case 3 SOUTHWEST AIRLINES: IS “LUV” AT TI At the beginning of 2019, Southwest Airlines fared thitd in the rankings of the best U.S. Airlines released by the Wall Street Journal, Delta Airlines ranked first and Alaska Ailines ranked second. These rankings were based on a composite set of parameters forming a scorecard. South: west did best on twohhour tarmae delays and worst on mis handled baggage (see Exhibit 1), The Dallas-based airline, famously known for its highly efficient and successful “low: cost” operations, seemed to face other challenges as well. It paid millions over the past decade to sete safety violations. This included fines for flying planes that needed repairs. In the past nine years, there were at least two incidents where the roofs of Southwest planes opened up inflight ‘The worst incident took place in April 2018. One of the engines on Soutwest Flight 1380 blew apart at 32,000 feet over Pennsylvania, ennifer Riordan, a 43-year-old mother of two, was blown partway out of a broken window. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) said a fan blade that had snapped off the engine wes showing sins of ‘metal fatigue. Later, the NTSB chairman, Robert Sumwalt, in the flight was missing a fan blade. This incident resulted in one fatality and seven others were Seopa Sate Uns, Aan Ese Poe Uses reory Det, Tae Unies Terar Dall, to reas ass rear duceion ‘Toe cat ya reed eb menor a fen or inelletne hung a ednsuae sens, Copii © 209 Daa and Bet HE LIMIT?" also hurt. In another incident in 2016, an engine on a South ‘west jet blew apast over Florida. This was also attributed to ‘metal fatigue, or wear and tear, hurting debris that struck the fuselage and tai. No one was hurt in that incident. Further, the union that represented its mechanics ac- cused Southwest Aitlines of pressuring their maintenance workers to cut comers to keep planes flying. A Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) investigation of these whi teblower complaints found mistrust of management to the extent of hurting the airline's safety* ‘Another development in the industry that also threat- ‘ened the company’s low-cost position was the advent of the ‘Ultra Low Cost Carriers” (ULC). These carriers are even more barebones and keep their basic fares very low, thus ‘eroding Southwest's lowprice advantage. They, of cours, ‘charge exra for everything including baggage handling.’ ‘As the investigation into the deadly engine failure con- tinued, Southwest Chairman and CEO, Gary Kelly, was faced with several questions regarding its low-cost business model. Was the low-cost business model, which put ite planes through frequent takeoffs and landings, putting the passengers at risk? Would Southwest withstand the on slaught of the ULCCs and comtinve to have its low-cost ad vantage to remain profitable in 2019 and beyond? Emergence, Growth, and Transition* Southwest Ailines began in response to an entzepreneurial opportunity that existed for low-cost, hasslefree travel EXHIBIT 1 USS. Arines Rankings Released at the Beginning of January 2019 1 Dela Data === Alaska Southwest «Spin. Detta Southwest 2 Alaska Alaska. = Spt ‘lta Alaska JetBlue JetBlue Alaska 3 Southwest Spirit Alaska Southwest Frontier Deka United Deka 4 Spin Southwest Southwest Spit spirit United Ameriean—_JetBtue 5S JetBlue" United “United American Datta Alaska Southwest Unted © Unted® American Frontler-—=«United=s‘JetBlue == Frontier == Alaska’ American 7 American JetBlue JetBlue JetBlue United == Southwest Spirit, «Spt 2 Frontier ‘Frontier American —-Frontier-« American «= American Frontier ‘Frontier pss comiaresthehesand-ore asain a 2054688052 (CE CASE 2» SOUTHWEST AIRLINES: IS *LUV" AT THE LMT? Strategic Management: Text and Sour 62039, Casesbetween the cities of Houston, Dallas, and San Antonio— the Golden Triangle that was experiencing rapid economic and poptlation growth during the late 1960s, Rollin King, « San Antonio entrepreneur who owned a small commuter air service, and Herh Kelleher, a New Jersey-born, New ‘York University Law School graduate who moved to San “Antonio in 1967 to practice law, pooled the seed money to start Southwest Aifines in response to this opportunity. “Alteran initial rough four years caused by the major aitlnes Southwest got its fights to takeo‘t in 1971 with Dallas Love Field as its base and it crossed every major benchmark in the following years. It remained the consistently profitable discount carrier year after year and became @ major airline in 1990 by crossing the $1 billion revenue mark. Focused fn the business travelers who needed to be “on-time, every time,” its business model had several intriguing elements. For example, by-passing the traditional “huband-spoke” configuration and offering short-haul, pointte-point airline service allowed savings on fundamentals such as gate fees because they could fly out of secondary airports additional savings were through elimination of other fringe services like no assigned seats, no meals, no baggage transfers, or few or no reservations through travel agents. The choice of operating @ new and uniform fleet of aircraft saved mainte- nance costs and facilitated optimum: utilization of human resources. Brilliant fuel hedges resulted in buge cost savings for years. In addition, the chariematic leadership of Herb Kelleher, and a strong company culture and incentives fo cused on tight costcontrol, made Southwest a legendary airline (see Exhibit 2 for Southwest's Mission Statement), In 2004, the leadership transitioned to Gary Kelly, a long-term employee and the former Chief Finaneial Officer of Southwest Ailines. The same year, Kelly heralded a se- ries of initiatives to put the airline on # higivgrowth trajec- tory. Thete included the code-sharing agreements beginning with ATA (in response to AivTran eyeing the Chicago mar. ket), a move into the Philadelphis market (a stronghold of USAir), and kicking off « campaign to repeal the Wright EXHIBIT 2. Mission Statement The mission of Southwest Airlines is dedication tothe highest quality of customer service delivered witha sense of ‘warmth, frlendliness, nclvidual pride, and company spit. ‘We are committed to provide our Employees stable work ‘environment with equal opportunity for learning and personal growth. Creativity and innovation are encouraged {or improving the effectweness of Southwest Alrines. Above all, Employees wil be provided the same concern respect, ‘and caring attude within the organization that they are ‘expected to share externally with every Southwest Customer, DOerEmplaer Seaweed Strategic Management: Text and Cases Amendment* that could boost Southwest’s ability to fly ‘uninterrupted services out of its traditional fort, Dallas Love Field airport In 2007, a nev fare structure was introduced that in cluded Business Selec. which gave customers the option of priority in boarding. With a new $40 fee that allowed cus tomers to be among the fist 15 passengers to board the plane, this new fare structure was definitly taxgeted at woo. ing some of the business travelers who wanted a litle more than no frills. However, with this move, Southwest managed to irritate some of its most loyal customers. While South west continued its bags-flytee policy, which had eontsib- ‘led to increasing its market share, Kelly declared “never say never” when probed about his company's plans to start charging baggage checkin fees in 2013. Southwest introduced, an indlight entertainment portal with free live and one demand television, offering 20 lve channels and 75 television episodes from popular series. I also introduced Imernet ac cess for $8 a day per device on W-Fi-enabled aircraft ‘While all these were significant departures ftom the orig nal Southwest business model, there were two ther important strategic changes initiated in Kelly's regime. The first was ex pansion into the international markets that began in Decem- ber 2008 when the company agreed to provide an online link to Westle's booking portal to help its customers book flights to Canada, Later, Southwest formally filed an application with the Department of Transportation forthe right to fy its own planes to Canada. As of January 2019, the company had ‘operations to over I destinations internationally. A significant chunk of the company’s revenues came (rom international ‘operations—approximately $595 million of the operating reve- ‘nes in 2017, $383 milion in 2016, and $287 milion in 2015, respectively, were attributable 10 foreign operations. The re- _mainder ofthe operating revenues, approximately $206 billion in 2017, $20.0 billion in 2016, and $19.5 billion in 2015, respec- tively, were attibutabe fo domestic operations! The second most significant departure was moving away from the organic growth strategy with the acquisition of AirTran Holdings Inc., the parent company of AirTran Airways (AirTran), for a combination of $14 Dillion cash, and Southwest Airlines common stock, The acquisition, am nounced in September 2010, was only the third in South: west’s history. It gave the discounter its first service in Atlanta, a Delta Air Lines fortress for decades, and more flights from New York and Washington, DC. Little more than a year aiter the transaction officially closed, Southwest was debubbing AirTran’s Atlanta hub and conceding markets to Delta. AirTran’s Atlanta hub had been Southwest's motivation in acquiring AirTren, in addition to further pushing into international markets “To make “To Wt aed eon y Priel ey Cate os FS 19h rented nota gn fo Dal Lane Faldo aspera and four borden sate-Oilaona. Lean New Me, aa Arkansas Net cy i tea bat igs pond tose ates, bat a bud aes ea ‘CASE 3 SOUTHWEST AIRLINES:IS-LUV® ATTHE LIMIT? COEXHIBIT 3 Cost Svucture Information Available asof Janvary2019 ——_saaries, wages, and beneis Fuetand a Wantenance materials andrepas Aircraft reals Landing fees an other rentals Deprecatin and omrtzation ‘ther operating expenses Total ‘Souce: Sete 1 igs wh BC. 218, ‘that shift in strategy has taken a huge effort, but asa leading domestic carrer, it was time ‘that we think about stepping fou.” said Kelly” Following what could possibly be the siow- est mesger in history, Southwest successfully completed it fon December 28, 2014, when the last AirTran flight flew, retracing its original Atlanteto-Tampa route of October 1993 (AirTran was called Valuelet at that time). “The com pany expected total acquisition and integration costs to be approximately $550 million (before profit sharing and taxes) upon completing the transition of AieTran 717-2005! ‘out ofthe feet in 2015," said company officials, The Triple-Pressure on Bottomline Increasing Costs of Human Resources. At approx imately 41 percent of total company operating expenses, salaries, wages, and benefits expenses were Southwest's largest operating costs, The terms ofits collective-arg ing agreements limited the company’s ability to reduce these costs.” Approximately $3 percent of its labor force was unionized. These employees had pay scale increases as a result of contractual rate increases. Additionally, there were new collective bargaining agreements ratified during 2016 with the majority of Southwest's unionized employees, {including its pilots and flight attendants, among others. Meanwhile, other unionized employees, including its ‘mechanics and material specialists were also in negotia: tions for labor agreements for the last six years. In Septem ber 2017, Southwest Airlines mechanic rejected a proposed. contract ofler that fell short of the pay rates they wanted. While Southwest described the pay rates and retirement customer Boi? was eet rm Boeing 73 whi bs acnaly ‘seuss cou. Tay, tod col epee nerd (10 CASE 3 SOUTHWEST AIRLINES: IS “LUV” AT THE LMT? Strategic Management: Text and 476 457 236 246 065 070 013 018 on 08 07 082 198 170 1148 1122 benefits in the proposed contract as industry leading, union leaders had opinions otherwise. According to the union leaders, the contract did not measure up to the higher his- torical rates Southwest mechanics eazned relative to the test of the industry and it id not do enough to compensate ‘members for their industrydeading productivity." Any ‘changes to the contract term could put additional burden on the low-cost competitive position, Increasing Fuel Costs." Jet fuel and oil represented approximately 22 percent of the company’s operating ‘expenses as of the beginning of 2019 and represented the second largest operating cost (see Exhibit 3). The cost of fuel could be extremely volatile and unpredictable and fluc- tated de to several factors beyond the company’s contol for example, conflicts and hostilities in oil producing areas, problems in domestic refining or pipeline capacity due to adverse weather conditions and natural disasters, or changes in currency exchange rates, Sovthwests ability to effectively address fue price increases and pass them to the consumers could be limited by factors such as it historical low-are reputation, the portion of its customer base pur ‘chasing travel for leisure purposes, and the risk that higher fares will drive a decrease in demand, This risk could partly bbe managed by utilizing overthecounter fuel derivative instruments to hedge & portion of its future jet fuel pur- chases. However, energy prices could fluctuate significantly in a selatively short amount of time. Since the company used a vasiety of different derivative instruments at differ ent price points, there was an inherent risk that the fuel derivatives it used would not provide adequate protection against significant increases in fuel prices and could infact result in hedging losses. Fora long time, the company alto ‘benefitted from accounting standards inthe United States, It faced the risk that its fuel derivatives would not be effec tive or that they would no longer qualify for hedge accounting CasesEXHIBIT 4 Southwest Aitinas Firm Dalveries and 2018 26 5 4 5 4 aa Options fer Boeing 737-700, 737-800, 2019 = 7 18 - - 22 737 MAX 7, and 737 2020 5 5 25 5 - 2s MAX 8 Airratt 2021 - - 34 = - 38 2022 5 5 a “4 5 Pa 2023 = 2 22 23 = 57 2024 5 " 20 a 5 6a 2025 - - 40 36 = 76 2026 = 5 = 36 5 36 2027 = = = a = 23 ‘Total 26 30 1970) 155 ao an (a) The company a ecbinto uosie7 MAX new of 87 MAX fa (by Tote agit in ets rom vue tied pain Score: Soto 14 ig ath SEC, 208 under applicable aecounting standards. This problem could have ben severe without the recent increases in shale oil produetion in the United States Several efforts were underway to reduce fuel consumption and improve fue efficiency. Southwest started modernizing its leet and also initiated other fuel initiatives. It was the first airline company in North America to offer scheduled service uilzing Boeing's new 737 MAX 8 airraft. This airraft ex tered service in fourth quarter 2017. The Boeing 737 MAX § ‘was expected to significantly reduce fuel use and CO, emis sions, There were 13 Boeing 737 MAX & aircraft in its fleet by the end of 2017, Southwest was also the launch customer {or the Boeing 737 MAX T series aiscra., with deliveries ex- pected to begin in 2019. It had placed frm orders for 197 of 737 MAX 8 aircraft and 30 of 737 MAX 7 aircraft (see Exhibit 4). These aircrafts would also have lower mainte- nance costs since they are new and they are unlikely to in- crease training costs since they are all large Boeing 737 aircrafts, continuing the Boeing 737 tradition at Southwest Competition and the ULCC threat? With moderate itmprovement in economic conditions aves the last few years and an increased focus on costs by mos ailines, competition has intensified in the ane industry. Southwest faced tough competition irom major US. aifines including American ‘Aislnes, Delta Ai Lines, and United Aihnes and other low cost competitors, including JeBlue Airways (sce Exhibits 5 and 6 for selected financial information). Southwest * Conte aie (ance moraine athe Ute uae) ee wt UAL Corpeaion (pet company ef Une Any 200, Th teks {ened ned Continental Hangs Ie, (UAL) Strategic Management: Text and Cases es eining 209 competed with these other airlines on virtually all of its scheduled routes, In addition, a new category of ultraow cost carriers (ULCCS), for example, Frontier and Spirit Air lines, emerged as a credible threat (Refer to Exhibit 1) The ULCCs represented a completely different ap. proach to the traditional air travel model. While similar to the disruptive innovation like Southwest Airlines in its in tial stages—when converting nonusers to users of ais travel the ULCCs are yet significantly different in several ways Allegiant Airlines perfected this model offering low-fare, high-value vacation packages from secondary airports 10 point in Florida and to Las Vegas. ‘The revenue stream for a ULCC was not based on ait tickets, the core revenve for low-vost airlines like Southwest, bat on purchase of ancillary products such as hotel and tour packages. The model evolved to be even less dependent fon Yacationjleisure travel. A ULCC aimed to stimulate travel decisions by offering very low fares and providing a nonstop routing where there was none, even if only for a few times a week, By offering a high valueso-cost equation forthe consumer, these aislines aimed to divert discretionary dollars into air travel, Unlike Southwest, the ULCCs were notin the business of connecting people and destinations. The stimulant of de- mand in the ULCC model was fares and not the need to get to a destination. Typically, a ULCC entered markets that it thought had latent potential, offered several fights, and then monitored the results. IFthe expectations about trafic materialized, it offered more services at that airport. If expectations did not materialize or the traffic was less productive than at other points, the ULCC moved out ‘Quickly. Wit the exception of some operations by Frontier CASE 3: SOUTHWEST AIRLINES: 15 “LUV” ATTHELMIT? citEXHIBIT 5 Southwest Aines Co, Consldated Passenger Stetemert of Income (anions except per Freight share amount " Other Tota operating revenues 20455 19.763 19058 175 1m m™ 4335 1210 1.980 21,965 24,146 20,289 Saas, wages, ng bene Fucland ot aintenance materials and repairs Landing fees and aiport rentals ere ‘ther operating expenses Tal operating expenses ‘OPERATING INCOME lon and amortization 1548 1.308 6186 asi 4076 1107 1.001 1304 1282 1201 1218 2825 2847 18,759 17738 3,206 3.407 Interest expense Captalred interest Interest income ‘ther gains fosses net ‘ota other expenses income) INCOME BEFORE INCOME TAXES PROVISION FOR INCOME TAKES NET INCOME [NET INCOME PER SHARE, BASIC (5) [NET INCOME PER SHARE, DILUTED () ‘Cash dividends declared per common share (6) at Denver, these aislines did not have their own tusf nor did they operate connecting hubs. In this model, airplanes were ‘moved around the country when opportunities were spotted, ULCC flight schedules fited their fleet availability and not necessarily n timings that were most preferred by customers ‘Alongside Allegiant, Frontier. Spirit, and Sua Country were the other prominent players in this gense. They repre sented about 7 percent of all US. asine departing seats by late 2018 and were expected to grow to over 12 percent by 2020, Southwest in 2019 As of January 2019, Southwest Airlines offered services to lover 100 destinations throughout the United States, Mexico, (12 CASE 3» SOUTHWEST AIRLINES: IS “LUV" AT THE LMT? Strategic Management: Text and 1m 14 12 29) 9) n 69) 5) 4 8 mn n 2 102 n 3,164 3.288 3.450 698 2 1287 2.465 3357 2.183 430 558 aa 429 557 345 6050 4750 3750 and the Caribbean. It operated more than 3,800 flights a day including more than 500 roundtrip maskets.* Its interna tional footprint expanded to over 14 destinations covered through 16 international gateway cities. The company re- ‘mained profitable at of 2018, Tt made significant technology investments and completed its single largest technology pro: ect im its history in the ecent years to completely transition its reservation system to the Amadeus Altea Passenger Ser vice System. The new reservation system wat designed to improve Hight scheduling and inventory management. It ‘would enable operational enhancements to manage fight di rruptions, such as those caused by extreme weather cond tions. Additional international grov and other foundational CasesEXHIBIT 6 Selected Financial Information of Major Competitors of Southwest Anes Enterprise vlue fn) at 4654 Market capitalization ftaday) (on) 32.39 1693 Proft margin (8) na aa Operating margin) saan 1 Priceto-eamings tio" 1053 595 Net income (bn) 246 Mt Gross profit on) 125 1189 Revenue fn) 2197 a4se Return on Assets) mm 388 Return on Eau 8) ast wa7 Earnings before interes, ax, and deprecation (EBITDA bo) 437 561 Tota debt (on) 338 34.29 Book value per share 1158 037 Dilated eS 429 208 502 3517 ent 345 2445 553 385 515 245 1193 215 oa 718 744 198 394 213 ons 112 1338 257 ae “a 186 57 52 Nia 2353 2265 407 138 602 12 116 1473 157 zo 3565 14a 587 188 06 Score: Yao finance: Thomson Rees, EDGAR Onine an Msi Cap, ena 1, 201, EBETDA, and operational capabilities were expected to get a boos. ‘The company continued to invest in technology to optimize other aspects of its operations. The progressive moderniza- tion ofits flet was also expected to facilitate cost control, Nevertheless, the mid-eat rankings suggested Southwest faced stiff competition from both the traditional carriers and the ULCCs. The company’s stock was down by 20 per- cent in 2018, The concerns about is planes and people com tinued. Amidst increasing fuel cost concerns, the company ‘was expected to slow its expansion plans and capacity. Is Southwest on the gliding path to history? ENDNOTES. 1 MeLaugin, EC. To B Sones, 2018. NTSB. Engen ely Southwest et ieient missing a fan Made. pe /wwwem co) 201/04/T}usipalacepbiasotavesighemecenelandig! indent, Koenig D. 2018 Soathwes ities has been aed wih fies, ‘nin ety complaints hs wn ticagtrivane com busines ftaoutbwestauinssaleyanesqaso 2018042409. 5. Boyd, M. 208, Utzon cot atthe new widest anes Bee ‘ww rbescom/stes/meboy201/08/0fuadonenstenrie Hethenewonleaterahness63726064530, Strategic Management: Text and Cases 4 This section dams heey fom the cave uy “Soutien: [LUV soaring” by Dara, N, Hines A and Dest GG. pbisied 11 Svotae Management Text ond Cases by Des. GG Lapis. T per MeNanara 2014 MeGrawHll Conpanes NY. Soutnet Anes, Dk ing, 2018 ipso go Archives! gra 580/0000952340 18000031 23120110 Soute tp warms amstoryfiodaynest/201505/08) eathwestcetbigatlntauddeeoresiranetin 204017) Soure Joss, Chris. Seas announce it neato igh ww aoa omy eavel ig 204/01/2 acu Inanehesinieratonaerics! 49301). Sout Mayon. Southwest Aittes tps $1 Sion. hs wn. asows couse asin 201S/022)oulestaies ope oiioninanmalprtiscrsissine! Southwest Aulnes, 104 ig, 2018 bps was gov Acie dg aa92580/0000092380800031 23120110, Shine. .201 Southwest Aitines mechanics onewbelningy eet propose cotatt. Dla Moran New bse dalasbews az) Sunny soutivestaines 2018/03) fsoulhwesaiinermetaniee reraelningveetgopestéconzit This subsection days heey om the company’s 1OX ngs with Ths subsection drs heavily om te are metoned in Endo 3. ‘Company webs. ‘Company’ 10 ing wi SEC. 201 2 (CASE 3 SOUTHWEST ARUNES:I*LUV" AT THE LIMIT? C13case 4 ZYNGA: IS THE GAME OVER?* In 2019, Zynga was optimistic. In an interview, CEO Frank Gibeau, said, "We're set up for a really strong 2019. We hhave a good lineup of games to create the base for us, and then we have more than nine games being built right now that will come out over the next couple of years, with a bunch coming in soft launch"! ‘While battling some rough tides, the company had gar nered its reputation as one with inconsistent leadership. In 2013, founder Mark Pincus stepped down and handed the charge to Don Mattrick, a 15-year employee of Electronic Arts expecting to tuen the company around. In April 2015, Don Mattrick left the position, and Pincus returned as (CEO for the second time. Justa year later in March 2016, Zynga announced the replacement of Pincus by the new ‘CEO Frank Gibeau, another 20year employee of Elec: tronic Arts, again expecting to turn around the company. Zynga’s lack of consistent leadership had been critica to ‘not formulating an effective turnaround strategy that might have led to progress. Throughout the revolving door of CEO replacements, Zynga had not developed a substan- tially successful new game. Consequently, ils revenues have been falling over the past years accompanied by consistent net losses. The company eventually made a comeback under Gibeau's leadership with strong acquisitions. In less than two years, Zynge acquired Peak Games’ casual card game studio, Gram Games and 80 percent of Small Giant Games, maker of Empires and Puzzles, for $560 million. Though Zynga’s revenue rose by 5 percent 10 $670 million by the end of 2018, it stil posted a net loss of $15 million for the year (sce Exhibits 1 and 2), In 2018, their top three online game revenue generating games were Zynga Poker, CSR Racing 2, and Hit It Rich! Slots. In another attempt at innovation, Zynga launched Wonks’s World of Candy in 2018, Alter years of struggling tw introduce new bit games and failing to combat the decline of formerly blockbuster properties like Farmville. the com- pany has been focusing on geting the most out of evergreen franchises like Zynga Poker, Words with Friends, and CSR Racing 2 by keeping them alive with updates. The fight :0 build new games that catch the audiences attention might be hard, but Zynga’s announcement of a multiyear agree: ment with Disney to develop a new Free-ToPlay mobile Star ‘Wars™ game brings an existing fandom as their audience. Ts ae ws developed by raul sents Ee 8. Engen Profesor tebe nee sr heunon Capri © 2019 Alen Bnet (C14 CASE 4 ZYNGA1S THE GAME OVER? Strategic Management: Text and Zynga’s Background Atte time it incorporated in October 2007, Zynga had be- ‘ome a dominant player in the online gaming field, almost entirely through the ute of socal medi platfocms. Located in San Francisco, the company was named by CEO Mark Pincus to pay tribute to is deceased beloved pet bulldog Zynga. Although this might have seemed whimsical, Zynga was actually 4 quite powerful company. Exemplifying Zynga's prominence, Facebook was reported to have ‘earned roughly 12 percent of its revenue from the opera tions of Zymga's virtual merchandise sales” ‘Zynea’s collection of games continued to expand, with more and more success stories emerging. A relative new: comet to the marke, its quick success was astonishing However, Zyng'simpiesive financials were possibly at ik because of what some considered questionable decision raking. Many of Zmga’s competitors, and even some part ners, were displeased wih be company’s actions and bee. to show iti the form of ligation. Agincour, a plait a 4 lawsuit brought against Zynga, sated, “Zyaga's remati- ale growth bas not been diiven by its own ingenuity Rather it has been widely reported that Zynge’s business ‘model is to copy creative ideas and game design from other game developers and thea use is matket power to bulldoze the games’ originators."' If lawsuits and ethical is- sues continued to arise for Zynga, sts powerful bulldog ould start looking more like « poodle. In January 2019, Zynga received $12 milion related tothe settlement ofthe derivative ization ces fr insider trading against the de rectors ofthe online gaming company: The Products With an abundance of software developess, the ability to create and distribute online games increases by the day, and the demand to play them is equally high. However, while ‘many people find these online games fun and, better yet ‘therapeutic, others cannot understand the hype. The best ‘way to understand the sudden infatuation is to view online gaming as simply a means of relaxation. In the movies, at least large executive offices are often shown with putting greens. dartboards, or even a bar fll of alcoholic beverages, These amenities are all meant to serve the same purpose: to relieve stress during a hard day's work, ‘We have all been there and looked for @ way to cope. How- ver, few of us have the opportunity to use such things as pulting greens to unwind at the workplace, And even if we ddd, how long could we afford to engage in such an activity before being pulled back to our desks? Cases