MEANING OF THE DOCTRINE

The prospective nature of the provision under Article 13(1) of the

constitution has led to the emergence of the doctrine of eclipse. This
provision deals with the pre-constitution laws and declares that all
such laws are void to the extent to which they are inconsistent with
the Fundamental Rights.
The doctrine of eclipse is based on the notion that a pre-constitutional
law which is inconsistent with a fundamental right is not a nullity or
void from its very inception. Such a law becomes only inoperative
from the date of the commencement of the constitution. It is
overshadowed or eclipsed by the fundamental right and remains
dormant but is not dead altogether. It is not wiped out completely
from the statute book. It continue to exist
I) for all past transactions
II) for the enforcement of rights acquired and liabilities incurred
before the date of the commencement of the constitution and
III) for the determination of rights of non-citizens who have not
been given the fundamental rights by the constitution. Thus, it
does not become void “in toto” for all purposes or for all times
or for all persons.
However, if the shadow cast on such a law by the relevant
fundamental right is removed by an amendment of the constitution,
then the law would again become constitutional and enforceable. In
other words, the amendment of the fundamental right makes the
impugned law free from all blemish or infirmity.
 FORMULATION OF THE DOCTRINE
The doctrine of eclipse was enunciated by the Supreme Court in the
Bhikaji case(1955).In this case, Section 43 of the Motor Vehicles
Act(1939)was amended by the Central Provinces and Berar Motor
Vehicles(Amendment Act 1947). This provision empowered the State
Government to take over the motor transport business to the
exclusion of individual operations. But, it became void with the
commencement of the constitution in 1950 as it violated the
fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g).
Later, the 1st Amendment Act(1951)amended Article 19(6) and
enabled the government to take over any trade or business either
exclusively or in competition with the individuals. Consequently, the
State Government issued a notification to take over the motor
transport business. This notification was challenged in the Supreme
Court. The State Government argued that from January 26,1950 to
June 18,1951,Section 43 of the Motor Vehicles Act(1939)remained
invalid, but the amendment of the provision under Article 19(6)by the
1st Amendment Act(1951)made the same Section 43 of the Act valid
again.
Finally, the Supreme Court held that the impugned Act became, for
the time being, eclipsed by the fundamental right but the amendment
of Article 19(6)removed the shadow. In other words, the court upheld
the validity of the notification by applying the doctrine of eclipse.

APPLICATION TO POST-CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS

Article 13(1)deals with the pre-Constitution laws while Article
13(2)deals with the post-Constitution laws. The latter prohibits the
state from making a law which takes away or abridges the
fundamental rights and any such law is void to the extent of the
contravention.
In Deep Chand case*(1959),the Supreme Court held that the
doctrine of eclipse applies only to, the pre-Constitution laws and not
to the post-Constitution laws. This is because, a post-Constitution law
which contravenes a fundamental right is a nullity or void from its very
inception and a still-born law. Therefore, it cannot be revived by a
subsequent constitutional amendment. Accordingly, the court upheld
the constitutionality of the Uttar Pradesh Transport
Service(Development)Act,1955 saying that it did not violate Article 31
of the Constitution.
In Mahendra Lal Jain case\'(1962),the Supreme Court reiterated
its verdict delivered in Deep Chand case (1959)and held that the
doctrine of eclipse cannot be applied to the post-Constitution laws.
The court observed:
＂The doctrine of eclipse will apply to pre-Constitution laws
which are governed by Article 13(1)and would not apply to post-
Constitution laws which are governed by Article 13(2).Unlike a law
governed by Article 13(1)which was valid when made, the law made
in contravention of the prohibition contained in Article 13(2)is a
stillborn law either wholly or partially depending upon the extent of
the contravention. Such a law is dead from the beginning and there
can be no question of its revival under the doctrine of eclipse”。
However, the position in Ambica Mills case\'(1974)was different.
In this case, the Supreme Court reversed its earlier stand and applied
the doctrine of eclipse even to a post-Constitution law. The court held
that a post-Constitution law which violates the fundamental rights is
not a nullity or void in all cases and for all purposes. Further, it said
that there are many exceptions to the doctrine of absolute nullity and
hence, it cannot be regarded as a universal rule. A post-Constitution
law which violates the fundament right conferred by Article 19 will be
effective as regards to non-citizens because fundamental rights are
not conferred on them. On the other hand, such a law will become a
nullity or void only against citizens because fundamental rights are
available to them. Speaking for the court, Justice Mathew observed:
“If the meaning of the word\'void\'in Article 13(1)is the same as
its meaning in Article 13(2), it is difficult to understand why a pre-
Constitution law which takes away or abridges the rights under Article
19 should remain operative even after the Constitution came into
force as regards non-citizens and a post-Constitution law which takes
away or abridges them should not be operative as respects non-
citizens. The fact that pre-Constitution law was valid when enacted
can afford no reason why it should remain operative as respects non-
citizens after the Constitution came into force as it became void on
account of its inconsistency with the provisions of Part III. Therefore,
the real reason why it remains operative as against non-citizens is that
it is void only to the extent of its inconsistency with the rights
conferred under Article 19 and that its voidness is, therefore, confined
to citizens, as, ex hypothesi, the law became inconsistent with their
fundamental rights alone. If that be so, we see no reason why a post-
Constitution law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by
Article 19 should not be operative in regard to non-citizens as it is void
only to the extent of the contravention of the rights conferred on
citizens, namely, those under Article 19. The voidness is not in rem but
to the extent only of inconsistency or contravention, as the case may
be of the rights conferred under Part III. Therefore, when Article 13(2)
uses the expression void\',it can only mean, void as against persons
whose fundamental rights are taken away or abridged by a law. The
law might be\'still-born\'so far as the persons, entitles or
denominations whose fundamental rights are taken away or abridged,
but there is no reason why the law should be void or 'still-born' as
against those who have no fundamental rights.”
 Accordingly, the Bombay Labour Welfare Fund Act(1953)was
held to be valid and operative with regard to non-citizens.
Later, the Supreme Court applied the doctrine of eclipse to a
post-Constitution law even against citizens in Dulare Lodh case (1984).