NIGERIAN

COUNTERTERRORIS
MS’ POLITICAL
ECONOMY
Srijan Vaish
POLSICI 2245E
1/4/23
 1

Introduction
Academic literature has aided the effectiveness of Nigerian counterterrorism against

Boko Haram insurgency through the analysis of the factors that helped Boko Haram take

root. A general conclusion was that the group exploited existing political and socioeconomic

issues, such as corruption, poor governance, poverty, hunger, and lack of education and

employment to gain support in the region especially among the youth.1 To end the

insurgency, the Nigerian government has primarily relied on hard counterterrorism measures 2,

such as the use of force against Boko Haram; however, this has been largely ineffective. 3

Although there is a sufficient amount of academic literature on insurgency and various

aspects of counterterrorism, the composition of Nigerian counterterrorism still requires

research.4 This research would contribute to the examination of the composition's

implications for Nigerian security policy. The ineffectiveness of counterterrorism strategies

and policies even after 14 years, despite claims of empirical analysis on the strategies and

their outcomes, indicates the need for this research and raises the question of the role of

government and other military officials in developing such strategies. Before the insurgency,

bad governance and corruption were Nigeria's biggest problems 5, which is why there is

1
Beatrice E. Awortu, “Boko Haram Insurgency and the Underdevelopment of Nigeria,” Research on
Humanities and Social Sciences 5, no. 6 (2015): pp. 213-220, 217; Olaniyi Evans and Ikechukwu Kelikume,
“The Impact of Poverty, Unemployment, Inequality, Corruption and Poor Governance on Niger Delta Militancy,
Boko Haram Terrorism and Fulani Herdsmen Attacks in Nigeria,” International Journal of Management,
Economics and Social Sciences 8, no. 2 (2019), https://doi.org/10.32327/ijmess/8.2.2019.5, 60.

2
Eugene Eji, “Rethinking Nigeria’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy,” The International Journal of
Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs 18, no. 3 (2016): pp. 198-220,
https://doi.org/10.1080/23800992.2016.1242278, 205.

3
Michael I. Ugwueze and Freedom C. Onuoha, “Hard versus Soft Measures to Security: Explaining the
Failure of Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Nigeria,” Journal of Applied Security Research 15, no. 4 (December
2020): pp. 547-567, https://doi.org/10.1080/19361610.2020.1811936, 558.

4
Kodili Henry Chukwuma, “Critical Terrorism Studies and Postcolonialism: Constructing Ungoverned
Spaces in Counter-Terrorism Discourse in Nigeria,” Critical Studies on Terrorism 15, no. 2 (November 2022):
pp. 399-416, https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2022.2048990, 400.

5
Evans and Kelikume, “Impact of Poverty, Unemployment, Inequality, Corruption and Poor
Governance,” 60.
 2

concern about their impact on Nigerian counterterrorism and a need for additional research.

This concern is supported by the existence of a political economy of violence and terrorism in

Nigeria that has the potential to have asymmetric benefits for a few individuals or groups

rather than having the intended benefit of aiding state efforts to end the insurgency and move

toward sustainable peace. Consequently, this essay contends that an asymmetric political

economy of violence and terrorism, as a result of the insurgency and its counterterrorism, has

contributed to the failure of the Nigerian state's response to Boko Haram. The lack of

transparency in the Nigerian government and its response to terrorism, as well as the absence

of accountability mechanisms, has kept this political economy afloat, as it provides those who

use it for their own benefit with nearly total impunity. Even though a lack of transparency and

accountability6 contributed to the failure of the state's response, its examination and analysis

are beyond the scope of this essay due to space restrictions.

The remainder of this research is organized as follows. Section I provides a brief

overview of the most recent empirical research on Nigeria's counterinsurgency and

counterterrorism response. Section II examines strategy formulation, budget allocation, and

implementation in anti-Boko Haram efforts. Section III looks at how strategy formulation,

budget allocation, and implementation affect the Nigerian military as an institution, with a

focus on counterterrorism efforts.

Exploitation of Political Economy in Nigeria

The rise of Boko Haram in the northeastern region has multiple causes. Sociological

explanations are crucial, as they explain why Boko Haram has neither been defeated nor

expanded its control to other regions of Nigeria. According to Rotberg (2004), the

6
Mohammed Nuruddeen Suleiman and Mohammed Aminul Karim, “Cycle of Bad Governance and
Corruption,” SAGE Open 5, no. 1 (January 2015): p. 215824401557605,
https://doi.org/10.1177/2158244015576053, 7; Habibu Yaya Bappah, “Nigeria's Military Failure against the
Boko Haram Insurgency,” African Security Review 25, no. 2 (November 2016): pp. 146-158,
https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2016.1151799, 150.
 3

combination of poverty, poor governance, and state failure fosters militancy and subsequent

instability.7 This explains why Boko Haram was able to exploit unemployment, poverty, 8

hunger, and a lack of education9 due to the region's severe underdevelopment relative to

other regions in order to gain support and recruit Nigerian youth to carry out attacks in their

country. Despite these sociological explanations, the Nigerian government's counterterrorism

responses are limited to harsh measures, such as the use of force. The Nigerian military is

superior to Boko Haram, but counterterrorism efforts have largely failed to put an end to the

fourteen year long insurgency causing widespread criticism10. In the academic literature on

Nigerian counterterrorism against Boko Haram, the need for soft measures is generally

recognised.11 These soft measures would eliminate support for organizations 12 and ensure

long-term peace after the insurgency is eradicated. Therefore, soft measures entail combining

hard measures with effective governance and political reforms to reverse Nigeria's historical,

social, and economic imbalances. This claim of a multifaceted and multi-casual

counterterrorism strategy that includes soft measures 13 is also supported by a dated logic,

which states that effective crime control depends on the support and cooperation of the

general public and that if the general public does not view authorities and laws as legitimate,
7
Suleiman and Karim, “Cycle,” 7.

8
Awortu, “Underdevelopment of Nigeria,” 215.

9
Oluwaseun Tella, “Boko Haram Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: The Soft Power Context,” Journal
of Asian and African Studies 53, no. 6 (February 2017): pp. 815-829,
https://doi.org/10.1177/0021909617739326, 819.

10
Tella, “Soft Power Context,” 825; Chukwuma, “Critical Terrorism Studies and Counter-Terrorism
Discourse in Nigeria,” 822;

11
Tella, “Soft Power Context,” 825; Chukwuma, “Critical Terrorism Studies and Counter-Terrorism
Discourse in Nigeria,” 400.

12
Tella, “Soft Power Context,” 825; Chukwuma, “Critical Terrorism Studies and Counter-Terrorism
Discourse in Nigeria,”826.

13
Adewunmi James Falode, “Hybrid Doctrine: The Grand Strategy for Counterinsurgency and
Counterterrorism Operations in Nigeria,” Defence Against Terrorism Review (DATR) 11, (July 2019):
7-31.  https://www.tmmm.tsk.tr/publication/datr/volumes/Datr_Vol.11.pdf, 25.
 4

they are less likely to defer to those authorities and laws. 14 Thus, soft measures are a pre-

condition for the success of Nigerian state response to Boko Haram. 

Government, other state institutions, and individuals or elites with political and

economic influence over state institutions, constitute a substantial portion of the Nigerian

political economy, as they control the formation and implementation of policies and budgets.

The composition of the Nigerian political economy is essential for studying the composition

of counterterrorism in order to comprehend how the influence of specific individuals on the

formulation of strategy and budget of counterterrorism measures impacts the success of these

efforts. Thus, research on composition would reveal how individuals with such influence

impede the defeat of Boko Haram. Due to the inadequacy of research in this instance 15, it is

challenging to quantify the extent of the influence. A lack of transparency, accountability, and

overt secrecy regarding counterterrorism strategies and budgets makes it nearly impossible to

measure and analyze quantifiable data, thereby necessitating additional research. This study

therefore focused on qualitative data rather than quantitative data.

The need to determine the extent to which the Nigerian government and military

officials (hereon state actors) and other private individuals with political and economic

considerations (private actors) present obstacles to counterterrorism efforts against the

insurgency stems from the widely acknowledged fact that government corruption and poor

governance plagued Nigerian society prior to the emergence of terrorism. The failure to

implement radical measures to eradicate these two obstacles from Nigerian society has

allowed terrorism to persist. Thus, it is not implausible that state and private actors in Nigeria

14
Friday Raphael Egbegi, Benjamin Okorie Ajah, and Chibuzor Ogbonnaya, “COMBATING BOKO
HARAM INSURGENCY THROUGH A SUPERIOR IDEOLOGY: THE ROLE OF THE
FEDEDERAL GOVERNMENT,” European Journal of Political Science Studies 1, no.2 (May 2018):
13-22, https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1244731

15
Chukwuma, “Counter-Terrorism Discourse in Nigeria,” 400.
 5

actively profit politically and monetarily from the country's ongoing violence and terror.

Comparatively, qualitative and limited quantitative evidence support this hypothesis.

Corruption and poor governance should be viewed as symbiotic, as they both benefit from

each other rather than harming one another. Concerning Nigeria's counterterrorism failures, it

is difficult to establish a causal link and the degree to which each factor contributes to the

failure of counterterrorism to end the Boko Haram insurgency is irrelevant.

In a nutshell, the failure of counterterrorism to defeat Boko Haram, the societal

challenges of poor governance and corruption call for an analysis of the motivations of

Nigerian state and private actors, who have a serious influence on counterterrorism efforts

and its outcomes against Boko Haram. This essay will therefore explore critically the

evidence of the presence of a political economy of war and terrorism, as well as its

asymmetric benefits for state and private actors. The essay will then analyze the precise

effects of this political economy on counterterrorism efforts against the insurgency.

How Are Nigerian State Actors Exploiting Political Economy?

Misallocation and Misuse of Funds
For counterterrorism to successfully end the insurgency, the government must allocate

funds and implement the strategy effectively and efficiently. Corruption and poor governance

in Nigeria impede the effective and efficient allocation of budgetary funds, thereby impeding

the success of Boko Haram counterterrorism measures. The lack of accountability and

transparency mechanisms to ensure the efficient use of budget allocations 16 further

contributes to the failure of government institutions. The most prominent example of this

scenario is approval of the security budget. A security vote is used to approve the budget in

order to maintain secrecy, through measures like limited public knowledge, over the budget

16
Suleiman and Karim, “Cycle,” 7; Bappah, “Military Failure,” 150; Michael Okwuchi Nwankpa, “The
Political Economy of Securitization: The Case of Boko Haram, Nigeria,” The Economics of Peace and Security
Journal 10, no. 1 (January 2015): 32-39, https://doi.org/10.15355/epsj.10.1.32, 35.
 6

and its use.17 The money spent by the Nigerian government since 2009 and the allocations to

the defence budget are enormous. Between 2011 and 2015, approximately 16 billion US

dollars were spent on counterterrorism18, and in 2014, the Nigerian defence budget comprised

20 percent of the national budget19. Since then, the defence budget has expanded due to

annual budget padding, in which extra items are added to the budget to ensure that there are

extra funds available for embezzlement during implementation20. Despite massive budget

allocations, the Nigerian government was unable to put an end to the insurgency. The

misallocation of funds is also inferred from claims regarding inappropriate budget items and

expenditures, as well as duplication of expenditures21 during budget implementation.

A qualitative study demonstrates that state actors use budget allocations for personal

use and the diversion of public resources for counterterrorism through kickbacks, fraudulent

payments, and no-bid contracts, which result in increased costs because these contracts are

awarded on the basis of political bias rather than merits. The same study also examines the

weak monitoring, controls, and audits in the Nigerian military or defence institution, which

enable the misallocation of funds because "various public scrutiny institutions, particularly

audit agencies, anti-corruption bodies, and Parliamentary Public Accounts Committees are

typically unwilling or prevented from investigating the military." 22 In this context, corruption

and poor governance, as well as a lack of accountability and transparency, are manifest in

17
Bappah, “Military Failure,” 150.

18
Eji, “Rethinking Strategy,” 204.

19
Bappah, “Military Failure,” 150.

20
Temitope Abiodun, Adepoju Asaolu, and Ifeanyichukwu Ndubuisi, “Defence Budget and Military
Spending on War against Terror and Insecurity in Nigeria: Implications for State Politics, Economy, and
National Security,” International Journal of Advanced Academic Research, July 2020, pp. 12-34,
https://doi.org/10.46654/ij.24889849.s6713, 27.

21
Abiodun, Asaolu, and Ndubuisi, “Defence Budget,” 24.

22
Abiodun, Asaolu, and Ndubuisi, “Defence Budget,” 24-26.
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Nigerian society, where government jobs, particularly those related to defence, have become

attractive.23 The ease of accumulating wealth has increased the popularity of politics in

general. One reason is that the members of the House of Representatives Committee on

Defence/Military Affairs have amassed wealth due to their political considerations while

overseeing military and security agency issues. Reportedly, the Nigerian government has

diverted funds for political campaigns, activities, and personal use.24 Colonel Sambo Dasuki,

the former National Security Adviser to former President Goodluck Jonathan, is an example

of funds being diverted for personal use25. 

The budget for counterterrorism efforts against the Boko Haram insurgency has not

been matched by the results. This concern is primarily attributable to fraudulent arms

purchases26 and misallocation of funds for the purchase of obsolete arms27. The lack of

transparency in Nigerian state institutions, including counterterrorism, is consistent with this

attribution. Modern weapons supported by cutting-edge technology would give the Nigerian

military an advantage over Boko Haram and hasten the conclusion of the war. Nevertheless,

the personal interests of former Nigerian military chiefs and politicians have taken

precedence, as they stole $15 billion through fraudulent arms procurement deals up until

201528. The study reveals that "fifty-five people, including military chiefs and political

appointees, have stolen over 1.3 trillion naira (US$6.8 billion) over seven years, while an
23
Abiodun, Asaolu, and Ndubuisi, “Defence Budget,” 27.

24
Abiodun, Asaolu, and Ndubuisi, “Defence Budget,” 27.

25
Abiodun, Asaolu, and Ndubuisi, “Defence Budget,” 27.

26
Bappah, “Military Failure,” 151; Daniel Kofi Banini, “Security Sector Corruption and Military
Effectiveness: The Influence of Corruption on Countermeasures against Boko Haram in Nigeria,” Small Wars
&Amp; Insurgencies 31, no. 1 (January 2019): pp. 131-158, https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2020.1672968,
149.
27
Abiodun, Asaolu, and Ndubuisi, “Defence Budget,” 24.

28
Victor Chidubem Iwuoha, “United States’ Security Governance in Nigeria: Implications on
Counterterrorism Strategies against Boko Haram,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 54, no. 8 (2019): pp.
1175-1194, https://doi.org/10.1177/0021909619862846, 1181.
 8

additional $2 billion was allegedly stolen from the National Security Budget under the watch

of the former National Security Adviser Colonel Sambo Dasuki." 29 Despite these concerns, it

is believed that USD 3.9 billion were spent on arms in Nigeria between 2014 and 2018 30,

including during the administrations of former President Jonathan and current President

Buhari. These allocations have specifically hindered counterterrorism efforts, as soldiers are

grossly underpaid and lack equipment and supplies. Thus, it is safe to conclude that

corruption or economic considerations have distorted the counterterrorism efforts against the

insurgency.

Ineffective strategy formulation and implementation

Effective implementation of good governance and anti-corruption legislation ensures that

counterterrorism against Boko Haram is effective and thriving due to the formulation and

implementation of effective strategies with the support of state institutions. In the case of

Nigeria, however, the formulation of counterterrorism policies has been ill-defined, reactive,

and ad hoc31, with weak institutional support, as there is no government ministry or agency

responsible for counterterrorism.32 Since 2009, the Nigerian National Assembly has been

ineffective in ensuring institutional support, as no agreement on the issue of a

ministry/agency in charge has been reached33. Consequently, there is no proper flow of

authority and responsibility, which becomes a breeding ground for corruption and further

poor governance as accountability and transparency become unthinkable. Unsatisfactory

strategy formulation is also exemplified by the expenditure of budget funds on office supplies

and services, building construction, and unnecessary international travel. According to a

29
Iwuoha, “Security Governance in Nigeria,” 1181.

30
Ugwueze and Onuoha, “Hard versus Soft,” 558.

31
Eji, “Rethinking Strategy,” 204.

32
Eji, “Rethinking Strategy,” 212.

33
Eji, “Rethinking Strategy,” 212.
 9

study of defence institutions, their primary obstacle is deteriorating infrastructure, inadequate

staffing, and a lack of funding, which hinders their ability to fulfill their responsibilities.34

Political elites of Northern Nigeria, who allegedly supported the insurgency 35, and

government officials in the administration of former Nigerian President Goodwill Jonathan,

who sabotaged government efforts because they supported Boko Haram, also impede the

effective implementation of strategies. However, the former president lacked the political will

to prosecute or remove them36. The lack of political will and inability to remove those

responsible for collaborating with the insurgency is another illustration of the deep roots of

corruption and poor governance in Nigerian institutions, which actively impedes the success

of counterterrorism.

This part of the section describes the political considerations of state and private actors in the

Nigerian political economy that have hindered the success of the state's response to end the

insurgency. Thus, this section successfully argues that a political economy of violence and

terrorism exists in the country. In addition to its exploitation by a few influential and

powerful individuals at the expense of society as a whole.

How does Exploitation Affect Nigerian State Response to Boko Haram?

Lack of good governance and corruption among state actors and influential private

individuals have also hampered efforts to end the insurgency in Nigeria on the ground. Due to

misallocation of funds during arms acquisition and fraudulent arms deals 37, the erosion of
34

Eji, “Rethinking Strategy,” 211.

35
Adeoye Afolabi, “Insurgency and Socio-Political Economy of Nigeria,” International Journal of
Development and Economic Sustainability 3, no.5 (October 2017): 61-74, http://www.eajournals.org/wp-
content/uploads/The-Insurgence-and-Socio-Political-Economy-In-Nigeria.pdf, 71.

36
Nwankpa, “Political Economy of Securitization,” 35.

37
Bappah, “Military Failure,” 149.
 10

military professionalism38, and low public confidence in the military and counterterrorism's

capacity to end insurgency39, efforts on the ground have failed. Low soldier morale is

detrimental to the success of on-the-ground operations as a result of these issues and the

general treatment of soldiers by high military officials and the government. If on-the-ground

operations fail and the counterterrorism strategy is dependent on their success, this indicates a

state failure.

Dilution of Professionalism in the Military

As a result of the state and private actors' lack of political will to end the insurgency,

the professionalism of the Nigerian military has diminished. This dilution is a result of their

use as political elites' police and security guards, which undermines their confidence and

hinders their ability to defeat Boko Haram. Due to the low level of public trust in the police,

the Nigerian military is responsible for maintaining law and order. 40 In light of the high

kidnapping rates, armed banditry, ritual killings, and theft, political elites have resorted to the

military for protection.41 Both of these instances demonstrate that the Nigerian government

has deliberately prevented the military from protecting the country from threats such as the

Boko Haram uprising. In this context, political economy has a cyclical effect on the military,

as counterterrorism has been ineffective due to state actors who seek to profit from the

insurgency. This has resulted in military soldiers being complicit with state actors, as they

have intimidated and coerced civilians into bribery at checkpoints 42, despite being victims of

bribery themselves.
38
Bappah, “Military Failure,” 155.

39
Afolabi, “Insurgency and Socio-Political,” 64.

40
ABDULRAHMA DAMBAZAU, “THE WEATHERHEAD CENTER PRESENTS... Nigeria and
Her Security Challenges,” Harvard International Review 35, no. 4 (2014): 65–70,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/43650245, 70

41
Bappah, “Military Failure,” 150.

42
Bappah, “Military Failure,” 150.
 11

Decline in Public Confidence

The disinformation efforts of the Nigerian government regarding the insurgency and

its counterterrorism efforts also reflect conscious efforts to portray their success in gaining

access to more international funds and assistance, so that state actors may further exploit

international financial assistance for their own personal gain. Several government claims

made to the public were determined to be false. The repeated assertion that Abubakar Shekau,

the leader of Boko Haram, had been killed later proved to be false.43 In another instance, the

military's denials that its fighter jets had crashed in territory held by the insurgents and that its

soldiers had fled to Cameroon were found to be false due to a video shot by the insurgents of

soldiers fleeing into Cameroon and the execution of a pilot.44 This harmed the credibility of

the military's information on their operation and, consequently, the public and international

community's opinion of the military. A subsequent quantitative study in 2014 in Nigeria

revealed that 45% of respondents believed the military to be corrupt, and 75% believed that

corruption in Nigeria had increased45. Therefore, there is a general opinion among the masses

supporting the inability of the military to end the insurgency. This has contributed to the

erosion of military’s capabilities as soldiers feel a loss of respect for them.

Decline in the Morale of Soldiers

The military's inability to end the insurgency due to dilution of professionalism and

fraudulent arms acquisition, as well as the decline in public confidence caused by the

dissemination of disinformation to protect their reputation, have contributed to a decline in

soldier morale. They are poorly armed, poorly compensated, and overworked, and many have

fled in the face of superior firepower and equipment. 46 A few individuals within the Nigerian
43
Bappah, “Military Failure,” 150.

44
Bappah, “Military Failure,” 150.

45
Bappah, “Military Failure,” 151.
46
Nwankpa, “Political Economy of Securitization,” 35; Abiodun, Asaolu, and Ndubuisi, “Defence
Budget,” 24.
 12

government and military institutions steal and divert budgeted funds and resources intended

for the general welfare of military personnel at the war fronts for their own personal use. 47

Inadequate policies and programs initiated and implemented by successive civilian and

military leadership only served to exacerbate and destroy the security situation in the country.

According to reports, daily allowances, medical evacuation, burial pay, and family allowance

were denied to soldiers.48 Additionally, there have been thefts involving the sale of raw food

and unit supplies.49 In light of the massive defence budget allocations discussed previously,

these incidents indicate theft and misallocation of funds for counterterrorism and soldiers.

The consistent denial of the general condition of Nigerian soldiers by high-ranking military

officials50 supports this claim. In addition, the funds were siphoned off by state and private

actors via fraudulent arms deals and other means. Former Nigerian military leaders and

politicians have stolen $15 billion through fraudulent arms procurement deals 51, revealing

patterns of misappropriation and siphoning of funds.

Conclusion
The misallocation of funds for personal gain and deliberate attempts not to implement

counterterrorism strategies illustrate how specific individuals in government, the military, and

state institutions with influence have distorted efforts to end the insurgency through

counterterrorism. In addition to delaying peace and post-conflict reconstruction, the

exploitation of this political economy illustrates the Nigerian government's ineffective

response to the Boko Haram threat. The deliberate failure of counterterrorism as a result of

the political economy's asymmetric benefit to a few influential and powerful individuals has
47
Abiodun, Asaolu, and Ndubuisi, “Defence Budget,” 25.

48
Iwuoha, “Security Governance in Nigeria,” 1181.

49
Iwuoha, “Security Governance in Nigeria,” 1181.

50
Bappah, “Military Failure,” 150.

51
Iwuoha, “Security Governance in Nigeria,” 1181.
 13

also led to the erosion of state institutions as well as public and international confidence in

Nigeria and its institutions. Even if Boko Haram is eliminated, it is necessary to eliminate

societal challenges in order to prevent the Nigerian state from being susceptible to further

instability, particularly during post-conflict reconstruction and the transition to peace. In

addition to ensuring transparency and accountability mechanisms, the administration of

President Muhammadu Buhari must implement radical reforms of state institutions.

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 14

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