tokyo: Nihon
keizai kenkyu senta, 2002).
25. Musakoji Kinhide, Tohoku Ajia jidai e no teigen (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2003).
26. Motegi Toshimitsu, Nihon gaiko no kosoryoku (Tokyo: Tokuma shoten,
2003).
27. Nakajima Mineo, “ODA o toriyame taiChugoku gaiko no arikata mo
minaose,” Chuo koron, March 2005, pp. 128–35.
28. Ogura Kazuo, “ ‘Joshiki’ ni hisomeru itsutsu no ayamari,” Ronza, March
2005, pp. 46–51.
29. Asahi shimbun, April 9, 2005, p. 15.
30. Nikkei sangyo, April 12, 2005, p. 3.
31. Rozman, Northeast Asia’s Stunted Regionalism, pp. 366–79.
32. Sankei shimbun, December 15, 2005, p. 2; Sankei shimbun, December 18,
2005, p. 12.
33. Tokyo shimbun, October 2, 2005, p. 3; Tokyo shimbun, October 19, 2005,
p. 5.
34. Nihon keizai shimbun, November 24, 2005, p. 25.
35. Nihon keizai shimbun, December 15, 2005, p. 9.
36. Sankei shimbun, December 15, 2005, p. 2.
37. “ ‘Higashi Ajia kyodotai’ koso ni netsu o ireru Chugoku no shini,” Foresight,
December 2005, p. 86.
Contributors
Joseph P. Ferguson is Vice President of the National Council for

Eurasian and East European Research. He received his Ph.D. from the
Johns Hopkins University, and was in residence at Princeton University
as a postdoctoral fellow. He has published numerous articles and essays
on the international relations of Eurasia and Northeast Asia.
Tsuyoshi Hasegawa is Professor in the Department of History and Co-
Director of the Center for Cold War Studies at the University of
California at Santa Barbara. He received his B.A. in international rela-
tions at Tokyo University and his Ph.D. in history at the University of
Washington. His monographs include The Northern Territories Dispute
and Russo Japanese Relations, 2 vols, (1998), and Racing the Enemy:
Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan (2005).
Takashi Inoguchi is Professor of Political Science at Chuo University
and Professor Emeritus at the University of Tokyo. His latest publica-
tions include Japanese Politics (2005), Japan’s Asian Policy (ed., 2004),
Reinventing the Alliance (co-ed., 2003), American Democracy Promotion
(co-ed., 2000), and Japanese Foreign Policy Today (co-ed., 2000). He is
Editor of the Japanese Journal of Political Science and President of the
Asian Consortium for Political Research.
Akio Kawato served in the Japanese Foreign Ministry from 1970,
mainly working on Russia. After serving as Ambassador to Uzbekistan
and Tajikistan, he retired in 2004. Now he is Chief Economist at the
Research Institute of Capital Formation, Development Bank of Japan,
and teaches at Waseda University. He is the author of many books on
international relations and a novel on Russia.
Ryosei Kokubun is Director of the Institute of East Asian Studies and
Professor of Political Science at Keio University. He is currently President
of the Japan Association for Asian Studies and also President of the Japan
270 ● Contributors
Association of International Relations. He co-edited The Rise of China

and a Changing East Asian Order (2004).
Cheol Hee Park is Assistant Professor at the Graduate School of
International Studies at Seoul National University after teaching at the
Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security under the Korean
Foreign Ministry and Tokyo’s National Graduate School for Policy
Studies. He has written many articles on Japanese politics, Korea-Japan
relations, and international relations in East Asia.
T.J. Pempel is Il Han New Professor and Director of the Institute of East
Asian Studies at the University of California, Berkeley. His recent books
include Regime Shift: Comparative Dynamics of the Japanese Political
Economy (1998), The Politics of the Asian Economic Crisis (1999), Beyond
Bilateralism: U.S.-Japan Relations in the New Asia-Pacific (2004), and
Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region (2005).
Gilbert Rozman is the Musgrave Professor of Sociology at Princeton
University, where he has taught since 1970. His most recent monograph
is Northeast Asia’s Stunted Regionalism: Bilateral Distrust in the Shadow of
Globalization (2004). He also co-edited Korea at the Center: The
Dynamics of Regionalism in Northeast Asia (2006).
Kazuhiko Togo served in the Japanese Foreign Ministry from 1968 on
Russia, the United States, Europe, international law, and economics.
After serving as Ambassador to the Netherlands, he retired in 2002. He
taught at universities in Moscow, Tokyo, and Leiden. In 2004–06 he was
engaged in teaching and research in Princeton. His recent publications
include Japan’s Foreign Policy 1945–2003: The Quest For a Proactive
Policy (2005).
Ming Wan is professor of Government and Politics and Associate
Professor and Associate Chair for undergraduate studies in the
Department of Public and International Affairs, George Mason
University. His most recent book is Sino-Japanese Relations: Interaction,
Logic, and Transformation (2006).
Index
Abe Shintaro, 10, 23, 73, 98, 101, 203 Asia-Africa Summit, 139
Abe Shinzo, 32, 113, 259 Asia-Europe Summit (ASEM), 100
Abductions issue, 25–6, 29, 69, 100, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC),
129–30, 187–94; as symbol, 32,103, and Taiwan, 175; decline of, 97, 248;
254 entrance into, 64, 91, 208; formation
Academia, 11–2, 75, 156 of, 45–8, 186, 243–7; summits, 25, 72,
Afghanistan, 225, 233, 241; Soviet war in, 7, 84, 101, 145, 212, 213, 217, 263–6;
45, 52; U.S. war in, 29, 120–2, 220, support for, 118, 245
232, 235 Asian Development Bank (ADB), 236
Africa, 116, 127, 225 Asian financial crisis, 81, 87–8, 96, 184,
Agreed Framework of 1994, 188, 192 189–90, 250–1, 256–7; and China,
Agriculture, 97, 109, 114, 232, 240, 247 178; and Japan, 21–2, 41, 102, 111,
Akayev, Askar, 229 118, 245, 248; and South Korea, 18,
Akino Yutaka, 231 81, 88, 190
Andijan, 235–7, 239–41 Asian Games, 166
Annan, Kofi, 138 Asian Monetary Fund (AMF), 87–9, 245;
Anti-Americanism, 26–7, 49, 59, 194 failure of, 22, 41, 102, 118, 227,
Anti-secession law, 166, 145, 170, 173, 176 250–7
Apology, 28, 39, 50, 66–7, 75–7, 153–4; and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), 118, 238–9
Koreas, 69–70, 189; by China, 138, Asian values, 245, 249, 256, 264
144, 152; of Murayama, 16, 28, 188, Aso Taro, 31, 265
249; of Obuchi, 22, 93, 95; of Atomic bomb victims, 70
Koizumi, 28, 30, 139–40, 196 August 15, 32, 39, 143
Armitage, Richard, 121, 193 August 1991 coup, 17, 61, 204
Arms, control, 8–9, 61, 72; sales, 67, 124, Australia, 116, 122, 260–1; and APEC, 44,
145–6, 209, 251 48–9, 186, 247; and China, 119, 127;
ASEAN, 6, 44, 88, 227, 240, 255–6; and the EAS, 5, 29, 31, 125, 256,
conference in Tokyo in 2003, 26, 262; 258–9, 263–5
leader in regionalism, 23, 265; Treaty Axis of evil, 25, 193
of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), 125, Azerbaijan, 231–2
262
ASEAN ⫹ 3, 234; formation of, 5, 88, Baker, James, 71, 74, 228
102–3, 190, 245, 250–1, 256; in 2005, Balanced expansion (kakudai kinko), 203
3, 29–31, 262–6; support for, 118, Belarus, 60
124–5, 253; summits of, 31, 144, 119, Blair, Tony, 100, 121
262, 264; vision statement, 262 Boao forum, 25, 253
Asia, balance with U.S., 1, 6–8, 29, 37, 43, Boucher, Richard, 241
125, 150, 183–4, 189, 193, 196, Bretton-Woods system, 52
243–5, 251, 257; priorities in, 2, 47 Brezhnev, Leonid, 6–7
272 ● Index
Bubble economy, 53; and thinking, 13, 118; Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS),
collapse of, 17, 36, 50, 82, 110, 148, 228–9
151, 155 Communist Party rule in China, 153–4, 165,
Bush, George H. W., 188, 206 171
Bush, George W., 116, 119, 257, 265; and Community in East Asia, 29, 32, 193,
Koizumi, 23–9, 125, 193, 196, 265; 255–8, 262–6
and North Korea, 25, 130, 184 Comprehensive National Security, 109, 124,
186
Cabinet, 31, 45, 112, 142–3 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), 85,
Cambodia, 51–2, 227, 240 124
Canada, 62 Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Carter, Jimmy, 69 Europe (CSCE), 238
Caucasus, 62, 90, 230–1 Confucianism, 250
Central Asia, 62, 225; and great power Constitution, 37–8, 74; limits on use of
competition (Great Game), 15, 215, force, 40, 59, 72, 140, 187–8; revision
226, 235–6, 240–1, 254; and Sino- of, 42–3, 114, 174
Russian ties, 3, 237–8; as a priority, 90, Corruption, 18, 203, 214–5, 239
230; Cooperation Operation (CACO), Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy
234–5, 241; plus Japan, 233–5, 241 (CEFP), 112
Chechen war, 64, 215 Countdown to 2000, 23, 91, 100, 208, 210,
Checkbook diplomacy, 39–40, 59, 73, 120, Crawford, John, 43
235, 241 Crime, 149, 244
Chen Shui-bian, 99, 117, 151, 174–5 Cross-border trade, 244
Chernenko, Konstantin, 9, 202 Cultural, fever, 13–4; opening, 26, 95,
Chi Haotian, 84 190–1, 254; exchanges, 11, 99, 194,
Chiang Mai Initiative, 22, 96, 102, 124, 250 227, 244, 246
China, and cultural barriers, 236; bridge to, Cultural Revolution, 150
14–5, 18, 65–7, 164, 248; equidistant
diplomacy, 47; fever, 146; military Daqing, 26, 216–8
cooperation with, 124; normalization Defense guidelines, 20, 72, 92–3, 127, 154,
with or the 1972 System, 38–9, 43, 45, 250
50, 142, 149–54, 161–3, 166; social DeGaulle, Charles, 37–9
problems of, 27, 141; world order of, D”Estaing, Giscard, 43
168, 171, 174 Democracy, 31; and Central Asia, 234–9;
Chino Tadao, 230, 233 and China, 50–1, 149; and Japan, 28,
Chosensoren, 185–6 44, 47, 185, 230, 264–7; and Russia,
Chun Doo-hwan, 9–10, 46, 49, 186 60, 62, 205–6; and South Korea, 9,
Clinton, Bill, 67, 69, 82–6, 90, 93–5, 99, 13–14, 17, 49–50, 70, 246, 249; and
169, 206; and globalization, 248; and Taiwan, 49, 127, 151, 155, 164–8,
Japanese concerns, 250, 254 175; third wave of, 49
Cold war, and later idealism, 19, 79, 243; Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), 43, 171,
reasoning of, 61–2, 149, 183–4, 195, 260
202, 244; restraints of, 7, 14–15, 58, Demonstrations in China in 2005, 113, 128,
143, 161, 247; second, 48 137–42, 145–7, 154–6, 165, 253–5
Collective security, 117, 122 Deng Xiaoping, 10–13, 40, 50–1, 66,
Colonialism, 24, 44, 75–6, 85–6, 128, 161, 79–80, 148–50, 248; concept of world,
165–6, 244 7, 83, 94
Comfort women, 17, 70, 79, 188 Developmental authoritarianism, 35, 49
Index ● 273
Diet, 60, 131, 162, 227; elections, 3, 22, 30, Russia, 29, 208; in South Korea, 46–8,
92, 111, 113, 187, 210, 231; history 95
resolution, 17, 188, 249; laws, 38, 59, Four islands in a batch, 102, 213, 217
121–2; territorial resolution, 218 Four-party talks, 17, 89, 97, 192
Dokdo/Takeshima dispute, 27, 77, 95, 115, France, 43, 52, 62, 123, 207
138, 147, 249; and Shimane Fraser, Malcolm, 44
prefecture, 30, 183, 195, 263 Free Trade Agreement (FTA) talks, 124, 126,
Drug trafficking, 109, 129, 239 252, 261; and China, 119, 252; and
Duma elections, 63 South Korea, 26, 190, 245, 251
Friendship diplomacy, 19, 43, 46, 142–3,
East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), 47, 151–4, 255
118, 243–5, 254–7 FSX controversy, 8
East Asian Summit, 3, 5, 29–31, 125–6, 243–5, Fujio Seiko, 10
256, 257–8, 263–6; vision for, 265 Fukuda, Takeo, 98; doctrine, 227, 255
East China Sea, 144, 147, 160, 171–3, 176, Funabashi Yoichi, 37, 83
221, 259–61 Functional separation (tatewari gyosei), 111
Eastern Europe, 61, 68, 203
Economic integration of Northeast Asia, 19, G-8 (G-7, G-5), 15, 35, 51–2, 257; Denver
117, 246 summit, 90, 208; Munich summit,
Economic power, impact of, 39, 58, 73, 150, 62–3, 98, 204; Okinawa summit, 22,
227, 248, 252 97, 101, 211–2; Tokyo summit, 45,
Economic reform in Japan, 20, 23, 81–2, 205; Williamsburg summit, 8–9, 45–6
113–4; and financial crisis, 81–2; and Gaiatsu (outside pressure), 59
resumption of growth, 32, 37 Gas, 127, 144, 147, 229, 237, 259–61
Emperor, Akihito, 69, 154; and talk of visit Generational change, 25, 49, 152–5
to South Korea, 70; and visit to China, Germany, 61–2, 123, 126, 207; parallel to
16, 64–7, 76, 79, 93, 153–5, 167; Japan, 40, 48, 52–3
Hirohito, 44; role of, 114 Globalization, 1, as a challenge, 250, 256–7,
Energy, competition, 127, 144–5, 160, 263; and market fundamentalism, 253;
215–9; cooperation, 208, 262; security, and market liberalization, 48–9, 51
30, 40, 45, 109 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 6, 10, 14; and Japan’s
Environmental problems, 41, 109, 126 response, 23, 53, 202, 246; visit to
Eurasian diplomacy, 90, 208, 231 China, 60; visit to Japan, 13, 17, 61,
European Bank for Reconstruction and 203–4
Development (EBRD), 236 Grachev, Pavel, 206
European Union (EU), 48, 52–3, Great Britain, 12, 36, 44, 62, 85, 122, 193
88, 145–6, 235–6, 239–41, Gromyko, Andrei, 202
244, 261 Gulf War, 57–60, 64, 71, 167, 184, 196,
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), 127, 129, 257; marginalization in, 20, 66, 68–9,
171 79, 82, 188
Famine, 26 Hasegawa Keitaro, 113, 168

Fishing, 63, 96–7, 165, 208; agreements, 85, Hashimoto Ryuichiro, 114
91, 95, 149, 210; wars, 206 Hashimoto Ryutaro, 20–1, 81–92, 143, 154,
Flying geese pattern, 35, 43, 46–50, 111, 188, 196, 231; and Russia, 22, 206,
246 210
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), 48–9, 232, Hashimoto-Yeltsin Plan, 91, 208
255; in China, 16, 66, 73, 148, 254; in Hata Tsutomu, 63, 67, 74, 206
274 ● Index
Hatoyama Yuko, 259 Ito Masayoshi, 45

Higuchi Report, 71–2 Ivanov, Igor, 211, 214
Hiramatsu Shigeo, 113, 168
History, card, 73, 93–5, 155, 250; debate, Japan, as model, 14, 66, 111, 150, 185, 249,
11–12; education, 28, 76, 155; 256; militarism of, 7, 40, 60, 75, 84,
repulsing criticism of, 2, 21 154
Historical debt, 36–41 Japan Defense Agency (JDA), 72, 83, 90,
Hokkaido, 202, 210, 244, 247 127, 172–3, 206, 209
Hong Kong, 44, 53, 76, 148, 175–6 Japan International Cooperation Agency
Hosokawa Morihiro, 17, 63, 67, 70–6, 154, (JICA), 231
205–6 Japan Socialist Party (JSP), 68, 82, 162;
Huang Ju, 142 collapse of, 15, 69, 74, 185–8, 195
Hu Jintao, 25, 27, 29, 138–42, 176, 237; Jiang Jingguo, 49
meetings with leaders, 31, 145, 216, Jiang Zemin, 18, 51, 70, 80, 85–6, 99; visit
258, 263–4 in 1992, 65, 167; visit in 1998, 21,
Hu Yaobang, 7, 9–13, 46, 50–1, 153 92–5, 103, 143, 154–5, 169; and Hu
Human rights, 31, 89, 221, 255, 257, 261; Jintao, 25, 141–2
and Central Asia, 230, 233, 235; and Joint Communique of 1972, 50, 93, 140,
China, 11, 27, 46, 65, 94, 227, 248; 152, 154, 162–8
and Russia, 62; and universal values, Joint Declaration of 1956, 61–3, 101,
245, 249, 264–5 203–5, 212, 216
Humanitarian assistance, 41, 63, 206, 215,
232; and North Korea, 89, 95, 100, Kaifu Toshiki, 59, 61, 65, 69, 73,
189, 192 95, 204
Human security, 22, 41, 97, 266 Kamisaki Takenori, 259
Kanemaru Shin, 68–9, 115, 187
Ideology, as a factor, 60, 66, 153–4, 202 Kanryu (Korea fever), 183
Ikeda Hayato, 38 Karimov, Islam, 230, 232–3, 235–8, 241
Ikeda Yukihiko, 206 Kase Hideaki, 113, 168
India, and the EAS, 5, 29, 31, 125, 258, Kashmir, 81
263–5; and role in Central Asia, 225, Kasyanov, Mikhail, 211
236; priority of, 100, 253, 260–1 Kato Koichi, 114, 189
Indian Ocean, 122, 265 Kato Ryozo, 101
Indonesia, 81, 88, 97, 189, 255, 260, 264–5 Kawana summit, 91–2, 210
Intelligence, satellites, 96, 191; sharing, 172 Kawaguchi Yoriko, 214, 216, 234–5
Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF), 8, 36, Kazakhstan, 60, 228–31, 234
45, 52 Kelly, James, 130, 192
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Khasbulatov, Ruslan, 204
69 Khodorkovsky, Mikhail, 216
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 88, Kim Dae-jung, 81, 89, 100, 102, 191–2,
109, 233, 250 253–4; visit to Japan, 21–2, 93–6, 103,
Internationalization (kokusaika), 9 190, 249–51
Internet, 27, 30, 137–40, 259 Kim Il-sung, 16, 68–9
Iran, 29, 123, 193, 225–7, 236 Kim Jong-il, 18, 25, 100, 102, 129, 190–3
Iraq, 193; War, 26, 37, 119; and Japanese Kim Young-sam, 15, 17, 70, 249
troops, 29, 42, 120–2, 194, 220, 257 Kirienko, Sergei, 210
Irkutsk summit of 2001, 23–4, 101, 212–3 Kishi Nobusuke, 37–8, 121, 162
Ishihara Shintaro, 8, 168, 175 Kissinger, Henry, 36–7
Islam, 119, 225; radicals, 168, 340 Kitaoka Shinichi, 59, 75
Index ● 275
Kohl, Helmut, 90 Mahathir, Mohammad bin, 47, 97, 118,

Koizumi Junichiro, leadership role of, 113–4, 245, 256
121, 170; overview of, 2; strategic Malaysia, 81, 97, 111, 253, 255–8, 263
thinking of, 5, 24, 28, 125, 193, 196, Mao Zedong and Maoism, 7, 12, 66, 152
253 Marcos, Ferdinand, 49
Komeito, 59, 64, 154, 259 Maritime Safety Agency, 42, 96, 129, 131,
Komura Masahiko, 231 191
Kono Yohei, 64, 114, 188 Market economies, Central Asia’s shift, 232,
Korea, annexation and rule over, 22, 69–70 235, 239; China’s shift in 1992, 16, 80,
Korean Airlines (KAL) downing in 1983, 13, 115, 148, 248; Russia’s shift, 60, 91,
46, 70, 187 244
Korean Peninsula Energy Development Meiji era, 161, 226
Organization (KEDO), 17, 69, 89, 96, Middle class values, 31, 265
121, 128, 188, 192 Middle East, 58, 60, 116–7, 123, 127, 159,
Korean summit of 2000, 100 225, 230; War, 36, 40, 48
Koreans, in Japan, 70, 129, 195; on Sakhalin, Migration, 109
70 Miki Takeo, 36, 39
Kowtow diplomacy, 75, 143, 155 Military affairs, revolution in, 41–2, 116,
Kozyrev, Andrei, 63–4 194
Krasnoyarsk summit of 1997, 91, Military bases, 116, 208; in Central Asia,
208–12 232–5, 237; in Japan, 71–2, 117, 172;
Kunadze, Georgy, 62, 204 in Korea, 26, 117
Kuriyama Takakazu, 59 Military budgets, 41, 59, 124; of China, 67,
Kwangju repression, 49 126, 151, 166, 171
Kyoto dorm dispute, 163 Ministry consolidation, 112
Kyrgyzstan, 229, 231, 234–6, 238–41 Military exercises of Russia and China, 146
Ministry of Education (and Science), 114–5,
Lake, David, 35–6 143–4
Lavrov, Sergei, 217–8 Ministry of Finance (MOF), 60, 82–3, 87–8,
Law and justice, 62, 204–5 233
League of Nations, 60 Ministry of Industry and Trade (MITI, later
Lee Teng-hui, 83, 151, 165, 174–5; and visa METI), 82–3, 87, 98, 144, 206
to Japan, 24, 99–100, 103, 128, 145, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), 83, 87,
169–70 93, 96, 226–31; and Russia, 22–3, 30,
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and 91, 98, 101, 219; China school, 24,
expertise, 12, 28, 112; and multi-party 66–7, 85, 169–70, 254; divisions in, 24,
coalitions, 3, 17, 74, 82, 206; loss of 74, 102, 206, 212–4, 233; role of, 60,
power, 15, 63, 73, 110, 154–5, 188; 69, 235, 113, 195; understanding of, 12
divisions within, 20, 23, 113, 152, Missile defense, 21, 42, 96, 123–4, 191, 214
171, 212 Miyazawa Kiichi, 17, 62–5, 70–4, 114, 143,
Li Peng, 51, 65–7, 99 154, 188, 196; Miyazawa Initiative, 22,
Li Zhaoxing, 139, 145 88, 96, 102, 189–90
Liao Zhengzhi, 152 Mori Yoshiro, 20, 23, 81, 97–103, 169, 175,
Lien Chan, 176 196, 211–3
Lockheed Scandal, 152–3 Multipolarity, 18
Losyukov, Aleksandr, 218 Murayama Tomiichi, 17–18, 67, 74–6, 82,
110–1, 196; apology of, 16, 28, 32, 96.
Machimura Nobutaka, 139, 173 140, 188
Maekawa Report, 7 Myanmar (Burma), 13, 89, 187, 227
276 ● Index
Nagano Shigeto, 67 North Korea (DPRK), clashes with, 42, 96;

Nakagawa Shoichi, 144, 259 concern over, 20, 41, 52, 191, 220;
Nakajima Mineo, 113, 168, 255 missiles, 73, 123, 129–30, 214, 258;
Nakamura Katsunori, 113, 168 nuclear program, 26, 29, 68, 73, 113,
Nakasone Yasuhiro, 44–6, 202–3; and 118–9, 129–30, 188, 192–4, 255;
Chinese ties, 50, 142, 153; overview of, normalization with, 68–9, 81, 89, 128,
2; strategic thinking of, 7–13, 36, 40, 184–92, 244; talks with, 15–16, 22,
186, 246–7 25, 58, 79, 100, 249, 254
Nakayama Kyoko, 233 Northern Territories (Southern Kurils), as
Nakayama Taro, 61–2, 65, 205 symbol, 32, 61–2, 77, 201;
Nakhodka, 26, 216–8 demilitarization of, 64, 207; inspection
Nanjing massacre, 16, 67, 115 in 2004, 27; joint development, 207;
National Defense Program Outline (NDPO), multi-layered approach, 207
71–2, 123–4; guidelines of 2004–5, Nuclear crisis, of 1993–94, 17, 69, 82–4,
146, 172 121, 187–9, 192, 249; of 2002–6, 3,
National identity, 1, 4, 226; and Asia, 81, 97, 29, 41, 115, 119, 130–1, 184, 217,
103, 245; and cultural superiority, 257, 266
148–9; left and right notions of, 6, Nuclear tests, of China, 16, 21, 67–8, 79,
11–12, 17–18, 59, 74–5, 189, 247, 252, 84–5; of India and Pakistan, 89, 92,
258; of China, 10–11, 148–9; pride in, 100; of North Korea, 32, 131, 258,
28, 45, 174; revitalization of, 23, 44, 219 260
Nationalism, 60; rise in China, 12, 18, 50–1, Nuclear, power plants, 273, clean-up, 207,
66–7, 246–7; rise in Japan, 18, 27–8, 211; safety summit, 299, three
42, 70, 75, 111, 114, 121; rise in principles, 59; waste dumping, 205;
Russia, 16, 18, 62 weapons abolition, 42; weapons
NATO, expansion, 22, 90 removal, 60; weapons transit, 74–5
Naval incursions, by China, 127, 145, 147, Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), 89,
172, 174; by North Korea, 42, 96, 129; 115
by Soviet Union, 202 Nye initiative, 72, 189
Naval power, 122–4, 127, 166, 171–2, 202;
and Seventh Fleet, 117 Obuchi Keizo, 20–3, 81, 91–8, 154, 190,
Naval visits, 90 210–1, 230, 196
Nazarbayev, Nursultan, 230, 241 Official Development Assistance (ODA), 41,
Netherlands, 44, 85, 122, 165 48–9, 113, 118; and Central Asian ties,
New thinking, of Gorbachev, 6, 9, 13, 43, 229–30, 232–3, 237–9; and China ties,
47; of China toward Japan, 25, 27 6, 10–13, 19, 43, 50, 66,
New Zealand, 122, 186, 261; and EAS, 5, 73, 95, 126, 150, 153, 252–5; and
29, 31, 125, 256–9, 263 South Korean ties, 9–10, 39, 49, 246;
Nixon, Richard, 86 gratitude for, 151, 227, 255–6;
Nodong missiles, 69, 123, 209 suspension and resumption, 21, 68,
Nonaka Hiromu, 154, 212–3 84–5, 89, 151
Non-Government Organizations (NGOs), Ogura Kazuo, 190
41, 115 Ohira Masayoshi, 44–5, 95, 150–2, 186
Nordpolitik, 13, 15–6, 50, 187 Okazaki Hisahiko, 113, 168
Normal country, transition to, 4–6, Okinawa, 38, 89, 170
42, 47, 177, 188, 196, 243 Oil, 40, 58, 229–30, 236–9; crises or shocks,
North American Free Trade Agreement 6, 36, 43, 48, 186; exploration, 67,
(NAFTA), 244 123; pipelines, 26–7, 215–9
Northeast China (Manchuria), 85, 247 Okinawa, 72, 82, 97
Index ● 277
Okita Saburo, 43 Rakhmonov, Imomali, 231

Olympic Games, 45, 151 Reagan, Ronald, 7–9, 12–14, 45, 52, 186
Omori Yoshino, 83 Realism, 16, 19–21, 191–3, 251, 256, 259
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Realpolitik, 57, 67, 73, 174
Countries (OPEC), 36, 40, 43 Recruit scandal, 69, 73, 203
Oshima Kenzo, 232 Reentry into Asia, 16, 19, 164, 188, 196,
Ozawa Ichiro, 37, 115, 188, 203 243, 257; foundation for, 4, 31, 95
Refugees, 125, 129, 144
Pacifism, 4, 11, 59, 74–5, 128; and passivity, Regime shift, 110–3
2, 120, 146 Regionalism, and China’s role, 21, 29, 126,
Pakistan, 100, 258 252–3, 259–62; open, 44–5, 51, 118,
Pan-Pacific regionalism, 43–4, 186 245, 256–8, 261; reasons for, 45, 189;
Park Chung-hee, 49, 185 thinking on, 3, 23, 58, 103, 126, 190,
Patriotic education, 11, 76, 114, 153, 165 243–8, 268
Pax Americana, 28–9, 57–8, 64, 77 Rhee Seung-man, 185
Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1978, 45, 50, Rice, Condoleezza, 259
142, 147, 150–5, 163 Rodionov, Igor, 208
Peacekeeping operations (PKO), 28, 41–2, Roh Moo-hyun, 25–30, 194–6; in 2005, 31,
58, 70–3, 117, 123; law on, 59, 64–6, 126, 147, 253, 263–4
121 Roh Tae-woo, 16, 49, 69, 76, 187
Pearl Harbor, 86 Russia, flexibility on islands in 1992, 16–7, 63,
Permanent Normal Trade Relations 79, 249; military cooperation with, 206
(PNTR), 99 Russian Far East (RFE), 18, 64, 187, 202,
Perry, Matthew, 36 211, 219, 244; and East Siberia,
Perry (William) process, 21, 96, 251 215–6, 219
Philippines, 49, 144, 208 Russian financial crisis, 22, 92, 98
Pipes (liaisons), 142, 154–5
Plaza Accord, 7, 46–8, 52 Safaev, Sadyk, 234
Policy Affairs Research Council, 82, 112 Sakakibara, Eisuke, 88
Politics and Economics, as two wheels, 32; Sakhalin, energy projects, 215, 219, 247;
newly matched, 2, 40, 44; separated, oblast, 206
61–3, 67, 245 Sanctions, on China, 15, 51, 53, 58, 65, 151,
Primakov, Yevgeny, 207, 210 227, 247–8; on India and Pakistan,
Prime Minister’s Office, 60, 112, 172, 231 100; on North Korea, 25–6, 29, 32,
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), 124, 220 131, 258
Public opinion, and nationalism, 8, 27, San Francisco Peace Treaty, 38, 44, 149
31–2, 75, 114; and China, 19, 21, 142, Sato Eisaku, 82, 162
146–8, 161, 177; and North Korea, 25, Sato Seizaburo, 45, 59, 75
191; and South Korea, 147; and Sea of Japan economic rim, 243–4, 247, 258
Taiwan, 99–100, 145, 159, 161, Sea lanes, 14, 127, 159, 168, 171–2
164–70, 177; placating in Japan, 1, 38; Security Treaty, 37, 111, 121, 149;
toward Japan, 7, 13–4, 18, 40, 70, 138, scope of, 87, 93, 117, 120, 127–8,
142, 161, 246–7 151, 163
Putin, Vladimir, and Mori, 23, 98, 101, Self Defense Forces (SDF), opposition to, 38,
211–4; and 2004 offer, 29, 217; visit in 74, 111, 114, 188; power of, 40, 42,
2005, 27, 30–1, 218 209; use of, 59, 90, 117, 121–4,
170–2, 194
Qian Qichen, 65 Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, 67, 77, 85, 115,
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), 116 125, 160, 165–7, 172
278 ● Index
September 11 attack on U.S., 24, 29, 41–2, Spying and bilateral relations, 10, 94, 214
121, 184, 193, 196 SS-20 missiles, 8–9, 40, 202
Seshima Ryuzo, 59 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 10, 13, 47,
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO, 52, 203
Shanghai Five), 234–5, 237–41, 264 Strategic partnership of China and Russia, 3,
Shenyang consulate incident, 125, 129, 144 18, 30
Shevardnadze, Eduard, 10, 71, 202–3 Strategic thinking, and political groups,
Shimamura Yoshinobu, 67 11–13, background orientations, 4,
Shinoda Kenji, 207 causes of, 28; Chinese on Japan, 138,
Silk Road Diplomacy, 230–1 146; comprehensive notion of, 36,
Singapore, 44, 127, 252, 255–6, 258 109–10; criteria for, 1–2, 20, 58–60,
264 73–5, 156, 159; degree of, 19, 43, 53,
Sino-Japanese War of 1894–5, 161 197, 205, 252; periodization of, 3–5,
Sino-Soviet ties, alliance, 149; split and 43, 184–6, 226; transition in, 23, 35,
reconciliation, 12, 60 64–8, 187, 193, 227; wavering in,
Six-party talks, 25–6, 30, 97, 117, 119, 130, 175–8
197, 217, 266; in jeopardy, 3, 31; Structural Impediments Initiative (SII), 8, 47
return of North Korea to, 32, 258–61 Student exchanges, 46, 140, 153
Smile diplomacy, 103, 251 Sugiura Seiken, 232
Soccer games in China in 2004, 27, 125, Sunshine policy, 21–3, 81, 89, 95, 103,
128, 140, 147, 255 190–2, 251–4
Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ, see Suzuki Muneo, 23–4, 98, 101, 113, 212–5
also JSP), 110, 189 Suzuki Zenko, 8, 10, 45
Soft power, 4, 227, 244, 255
Sonoda Sunao, 202 Taepodong missiles, 21, 95, 115, 123, 129,
Soskovets, Oleg, 206 191–2, 209–10, 250
South Asia, 254 Taiwan, and China’s national security or
South China Sea, 125, 167, 171, 176 anti-secession law, 29, 117, 170,
South Korea, dependency of, 6; image of, 21; 173–5; and defense guidelines, 85–7,
normalization with China and Russia, 168–71; and one China policy, 93,
50, 61, 68–9, 126, 188; normalization 127, 140, 150–1, 155, 160–2, 166;
with Japan, 38–9, 184–5, 195, 248; and two plus two talks, 127–8, 145,
split with Japan in 2005, 26–7, 29, 160, 172–3, 176; lobby, 162, 171;
138, 260; thinking on North Korea, significance of, 2, 143, 159–60
29, 190, 194 Taiwan Relations Act, 162, 174
Southeast Asia (SEA), and competition with Taiwan Strait Crisis, 20–1, 86, 117, 160; and
China, 18, 26, 176, 190, 253–6, 261; Japan’s reaction, 21, 83–4, 127,
and Japan’s historic role, 44, 161, 255; 148–51, 90, 167–9, 189, 209
influence in, 246, 248, 255–6; priority Tajikistan, 229, 231–2, 234, 236–8
of, 3, 6, 46, 116, 159, 185–6, 190, Takashima Masuo, 45
245, 264; ties to Northeast Asia, 117, Takeshita Noboru, 10–11, 46–7, 73, 82, 92,
246, 249–50, 265 153
Soviet Union, collapse of, 16, 50, 57, 60–2, Tamba Minoru, 91, 101
68, 115, 148–50, 164, 237; diplomatic Tanabe Makoto, 68, 187
relations with, 38; military buildup of, Tanaka Akihiko, 75
45, 52, 202; threat of, 2, 7–8, 16, 43, Tanaka Hitoshi, 192, 266
186, 208 Tanaka Kakuei, 36, 46, 149, 152, 162, 213;
Space programs, 151 faction of, 21, 82, 153–5
Index ● 279
Tanaka Makiko, 24, 113, 213–4 United States, and normalization with China,
Territorial disputes, 77, 117, 262; with 39, 43, 52, 147–9, 161–2; as strategic
China, 50, 67, 140; with Russia and competitor, 15; deficits of, 48, 52;
impact on relations, 24–7, 30–1, 38, dependency on, 2, 18–9, 39, 75,
61–4, 73, 201, 204, 207, 212, 262 226–7, 247; division of labor with, 25,
Territorial waters law in China, 67, 166–7, 51–2, 245; occupation by, 44–5, 185;
170 passing by, 20, 80, 86, 96, 102; saying
Terrorism, 115, 196; response to, 4, 24, 42, no to, 8, 16, 164, 187–8; treasury
116, 121, 123, 215, 257 bonds, 46–8, 52–3, 246
Textbook issues, 24, 76–7, 115, 143–4, Uno Sosuke, 73, 95, 203
195–7, 260; and China, 11, 27, 125, U.S.-Japan alliance, consolidation in 1995–9,
138–42, 260; and South Korea, 70, 20, 84, 120, 127, 149, 168, 188–9;
138, 147, 191 development of, 38; meaning of, 7–8,
Thailand, 80, 87–8, 97, 111, 189, 263 45, 71–2; restructuring in 2005, 42,
Theater Missile Defense (TMD), see Missile 194; tests for, 28–9, 162–3; views of,
defense 40, 214
Three No’s, 86, 93–4, 169 U.S.-Japan-China triangle, 18, 80, 83–7, 99;
Tiananmen repression, and Japan’s response, golden era, 35, 47, 60, 202; changing
11, 13–4, 18, 65, 79, 95, 160; as nature of, 65, 102, 248, 251–2
turning point, 15, 50–1, 80, 143, 153, U.S.-Japan-Russia triangle, 16, 38, 246–7
155, 164; reverberations of, 141, 165 U.S.-Japan-South Korean triangle, 27–9, 96,
Togo Kazuhiko, 230 102, 185–7, 195–6, 260
Tojo Hideki, 39 Usui Hideo, 206
Tokyo Declaration, 17, 63–4, 205, 249 Uzbekistan, 228–41
Tokyo Tribunal, 38
Toshiba incident, 10, 13, 203 Vietnam, 227, 264; invasion of Cambodia, 7,
Toyota, 219 51–2; War, 36, 39, 43, 48, 52, 255
Tourism, and Mt. Kumgang, 191–2 Visits, to Southeast Asia, 251; to Central
Trade disputes, 7, 12, 16, 46, 71–3, 82, 164, Asia, 227, 241; to China, 21, 32, 153,
203, 246, 257 94, 258; to India, 100; to North Korea
Trade goals and data, 52, 148, 175, 203, in 2002 (Pyongyang Declaration),
215, 219, 232 25–6, 41, 129, 192–3, 196, 253; to
Transneft, 216–8 North Korea in 2004, 25, 27, 130,
Triangle with China and South Korea, 29, 194; to Russia, 26, 216, 218; to South
70, 176 Korea, 9, 32, 46, 70, 194, 258, 263
Trilateral Coordination and Vladivostok, 90, 216; speech of 1986, 203,
Oversight Group (TCOG), 22, 27, 96 246
Turkey, 236
Turkmenistan, 229–33 Wang Guangya, 138
War renunciation, 36–41
Ukraine, 60, 232 War reparations, 39, 50, 66–70, 150
Unit 731, 115 Watanabe Michio, 62–3, 74,
United Nations, and China or Taiwan, 162; 205, 230
reform with Japan’s Security Council Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), 4,
entry, 4, 27, 30, 42, 126, 138–40, 208, 116, 129, 193, 196
253–4, 263; resolutions of, 32, 258; Wen Jiabao, 126, 138
role in, 41–2, 122, 231; support for, Winter Sonata, 26
28–9, 109, 164, 232 World Bank, 91, 233
280 ● Index
World Cup, 22, 26, 190 85–6; Miki’s visit, 39; Nakasone’s visit,
World Health Organization (WHO), 175 10–11, 13, 39–40, 44, 46, 50, 142,
World Trade Organization 153; South Korean reactions, 49, 196;
(WTO), 21, 53, 81, 94–9, 109, 126, Taiwanese visits, 128
175 Yeltsin, Boris, 15, 18, 22, 90–2, 98, 204–11;
World War II, fiftieth anniversary of end, 17, cancellation of visit in 1992, 17, 62–4,
67, 75–6, 79, 140, 188, 249; impact of 70; visits to Japan, 63; visits to China,
defeat, 2, 4–6, 28, 36, 49, 163, 201, 67
226; invasion of China, 51, 85, 144, Yen revaluation, 7, 43, 46, 52–3, 246, 255
161; Soviet role in, 85, 218 Yoshida Shigeru, 149, 161; doctrine or
Wu Yi, 30, 128, 263 school, 37–9, 114–5, 246
Yugoslavia (Kosovo war), 21, 94, 140–1
Xinjiang, 119, 225 Yukos, 216
Yasukuni shrine, 32, 76–7, 143; and Abe, 32, Zeng Qinghong, 142
259; and Koizumi, 23, 27–31, 113, Zhao Ziyang, 50–1
125–6, 147, 154–6, 176, 194–5, 263; Zhou Enlai, 7, 11, 152, 162, 165
burials in, 38, Chinese reactions, 39, Zhu Rongji, 94, 97, 99
137–8, 170; Hashimoto’s visit, 21, Zoellick, Robert, 53

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Japanese Strategic Thought toward Asia

Strategic Thought in Northeast Asia

Russian Strategic Thought toward Asia

Japanese Strategic Thought toward Asia

Korean Strategic Thought toward Asia

Chinese Strategic Thought toward Asia

1. Japan—Foreign relations—Asia. 2. Asia—Foreign relations—Japan.

9 Japanese Strategic Thinking toward Russia 201

J apan being part of Northeast Asia had been directly influenced

asserting nationalism and preparing for breakthroughs in Asia; how

opportunities. Koizumi left behind weakness and pragmatism in favor of

of the great power balance facing Japan, the situation is changing.

advance expediently toward normalcy. They understood the need to make

Japan’s incontestable economic weight among the Western powers.

drastic changes: daisanno kaikoku (the third opening). The enormous

actively engaged and, perhaps, to accomplish all three of its paramount

around the corner. The bubble economy instilled confidence in Japan’s

The First Half of the 1990s

The Second Half of the 1990s

Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) in April 1999.

Although in general, Japan’s foreign policy during Mori’s period may

The Koizumi Era

to patch up relations with China, Russia, and South Korea to some

from Japanese opinion that relations were now securely on an ascending

We find evidence for multiple explanations for the malaise in Japan’s

States. Newly in office, Koizumi faced a recently configured Bush foreign

“Northern Territories” with Russia, “abductions” with North Korea, and,

Japanese Strategic Thought

J apanese strategic thought in the 1980s faced a major transition from

role of spoiler or free rider. Lake’s purpose in postulating the politico-

Table 2.1 Japan’s foreign policy roles

Role Principal Author Period Features

1. Pro- and anti-alliance 1945–60 Constitution vs.

security treaty in the National Diet against vigorous resistance and

Yoshida Line or Free Rider, 1960–75

diplomacy, taking advantage of its economic dominance in the region as

Systemic Supporter, 1975–90

Global Civilian Power, 1990–2005

became active in peacekeeping, international rescue and relief, and

Global Ordinary Power, 2005–20

Contexts and Actors Triggering Strategic Thought

Singapore, and Hong Kong) and then members of ASEAN should be

the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in 1989. The

Japan’s Asian Policy in the 1980s as Seen

regional integration took shape through the diffusion of industrial pro-

should have been alerted by the rising voice of demonstrations for

“punish Vietnam for invading and occupying Cambodia in 1979.”

Japan’s U.S. Policy and Asia

share leadership in Asia, assuming a division of labor where security

integrative processes deepened, the role of the German mark within

25. Kimiya Masafumi, Kankoku: Minshuka to keizai hatten no danamizumu

Japan’s Strategic Thinking toward

accurately assess the new reality of international relations and raise

Impact of the Gulf War on Japan’s

was slow to recognize the requirements of the new international

of great power status would revive history as a major issue, which, in

The End of the Cold War and the

resolution of the Northern Territories question the precondition of

A New Era in East Asia and the

plagued Sino-Japanese relations in the past. Miyazawa and the Foreign

destined to become difficult. Buoyed by the emperor’s visit, Japan

on testing, this was perceived by the Japanese as an open challenge,

Rapid Rise in Korea’s Significance for

governments to begin normalization talks and calling for Japan to