A basic nomic sufficiency analysis

Reality Week 3:
1. Nomic sufficiency analyses
Causation 2. Chance-raising analyses
C is a cause of E iff:
(i) C and E are disjoint, and
Cian Dorr 3. Counterfactual analyses
26 October 2010 (ii) it is nomically necessary that if C occurs, E
4. More about counterfactuals
occurs (C is ‘nomically sufficient’ for E).

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Problems for the nomic sufficiency analysis

Mackie’s fix:
(1) Problem of effects. C is a cause of E iff C is disjoint from E and C is a
necessary part of a nomically sufficient condition for
(2) Problem of epiphenomena. How about this fix for the completeness problem? E (an “INUS” condition)
(3) Problem of completeness. C is a cause of E iff C and E are disjoint and C is part • in other words: for some D, C∧D is nomically sufficient
(4) Problem of pre-emption. of a nomically sufficient condition for E. for E and D alone isn’t.
(5) ProblemE of chancy worlds.
C
C • No good: if there is any nomically sufficient condition D • This is no good as it stands. Suppose X is nomically
for E, then every C is part of the nomically sufficient sufficient for E, and (¬X∧¬C) is not nomically sufficient for
X condition C∧D, and so will count as a cause of E on the E. Then ((X∧C) ∨ (¬X∧¬C)) is not nomically sufficient for
E
revised analysis. E, while C ∧ ((X∧C) ∨ (¬X∧¬C)) is.
E • Can we solve this problem by requiring D to be “non-
C disjunctive”? Not obvious how we could do this while
still allowing ordinary macroscopic events to be causes.

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Problems for the chance-raising analysis

(1) Problem of effects
Basic chance-raising analysis: (2) Problem of epiphenomena
C is a cause of E iff: (3) Problem of completeness
1. Nomic sufficiency analyses (4) Problem of pre-emption
(i) C and E are disjoint and >>?
2. Chance-raising analyses (5) Problem of chancy worlds deterministic worlds (?)
(ii) Chance(E occurs|C occurs) > Chance(E occurs|C
3. Counterfactual analyses (6) Chance of causation vs. chancy causation (?)
doesn’t occur)
4. More about counterfactuals (7) Problem of fizzling
Chance(X and Y)
where Chance(X|Y) =df
Chance(Y) C D E

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A possible solution: “conditionalising things in” Counterfactual theories
C is a cause of E iff
(i) C and E are disjoint, and
(ii) For some appropriate truth, F,
Chance(E occurs|C occurs and F) > 1. Nomic sufficiency analyses A basic counterfactual analysis:
Chance(E occurs|C doesn’t occur and F) 2. Chance-raising analyses C is a cause of E iff
• If we require “appropriate” Fs to include a detailed 3. Counterfactual analyses (i) C and E are disjoint and
description of history up to the time of C, we can avoid 4. More about counterfactuals (ii) if C hadn’t occurred, E wouldn’t have occurred
the problems of effects and epiphenomena.
(E counterfactually depends on C).
• If we can somehow ensure that “appropriate” Fs have to
contain information about the non-completion of other
causal chains, and about the fizzling of the C-to-E
chain, maybe we could avoid the problems of pre-
emption and fizzling.
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The counterfactual analysis and the problems

Dying versus dying this death

(1) The problem of effects

• Lincoln would still have died eventually even if Booth
hadn’t shot him. We don’t want to have to say that
(2) The problem of epiphenomena because of that, his death wasn’t caused by Booth’s ‘Holding things fixed’ analysis:
shooting!
(3) The problem of completeness C causes E iff :
(4) The problem of pre-emption — still with us! • Standard solution: this death doesn’t happen in possible
(i) C and E are disjoint, and
worlds where Lincoln dies of old age.
(5) The problem of chancy worlds — ??? Can this solve the pre-emption problem? (ii) for some appropriate true proposition F: if C
(6) Chance of causation vs. chancy causation — ??? hadn’t occurred but F had still been true, E
• Suggestion: the particular event that is Victim’s actual wouldn’t have occurred.
(7) The problem of fizzling death couldn’t have occurred any later, so it does
counterfactually depend on Assassin 1’s shot.
• But then even the passing of a bird that distracts Assassin
1 for a moment will count as a cause of Victim’s death.

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Counterfactuals

1. Nomic sufficiency analyses

The “closest worlds” analysis of counterfactuals: “Closeness” ≠ intuitive similarity:
2. Chance-raising analyses
If it were that P, it would be that Q iff ‘If Nixon had pressed the button, there would have
3. Counterfactual analyses
all the closest P-worlds to the actual world are Q- been been a nuclear holocaust’ (K. Fine).
4. More about counterfactuals
worlds.

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Do the truth-values of counterfactuals
supervene on facts of other kinds?
‘If I had tossed this coin, it would have
landed Heads’
• Lewis: false
• Stalnaker: neither true nor false
• “Molinist”: either true or false, we just don’t—
can’t?—know which

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