1.
Recap: the world as spacetime manifold
2. First challenge: what about change?
Reality week 4: 3. Second challenge: what about tense?
4. Contextualism about tense
Time and tense 5. Q1: Do propositions change their truth-values?
Cian Dorr 6. Q2: Are all times “metaphysically on a par”?
7 February 2012
7. Modal analogues of Q1 and Q2
8. What are possible worlds?
9. Lewis’s modal realism
10. Contingent and temporary existence
1 2
Change as nonuniformity
First we need to ask what account the the manifold
hypothesis can give of times—temporal intervals like
Response to the challenge of change:
2010, and instants like 10.40GMT on 7/2/2012? • For the universe to change is for it to be nonuniform
• Appealing answer: these are just certain spacetime along the temporal direction.
regions. • In a changeless world, every instant of time would be
• 2010 is a 4D region just like every other. All it takes for there to be change
• 10.40GMT on 7/2/2012 is a 3D slice through the 4D is for instants of time to be dissimilar to one another.
manifold.
4 5
• Given this, we can say that a particular object changes iff it
is nonuniform along the temporal direction: the 3D regions
that are its intersections with different instants of time are
not all alike.
• Particular kinds of change involve particular kinds of
nonuniformity. For example, one grows iff earlier 3D
slices through your 4D region are smaller than later
ones.
7 8
What about change?
Some obvious facts:
• Plants grow
• People learn
• Objects move
• Things change
Are these facts consistent with the manifold
hypothesis? Or does the hypothesis really deserve
the nickname “the block universe”?
3
• What about changes in particular objects (e.g. people,
planets)?
• To see how this might be accounted for by manifold
theorists, we need to know more about how they propose
to account for the existence of such objects. (Week 6)
• The obvious approach: planets, people, etc. are just
certain interesting 4-dimensional spacetime regions.
• or at least, they “occupy” such regions.
6
Objection: why should dissimilarity along some
dimensions constitute change, when dissimilarity
along other dimensions does not?
The fact that [a certain poker] is hot at one point in a series
and cold at other points cannot give change, if neither of
these facts change—and neither of them does….
Let us consider the case of another sort of series. The
meridian of Greenwich passes through a series of degrees of
latitude. And we can find two points in this series, S and S’,
such that the proposition “at S the meridian of Greenwich is
within the United Kingdom” is true, while the proposition
“at S’ the meridian of Greenwich is within the United
Kingdom” is false. But no one would say that this gave us
change. Why should we say so in the case of the other
series? (MacTaggart, ‘The Unreality of Time’)
9

Reply: that’s just what change is—difference along a
temporal dimension.
• So there is no mystery about why the difference between
temporal and non-temporal dimensions is relevant!
10
What about past, present and future?
Some more facts:
• Obama is president
• a lecture is going on in Schools
• it was dark in Oxford 12 hours ago
• there have been dinosaurs
• ....
How can these facts be identical to facts of the sort
recognised by the manifold hypothesis?
• Doesn’t the manifold picture leave something crucial out,
namely the facts about which times are past, present, and
future?
13
1. Recap: the world as spacetime manifold
2. First challenge: what about change?
3. Second challenge: what about tense?
4. Contextualism about tense
5. Q1: Do propositions change their truth-values?
6. Q2: Are all times “metaphysically on a par”?
7. Modal analogues of Q1 and Q2
8. What are possible worlds?
9. Lewis’s modal realism
10. Contingent and temporary existence
16
Why do some directions in the manifold count as
temporal?
• One possible answer: one of the geometric relations that
give the manifold its structure is the before-after relation.
This cannot be explained in other terms.
• Another possible answer: there is some distinctive fact
about the distribution of physical fields in virtue of which
these directions deserve the name ‘temporal’.
• Non-Humeans about laws or chances might also appeal
to them.
11
Responses:
• For Obama to be president is for Obama to be president
at 10.45GMT on 7/2/2012.
• For there to be a lecture going on in Schools is just for
there to be a lecture going on in Schools at 10.45GMT on
7/2/2012.
• For it to have been dark in Oxford 12 hours ago is just for
it to have been dark in Oxford at 22.45GMT on 6/2/2012.
• For there to have been dinosaurs is just for there to be a
time t earlier than 10.45GMT on 7/2/2012 such that there
are dinosaurs at t.
• For a time to be past/present/future is for it to be before/
identical to/after 10.45GMT on 7/2/2012.
14
How to talk about propositions
The truth schema:
For the proposition that ___ to be true is for it to
be the case that ___.
The attitude schema:
To believe/know/say/assert/... that ___ is to stand
in the belief/knowledge/saying/assertion/...
relation to the proposition that ___.
17
1. Recap: the world as spacetime manifold
2. First challenge: what about change?
3. Second challenge: what about tense?
4. Contextualism about tense
5. Q1: Do propositions change their truth-values?
6. Q2: Are all times “metaphysically on a par”?
7. Modal analogues of Q1 and Q2
8. What are possible worlds?
9. Lewis’s modal realism
10. Contingent and temporary existence
12
How can this not be absurd, given that this particular
slice through the manifold is not being claimed to be
in any way “metaphysically special”?
• Compare ‘here’:
(a) for it to be warm here is for it to be warm in Oxford
(b) for it to be warm here is for it to be warm in London
• Philosopher A could speak truly by uttering (a) in Oxford,
while Philosopher B spoke truly by uttering (b) in London.
Neither Oxford nor London has to be in any way
“metaphysically special”.
•
That’s because the word ‘here’ is context-sensitive: it can
be used to talk about many different places.
15
Characterising context-sensitive sentences
When a declarative sentence ϕ is context-
INsensitive, there is a particular proposition p such
that everyone who utters ϕ [while speaking literally]
thereby stands in the saying [or asserting] relation to
p.
Any sentence that cannot be associated in this way
with a single proposition is context-sensitive.
• EG: ‘I am tired’ and ‘It is hot here’ are context-sensitive.
• It’s certainly not true that everyone who utters ‘I am tired’
says that I am tired, or that everyone who utters ‘It is hot
here’ says that it is hot here.
18
 Contextualism about tense
According to the view we are considering, the
following sentences are all context-sensitive:
‘Obama is president’
‘A lecture is going in in Schools right now’
‘It was dark in Oxford 12 hours ago’
‘There have been dinosaurs’
• People who utter these sentences at different times will
say different things, just as people who say ‘it is raining
here’ in different places say different things.
• Presumably if this is right, it extends to all sentences that
can be uttered truly at one time and falsely at another.
19
Examples of propositions where it is (relatively)
uncontroversial that they are either always true or
never true:
• that Obama is president throughout 2009
• that there are or were or will be dinosaurs
• that there are dinosaurs at some time prior to 2012
Are there also propositions that are sometimes true
and sometimes false?
• Propositional eternalists say ‘No’: propositions never
change their truth values
• Propositional temporalists say ‘Yes’: there are temporarily
true and temporarily false propositions as well as
permanently true and false ones.
22
But contextualists about tense will not accept such
arguments.
• Consider the propositions I now assert when I say
‘Obama is president’ and ‘Obama is president at
10.55GMT on 7/2/2012’. Call them P1 and P2.
• According to the particular version of contextualism
about tense we have been considering, for P1 to be true is
Obama to be president at 10.55GMT on 7/2/2012.
• Of course this is also what it is for P2 to be true (by the
truth schema).
• If so, we can hardly claim that P1 changes its truth value
even though P2 does not!
25
We have been speaking of context-sensitivity as a
property of sentences. But in semantics, we want to
be able to explain the context-sensitivity of sentences
as due to the presence in them of particular context-
sensitive words.
• EG: ‘It is raining here’ is context-sensitive because ‘here’
is context-sensitive; what one says in uttering ‘It is raining
here’ depends on what place one refers to with ‘here’.
• Which word in ‘Obama is president’ is context-sensitive?
• Plausibly, the answer is ‘is’. More generally, the most
plausible version of the view attributes the relevant kind
of context-sensitivity to the verbs (or more specifically
still, to their tense morphemes).
20
Propositional eternalists must be contextualists about
tense.
But are there not thoughts which are true today but false
in six months time? The thought, for example, that the tree
there is covered with green leaves, will surely be false in
six months time. No, for it is not the same thought at all.
The words ‘this tree is covered with green leaves’ are not
sufficient by themselves for the utterance, the time of
utterance is involved as well. Without the time-indication
this gives we have no complete thought, i.e. no thought at
all. Only a sentence supplemented by a time-indication
and complete in every respect expresses a thought. But
this, if it is true, is true not only today or tomorrow but
timelessly. (Frege, ‘Thoughts’)
23
Almost no-one thinks that there are propositions that
are true in only some places. So almost everyone will
reject the following argument:
• ‘Obama is popular in Hawaii but not popular in Arkansas.
So, the proposition that Obama is popular is true in
Hawaii but not in Arkansas. So there is a proposition that
is true in some places and not true in others.’
26
1. Recap: the world as spacetime manifold
2. First challenge: what about change?
3. Second challenge: what about tense?
4. Contextualism about tense
5. Q1: Do propositions change their truth-values?
6. Q2: Are all times “metaphysically on a par”?
7. Modal analogues of Q1 and Q2
8. What are possible worlds?
9. Lewis’s modal realism
10. Contingent and temporary existence
21
Propositional temporalism strikes some people as
obviously correct:
• ‘Of course there are propositions that are sometimes true
and sometimes false. For example, the proposition that
Obama is president was false until January 2009, then
became true, and will become false again in 2013 or
2017.’
24
Contextualism about tense is naturally allied to
propositional eternalism.
• Suppose you are a propositional temporalist. You believe
that in addition to eternally true and false propositions
like the proposition that Obama is president in 2012,
there are temporarily true and false propositions.
• Presumably you believe in lots of such propositions. For
example, a proposition that is true exactly when Obama
is president.
• So why not think that the sentence ‘Obama is president’
context-insensitively expresses a proposition—the
proposition that Obama is president, simpliciter—that is
true exactly when Obama is president?
27
 Now we can diagnose what lay behind the feeling
1. Recap: the world as spacetime manifold
Are all times “metaphysically on a par”?
that the manifold picture lacks genuine change.
2. First challenge: what about change?
• The idea is that “genuine change” would involve “Temporal egalitarianism”: Yes
change in facts—propositions changing their truth 3. Second challenge: what about tense?
value. According to propositional eternalists, this • The present time is simply one time among others, just as
doesn’t happen. 4. Contextualism about tense here is simply one place among others.
“Temporal elitism”: No
5. Q1: Do propositions change their truth-values?
It is always a quality of that poker that it is one which is hot on
that particular Monday. And it is always a quality of that poker 6. Q2: Are all times “metaphysically on a par”?
• Presentness is a feature which singles out one particular
instant of time as uniquely special.
that it is one which is not hot at any other time. Both these
qualities are true of it at any time—the time when it is hot and 7. Modal analogues of Q1 and Q2 • Being present is quite a different from being identical to t.
the time when it is cold. And therefore it seems to be erroneous
8. What are possible worlds? • The division of all times into (i) the present time; (ii) past
to say that there is any change in the poker. The fact that it is hot times (times earlier than the present) and (iii) future times
at one point in a series and cold at other points cannot give 9. Lewis’s modal realism (times later than the present) marks an objectively natural
change, if neither of these facts change—and neither of them classification. It “carves at the joints”.
does. (McTaggart) 10. Contingent and temporary existence
28 29 30

Conversely: Propositional temporalism arguably

requires temporal elitism

Temporal elitists had better be propositional

temporalists!
• According to them, 14/2/2012 is objectively special (it
contains the present instant!).
• But you would have to be crazy to think that the
proposition that 14/2/2012 is objectively special is
eternally true!
• Just as, for any person x, we must distinguish the
proposition that x is president simpliciter from the
(eternal) propositions that x is president at t, so for any
proposition p, we must distinguish the proposition that p
is true simpliciter from the (eternal) propositions that p is
true at t.
• Proposal: the present time is the unique instant t such that
for every proposition p, p is true simpliciter iff p is true at
t.
How is this to be explained?
Option 1: analyse ‘present’ in terms of ‘at’, as follows. For a
time to be present just is for all and only the true
propositions to be true at it.
Option 2: analyse ‘at’ in terms of ‘present’. For a proposition
to be true at t just is for it to be true simpliciter whenever
t is present
• A worry about option 1: worlds of eternal recurrence.

• If this is correct, it seems to attribute an extremely

metaphysically interesting feature to the present time!

31 32 33

Some common terminology 1. Recap: the world as spacetime manifold

Worlds and times
2. First challenge: what about change?
It is possible that P  at some possible world, P
3. Second challenge: what about tense?
It is necessary that P at every possible world, P
4. Contextualism about tense
“The A-theory”: = temporal elitism.
5. Q1: Do propositions change their truth-values?
• or maybe temporal elitism + propositional temporalism It will always be that P at every future time, P
“The B-theory”: = temporal egalitarianism 6. Q2: Are all times “metaphysically on a par”?
It has been that P at some past time, P
• or maybe temporal egalitarianism + propositional 7. Modal analogues of Q1 and Q2
eternalism It has always been that P at every past time, P
8. What are possible worlds?
It will be that P at some future time, P
9. Lewis’s modal realism
10. Contingent and temporary existence
34 35 36
The B-theory of time
‘Mary is happy’ is indexical
At t, when we say ‘Mary is
happy’ we express the
proposition that Mary is
happy at t
A single proposition cannot
be true at some times and
false at others
All times are “on a par”
Its unpopular modal analogue
‘Mary is sometimes happy’ is
indexical
At w, when we say ‘Mary is
sometimes happy’ we
express the proposition that
Mary is sometimes happy
at w
A single proposition cannot
be true at some possible
worlds and false at others
All worlds are “on a par”
37
The A-theory of time Its popular modal analogue 1. Recap: the world as spacetime manifold
In addition to all the eternal In addition to all the non- 2. First challenge: what about change?
propositions that Mary is contingent propositions that
happy at t, there is the Mary is always happy at w, 3. Second challenge: what about tense?
changeable proposition that there is the contingent
4. Contextualism about tense
Mary is happy proposition that Mary is
always happy 5. Q1: Do propositions change their truth-values?
The present time is objectively The actual world is objectively 6. Q2: Are all times “metaphysically on a par”?
special: what’s true at it is just special: what’s true at it is just
7. Modal analogues of Q1 and Q2
true. true.
8. What are possible worlds?
Non-present times are like Non-actual worlds are like
9. Lewis’s modal realism
false stories—albeit stories false stories—albeit stories
that used to be or will be true. that could have been true. 10. Contingent and temporary existence
38 39

Some reductive accounts of ‘possible world’ and ‘at
w’ which have been suggested by “modal A-
theorists”:
• A PW is a maximal consistent set of propositions. “At w,
P” means “the proposition that P is a member of w”.
• A PW is a maximally strong proposition: a proposition P
such that for every other proposition Q, either P entails Q
or P is inconsistent with Q. “At w, P” means “w entails
that P”.
• A PW is a maximally strong property of universes....
What is it for two propositions to be inconsistent?
• Obvious answer: it’s for it to be impossible that both are A competing analytic programme (associated
true.
especially with Stalnaker):
• Similarly, for one proposition to entail another is for it to
be necessary that if the first is true, the second is true. • Propositions are sets of possible worlds.
• If we take these as definitional, we cannot without • Properties are functions from possible worlds to sets of
circularity treat ‘Possibly P at some possible world, P’ objects.
and ‘Necessarily P at every possible world, P’ as • ...
definitions of ‘possibly’ and ‘necessarily’.

40 41 42

1. Recap: the world as spacetime manifold

An option for those who are A-theorists about both time and
modality: the instants of time are just a subset of the possible
worlds!
• A set S of propositions is a possible world iff it’s POSSIBLE
that all and only the members of S are true.
• S is a time iff either all and only the members of S are
true, or IT WAS ONCE THE CASE THAT all and only the
members of S are true, or IT WILL EVENTUALLY BE THE
CASE THAT all and only the members of S are true.
2. First challenge: what about change?
3. Second challenge: what about tense?
4. Contextualism about tense
5. Q1: Do propositions change their truth-values?
6. Q2: Are all times “metaphysically on a par”?
7. Modal analogues of Q1 and Q2
8. What are possible worlds?
Can we provide a proper reductive definition of
‘Possibly P’—one that breaks out of the ‘modal
circle’?
The best-known reduction is Lewis’s counterpart
theory. Roughly:
‘It is possible that a is F’ =df a has a counterpart that is F.
• (where F is purely qualitative)

9. Lewis’s modal realism

10. Contingent and temporary existence
43 44 45
To agree with common opinion about what’s
possible, this requires Lewis to embrace some odd
claims about what there is!
• EG: if it’s possible for me to be killed by a pink-and-grey
striped dragon, there must be a pink-and-grey striped
dragon (that kills a counterpart of me).
According to Lewis, there are (unrestrictedly
speaking) pink-and-grey striped dragons (etc.). But
they are all spatiotemporally disconnected from us.
46
1. Recap: the world as spacetime manifold
2. First challenge: what about change?
3. Second challenge: what about tense?
4. Contextualism about tense
5. Q1: Do propositions change their truth-values?
6. Q2: Are all times “metaphysically on a par”?
7. Modal analogues of Q1 and Q2
8. What are possible worlds?
9. Lewis’s modal realism
10. Contingent and temporary existence
49
Forms of “temporaryism”
• ‘the growing block view’: things begin to exist but
nothing ever ceases to exist.
• ‘the shrinking block view’: vice versa
• ‘presentism’: ‘only present objects exist’. Basic idea:
nothing will exist after it is destroyed; nothing existed
before it was created.
52
Lewis identifies possible worlds with maximal
spatiotemporally connected objects.
• Just as I could have been different ways in virtue of the
existence of other people (my counterparts) who are those
ways, the universe could have been different ways in
virtue of the existence of other universes which are those
ways.
47
Let’s use ‘x exists’ to mean ‘there is something
identical to x’.
• ‘something’ must be understood unrestrictedly.
• So even events (etc.) ‘exist’ if there are events.
• Trivially, everything exists.
50
We occasionally seem to talk about things that
contingentists and temporaryists don’t believe in.
— Some of this talk is easily “paraphrased away”:
• The war that would have broken out if Nixon had pushed
the button would have been terrible.
• The philosopher who taught Alexander was a genius.
— In other cases, finding paraphrases is a serious
challenge.
• Many ancient philosophers are still widely studied.
• The causes of the current economic crisis are numerous.
• There have been three kings of England named ‘George’.
• There are infinitely many possible sisters of David Lewis.
53
Lewis’s view is in some ways like the modal analogue
of the B-theory; in other ways, not.
• For Lewis, it makes perfect sense to ask whether ‘Mary is
always happy’ is true, simpliciter. We do not have to
think of this sentence as containing a context-sensitive
element that refers to a particular possible world.
• However, many ordinary quantified sentences, e.g. ‘there
are no blue swans’, need to be contextually restricted to
be true.
48
Necessitism: Necessarily, for every x, it’s necessary
that x exists.
Contingentism: It’s possible for there to be an x such
that it’s not necessary that x exists.
• Some use ‘possibilism’ and ‘actualism’ for these views.
Others use these labels for what I called ‘the modal B-
theory’ and ‘the modal A-theory’.
‘Permanentism’ (aka ‘eternalism’): Always, for every x,
it’s always the case that x exists.
‘Temporaryism’: There is or was or will be an x such
that it’s not always the case that x exists.
• The B-theory seems to require permanentism. Both
options are available to A-theorists.
51