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Relay models for protection studies

Conference Paper · July 2003

DOI: 10.1109/PTC.2003.1304799 · Source: IEEE Xplore

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 Paper accepted for presentation at 2003 IEEE Bologna Power Tech Conference, June 23th-26th, Bologna, Italy
Relay Models for Protection Studies
C.L.Hor, K.Kangvansaichol, P.A. Crossley, A.Shafiu
Abstract-- Power system protection relays have changed signifi-
cantly during the last ten years. Processor based designs are now
highly reliable integrated protection, control and monitoring
systems that significantly outperform the suite of relays and con-
trol equipment from the electromechanical and static era. Tech-
nological advances and utility restructuring ensures protection
remains an immensely challenging field, especially for young IT
literate electrical power engineers.
Modelling and simulation can help engineers better under-
stand how a new or proposed relay reacts during a fault or other
non-fault disturbances. Such knowledge can help a manufacturer
improve the quality of the design and hopefully correct any
weaknesses before the relay is applied to an actual network.
Similarly, utilities can use a simulator to investigate whether a
particular relay is suitable for their network and perhaps if one
has mal-operated what caused the problem.
The paper describes various software relay models (developed
using FORTRAN IN PSCAD/EMTDC) and discusses how they can
assist a protection study. Numerous types of faults were applied
to the simulated networks to verify the robustness and functional
accuracy of the model. The results from these tests and the steady
state operating characteristics of each relay model are presented.
Index Terms—Relay Modelling, FORTRAN, PSCAD/EMTDC
I. INTRODUCTION
M ANY blackouts are related to protection system failures.
Some of these were initiated by non-catastrophic distur-
bances, which were supposed to be cleared by protec-
tion relays. However, relay malfunctions allowed the distur-
bances to propagate through the wider area network and even-
tually result in cascading trips and widespread blackouts. Ac-
cording to the study by NERC (North American Electric Reli-
ability Council) events, almost 75% of major disturbances
involved protection relays. Two major failures on the WSCC
(Western System Coordinating Council) system in 1996 dem-
onstrated how a protection operation could lead to power sys-
tem blackouts. The first event started on July 2nd and involved
a flashover on a 345kV transmission line. The protection
scheme operated incorrectly and resulted in the tripping of
two generating units nearby. Another event on August 10th
Manuscript received on April 11th, 2003.
Ching Lai Hor, Kunn Kangvansaichol and Peter Crossley are with the
Electric Power and Energy Systems Group, School of Electrical and Elec-
tronic Engineering, The Queen's University of Belfast, Ashby Building,
Stranmillis Road, Belfast BT9 5AH, Northern Ireland, United Kingdom
(email: c.l.hor@ee.qub.ac.uk, k.kangvansaichol@ee.qub.ac.uk, p.crossley
@ee.qub.ac.uk).
Ahmed Shafiu is with Manchester Centre of Electrical Energy, Depart-
ment of Electrical Engineering and Electronics, UMIST, P.O.Box 88, Man-
chester, M60 1QD, United Kingdom (email: A.Shafiu@student. umist.ac.uk).
0-7803-7967-5/03/$17.00 ©2003 IEEE
was due to relay false tripping. These blackouts have cost the
economy of the west USA approximately two billions US
dollars, including all aspects of interconnected infrastructures
and even the environment. A large-scale blackout is a rare
event but, when it occurs, the impact on the system and na-
tion’s economy could be catastrophic [7].
Software modelling of relays is therefore essential for the
reliable operation of a modern power system. It not only helps
us to evaluate the protection system performance during faults
and other conditions but also generates useful data that can be
used in the event of a real fault to understand what happened.
It also ensures better protection planning and a more reliable
design strategy.
II. PROTECTION RELAY MODELLING
Microprocessor relays are capable of generating mountains
of data. During a widespread blackout that involves numerous
cascading trips, the quantity of data can be overwhelming.
The data often incorporates irrelevant, unclear and inaccurate
fragments of information and can severely affect the decision
making process [1]. Assuming all the protection devices oper-
ate correctly, and the data is communicated without error, any
fault situation results in a particular symptom pattern (states of
relays and breakers). By correctly recognizing this pattern,
hidden knowledge about the faulted network can be identified
and extracted. Each piece of data provides useful information
that in conjunction with other information yields the required
knowledge to take the appropriate actions [2].
A. Overcurrent Relay Model
An overcurrent relay operates when the magnitude of the
current exceeds the pickup or operating level for a time
greater than a pre-set delay (definite time) or a time delay de-
termined by the operating characteristic (inverse) [11]. An
overcurrent relay can also be set instantaneous, i.e. it operates
with no intentional time delay. A requirement of an overcur-
rent relay is that it should remain stable, i.e. not operate, on a
starting current, a permissible overcurrent or a current surge.
This requires the inclusion of a time delay that inhibits opera-
tion for a period that in an inverse relay depends upon the
magnitude of the current. In a definite time relay the overcur-
rent must be greater than the current operating setting for a
preset period. If a delay is unacceptable, an instantaneous
overcurrent relay can be used but its operating setting must be
set sufficiently high to prevent maloperation on non-fault cur-
rent surges or remote faults which should be cleared by other
protection devices. Grading or relay coordination must con-
sider the operating behaviour of neighbouring overcurrent
relays, i.e. on a radial system a downstream fault must be
cleared by a down stream relay. The operating time and reset
time equations for each overcurrent element was selectable
from a choice of four IEC or five IEEE standard curves via a
GUI. The operating and reset characteristic of an inverse time
overcurrent relays can be expressed using the following
mathematical equations [5]:
 K 
t trp (I) =  T0 + P  (1)
 M − 1
 t 
t rst (I) =  2 r 
 M − 1
where ttrp(I) is the trip time and trst(I) is the reset time. M is the
relay current in multiples of tap setting. K, tr, TO and P are
constants that describe the operating characteristic of the mod-
elled relay.
The duration of the time to trip or reset can be calculated
based on the value of the nominal current and the tap setting
of the relay. The decision is computed by solving the integral
equation:
T
1
∫ dτ = 1
τ t(I )
=0
This equation (3) holds for all values of current above or
below the pickup threshold. When the integration is equal or
greater than one, a trip command is generated. Any constant
magnitude of current below the pickup threshold will never
trigger the relay to trip. The reason is because the value of t(I)
will be negative and the integral equation will never equal one
[6].
1) Modelling the induction disc
The model was designed to emulate the operating charac-
teristics of a rotating disc in an electromechanical relay. The
model processes a sum instead of a continuous integral [6]:
N
∑ t(I) ∆t = 1
1
i =0
where ∆t is the period of processing and TO the time to trip is:
TO = N × ∆t
The speed of rotation of the “virtual” disc depends on the
magnitude of the current and the chosen operating or reset
characteristic. The relay operates when the disc reaches 100%
of its maximum value.
When the magnitude of the fault current is higher than the
pickup threshold (value selected via GUI in Figure 1), the
movement of the virtual disc in a 20ms period (50Hz power
cycle) depends on the operating time defined by comparing
the fault current against the selected inverse time characteris-
tic. As soon as the disc reaches 100%, the relay operates and
trips the circuit breaker. Similarly, if the magnitude of fault
current is below the pickup threshold, the disc shall decrement
to zero. The time it takes to reset is according to the reset time
of the inverse time curve characteristic for that particular
value of current.
Fault current in RMS ≈ 1.52kA
Extremely Inverse characteristic
(2)
Estimated time to trip at t ≈ 0.6075s
Fault injected at t ≈ 0.1s for period of 0.5s
Percentage disc travel = 83%
(3)
Fig.1. ‘Virtual’ Disc Travel against the transient fault current
Figure 1 displays a simple simulation result showing how
the ‘virtual disc’ is plotted against time. The relay model is
subjected to a constant fault current for a period of time that is
slightly less than the operating time. It can be seen clearly in
the diagram that how the disc increments to the boundary of
operation and then decrements after the transient fault current
subsides below the pickup threshold.
2) Accessing the relay’s dynamic response.
Consider the periodic waveform with tripping time Ttrp and
reset time Trst shown in Figure 2. Each consists of an integral
number of cycles, NA and NB with amplitude of I2 and I3
above and I1 below the pickup threshold. Note that: The am-
plitude of I3 is less than I2.
(4)
The two different amplitudes of faults e.g. I2 and I3 were in-
jected to phase A and phase B with the same time periods to
evaluate the relay’s dynamic responses. The disc of phase A
reaches its maximum value earlier than the disc of phase B
(5) since the amplitude of I2 > I3. X shows the maximum points of
the disc travel for phase A.
Figure 3(i) shows that the disc increments during the time
period of Ttrp when the fault currents are greater than the
pickup threshold. It then decrements or resets in the time pe-
riod of Trst when the fault currents fall below the pickup
threshold. The reset time is generally much longer than the
pickup time. This can be seen clearly by comparing the gradi-
ent of the reset curve to the pickup curve.
Figure 3(ii) illustrates the response of the protection system
to the changing fault currents in Figure 2. The relay generates
a trip command to open the circuit breaker at about 0.41s.
Assuming the breaker is a vacuum or SF6 type, the breaker
operating times are approximately 0.06 - 0.08s. Thus the
breaker opens at t ≈ 0.48s.
 reaches 100%. This also indicates that the timing has reached
I2 a trip value and a trip output is issued. If the MOP drops back
I1 below the pickup prior to trip, the virtual disc decrements ac-
cording to the reset characteristic selected by the user [8].

Breaker opens
I3
I1

I3< I2

I1

Fig.2. Varying the magnitude of fault currents

X
Disc resets

Fault injected
Relay trips as disc
reaches 100%

Fig.4. Flowchart of the overcurrent algorithm

Protection Relay
A simplified sample code that emulates the disc operating
characteristics is included below: -
Line Breaker TRIP = ($TD/7)*(28.2/(MOP**2 - 1) + 0.1217)
Relay tripped at about 0.41s and breaker at about 0.48s RESET = ($TD/7)*(29.1/(1 - MOP**2))
IF (FLT .GE. $ISET) THEN Disc moves
DM = (DELT/ TRIP)*100 forward
Fig.3. The response of the protection systems DS = DS+ DM
IF (DS.GT.100) DS = 100
Figure 4 shows the flow chart of an overcurrent relay ELSE
model. The integration of the current, as given in Equation (3) DM = (DELT/RESET)*100 Disc resets
is performed by sampling the applied signal and periodically IF (DS.GT.0) DS = DS - DM
updating the disc travel. The disc is set at zero initially. IF (DS.LE.0) DS = 0
The fast Fourier transform (FFT) computations are done at ENDIF
each sampling instance and are based on sampled data win-
dow covering the proceeding cycle of the input signal. Sam- TRIP is denoted as the tripping time and RESET the reset
pled data is written into a buffer that updates every sampling time. Both are calculated based on IEEE extremely inverse
instance and consists of 1/16, 1/32 or 1/64 time cycle. In this ex- operating characteristics. When the magnitude of current FLT
ample, 1/16 of a cycle is selected as the time interval, i.e. disc is greater than the setting ISET, the relay picks up and trips
travel is updated each 1/16 cycle. based on the calculated TRIP time. If the magnitude of current
The current magnitude output from the FFT is compared to FLT is less than the setting ISET, the relay resets based on the
the pickup setting. If the current exceeds the current pickup calculated RESET time.
setting, the multiple of pickup (MOP) is computed and applied
to the selected inverse time characteristic equation. The new B. Auto-recloser
time interval is defined before an augmentation of disc travel The majority of faults on overhead distribution lines are
is determined. The larger the value of the MOPs, the greater transient (typically 80 – 90%). Consequently, in most cases,
the disc increments in one time interval. The disc increment is once a fault has been cleared the line can be restored to ser-
normalized to a 100% base, which represents the percentage vice by a multi-shot auto-recloser. The auto-recloser initiates
of travel required to operate the relay. The incremental change the closing of the circuit breaker a short time after the breaker
is added to the previous travel value to obtain a new value of has been tripped by the protection relays. If the first reclose
disc travel. This process is continued until the virtual disc attempt is unsuccessful, i.e. the fault is re-energised and the
protection operates again, the 2nd reclose sequence is initiated.
The trip reclose process continues until a reclose attempt is
successful or the maximum number of reclose attempts has
been reached [≤4] and the recloser is locked out. The main
menu setting and dead times setting of the auto-recloser model
can be done via a GUI. Figure 5 shows a menu that allows
users to select their dead times shots.
When designing the auto-recloser model, the following is-
sues were considered: - dead time, reclaim time, protection
reset time, breaker lock out and fault deionisation time. An
auto-reclose scheme can be high speed (less than a second) or
time delayed (generally more than a second). However, it is
important that dead times are not chosen less than the mini-
mum deionisation time.
The model implemented in FORTRAN allows the user to
deliberately impose a fault on the auto-recloser via the GUI so
that an impact of auto-recloser failure can be monitored. For
example, the duration to reset the auto-reclose can be adjusted
as well as the pulse duration fired. The model was developed
from the auto-recloser scheme and its shot controller de-
scribed in the reference papers [2,9]. The paper described how
the control block diagrams in EMTDC could be used to model
an auto-recloser.

Fig.5. Auto-recloser Dead Time Settings

There are no standard to define the number of shots for any

specific application. On the UK MV system, only two to three
shots auto-reclose scheme are normally utilised. The advan-
tage of having four shots is that the final dead time can be set
sufficiently long to allow any transient fault to be removed
before reclosing for the final time. However, this arrangement
may present unnecessary lockout for consecutive transient
faults. The dead time settings for a typical 11kV distribution
network in UK could be: - 1st dead time = 5 – 10s, 2nd dead
time = 30s and the 3rd dead time = 60 – 100s. The 4th dead
time which is not common in the UK but found in many coun-
tries e.g. South Africa and United States, is set between 60 –
100s.
Figure 6 and 7 shows the operation of a recloser and pro-
tection system on a permanent phase A-B fault. To minimise Fig.7. The response of the protection system to the phase A-B fault
the run time of the simulation each auto-recloser dead time is
set artificially short. As the result, the relay is not able to
reset fully before it operates again after the breaker is re-
closed (shown in Figure 7, 13 and 14). Typical settings were
divided by a factor of 100 i.e. 0.1s, 0.3s, 0.6s and 1s.

Fig.6. The response of the recloser to a permanent phase A-B fault

Fig.8. The flowchart of the shot controller of Auto-recloser scheme
 Figure 8 illustrates a simplified portion of flow chart for an laying the opening and closing of the auxiliary contacts during
auto-recloser shot controller, which directs the output to the the operation. Malfunction breaker delay time is the period of
dead timer. To initiate an auto-reclose sequence, the breaker time set for the breaker in which if the time given is exceeded
must be open before a reclose attempt and the protection must a breaker failure alarm will be activated.
have operated to trip the breaker. When these two conditions A simple model of 33/11kV distribution network was con-
are fulfilled, logic one is “Input” to the shot controller, which structed as shown in Figure 10. The model is used to evaluate
directs the output to the dead timer. When the Count hits the the coordination setting of an overcurrent model using the
given upper limits e.g. Shots, a high output is generated to set protection failure monitoring system. The substation was pro-
the Input to zero. The reclaim time period is given by the users tected by time delayed and instantaneous overcurrent relays at
via the GUI. When it is exceeded, the recloser will reset ready the 33kV and 11kV side of the transformer. The upstream
for the next reclosing operation. relay is coordinated with the downstream one. The down-
stream relay also incorporates a recloser function.
C. Protection Failure Monitoring
Incorrect operation of protection system is generally caused
by a failure, malfunction or an unanticipated operation. A
modern power system is a complex network, therefore, it is
practically impossible to anticipate and provide protection for
the infinite number of power system problems. Failure moni-
toring applies various protection failures to the simulated
power network to evaluate the system performance and help
the user understand how other protection systems would re- Fig.10. 33/11kV Simulated network
spond to such failure. This should ensure better planning and
design can be carried out. Various types of protection failures The simple flowchart of relay pickup failure is included in
are included such as breaker malfunction, breaker slow clear- Figure 11.
ing, relay tripping failure and relay pick up failure, as shown
in Figure 9.

Fig.9. Different types of failures monitored via the GUI

Relay pickup failure is divided into two cases i.e. slow

pickup and pickup below the actual setting. Fault current
sometimes alters actual relay setting and affect the correct
pickup times. Depending on the time margin and coordination
settings, pickup failures can cause incorrect trips on the up-
stream relays. Relay tripping failure inhibits the trip command
when the relay has picked up.
A circuit breaker malfunction is categorised into two com-
mon cases; failure when both the auxiliary contacts are closed
(0) and unknown state when both the auxiliary contacts are
opened (1). Breaker slow clearing involves the process of de-
Fig.11. A flow chart of relay pickup failure
1) Breaker Malfunction
A healthy breaker should operate successfully in its closed
state when it is required to do so and also within its fault
clearing time. The breaker malfunction considers that the
breaker fails to open when it is required to do so. This inad-
vertently causes the upstream relay to pickup and trip. Figure
12 shows that the malfunction of the breaker at the down-
stream relays results in the tripping of the upstream relay.
The auxiliary contacts for a healthy breaker is 52A(0) and
52B(1). When the breaker malfunction is selected, the auxil-
iary breaker contacts are either both reset to zero (Breaker
failure); 52A(0) and 52B(0) or set to 1 (Unknown state);
52A(1) and 52B(1). A breaker failure alarm is generated if the
breaker is not opened more than 0.15s (selectable via GUI)
after the trip signal from its respective relay is received.
Fig.12. Breaker malfunction at the downstream
Figure 12 shows that the relay at the LV side tripped at t ≈
0.57s but the circuit breaker did not open. The relay at the HV
side tripped at t ≈ 1.71s and breaker opens at t ≈ 1.79s. before
the relay resets.
2) Breaker slow opening 0.4s and slow closing 0.1s
An aging or worn mechanism inside the breaker could re-
sult in a “stuck” breaker or a delayed opening/closing time.
The slow clearing function allows the breaker to open or close
slowly.
Fig.13. Breaker slow opening and closing at the downstream
Figure 13 shows the response of the relays when the
breaker opened at 0.4s and closed 0.1s slower than expected.
The downstream relay resets three times as a result of reclos-
ing scheme. The relay at the LV side first tripped at t ≈ 0.57s
but the circuit breaker did not open until t ≈ 1.05s. The relay
at the HV side tripped at t ≈ 2.52s and the respective HV
breaker opened at t ≈ 2.60s before the relay resets. Breaker
slow opening and closing scheme can be easily implemented
by adding the time delay to breaker (value given by the user)
after the tripping signal is initiated.
3) Relay initial slow pickup = 0.3s
A fault in the relay may alter the pickup setting. Figure 14
shows that the downstream relay picks up 0.3s slower than
expected. This inadvertently causes the upstream relay to op-
erate after a few cycles.
Fig.14. Relay at the downstream slow pick-up
Figure 14 shows that the initial slow pickup of the relays
on the LV side causes the tripping of relay at HV side. The
relay was supposed to trip at t ≈ 0.57s (fault is injected at t ≈
0.3s) but it tripped at t ≈ 0.87s. The circuit breaker opened at t
≈ 0.95s. The relay resets after receiving the recloser pulse and
pick up immediately when fault is still there. The relay at HV
side tripped at t ≈ 4.22s and the circuit breaker opened at t ≈
4.30s. The relay resets after the current dropped below setting.
D. Current Differential Relay
Differential protection is a reliable method for protecting
generators, transformers, buses and transmission lines.
Kirchoff’s Current Law is used to compare the currents on
both sides of the protected equipment. Under normal condi-
tions, or for faults outside the protected zone, the currents are
equal and no current flows through the relay. If a fault devel-
ops inside the protected zone, the currents are unequal and the
current flowing through the relay initiates the tripping of the
circuit breakers at either end of the zone.
 The main disadvantage of differential protection is that the tively, can be monitored externally. If necessary all phases can
CTs used to measure the primary currents at both sides of the be monitored, but normally only interesting information is
protected zone must produce the same secondary current sig- displayed.
nals under normal operating conditions and ideally for all R S
faults outside the protected zone. The latter can be difficult or 100km 100km 100km
1 4 3 4 3 1
economically impossible to achieve, consequently differential
P T
algorithms must be designed to cope with a current flowing
5 5
through the relay when the “through or restraint” current is
high. Figure 15 shows a typical operating characteristic for a 100km 100km 100km
current differential relay. A two-sloped biased characteristic 1 1 2 1 2 1

setting is selected. There are 4 parameters, k1, k2, IS1 and Q

IS2, these needed to be set as illustrated in Figure 15.
Fig.15. Typical setting for current differential relay
Fig. 16 shows the diagram of the current differential relay
model. The first block is “General Setting & Relay Setting”,
which acquires all the general settings, such as number of ter-
minals, base frequency, and all the relay setting, such as k1,
k2, IS1, IS2 and relay characteristic. It also gets the current
signal and prepares the data as necessary. CT correction fac-
tors should be applied when related CTs do not have the same
CT ratio.
Fig. 17 Test System
U
An EHV double circuit network comprising six substations
and six 100km transmission lines as shown in Fig.17 is chosen
to test the differential relay models. An A phase-to-ground
low resistive fault is generated on line R2-S1 at time 0.2s. The
fault is 50 km from terminal R2. A second fault, with the same
parameters, is applied on line S2-U1. These two faults were
chosen to allow a comparison between the effect of internal
and external faults.
1) Internal Fault
The internal fault on line R2-S1 must be detected by the dif-
ferential relay model. Fig.18 shows the values monitored by
the model. In Fig. 18, Pickup Current (PICKUPa) and Differ-
ential Current (DIFFa) of phase A are compared. It is clearly
seen that, after faults was applied, differential current exceeds
the pickup currents; thus, resulting in a trip signal.

General Setting Base Frequency, Number of

& Terminals, k1, k2, IS1, IS2
Relay Setting (LFCB), CT Correction Factors
Fig. 18 Internal Fault on Line R2-S1

2) External Fault
Filtering, FFT, Relay For an external fault PICKUPa increased while DIFFa de-
Relay Algorithms Calculations creased. Therefore, no trip signals are initiated.

Monitoring Trip Signal to Breakers,

& PICKUPabc, BIASabc,
Control DIFFabc etc

Fig.16. Differential Relay Block Diagram

The second block, “Relay Algorithms”, uses the data re-
ceived from the CTs to calculate all required information.
First all signals are fed to “Filtering” system to reduce noise,
and then, to “FFT” to derive the fundamental frequency in-
formation. The bias current, pickup current values and differ-
ential current values are calculated based on the relay charac-
teristic setting. Finally, the last block, “Monitoring & Con-
trol”, generates the trip signal for the related circuit breakers.
In addition to the trip signal, the pickup current, differential
current and biased current e.g. PICKUP, DIFF, BIAS respec-
Fig. 19 External Fault on Line S2-U1
E. Event Database
Sampled data recorded by the digital relay models are con-
verted into an event report; a stored record of what the relay
saw and how it responded. The user uses the available data to
determine if the response of the protection system was correct
for the given system conditions. The event report output by
EMTDC is 1ms time tagged and can be transformed into a
sequence of event report. The data collected is analysed using
various analytical tools[1] to extract useful information. Fig-
ure 20 illustrates the process of transforming data into knowl-
edge.
Event
Data
Extracted Assimilated Knowledge
Information Information
Fig. 20 Transferring Data to Knowledge
III. CONCLUSION & FURTHER WORK
Many substations are now equipped with microprocessor
based protection and control relays and other types of IEDs.
These intelligent devices behave as the “eye and ear” of the
power system, they provide real time data and information to
the “brain” in the control room or engineering office. The in-
formation is crucial in understanding how the system is oper-
ating, how the relays and control equipment have responded to
an event or command and how the system should be restored
or reconfigured. Access to data from a real substation is al-
ways difficult; consequently most protection and planning
studies rely on simulators. The relay models generate a pattern
of data for each different case so that detailed analysis can be
carried out.
This paper describes how to model various types of protec-
tion for use within the EMTDC transient power system simu-
lator. The simulator generates the voltage, current and logic
data necessary to perform protection and planning studies and
evaluate the response of protection and control equipment.
The software relay models are used to allow simultaneous
observation of how the transient signals affect each relay and
also to evaluate their effect on the state of the power system.
To increase the flexibility of the simulator and enhance its
capabilities, the relay and control models were implemented in
Fortran and C++ with a GUI as a user interface. The relay
models are stored in a library and can be used with any type of
network simulation. Each model includes a monitoring system
and an FFT algorithm designed to pre-process the raw net-
work data. The models have been successfully used in various
research projects described in references [1, 3, 4, 10].
IV. REFERENCES
Papers from Conference Proceedings (Published):
[1] C.L. Hor, P. A. Crossley, F. Dunand, “Knowledge Extraction Within
Distribution Substation Using Rough Set Approach”, in IEEE PES Win-
ter Meeting Proceeding, January 27th – 31st, 2002, New York City, NY,
USA
[2] C.L Hor, A. Shafiu, P. A. Crossley, F. Dunand, "Modelling a Substation
in a Distribution Network: Real time data generation for knowledge ex-
traction" in IEEE PES Summer Meeting Proceeding, July 21st – 25th,
2002, Chicago, IL, USA.
[3] N. Villamagna, P. A. Crossley, H.Y.Li, “GPS synchronized Current
Differential Protection with Adaptive Bias Operating Characteristic”, in
Proc. International Symposium Modern Electric Power Systems
MEPS'02, Wroclaw, Poland.
[4] K. Kangvansaichol, P. A. Crossley, “Multi-zone Current Differential
Protection for Transmission Networks”, in IEEE Transmission and Dis-
View publication stats
tribution Conference and Exposition, 7-12 September 2003 Dallas,
Texas USA.
[5] M.S. Sachdev, Mietek Glinkowski, “Relay Models for use in EMTP”, in
IEEE PES Tutorial on Electromagnetic Transient Program Applications
to Power System Protection, April 17, 2000
[6] S.E. Zocholl, “Testing Dynamic Characteristics Of Overcurrent Relays”,
in 20th Annual Western Protective Relay Conference Spokane, October
19-21, 1993, Washington, USA.
[7] Xingbin Yu, Chanan Singh, “Probabilistic Power System Security
Analysis Considering Protection Failures”, 7th International Conference
on Probabilistic Methods Applied to Power Systems, September 22-26,
2002, Naples, Italy.
[8] J.Johnson, R.Hamilton, P.Lerley, “Voltage Restrained Time Overcurrent
Relay Principles, Coordination, and Dynamic Testing Considerations”,
54th Annual Conference for Protective Relay Engineers, Texas A&M
University, April 3-5, 2001, Texas, USA.
Dissertations, Reports and Books:
[9] A. Shafiu, “Real time data generation in a distribution substation”,
M.Sc. dissertation, Department of Electrical Engineering & Electronics,
UMIST, 2001
[10] K. Kangvansaichol “Wide Area Backup Protection Using Current Dif-
ferential Protection”, PhD First Year Transfer Report, Dept Elect. Eng,
UMIST, 2002
[11] C. Russell Mason, “The Art and Science Of Protective Relaying”, Gen-
eral Electric Company, 1965
V. BIOGRAPHIES
Ching Lai Hor received his BEng(Hons) degree in
Electrical & Electronic Engineering from UMIST in
1997. He worked for two years as an Electrical Engi-
neer in ALSTOM Power before pursuing his Ph.D.
degree in 2000. He spent the first two years of his re-
search at UMIST and his final year at the Queen’s Uni-
versity of Belfast. He is currently a member of the IEE
and IEEE. His fields of interests include power system
protection, data mining, substation automations, reli-
ability evaluations and renewable energy.
Kunn Kangvansaichol received his BEng(Hon) and
MPhil degree in Electrical & Electronic Engineering
from Chulalongkorn University, Thailand in 1997 and
2000 respectively. Currently, he is pursuing his Ph.D.
degree at the Queen’s University of Belfast in the area
of wide area protection. His special interests include
power system protection and reliability evaluation tech-
niques.
Peter A. Crossley is the Professor of Electrical Engi-
neering at the Queen’s University of Belfast. He gradu-
ated with a First Class in B.Sc degree from UMIST in
1977 and a PhD degree from the University of Cam-
bridge in 1983. He had been involved in the design and
application of digital protection relays and systems for
25 years, first with GEC, then with ALSTOM and UM-
IST, and later with the Queen’s University of Belfast.
He has published over a 150 technical papers on protec-
tion. He was the Chairman of the 2001 IEE Develop-
ment in Power System Protection Conference in Am-
sterdam and is an active member of various CIGRE,
IEEE and IEE committees on protection.
Ahmed Shafiu received his First Class BEng(Hon)
degree in Electrical and Electronics Engineering from
the University of Birmingham in 2000 and his M.Sc
degree with Distinction from UMIST in 2001. Cur-
rently, he is pursuing his PhD degree at UMIST in the
area of Embedded Generations. His special interests
include renewable energy, power system protection and
power systems modelling.