Untitled

Uncertainty in Indonesia
Author(s): Michael Leifer

Source: World Policy Journal, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Winter, 1990/1991), pp. 137-157
Published by: Duke University Press
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40209201
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UNCERTAINTY IN INDONESIA
Michael Leifer
As Indonesia moves toward the end of a remarkable era in its history, this
vast archipelago of 180 million people has become absorbed by the poli-
tics of succession. How the succession question will be resolved is also a
subject of great interest and speculation beyond Indonesia's borders.
At issue is the seeming determination of President Suharto to soldier
on in office, thereby increasing the likelihood that ultimate political change
will be less than orderly. Such an outcome would not only represent a
serious setback for Indonesia, it would also be ironic, given the president's
consistent concern with national harmony since assuming power nearly
a quarter of a century ago.
The succession battle will be fought and decided by a small circle com-
prised of Suharto, the military, and other members of the ruling elite.
In this respect, the wave of democratization now sweeping the world has
left Indonesia surprisingly untouched, prompting neither a more asser-
tive opposition nor a more open and accommodating government.
President Suharto is currently serving his fifth unopposed term of office.
His term expires in March 1993, at which time he will be nearly 72 years
old. Suharto is widely believed to be intent on serving another five years
despite his age (retirement is normally at age 55 in Indonesia) and despite
signs of dissent within the armed forces, which have been his power base
from the outset. Insistence on a further term of office could possibly pro-
voke a coup attempt with adverse consequences for national unity and
international business confidence in Indonesia. Indeed, factional conflict
within the armed forces could unleash cultural tensions in the political
heartland of Java, thus giving greater impetus to separatist movements
in outlying Irian Jaya, East Timor, and Aceh.
Michael Leifer is a professor of international relations at the London School

ofEconomics and Political Science. His published works include Indonesia's
Foreign Policy (London and Boston: Allen andUnwin, 1983) and ASEAN
and the Security of South-East Asia (London and New York: Routledge,
1989).
138 World Policy Journal
Even if Suharto should secur

might still be tested. On the
tated in office, a destabilizing
if the vice-president who succe
8 of the constitution provides f
to succeed the president.) On
sixth term without making ad
dency to a nationally acceptab
persist in acute form. As he age
petence would undoubtedly
The manner of political succ
has experienced succession on
transfer of power occurred a
abortive coup in 1965 that ex
was followed by extensive blo
culturally diverse archipelago
war loomed.
The condition of Indonesia in
The most important differen
tition between the army and
no longer exists, and a more
scious of the dangers of a bre
ical succession will nonethele
maturity. Its manner will demo
ment created by Suharto over
just an instrument of person
Although public interest in
since Suharto was last reelect
way to restrict discussion of
of retired officers and politic
in March 1993 and that his s
terms in office. Barely conce
discussion was premature and
supreme People's Consultative
choose a president and vice-p
intention to retain the presiden
on phasing out the founding
independence struggle agains
as an exception to this rule, w
forces and selectively in the
Uncertainty in Indonesia 139
Suharto is believed to be motiv

incomplete. He is also said to be c
for himself in history and with
financial assets of his family, w
become a national scandal. (For e
that Bank Duta, the country's s
because of improper foreign-exc
one of Suharto's sons has been o
excessiveindulgence of his fami
establishment's political alienati
Despite growing resistance in th
term of office, Suharto retains c
that should not be underestimat
military appointments. His rene
than on previous occasions, but
he avoids choosing a vice-presid
military might unite.
But such a political triumph mig
sion is deferred rather than con
is on Suharto's side. The longer
sion, the greater the prospect of
his purpose and priorities- and tha
was the experience of his prede
Indonesia's first decade and a ha

was marked by political turbule
blame for the country's econom
pestuous personality of the countr
the past quarter of a century ha
nomic development. These achiev
ical sobriety and managerial ski
president, Suharto.
In October 1965, as a major-gen
reserve in Jakarta, Suharto crush
uted to Indonesia's Communist Pa
and commander of the army, he
power to himself from a discred
removal from office. At the tim
unknown outside of Indonesia. W

he became acting president a
of state.
Suharto has subsequently dominated Indonesian politics in a unique
way, setting the country on a new and quite successful course in economic
and foreign affairs without facing any effective challenge to his position.
It needs to be stressed, however, that his political dominance has been
maintained by authoritarian practices and at the expense of human rights.
Furthermore, the benefits of economic development have been very
unevenly distributed. Thirty million of some 180 million Indonesians live
below the World Bank poverty line, and 60 percent of Indonesian cur-
rency in circulation is reported to be in the capital, Jakarta.1
While strikingly different in style and policy from Sukarno, Suharto
has nonetheless shared his predecessor's cultural identity and nation-
building priorities. Both are products and exemplars of the Javanese cul-
tural tradition. It was Sukarno who devised the five principles, or Pan-
casila, that have made up the guiding philosophy of the Indonesian state
for nearly five decades. They were promulgated shortly before the procla-
mation of independence in August 1945 as a way to contain the fissiparous
cultural diversity of an archipelago-state whose boundaries had been set
by the Dutch. Sukarno was concerned about the absence of a single cul-
tural tradition to unite the nation in the face of Muslim attempts to define
national identity on the sole basis of Islam. Sukarno, who came out of
a cultural tradition that predates Islam and is strongly entrenched in east
and central Java, put forward the Pancasila in an attempt to promote
national harmony.
The key to the formula was its central injunction to believe in a single
deity, without stipulating which deity should be the object of religious
devotion. This syncretic device for religious pluralism and tolerance was
adopted by Suharto and has been entrenched constitutionally as the
national philosophy. It has also been employed as an instrument of social
and political control and portrayed as a more appropriate ideology for
the country than such "alien" beliefs as Marxism and liberalism. The Pan-
casila reflect the widespread belief in the need for national harmony. Yet
while Sukarno sought to encourage that harmony through political mobili-
zation and national symbols, Suharto has sought harmony through the
reduction of public politics to ritual activity in the declared interest of
providing stable conditions for foreign-assisted economic development.
While Sukarno left behind a reputation as a revolutionary nationalist,
Suharto, by contrast, has shown a clear aversion to the histrionic diplomacy
of his predecessor. Indeed, he has

matic style unwittingly served to
respected in the chancelleries of
pointed out: "We shall only be able
are possessed of a great national
of Suharto's political outlook in t
national failures.
Although Suharto repudiated th
been no less an Indonesian nation
pride in Indonesia's victory over
and most populous country in S
him, Suharto has worked toward
of regional order in Southeast A
Suharto has committed his gover
frontation. The underlying rationa
that Sukarno's confrontational po
Suharto's prescriptions for nation
part of the vocabulary of the
(ASEAN), which Indonesia was
Indonesia's success in economic
the country's virtual self-sufficien
consequence of Suharto's stewar
by a military style of leadership
junior commanders, i.e. ministers,
of a general plan of action. From
sionally competent economists h
the macromanagement of the ec
to Indonesia's economic success.
Development has proceeded through close engagement with the inter-
national economy, with international agencies generally approving of pri-
orities set out in successive five-year plans. That approval has been reflected
in a constant flow of investment capital from foreign consortia and busi-
ness enterprises, with the emphasis shifting over time from the extraction
of natural resources, especially oil and natural gas, to processing and
manufacturing industries. The high degree of international confidence
in Indonesia's development strategy is also reflected in the amount of aid
the country receives. For example, the Inter-Governmental Group on
Indonesia (IGGI), an international aid consortium set up in Holland in
February 1967, pledged $4.5 billion for the fiscal year ending in March
1991- a figure closely in line with the World Bank's recommendation.
Although Indonesia has ge

management of its economy,
tion and endemic corruption
are resented at home, and th
sion. Fortunately for Suharto
at a time of economic achieve
By the
late 1980s, Suharto's
the impact
of the economic r
oil and gas revenues had pri
and corruption. The remarka
War of October 1973 served t
tice of import-substitution ind
was guided by political and p
1980s, however, Indonesia w
disaster as oil prices and nati
economic crisis was compoun
were denominated in dollars
its foreign debt was denom
After the initial impact of
assessed, the government respo
followed by several economic
nocrats had long advocated. T
ever, by independent econom
tive of no more than transitory
were made in the economy. Th
stood in the way of the libe
to follow the example set by
Eventually Suharto was per
tion in the interest of transfo
nationally competitive econo
vated by his realization that
to reschedule loans from for
reputation of creditworthine
rescheduling of loans would in
and the late President Sukarn
Indonesia's economy. Such a
pride in his reputation as In
After the currency devaluat
accelerated. Bureaucratic contr
were dismantled, and the fi
to a degree. The reforms were int

Indonesia to take full advantage o
was to shift the economy away f
striking way.3
The extent to which Indonesia h
sion of the 1980s was evident in the
ment. The president announced t
grown a highly respectable 5.7 pe
ment spending increased by 17 p
structure and development projec
August 1990, Suharto announced a
percent.4) Foreign investment totale
South Korea, and Taiwan playing
passed in the first six months of
Of equal significance was the ris
lion in 1989 (from $8.3 billion i
degree of domestic business confi
vate sector. Moreover, although
billion- which far exceeded the le
turbingly high debt-service ratio
percent, making it unlikely that
rescheduling.
Indonesia was also able to make s
This is because its deregulation p
country to exploit comparative c
and currency. This strong econom
in the short term, certainly in th
tion. Indonesia's economic prospe
ever. Built-in structural problems
cially if the succession question i
Indonesia's development is vulne
which has been growing at a rate of
to reach 216 million by the year
able figure by global family plan
Indonesia somehow has to find th
of another Singapore. More to the
population is under 15, and every
enter the job market. A sustaine
to be absolutely essential to keep
dant social and political problem
Indonesia's development is v
that is heavily dependent on
income of $520 that is unevenl
to exploit the potential of the
to a considerable degree on t
is vulnerable to factors largely
in the United States and other
stands to benefit from the v
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Ove
crisis could hurt Indonesia a
the country rises, fueling in
national competitiveness. Sho
sion, markets for Indonesia'
Although Indonesia's econom

ments are nonetheless impr
dismal record of so much of
enhanced its image internati
image at home and strength
Indonesia's foreign policy-
Suharto's strong imprint. As
to work within explicit para
of Foreign Affairs has been pe
direction has been indicated
commitment to ASEAN the
For a long time, there has
that their nation was destined
that role ought to be has never
stridently sought during hi
map, Suharto deferred resum
Indonesia's economy made
Indonesia was instrumenta
managerial role it initially a
limited. At the founding of
a viable regional order would
powers could be excluded f
Consistent with this convictio
tion to a Malaysian proposal
zone guaranteed by the major wo

suggested that the region be tran
and Neutrality that excluded the
that nonetheless reflected Jakart
Indonesia's alternative formula in
ational utility.
Suharto prescribed a circumscrib
of his nation's economic shortcom
risk reviving apprehensions th
diplomacy of Sukarno. This mode
of frustration, especially on the
establishment. That frustration bec
of the conflict over Cambodia, w
Indonesia.
Although Jakarta objected to V
its primary worry was the way
against Vietnam and into a coalit
foremost external threat to Indo
Vietnam's side was corresponding
Indonesia became a reluctant par
ship with China because of the
Thailand, for whom Vietnam rep
threat.
While Indonesia formally adhered to ASEAN's consensus with respect
to Cambodia, it explored the prospect of accommodation with Vietnam,
with whom Jakarta had enjoyed a long-standing special relationship arising
from a shared experience of national revolution and a common appre-
hension of China. Soviet interest in promoting a rapprochement with
China, made conditional on a change of policy toward Vietnam over Cam-
bodia, gave Indonesia an opening to improve relations with Hanoi in the
mid-1980s. Its then Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja had been
pressing for an informal meeting between regional parties to the Cambo-
dian conflict for a long time. That proposal bore diplomatic fruit after
the head of the Cambodian resistance coalition, Prince Norodom Siha-
nouk, was persuaded to begin direct discussions with Hun Sen, the prime
minister of the government installed in Phnom Penh by the Vietnamese
army. From 1988 onward, several international conferences on Cambodia
were held in Jakarta, which helped to raise Indonesia's diplomatic profile
but also exposed the limitations of its role in mediating the conflict. When
a settlement finally seeme

Nations- not Indonesia- we
Frustration over Cambodi
attaining a higher internatio
matic example of that intere
Indonesia and China had agr
matic relations. That announc
nese Foreign Minister Qian Q
the funeral of Emperor Hir
Jakarta in August 1990 on th
known that the military ha
Indonesian relations could be
asserting his personal author
There have been other nota
international profile. For ins
Palestinian state that was pro
mitted it to establish a diplo
such a mission had long been r
Islamic political demands am
that granting permission for t
objections to the establishm
Another calculation- this on
Aligned Movement- also fig
Belgrade in September 1989 m
Movement summit since 197
the pointless rhetoric of the
the Non-Aligned Movement
which Indonesia invaded in 1
be a point of contention. At
inviting Indonesia to become
tinian mission in Jakarta wa
Organization, thereby shori
movement.
Should Indonesia become chair, Suharto would find himself p

host to a meeting of the heads of government of the Non-Alig
ment in September 1992. This would give him an opportunity
in his new international prestige just months before the preside
tions, making it more difficult

lishment to press for his early r
Despite Suharto's impressive eco

over the past 25 years, he remain
in his authority arising from str
by economic development, the gro
the armed forces, and widesprea
ruption associated with Suharto
Over the past 25 years, Indones
the nation has developed econom
of a middle class concentrated in
quences. Although the middle cla
growth, it has resented the stric
Yet because of the repressive nat
controls on the press, and the a
and political parties, there has b
ment. Highly dependent on gov
groups have also been quiet. The
only occasionally- are those of t
politicians who came to some pro
that Suharto had falsely interpr
Stresses have also arisen as a re
that generates a natural jealousy
live in urban kampongs or villag
distribution of wealth was raise
the Indonesian Economists Ass
kept partly at bay because the g
food- rice- is readily available
While Islam is no longer the bu
growing popular appeal at a time o
A politicized Islam is seen by s
Sukarno's socialism and the ineq
Islamic revolution in Iran, the go
to deny any opportunity for po
that might serve as a catalyst fo
disaffected groups, including th
outburst of Islamic dissatisfa

Jakarta, which the governm
In addition to the governm
are other factors that explain
politics today. To start, Musl
culture; nor does Islam expr
organizations. Islamic identit
that all Indonesian organizatio
Muslim solidarity was dimin
(Muslim Scholars) faction wit
Party and public politics in
fortunes. Suharto has also be
constituency, as evidenced m
licly endorsed him for anoth
Despite the aforementioned
only at the periphery of the
sions that have beset modern
of the continuing centrality of
language, and a deferential p
by the archipelago-wide presen
tant national institution. Th
repression and cooptation, in
yayasans, nonprofit foundation
Besides the armed forces, th
loyalty and obedience of a va
an elitist tradition. For all th
likely to come from near th
Although Indonesia's bureauc

more complex and skilled as
modern state, the political sy
than substance. In justifying
government has argued that
cess that would lead in Indon
than the stability required t
Suharto has not been comple
tion that has swept much of
public statements in favor of greate

cism, not enthusiasm.6
On the surface, Indonesia abides
regular elections to a national par
lation. Members of parliament
appointees comprise the People's
function is to elect an executive p
every five years. In principle, the
is an intrinsic part of the politic
do not provide a free and fair ch
The president is chosen by an ele
1,000 members are nominated by
Suharto's 25 years in office, ther
candidates. He has always been th
by unanimous acclamation.
Indonesia's opposition parties h
while their distinctive identities
ognition by mergers and ideolog
parliament have been managed to
sibly an association of functiona
the Sukarno era. Golkar serves as
has been employed as an electoral
inalliance with appointed memb
dominated the parliament and t
That working relationship has b
differences between Suharto and th
members of parliament have begun
ously, for example by questioning
said, popular and parliamentary
been relatively restrained and we
effect has been that the constitutio
ritual quality. It has served to va
obliging the government in any p
norms of democratic accountabili
Suharto has insisted on exercising
constraints until his term expires. O
is drawing near does he feel obli
his stewardship to the next

in principle, then withhold
Suharto's style of leadership le

exercise of power in Indonesi
tionalism facilitates Suharto'
a military establishment in w
ical entitlement and central
in Indonesia's experience of n
no confidence in the compete
state-building role as critical
beyond the conventional resp
decade following independe
This claim
functio to a dual
introduction of Sukarno's au
which replaced parliamentar
that system collapsed and wa
Suharto, dual function came
of the military increasingly
bureaucratic, and diplomatic
Suharto, a retired general w
of support, has protected th
Although Suharto has undou
the armed forces, which hav
that generalization requires som
have never exhibited perfect u
rivalries and factionalism ba
military function. Sukarno e
own political advantage. Sinc
ever, those differences have be
more professional and as succ
nated in the importance of
corporate and national inter
There is no way of being ab
a whole would behave in a d
succession. Of importance wo
would be a contentious facto
believed he was either servin
The issue has been put in these

appeared to have consolidated his
less dependent on direct military
has been able to determine the n
as reflected in his controversial c
vice-president in March 1988, a c
military sentiment.8
An alternative view of Indonesia
stitutionalism and the practice of
for military rule during the Suhart
for exercising personal power. Str
semblance of institutionalizatio
modern-day version of the tradition
trated in the hands of a king-lik
In such a polity, prearranged suc
cess because of the presumed div
dent rules in the style and mann
be reluctant to appoint a political
create an alternative locus of pow
lished political order. Although S
he has told close confidants that
solidation of position were the re
nally deferential to Islamic intere
cultural values, including mystic
At issue as the Suharto era draw
in sight is the extent to which th
politics constitute competing forc
genuinely constitutional and plura
tion because political demobilizati
has been so successful and becaus
remain united over the principle
tics as too important a matter to
Two other factors also probably c

office: concern for his family an
has been marked by the constructio
ture of patronage and by the con
conspicuously indulged his family
business partners. This pract

country's economic achievem
family and the "conglomerate
enterprises. In an attempt to
called on ethnic Chinese to tra
to cooperatives run by indig
What has come to distinguis
extent to which his indulgen
senior members of the officer
have been pursued is a politic
he does not appear to appreci
questioning of the business ro
lenge to his political authorit
become relevant to the politi
Although none of Suharto's son
and could therefore be consi
his sons, daughters, and othe
sion to Indonesian politics. In
Arismunandar, has been mad
appointment as head of Kost
former aide, Brig. Gen. Kent
of the Jakarta garrison.
This convergence of family i
vant to the succession question.
on whom he dotes, to encour
capable of exercising it to their
because his family's economi
shared concern about protecting
tial power. Related to that co
for the physical security of t
in the future as old scores ar
These considerations are like
retiring from high office unt
can be provided through a po
is also reluctant to leave offic
the correct version of his his
has let it be known that he reg
from political and economic c
appropriately grateful and cer
activities, which, according to Su

well-being.
Suharto's own view of his place in history was apparent in an autobiog-
raphy published in April 1989.9 One student of his rule has said that this
book reveals Suharto's conceited, mean-spirited, graceless, and insecure
side.10 A striking feature of the autobiography is his defense of the eco-
nomic indulgences of his six children and his unwillingness to acknowl-
edge any contribution to his New Order by other leading Indonesians,
in particular members of the military. This self-centered attempt to rewrite
the historical record has embittered some senior and retired officers, who
now feel that Suharto has increasingly used and abused the armed forces
for the benefit of himself and his family. That discontent was manifest
in an August 1990 petition signed by 58 prominent Indonesians, including
retired generals, who called on Suharto to give up office in March 1993. "
Suharto's unprecedented tenure in office and the skill with which he
has managed all political challenges have clearly engendered in him a great
deal of hubris. Encouraging Suharto in his obduracy, despite evident
disaffection within the military establishment, is a vivid memory of the
last and only other Indonesian experience of political succession. Sukarno
was politically dispossessed, and his historical reputation as a nationalist
leader was subsequently besmirched. His family and his political associates
were stripped of their wealth; some were put on trial and sentenced to
prison and death. The example of Sukarno's fate bolsters Suharto's reluc-
tance to give up office until he can be assured that he will not meet a
similar fate.
Over the years Suharto has taken steps to reinstate Sukarno's reputa-
tion. He sanctioned the construction of a tomb over his grave site, accorded
him and former vice president Hatta the title of "proclamators" of inde-
pendence, and named Jakarta's international airport after them. It would
seem that Suharto is haunted by the specter of Sukarno's historical fate
and has sought to make amends for his own role in that episode by
propitiating his immortal spirit.
Ironically, in his attempt to avoid Sukarno's fate, Suharto may be ensuring

a similar one for himself. His greatest problem is that time is running
out, and his support from the military, which has been the key to his polit-
ical power, is eroding. Suharto has responded by trying to rise above the
military by wielding power without consulting the armed forces. His insis-
tence on having Lieutenant-G

in March 1988, despite oppositi
example.
Sudharmono, a retired soldier, was not regarded as a representative of
military interests. A lawyer by training, he had been influential as state
secretary and also as general chairman of Golkar; his tenure in both posts
was perceived by members of the armed forces to be against their interests.
(As state secretary, he controlled the allocation of funds, and as general
chairman, he appeared to be building a civilian power base.) While his
candidacy was clearly opposed by the armed forces faction within the
People's Consultative Assembly, the issue was not pressed to the point
of confrontation. Nonetheless, it added to the tension caused by the ear-
lier removal from office of Gen. Benny Moerdani, the commander of the
armed forces.
Moerdani was removed not long after his term had been extended for
a year and in advance of the regular cabinet reshuffle that followed the
re-election of the president in 1988. Moerdani is a distinguished soldier
with both field and intelligence experience whose loyalty to the president
had been thought rock-solid. Indeed, he owed his more recent military
career to presidential favor. Their relationship had a father-son quality
to it, but had become strained because of Moerdani's attempt to warn
Suharto about the adverse political consequences of his indulging his venal
family.
As a Catholic with a German grandparent, Moerdani has been ruled
out as a presidential contender. Nevertheless, he does command consider-
able respect as a soldier and had been influential in military appointments.
Suharto kept him in the government, giving him the post of minister of
defense. (The position did not grant him operational control of the mili-
tary, however.) Although a member of the cabinet, Moerdani has become
increasingly outspoken in his calls for political change. For example, in
a May 1990 speech in \bgyakarta, he is said to have made it clear that
he favored a change of leadership at the end of Suharto's current term
in 1993.12
Working to Suharto's advantage is the military establishment's evident
concern over the prospect of a breakdown of order caused by internecine
strife. Irrespective of personal and factional differences, the Indonesian
officer corps has sustained a strong sense of corporate identity. Corporate
interest, of course, is not necessarily the same as national interest- with
the doctrine of dual function a case in point. However, the senior echelons
of the armed forces appear to be governed by an awareness of the necessity
of restraint so as to avoid the vi

succession.
Ideally the officer corps would
1993 in favor of an acceptable s
compromise alternative would
another term of office, but wit
within the military establishme
armed forces. The conventional
vice-president and eventual su
incumbent commander of the a
president and is well known for hi
He is also known to be close to Moe
ring to his seniority and greate
to be acceptable to the orthodox
been increasing in Indonesia.
The difficulty with this scenar
the military establishment, it may
Tri is an engineering officer a
experience. He is also thought t
spirit,especially when it comes
the military establishment may
not. Loyalty is not the issue. Suh
a concern that he would not be a
reputation and his family's wealt
office.
Suharto, like Indonesia, continues to confound critics. In March 1966,

there was no expectation that a barely known soldier would be able to
consolidate power, let alone exercise it without serious challenge for a
quarter of a century. Suharto's system of rule combines personal and institu-
tional factors, but the personal would seem to be the more important.
Indeed, Indonesia's constitutional apparatus has a camouflage-like quality
that lends legitimacy to the exercise of personal power.
Suharto has amassed his enormous personal power with the support
of the armed forces, which have been employed as an instrument for
intimidating civilian political groups, including parties from the Sukarno
era, and have been decisive in molding Indonesia's political system. While
the military has backed Suharto's management of Indonesia's political and
economic order, the question

indefinitely. The armed forc
institution. Political successi
of its senior echelons and the e
purpose in keeping Indones
by Suharto since the mid-19
Although the armed forces
sign that the military establ
in the political sphere, which
Accordingly, the armed forces
in political succession. The k
lie in the choice of a vice-presi
fail to act in a politic manne
prospect could arise of some
with the key consideration b
vails. The stakes will be very
an important change in the
probably close ranks in the fac
in part because Suharto refu
of political succession, raisin
Suharto may well confound
tive initiative, of which he h
The political stability and ec
willingness and ability to act
and Indonesia, it may expo
ephemeral rather than an en
able economic achievements
Notes
1 Sec Professor Juwono Sudarson

1990.
2 Address to parliament on August 16, 1969, reprinted in The Indonesian Review of
International Affairs (Jakarta), July 1970.
3 For an incisive account of Indonesia's recent economic progress, see Eugene B. Mihaly,
"Indonesia: A New Dragon?" The World Today, August-September 1990.
4 Jakarta Post, August 18, 1990.
5 For a discussion of this dimension of

Factor in Indonesia's Foreign Policy: A C
ed., Islam in Foreign Policy (Cambridg
6 See The Indonesian Observer, Augu
7 For an excellent assessment of the nat
tary Ascendancy and Political Culture
Ohio University, 1989).
8 For an informed analysis of changing
Civilian Relations in Indonesia in the L
1 (1988).
9 Suharto, My Thoughts, Words and Deeds (Jakarta: P. T. Citra Lamtero, Gung Persada,
1989).
10 Sec David Jenkins, Sydney Morning Herald, July 4, 1989.
11 Sec an account by Reuters in The Straits Times (Singapore), August 15, 1990. The epi-
sode was not reported by Indonesia's press.
12 See Michael Vatikiotis, "A Stir in the Ranks," Far Eastern Economic Review, July 5,
1990.

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Uncertainty in Indonesia

Author(s): Michael Leifer

Michael Leifer is a professor of international relations at the London School

Even if Suharto should secur

Suharto is believed to be motiv

Indonesia's first decade and a ha

unknown outside of Indonesia. W

of his predecessor. Indeed, he has

Although Indonesia has ge

to a degree. The reforms were int

Although Indonesia's econom

zone guaranteed by the major wo

a settlement finally seeme

Should Indonesia become chair, Suharto would find himself p

tions, making it more difficult

Despite Suharto's impressive eco

outburst of Islamic dissatisfa

Although Indonesia's bureauc

public statements in favor of greate

his stewardship to the next

Suharto's style of leadership le

The issue has been put in these

Two other factors also probably c

business partners. This pract

activities, which, according to Su

Ironically, in his attempt to avoid Sukarno's fate, Suharto may be ensuring

tence on having Lieutenant-G

of restraint so as to avoid the vi

Suharto, like Indonesia, continues to confound critics. In March 1966,

economic order, the question

1 Sec Professor Juwono Sudarson

5 For a discussion of this dimension of

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