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New Mandala

New perspectives on Southeast Asia


http://www.newmandala.org

Piety, politics and the popularity of Felix Siauw

In the aftermath of the official ban of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), the Nahdlatul Ulama-linked
paramilitary front Banser has made headlines by disrupting appearances by Felix Siauw, a popular
yet controversial HTI-linked preacher. Ustadz Felix, as he is known to his fans, has been accused
of promoting a transnational caliphate and undermining Pancasila, the founding principles of
Indonesian nation-state. However, such challenges did not stop him from engaging in dakwah
(Islamic preaching). Instead, he has intensified both his online and offline dakwah activities. His
popularity has not fallen, but risen.

A prolific writer, a visual enthusiast, a social media activist, an inspiring speaker, a religious
entrepreneur, a political activist, a coffee lover, a former marketing manager—Felix Siauw has many
faces. Born into an ethnic Chinese family 1984 in Palembang, South Sumatra, Felix was a Catholic
before being converted to Islam in 2002, after learning about Islam through his HTI activist friends
at Institut Pertanian Bogor (Bogor Agricultural Institute, IPB) in West Java, a well known hub of

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New Mandala
New perspectives on Southeast Asia
http://www.newmandala.org

Islamist activity. His extensive use of social media, fetching visual aesthetic, oral persuasion, and
marketing strategy—not to mention his ethnic Chinese background, his status as a mualaf (convert
to Islam), and his affiliation with HTI—make Felix a unique player in the crowded Islamic preaching
market in Indonesia today.

As of today, Felix has more than 4 million followers on Facebook, 2 million followers on Twitter and
1 million followers on Instagram, making him one of the most popular preachers on Indonesian
social media. Moreover, he is not alone, but part of a broader network sharing similar information
online. He operates various businesses to promote and sustain his dakwah activities. With his wife
he runs Hijab Alila, an Islamic fashion brand named after their first daughter. He has his own
publishing house, AlFatih Press, for which he has authored or co-authored at least ten books,
including the best seller Udah Putusin Aja (Cut it Out Already) and Yuk Berhijab (Let’s Wear
Hijab). Together with a few friends, he established Yuk Ngaji, a dakwah team running activities
billed as Hangout, Meetup, and Islamic study sessions targeting Muslim youths.

Unlike other popular preachers, such as Yusuf Mansur and Mamah Dedeh, who often avoid
contentious political topics, Felix does not shy away from his commitment to establish an Islamic
caliphate such as propagated by HTI.

Even though he comes from a non-Muslim family, he often labels non-Muslims as kafir (infidels)
and disapproves of the idea of their leading Muslim societies. After the Al-Maidah incident that led
to former Jakarta governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) being charged for blasphemy, Felix
Siauw immediately tweeted 32 short messages attacking Ahok for offending Muslims. One of his
tweets stated: “Let us tell Ahok, this is not racism, Muslims are not taught to hate race, but to hate
infidel-ness, arrogance and injustice”. In this sense, Felix Siauw is a HTI poster boy, showing that
the organisation is not “anti-Chinese”, and is only against those who insult Islam. Felix labelled
Ahok as a penista agama (insulter of Islam) and mobilised his followers to join the anti-Ahok Aksi
Bela Islam (Action to Defend Islam) rallies in Jakarta.

But Felix has been smart in blurring the boundary between Islamic practice and HTI ideology. He
intentionally uses the supposedly inclusive concept of Islam Rahmatan lil-Alamin (Islam as blessing
for all) to promote HTI ideology. He claims he is engaging in dakwah and upholding Islam; in
practice what he promotes is Islamic teaching as understood by HTI. Such strategies allow him to
continue to subtly promote HTI ideology even without carrying the name of this banned
organisation, navigating through various online and offline spaces without being accused of
breaking the law.

His political stands have led some of his opponents to label him as an ustadz radikal (radical
preacher). His followers, meanwhile, see him as an ustadz gaul (down-to-earth preacher). But of
course, one can be radical and down-to-earth at the same time. It is this blend of radikal and gaul

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New Mandala
New perspectives on Southeast Asia
http://www.newmandala.org

that makes Felix Siauw one of the most interesting figures in Indonesia’s new popular Islam. In
other words, his preaching is fun yet hard line, colourful yet conservative, interactive yet dogmatic.

By juxtaposing these supposed contradictions, he is flexible enough to adapt to recent


developments and social realities, while holding firm to his ideological commitment. He retains his
Chinese name as a recognition of his heritage, but disapproves of Chinese New Year celebrations.
He wears batik to indicate his appreciation of Indonesian culture, yet this does not mean that he
endorses Pancasila, or even the Islamic-tinged nationalism of Indonesia’s mainstream Islamic
organisations. He follows the logic of social media, but at the same time he seeks to “Islamise"
these platforms. He strongly rejects democracy, yet embraces existing democratic space to
promote theocratic ideology.

Who does this blend of radikal and gaul appeal to, and why? Many of Felix’s followers are Muslim
youth who previously had little religious education, yet would like to hijrah (“withdraw from the
sinful world”). Felix, the convert-turned-preacher, provides them with a role model for becoming a
pious Muslim. The titles of his books and talks, such as Art of Dakwah, Power of Ngaji, Miracle of
Hijrah and Ways to Believe, clearly illustrate how he makes his preaching appealing to young
audiences. When I talked to young female followers of Felix Siauw in a few events, they told me
why they like his dakwah materials and styles—being “cool”, “beautiful”, “energetic”, “nice to
read”, “nice to be seen”, “easy to understand”, “touching” and “logical”.

For those who engage with his ideas beyond social media, Felix provides two types of book. The
first appeals broadly to conservative-inclined Muslims and avoids direct ideological reference, such
as in Udah Putusi Aja. The second, meanwhile, subtly promotes HTI ideology, such as in
Khilafah*Remake. The first type is accepted better among Felix’s followers. Similarly, many of his
followers like his preaching style, but do not necessarily agree with all of the content. They might
agree with him on issues such as Islamic dress codes and social interaction, but hesitate to
endorse his political stands, particularly on the Khilafah. Many of his followers would disagree with
the disruption of his talks and disapprove of the application of the “radical” label to him, but they do
not necessarily understand what constitutes the Caliphate nor support HTI ideology.

Having said this, one should not underestimate his ability in shaping Muslim public opinion. In
December 2017, Felix performed well in an episode of the popular TV talk show, Indonesia
Lawyers Club, on the theme of 212: Perlukah Reuni? (212: Is Reunion a necessary?). His
arguments could be easily rebutted by learned Muslim scholars and clerics. But he is not there to
convince prominent kiai and ulama, especially those in NU. His aims are to consolidate his support
base and to convince his potential followers. On this ground, he has been quite successful: there
has been a surge in the number of his Facebook and Instagram followers, and he receives ever
more invitations to speak in Indonesia and abroad.

Felix has been also active in building bridges with non-HTI Islamist groups and preachers, in order

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New Mandala
New perspectives on Southeast Asia
http://www.newmandala.org

to broaden his support base without necessarily giving up his commitment to HTI ideology. Of
course, as one might expect there is competition between different Islamist groups, and various
contradictions in Felix’s own strategy, as other Islamist-oriented groups such as Prosperous
Justice Party (PKS) and (Islamic Defender Front) FPI differ from HTI in their goals and approaches
in pursuing Islamist agenda. But the more the Indonesian government would like to ban these
groups or sanction individual preachers, the more it contributes to the siege mentality, and the
resulting intra-organisational solidarity, among various Islamist groups.

Moreover, Felix is not an isolated case. He has built up friendship with other preachers such as
Abdul Somad (traditionalist-inclined), Salim A Fillah (tarbiyah-inclined), and Adi Hidayat (salafist-
inclined). They reflect a broader change in the trend of Islamic preaching—one in which piety,
politics, and popularity are interconnected, and in which the disintermediating effects of social
media, and the influence of market forces, increasingly shape the face of political Islam.

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