The Concept of "System" in International Relations Theory

Author(s): Jay S. Goodman

Source: Background, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Feb., 1965), pp. 257-268
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association
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THE CONCEPT OF "SYSTEM" IN INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS THEORY

Jay S. Goodman
Wilson Dissertation Fellow
Department of Political Science
Brown University

Writers attempting to build a theoretical framework for the

discipline of international relations often attribute multiple mean-
ings to all-inclusive concepts. "Power" is one such term; "balance
of power" is another. In the cases of "power" and "balance of
power," however, scholarly efforts have been devoted to making
clear the multiple usages of the terms at both the textbook and
more advanced levels (Morgenthau, 1960, p. l67f; Haas, 1961;
Claude, 1962). One concept which has not received such clarifica-
tion and which does have more than one usage in the literature is
"system."

It is not the purpose of this paper to analyze the validity of the

concept of "system" in any of its usages. Students of international
relations can hardly fail to be impressed with the potential fruit-
fulness of the idea of "system" in the two usages of it which
possess theoretical implications. The premise of this paper is,
rather, that in a developing discipline one should heed the advice
of Max Weber (1949, pp. 13-14): the concern for clarity must be
paramount. And the concept of "system" has not always been used
either with consistency or with clarity in the research of our field.
The aim of this effort is to perform a constructive rescue job on the
concept of "system," so that it will not become a term shedding
more smoke than light on the nature of international politics.

I. Three Usages of "System"

Three major usages of "system" can be gleaned from the works

of scholars in international relations. There can be, of course, no
objections to scholarly utilization of one hundred operating defi-
nitions so long as each author makes evident precisely how he is
using the term in each instance and so long as there are no unan-

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nounced transitions from one meaning to another in order to resolve
semantically irresolvable problems of complex data. The major
usages are as follows. Usage One is System-as-Description. In
Usage One, "system" refers to an arrangement of the actors of
international politics in which interactions are patterned and identi-
fiable. Usage Two is System-as-Explanation. In Usage Two, "system"
refers to a particular arrangement in which the nature of the ar?
rangement makes // the major variable to be considered in explain-
ing the behavior of the actors in the international arena. Usage
Three is System-as-Method. In Usage Three, "system" refers to the
application of special types of approaches, methodologies, or analy?
tical concepts to the data of international politics. Usage One is a
descriptive employment of the term "system;" Usages Two and
Three, in contrast, possess important theoretical implications for the
discipline.

Elaboration and illustration may make the three usages clearer.

System-as-Description is embodied in James M. Rosenau's (1961,
p. 77) observation that ". . . a system is considered to exist in an
environment and to be composed of parts which, through inter?
action, are in relation to each other. Consequently, a system has a
structure and encompasses processes through which it is either sus-
tained or changed." There are in Usage One regular and identifi-
able patterns of action. Thus authors refer, in this usage, not only
to "the international system," but to particular "systems." John H.
Herz (1961) writes of "collective security" "systems;" George
Liska (1957) of "systems" of equilibrium. And Morton A. Kaplan
(1957) has constructed models of six different types of international
"systems." Each is, at the minimum, using Usage One of "system."
It is assumed, as Kaplan (1961, p. 343) points out, that "... some
pattern of repeatable or characteristic behavior does occur ..."

System-as-Description possesses no theoretical implications by

itself; that is, no commitments as to the causal factors in inter?
national behavior necessarily follow from Usage One. This is not
to say that theory cannot follow upon the description of a particular
"system" in the Usage One meaning. But Usage One of "system"
contains no built-in cues as to how causal influences are to be allo-
cated. Description may lead to theory, but there are no theoretical
propositions which automatically follow in any way from System-as-
Description. The crucial difference between Usage One and Usage
Two is that the latter makes a positive identification of the major
variable determining international behavior. Thus, System-as-Ex-

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planation considers the arrangement of the actors itself to be the
most important among the possible causal factors in structuring
international behavior, whereas Usage One implies no such weight-
ing of casual factors. All Usage Two's are Usage One's, but not all
Usage One's are Usage Two's.

Usage Two possesses theoretical implications precisely because

it stresses the causal importance of the arrangement itself. System-
as-Explanation utilizes the concept of "system" to refer to an
arrangement among the actors in which the nature of that arrange?
ment makes it the most critical variable affecting international rela?
tions. Thus, Kenneth Waltz argues that in the structure of the
contemporary state "system" itself lies the source of major phenom?
ena of international behavior such as war. System-as-Explanation
is the equivalent of Waltz's "Third Image." Waltz (1959, p. 159)
presents his "Third Image" in this manner:

With many sovereign states, with no system of law enforceable

among them, with each state judging its grievances and ambitions
according to the dictates of its own reason or desire?conflict,
sometimes leading to war, is hound to occur.2

Scholarly usage of System-as-Explanation can be further illus?

trated. Some of Kaplans propositions clearly imply an acceptance
of Usage Two of "system." An example might be that in the loose
bipolar system, "all bloc actors are to increase their capabilities in
relation to those of the opposing bloc." (Kaplan, 1957, p. 38). In
addition, he refers to game theory in his book, it appears, partially
because the rules and play of mathematical games stimulate the
manner in which the "system" (Usage Two) extant at a given
time in international politics imposes itself upon the choice and
execution of the strategies available to the actors. Two other
examples may serve as final illustrations of System-as-Explanation.
Consider Kenneth Boulding's statement (1962, p. 273):
Under these circumstances, the problem of conditional viability
becomes of great interest, for the question whether we can continue
to have a world of independent states or whether sovereignty, by
the sheer logic of international systems, will have to be surrendered,

'For a similar but not identical approach to System-as-Explanation, one which stresses
patterns of interaction, see Charles A. McClelland (1960), particularly p. 324 and
pp. 327-328.
2Italics added. Waltz makes clear that the "Third Image" does not necessarily explain
the particular causes of a specific war.

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 by agreement, as we hope, or by conquest, as we fear, now resolves
itself largely into the possibility of a system of conditional viability.3

And consider Charles McCielland's statement (1961a, p. 202):

Since both principal actors occupy similar positions and experience

similar difficulties, they might drift gradually toward collaboration,
except that such a movement is blocked by the essential conflict
structure of the international systern.A

Authors utilize Usage Three of "system" to refer to particular

approaches, methodologies, or analytical concepts used to structure
or order the data of international politics. Thus McClelland refers to
General Systems Theory as a "form" of dealing with problems of
"organized complexity" (1960, p. 328). Kaplan (1957) and Arthur
L. Burns (1961) use the mathematical tools of game theory. In
addition, the particular "systems" utilized in System-as-Method are
often drawn from other disciplines and applied to international
politics. McCielland's (I96lb) homeostatic equilibrium "system"
concept comes from biology; George Liska (1957) derives his
concept of equilibrium "systems" from economics; and R. N. Rose?
crance (1963) finds "systems" in mechanics analagous to those
of politics.

In any utilization of Usage Three of "system," the focus of

the approach, methodology, or concept may be upon any aspect
of the data of international politics. The focus may be upon ar?
rangements of actors, interaction of actors, or recurring patterns
of individual behavior within an actor-state. The focus may be
upon causal factors or upon classification. The focus may be all-
inclusive, macroanalysis of an international "system" (Usage One),
or limited, microanalysis of a sub-"system" (Usage One).

It is difficult to determine if System-as-Method constitutes a

distinct "school" within the discipline of International Relations
because of the variety of foci and the variety of approaches, method?
ologies, and concepts subsumed under it. Clearly, users of other
methods such as the comparative or historical method could employ
the concept of "system" in its Usage Three meaning. It would
appear that the characteristics of a separate System-as-Method
school would be an emphasis upon whole "systems" (Usage One)
as a starting point for scholarly analysis and upon concepts or tools
3ItaIics added.
4Italics added.

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for analysis which have originated in other disciplines and which
may be useful within International Relations. One surveying the
literature would be more inclined to conclude that there is a gen?
eral "systems" approach (Usage Three) than that there is a uni-
versally accepted and verified general "systems" theory (Usage
Two). And within the "approach," the tools used also vary greatly.

There are two ways in which difficulties arise in the use of

"system" in the literature. First, an author may fail to specify
which definition he is using. In this instance, where Usage One and
Usage Two are concerned, the term may become the means by
which the writer conceals a lack of clarity in his treatment of the
material. Ambiguity is the consequence. Seeond, the author may
accept the theoretical implications of Usage Two and Usage Three
but fail to keep the assumptions necessary to each separate in his
own thinking and the implications of each separate in his work. The
consequence in this instance is confusion. Such ambiguity and con-
fusion in the use of "system" do present problems in the literature,
and it is to these that we now turn.

II. Problems in the Utilization of "System" in International

Relations Theory

It is not the purpose of this paper to be exhaustive, but rather

to be illustrative. The problems in the utilization of Usage One
and Usage Two, System-as-Description and System-as-Explanation,
are ones of ambiguity. Inis L. Claude's work may serve as an ex?
ample. Claude (1962, pp. 25-37) has been highly critical of Hans
J. Morgenthau's usage of the concept of "balance of power,"
charging the latter with ambiguity in order to conceal shifts in
meaning in handling data. Yet in his own prize-winning book,
Power and International Relations, Claude frequently uses the term
"system," always without definition. It is thus rendered very difficult
for the reader to distinguish what Claude means to say in certain
instances. A selection from his work may illustrate the problem:

All this does not mean that the balance of power can be dismissed
as an outmoded system, a replica of the past which is already
tending to become a mere historical curiosity. For the balance of
power system is not one which exists only if instituted by deliberate
choice; rather it is the system unless and until superseded by a
consciously elected alternative. Given a pattern of independent
states existing in mutual contact and relationship, those states
manipulate the distribution of power among themselves, and share

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 in the decentralized management of the system in the absence of an
institution equipped to exercise central direction. Twentieth century
efforts to replace the system have at most introduced modifications
of its operative mechanism; today the balance of power system exists
by default (Claude, 1962, p. 93).5

The meaning of Claude's paragraph is altered if one substitutes

Usage One and Usage Two of "system" each time he refers to
the term; the differences in implications becloud the explication
which Claude is attempting. Is the "balance of power" arrange?
ment among nations simply a particular describable pattern of
interactions?Usage One? Or is it an arrangement which is itself
the most important variable in determining certain phenomena of
international politics?Usage Two ? A close look at part of the cited
quote from Claude (1962, p. 93) would indicate that the latter
condition is indeed the case in his mind:

Given a pattern of independent states existing in mutual contact

and relationship, those states manipulate the distribution of power
among themselves, and share in the decentralized management of
the system m the absence of an institution equipped to exercise
central direction.6

If indeed Claude is using System-as-Explanation, then the prin?

cipal phenomena which the "system," Usage Two, appears to deter?
mine in his analysis are its own perpetuation and the limits of the
control available to the state-actors. Yet without making clear
which usage of "system" he is utilizing in his analysis, Claude
cannot resolve that problem which appears to be most important
in his discussion: what is the relative weight to be assigned to the
influence of the actors and what is the relative weight to be assigned
to the arrangement of the actors as causal factors in international
politics? If Claude is in fact accepting Usage Two of System, the
reader can draw one conclusion from his argument; but since he does
not make his definition of "system" explicit and since he does talk
about the ability of the states to "manipulate" and exercise "manage?
ment" of the "system," one cannot be sure at all of his meaning.
It is not that Claude is trying to resolve the "level of analysis"
problem; it is the case that his unclear use of the concept of "system"
puts him in the position of attempting to assess variables without
establishing a clear personal focus in terms of "level of analysis."7

5Italics added.
6Italics added.
7See J. David Singer, 1961, particularly pp. 80-81. For an effort at bridging the
perspective of the two levels of analysis, see James N. Rosenau, 1963.

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 Claude's difficulty is a fundamental one in international rela?
tions theory. Weighing the relative influence of the actors vis a vis
the arrangement of the actors in any particular "system" (Usage
One) cannot fail to be difficult and complicated. But is it possible
at all without a clear usage of "system"? System-as-Description
makes no commitment to an answer; System-as-Explanation makes
a very definite commitment to an answer, although to only one of
the possible ones. In Claude, the term "system" lacks precision and
theoretical utility. Has Claude utilized "system" ambiguously in
order to resolve his theoretical difficulties by semantics?

The problems in the utilization of Usage Two and Usage Three

are ones of confusion between phenomena and method. Authors
claim that they are introducing a methodology, but what they may
be doing is accepting the implications of Usage Two, System-as-
Explanation, either intentionally or unintentionally. System-as-
Method often contains unstated assumptions which impose a type
of determinism on the behavior of the international actors; behavior
is not structured by the nature of the international "system" (Usage
Two), but descriptions of behavior are structured by the analytical
tool of "system" (Usage Three). Some types of "systems analysis"
(Usage Three) thus force international politics to be viewed as a
"system" in the meaning of Usage Two because of the nature of
the tools rather than the nature of the arrangement.8 It may be
true that international relations should be visualized as a "system"
(Usage Two) in which the nature of the arrangement is the major
determinant of actor behavior. But if this is the case, it will have to
be proved by argument and evidence; it should not be imposed
arbitrarily on raw evidence by the choice of a particular methodology.
It is possible that such wrenching practices are the source of Stanley
Hoffmann's objections to the whole "systems" (Usage Three)
approach.9

8To the degree that System-as-Method is an approach to international politics taking

"whole systems" (Usage One) as a point of emphasis and a point of departure,
problems of this kind may develop. Thus Singer (1961, p. 80) says of the "system-
oriented model": . . . it tends to lead the observer into a position which exaggerates
the impact of the system upon the national actors and, conversely, discounts the
impact of the actors on the system."

9See Stanley Hoffmann (1960). It is not the purpose of this paper to consider the
validity of the concept of "system" in any of its usages. Hoffmann, on the other
hand, does seriously question the validity of the use of "systems" (Usage Three) in
theory in the field. A personal judgment of this author would be that the "systems"
approaches (Usage Three) are a very exciting step in the right direction as opposed to
a "huge misstep."

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 Morton A. Kaplan's work may serve as one example of diffi?
culties that arise in the usage of System-as-Explanation and System-
as-Method. His System and Process in International Politics is a
complicated effort to build models of types of international "sys?
tems" (Usage One). A large portion of his book is devoted explicitly
to an effort to delineate causal factors in situations in international
politics. At the onset, Kaplan lists the essential and transformation
rules for each of his international arrangements. In some proposi-
tions he appears to emphasize the "system" (Usage Two); in
others, he stresses the importance of the internal arrangements of
particular actors.

Kaplan does not make clear, however, what the source of

each of his rules is. The reader experiences difficulty in apprehend-
ing the source of Kaplan's rules because Kaplan adopts, or appears
to adopt, a particular type of "systems analysis" (Usage Three) as
part of his methodology for determining these rules. Game theory
seems to have been the derivation of at least some of Kaplan's
propositions. In the case of each rule, the reader can deduce that it
may have been formulated in one of several ways. First, Kaplan
may assume the validity of Usage Two of "system." If he does, then
the rules may either have been conceived in his own mind as logi-
cally deriving from his acceptance of System-as-Explanation, or
they may follow from experiments in game theory which he has
chosen as his method because of his assumption of the validity of
Usage Two of "system," or they may come partially from each
source. Second, Kaplan (1957, p. 4) may simply be describing pat?
terns of action which he discerns in possible arrangements of inter?
national actors. If he is, then the rules may either have been con?
ceived from a pattern in his own mind, or they may have been
derived from game theory, or they may come partially from each
source. Third, Kaplan may have derived his rules from experiments
in game theory without any prior commitment to either a purely
descriptive or any particular causal explanation. If he did, then it
must be kept in mind that the implications of game theory are such
as to give a built-in credence to a System-as-Explanation vision of
the causal factors of international politics.10

Confusion as to the course of Kaplan's rules has theoretical

importance. If Kaplan has assumed Usage Two of "system" or if
he has chosen his form of "systems analysis" because it gives a
10Waltz (1959, p. 204) recognizes explicitly the similarity between his "Third
Image" and the implications of game theory.

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built-in prejudice in favor of such a System-as-Explanation vision
of international politics, then his method loses its utility for testing
the validity of the causal importance of a "system" in the Usage
Two meaning. Such is especially the case in the absence of an
explicit effort to somehow compensate for the possible built-in
consequences of the method so as to make it a commitment-free
analytical tool. Kaplan's work seems to contain an unstated series
of relationships between discovery of propositions about behavior
and methodology, between acceptance of System-as-Explanation and
utilization of System-as-Method. Yet the very theoretical usefulness
of System-as-Method lies in its potentiality as a neutral device for
testing propositions about international behavior.

It is conceivable that there can be no commitment-free usage of

System-as-Method, or indeed of any method in the sociai sciences.
All theoretical methods or orientations involve assumptions of some
sort; this fact does not constitute an argument against the use or
development of theory. It does constitute an argument for full
awareness and explicit statement of all premises, and for clarity in
the use of concepts involving such assumptions. All methods in
international politics involve some assumptions. An ideological
orientation, for example, involves suppositions about the influence
of values on human behavior. An orientation towards national
character involves postulates about the influence of cultural char?
acteristics on group behaior. But these last two methods are hardly
methods in the scientific sense: they are eclectic and influence is
allocated according to the predilections of the observer. These
methods are not usually subject to replication. System-as-Method,
however, purports to be a scientific approach to politics, and thus
must be judged by the internal canons of science. In such a method,
tricky built-in tendencies to bias are less condonable and more to
be guarded against than they would be in a method accepting lower
goals.

And System-as-Method does seem to carry with it the problem

of obtaining, even as an unintended consequence of such a choice
of tools, the implications of Usage Two of "system." Another illus-
tration may clarify this difficulty. R. N. Rosecrance (1963, p. 223)
in his Action and Reaction in World Politics utilizes one type of
"systems analysis" (Usage Three). He draws analogies for his
analyses of international "systems" (Usage One) from the model
"system" of a hot water heater. International "systems" (Usage
One) may indeed operate like hot water heaters, but the choice of
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this particular model imposes certain conditions on the data that
makes his "system" (Usage One) appear as a "system" (Usage
Two).
Rosecrance argues that international disturbances can be reduced
by increasing the variety of moves available to the regulator (the
heater). It is true that water heater difficulties may be alleviated by
increasing the number of pipes. If international politics resembles
the heater, however, then Rosecrance has a "system" in the meaning
of Usage Two. The nature of the arrangement, i.e., into a proto-
heater, makes the "variety" of choices available to the regulator
the variable which is the primary determinant of the outcome of
the strategies of the actors. His choice of a type of "systems analysis"
(Usage Three) seems to force his data to be viewed from a System-
as-Explanation perspective. Yet in his conclusion, Rosecrance (1963,
pp. 304-306) explicitly rejects just such a System-as-Explanation
interpretation of international politics.

III. Conclusions

At the onset of this paper it was stated as a basic premise th

clarity must be a paramount consideration in the development
theory for the discipline. This paper has illustrated some of th
problems in current usages of the concept of "system"; the delinea
tion of the three Usages may open some paths to the elimination o
certain ambiguities and confusions in the future. Usage On
System-as-Description possesses no significant theoretical impli
tions. The theoretical importance of the concept of "system" l
in Usage Two, System-as-Explanation, and Usage Three, System-
Method.

Usage Two refers to a situation in which the nature of the

arrangement among international actors is the primary determina
of behavior and the outcome of behavior among those actors. If th
existence and causal nature of "system" in the meaning of Usa
Two can be firmly established, then the concept in this usage w
become crucial to all understanding of international politics.
different ways, the work of Waltz and Kaplan undertakes to prov
the validity of the concept of System-as-Explanation. When it
demonstrated, logically or empirically, that there is an operat
international "system" (Usage Two), the next step will be to g
from the general case to propositions about the probability of spe

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cific acts in international politics. Surely this is being attempted
now. The concept of "system" as it is in Usage Two becomes the
potential theoretical key to unlocking the source of some of the
complicated interactions of international politics.

Usage Three, System-as-Method, possesses theoretical signifi?

cance because it represents the research frontier of our discipline.
Utilizing tools not originally developed in or for political science,
those researchers working with System-as-Method are, whatever the
outcome of their efforts, charting new paths in the study of inter?
national politics. In utilizing the tools of simulation, for example,
a type of experimentation with the possibilities of international
"systems" in the meaning of either Usage One or Usage Two be?
comes feasible. Such "laboratory" activity can hardly be accom-
plished in any other way in the field of international politics. Appli?
cation of game theory clearly has potential usefulness in the area of
international conflict. The possibility of testing propositions with
the methods of simulation and game theory cannot fail to have
implications for the pace of development of theory. Further, the
concept of a new form of approaching data contains potential fruit-
fulness.

Whatever the eventual outcome of attempts to develop theory

by the use of System-as-Method, the student of international rela?
tions will await hopefully future developments in the use of the
concept of "system." He will be particularly hopeful about the
possibility of achieving clarity in its usage.

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<^fc>

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