RAJIV GANDHI NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF LAW PUNJAB, PATIALA

EVIDENCE LAW

TOPIC: “CASE COMMENT: BADRI RAI & ANR. V. STATE OF BIHAR”.

SUBMITTED BY:

Paras Jindal

Roll. No. : 19053

 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

On completion of this project it is my privilege to acknowledge my heartfelt gratitude and

indebtedness towards my teachers for their valuable suggestion and constructive criticism. Their
precious guidance and unrelenting support that kept me on the right path throughout the whole
project and I’m thankful to my teacher in-charge and project coordinators for giving me this
relevant and knowledgeable topic.

I wish to express my sincere gratitude to my teacher Dr. Manoj Sharma for her guidance and
encouragement in carrying out this project work.

I also wish to express my thanks to my group members and my friends for their ideas because of
which this project became more captivating. I am also thankful to my institution library for
providing a broad range of books to learn more.
 SUPERVISOR’S CERTIFICATE

Dr. Manoj Sharma Date:

(Assistant Professor of Law)

This is to certify that the project ‘Case Comment: Badri Rai & Anr. v. State of Bihar’ submitted
to Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Patiala is in fulfilment of the requirement of the
B.A.LLB (Hons.) Course is an original and bona-fide research work carried out by Mr. Paras
Jindal under my supervision and guidance. No part of this project has been submitted to any
University for the award of any Degree or Diploma, whatsoever.
 INTRODUCTION

One of the basic principles of criminal law is that one person cannot be held responsible for the
actions of another, except in cases of abetment in criminal proceedings or a contract of agency in
civil proceedings. However, when it comes to conspiracy, all individuals involved in the
conspiracy are considered to be mutual agents or confederates for the purpose of executing the
joint purpose. A conspiracy refers to a clandestine scheme devised by a group to carry out
actions that are either illegal and detrimental, or not illegal but achieved through illegal methods.
According to Emperor v. Shafi Ahmed,1 if two or more people conspire to commit an offense,
each one is viewed as the agent of the other, and as the principal is liable for the acts of the
agent, each conspirator is responsible for what their fellow conspirator does in furtherance of the
common intention they both share.

For section 10 to be applied, the fundamental requirement is the presence of the crime of
conspiracy. If this condition is fulfilled, then anything spoken, written or done in relation to their
shared intention is pertinent against all the individuals suspected to have participated in such a
plot and is also useful in demonstrating the existence of the conspiracy. The application of
section 10 is subject to the condition that there must be reasonable grounds to believe that two or
more people have conspired together.

In the case of Government of NCT of Delhi v. Jaspal Singh,2 it was established that as long as
there is enough evidence to support the belief that there was a connection between the
individuals involved in a common design, it doesn't matter if they were strangers to each other or
if they didn't know the exact role of each person or if they didn't perform all the acts jointly. It is
not necessary that all conspirators were involved from the beginning; even those who join later
can be considered guilty if the agreement is proven. However, the court must first present some
evidence that prima facie demonstrates the existence of the conspiracy before admitting any
statements, actions, or writings of the alleged conspirator as evidence.

1
(1929) 31 BOMLR 515.
2
2003 (10) SCC 586.
The case of Thakur Gulab Singh v. Emperor3 noted that for a conspiracy prosecution to succeed,
it is necessary to demonstrate that at least two people have agreed to commit a conspiracy. This
ruling is based on the decision in King v. Plummer.4 Moreover, the person making the statement
must be a part of the conspiracy and must have conspired with other members. Any actions or
statements made by a conspirator can only be used to prove the existence of the conspiracy or to
show that a particular person was involved. Such evidence cannot be used in favor of the other
party or to demonstrate that someone was not involved in the conspiracy. Additionally, there
must be a reasonable basis to believe that the accused have conspired together. While this
expression does not require actual proof, it does require prima facie evidence supporting the
existence of a conspiracy before any statements or actions made by one conspirator can be used
against the other.

According to the ruling in Samundar Singh v. State,5 if there is prima facie evidence of
conspiracy at an early stage of the trial, and later evidence displaces that belief or proof, then the
previous evidence must be rejected by the court. Regarding the admissibility of evidence, only
things that were said, done, or written in reference to the common intention of the conspiracy can
be presented in court. However, if anything said, done, or written by a conspirator occurs after
the conspiracy has ended or no longer exists, it cannot be used against others in the conspiracy.

The Indian legal system has a broader application of section 10 compared to the English legal
system. While the English law uses the phrase ‘in furtherance of their common intention,’ the
Indian law employs the phrase ‘in reference to their common intention.’ This difference in
phrasing is specifically intended to expand the reach of this section beyond what is provided for
in English law. The phrase "in reference to their common intention" implies that the statement
was made with regards to what was intended in the future at the time of the statement.
Furthermore, the term 'anything said' would encompass the verbal statements, speeches, or
declarations made by a conspirator. Evidence of communication between conspirators during the
time when the conspiracy is in effect is admissible. However, any written material produced by a
conspirator would not be admissible in court against him or others if it is not related to the

3
35 Ind Cas 991.
4
[1902] 2 K.B. 339.
5
AIR 1965 Cal 598.
common intention of the conspiracy. The term 'written' would cover handwritten or typewritten
manuscripts, regardless of whether they are signed or unsigned.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Ramji Sonar, the second appellant, is a goldsmith who operates a shop in Naogachia village.
Ramji's shop is located between the police station building and the residence of the Inspector of
police. The Inspector was the first informant in the case that resulted in the prosecution and
sentencing of the appellants. Badri, the first appellant, runs a small school for boys about 50
yards away from Ramji's shop. On August 22, 1953, the Inspector raided a vacant building in
front of Ramji's house and made a seizure of certain amount of molten silver and such
ornaments. Six strangers were melting the ornaments, and it was suspected that the seized objects
were stolen property that was to be sold to Ramji in a shape that is distinct from stolen property
and hence could not be identified with it. The seizure was made on this suspicion.

Following the seizure and arrest of Ramji and six others, Ramji was released on bail on the same
day. Police investigations into the case began, and on August 24, 1953, at around 7:30 p.m., the
Inspector in charge of the police station was approached by both appellants while he was on his
way from his residence to the station. Ramji asked the Inspector to cover up the case for a
valuable consideration, but the Inspector refused to talk about it on the road and asked Badri to
come to the police station instead. The Inspector then reported the incident to the sub-inspector
(P.W. 9) and to his superior officer, the D.S.P. (P.W. 8), who were both posted to the same
police station.

On August 31, Badri, the first appellant, visited the police station and met the Inspector in the
central room. He gave the Inspector a package wrapped in an old newspaper, which contained
Rs. 500 currency notes. Badri told the Inspector that Ramji had sent the money through him as a
bribe to hush up the case against Ramji. Several police officers and a local merchant were
present at the time. The Inspector immediately created a report about the bribe and made a
seizure list of the money. He then arrested the appellant and locked him in the thana lock-up.
After conducting due investigation, the trial of the appellants started and they were convicted and
sentenced to 18 months rigorous imprisonment along with fine of Rs. 200/- each.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE FIRST APPELLANT’S STATEMENT MADE ON BEHALF OF THE SECOND

APPELLANT REGARDING BRIBING THE POLICE OFFICER IS ADMISSIBLE AGAINST THE SECOND

APPELLANT?

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT AND CRITICAL ANALYSIS

The defense counsel of Ramji pointed out that the charge under section 120B of the IPC was
added solely to make Badri’s statement admissible against him, as it would not have been
considered evidence otherwise. However, the incident that occurred on August 24th clearly
indicates the existence of the conspiracy, and therefore, the court was justified in adding the
charge under section 120B. It is not a valid argument to claim that the act or statement of one
conspirator cannot be admissible against the other unless the charge under that similar section is
framed. Section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act was intentionally legislated to make statements
and acts of co-conspirators admissible as evidence against the entire group of conspirators,
considering the nature of the crime.

Conspiracy is a secretive and hidden activity, making it difficult for the prosecution to link each
isolated act or statement of one accused with those of the others, unless there is a common link
connecting them all together. In a criminal case, typically one person cannot be held responsible
for the actions or words of another. However, when there is evidence that a group of people have
worked together with a common intention to commit a crime, the law has introduced the concept
of common responsibility. This is based on the idea that everyone involved in a conspiracy is
acting as an agent for the others. Once the court has reasonable grounds to believe that there is a
shared interest or purpose between a group of people, any act or statement made by one
conspirator is considered the act or statement of the others, as long as it is related to the
conspiracy's objective. Otherwise, individual acts carried out in secret to achieve a shared goal
may not be understandable without considering the overall purpose of the conspiracy.

The defense, secondly, argued that the statement made by the first appellant on August 31
regarding the purpose of the payment was not admissible as evidence because the conspiracy had
already been carried out before the statement was made. They relied on the decision of Mirza
Akbar v. The King Emperor,6 as a precedent to support this argument. However, the decision in
Mirza Akbar v. The King Emperor actually by itself refutes this argument. The statement made
by the first appellant on August 31st, about the purpose of the payment, is considered part of the
same transaction as the act of making the bribe payment. Therefore, it cannot be argued that the
statement was made after the conspiracy's objective had already been achieved. The conspiracy's
objective was to bribe a public servant in charge of a criminal investigation to hush up the case
against the second appellant, and this objective had not yet been achieved when the statement
was made.

The case of R. v. Blake,7 provides authoritative guidance on what is admissible and what is not
admissible in conspiracy cases, and it holds that documents used to effectuate the conspiracy are
admissible, while those created after the objective has been achieved are not admissible. Section
10 of the Indian Evidence Act follows the same principle. As the statement made by the first
appellant was made in the course of the conspiracy and accompanied the act of making the bribe
payment, it is covered by section 10 and is admissible.

The fact that both appellants approached the police officer to suppress the case provided a
reasonable basis for the court to believe that they conspired to bribe the officer. The first
appellant gave money to the police officer in the police station, which constitutes an act in
furtherance of their common intention. According to the principle of agency, the statement made
by the first appellant on behalf of the second appellant is admissible against him as well.
Therefore, the only question of law raised in the appeal had no merit, and the appeal was
dismissed.

CONCLUSION

According to section 10 of the Evidence Act, if there is evidence that two or more people
conspired together to commit a crime, then any act of one conspirator is considered an act of all.
This rule of common responsibility is based on the principle that each member of a conspiracy is
acting as an agent for the others. It is not possible for a person to claim that they were not a party
to the conspiracy in order to avoid being implicated. In summary, any act committed by a

6
(1941) 43 BOMLR 20.
7
(1844) 6 QB 126.
conspirator can be attributed to all members of the conspiracy based on the general principle of
agency.

The case of Badri Rai & Anr. v. State of Bihar8 established that Section 10 of the Evidence Act
was created with a deliberate purpose of allowing acts or statements of co-conspirators to be
admissible against the entire group of conspirators due to the nature of the crime. Due to the
secretive nature of conspiracies, it is often challenging to gather evidence directly. It is difficult
for the prosecution to connect each individual act or statement of one accused person with the
acts or statements of the others unless there is a common thread linking them together.
Therefore, evidence can only be obtained from family members, close associates, or those who
have intimate connections with the conspirators.

8
1959 SCR 1141.