Dr.

RAM MANOHAR LOHIYA

NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY, LUCKNOW

ACADEMIC SESSION: 2020-21

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE

CASE ANALYSIS: Manohar Lal Chopra v Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal
CONCERNING INHERENT POWER OF COURT FOR GRANTING INJUNCTION

Submitted to: Submitted by:

Mr. Vipul Vinod Harshita Yadav

Assistant Professor (Law) Enrolment No. 190101065

4th Sem. B.A.LL.B. (Hons.)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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Contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS.........................................................................................................2
DECLARATION......................................................................................................................3
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.......................................................................................................4
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES..................................................................................................5
Cases.................................................................................................................................................5
Statutes.............................................................................................................................................5
INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................................6
CHAPTER 1: FACTS AND JUDGMENT............................................................................8
Background and Facts of the Case.................................................................................................8
Contention......................................................................................................................................10
Judgment........................................................................................................................................11
Concurring Opinion......................................................................................................................12
CHAPTER 2: ISSUES RAISED...........................................................................................13
Inherent Powers of the Court vis-à-vis s. 151 of the Code..........................................................13
Inherent Power of the Court vis-à-vis s. 94 of the Code.............................................................14
CHAPTER 3: AUTHORITIES DISCUSSED IN MANOHAR LAL..................................15
Subramanian v. Seetharama Aiyar................................................................................................15
Dhaneshwar Nath Tewari v. Ghanshyam Dhar Misra..................................................................15
Padam Sen v. State of Uttar Pradesh.............................................................................................16
Cohen v. Rothfield..........................................................................................................................17
Hyman v. Helm...............................................................................................................................17
CHAPTER 4: BEARING ON SUCCEEDING JUDGMENTS.........................................19
CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................................22
BIBLIOGRAPHY..................................................................................................................23

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 DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the project work is a case analysis on the case of“Manohar Lal Chopra
v Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal” submitted to the Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National
Law University, Lucknow is a record of an original work done by me under the guidance of
Mr. Vipul Vinod, Assistant Professor (Law), Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law
University. This project work is submitted in the partial fulfilment of the requirements for the
award of the degree of B.A. LL.B. (Hons.). The results embodied in this paper have not been
submitted to any other University or Institute for the award of any degree or diploma.

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 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This term paper would not have been accomplished without the generous contributions of
individuals. First of all, I express my gratitude to the Almighty, who aided me with his
strength, wisdom and patience to complete this term paper.

Additionally, I express my gratitude and deep regards to my teacher for the subject Mr.
Vipul Vinod for giving me freedom to work on the case of “Manohar Lal Chopra v Rai
Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal” and also for his exemplary guidance, monitoring and
constant encouragement throughout the course of this term paper.

I would also like to thank the librarians of Dr. Madhu Limaye Library who extended their
assistance to me by helping me out consult the relevant books on the online platform and
provided me with research material and good books to work upon and the distinguished
authors and journals for providing in the public domain such invaluable information.

Finally, I also thank all of my friends and seniors who aided me along the way, and my
family and friends for their constant encouragement without which this assignment would not
have been possible.

I know that despite my best efforts some discrepancies might have crept in which I believe
my humble Professor would forgive.

Thanking You All.

Harshita Yadav

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 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

1. A.K.A. CT.V. CT. Meenakshisundaram Chettiar v. A.K.A. CT.V. CT. Venkatachalam

Chettiar1978 SCC
2. Bhagat Singh v. Jagbir SawhneyAIR 1941 Cal 670
3. Chinese Tannery Owners' Association v. Makhan Lal AIR 1952 Cal 560
4. Cohen v. Rothfield (1919) 1 KB 410
5. Dhaneshwar Nath Misra v. Ghanshaym Dhar Misra 1939 SCC OnLine All 28
6. Firm Bichchha Ram v. Firm Baldeo Sahai, AIR 1940 All 241
7. Govindarajulu v. Imperial Bank of India, AIR 1932 Mad 180
8. Hyman v. Helm LR (1883) 24 Ch. D. 531
9. J.T. Republike v Rungta & Sons AIR 1966 Cal 382
10. Karuppayya v. Ponnuswami, AIR 1933 Mad 500 (2)
11. Lata Ashok Khandagale vs Smt. Kamal Changdeo Sonawane Writ Petition 3550 of
2020
12. Manohar Lal Chopra vs Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal1962 Supp (1) SCR 450
13. Murugesa Mudali v. Angamuthu Mudali AIR 1938 Mad 190
14. Padam Sen v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1961) 1 SCR 884
15. Ram Yagya & Anr. v. Jagannath Prasad & Ors. 1962 SCC OnLine All 152
16. Subramanian v. Seetharama Aiyar 1948 SCC OnLine Mad 92
17. Shyam Sel & Power Limited v Bahubali Promoters Private 2019(1) RCR (Rent) 386
18. Varadacharlu v. Narsimha Charlu, AIR 1926 Mad 258

Statutes

Civil Procedure Code, 1908

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 INTRODUCTION

Manohar Lal Chopra v Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal 1was a case which appeared
before a Supreme Court bench of four judges. Justice Raghubar Dayal wrote the judgment for
himself and Justice K.N. Wanchoo and Justice K.C. Das Gupta. Justice J.C. Shah concurred
from the majority view and wrote the concurring opinion, and the judgment got deliveredon
November 16, 1961. The main issue before the court in this case was whether the Court could
exercise its inherent powers when there were specific provisions in s. 94 and O. 39 in the
Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908 (hereinafter, ‘the Code’) for the issue of interim
injunctions. Following this the court had to determine whether the High Court, in the exercise
of its inherent jurisdiction, exercised its discretion properly, keeping in mind the facts of the
case.

This paper aims to study the verdict and the rationale of the Court, and concurring opinion in
this case to find out what modifications or certainty the case brought about on the matter of
inherent jurisdiction of the court. This inherent power of the court comes from the doctrine of
‘ex debito justitiae’ which implies that the remedy that the court provides in such
circumstances is the court’s debt, which is being discharged towards those who have suffered
from any remissness of the judicial process, as a matter of their right, 2so that justice does not
suffer. So, the paper will also delve deep into this doctrine to find out its scope vis-à-vis s.
151 of the Code which deals with inherent power of the court.

The importance of this case is one which cannot be undermined; because prior to this case,
there existed a difference of opinion among the high courts on the question that whether a
Court can issue an interim injunction under circumstances which are not covered by O.39 of
the Code, if the Court is of opinion that the interests of justice require the issue of such
interim injunction. This case clarified the point when the Supreme Court affirmed the view
that the Courts have inherent jurisdiction to issue temporary injunctions in circumstances
which are not covered by the provisions of O.39 of the Code.

So, this paper will highlight the contribution of this case and the importance of the doctrine of
ex debito justitiae and the inherent power of the court; since the provisions of the Code are
not exhaustive, the Legislature is incapable of contemplating all the possible circumstances
which may arise in future litigation and consequently for providing the procedure for them. In

1
Manohar Lal Chopra v Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal 1962 Supp (1) SCR 450
2
Black’s Law Dictionary 7th edn

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this paper, the first chapter will focus upon the facts of the case, and the judgment delivered
by the court. The second chapter will elaborate upon the issues raised in this case, and will
also discuss the doctrine of ex debito justitiae. The third chapter will focus upon the
authorities that were used by the Court to formulate the rule of law, and also those used by
the concurringjudge for reasoning differently from the majority view. The fourth chapter will
focus on the value of this case as a precedent. The fifth part will be the conclusion of the
author.

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 CHAPTER 1: FACTS AND JUDGMENT

Background and Facts of the Case

The case Manohar Lal Chopra v Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralalwas brought before the
Supreme Court as an appeal by special leave by one of the partners of a partnership firm
against the order dated May 10, 1955, of the former Madhya Bharat High Court which had
held thatr. 1 of O. 39 did not apply to the case and the order of injunction could be issued in
the exercise of the inherent powers of the Court under s. 151 of the Code.3

Manohar Lal Chopra, the appellant, and Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal, the respondent
had entered into a partnership for working coal mines at Kajora Gram (District Burdwan) and
manufacture of cement as well. They had named the partnership as ‘Diamond Industries’
head office of which was situated at Indore. On August 22, 1945, the partnership was
dissolved by a dissolution deed under which the appellant was entitled to one-fourth of Rs.
4,00,000/- i.e., the capital of the partnership; once he has rendered full, correct and true
account of the partnership business, and the same has been checked and audited by the
respondent. Moreover, the second proviso at the end of the deed of dissolution provided that
any dispute regarding the money or rights and liabilities of the partners were to be decided
either amicably or in court at Indore and nowhere else.4

In pursuant to this, a registered letter was sent on September 29, 1945 by the respondent to
the appellant requiring him to explain and satisfy the respondent of the accounts within three
months. It was also alleged in the notice that the appellant has wilfully falsified the entries in
the accounts,and has also appended false and fictious entries, with malafide intention to cause
wrongful loss to the respondent and wrongful gain to himself. The appellant in his reply sent
to the respondent on December 5, 1945, denied the allegations and requested the respondent
to meet him within ten days at Asansol or Kajoraram.5 The respondent did not act upon this.

A suit was then instituted by the appellant against the respondent in the Court of Subordinate
Judge at Asansol on August 18, 1948. He wanted the recovery of his share in the capital and
assets of the partnership firm as well as damages for wrongful withholding of the payment. 6
The respondent, reacting on this, filed a petition under s. 34 of the Arbitration Act in Asansol

3
Supra note 1
4
Supra note 1, para 2
5
Supra note 1, para 3
6
Supra note 1, para 4

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Court on October 27, 1948 to stay the suit since there existed an arbitration provision in the
original deed of the partnership. But the court rejected his application on August 20, 1949.7

In the meanwhile, the respondent also went to the Court of the District Judge in Indore and
filed a suit against the appellant on January 3, 1949, for interest on the settled accounts or for
a direction to the appellant to render true and full accounts of the partnership.8

Consequently, the respondent filed his written statement in the Asansol Court on November
28, 1949, saying that as per the deed of dissolution the appellant had agreed to have disputes
solved in the Court at Indore hence, the Asansol Court has no jurisdiction to try and entertain
the appellant’s suit which is vexatious, speculative, oppressive, and instituted malafide.9

Later, in December 1951, the respondent applied in the Asansol Court to stay the suit in
exercise of its inherent power saying that the appellant had abused the process of the court by
instituting the suit in Asansol Court in complete disregard of the dispute resolution
mechanism provided in the deed of dissolution of the partnership. This application of the
respondent was rejected by the Asansol Court on August 9, 1952 holding that there was no
scope for acting under s. 151 of the Code, as s. 10 of that Code had no application to the suit,
it having been instituted earlier than the suit at Indore.

This order was also confirmed by the Calcutta High Court on May 7, 1953, which further
directed the Subordinate Judge of Asansol Court to conclude the hearing of the case as
expeditiously as possible.10

In the meanwhile, in the Indore Court, the appellant applied for staying the suit under ss. 10
and 151 of the Code on April 28, 1950. This was opposed by the respondent on the ground of
the term in the deed of dissolution of partnership, and also on the ground that the two suits
(that in Asansol Court, and that in Indore Court) were of different nature, their subject matter
and relief claimed being different.This application of the appellant was rejected by the Indore
Court on July 5, 1951 relying on the term of the deed of dissolution. This order was
confirmed by the High Court of Madhya Bharat11 on August 20, 1953.12

7
Supra note 1, para 5
8
Supra note 1, para 6
9
Supra note 1, para 7
10
Supra note 1, para 8
11
Presently, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh
12
Supra note 1, para 9

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So, the proceedings in both Asansol Court as well as Indore Court were running
simultaneously. But then on September 14, 1953, the respondent applied in Indore Court for
restraining the appellant from continuing the proceedings in the Asansol Court alleging that
the appellant had filed the suit there to put him to trouble. The appellant contested this
application saying that it is well within his rights to institute the suit at Asansol, the Court
was competent to try it, and that the respondent's objection for stay of proceedings in the
Asansol Court had been once rejected by that Court, andhe also denied the allegation that his
intention in instituting the suit was to cause trouble and heavy expenses to the respondent.13

The Additional District Judge at Indore Court issued interim injunction under O. 39 of the
Code to the appellant restraining him from proceeding with his Asansol suit pending decision
of the Indore suit, as the Indore Court was the proper forum for deciding the dispute between
the parties. The appellant went in appeal to the High Court of Madhya Bharat against this
order. The High Court ordered dismissal of the appeal on May 10, 1955 saying that though
the r. 1 of O. 39 did not apply to the facts of the case, the order of injunction could be issued
in the exercise of the inherent powers of the Court under s. 151 of the Code. 14 Aggrieved by
this decision the appellant preferred an appeal against this decision by special leave in the
Supreme Court.

Contention

The appellant had contended before the Supreme Court that the Court (i.e. Indore Court)
could not exercise its inherent powers when there were specific provisions in the Code for the
issue of interim injunctions, i.e., s. 94 which make it clear that interim injunctions can be
issued only if a provisions for their issue is made under the rules, as they provide that a Court
may, if it is so prescribed, grant temporary injunctions in order to prevent the ends of justice
from being defeated, and the word ‘prescribed’, according to s. 2, means ‘prescribed by
rules’, and that rr. 1 and 2 of O. 39 lay down certain circumstances in which a temporary
injunction may be issued.15 The appellant also contended that the Court, in the exercise of its
inherent jurisdiction, did not exercise its discretion properly, keeping in mind the facts of the
case.

13
Supra note 1, para 11
14
Supra note 1, para 13
15
Supra note 1, para 17

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The Supreme Court did not delve into the question of jurisdiction, it being the subject matter
in the suit at Asansol and also in the suit at Indore which hadn’t been decided by any of the
two courts.

Judgment

The judgment in this case was written by Justice Raghubar Dayal. After analysing cases from
different high courts, the Supreme Court held that the Courts have inherent jurisdiction to
issue temporary injunctions in circumstances which are not covered by the provisions of O.
39 of the Code. The reasoning behind this decision was that there exists no express provision
in s. 94 which provide specifically that a temporary injunction is not to be issued in cases
which are not mentioned in those rules of O. 39. 16 The Supreme Court further opined that the
provisions of the Code are not exhaustive and thatwhen the rules prescribe the circumstances
in which the temporary injunction can be issued, it simply implies that ordinarily, the Court is
not to use its inherent powers to make the necessary orders in the interests of justice, but is
merely to see whether the circumstances of the case bring it within the prescribed rule.

The Supreme Court also added that even without the s. 94 of the Code, the Court possess the
power of inherent jurisdiction and temporary injunction can be granted in the exercise of that
jurisdiction when it is absolutely necessary for the ends of justice to make such order 17, and
that the inherent powers of the Court are not controlled by the provisions of the Code as is
made clear in s. 151 of the Code.

Then the court referred to Padam Sen v. State of Uttar Pradesh18(which will be discussed in
Chapter 3 of this paper) and opined that the inherent power has not been conferred upon the
Court; it is a power inherent in the Court by virtue of its duty to do justice between the parties
before it, and it cannot be held that the provisions of the Code control the inherent power by
limiting it or otherwise affecting it.19

Next, while dealing with the question as to whether the Court had erred in issuing a
temporary injunction to the appellant restraining him from proceeding with the suit in the
Asansol Court, the Supreme Court opined that the inherent powers are to be exercised by the
Court in very exceptional circumstances, for which the Code lays down no procedure, so such

16
Supra note 1, para 19
17
Supra note 1, para 18
18
Padam Sen v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1961) 1 SCR 884
19
Supra note 1, para 23

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an order should not be made unless it is absolutely necessary for the ends of justice. 20 After
discussing some foreign judgments the court came to this conclusion that since the plaintiff of
the subsequent suit had sought to restrain the plaintiff of the earlier suit from proceeding with
his suit, in spite of the decision of the Calcutta High Court which had decided the issue of
jurisdiction of Asansol Court, this cannot be justified on general principles when the previous
suit has been instituted in a competent Court, and s. 10 of the code cannot be applied to stay a
previously instituted suit.

Moreover, the Supreme Court also observed that the Indore Court could not have issued an
injunction or direction to the Asansol Court not to proceed with the suit. The effect of issuing
an injunction to the plaintiff of the suit at Asansol, indirectly achieves the object which an
injunction to the Court would have done, and a court ought not to achieve indirectly what it
cannot do directly. Thus, the injunction order passed under the inherent jurisdiction of the
Court was set aside for being an order not necessary in the interest of justice or to prevent the
abuse of the process of the Court.21

ConcurringOpinion

Justice J.C. Shah agreed with the Court’s conclusion that the injunction order must be set
aside but, Justice Shah was of the view that the powers of courts, other than the Chartered
High Courtsin the exercise of their ordinary original civil jurisdiction to issue temporary
injunctions, are defined by the terms of s. 94(1)(c) and O. 39 of theCode, and a temporary
injunction may be issued only in those cases which come strictly within those rules, and
normally the civil courts have no power to issue injunctions by transgressing the limits
prescribed by the rule.22

Justice Shah was also of the view that inherent jurisdiction of the court to make order ex
debito justitiae is undoubtedly affirmed by s. 151 of the Code, but that jurisdiction cannot be
exercised so as to nullify the provisions of the Code, and where the Code deals expressly with
a particular matter, the provision should normally be regarded as exhaustive. 23 He relied on
the same case as that relied on by Justice Dayal, i.e., Padam Sen v. State of Uttar Pradesh
and reached to the conclusion that the power to issue injunctions may be exercised, but it
must be deemed to be not exercisable in any other manner or for purposes other than those set

20
Supra note 1, para 28
21
Supra note 2, para 40
22
Ibid
23
Supra note 2, para 42

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out in O. 39 rr. 1 and 2 of the Code.24 Ultimately, Justice Shah also said that the temporary
injunction order of the Indore Court should be set aside.

24
Supra note 2, para 44

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 CHAPTER 2: ISSUES RAISED

Inherent Powers of the Court vis-à-vis s. 151 of the Code

There exists an age-old and well-established principle that every court has power to act ex
debito justitiae to do that real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone it
exists. Also, it has an inherent duty to prevent abuse of the existing processes of the court. It
is in pursuance to this principle that the court, when the circumstances so require, act upon
the assumption of possession of inherent power. This well-established principle has also
received legislative recognition in s. 151 of the Code as ‘saving of inherent powers of the
Court’ which states that:

“Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent
power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of
justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court.”

It is clear from the reading of this section that it does not confer any powers, but only
indicates that there ‘is’ a power to make such orders as may be necessary for achieving the
ends of justice, and also to prevent an abuse of the process of the court. The court is not
powerless to grant relief when the ends of justice and equity so demand, because the powers
vested in the court are of a wide scope and ambit. And, since CPC is the fundamental law that
governs the operations of the courts, the power can be applied to support the provisions of the
code instead of overriding.

Since, the laws are just a medium to achieve justice and are not the end result, if the ordinary
rules of procedure do not cater to justice in any case, it becomes the duty of the court to
countermand those rules.So, for the ends of justice and for preventing the misuse of the court
processes, the court is allowed to apply such powers.These powers can help in curtailing the
litigation process, preventing multiplicity of proceedings and provide fair and proper justice.

This inherent power of the Court under s. 151 allows the Court:

 to recheck the orders to determine errors committed by the Court, if any;

 to nullify the orders which are illegal or passed without any proper jurisdiction;

 to consider subsequent events in the case;

 to eradicate the comments made against a judge;

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  to re-hear on merit or re-examines its order.

The two major principles to exercise inherent powers, i.e., to meet the ends of justice and to
prevent the abuse of process of the court, are visible in the actions of the Court listed above.
Remedies should be provided to the parties in some cases on the grounds of actus curiae
neminem gravabit, i.e., an act of the court shall prejudice no one, where there is an unfair use
of legal proceedings in order to achieve an improper advantage over a party.

This restriction, for practical purposes, on the exercise of these powers is not because these
powers are controlled by the provisions of the Code but because it should be presumed that
the procedure specifically provided by the Legislature for orders in certain circumstances is
dictated by the interests of justice.

Inherent Power of the Court vis-à-vis s. 94 of the Code

The cl. (c) of s. 94 was the centre of the issue in Manohar Lal case. It provides that:

“in order to prevent the ends of justice from being defeated the Court may, if it is
so prescribed, grant a temporary injunction.”

The word ‘prescribed’, according to s. 2, means ‘prescribed by rules’ and that rr. 1 and 2 of
O. 39 lay down certain circumstances in which a temporary injunction may be issued. But it
was observed in Manohar Lal case that there’s nothing in s. 94 which prevents the grant of
injunction in circumstances other than those mentioned in O. 39.

Further to avoid any misuse of the inherent power, the Manohar Lal case clarified the
position that this power of the court is limited to the extent that it cannot be exercised if its
exercise is inconsistent with, or comes into conflict with, any of the powers expressly or by
necessary implication conferred under the Code.If there are express provisions exhaustively
covering a particular topic, that give rise to a necessary implication that no power shall be
exercised in respect to that topic in any manner other than that prescribed by the said
provision.

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 CHAPTER 3: AUTHORITIES DISCUSSED IN MANOHAR LAL

Due to the nature of the findings of the Supreme Court it is pertinent to note and understand
the different authorities that the court used while elucidating its opinions.

Subramanian v. Seetharama Aiyar25

This case was an appeal to the Madras High Court against an injunction ordered by a
subordinate court in the exercise of inherent jurisdiction under s. 151 of the Code. The
Madras High Court held that an order of injunction can be issued only when the facts of the
casejustify the issue of an injunction under O. 39, rr. 1 and 2 of the Code. The Court further
added that the extraordinary jurisdiction possessed by the High Court is not possessed by any
of the subordinate Courts hence, lower Court does not have inherent jurisdiction to issue an
injunction apart from the provisions of O. 39 of the Code.26

But this decision along with Varadacharlu v. Narsimha Charlu,27Govindarajulu v. Imperial

Bank of India,28Karuppayya v. Ponnuswami,29 andMurugesa Mudali v. Angamuthu
Mudali30was not approved by the Supreme Court in Manohar Lal31case which is being
studied in this paper.

Dhaneshwar Nath Tewari v. Ghanshyam Dhar Misra32

In this case the question before the Allahabad High Court was whether the application for
leave to sue as a pauper amounted at that stage to a “suit” so that the order of injunction could
come under O. 39, r. 1 of the Code. It was held that the order could be passed by the court, in
the exercise of its inherent powers under s. 151 of the Code, in the interests of justice, for
restraining the defendant from appropriating or alienating the property which was the subject
matter of the litigation, without expressing any opinion on the question whether there was or
was not a “suit” before the court.33

Thus, this case presented the position that apart from the provisions of O. 39 of the Code, the
court has inherent jurisdiction to pass an order of temporary injunction providing for the
25
Subramanian v. Seetharama Aiyar 1948 SCC OnLine Mad 92
26
Supra note 25, page 542
27
AIR 1926 Mad 258
28
AIR 1932 Mad 180
29
AIR 1933 Mad 500 (2)
30
AIR 1938 Mad 190
31
Manohar Lal Chopra vs Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal 1962 Supp (1) SCR 450, at para 18
32
Dhaneshwar Nath Misra v. Ghanshaym Dhar Misra 1939 SCC OnLine All 28
33
Supra note 32, page 204

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necessary protection and security of the property which is the subject matter of the litigation
becausethe express provisions contained in the Code are not exhaustive. This case along with
Firm Bichchha Ram v. Firm Baldeo Sahai,34Bhagat Singh v. Jagbir Sawhney35and Chinese
Tannery Owners' Association v. Makhan Lal36were approved by the Supreme Court in the
present case under study.37

Padam Sen v. State of Uttar Pradesh38

In this case, the question before the Supreme Court was about the powers of the Court to
issue a commission in the exercise of its powers under s. 151 of the Code in circumstances
not covered by s. 75 and O. 26. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that:

“The inherent powers of the Court are in addition to the powers specifically
conferred on the Court by the Code. They are complementary to those powers
and therefore it must be held that the Court is free to exercise them for the
purpose mentioned in s. 151 of the Code when the exercise of those powers is not
in any way in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or
against the intentions of the Legislature.”39

Therefore, the Court in this case held that in exercise of the powers under s. 151 of the Code,
the Court cannot issue a commission for seizing books of account of plaintiff, i.e., a purpose
for which a commission is not authorized to be issued by s. 75 of the Code.

In Manohar Lal case40 the Courtrelied on this case to hold that the opinion clearly meant that
the inherent powers are not in any way controlled by the provisions of the Code as has been
specifically stated in s. 151 itself, but those powers are not to be exercised when their
exercise may be in conflict with what had been expressly provided in the Code or against the
intentions of the Legislature.41

34
AIR 1940 All 241
35
AIR 1941 Cal 670
36
AIR 1952 Cal 560
37
Supra note 1, para 18
38
Padam Sen v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1961) 1 SCR 884
39
Supra note 38, page 887
40
Supra note 1
41
Supra note 1, para 21

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Cohen v. Rothfield42

The Supreme Court in Manohar Lal case referred to this case which ponders upon the
question of issuing an order to a party restraining him from proceeding with any other suit in
a regularly constituted Court of law. The King’s Bench in Cohen had held that:

“Where it is proposed to stay an action on the ground that another is pending,

and the action to be stayed is not in the Court asked to make the order, the same
result is obtained by restraining the person who is bringing the second action
from proceedings with it. But, as the effect is to interfere with proceedings in
another jurisdiction, this power should be exercised with great caution to avoid
even the appearance of undue interference with another Court.”43

The Court thus observed that inherent jurisdiction to be resorted to with great care and on
ample evidence produced by the applicant that the action abroad is really vexatious and
useless. Now, what amounts to vexatious claim was described in the next case.

Hyman v. Helm44

In this case, the defendant had bought an action before the Chancery Division of the High
Court against the plaintiffs in San Francisco. The plaintiffs, in an action in England, prayed to
the Court to restrain the defendants from proceeding further with the action in San Francisco.
It was contended that it was vexatious for the defendants to bring the action in San Francisco
as the witnesses to the action were residents of England, the contract between the parties was
an English contract and that its fulfilment took place in England.

The Court here opined that where a party claims the interference of the Court to stop another
action between the same parties, the burden lies upon that party to show to the Court that the
multiplicity of actions is vexatious. So, if two actions are brought by the same plaintiff
against the same defendant in England for the same cause of action, then,prima facie that is
vexatious, and therefore the party who complains of such a multiplicity of actions had made
out a prima facie case for the interference of the Court.45

The Supreme Court in Manohar Lal46 relying on this decision observed that it is the plaintiff
of the subsequent suit who seeks to restrain the plaintiff of the earlier suit from proceeding
42
Cohen v. Rothfield (1919) 1 KB 410
43
Ibid, page 413
44
Hyman v. Helm LR (1883) 24 Ch. D. 531
45
Ibid, page 537
46
Supra note 1

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with his suit, which cannot be justified on general principles when the previous suit has been
instituted in a competent Court.47 The Court further added that the suit instituted by the
defendant at Asansol Court cannot be said to be instituted in anticipation of the Indore suit,
since defendant’s suit was a previously instituted suit. The Court also said that the question of
jurisdiction of the Asansol Court over the subject matter of the suit before it can be decided
by that Court and not the Indore Court, and finally held that the Indore Court could not have
issued an injunction or direction to the Asansol Court not to proceed with the suit.48

47
Supra note 1, para 30
48
Supra note 1, para 38

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 CHAPTER 4: BEARING ON SUCCEEDING JUDGMENTS

The case Manohar Lal Chopra v Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal (hereinafter, Manohar
Lal case) has been applied in 572 cases49 in various High Courts across the country and in the
Supreme Court as well.

The first case in which Manohar Lal case was applied came before Allahabad High Court as
Ram Yagya & Anr. v Jagannath Prasad & Ors.50In this case neither the counsel nor the
appellant appeared on the date of the hearing, and the respondent having appeared the appeal
was dismissed for default of the appellant under r. 17 of O.41 of the Code. After the expiry of
30 days, which is the period of limitation prescribed under s. 168 of the Indian Limitation
Act for readmission of an appeal dismissed for default, the appellant moved another
application invoking r. 19 of O. 41as well as s. 151 of the Code. It was contended that special
provisions such as r. 19 of O. 41would not bar the court from exercising its inherent
jurisdiction under s.151 of the Code because the extraordinary circumstances of the case
would justify the court in overcoming the bar of limitation by invoking its inherent
jurisdiction.But the Allahabad High Court relying on Manohar Lal case held that when there
is a clear provision in the Code itself and a particular case falls fairly and squarely within
such provision then it is not possible to invoke the inherent powers under s. 151 merely to get
over the bar of limitation.51

In A.K.A. CT.V. CT. Meenakshisundaram Chettiar v. A.K.A. CT.V. CT. Venkatachalam

Chettiar52 reliance was placed on behalf of the respondent in support of the contention that
amendment of pleadings cannot be made under s. 151, if the case does not fall within the
special provisions of O. 6, r. 17 of the Code. The Madras High Court found considerable
delay in coming forward with the petition hence, the petitioner was not entitled to have the
amendments prayed for made in the plaint. Relying on Manohar Lal case the High Court held
that ‘the inherent powers are to be exercised by the Court in very exceptional circumstances,
for which the Code lays down no procedure’ – this is a well-recognised principle, if a case
does not fulfil this criterion, there is no scope to resort to s. 151for setting aside such a
decree.

49
SCC OnLine
50
Ram Yagya & Anr. v. Jagannath Prasad & Ors. 1962 SCC OnLine All 152
51
Ibid, para 8
52
A.K.A. CT.V. CT. Meenakshisundaram Chettiar v. A.K.A. CT.V. CT. Venkatachalam Chettiar1978 SCC
OnLine Mad 216 

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The Court further said that s. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be taken to nullify
the provisions of the code, namely, s. 10 of the Code of Civil procedure. The appellant has to
establish that s. 10 applies in the instant case and whole of the subject- matter in both the
suits are identical failing which the appeal must fail.

Recently, on 28 January 2021, in Smt. Lata Ashok Khandagale v Smt. Kamal Changdeo
Sonawane53the Bombay High Court applied Manohar Lal case and said that rr. 1 and 2 of O.
39 of the Codeare not exhaustive and the situations not covered therein could be met by
passing suitable orders in fit cases under ss. 94 and 151 of the Code. The High Court also
held that:

“In deserving cases, where it is imminently required, the Court is not powerless
and may pass appropriate order of temporary injunction at the instance of
defendant in the interest of justice. The Court cannot be mute and silent spectator
to the illegal act and exercise of force by the plaintiff in dispossessing the
defendant, in the garb of Court's order of ad-interim injunction and once the
Court finds that the plaintiff has taken the law in his own hand and by abusing
the process of Court has sought to dispossess the defendant, the Court may not
only pass an appropriate order for restoration but also it becomes bounden duty
of the Court to ensure that the defendant who has been dispossessed by force is
restored back his possession.”54

The Calcutta High Court had to deal with a situation in the case ofShyam Sel & Power
Limited v Bahubali Promoters Private.55The respondent relied upon the case of J.T.
Republike v Rungta & Sons56 to plead before the Court that a suit under s. 151 of CPC can be
stayed if the matter in issue is “directly and substantially in issue” in the previously instituted
suit, namely, the suit for eviction and hence the second suit for mesne profits is liable to be
stayed under s. 10 of the Code. But the Calcutta High Court observed that the judgment relied
upon by the respondent has not taken into consideration the Supreme Court judgment
of Manohar Lal57 wherein it has been made clear that when there is an express provision in
the code, any departure therefrom is not permissible. So, where s. 10 is the ruling section,
recourse cannot be had under s. 151 of the Code. Moreover, the causes of action in both the

53
Lata Ashok Khandagale v Smt. Kamal Changdeo SonawaneWrit Petition 3550 of 2020
54
Ibid, para 16
55
2019(1) RCR(Rent) 386
56
AIR 1966 Cal 382
57
Supra note 1

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suits were different.The suit before the City Civil Court was for eviction due to sub- letting
whereas the instant suit was for recovery of mesne profits. Hence, s. 10 would not apply and
recourse to s. 151 cannot be taken to nullify the provisions of s. 10 of the code.

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 CONCLUSION

This judgment Manohar Lal Chopra v Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal is of importance
while deciding two issues, firstly, whether the court has power to grant temporary injunction
in cases which are not covered by rr. 1&2, O. 39, and secondly, whether this power is
absolute and can be used to nullify an express provision of the Code.

The most important question to be determined in this case was whether the injunction issued
by the Indore Court exercising its inherent power to stay the proceedings in the Asansol
Court was justified when such a circumstance is not covered under O. 39. The Supreme Court
in this case was of the opinion that s. 151 of the Code is a saving clause which itself saves the
inherent power of the court which it already possesses from being affected by other
provisions of the Code. So, the court can grant temporary injunction if is necessary to serve
the ends of justice. The court also looked into the various High Court decisions which
provided a conflicting view and thus clarified the stand point by disapproving some and
approving others.

Then the court went on to decide that whether the circumstances of the case warranted the
Indore Court to invoke its inherent power and whether the order passed using this power was
justified. The court in thus regard held that the inherent powers can be invoked only in
exceptional circumstances but not in such a manner that it conflicts an express provision of
the Code. In this case, the court came to the conclusion that the interim injunction granted by
the Indore Court goes against the provision mentioned in s. 10 of the Code, since the suit in
Indore Court was instituted later than the suit in Asansol Court. Moreover, the Court also
observed that the Indore Court could not direct the Asansol Court to not proceed with the suit
since it was a competent court.

This case has been instrumental in clarifying the stance on inherent power of the court and
when it can be invoked. An analysis of subsequent judgments shows that the courts have
relied upon Manohar Lal case while invoking inherent powers and the condition of
exceptional circumstances has also been complied with. The courts have also followed that
any departure from an express provision of the Code which in effect conflicts the provision is
not permitted.

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 BIBLIOGRAPHY

 CK Takwani, Civil Procedure with Limitation Act, 1963 (7th edn, Eastern Book
Company 2016)
 Mulla, The Code of Civil Procedure(19th edn, Lexis Nexis Butterworths 2017)
 Sarkar, Code of Civil Procedure Vol. 1(12thedn, Lexis Nexis Butterworths Wadhwa
2016)

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