Doh Covid 19 Response

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The Philippine response to COVID-19 has been called as one of the harshest lockdowns in the

entire globe, the wearing of masks and social seclusion were tightly enforced and entire provinces and
cities were placed under lockdown. Mobility was also prohibited. Under the Interagency Task Force
(IATF) on Emerging Infectious Diseases, which is led by the Department of Health, the Philippine
government mounted a multi-sectoral response to the COVID-19 (DOH).

The Philippines took a number of measures, including establishing a community quarantine in


Metro Manila that later spread to Luzon and other regions of the nation; increasing the number of licensed
testing labs nationwide from one national reference laboratory run by the Research Institute of Tropical
Medicine (RITM); and working to ensure that its healthcare system can handle surge capacity, which
includes the funding of services and the management of cases requiring special care. In order to
detect COVID-19 instances, comprehend disease dynamics and trends, and locate hotspots of disease
transmission, surveillance is used.

Early in the outbreak, the Department of Health added COVID-19 to the list of illnesses that must
be reported to the government, making sure that data was being gathered to help determine the best
course of action. Using already-in-place surveillance technologies allowed for the quick identification of
instances as well as the detection of anomalous clusters. The answer also depends on contact tracing. It is
a mechanism to identify close contacts who should be quarantined as well as to detect and isolate
illnesses. It enables the investigation's system to follow the spread of illnesses as well as the
circumstances, locales, occasions, or other channels where transmission has taken place or may have been
accelerated.

To increase the functionality of the previous COVID-19 information system, the DOH
Epidemiology Bureau created COVID KAYA, a case and contact tracing tracking system for epidemic
and surveillance officers, healthcare professionals, and laboratory-based users. Also, it is crucial for
people to comprehend the situation, be aware of it, and take precautions to safeguard their health, their
families, and the greater community. This requires efficient communication with communities. Through
the release of numerous communication materials on the dangers of COVID-19 and how people should
take precautions through traditional and social media, the DOH increased the spread of information.

These endeavors did not, however, come without shortcomings. Logistics support is a crucial
component of the response because COVID-19 calls for a lot of moving parts and supplies. There have
been numerous reports about the DOH's inability to offer technical assistance in the recalibration of PPE
standards and necessary supplies. One of the widely contested concerns surrounding the DOH's response
to COVID19 was the shortage of crucial COVID-19 commodities including vaccines. The Philippines is
receiving its first dosages of the Pfizer vaccine at a discounted price as a lower middle-income nation
owing to the World Health Organization program known as COVAX. The assistance program, which
aims to provide 2 to 3 billion doses this year, was established to ensure that the race for vaccines among
wealthy nations did not leave poorer countries in the dark.

However, the first 117,000 vials of the two-dose vaccine that COVAX arranged are only enough
to vaccinate 56,000 of the roughly 1.7 million health workers who are at the top of the country's priority
list for immunization, according to the spokesman for the Philippine COVID-19 Task Force. One of the
DOH COVID19 Response's main shortcomings was the lack of a more aggressive rollout of
vaccines. Moreover, the country's hesitation to receive vaccinations has been a problem for the DOH. The
Philippines' administration is aware that the only way to end the current problem is by immunizing the
populace. Yet, many Filipinos are suspicious, and vaccination uptake is still dangerously low, despite
the fact that health professionals say vaccination is an essential instrument in putting a stop to the
pandemic.

Around 68% of respondents in a Social Weather Stations (SWS) study of 1,200 people in May
2020 said they were unsure or opposed to getting the vaccine. Their main worry was that the vaccine
would have fatal side effects or cause them to die. In contrast, a global poll conducted by Gallup in
2020 of thousands of individuals in 116 nations and regions revealed that 32% of respondents said
they would not receive the vaccination. A significant problem for DOH is vaccine mistrust, which has
been exacerbated by a lack of vaccine information throughout the nation. With a surge of cases, the
nation's strategy for reducing COVID-19 has been riddled with flaws and uncertainty. The Philippines
finished last in Bloomberg's Covid Resilience Index of the best and worst places to be during the
pandemic, concluding a continuous decrease over the course of 2021, primarily due to the slow
implementation of testing, tracking, and quarantine systems.

The Philippines was noticeably slow to adopt similar policies regarding travel restrictions and
emergency measures as other nations did. The only travelers subject to the travel ban are those leaving
from Wuhan, China. Early in February 2020, the administration asserted that there was "nothing truly to
be afraid of" with the support of DOH. It was possible to manage this circumstance better. Instead of
undermining the spread of the virus, the DOH ought to have enacted early limitations like the other Asian
nations. The sudden increase in cases during the early stages of the epidemic has been attributed to the
late lockdowns and limitations. Another area where they could have done better was the testing's pace.
The COVID19 testing procedure has been held up by a lack of finance and logistical support. Community
spread was already widespread in many areas by the time testing became much more accessible, making
contact tracing and isolating individuals before they infected others difficult or impossible.

There were some locations where tracing, isolating, and quarantines could have been improved.
The DOH did not do a sufficient job of quarantining people who were exposed, tracking down their
contacts, or isolating people who were known or believed to be infected. A last point is that the DOH's
reaction to the pandemic was primarily decentralized. Local and regional leaders were responsible for the
majority of the pandemic response. Lacking a solid national policy, many LGUS attempted informal and
uncoordinated regulations that ineffectively slowed the virus' spread. This led to many local outbreaks
experiencing abrupt, significant increases in infection rates, putting a tremendous burden on the
healthcare system and spreading the disease throughout the entire country.

The government along with numerous national governments long ago recognized widespread
infectious disease outbreaks as a global and national security concern but in the face of this coronavirus
pandemic, they failed to adequately fund and carry out fast and effective responses. Major institutional
and policy changes will be necessary to strengthen the foundations of national a health security in order to
prevent a repetition of these shortcomings in future pandemics.
Strengthening the front lines of the healthcare system is the most crucial thing to do in order to
improve preparedness for the next pandemic. To advance health equality in hospitals and healthcare
systems, the DOH must implement national policies and pandemic readiness criteria. Throughout the
current pandemic, health systems have fought to survive while striving to keep their patients safe and
healthy. Hospitals in areas where COVID-19 cases are increasing exponentially have faced numerous
shortages, including those of emergency and intensive care specialists, testing supplies, necessary
medications, ventilators, hospital wards, personal protective equipment, and other essential health
resources and services.

To guarantee that these organizations advance both safety and equity, there has to be a
national policy to expand the nation's primary care capacity as well as to set and enforce pandemic
readiness criteria for hospitals and health systems. Investment in healthcare to increase access to
patient populations in impoverished populations, and standard stocks of personal protective equipment
prioritized for the emergency department to protect frontline staff is important components of such a
national policy. The devastating effects that emerging infections can have on people's lives and
livelihoods around the world are vividly and painfully demonstrated by the coronavirus pandemic.

The worldwide response has exposed the underlying inadequacies and disparities in pandemic
readiness and response; this must be a pivotal moment. Governments should be intelligent enough to
avoid such costly blunders in the future and instead take preventative measures to increase pandemic
preparation in light of the bitter lessons learnt. A new virus will emerge once this one has been
eliminated. Pandemics are unavoidable, but the systemic policy shortcomings that have followed the
development of this coronavirus were not. Effective reforms on policies are intended to guarantee that
a tragedy of this scale never occurs again.
REFERENCES:

McCarthy, J. (2021, February 18). The Philippines Has Vaccinated Zero Health-Care Workers

So Far. NPR. https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2021/02/18/969008730/the-

philippines-has-vaccinated-zero-health-care-workers-so-far

Oxford Business Group. (2022, November 15). Analysing the Philippines’ health and economic

response to Covid-19 - Asia 2021 - Oxford Business Group.

https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/reports/philippines/2021-report/economy/concerted-

response-measures-implemented-to-address-the-health-and-economic-ramifications-of-

the-covid-19-pandemic

Recommendations | Pandemic Preparedness: Lessons From COVID-19. (n.d.). Council on

Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/report/pandemic-preparedness-lessons-COVID-

19/recommendations/

The Diplomat. (2022, February 11). The Philippines’ COVID-19 Response Has Left the Most

Vulnerable Behind. https://thediplomat.com/2022/02/the-philippines-covid-19-response-

has-left-the-most-vulnerable-behind/

Why the Philippines Became the Worst Place to Be in Covid. (2021, September 29).

Bloomberg.com. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-09-29/why-the-

philippines-just-became-the-worst-place-to-be-in-covid#xj4y7vzkg

The World in Crisis: Government Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic | Darden Ideas to

Action. (2021b, March 11). Darden Ideas to Action.

https://ideas.darden.virginia.edu/government-responses-covid19-pandemic

World Health Organization: WHO. (2020, May 9). 100 days of COVID-19 in the Philippines:

How WHO supported the Philippine response.


https://www.who.int/philippines/news/feature-stories/detail/100-days-of-covid-19-in-the-

philippines-how-who-supported-the-philippine-response

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