The United Arab Republic: An Assessment of Its Failure

Author(s): Monte Palmer

Source: Middle East Journal , Winter, 1966, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Winter, 1966), pp. 50-67
Published by: Middle East Institute

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4323954

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 THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC:

AN ASSESSMENT OF ITS FAILURE

Monte Palmer

O N February 1, 1958, the unification of Syria and Egypt was heralded as

the first step in the revival of the Arab nation. Less than four years
later the union was torn asunder. Both sides surveyed the damage;
each accused the other of deviation and lack of sincerity.
In the article which follows we shall consider the causes for the failure of
the United Arab Republic. In so doing a dual purpose will be served. First, it
will be demonstrated that the causes of the split far exceeded the actual military
coup d'etat that precipitated the secession. Second, surveying the experience
of the United Arab Republic will enable us to ask some pertinent questions
concerning the course of Arab unity in general.

Support for the concept of Arab unity has traditionally been strong in Syria.
In the years just prior to 1958, the idea of union with Egypt became especially
popular. In a national conference held in 1956, the Syrian political parties
unanimously adopted a resolution calling for:

Expanding the bilateral agreement with Egypt, by concluding an agreement

between the two parties covering economic, political, and cultural affairs, so that
these agreements may serve as nucleus for all-embracing Arab unity.'

In November 1957, and again in January 1958, the Syrian Parliament

passed resolutions calling for the union of Egypt and Syria.2 A joint Egyptian-
Syrian parliamentary session was held in Damascus in November of the same
year.3 This session, too, resulted in a resolution calling for the unification of the
two states.

1. Fayez A. Sayegh, Arab Unity (New York: Arab Information Center, 1958) p. 19.
2. Ibid., pp. 14-15.
3. Ibid.

$> MONTE PALMER is assisant professor in the department of government of Iowa State Univers

50

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 UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC: ASSESSMENT OF FAILURE 51

Actual negotiations for the merger of Egypt and Syria were conducted in
Cairo during January of 1958. In spite of the parliamentary preliminaries, the
negotiations were the product of a small cadre of Syrian military and political
elites.4 Members of the Ba'th, especially $alah Bitar, played an active r6le in
the negotiations. The predominant influence, however, was exerted by the
Syrian officers.5
The actual outcome of the negotiations leaves little doubt that not only
were the Syrians the initiators of the negotiations, but that they were under
considerable pressure to accomplish their goal. Nasir set the price for Egypt's
participation. The articles of the Provisional Constitution of the UAR leave
little doubt that these conditions were indeed met. The Syrians came to Nasir
and he imposed his terms. In the words of Michel Aflaq:

The party in Syria (the Ba'th) was taken by surprise during the unity negotia-
tions when 'Abd al-Nasir imposed the conditions that parties in Syria must be
dissolved, and that studies of the form of the union would be delayed until after
it was announced . . but we could not let these conditions ... stand against the
will of the people . .6

Let us now consider the conditions in Syria that induced the Syrian elites to
legislate themselves out of business. At least six factors influenced their pre-
ceptions. First, both the army and the political 6elites were experiencing in-
creased pressure from the communists. Second, these two were also experienc-
ing considerable pressure from the Syrian right. Third, the diffusion of power
within Syria, especially within the army, had resulted in an impasse which ren-
dered positive action by any group difficult if not impossible. Fourth, the
masses were restive and had manifested considerable support for union with
Nasir. (The stalemate among the elites had obviously contributed to this un-
rest.) Fifth, many (if not all) of the actors were emotionally involved in the
nationalist movement and had identified with its goals. Sixth, there was a
strong sense of optimism on the part of the Syrian elites. The Syrians felt that
they would come out on top, regardless of the original conditions.
Many of these points were illustrated in an account of the negotiations pro-
vided by Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, the editor of Al-Ahrsim and a close
confidant of President Ndsir.7

4. Michel Aflaq, Ma'rakat El-Maskr El-Wahid (Struggles of the Common Destiny) (Damascus:
Daral-Adab, 1963), pp. 193-201; Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, Ma Illadhi Jara ft Suriya (What
Happened in Syria?) (Cairo: Dar El-Qamiyya, 1962), pp. 8-40; Khalil Kallas et al., (Bizri
Hawrani and other members of the Syrian elite that participated in the early stages of the UAR)
Siriya al-Muhattima lil-Isti' mar wal-Diktauiriyya (Syria, Crusher of Imperialism and Dictatorship)
(Damascus: Dar Al-Istiqll, 1962), pp. 1-2.
5. Haykal, pp. 35-37; and United Arab Republic, Mahidir Jalsat Mubahathat Al-Wahda
(minutes of the Unity Discussions) (Cairo: National Publishing House, 1963) pp. 95-99.
6. Aflaq, pp. 195-96.
7. Haykal, see n. 50.

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52 THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

According to Haykal, the army assumed

to the merger negotiations.8 At this tim
representing each of the 22 Syrian army units attempted to resolve their differ-
ences. The only alternative upon which they could agree, according to Haykal,
was to petition Nasir for unity.'0 Supposedly an agreement was prepared to
this effect, which the officers then signed with "fear, perplexity, doubt, hope,
and ambition.""l- All 22 officers "with the exception of Sarraj, who was left to
hold the reins of power," flew to Cairo.'2 They arrived on January 14, 1958.
After some delay they met with Nasir and informed him of the party bickering,
the communist infiltration, the mutual distrust within the army, and the
smuggling of arms across the Syrian border from the Baghdad Pact.'3 They the
proposed immediate unification. Nasir described the meeting in a speech
delivered shortly after the secession of Syria.

You all know how the Union was started in 1958. The Syrian army was then
divided into clans and parties. To those who then spoke about union, I said the first
condition of union would be keeping the army out of politics. I said preliminary
steps were necessary, as union entailed great difficulties and problems. To this
they answered: 'Where are the objectives you continuously called for, do you now
repudiate them?' I said: 'I do not repudiate these objectives, but I would like to
feel secure about the future.'
They said: 'What about Syria, will you leave it torn by hatred till it be lost?'
I answered: 'To me, Syria is my homeland, my motherland, and a part of the Arab
world in which I believe."'4

Nasir rejected the internal difficulties of the army as being a sound basis for
unification, whereupon the Syrian officers cited the earlier parliamentary resolu-
tions and the broadly manifested desire of the Syrian people for unity.'5 Nasir
still refused, noting that although the army held the reins of power, they did
not represent the duly constituted government of Syria.'6 One of the officers
then flew to Syria and returned with Salih Bitar (co-leader of the Ba'th),
the Syrian foreign minister.'7 Bitar came as a representative of the Syrian
government.'8
On January 16, all of the officers, plus Bitar and some Deputies from the

8. Ibid., p. 31.
9. Ibid., p. 32.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., p. 33.
14. Scribe Chronology, No. 763. Speech of Sept. 28, 1961.
15. Haykal, p. 35.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.

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 UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC: ASSESSMENT OF FAILURE 53

Syrian Chamber of Deputies, demonstrated for unity at a

tian National Assembly. Following this the officers and Bitar met with Nasir
at his home. It was at this time, the hour being well past midnight, that Nasir
presented the conditions for unity: a plebiscite, the dissolution of parties, and
the withdrawal of the army from politics. The terms were met with silence.
Nasir then asked Bitar if the Ba'th was ready to dissolve itself. Bitar replied
that he would have to check with the Ba'th leaders in Syria. Nasir then men-
tioned the fact that most of the officers were close to some political party and
asked them how they felt about the conditions. The officers replied that they
would do as Nasir ordered. He then told them to go and think things over.
Apparently no one objected submitting the union to a plebiscite, but many fe
that the abolition of political parties and the cessation of military interventio
in politics would destroy political life in Syria.'9
During the pause a messenger was dispatched to Damascus to consult with
Sarraj. Sarraj replied that popular pressure for unity was mounting and that it
was impossible to withstand it. Nasir held firm and the party found their hold
on the masses to be precarious and returned to Cairo impressed with the
necessity of forming a merger.20
Much of Haykal's account of the negotiations rings true. This is especially
the case in regard to the pressures which induced the Syrian elites to accept
Nasir's terms. Syria's history of military coups adequately testifies to the dis-
sension within the army.2' Throughout 1957 the Western press increasingly
called attention to the spread of communist influence in Syria. The existence of
communist influence is further corroborated by the bitter chastisement heaped
upon Nasir by Syrian communist leaders both during his purge of the Syrian
army and following Syria's secession.22
Pressure from the Syrian right and their external allies had also increased.
The Eisenhower doctrine had been formulated in January of 1958. During
1957 the Turkish army had held maneuvers on the Syrian border. Iraq had
continued to make overtures to Syrian elements favoring cooperation within the
Fertile Crescent.
There also can be little doubt of the existence of mass support for the
merger within Syria or Nasir's popularity. The existence of such support has
been given frequent albeit backhanded recognition by Syrian leaders.

There was and is love for Nasir. The people think of him as a hero, but they
wanted a hero and not a tyrant.23

19. Material in this paragraph adopted from Haykal, pp. 35-39.

20. Ibid.
21. N. A. Ziadeh, Syria and Lebanon (New York: Praeger, 1957). Interview D-1 (Damas-
cus, April, 1963).
22. Kallas et al. See section by Bizri, dispossessed commander of the First Army, p. 78.
23. Kallas et al., p. 44.

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 54 THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

There are similarly numerous indi

sive optimism in terms of their abili
the Egyptians. This general feeling
quotation.

As for the basic differences which existed between the two regions-differences
concerning freedom and democracy-the party (the Ba'th) hoped, with superficial
optimism, that unity would result in a decrease of individual rule, and that the
interaction between the peoples of the two united regions . . . would result in
evolution-rapid evolution-toward democracy and away from the rule of a single
individual.24

This prevailing optimism, given the pressing circumstances under which the
Syrian leaders found themselves, undoubtedly reduced both the number and
intensity of the doubters.
Having considered the factors which led to the formation of the UAR, let
us now turn to its dissolution.

II

We have seen that major impetus for the merger came from the Batth, the
army officers and the urban masses. It was these same elements, therefore, upon
which the union had to rely for its major support. This support was not forth-
coming. Nasir was forced to tighten his authority as early as October 1958,
and by the end of the year most of the original Syrian members in the central
government had contemplated resigning.25 This step, however, was delayed un-
til the end of 1959. The army was growing restive, and Nasir found it exceed-
ingly difficult to mobilize his mass support and to establish a strong popular
base for his regime.
The reasons for the disaffection of the Syrian elites are numerous. First, as
we have seen, the Batth and the military officers were dissatisfied with the origi-
nal terms of the merger. As long as they faced the various pressures suggested
in the preceding section, unity appeared as the lesser of two evils. Once the
merger was formed, the old pressures were reduced. The terms of the merger
then became the primary source of discontent. Nasir alluded to this possibility
when he refused to accept the stalemated power struggle within the Syrian mili-
tary as a basis of unity. In truth, that situation was not really altered by the
participation of the equally divided political elites.
Discontents over the terms of the merger were intensified when it rapidly
became obvious that the political parties, especially the Ba'th, were actually to
be dissolved, and that the Syrian politicians would not be "doing business as
usual." Optimism was followed by disillusionment.
Second, the Syrian elites felt that they were being relegated to secondary
24. Afliq, p. 199.
25. United Arab Republic, Mahidir Jalsat Muhahathiit Al-Wahda, p. 261.

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 UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC: ASSESSMENT OF FAILURE 55

positions, and that the Egyptians were trying to run the

relates to positions in both the central and regional gover
central cabinets, with few exceptions, Syrians headed the
tries such as the Ministries of Health, Culture and Nation
pal and Village Affairs, and Communications.27 Sal4i Bitir
minister at the time of the merger, was especially bitter
did not receive the foreign affairs portfolio in the centr
to Haykal's account, Bitar and Aflaq approached Nasir
complaining that the Syrians were not receiving equal tre
this they suggested the formation of a presidential counc
members from each region.30 Haykal proceeded to ch
ing that all three of the Syrian members on the propo
Ba'thists (Ilawrini, Aflaq and Bitar) 31
The situation within the Syrian region was similar. Thi
400 positions in Syria were known to have been filled by
tual number is believed to have been higher.33 In the Syr
try, seven of the top 13 officials were Egyptians.34 In th
Authority, four out of the top six officials were Egyptia
between 30 and 40 Egyptian judges in Syria, as well as inn
needed teachers and technicians.36 (These were not among
above.) The adverse reaction to the Egyptians in industria
what mitigated by their obviously valuable technical
large number of Syrian law graduates available, howeve
Egyptian judges may well have been a source of ill feeling
It could be argued that the actual number of Egyptians
positions in the Syrian regional apparatus was not excessiv
of common citizenship a certain amount of interchanging
to be expected. The discontent caused by the presence of
tions, however, was exacerbated by a number of factors.
that the Egyptians were filling lucrative positions that m
elites felt were rightfully theirs. Supply, needless to say,
Discontent over the Egyptians was compounded by the
apparatus was limited in its scope to Syrian regional affai

26. Kallas et al., p. 46.

27. Cabinet Listings.
28. Haykal, pp. 9o-91.
29. Ibid., p. 92.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Interview (Damascus, April, 1963).
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Interviews (Damascus, April, 1963).

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56 THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

ment), and the fact that the Egyptian regional apparatus consisted exclusively
of Egyptians.37 Then too, the existence of over 800 Egyptian officers in Syria
more than likely gave the impression that Egyptian administrators were equally
ubiquitous.38
A third and concomitant reason for the disaffection of the Syrian 6lites
relates to their feeling that they were being bypassed in the decision making
process. Many of the Syrian elites felt that they were not being consulted, that
their subordinates were going over their heads by referring matters directly to
Cairo, and that the Egyptians were keeping secrets from them.39 Centralization
was indeed excessive. It became more and more evident as the merger pro-
gressed.40 To paraphrase a comment from one of my interviews, "the direct
line to Cairo happened only late in the game."'4' The following quotation
illustrates the nature of the Syrian complaints.

Toward the end of 1959, Doctor 'Aziz Sidqi, the central Minister of Industry,
announced a five year plan for the Syrian Region. In spite of the fact that a
Syrian ministry had been created for this purpose in July 1959, Syrian notables
and experts were not consulted before the issuance of the plan.42

A fourth source of discontent, especially among the officers, was the transfer
of large numbers of Syrian officers and politicians to Cairo.43 The politicians
and politically inclined officers tended to view transfer to Egypt as exile. The
officers preferred death to transfer.44 Both officers and civilians bitterly com-
plained that once in Cairo they were given only nominal tasks to perform, tasks
that bore little if any relationship to policy making.45 Impartial observers
tended to corroborate the Syrian view.46 There is little doubt that selection of
Syrian cadres was sharply influenced by their past political affiliations. Aside
from banishment to Cairo, extensive transfers also took place within Syria, with
individuals objectionable to Nasir being placed in areas in which they could
do the least amount of harm.
The Egyptians have not denied the circumstances surrounding the Syrian
complaints. On the contrary, they have attempted to justify such policies on the
basis of need, chiding the Syrians for being selfish and opportunistic.

Egypt had more technicians than any other Arab country. Syria needed experts,
especially in petroleum processing. Egypt sent several petroleum experts-experts

37. Cabinet Listings.

38. Haykal, pp. 49-56.
39. Kallas et al., pp. 46-58.
40. Interviews (Damascus, April, 1963).
41. Ibid.
42. Kallas et al., pp. 28-31.
43. Ibid., p. 61.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid., pp. 2-3 (Section by Akram Hourani).
46. Interviews (Damascus, April, 1963).

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 UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC: ASSESSMENT OF FAILURE 57

which she could have used herself-as well as several planners

fields. Yet the cry went up that Egypt wanted to turn Syria into
unemployment in order to find employment for excess Egyptian
Damascus is only sixty kilometers from the Israeli border. Th
was in bad shape as a result of internal dissension. Therefore, i
send Egyptian officers to strengthen the Syrian First Army. T
Syria was under military rule by the Egyptians.47

Many Syrian officers came to Egypt because there were few tr

in Syria. The cry arose that Syrian officers were being exiled t
their place was being filled by Egyptians. (Egyptian sources list
officers in Syria at the time of the break. )48

Mahmuid Riyadh, Egyptian Ambassador to Syria before the m

for a period. People began saying that he was the Egyptian High
Syria.49

When Field Marshal Hikim 'Amir was forced to go to Damascus to straighten

things out, they referred to him as 'the King's representative.'50

Both sides have testified that such difficulties began right from the begin-
ning.5' This fact is also reflected by the number of Syrians who resigned during
the first year of the merger. This in turn led Nasir, who after all had a strong
personal stake in the success of the merger, to tighten his control as much as
possible. This further alienated the Syrian elites and led to complaints of exces-
sive restraint.52 A circle therefore developed in which Nasr pressed harder
to get results, yet the harder he pressed the more resistance he encountered. In
Haykal's words, "the United Arab Republic couldn't fight against the lack of
positive action or effort."53
Popular support for the merger, especially among the urban masses, was
one of the factors leading to its formation. Yet Nasir, according to his own
admission, was unable to mobilize this support effectively.

We committed a grave mistake, no less than the dangerous illusion wherein we

lost ourselves. This mistake was the insufficiency of the popular organization . ..
We did not exert sufficient effort to awaken the people to their rights and the
latent energies protecting these rights . . .54

Why did the early promise of popular support fail to materialize and why
was the existing support difficult to organize? One answer is that the envisaged

47. Haykal, pp. 74-75.

48. Ibid., p. 75.
49. Ibid., p. 76.
50. Ibid.
51. Aflaq, pp. 200-202; Kallas et al., pp. 20-30; Haykal, pp. 90-91.
52. Kallas et al., pp. 1-5.
53. Haykal, p. 56.
54. Nisir's speech of October 16, 1961, Scribe Chronology, No. 803.

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 58 THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

benefits of the merger also failed to m

lem in the next section. Two additional
popular support for the merger was fr
support manifested for the merger wa
matters briefly.
A myriad of political parties and oth
within Syria at the time of the merge
quantity-was therefore divided. In an
various Syrian elites and to reduce the n
ished all political parties and instituted
ever, met with little success. The parties
in spirit. Not all of the quasi-political g
Nasir's popular support remained.

The Bath kept acting like a party after par

its members resented any attempts to rest
interfere in the transfers within the First Ar

At the same time, most of the conflicti

the National Union. In spite of efforts
pick candidates for responsible positio
more than a new arena in which the vari
in their traditional manner.

As a popular organization we formed the National Union to act as a frame

encircling the conflict between classes. Our mistake was that we allowed reac-
tionary forces to join the National Union. As a result, these reactionary elements,
which infiltrated into the National Union managed to paralyze its revolutionary
effectiveness and turned it into an organizational front, not motivated by the real
demands of the people. This mistake is shown by the fact that some who are
leading the reactionary secessionist movement in Syria were themselves leading the
National Union organizations.56

In reviewing the causes for the failure of the UAR both the Egyptians and
the Syrians have had occasion to question the depth if not the sincerity of the
enthusiasm with which the masses acclaimed the merger.57 The Egyptians have
been especially caustic, referring to the nationalist response in Syria as "efferves-
cent sentimentalism."58 The absence of deep emotional commitments to the
union, according to the Egyptians, was due to a variety of factors. First, they
feel that the merger came too easily.59 Had the union resulted from a difficult
55. Haykal, p. 95.
56. Nasir's speech of October 16, 1961, Scribe Chronology, No. 803.
57. Aflaq, pp. 200-202; Haykal, pp. 1-20, 47-48.
58. Haykal, pp. 5-6.
59. Ibid.

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 UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC: ASSESSMENT OF FAILURE 59

and protracted struggle there would have been a deep-roo

Had it been necessary to fight to form the union, the pe
more willing to sacrifice to preserve it.60 Second, the Eg
the nature of the ties binding the people of the two states. Maybe, after all,
there were not sufficient philosophical, economic and social bases upon which
the union could be founded. This is not to say that the existence of strong ties
between the two countries was denied. The difficulty as the Egyptians saw it
lay in the fact that these ties sufficed only to stimulate the desire for unity.
They were not sufficient to sustain it.

There were not, in fact, sufficient, necessary and effective ties between the
Syrian and Egyptian Arab people to establish immediate unity . . . except one
thing-Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir .. . One person is not enough to make unity.. .61

Third, the Egyptians felt that "because of the long years of oppression, the
Syrian people had not yet arrived at the stage of complete preparedness for
unity." The same thought was expressed by Nasir when, in a previously
cited quotation, he called attention to the error of not sufficiently awakening
the people to their rights.62
On the Syrian side, a variation of this same theme has been stressed by
Michel Aflaq.

The level of consciousness among the majority of the people and popular move-
ments in the two countries lacked maturity and order.
Many people entered these unity movements for parochial reasons, without
willingness to bear the full burden and responsibility. This attitude encouraged
deviation.
This weakness in the level of consciousness was especially evident in the Egyp-
tian Region.63

III

We have seen that the UAR was beset by internal conflict almost from
the beginning. The result of this conflict was a loss of interest on the part
of the Syrian d'lites. Disinterest or disenchantment developed covert hostility.
This placed the burden of support squarely on the masses.
The emotional aspects of popular support were of uncertain quality.
Much depended upon Nasir's ability to demonstrate the viability of the UAR
in material terms. This he could not do. A great deal of effort was expended,
and certain gains were made.64 In the process, however, support in the key
areas was further alienated.

60. Ibid.
61. Ibid., p. 7.
62. See n. 103.
63. Afluq, pp. 202-203.
64. Interviews (Damascus, April, 1963).

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60 THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

In this section we shall review both

progress, and the factors which led to
for the merger. Five factors must be considered: (1) environmental cir-
cumstances over which the UAR had no control; (2) operational factors
which inhibited economic development; (3) internal security policies; (4)
friction between the Egyptians and Syrians; (5) the prevalence of rumors
and other dysfunctional factors.

From the moment of its inception, the United Arab Republic was forced
to contend with a variety of environmental circumstances over which it pos-
sessed little if any control. On one hand, the union was born in a hostile
regional environment. On the other, the new unit was confronted with eco-
nomic circumstances that can only be described as unfortunate.
The proclamation of the UAR was widely hailed throughout the Arab
world as the first step toward the long coveted goal of Arab unity. At the
same time, the formation of the union was a source of anxiety to the ruling
elites in each of the states surrounding Syria. Israel and Turkey, the more or
less traditional enemies of Syria, were expected to be unhappy over any incre-
ment in Arab strength. Their opposition to the union, however, appears to
have been of questionable importance. What damage their efforts might have
accomplished was probably more than offset by the internal solidarity stim-
ulated by their opposition.
The opposition of Syria's Arab neighbors, each of whom had felt Nasir's
wrath, was of a more insidious nature. Unable to attack the new unit openly,
Syria's neighbors aided and abetted the UAR's internal enemies. Almost all
of the Syrian leaders had ties in one or more of the neighboring states.65 As
the various Syrian 6elites grew restive, Syria's neighbors undoubtedly provided
them with both support and refuge. Sabri 'Asall, a pre-union prime minister
and a central vice president at the start of the merger, for example, was
accused by the Egyptians of consistently slipping across the Lebanese border
to "gamble and speak to his friends against the union." Adding circumstantial
evidence, the Egyptians cited 'Asall's confessed acceptance of 10,000 Iraqi
Dinars in 1954.66 Proof of 'Asali's complicity was supposedly revealed in a
document made available by Qasim following the Iraqi revolution of July,
1958.67 'Asali resigned in October of the same year.
'Abd al-Hamid al-Sarraj, Minister of Interior in the Syrian executive coun-
cil and later Central Minister of the Interior, to cite a second example, was

65. Haykal, pp. 74-124.

66. Ibid., p. 78.
67. Ibid.

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 UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC: ASSESSMENT OF FAILURE 61

reported by the Egyptians to have received a check from

one million pounds sterling, with which to disrupt the Syria
ratify the merger.68 Sarraj delivered the check to Nasir.
The political environment of the UAR was obviously
given the need for rapid progress, the adverse economic c
by the UAR were of far greater significance. 1957 had been
crops and general prosperity throughout Syria.69 Import and
tions were few.70 In 1958, however, Syria experienced t
successive years of severe drought.7' Grain surpluses ha
600,000 and 800,000 tons in previous years.72 During the
merger there were no surpluses.73 Drought caused losses
national income by one third.74 There was a similar reduc
nues. Oil transport revenues that had totaled ?S 90,000,00
at the start of 1956 and 1957 respectively, fell to ?S 25,0
of 1958.75 This was largely due to oil stoppages resulting fro
Syrian foreign exchange reserves were further deplete
Syrian merchants had more than doubled their imports a
expectations that restrictions would be imposed followin
Similar expectations also led to a mass exodus of Syrian
that continued throughout the merger. In 1961, for insta
that between ?S 500,000,000 and ?S 600,000,000 left the c
In a normal year such adverse circumstances would hav
dislocations. In Syria, however, the need for foreign exch
increased due to the requirements of the development pl
tions were imposed almost immediately. By 1960 such restric
imports to the bare essentials.78

Other factors than the environmental, however, were of e

importance. Foremost among these were factors relating
coordination and economic policy.
Syria's administrative apparatus left much to be desired
reasons for the union's failure President Nasir underscored t
breakdown.
68. Ibid., pp. 103-106, 46.
69. Interviews (Damascus, April, 1963).
70. Ibid.
71. Nasir's speech on February 20, 1961, Scribe Chronology, No. 196.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid.
75. Kallas et al., p. 22.
76. Interviews (Damascus, April, 1963).
77. Ibid.
78. Kallas et al., pp. 20-23; Interviews (Damascus, April, 1963).

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62 THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

We have been unable to develop the gove

revolutionary action. Until now we were f
imperialism and reaction according to old
become outmoded. In certain cases, the go
conveying to the people the new feeling t
interests were rather subservient to the g
fects . .79

The existing administrative capability

zation.80 Matters of a regional nature frequently were forwarded to Cairo
for decision or approval.8' This in itself inhibited progress. Probably more
dysfunctional was the excessive centralization that existed within Egypt itself.
According to an impartial examination of the Egyptian administrative apparatus
conducted at the request of President Nasir, the top administrators were so
overloaded, their span of control so broad, and the lines of authority so
blurred, that effective coordination was almost out of the question.82
In evaluating the dysfunctional effects of this lack of coordination, it is
important to bear in mind that this involved not only routine decisions, but
also complicated schemes intended to synchronize economic development in
the two countries. Spare parts or materials that were produced in Egypt were
expected to be used in Syria. Frequently such parts or materials were similar
to materials previously used, yet were sufficiently different in form or quality
to disrupt production. Dispatch and coordination of shipping were special
problems.83
The fact that signs of progress were not readily apparent in the years of
the UAR was due in part to Nasir's decision to place the emphasis on agricul-
tural and infrastructure development.84 Judged in terms of sound economic
planning, there can be little doubt that this decision was theoretically correct.
The need for such development was stressed by both the World Bank report
of 1955, and the FAO report of 1957.85 Large scale schemes may have
temporarily captured the imagination of the people, but they also tied up
excessive amounts of foreign currency and necessitated further import restric-
tions.86 The Economic Plan, for instance, envisaged that approximately fifty
per cent of the development costs would be met by the "private sector."87

79. Nasir's speech of October 16, Scribe Chronology No. 803.

80. Interviews (Damascus, April, 1963).
81. Ibid.
82. Luther Gulick and James Pollock, Government Reorganization in the United Arab
Republic: A Report Submitted to the Central Committee for the Reorganization of Government
(Cairo, 1962).
83. Interview (Beirut, March, 1963).
84. United Arab Republic, The Year Book (Cairo: Information Dept., 1960), pp. 331-421.
85. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of
Syria (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1955); FAO Mediterranean Development Project, United
Arab Republic, Syrian Region (Rome: FAO, 59/8/6040, 1959).
86. Interviews (Damascus, April, 1963).
87. Ibid.

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 UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC: ASSESSMENT OF FAILURE 63

Such support did not materialize.88 The development plan, accordin

petent economic observer on the scene, was "unrealistic to start w
effort to show tangible signs of development the original plan wa
and, according to the same observer, made "even more unrealistic.
The experience of the economic plan reflects one of the many d
faced Nasir. On one hand, he felt the need to take the measures ne
long range development. On the other, he realized the political
the situation. The result of this dilemma was that policies emerged
designed to meet both contingencies, but which really satisfied
situation is particularly evident in fiscal matters. Syrian curre
separate from that of Egypt throughout the merger.9' The sam
certain financial reserves and assets. In the early years, Nasir was
push these issues too hard. The Syrians claim to have successfu
number of such attempts to implement fiscal policies they felt to
the best interests of Syria.92 Nasir bore the stigma of having propo
from which he received little benefit. A paradoxical situation e
fore, in which the union was beset by too much centralization
and not enough on the other.

Economic progress was also hindered by decisions that were pur

One aspect of this problem was expressed succinctly in one of my
"Syria was terribly short of politically acceptable technicians
considerations reduced the already scarce supply of technically ski
A second example of economic need being sacrificed by political
tions can be found in Nasir's decision to close Syria's borders w
Jordan. Traditional trade patterns, patterns already disturbed
taken to coordinate the economies of the two states, were ther
disrupted. Much of the Syrian-Iraqi trade continued through ill
but such restrictions resulted in a loss of government revenues
the burdens of the urban populace.94

The fact that the economy was not responding effectively stim
content and inhibited efforts to build a sound base of mass s
hostile attitude of the elites and need to press economic developme
in the imposition of increasingly severe political restrictions. Inte

88. Ibid.
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid.
92. Kallas el al., pp. 27-29.
93. Interviews (Damascus, April, 1963).
94. Ibid.

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64 THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

provisions were implemented that far exceeded those experienced by the

Syrians prior to the merger.5 It soon became impossible for most Syrians to
leave the country except illegally. This was done to keep both financial and
human assets within the country, and to hold down the movements of the
"unhealthy elements in society." 96 Increased restrictions led to increased resist-
ance. Skilled and prosperous Syrians living or working outside of the country
stayed out.97 Many skilled Syrians within Syria left the country and took
their financial resources with them. The prospect of rapid economic develop-
ment was further retarded.

Development was further reduced and discontents increased by two addi-

tional factors. First, the Egyptians and Syrians did not work well together.98
Second, rumors, some based in fact, were rampant throughout the country.
We have observed that the fact that Egyptians filled a large number of
desirable government positions-(approximately 10 to 15 per cent of all
executive positions according to one reliable estimate) -had created animosity
and stimulated regional solidarity among the Syrians.99 Such animosity was
sharply increased by what one observer referred to as "the inability of the
Egyptians to understand the Syrians."100 According to most reports the
Egyptians were sincere and worked hard, often showing greater willingness
than the Syrians to work in rural areas.'0' The trouble seems to be that the
Egyptians were especially inept in the art of personal relations.'02 Frequently
they assumed supercilious attitudes, insinuating that the Syrians were country
cousins.'03 Such attitudes provided fertile ground for suspicions that Syria
was being turned into a colony.'04
Conflict was also related to problems of social interaction.'05 Clannishness
hindered understanding and stimulated mistrust. Many of the Egyptians were
single and quite naturally sought female companionship.'06 Overt flirting and
similar activities are taboo throughout the Muslim world. One who has been
both to Cairo and Damascus cannot, however, escape the obvious conclusion
that liberalization in this regard has progressed much farther in the former
than in the latter.

95. Interviews (Damascus, April, 1963); Interviews (Beirut, March, 1963).

96. Interviews (Bierut, March, 1963); Interviews (Damascus, April, 1963).
97. Interviews (Beirut, March, 1963).
98. Interviews (Beirut, March, 1963); Interviews (Damascus, April, 1963).
99. Interviews (Damascus, April, 1963).
100. Interviews (Damascus, April, 1963).
101. Interviews (Damascus, April, 1963).
102. Interviews (Damascus, April, 1963); Interviews (Beirut, March, 1963).
103. Ibid.
104. Interviews (Beirut, March, 1963).
105. Interviews (Beirut, March, 1963).
106. Interviews (Beirut, March, 1963).

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 UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC: ASSESSMENT OF FAILURE 65

In an atmosphere so beset by problems it was only to be expected that

rumors would abound. This was obviously the case in Syria. The Syrians, for
instance, accused the Egyptians of perpetrating rumors in an effort further to
divide the Syrians against themselves.107 The past record of the Voice of the
Arabs lends credence to this theory.
From all accounts, however, the overwhelming majority of the rumors
concerned blunders, repressions, suggestions of further integration measures,
and accounts of various misdeeds and indiscretions on the part of the Egyptians.
A few illustrations will suffice.
Radio Free Egypt (French) reportedly bombarded Syria with reports that
Nasir was planning to relocate over a million Egyptians in Syria."08 Given
the animosity that was developing toward the Egyptians and the adverse
economic circumstances then prevalent, the thought of a million more Egyptians
was obviously abhorrent to most Syrians. As far as I have been able to deter-
mine, no such plans had actually been drawn up.'09 The obvious merits of
such a project (from the Egyptian point of view) appear, however, to have
stimulated much unofficial discussion.
Rumors of economic blunders also appear to have some relation to fact.
One such a rumor concerned the Syrian purchase of structural iron supposedly
manufactured in Egypt."0 The Egyptian price was approximately double the
price paid for previous iron shipments from Belgium. When the iron arrived,
it turned out to be the very same Belgian product that had been re-exported
from Egypt, with the Egyptians pocketing the difference.
Other rumors seemed to have less relationship to reality. The ones relating
to the behavior of the Egyptians were especially vicious. Some rumors con-
cerned the abduction of teenage girls by a ring of Egyptian officers. Still other
rumors concerning Egyptians bordered on the absurd. The two examples
quoted below were taken from the Syrian press reviews shortly after the break.

At the office of Captain Sami Fikri 'Amir's aide, the command discovered a
huge machine to tape all telephone communications made by Syrian officers. The
cost of this electronic equipment is 100,000 dollars. It was placed in a wooden
cabinet. Sami Fikri used to issue decrees dismissing Syrian officers, transferring
them, and scattering them, in the light of these telephone communications."'

An electric stove ordered by the Damascus Investigations Service of the last

regime reached Damascus. This stove, which was intended to burn the citizens
into ashes, will be shown to the people over T.V.112

107. Press Digest, Sept. 30, 1961 (Confidential).

108. Haykal, p. 49.
109. Interviews (Damascus, April, 1963).
110. Interviews (Beirut, March, 1963); Kallas et al., pp. 34-37.
111. Press Digest, October 3, 1961.
112. Ibid., November 6, 1961.

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66 THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

The effect of such rumors, regardles

breed mistrust and generally to lower

IV

The preceding sections tend to give the impression that everything went
wrong at once. This obviously was not the case. There was initial discontent
among certain elites. This discontent spread. Adverse economic circumstances
meant that emotional support that might have sustained the union under
better circumstances was put to a severe test. As people lost interest or became
hostile, progress became that much harder. More and more reliance had to
be placed on Egyptians and more and more economic and security restrictions
had to be imposed. Opposition manifested itself in showdowns and discontent.
It was not an overt thing that could be fought or wiped out.

Things moved slowly and gradually in a way that would not cause alarm or
undue concern . . . (the opposition) kept picking away slowly from inside, pick-
ing up allies as time went by . . . (the) opponents couldn't resist unity openly,
so they resorted to psychological sabotage . . . resistance to the union was caused
by a number of small problems . .113

By 1961 matters had reached the point where drastic measures were neces-
sary. Stringent new currency regulations were imposed in February of 1961.

If the foreign currency with which we are building our country is smuggled
abroad by those who exploit the fruit of our labor and deposit the funds in foreign
banks, how shall we proceed with the construction? Our income must be invested
inside the country . . . This is the reason behind the decree for the reorganization
of foreign currency in the Northern Region . .114

In July the "Socialist Decrees" were issued."5 In Egypt this meant govern-
ment ownership or participation in all sectors of the economy."6 The number
of firms nationalized in the Northern region was far less than in the Southern
region, but the writing was clearly on the wall."7 In August the administrative
structure of the UAR was totally overhauled; regional councils were
abolished."18 Extensive military transfers took place during tie same perio

. . . Today we strengthen and consolidate the Union through a unified governme

applying all measures stabilizing this union as desired by the Arab people . . .120

113. Haykal, p. 56.

114. Nsir's speech of February 20, 1961, Scribe Chronology, No. 196.
115. See the July & August, 1961 issues of the Arab Political Encyclopedia.
116. Ibid.
117. Ibid.
118. Scribe Chronology, No. 672, August 16, 1961.
119. Interviews (Beirut, 1961).
120. Nasir's speech of August 16, 1961, Scribe Chronology, No. 676.

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 UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC: ASSESSMENT OF FAILURE 67

On the 26th of September Nasir accepted the resign

al-Sarraj, Vice President of the Republic for the Interior."2' Sarraj had been
largely responsible for the security apparatus in Syria and was widely attacked
for his excessive measures by both Syrians and Egyptians.'22 Two days after
his resignation, the coup occurred. This is not to suggest that the presence
of Sarraj had prevented the coup. Sarraj's resignation does indicate, however,
that he had become dissatisfied with his position. This may well have affected
his application of security measures.
On September 28, "small groups of army troops moved from the Katana
camp, laid hands on the broadcasting station in Damascus, surrounded Army
headquarters there, and broadcast a number of consecutive statements." 123
One of these statements, number nine, established the terms under which the
union could be re-established. Nasir refused.

What happened today should not be subject to bargaining or compromise. This

is my firm belief and this is what I consider my duty at this moment. I entirely
reject bargaining and half-measures. When struggling involves bargaining, it
loses its sacred significance. We cannot bargain our Arabism or nationalism.
Should we thus bargain we would then be signing the document of slavery of ffiis
Republic.. 124

Troops were dispatched and then recalled.'25 The union

From the preceding discussion it has become obvious that the failure of
the UAR was due to a variety of factors. Syrian leaders quarreled with the
Egyptians and among themselves. The administrative burden of the union
was too great for the existing apparatus. The economic viability of the
merger, in spite of what its potential might have been, was not demonstrated.
Popular enthusiasm could not be translated into effective support.
Are the causes of the UAR's failure unique to the two countries involved,
or does the failure of the UAR call into question the whole concept of Arab
unity? Are the leaders of ten Arab states any less likely to quarrel than the
leaders of two? Are the economic and administrative systems of the Arab
states as a whole any better equipped to meet the demands of union than were
those of Egypt and Syria? Will popular support be any easier to institutionalize
in the Arab world at large than it was in Syria?
The answers to these questions lie in the future. The failure of the UAR
did not destroy the concept of Arab unity. It did, however, point to the
practical problems involved.
121. Scribe Chronology, No. 758, September 26, 1961.
122. Haykal, pp. 103-120; Kallas et al., p. 60.
123. Nasir's speeches of September 28, 1961, Scribe Chronology, No. 763.
124. Ibid., No. 764.
125. Haykal, pp. 9-10.

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