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5
STRATEGIC CONVERGENCE
OR STRATEGIC RIVALRY?
China and America in
the Middle East

Christopher K. Colley

Over the last half-​decade, relations between the United States and China have deteriorated sig-
nificantly. The election of President Donald Trump in 2016 injected a greater degree of unpre-
dictability into bilateral ties, which has caused the strategic rivalry between the two powers to
experience regular points of escalation. Furthermore, the Xi Jinping administration is much
more assertive and aggressive in defending what it perceives as China’s interests and is rapidly
taking on a more global role. In many parts of the Indo-​Pacific region, the United States and
China have pushed back against each other, or have used their powers to lobby various states
to back their causes.1 Importantly, what was once a spatial rivalry, centered on areas such as the
South China Sea and Taiwan, has evolved into a positional rivalry where states jockey for influ-
ence and prestige far from their home borders.2 This positional rivalry has increasingly evolved
into competition in the greater Indo-​Pacific that includes the northern Indian Ocean and the
Middle East–​North Africa (MENA).
This chapter argues that in the MENA region, there are opportunities for both rivalry escal-
ation and cooperation between Washington and Beijing. As the United States becomes much
less reliant on the Gulf region as a source of energy and as China becomes more dependent
on the region for its future energy needs, the potential for China and the United States to find
common ground and work together on regional challenges exists. However, I also argue that,
for the foreseeable future, the psychological dynamics of the rivalry will curtail options to work
together. This chapter is divided into three main sections. First, I provide an assessment of
American and Chinese interests in the region and discuss the main areas of potential cooper-
ation and competition. Next, I address how various MENA states approach this rivalry, and
how they can effectively maintain solid ties with both Washington and Beijing. The final
section will analyze China’s current and likely future MENA policy. To begin, I provide a brief
but necessary conceptual and theoretical explanation of what constitutes strategic rivalry.

Strategic rivalries
Rivalries are a common form of competition in international relations. Analysts and scholars fre-
quently utilize rivalry to explain competition between states, but fail to specify what they mean by

DOI: 10.4324/9781003034520-6 61
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Christopher K. Colley

a “rivalry.” Strictly speaking, three key components must be met in order for there to be a “strategic
rivalry.” First, states engaged in a strategic rivalry must view each other as competitors. Second,
rivals must see each other as an actual or latent threat that has the potential to conduct military
operations against the state. Finally, both states must perceive each other as enemies. In order for
a strategic rivalry to exist, all three criteria must be present.3 In the case of the Sino-​US strategic
rivalry, all three criteria are met. While Chinese leaders and scholars frequently argue that they do
not perceive the United States as a “rival,” official documents and statements from the Chinese gov-
ernment do identify the United States in this way. Of vital importance to the case under review,
rivalries also cloud decision-​makers’ perceptions and cause them to fail to analyze events in an
objective manner. Instead, events are viewed through the prism of worst-​case scenarios. Situations
that may be mundane and routine can be cited as evidence of the other side’s treachery.
A final note is in order on the nature of different strategic rivalries; they are divided into
“spatial” and “positional” rivalries. Spatial rivalries are centered on contestations over territory.
Positional rivalries see rival states compete for prestige and influence, either in regions or at a
more systemic level.4 The current Sino-​US strategic rivalry was initiated after the Tiananmen
Square demonstrations in the spring of 1989 and was originally spatial, with a focus on East Asia
with the status of Taiwan as the core point of rivalry maintenance and escalation. Over the last
decade, the rivalry has evolved into a positional rivalry, where the United States and China are
competing for influence in multiple areas. With China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), this
competition has spilled into the MENA and Indo-​Pacific.5

American and Chinese interests in the Middle East

American interests
Since the 1970s, the primary American interest in the Middle East has been to ensure a depend-
able supply of oil that would not be jeopardized by some of the military conflicts in the region.
For several decades, Washington did not hesitate to use both the military and resources of the
State Department to secure American interests. The wars in Iraq and American support for
Israel are concrete example of this regional focus. However, over the past 15 years questions have
been raised about how engaged the United States should be, with multiple American presidents
talking about reducing the American presence in the region.6 President Donald Trump signifi-
cantly added to this debate by pulling 1000 American troops out of Syria.7 While American
leaders speak of an American “withdrawal” from the region, their actions are the opposite. As
of 2019, the American force structure in the Middle East was actually higher than it had been
since 2006. Substantial troop increases have taken place in the Gulf as well as Djibouti.8 In
fact, when hostilities between Saudi Arabia and Iran escalated in 2019, Washington sent 1800
additional American soldiers to Saudi Arabia in an attempt to reinforce their defenses.9 Such
behavior demonstrates the continuing American concern about the stability of the region,
which is the paramount American concern in MENA.
American concerns about regional stability were much greater in the 1990s and 2000s, when
large percentages of American oil imports were derived from the Gulf region. As Figure 5.1
depicts, American demand for oil from Gulf Cooperation Council states (GCC) peaked in the
early 2000s and since 2005 there has been a sustained decrease in American petroleum imports
from the Arabian Gulf. This stands in contrast to the data in Figure 5.2, which show the
sustained increase in Chinese imports of Gulf oil. Perhaps of greater strategic importance are
the data in Figure 5.3, showing the rapid rise in domestic oil production in the United States,
which saw it become a net oil exporter in December 2018 for the first time in 75 years.10

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Strategic convergence or rivalry?

700000

600000

500000

400000

300000

200000

100000

0
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
U.S. Imports from Kuwait of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Mbbl

U.S. Imports from Saudi Arabia of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Mbbl

U.S. Imports from United Arab Emirates of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products
Mbbl
U.S. Imports from Oman of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Mbbl

U.S. Imports from Iraq of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Mbbl

Figure 5.1  American imports of GCC oil, 1993–​2019 (thousands of barrels)

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Petroleum and Other Liquids.”

Directly related to energy security in the region is the maintenance of sea lanes of commu-
nication (SLOCs). The crisis of maritime security posed by Somali pirates in the mid-​to late
2000s in the Gulf of Aden led to a multinational effort to secure the sea lanes. This effort has
been extremely successful in curbing the threat of piracy in the region. As will be discussed
below, the naval patrols represent empirical evidence of where Chinese and American interests
overlap and have the potential to serve as a template for future cooperation between the two
rivals. The more recent Operation Sentinel, designed to protect the SLOCs around the Strait
of Hormuz, is another example of Washington’s security interests in the Gulf. This military
operation is directly tied to American attempts to contain Iran and thwart its potential nuclear
weapons program.
While opportunities exist for cooperation between China and the United States in the
MENA, the positional rivalry influences interactions. American apprehension over construc-
tion of BRI ports in the region is concrete evidence of rivalry maintenance, and even escal-
ation. The Chinese port project in Duqm, Oman is a case in point.11 At least $10 billion12 has
been earmarked for the project that is being implemented by multiple Chinese enterprises.13
Importantly, China is Oman’s largest customer for Omani oil and Chinese investors are expected
to be the largest investors in Duqm. The Duqm Special Economic Zone Authority (SEZAD)

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Christopher K. Colley

450

400

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

0
2007 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2017

Saudi Arabia Iran Oman UAE Iraq Kuwait

Figure 5.2  Chinese imports from selected Gulf states, 2007–​2017 (millions of barrels per year)
Note: The original data were measured in annual tons of oil. This has been converted into barrels of oil
per year. The conversion rate is 7.33 barrels per ton.
Sources: Petroleum & Petrochemical Today (当代石油石化). From 2007–​2010 it is derived from the
General Administration of Customs, Public Relations China （中华人民共和国海关总署).

14000

12000

10000

8000

6000

4000

2000

0
02-11-00
09/22/2000
05-04-01
12/14/2001
07/26/2002
03-07-03
10/17/2003
05/28/2004
01-07-05
08/19/2005
03/31/2006
11-10-06
06/22/2007
02-01-08
09-12-08
04/24/2009
12-04-09
07/16/2010
02/25/2011
10-07-11
05/18/2012
12/28/2012
08-09-13
03/21/2014
10/31/2014
06-12-15
01/22/2016
09-02-16
04/14/2017
11/24/2017
07-06-18
02/15/2019
09/27/2019
05-08-20

Figure 5.3  Four-​week average of US domestic petroleum production, 2000–​2020 (thousands of barrels
per day)
Source: US Energy Information Administration, “Petroleum and Other Liquids.”

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Strategic convergence or rivalry?

is considered the flagship project for Oman’s participation in the BRI. Of vital relevance to
Oman’s future economic development, the port at Duqm is designed to enlarge Oman’s share
of maritime traffic with the goal of utilizing Oman’s geographical advantage by siphoning
off maritime traffic from the Arabian Gulf, thus giving Oman a greater share of the lucrative
maritime transport trade.14 Further complicating the situation, the Omani government has also
granted the American military access to the ports at Duqm and Salalah.15 In fact, in the battle
with Beijing for influence in the region, Washington is seeking to confine China to just the
economic sphere in Duqm and is actively trying to keep the Chinese military out of the port.
Muscat has signed deals with the British and American militaries to operate out of Duqm, but
has not signed similar deals with China.16
The 2017 American National Security Strategy is firmly in line with the psychological
aspects of the positional rivalry. The document states:

China and Russia challenge American power, influence, and interests, attempting to
erode American security and prosperity. They are determined to make economies
less free and less fair, to grow their militaries, and to control information and data to
repress their societies and expand their influence … China and Russia want to shape a
world antithetical to US values and interests. China seeks to displace the United States
in the Indo-​Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-​driven economic model,
and reorder the region in its favor.17

Apart from jockeying for influence over geographic locations, the rivalry is also present in
the field of high tech. Telecommunications companies in multiple MENA states, including
Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Oman and Kuwait have partnered with
Huawei to help the company develop its 5G networks.18 American concerns over Huawei are
well known, and multiple American administrations have voiced concerns about American
partners and allies working with the Chinese firm, as they fear that vital networks may be
compromised and open to Chinese espionage. These fears rapidly escalated during the four
years of the Trump administration.19 While such concerns may be justified on the grounds of
national security, they put Middle Eastern governments in a difficult position. In many ways,
their security is tied to the United States, but their economic futures are increasingly linked
to China.
Overall, although American interests in the MENA have decreased over the past 15 years,
Washington has not followed their rhetoric with actions. Apart from the limited withdrawal
from Syria, fears that the Americans will pull out of the Middle East have not been met with
actual actions. American leaders speak of withdrawal, but the reality is very different. The
increases in the American forward presence in the MENA demonstrate that the United States
still places enormous weight on maintaining security in the region. This is in sharp contrast
to the Chinese, who maintain a low military profile while dramatically expanding their eco-
nomic footprint. Furthermore, the steady growth in Chinese economic activities in the region
has caused Washington to push back and pressure regional governments to reject Beijing and
its initiatives.

Chinese interests
Over the past two decades, China’s economic footprint has soared in the MENA region. For
example, in 1993 China exported $2.7 billion worth of goods to the Middle East. This amount
soared to $124 billion by 2016.20 According to the Chinese Investment Tracker, from 2005 to

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Christopher K. Colley

the end of 2020, Chinese investment and contracts in the greater Middle East were worth
nearly $197 billion, with $102 billion invested over the five-​year period from 2014 to 2019.21
Crucially, China’s trade depends heavily on reliable security in the region. However, its military
presence in the region is minuscule when compared with that of the Americans. As shown in
Figure 5.2, China is far more reliant on Middle Eastern oil than the United States. Related
to this is the security of SLOCs that connect the region to China. China currently imports
56 percent of its oil from the Middle East22; furthermore, it is estimated that 80 percent of all
oil consumed by China in 2030 will be imported.23
A key question when analyzing China’s emerging role in the region is whether China has
the capacity to safeguard its interests in the Middle East. I argue that Beijing increasingly has the
capacity to provide a much greater form of security, but more importantly, it lacks the political
will to fulfill such a role.

A “free-​riding” dragon?
Chinese analysts frequently accuse the US government and military of hegemonic behavior.24
While there may be some merit in this accusation, in the Middle East China is a primary bene-
ficiary of such “hegemony.” The American navy is by far the dominant military presence in the
Gulf, and for decades has provided protection of the SLOCs leading in and out of the region.
Such SLOCs are vital to China’s economic wellbeing. President Barack Obama called China
out for not doing its part in global security. Specifically, he stated, “They are free riders. And
they have been free riders for the last 30 years and it’s worked really well for them … Nobody
ever seems to expect them to do anything when this stuff comes up.”25 Chinese scholars Sun
Degang and Xu Ruike argue that while the United States has many allies in the region, China
currently does not have any. In addition, even though China is now an economic power in the
region, it “is likely to remain a military featherweight for the coming decades. It has neither the
intention nor the capability to project its military power to challenge American military dom-
inance in the Middle East.”26 These authors admit that China is to some degree a free-​r ider on
America’s protection of oil SLOCs and will continue to be for years to come.27 Interestingly,
Sun, who is one of China’s leading scholars on the Middle East, has written that China is not
completely free-​r iding because it is providing public goods in the form of massive infrastructure
projects.28 While there is some merit in this argument, the details of many BRI projects are not
publicized, thus making it impossible to ascertain how much the Chinese government is paid
back for various infrastructure projects. In comparison American taxpayers are not reimbursed
for footing the bill as the protector of the region’s SLOCs.

An evolving Chinese security presence?

As China’s need for natural resources, especially energy, continues to grow, there is concern in
Chinese defense circles that the Chinese military will need to continue to build on its ability
to defend Chinese interests in the IOR. China’s 2015 official Defense White Paper specifically
called on the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to construct

a modern maritime military force structure commensurate with its national security
and development interests, safeguard its national sovereignty and maritime rights and
interests, protect the security of strategic SLOCs and overseas interests, and participate
in international maritime cooperation, so as to provide strategic support for building
itself into a maritime power.29

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The PLAN is well on its way to establishing such a navy, and in fact recent reports indicate that
the PLAN is now in possession of the world’s largest fleet.30 While this fleet may lack adequate
air-​cover and the technological sophistication of the American fleet, it is gradually expanding its
presence in the IOR and Middle East region. The challenges of protecting Chinese SLOCs in
the Gulf has been highlighted by several experts from the Chinese Naval Academy of Military
Science, who have argued that in this region China needs sea power to ensure the safe export
of oil from the Gulf in order to guarantee the national energy supply.31
As of the end of 2020, the PLAN does have the resources to provide a meaningful security
role in the Middle East. At any given moment, it has between six and eight warships in the nor-
thern Indian Ocean.32 In addition, the PLAN has played a very positive role in the anti-​piracy
patrols off the coast of Somalia, so that by 2019 it had escorted over 3400 merchant ships, of
which 51 percent were foreign flagged.33 What Beijing lacks is the political will to conduct
such missions in areas such as the Gulf. The abovementioned case of Operation Sentinel in the
second half of 2019 is an example. Attacks on merchant ships around the Strait of Hormuz,
which potentially jeopardized oil imports to China, resulted in an American-​led effort to halt
the attacks. While the Chinese foreign ministry did acknowledge the complicated nature of
the security situation, Beijing only stated that it would study the American initiative to send
support ships.34
Beijing’s reluctance to more fully engage in the regional security dynamics in the Middle
East is best explained as a rational attempt by Chinese leaders to not have to choose sides in
the complicated politics of the region. Had PLAN warships joined in Operational Sentinel,
they may have been forced to attack Iranian installations, from whence the attacks are believed
to have originated. This would have produced a very difficult political situation as Beijing has
close ties with Tehran.35 This form of political fence sitting is beneficial to China. As long as
China’s political and economic interests are maintained at relatively low cost, there is no imme-
diate need for a sizable PLAN presence. In fact, under the current conditions of the positional
rivalry, any expansion in the Chinese military in the region would likely be met with hostility
from Washington, thus putting America’s allies and partners in the region in a very awkward
situation where they may have to make some difficult decisions regarding their economic ties
to China, and their security and political ties to the United States.
One such case is the cooperation between Israel and China, where the lure of the Chinese
market is in direct competition with Israel’s most important security partnership: its ties with
Washington. Beijing is mostly interested in business deals with Israel, and it remains a safe dis-
tance from the one of the most pressing political issues in Israeli domestic and foreign policy,
that of the Israeli–​Palestinian peace process. While China has discussed the peace process, and
in 2002 even appointed a Middle East envoy,36 veteran Sinologist Andrew Scobell has labelled
these actions as “virtually meaningless” and “all about symbolism rather than substance.”37
Even though China may be hesitant to enter the political minefield of the Israeli–​Palestinian
peace process, Chinese companies have not hesitated to engage Israel in areas that have raised
serious security concerns with the Americans.38 Chinese entities now have influence over as
much as a quarter of the Israeli tech industry, which includes defense contractors that have joint
projects with Washington.39 The rivalry literature stresses that events between rivals are fre-
quently perceived through the prism of worst case scenarios. For example, Washington strongly
opposed the 2015 multi-​billion dollar deal between the Shanghai International Port Group
(SIPG) and the Israeli Transportation Ministry to operate Haifa Port, where in 2021 SIPG was
scheduled to control daily operations for 25 years.40 Haifa port frequently hosts the American
6th Fleet and is an anchor of the American–​Israeli defense partnership. Citing concerns over
Chinese espionage, Washington has even stated that port visits by American warships might

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cease once China takes control in 2021.41 Former American National Security Advisor John
Bolton and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo reportedly told Israeli officials to choose between
Beijing and Washington.42 American pressure on Israel to avoid Chinese entities or to curtail
business opportunities that touch on security concerns is an increasingly common approach to
the region. The often blurred line between Chinese commercial actors and the Chinese gov-
ernment does not help the situation. While it is likely that many Chinese projects in the region
are based on economic assessments, the perception in Washington (real or imagined) that they
possess dual use capabilities that can be also used for spying activities cannot completely be
dismissed.

Cooperation with Washington over Iran

While the past half-​decade has seen a significant expansion in rivalry escalation between China
and the United States, there are areas where the rivalry has not influenced their interactions in
the Middle East. The 2015 Iranian nuclear deal is a case in point. The deal, which was several
years in the making, was designed to curb Tehran’s nuclear weapons program and to provide it
with an opportunity to lift sanctions to revitalize its economy. Hua Liming, a former Chinese
ambassador to Iran, argued that Beijing’s influence in Tehran was a unique opportunity to show
the world that China was a responsible rising power that could help stabilize the global order.43
The timing of the negotiations with Iran coincided with President Obama’s second term, and
with the coming to power in Beijing of Xi Jinping. Crucially, sensing a diplomatic oppor-
tunity, President Xi began to lobby Iran about cooperating on its nuclear program. Specifically,
Xi dispatched Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to mediate between the United States, the
European Union, and Iran, and to encourage them to meet each other halfway. From June 2013
until July 2015, Beijing pushed Tehran to bring the Seven Party Talks to an acceptable ending
on at least 17 occasions.44 It is important to note that this was not the first time China had sided
with the United States on the Iranian issue. A central Chinese concern has always been to not
allow the Iranian nuclear issue to become an impediment to Sino-​US relations. China actually
voted yes on all four American-​backed United Nations Security Council resolutions that dealt
with Iran. However this was done after Beijing had held meetings with the United States to
reduce damage to Beijing’s ties with Tehran.45 To further entice Iran to accept the nuclear deal,
China’s ambassador to Iran, Pang Lin, made it clear that a comprehensive agreement on the
nuclear issue would create a “more relaxed environment and more investment opportunities for
China in Iran to continue to deepen practical cooperation.”46 Such an incentive was realized in
2016, when 30 percent of total Iranian foreign trade was with Beijing, and in July 2017, when
a nearly $5 billion deal was signed between the National Iranian Oil Company and a consor-
tium composed of the China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) and Total. Total’s share
was transferred to CNPC in 2018.47
As the Chinese economy continues to grow and Chinese interests deepen in the Middle
East, there will be both opportunities and challenges for the United States and China in their
strategic rivalry. China’s current ambitions in the region are largely centered on business oppor-
tunities, but are slowly expanding into political and security realms. Such a shift will inevitably
draw scrutiny from Washington. As discussed above, China does benefit enormously from the
security provided by the American military in the MENA region. While China now has the
ability to project meaningful power in the IOR, for political and logistical reasons it chooses
to not become overly engaged in area. In a post-​COVID-​19 world that may see the Belt and
Road Initiative more fully engaged in the MENA, regional states with their various interests

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are seeking to find a practical way to work with both the United States and China without
upsetting either power.

Middle Eastern States and Sino-​American strategic rivalry

Considering the structural dynamics of Sino-​American strategic rivalry, states in the MENA
need to find a means to navigate the potentially complex and volatile game of great power
politics unfolding between Beijing and Washington. A key issue is the durability of American
security guarantees over the next ten to 20 years, considering the decreasing relevance of Middle
Eastern energy to the United States. Are American leaders and the American public willing to
maintain a large forwardly deployed military force in a region that is volatile and is no longer
perceived as vital to American national security? How closely should MENA states, and specific-
ally states in the Gulf, work with China? While Beijing is reluctant to become a major provider
of security (outside of anti-​piracy operations), China’s demand for energy resources will con-
tinue to grow. The lure of the Chinese market for everything from incoming Chinese tourists,
to consumer goods, to the high tech sector represents an attractive and lucrative opportunity
for states that are trying to diversify their economies away from an overreliance on energy. This
section specifically addresses the interests of several states in the region and ends with an analysis
of the current and potential future competition between Beijing and Washington in the MENA.

Economic diversification
The global crash in demand for petroleum as a result of the COVID-​19 pandemic serves as a
stark reminder for MENA states of the risks of overreliance on the sale of oil as the foundation
of regional states’ economic wellbeing. Cognizant of such dependency, multiple states in the
Gulf have crafted strategies to diversify their economies, and a key part of their plans includes
working with China. Multiple GCC states have long-​term development strategies directly
linked to China. King Salman bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud’s March 2017 visit to Beijing linked
Saudi Arabia’s economic “Vision 2030” strategy with China’s BRI, and saw the signing of 20
deals worth over $60 billion.48
Kuwait and Bahrain have also linked their development strategies to the Chinese economy.
New Kuwait 2035 (its long-​term development strategy) has devoted $130 billion to the “Silk
City,” which sees the BRI as a major component. In 2018, Bahrain linked its “Vision 2030” to
the BRI and the country’s economic development. While details are slim, in 2018 the foreign
ministers of China and Bahrain signed an MOU to jointly develop BRI projects.49 Overall,
China is the GCC’s top economic partner and is the number one trading partner for Kuwait,
Oman, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In fact, in 2018, roughly two-​thirds of Chinese investment
in the MENA went to GCC states. As demonstrated in Figure 5.2 above, most GCC states have
seen a steady rise in their exports of oil to China, this stands in contrast to a steady decline in
oil sales to the United States.
Outside of the GCC, Egypt has also been a beneficiary of Chinese investment and the BRI.
In the decade from 2010 to 2020, China invested nearly $25 billion in Egypt.50 While Egypt
may have great potential for investment, the Chinese complain about rampant corruption. For
example, in 2016 a $20 billion deal was signed by two Chinese state-​backed firms to construct
a new city outside of Cairo. However, in 2017 one of them pulled out after complaining of
disagreements over permits and prices. In addition, concern in China that the political volatility
since 2011 could resurface has led to worries about investments in Egypt. There is also concern

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that even though increases in Chinese maritime traffic through the Suez Canal bring in much-​
needed revenue to Egypt, Chinese shipping companies are also looking to the Artic Passage in
the warmer months of the year as a viable and cheaper alternative to the Suez Canal. A cargo
ship from China can reach Rotterdam or Hamburg in just 35 days through the Artic Passage,
instead of the 50-​day route through the Suez. In addition, the cost of shipping drops by 20 to
30 percent when transiting via the Arctic circle.51

Ports and competition

Several GCC states are actively working with China on port projects that are part of the BRI.
These projects dovetail with their strategies for economic diversification and offer empirical
evidence of a long-​term goal of engaging with Beijing on economic issues beyond the selling
of fossil fuel. Two of the most important of these projects are the construction of the port of
Duqm in Oman and the upgrading of the Khalifa Port in Abu Dhabi.
The Duqm Special Economic Zone Authority (SEZAD) represents the flagship BRI project
in Oman. It is being developed as a multi-​purpose international port. Zayed University’s Eric
Staples argues that a main goal of the port is “redirecting traffic away from the Gulf and altering
the configuration of the current maritime routes in the Indian Ocean.”52 The port will have a
China–​Oman industrial park on 1172 hectares. By 2022, Duqm is expected to have a popula-
tion of 25,000 complete with manufacturing and hospitality centers.53
Oman is not the only GCC state that is pursuing economic diversification through the
BRI. The UAE also sees the BRI as a strategic opportunity and is seeking to expand on its
role as an international hub for logistics and commerce. In June 2017, Chinese entities signed
a $300 million dollar deal to upgrade operations in Abu Dhabi’s Khalifa Port free zone. The
Chinese firm COSCO was awarded shipping rights worth over $700 million to develop and
then operate a container terminal for 35 years.54 Furthermore, the Jiangsu Provincial Overseas
Corporation and Investment Company Limited was awarded a 50-​year lease to operate out of
the port.55 A central goal for the UAE is to utilize the geographic location of the country as a
launching pad for the transit of Chinese cargo to third countries. This strategy has achieved con-
crete results as an estimated 60 percent of China’s trade with Europe and Africa passes through
the UAE.56 Crucially, GCC states transforming themselves into engines of economic growth
with Chinese assistance does not seem to elicit the same negative response from Washington.
As mentioned above with the case of Duqm, where the Americans do not wish to see Chinese
warships paying port calls, projects centered on economic development are not perceived as
overly sensitive.
One significant issue that is frequently sidestepped regarding the BRI in the MENA and
beyond is the growing concern in China about the economic viability of various projects.57
This stems from a lack of coordination in China as many Chinese companies were given
money to carry out projects in parts of the world they knew little about and did not conduct
proper risk assessments of new projects. Notable China scholar Zhao Suisheng has argued
that a basic flaw with the BRI is that, “Beijing has yet to develop practical programs based on
scrupulous economic planning and formidable diplomatic actions to realize these ambitious
goals.”58 In addition, and of particular concern for Gulf States, is the potential for competition
among countries with similar projects. For example, will the port project in Duqm, as indicated
above, siphon business away from ports inside the Gulf? How will the construction of the
Pakistani port of Gwadar, located just 400 kilometers from the Strait of Hormuz, influence this
situation?59 While the BRI may be strategic in its long-​term aims, its on-​the-​g round imple-
mentation does not always take market-​based economics into account.60 Nor were necessary

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questions asked about one project making another project less economically viable because of
direct competition.
While the construction of ports and projects aimed at economic development is a central
component of Beijing’s engagement with MENA states, areas of rivalry escalation between
China and the United States still exist. The case of the Chinese company Huawei presents
challenges to MENA states. American concerns about the possibility of Huawei being utilized
as a tool in Chinese espionage are controversial. The details of the dispute between the United
States and China over Huawei are beyond the scope of this chapter; however, it needs to be
noted that there is concern in the Gulf region that states need to be very careful about how
closely they work with the Chinese on this issue. This sensitivity was reinforced when Michael
Mulroy, the top Pentagon official for the region, made it clear that Beijing’s attempts to gain
influence in the Middle East could undermine security ties between Washington and its Middle
Eastern partners and allies. Such warnings represent a current and future challenge to MENA
states. How do they fully embrace the economic opportunity that China presents, while not
alienating the Americans and potentially jeopardizing long-​established security ties?
Regardless of the political party in the White House, China has been identified by the
Americans as a strategic rival and threat. This represents a long-​term structural challenge to
MENA states whose interests do not align with one of the two powers. In the years –​and
likely decades –​ahead, these states, and especially the GCC, will need to keep a close watch on
the political winds blowing from both Beijing and Washington. This is in order to best situate
themselves in the positional rivalry between China and the United States in the region. MENA
states do not necessarily have to pick sides, but they would be well advised to ascertain each
state’s (or a specific administrations’) red lines and be careful not to cross such lines.
With the rise of green energy and the continuation of fracking in the United States,
American strategic designs on the Middle East will not return to the days of American reliance
on Gulf oil. However, Chinese dependency will likely increase in the next decade, regardless
of advances in alternative energy. Even when global oil demand decreases because of advances
in green technology, demand from the Gulf will still likely remain high. This is because the
price of extraction is low and the quality of oil is high. For example, in Saudi Arabia the price
of extraction is only $2.80 a barrel, which is one-​third the global average. In comparison,
competitors such as Canada and Venezuela have oil reserves that are expensive to extract and
more difficult to refine.61 Petroleum states may see the price of oil decline, but because of their
competitive advantage in extraction and quality, they will likely not see a commensurate decline
in demand from China. Such a strategic outlook does not necessarily represent a hedging policy
by Gulf States,62 but is more in line with market principles. Hedging as a concept includes
both confrontational and cooperative approaches to a specific state.63 MENA, and especially
GCC states, seek to have a “win–​win” approach to both the United States and China, and
their perceived tilt towards Beijing is centered on market economics and anticipated future
economic opportunities. The absence of a simultaneously confrontational approach by MENA
states towards Washington, as hedging would require, casts doubt on its ability to explain the
current situation.

China’s future MENA policy in the context of strategic rivalry

with the United States
As the Chinese economy continues to perform and hundreds of millions of Chinese enter
the middle class, China’s consumption of Middle Eastern oil will continue to rise. A steady
expansion in Chinese economic interests in the MENA will coincide with a steady decrease

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Christopher K. Colley

in American economic interests in the region. The COVID-​19 pandemic will likely cause a
rethink in Beijing of BRI projects, with extra scrutiny on projects that may not be econom-
ically viable. However, given the strategic interests of China, BRI projects in the MENA will
likely continue. As of November 2020, China had invested only $2.36 billion in the Middle
East and North Africa for the entire year. In comparison, in 2018 Beijing invested $26.62
billion, and in 2019 it invested $17.34 billion.64 The paltry sum in 2020 will likely substantially
increase once the pandemic is brought under control.
On the security front, Chinese interests in the MENA region are actually closely aligned
with those of Washington. Both states seek stability and economic development. Even in the
case of Iran, China does not support a nuclear-​armed Iran and, as mentioned above, has taken
actions in the United Nations to curtail Tehran’s nuclear ambitions. Writing in the Chinese
publication Arab World Studies, Li Weijian, from the Shanghai Institute of International Studies,
argues that “the U.S. is unwilling to face hot issues in the Middle East alone. Therefore it is
possible to seek consensus and cooperation with China on issues such as maintaining stability
in the Middle East.”65 Li’s optimistic assessment of Chinese ties with the United States in the
MENA are also supported by Xi Guigui and Chen Suisheng, who believe that there is room
for the United States and China to cooperate in the region and that many of the difficulties
experienced by the United States in the Middle East can be alleviated with the help of China.66
Chinese analysts are also skeptical that Washington will significantly withdraw its forces from
the region, with one calling President Trump’s claims to withdraw a form of “blackmail.”67 In
contrast to more optimistic analyses of bilateral ties, the rivalry between China and the United
States in the MENA region does raise some concerns in Beijing about the exposure of Chinese
SLOCs in the IOR, which 80 percent of China’s imported energy traverses. Chinese scholars
have written about the “Indian Ocean Dilemma” and argue that the United States seeks to
contain China’s rise through the domination of the oil reserves and the SLOCs in the Middle
East.68
Ultimately, China’s MENA policy will continue to grow, and will no longer be modest
in its scope. For the next decade, this policy will attempt to focus on economic interactions
while carefully working around difficult political and security challenges. For their part, many
MENA states –​especially in the GCC –​will continue to embrace China and the economic
opportunities it offers. As long as a robust American military presence is a reality in the region,
there will be little incentive for Beijing to significantly enlarge its security presence. However,
in the event of a major American withdrawal, Chinese leaders would be put in an awkward
situation where they may have to become more engaged and deal with some of the more dif-
ficult political and security challenges in the region. This is a situation Beijing does not wish
to find itself in. Chinese leaders and analysts are happy to free-​r ide off the American security
presence and denigrate the American force structure as “hegemonic,” while showing the flag
to protect against Somali pirates armed with speedboats and AK-​47s. Dealing with regional
rivalries where forces are armed with anti-​ship missiles (some of which were supplied by the
Chinese)69 is a very different matter.

Conclusion
Strategic rivalries that are positional are a common phenomenon in international relations.
The roles of China and the United States in the Middle East present an interesting case study.
Both states share a common interest in stability and economic development; however, rivalries
influence how events are presented and understood. A systemic lack of trust exists between
Washington and Beijing that is likely to persist for the indefinite future, and will likely witness

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periods of intense escalation over the coming decade. Because of this, actions carried out by one
state, such as the sale of technology or the reinforcing of a military base, are frequently viewed
in zero-​sum terms by the other rival state. Over the past decade, China has demonstrated a
willingness to work with the United States in areas such as maritime security in the Gulf of
Aden. Such actions may provide helpful security and good public relations, but their impact on
reducing tensions is ephemeral at best. While a change in leadership in either capital may lead
to temporary reductions in rivalry maintenance, the underlying structure of the rivalry will be
present and, barring an extremely unlikely sudden collapse of either China or the United States,
the rivalry will continue to experience significant points of escalation. In the MENA, this situ-
ation will manifest itself through pressure on states to join with the United States or China in
various initiatives, or to purchase various products such as 5G networks or military arms. For
their part, MENA states may pursue options that seek to gain the most from each power, while
attempting to stay neutral in their rivalry. This may prove to be a difficult task.

Author’s note
The opinions expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not reflect the views of
the United Arab Emirates National Defense College or the UAE government.

Notes
1 Cheung Tai Ming, “The Riddle in the Middle: China’s Central Military Commission in the Twenty-​
first Century,” in Philip C. Saunders and Andrew Scobell (eds), PLA Influence on China’s National
Security Policymaking (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015), 84–​119, as well as multiple
editions of the Chinese government publication China’s National Defense (Beijing: Information Office
of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2004), www.china.org.cn/​e-​white/​20041227.
For example, the United States is not always named in the reports, but it is clear that the government
is signaling out the United States.
2 Michael P. Colaresi, Karen Rasler, and William Thompson, Strategic Rivalries in World Politics
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
3 Colaresi et al., Strategic Rivalries in World Politics, 25.
4 Colaresi et al., Strategic Rivalries in World Politics, 79.
5 Timothy R. Heath and William Thompson, “Avoiding U.S.–​China Competition is Futile: Why the
Best Option is to Manage Strategic Rivalry,” Asia Policy, 13(2) (2018), 91–​120.
6 David D. Kirkpatrick, Ben Hubbard and David M. Halbfinger, “Trump’s Abrupt Shifts in Middle
East Unnerve U.S. Allies,” The New York Times, October 14, 2019, www.nytimes.com/​2019/​10/​12/​
world/​middleeast/​trumps-​abandonment-​of-​the-​kurds-​in-​syria-​has-​other-​allies-​worried.html
7 “Donald Trump’s Betrayal of the Kurds is a Blow to America’s credibility,” The Economist, October 17,
2019, www.economist.com/​leaders/​2019/​10/​17/​donald-​trumps-​betrayal-​of-​the-​kurds-​is-​a-​blow-​to-
​americas-​credibility
8 N. Janardhan and Christopher K. Colley, “Flag Follows Trade –​China’s Security Imprint in the Belt
and Road Initiative, Indian Ocean and Gulf,” Emirates Diplomatic Academy: EDA Insight (2019), www.
eda.ac.ae/​docs/​default-​source/​Publications/​eda-​insight_​china-​bri_​en_​final_​v2.pdf?sfvrsn=​2
9 Christopher K. Colley, “Why China’s PLA Will Not Replace the Americans in the Middle East,” The
Diplomat, November 1, 2019, https://​thediplomat.com/2​ 019/1​ 1/w ​ hy-c​ hinas-p​ la-w
​ ill-n
​ ot-r​ eplace-t​ he-​
americans-​in-​the-​middle-​east
10 Javier Blas, “The U.S. Just Became a Net Oil Exporter for the First Time in 75 Years,”Bloomberg, December
6, 2018, www.bloomberg.com/​news/​articles/​2018-​12-​06/​u-​s-​becomes-​a-​net-​oil-​exporter-​for-​the-​
first-​time-​in-​75-​years
11 “Chinese Money is Behind Some of the Arab World’s Biggest Projects,” The Economist, April 20,
2019, www.economist.com/​middle-​east-​and-​africa/​2019/​04/​20/​chinese-​money-​is-​behind-​some-​
of-​the-​arab-​worlds-​biggest-​projects
12 All figures throughout are in US$, unless otherwise noted.

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Christopher K. Colley

13 Mahmood Muhammed Abdul Ghaffar, “Strategic Development of Sino-​GCC Relations: Visions of

Arabian Gulf Economic Development and the Belt and Road Initiative,” Asian Journal of Middle Eastern
and Islamic Studies, 12(4) (2019), 522.
14 Jonathan Fulton, China’s Relations with the Gulf Monarchies (London: Routledge, 2019), 133.
15 Camille Lons, Jonathan Fulton, Sun Degang and Naser Al-​Tamimi, “China’s Great Game in the
Middle East,” European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2019, 30.
16 “Chinese Money Is Behind Some of the Arab World’s Biggest Projects.”
17 The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: US
Government, 2017), www.whitehouse.gov/​wp-​content/​uploads/​2017/​12/​NSS-​Final-​12-​18-​2017-​
0905.pdf
18 Lons et al., “China’s Great Game,” 13.
19 Lons et al., “China’s Great Game,” 16.
20 Daniel S. Markey, China’s Western Horizon (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), 126.
21 American Enterprise Institute, China Global Investment Tracker, www.aei.org/​china-​global-​investment-​
tracker
22 Xu Ruike and Sun Degang, “Sino-​American Relations in the Middle East: Towards a Complementary
Partnership?” Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, 13(2) (2019), 150.
23 Jonas Parello-​Plesner, “China’s Gulf Connection,” The American Interest, January 8, 2019, www.the-​
american-​interest.com/​2019/​01/​08/​chinas-​gulf-​connection
24 Andrew Erickson, “Chinese Views of America’s New Maritime Strategy,” In Andrew S. Erickson,
Lyle J. Goldstein, and Nan Li (eds), China, the United States and 21st-​Century Sea Power (Annapolis,
MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010), 435, 441–​442.
25 Bree Feng, “Obama’s ‘Free Rider’ Comment Draws Chinese Criticism,” The New York Times, August
13, 2014, https://​sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/​2014/​08/​13/​obamas-​free-​r ider-​comment-​draws-​
chinese-​criticism
26 Xu and Sun, “Sino-​American Relations,” 153–​154.
27 Xu and Sun, “Sino-​American Relations,” 154.
28 Lons et al., “China’s Great Game,” 15.
29 State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, China’s Military Strategy 2015
“中国军事战略2015.” 中华人民共和国国务院新闻办公室 中国的军事战略（2015年5月）中华
人民共和国国防部, www.mod.gov.cn/​regulatory/​2015-​05/​26/​content_​4617812.htm
30 “China Now Has the World’s Largest Fleet, Alarming Its Pacific Rival,” The Economist, September
26, 2020, www.economist.com/​united-​states/​2020/​09/​26/​china-​now-​has-​the-​worlds-​largest-​fleet-​
alarming-​its-​pacific-​r ival
31 Li Jian, Wen Chenwen, and Jin Zui, “Indian Ocean Sea Power Pattern and China Sea Power: Indian Ocean
Expansion,” Pacific Journal 22(5) (2014) 李剑，陈文文，金晶，印度洋海权格局与中国海权的印
度洋拓展，太平洋学报，2014年第5期, www.cnki.com.cn/​Article/​CJFDTotal-​TPYX201405009.
htm
32 Anirban Bhaumik, “6–​8 Chinese Navy Ships Always in Indian Ocean,” The Deccan Herald, January 9,
2019, www.deccanherald.com/​national/​6-​8-​chinese-​navy-​ships-​always-​712273.html
33 “Chinese Naval Fleets Escort 3,400 Foreign Ships Over Past 10 Years,” Xinhua, January 1, 2019, www.
xinhuanet.com/​english/​2019-​01/​01/​c_​137712892.htm
34 Consulate-​General of the People’s Republic of China in Chicago. “Spokesperson for Chinese Foreign
Ministry Geng Shuang,” December 11, 2019 2019 年10月11日外交部发言人耿爽主持例行记
者, http://​ae.chi​nese​emba​ssy.org/​chn/​wjbfy​rth/​t1707​146.htm; Alexander Cornwall, “China Might
Escort Ships in Gulf Under U.S. Proposal –​Envoy,” Reuters, August 6, 2019, https://​af.reuters.com/​
article/​worldNews/​idAFKCN1UW1DW
35 For example, in 2017 China extended a $10 billion line of credit to Iran for infrastructure. In the event
of hostilities, such ties may be jeopardized. See “Strategic Development of Sino-​GCC Relations,” 527.
36 On China’s Middle East Special Envoys, see Chapter 26.
37 Andrew Scobell, “China’s Search for Security in the Greater Middle East,” In James Reardon-​Anderson
(ed.), The Red Star and the Crescent (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 30.
38 On China’s approach to the Israel–​Palestine issue, see Chapters 7, 13, and 25.
39 Ilan Berman, “Reshaping Regional Politics,” Middle East Quarterly 26(4) (2019), 5.
40 Berman, “Reshaping Regional Politics,” 5.
41 Berman, “Reshaping Regional Politics,” 6.
42 Lons et al., “China’s Great Game,” 16.

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43 Robert R. Bianchi, China and the Islamic World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), 81.
44 John Garver, “China and the Iran Nuclear Negotiations,” In James Reardon-​Anderson (ed.), The Red
Star and the Crescent (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 139.
45 Garver, “China and the Iran Nuclear Negotiations,” 127.
46 “Speech by Ambassador Pang Sen”, China–​Iran Relations Outlook Seminar, March 3, 2015 驻伊
朗大使庞森在“中国与伊朗关系展望研讨会”上的讲话, https://​china.huanqiu.com/​article/​
9CaKrnJIph4
47 Mohsen Shariatinia and Hamidreza Azizi, “Iran and the Belt and Road Initiative: Amid Hope and
Fear,” Journal of Contemporary China 28(120) (2019), 5–​6.
48 Ghaffar, “Strategic Development of Sino-​GCC Relations,” 522.
49 Ghaffar, “Strategic Development of Sino-​GCC Relations,” 523.
50 China Global Investment Tracker.
51 Bianchi, China and the Islamic World, 115–​118.
52 Eric Staples, “The Ports of Oman Today,” In Abdulrahman Al Salimi and Eric Staples (eds), The Ports
of Oman (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 2017), 362.
53 Fulton, China’s Relations with the Gulf Monarchies, 133.
54 Ghaffar, “Strategic Development of Sino-​GCC Relations,” 524.
55 Fulton, China’s Relations with the Gulf Monarchies, 101.
56 Lons et al., “China’s Great Game,” 27.
57 Author’s interviews and discussions with Chinese experts in Beijing, 2016–​2018.
58 Zhao Suisheng. “China’s Belt-​Road Initiative as the Signature of President Xi Jinping Diplomacy: Easier
Said than Done,” Journal of Contemporary China 29(123) (2020), 2.
59 Li et al., “Indian Ocean Sea Power Pattern,” 9.
60 Zhao, “China’s Belt-​Road,” 9.
61 “Aramco is Both the Oil Sector’s Goliath and a Firm Vexed by Problems,” The Economist, October
31, 2019, www.economist.com/​briefing/​2019/​10/​31/​aramco-​is-​both-​the-​oil-​sectors-​goliath-​and-​a-​
firm-​vexed-​by-​problems
62 Jean-​Loup Samaan, “Confronting the Flaws in America’s Indo-​Pacific Strategy,”War on the Rocks, February 11,
2019, https://​warontherocks.com/​2019/​02/​confronting-​the-​flaws-​in-​americas-​indo-​pacific-​strategy
63 Oystein Tunsjo, “U.S.–​ China Relations,” in Robert S. Ross and Oystein Tunsjo (eds), Strategic
Adjustment and the Rise of China (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2017), 63.
64 China Global Investment Tracker.
65 Li, Weijian, “Research on China’s Middle East Strategy Construction,” Arab World Studies 2 (2016),
8–​9. 李伟建， 中国中东外交战略构建研究，阿拉伯世界研究，2016， 2, 第8–​9页。
66 Xi Guigui and Chen Shuisheng, “China’s Middle East Economic Diplomacy in the Context of the
Belt and Road Initiative,” Arab World Studies 6 (2016), 58. 席桂桂, 陈水胜.一带一路背景下中国的
中东经济外交[J]‌. 阿拉伯世界研究, 2016 (6), 58. 席桂桂， 四川外国语大学国际关系学院副教
授(重庆 400031); 陈水胜， 中国政法大学
67 Wu Min, “Analysis of a Series of ‘Withdraw’ Actions Claimed by Donald Trump,” Military Digest
13(421), 39. 吴敏文. 特朗普声称的一系列“撤军”真假几何[J]‌. 军事文摘, 2018, 421 (13), 39.
68 Zeng Xinkai, “The American Factor in China’s ‘Indian Ocean Dilemma’,” (2012) 曾信凯，中国“
印度洋困境”中的美国因素，南亚研究，2012年第2期 http://​kns.cnki.net/​kcms/​detail/​detail.
aspx?filename=​LAYA201202007&dbcode=​CJFQ&dbname=​CJFD2012&v=​
69 John Garver, China and Iran (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2006), 182.

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