Hebrew University of Jerusalem

The Faculty for Social Sciences

The Department of Political Science

Does Deliberation Lead to Rationality?

An Analysis of Deliberative Democracy – is it a Solution to
Irrational Political Behavior?

Course: Irrational Political Behavior and Democracy (56173)

Taught by: Assistant Professor Tristan Klingelhoefer
Written by: Avia Sharon (318759412)

Jerusalem
20/2/2023
 Introduction

Irrational political behavior proves problematic for democratic theory. In this

paper I question whether deliberative democracy manages to sufficiently solve these

problems. I start by explaining three types of irrationalities that cripple democratic theory.

I show how arbitrariness, inconsistency and pre-disposition sever the tie between political

actions and deeply held political beliefs. A connection crucial for deriving public

legitimacy for public decisions based on political actions such as voting which is the

bedrock of democratic theory.

Then I turn to deliberative democracy. I briefly explain the concept of deliberative

democracy and its origins in Rawls’s idea of public reason. After which I explain why its

proponents argue it improves on general democratic theory in regard to irrationality and

why I remain unconvinced by these arguments. Lastly, I attempt to salvage deliberative

democracy with some amendments and briefly analyze the consequences of such

amendment and how they too are insufficient at solving our problem stemming from

irrationality.

Democratic Theory and Irrationality

There is a large body of work regarding the problems imposed on democratic

theory by various types of irrationalities. In this part of the paper I will briefly introduce

three such categories of irrationality and the problem each of them incurs within

democratic political thought. As I mentioned there is a large variety of categories of this

type but in this paper I will only refer to three of them: arbitrariness, inconsistency and
pre-disposition. I address these irrationalities in particular not because they are of unique

interest when posed against deliberative democracy but because they suffice for my

argument that deliberative democracy fails to solve the issues brought on by irrational

political behavior in general.

All three of these types of irrationality (much like others I neglect) can be

contrasted with assumptions democratic theorists usually accept implicitly about the

democratic political agents. That is, as I see it, the reason they prove so problematic for

democratic theory. Democratic theory bases itself, like most other social and political

theories that come to mind, on assumptions about human nature and behavior. One of

these assumptions is that the political agents will act rationally. 1 This can be construed in

many different ways each with corresponding irrationalities disproving it, posing an

empirical problem to democratic theory.

The first democratic assumption of rationality that I will address is that of non-

arbitrariness. Simply put that political behavior and choices will be directed in a deliberate

manner towards consciously formulated goals.2 A seemingly trivial assumption. After all

is not all behavior rational in this sense? People orient themselves towards a chosen goal

and act accordingly in order to advance it. In the sphere of modern democratic politics that

would mean that people choose who to support politically (either by voting or by
volunteering/advocating) according to their political goals. Once again, seemingly a trivial

analysis of human behavior.

In a representational democracy it is critical that we understand people’s political

actions as representative of their chosen means towards political goals. This is the only

way to derive legitimate and relevant public opinion from elections. If people’s votes are

representative of their political interests and views, it is possible to derive legitimacy for

1
Berelson, B. (1952). “Democratic Theory and Public Opinion”. The Public Opinion Quarterly, 16(3), 313–
330.
2
Berelson, B. (1952). “Democratic Theory and Public Opinion”. The Public Opinion Quarterly, 16(3), 327
collective political decisions based on their aggregation. If, however, these votes are

representative of something else, it seems incredulous to use them as justificatory basis for

political decisions.

Arbitrariness can manifest itself in political decisions in two major ways. First, it

may manifest by people acting (politically) against their professed political goals. Second,

it may manifest by people’s political behavior being dictated by non-political goals or

factors which are distinctly disconnected from politics.

Regarding the first manifestation, empirical economic studies have shown

repeatedly that people vote against their own (perceived) economic interests. 3 One can

argue (as I have elsewhere) that perhaps these political agents vote against specific

political interests (in this case their economic interests) but they do so generally in order to

vote in accordance with other political interest they prioritize over them. However, this

type of argument does not solve for other cases of seemingly arbitrary political behavior.

In regards to which we have ample empirical research showing a surprising correlation

between lowered voting for the in-power party and negative experiences unrelated to

politics during their mandate.4 If people’s political choice in the ballot box is determined

by a purely non-political factor such as (per the example in the footnotes) the hardship

brought on by natural disasters completely beyond the purview of political decisions, how
can they be used to justify future political decisions?

The second assumption of rationality which I would like to analyze is that of

consistency. This assumption can be interpreted in three ways. It can be understood as

people’s political behavior being consistent with their political beliefs however this

amounts to the same version of rationality as the previously discussed arbitrariness. The

3
For example, see Rothstein, Bo & Uslaner, Eric. (2005). “All for One: Equality, Corruption, and Social
Trust”. World Politics. 58.
4
For example, see Achen, C. & Bartels, L. (2016). “Chapter Five. Blind Retrospection: Electoral Responses
to Droughts, Floods, and Shark Attacks”. In Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce
Responsive Government (pp. 116-145). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
second interpretation is that people’s positions on separate political issues will be

consistent with one another. A clearly suspect assumption 5 but not the one I will use here.

The Third is that people’s political beliefs themselves will be consistent over time.

If we are to take ballots as an expression of deeply held social and political beliefs

we would expect them to be relatively constant over time. Of course, some changes in

real-world circumstances could reasonably create discrepancies in people’s actual beliefs.

For example, a failure of any specific policy to achieve its goals could serve as a rational

reason to switch positions regarding it. However, changes in political positions about

specific policies that cannot be the result of a change in relevant circumstances are

suspect. If political persuasions on political issues do not have persisting impact then their

expression in the ballot box is hardly the expression of true and deeply held political

beliefs that can give legitimacy to public decisions. If votes are nothing more than the

expression of passing attitudes they can hardly be the source of a public mandate

democratic theorists derive from them.

Once again, we have ample empiric work discrediting this perception of votes. For

example, Bartel’s research showing a complete lack of correlation between people’s

political positions on major issues from one election to the next. 6 A wide variation in

political expression over short periods of time that discredits the idea that votes represent
actual beliefs. They are more aptly understood as the expression of mere attitudes that

cannot be condensed into something with as far-reaching implications as public opinion or

public reason.

The final assumption of rationality I will address in this paper is what I will call

objectivity. This is not a precise term as it may seem more demanding than I mean by it so

I will explain. By objectivity I mean the assumption that people consider all arguments
5
Mettler, S. (2018). “A Time of Contradiction” In The Government-Citizen Disconnect. Russell Sage
Foundation.
6
Bartels, L. M. 2003. “Democracy with Attitudes”, in M. MacKuen and G. Rabinowitz, eds., Electoral
Democracy. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
and positions on a particular issue in a fair manner which at least resembles objectivity.

This is a basic requirement of democratic theory because if people’s political positions are

not the result of actually weighing the relevant considerations fairly then their professed

political beliefs may not in fact be a true expression of their actual beliefs in the relevant

circumstance. For example, let’s assume I profess to support policy X because it will

advance my political goal of equality of opportunity in the job market. This seems like a

good rationale for my support if and only if I came to that conclusion after duly

considering all the evidence on the relation between policy X and equality of opportunity

in the job market fairly and objectively.

Once again, the assumption of rationality falls short in empirical studies. For

example, Zaller found that people are commonly predisposed when considering different

evidence about political positions.7 Most people screen the information they consume

based on several kinds of pre-dispositions and not based on merit. They are more open to

receive information about issues that they are already engaged with. They are more open

to accept information that supports their previously held position. They give more weight

to recently acquired information and their professed positions can be altered by bringing

certain considerations to the forefront of their minds.8

In summary there are various types of irrationalities that can cause problems for
democratic theory. In this part of the paper I briefly explained three of them and provided

empirical sources for their disproval. In a representative democracy we need votes to be

the expression of actual deeply held political beliefs. Whether it be the disconnect between

voting and professed political goals or the connection between voting and explicitly un-

political goals, arbitrariness of voting choices clearly undermines that requirement.

Inconsistency of policy positions reveals that votes are more aptly viewed as mere

political attitudes than the expression of actual deeply held political beliefs. Predisposition
7
Zaller, J. (1992). “The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion” (Cambridge Studies in Public Opinion and
Political Psychology). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
8
There
in political considerations shows that even if policy positions were consistent they would

still not be a true expression of actual political beliefs.

Deliberative Democracy and Public Reason

In this part of the paper I will analyze deliberative democracy in light of the three

irrationalities discussed above. I begin with a brief explanation of the relation between

deliberative democracy and Rawls’s concept of public reason which will serve us later in

the paper. I move on to evaluate which types of irrational political behavior does

deliberative democracy manage to subvert and which it does not.

Deliberative democratic theory is the school of thought that emphasizes the role of

public discourse and deliberation in the collective decision-making process. It bases itself

in the assertion that political decisions ought to be the result of free and fair discussion

among citizens rather than via some majority vote. Some see it as a resurgence of original

Athenian direct democracy where citizen deliberation was the heart of the political

process. Modernly it was popularized as a solution to some shortcomings of the

representative democracy that has come to be the norm. One of its most important

proponents is Habermas who proposed the idea of a "communicative rationality" as a

means of resolving political disputes through reasoned debate. 9 Its most common

contemporary version is having citizens picked at random (much like jury duty in the U.S.)

to take part in a deliberation on a certain political issue, guided by some experts in a

consultory role.10

9
Habermas, J. (1996). “Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and
Democracy” (Trans. William Rehg). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
10
Rincon, L. (2022, September 12). “Deliberative democracy in action”. The Hague Academy. Retrieved
February 12, 2023, from https://thehagueacademy.com/news/a-quick-guide-to-deliberative-democracy/
 As I alluded to in the introduction to this part, deliberative democracy is deeply

rooted in Rawls’s contentious concept of public reason.11 Public reason is Rawls’s idea

that the collective decisions are only legitimate when justified on term that are relevant to

all reasonable individuals in the collective.12 Its relation to the theoretical justification for

deliberative democracy is thus quite obvious. Deliberative democracy’s main

“improvement” on representative democracy is that it supposedly gives us the procedural

framework for collectively arriving at decisions in large societies with legitimate and

reasonable disagreements about the best means to achieve political aims and the very

nature of these aims themselves.

The similarities between that goal and the concept of public reason are both

evident and prominent. Deliberative democracy is the procedural framework for arriving

at legitimate collective decisions via deliberation and persuasion. Public reason is the

demand that for collective decisions to be legitimate they must be justified in terms

relevant to all relevant parties. Deliberative democracy is thus the technical institutional

framework for meeting the demand of public reason. Public decisions must be arrived at

by deliberation between the relevant parties thus for these decisions to come to pass the

deliberators must be convinced in terms that they deem relevant. 13 This connection is

important because the concept of public reason has come under a lot of scrutiny and has
received a lot of criticisms, one of which is of particular interest in this argument about

rationality and deliberative democracy.

There is a line of argument common among proponents of deliberative democracy

which goes something like the following: “If people are forced to hold deliberation about

collective decisions they will be less prone to irrational political behavior since irrational

11
Baynes, Kenneth. (2010). “Deliberative Democracy and Public Reason”. Veritas. 55.
12
Rawls, J. (1997). “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”. The University of Chicago Law Review, 64(3),
765–807.
13
Sharon, Assaf, “Collective Reason or Individual Liberty: Deliberative Democracy and the Protection of
Liberal Rights”, in Debra Satz, and Annabelle Lever (eds), Ideas That Matter: Democracy, Justice, Rights
(New York, 2019; online edn, Oxford Academic, 22 Aug. 2019)
tendencies will be negated via the deliberative efforts”.14 This rationale is not without

merit or basis in empiric work.15 Clearly when engaged in deliberation some irrationalities

may lose their hold on the deliberators. For example, at face value, the irrationality of

inconsistency will probably be negated through proper deliberation since deliberators will

hold each other accountable for inconsistent arguments. A similar argument can be made

for nullification of the irrationality of arbitrariness via deliberation as arbitrary arguments

will also be called out by opposing deliberators.

These are the types of arguments proponents of deliberative democracies often

make. Since deliberation is the procedure for decision making, the decisions cannot be

justified in irrational terms or ways since the deliberative process will inherently make

them obsolete. This is a superficial and overly-simplistic line of reasoning in my eyes.

Let’s return to inconsistency for example. While it may be true that within a given

deliberation the different parties will hold each other accountable for inconsistencies, how

does that argument fare when addressing inconsistencies over different deliberations?

According to the common version of deliberative democracy deliberators are chosen at

random for each deliberation and are not a constant throughout them. So while someone

may be held to account for inconsistent arguments throughout a certain deliberation there

is no mechanism for enforcing consistent rationale over several deliberations.

Additionally, while this line of self-enforcing rationality in deliberation may be a

somewhat relevant solution to some types of irrationality, it may not be so for others.

Consider the irrationality of pre-disposition in its various sub-categories. I suppose

14
Quong, J. (2013). “On the Idea of Public Reason”. In J. Mandle and D.A. Reidy, eds. A Companion to
Rawls. P. 273.,
Sharon, Assaf, “Collective Reason or Individual Liberty: Deliberative Democracy and the Protection of
Liberal Rights”, in Debra Satz, and Annabelle Lever (eds), Ideas That Matter: Democracy, Justice, Rights
(New York, 2019; online edn, Oxford Academic, 22 Aug. 2019)
Thompson, Dennis. (2008). “Deliberative Democratic Theory and Empirical Political Science”. Annual
Review of Political Science. 11.
Baynes, Kenneth. (2010). “Deliberative Democracy and Public Reason”. Veritas. 55.
15
Waldinger, R., & Schultz, M. (2023). “Good life: Lessons from the world's longest scientific study of
Happiness”. Simon & Schuster.
deliberation would force people to engage with certain issues thus making them more

open to receive information regarding them. However, how does it make people less prone

to accepting information that supports their previously held position within the

deliberation? Deliberation would certainly not fix the issue stemming from the way people

give disproportionate weight to recently acquired information. If anything that problem

would be exacerbated by intelligent deliberators having the opportunity to abuse that

inclination by bringing up arguments closer to the end of the deliberation. Similarly the

ability to change people’s minds by priming them to consider specific aspects of the issue

would also be open to abuse.

In summary deliberative democracy’s advocates argue that it fosters rational

collective decision making since deliberators will hold each other accountable for various

forms of irrationality. This may hold for some minor effects of irrationality but does not

fix the overarching issue since deliberators are not uniquely rational and the deliberation

process leaves room for most irrationalities to take place.

Can Deliberative Democracy be Salvaged?

In the last part of this paper I suggest changes to deliberative democracy that may

salvage it in light of Rawls’s public reason and the problems brought up in the previous

part.. After which I consider whether these amendments to deliberative democracy suffice

and whether the amended deliberative democracy remains true to itself.

In defense of deliberative democracy it must be said that its very nature is

supposed to exclude bad faith deliberators and manipulators. Deliberation is usually

regarded as an ideal process of fair and good-faith debate. 16 This is great in theory but as I

addressed in the first part of the paper we are interested in a practical form of government
16
Baynes, Kenneth. (2010). “Deliberative Democracy and Public Reason”. Veritas. 55.
that can deal with the empiric irrationality of political actors. If we could just assume away

irrational persuasion or manipulation we would be assuming away the question itself. We

need to find a practical mechanism which would allow us to exclude these kinds of actors

if we are to salvage anything from deliberative democracy in way of rational political

behavior.

This is where I would like to return to Rawls’s idea of public reason and the

criticism commonly leveled at it. This criticism is that Rawls assumes away the problem

in the same way deliberative democratic theorists do. Briefly, this is the criticism that

Rawls’s restriction of public reason’s justification to reasonable individuals is ad hoc. 17

One aspect of this criticism is that if we can simply ignore the reasoning of those we deem

unreasonable we can solve any disagreement by deeming the opposition unreasonable.

The other side of it is that if the justification of public decisions is that their rationale is

relevant to all who fall under their purview, the unreasonables cannot be simply ignored in

the justificatory front while expected to conform to the decision.18

I think this is a fundamental misunderstanding of Rawls’s point. His aim was to

provide a scheme for collective decision making, not one for justification or making some

“correct” decision.19 Rawls does so by subjecting the employment of collective authority

to collective reasoning. Collective reasoning demands of us justifications in terms that are

relevant to the entire collective. That is not to say that the reasons must be justified in

terms relevant to each end every individual within the collective, but those who are

committed to the idea of collective decisions being made in a way that is relevant to all. 20

17
Enoch, David, “Against Public Reason”, in David Sobel, Peter Vallentyne, and Steven Wall (eds), Oxford
Studies in Political Philosophy, Volume 1, Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy (Oxford, 2015; online edn,
Oxford Academic, 20 Aug. 2015)
18
There
19
Sharon, Assaf. (2019). “Collective Reason or Individual Liberty: Deliberative Democracy and the
Protection of Liberal Rights”. Thompson, Dennis. (2008). Deliberative Democratic Theory and Empirical
Political Science. Annual Review of Political Science. 11.
20
There
These are Rawls’s reasonables and the unreasonables are thus those who are not

committed to making collective decisions together freely and fairly.

Once this is understood it may be implemented into deliberative democracy in

order to solve at least part of our issues with irrational political behavior. If we limit the

scope of deliberators (in some feasible way) to those committed to good faith deliberation

and rational arguments we may at least minimize the effects of some irrationalities. This

sort of limitation (however we manage to enforce it) will ensure that our deliberators are

uniquely non-pre-disposed or at least uniquely less pre-disposed than in current

deliberative democratic theory.

Another issue, that of inconsistency over multiple deliberations, may be solved by

having these good-faith deliberators remain a fixture of the deliberations rather than

alternating randomly. I suppose other irrationalities may be sidestepped by similarly

amending deliberative democracy specifically to address them but for the remainder of

this paper I’ll analyze the implications of such amendments, specifically the two I

suggested.

Limiting the range of possible deliberators in a deliberative democracy is in effect

limiting the range of legitimate political actors. That would be the abolition of universal
suffrage. This may be a price we are willing to pay to avoid the issues brought on by

irrational political behavior but we must acknowledge it is a price. Moreover the idea of

permanent deliberators limits the suffrage even further specifically to the select few who

are somehow chosen from within the circle of reasonables.

Having a permanent circle of decision makers from within a limited range of

people from the collective seems to me a much less democratic proposition than what we

currently have. Perhaps this can be avoided by holding elections from within the

reasonables for a term in the deliberative process. But how will this vote be held? Do only
reasonables get to vote on deliberators from within their own group or does everyone get

to vote?

If only reasonables get to vote and stand for elections than what we have done in

effect is to place an epistocratic “reasonableness” veto or limitation. 21 If everyone gets to

vote on reasonable deliberators our system is vulnerable to the same irrational voter

behaviors as democracy except it has a “reasonableness” qualification test for candidates.

Either way I think the deliberative democracy we get is prone to many of the same

problems stemming from irrational political behavior it had originally though perhaps the

effect of these would be lessened.

In summary, I believe that deliberative democracy does not manage to solve

irrational political behavior nearly as well as it espouses to. Irrational political behavior

roves problematic for democratic theory because it severs the connection between political

decisions and actual political beliefs in various ways. Arbitrariness in political decisions

show them not to be motivated by actually relevant political considerations. Inconsistency

proves that even the political beliefs being expressed by political actions are not

necessarily as deeply held as we want them to be in order to be relevant. Pre-dispositions

of various sorts show that people’s political beliefs and decisions are not based on merit.

Deliberative democrats commonly argue that deliberation can nullify irrationality.

That may hold partially for some of the irrationalities addressed in this paper but certainly

not all of them. In fact deliberation may make some of them, such as pre-dispositions,

more open to abuse. These deficiencies in deliberative democracy may be fixed with some

amendments that align it more properly with the concept of public reason on which it is

based. For example, limiting the range of possible deliberators to those committed to

collective decisions being made fairly and collectively may subvert some irrational

behaviors. However, when analyzing these necessary amendments, it becomes obvious

21
Brennan J. (2016). Against democracy. Princeton University Press.
that they may lessen some effects of irrationality they do not nullify it and they do so at a

heavy price in democratic terms.

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