IOL assignment 1

Question 1

(a) The Act was adopted on 5 April 1996, assented to by the president on the 10 April 1996,
but it only commenced on 19 June 1996. EXPLAIN the difference between the dates of
assent and commencement with reference to the provisions of section 13 of the
interpretation Act 33 of 1957. (10

The expression “commencement” when used in any law and with reference thereto, means the
day on which that law comes or came into operation, and that day shall, subject to the
provisions of subsection (2) and unless some other day is fixed by or under the law for the
coming into operation thereof, be the day when the law was first published in the Gazette as a
law. Whilst the date of assent is when the Act was first was approved. This Act was approved to
by the president as a law on 10 April 1996 but it came into effect on 19 June 1996 meaning that
the act was approved before and it came into effect later on.

Where any law, warrant or order granted or issued under the authority of a law, is expressed to
come into operation on a particular day, it shall be construed as coming into operation
immediately on the expiration of the previous day. This provision according to section 13 of the
Interpretation Act 33 of 1957 means the if the National Youth Commission Act if it had come into
operation on a particular day it shall be seen as it has come into operation on expiration of the
previous day. If this Act which was adopted on 5 April 1996 as the day it was issued it should
have come into operation on the 4th of April 1996.

If any Act provides that that Act shall come into operation on a date fixed by the President or the
Premier of a province by proclamation in the Gazette, it shall be deemed that different dates
may be so fixed in respect of different provisions of that Act. According to the Youth Commission
Act the president assented the act on 10 April 1996 but the Act came into operation on 19 June
1996 but this Act had not made a fixed date for the Act to come into operation so the provisions
of this Act was not different

The purpose of the Act should be determined by making sure the Youth follow the provisions of
the Act and the commissioner being appointed by the president was to make policies and rules
concerning the youth and to promote a uniformity of approach by all organs of state, including
provincial governments, to matters relating to or involving the youth.

The three internal aids that can be consulted are the title which stated that the Act was to provide
for the establishment, constitution, objects and functions of a National Youth Commission; and to
provide for matters connected therewith.
The second internal aids was the preamble with stated that SINCE it is necessary to create a united,
non-racial, non-sexist and prosperous society, in which the youth of South Africa shall promote
national reconciliation and unity, build a new patriotism and foster peace, justice and a human rights
culture; AND SINCE it is imperative that South Africa recognises the role that youth played and will
still play in society, and since the youth in South Africa constitutes an energetic, creative and the
largest sector of our population, and given the challenges this sector faced and continues to face;
AND SINCE it is necessary to redress the imbalances of the past and to create a national youth policy
aimed at empowering the youth and allowing them to realise their full potential through optimal
access to opportunities

The third internal aid is the definitions which stated that "Chairperson" means the chairperson of the
Commission designated in terms of section 4(3); (vi) (ii) "Commission" means the National Youth
Commission established by section 2; (iii) (iii) "committee" means a committee established under
section 6(2); (ii).

(c) IDENTIFY the long title of the act and explain why the long title is important for statutory
interpretation. (6)

To provide for the establishment, constitution, objects and functions of a National Youth
Commission, and to provide for matters connected therewith. The long title is used by the court to
interpret certain provisions of the statute. It helps with the ambiguity and confusion of the act and
not in giving conclusive aid in interpreting the provisions of the statute. The long title of the Act is
relied upon as a guide to decide the scope of the Act. The long title is equally important for statutory
interpretation because it gives aid in interpreting the provisions of the statute.

Question 2

(a) James was appointed by the President as a member of the Commission for a period of six
years. The Commission argued that in terms of section 5(1) it states that “members of the
Commission shall hold office for a period not exceeding five years”. Advise the
Commission on this argument by briefly explaining to him HOW peremptory provisions
differs from directory provisions, and WHETHER the appointment complied with the
statutory requirements (refer to at least two examples from the relevant case law).

Peremptory provision differs from directory provision by that in peremptory provision words
with an affirmative nature indicate a peremptory provision and words such as shall indicate a
peremptory provision but in directory provision it differs because permissive words such as may
indicate discretion and will be interpreted as directory and according to the terms of section 5(1)
this was peremptory provision in nature. Words in negative form shows a peremptory provision
and it indicates that something is not allowed, the use of positive language indicates a directory
provision.
 Adding a penalty to a prescription indicates that it is a peremptory provision whilst where the
provision is in positive words and no penal sanction is included for non-compliance with the
requirements then the provision should be considered a directory provision for example James
appointment was directory in nature since no penal sanction was included.

In peremptory provision if the validity of the act would defeat the purpose of legislation the act
will be void and in directory if strict compliance with the provision would lead to injustice or
fraud it will be presumed its directory even if the act will be null or not.

If a provision requires that a certain act must be performed within a prescribed time, and the
court has not been empowered to grant an extension of the time limit, the requirement is
presumed to be peremptory. If other provisions in the legislation could become superfluous
when noncompliance with prescribed requirements results in the nullity of the act, there is a
presumption that the requirements are merely directory

Question 3

(a) EXPLAIN the different methods of computation of time (specifically the ordinary civil
method and with reference to relevant case law case law).

The law makes a distinction between the various methods of computation of time there is
the common law method, the ordinary civil method. The important words in calculating the
period are those that fix the commencement of the period which are, “as from the date on
which the claim arose”. Those words are the typical words of commencement that bring the
ordinary civil method of computation into operation. It is also the case where the parties
have not indicated in their contract how such period should be reckoned, the computation
should as a general rule, be made including the first day and excluding the last day.

The statutory computation is used in the calculation of the number of days prescribed for
the doing of an act or for any other purpose prescribed. Where a particular number of days
is prescribed without there being any exclusion of the application of section 4, either in
express terms or by necessary implication, the natural inference would be that the
Legislature intended the section to apply. However, the scope of the Interpretation Act is
limited to the computation of days.

The common law method of computation differs between natural computation, ordinary
civil and extra ordinary civil computation methods. In terms of the natural computation
method, the period is calculated from the time or hour it start up to the corresponding
minute or hour of the last day of the period mentioned.

The ordinary civil computation method on the other hand prescribes that the first day of the
period is included but the last day is excluded which means that the act must occur before
such day or it will be valid. In terms of the extraordinary civil method of calculation both the
first and the last days are included in the calculation of the period. The clear wording of a
 statute or contract may of course lead to the rejection in any particular case of the ordinary
civil 4 rule in favour of the natural de memonto in momentum rule or in favour of the
exceptional civil rule, which includes both the first and the last days.

This statutory method of computation of time as contained in section 4 of the Interpretation

act, in terms whereby the first day of the period is excluded and the last is include. It is also
in line with the court decisions regarding the calculation method of preference where no
particular method is prescribed by the parties or by legislation. Furthermore, the
Interpretation Act cannot be followed since the prescribed period is not mentioned in days
but months. The wording of the relevant clause also plays a very important role since it may
determine the day from which the calculation commences. If it is worded in such a way that
the period start from a certain date or after a certain date, it may result in different (dies
cedit) even if the same method of computation is applied

4Briefly discuss the impact of the interpretation clause of the Constitution (article 39(2)) on the
approach adopted by courts when interpreting statutes (refer to relevant case law in your
answer). (10

The Interpretation clause of the Constitution is conceived that it could deal with two separate
subject matters which are interpretation of legislation; and interpretation of the Constitution itself.
the Constitutional Court has held that in determining whether it is appropriate to read down a
particular legislative provision, the Court must primarily be guided by those provisions and not by
the approach in a foreign jurisdiction (S v Bhulwana, S v Gwadiso 1996(1) SA 388 par. 26 per
O'Regan J). It is thus clear that the two sections have served a useful purpose in providing a basis for
the development of a South African jurisprudence regarding the way the reading down should be
approached.

While the rules of interpretation of statutes precluded the use of Parliamentary material as an aid to
interpretation, this exclusionary rule had been relaxed in certain jurisdictions. It was not necessary
to decide whether our courts should follow suit. The Court was here concerned with interpretation
of a constitution as distinct from ordinary legislation. Cases often provide clarity on the
interpretation of statutes, in other words, they make the statutes easier to understand. The
Constitutional Court has the final say in constitutional matters, that is, any issue that relates to the
interpretation, protection or enforcement of the Constitution.

The courts when interpreting statutes it does so with the help of the court interpreter, The function
of the court interpreter is to provide language interpretation in court for those who are not
proficient in English. A court interpreter must make sure that all parties to a case understand the
legal proceedings in a language of their choice.

With regard to the interpretation of the Constitution itself, the issues are two whether it is necessary
to lay down guidelines regarding the meaning of phrases such as an organ of state in consultation
with after consultation with, whether a section similar to Section 39(1) of the Working Draft should
be included regarding the interpretation of the Constitution itself, that a Court must promote the
values that underlie an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality must consider
international law may consider foreign law; If the Constitution includes a definition clause, these
aspects could comfortably be dealt with in such a clause.

REFERENCES

Kleynhans v Yorkshire Insurance Co. Ltd 1957 (3) SA 544 (A) at 549 G-H.

S v Bhulwana, S v Gwadiso

Interpretation of Statutes study guide