PART ONE

I- TEN YEARS AFTER SERVAL FOR THE SURVIVAL OF MALI, By

TOUKO Arinte, Grenoble University Community, France

Today is the tenth anniversary of Operation Serval, which saw the deployment of French

forces in Mali to stop the advance of terrorists who had the capital Bamako in their sights.
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Ten years after the launch of this operation, relations between Mali and France have gone

from great love to mutual detestation. Why such a mess between two states that have a long

history of privileged partnership and whose peoples cherish each other through common life

projects such as mixed marriages, humanitarian and development projects. Many French

expatriates have dual nationality and vice versa.

To understand the decrescendo of this relationship between the two countries, it would be

necessary to diagnose the state of mind of the French forces that intervene most often in

Africa. Like any institution, the armies of all countries have traditions, models of strategy and

reference. Some French army corps have a colonial culture. They still have at their disposal

reminders of how to deal with the black man. These are often stereotypes that no longer

correspond to reality.

Moreover, these armies arrive on conquered ground. They arrive with the mentality of saviors

in the face of national armies completely lacking in the latest generation of war equipment.

And for good reason, according to the new military authorities in power in Mali, because the

former colonial power is using all its weight to prevent them from acquiring it in order to

better control them and thus remain indispensable. This is why any purchase of military

equipment must pass through the censorship of this former military power. And according to

the Malian military junta, even the overflight of their territory by the Malian national forces

must receive authorization from the French forces.

Thus the behavior of the French forces during their interventions obey these stereotypes.

When intervening in a country, for example, they know, according to their archives, which

people they can count on. These people having been in the past, notably during colonization,

collaborationists. Unfortunately the former collaborationists are considered traitors by their

own compatriots and are often watched like milk on the fire. This is the case of the Touaregs

of Mali, who have a favorable sympathy capital for the French armies and France in
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particular. One can understand why, perhaps, the sanctuarization of Kidal to prevent Malian

forces from retaliating against this collaborationist people of all stripes was the trigger for

animosity against France by the rest of Mali. This "collaborationist on all sides", because they

are in love with France and suspected by the authorities in Bamako of having allegiances to

certain Islamist groups against which the Malian authorities are fighting.

The French forces thus arrived in a pressure cooker ready to explode. If at first their

interposition between the loyalist forces and the presumed terrorists, among whom were

nomadic or sedentary peoples at odds with the central power, was a success. This strange war

could not last long enough for the authorities in Bamako, who could not tolerate this de facto

secession, which was taking away part of their territory and their potential natural resources.

II- TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY

1. The thorny case of Kidal

France has paid for its sanctuarization of Kidal. We remember the death of three French

journalists in this zone, which was supposed to be under the control of the joint French and

Kidal forces.

In any case, Kidal stirs up fantasies or hypotheses that are a matter of secret defense for

France and Mali. What is or was in Kidal to make it a sanctuary? Was it only for the

protection of people who were considered rebels and perceived as traitors by the government,
but who had the sympathy of France for services rendered in the past? Was Kidal worth the

sacrifice?

At the time, French opinion accused the state of having sacrificed the three journalists for

unavowed interests. For once, the hypothesis of mining interests in the area did not come from

Africans and Malians.

2. The northern zone in general 3

During the summer, the cultural season, indigenous African peoples, particularly the Peuhl

and Tuareg of the desert, are seen to flock to Europe and France in particular, known for their

particular dress and music.

The Tuaregs are a nomadic people of the desert that the former PARIS-ALGER-DAKAR

rally has helped to mythologize further to be known. This people has given its name to a

series of SUVs and off-road motorcycles. They are an ancient and mythical people who

produce dreams for countless adventurers and daredevils from all over the world. They are a

singular people who do not want to be blended into an anonymous mass of Malian peoples.

They cultivate their singularity. It is considered indomitable. They have their own salesmen

who scour the world and television platforms to sell their culture, or to victimize themselves

and appeal to world empathy.

Did France get caught in the trap by making Kidal a sanctuary? Or was it a repeat of its

winning intervention in Ivoiry Coast with the same strategy of interposition between loyalist

forces in the south and Guillaume Soro's rebels in the north? This other funny war finally

found a solution even if it was not ideal for all. The same strategy does not win everywhere. Is

it that the Tuareg people are grateful to France and to those who accept their uniqueness and

protect them.
A people that feels protected and supported by a country or by the international community

can only delay its cohesion with the central power. And when the de facto secession is

accompanied by funding that goes directly into the region's coffers and whose efficiency in its

use can be seen, it is not surprising that this part does not want to return to the old order.

Everything revolves in fact and finally around the management of the Common Good.

Indeed, this temporary secession has led to the emergence of new local leaders who no longer 4

want to be drowned in the great mass of anonymous people of the old Malian order.

The central government, if it wants to promote the reunification of the former parties that

have escaped from its control, must review its former management methods and find a way to

ensure that the new authorities and officials who were formed during the de facto secession do

not lose their privileges. It is often these new officials who resist returning to the old

Republic.

II- FROM SERVAL TO BARKHANE.

The transfer from Serval to Barkhane to give a new lease on life to this military operation will

not work. Barkhane will not do any better and will be satisfied with a few spectacular actions

from time to time, notably with the elimination or arrest of a few terrorist leaders, without

preventing terrorism from spreading its tentacles to every corner of Mali.

The decision to redeploy Barkhane troops will accelerate the disenchantment between

Bamako and Paris. The Malian authorities have seized the opportunity to unravel the binding

military agreements that bound them to their former metropolis and to diversify their

partnership, essentially with Vladimir Putin's "New Russia". This will not be well seen by

Paris.
After skirmishes between the two capitals that led to the dismissal of the French ambassador

and the banning of French media in Mali, this quarrel continued into the halls of the United

Nations.

The latest illustration of this conflict between the two countries was, on the one hand, the

cessation of development aid from France to Mali, and on the other hand, the banning by the

military junta of Mali of all NGOs that receive French subsidies. 5

One may ask:

- What was the importance of French humanitarian and development aid to the Malian people

and what will be the consequences afterwards?

- What do the Malian authorities gain by banning the NGOs that benefit from French

subsidies? Can they, with a bloodless economy, take over; if not, where will they find partners

to take over from France?

- Apart from military aid, which seems to be its preferred field of partnership with African

countries, will Russia be able to diversify into development projects?

This tenth anniversary of the Serval operation for the survival of Mali gives us the opportunity

to carefully examine the role of NGOs in this war between France and Mali. This will be the

second part of our reflection.