Ehess

EHESS
The French Army and Intervention in Southern Russia. 1918-1919

Author(s): J. Kim Munholland
Source: Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Jan. - Mar., 1981), pp. 43-66
Published by: EHESS
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20169910 .
Accessed: 17/06/2014 21:22
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
EHESS is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Cahiers du Monde russe et
soviétique.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 188.72.96.15 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 21:22:44 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
J. KIM MUNHOLLAND
THE FRENCH ARMY AND INTERVENTION

IN SOUTHERN RUSSIA
1918-1919
Allied intervention in the Russian Revolution and civil war continues

to fascinate historians and to provoke lively controversy over Allied
policy. One episode of the intervention that has been vigorously criti
cized from diverse viewpoints was the French decision to send an Allied
military force into the Ukraine and the Crimea during the winter and
spring of 1918-1919. While differing in their explanations, western and
Soviet historians are virtually unanimous in describing the French
intervention in Southern Russia as a failure. A leading Soviet historian
has attributed this failure to war-weariness and mutinies among the
Allied troops, an inability of French leaders to chose among the conflict
ing anti-Bolshevik movements, and to the effectiveness of the Bolshevik
led resistance.1 For most western historians French military inter
vention appeared to have been badly organized, insufficiently supplied,
and ill-defined in its objectives. In a severely critical assessment Peter
Kenez has observed that French leadership failed to match its policy
with the resources necessary for success, thereby casting doubts upon its
own competence, and John Reshetar has dismissed the operation as
"a French fiasco."2 Only one historian so far has argued that French
policy was not an unrelieved catastrophe, but this assessment was made
without benefit of French archival sources that recently have been
opened to scholars.3 Most western accounts rely heavily upon memoirs
of participants sympathetic to the Volunteer cause and upon documents
brought to the west by white ?migr?s after the defeat of anti-Bolshevik
forces. These memoirs and documents reflect the biases and frustrations
of the Volunteers who were bitterly critical of French policies in Southern
Russia.
Although any attempt to improve the tarnished image of French

actions may be difficult, the opening of French military and diplomatic
archives permits at least a clearer understanding of the influences that
shaped French behavior during these turbulent days. This evidence
suggests that intervention in Southern Russia was initially conceived
along lines of a pre-war "colonial" expedition whereby French leaders
hoped to acquire political (a Bolshevik defeat) and economic (a sphere
Cahiers du Monde russe et sovi?tique, XXII (1), janv.-mars 1981, pp. 43-66.

44 J. KIM MUNHOLLAND
of influence) gains from a limited investment. Essential to this policy

was the collaboration of all anti-Bolshevik elements in the Ukraine.
Ultimately, the French government's policy became frustrated by the
realities of conditions in Southern Russia, and it was greatly influenced
by the attitudes and perceptions of the military commanders who led
the expedition.
From the very outset French officers played a crucial role in assessing
the prospects for a successful intervention. When they encountered a
predominantly hostile population in Southern Russia, a disciplined and
impressive Bolshevik military opposition, mutinies among their own
troops, a shortage of supplies, and an inability to secure unified and
effective collaboration from the various anti-Bolshevik movements, the
French commanders and, ultimately, the government in Paris concluded
that the risk of intervention exceeded any possible gain. Instead of
direct military intervention the French government turned to a policy
of quarantine for Bolshevism and indirect assistance to the white oppo
sition. This paper examines the role of the military in shaping French
policy in Southern Russia during the intervention of 1918-1919.
The first official sign of French preparation for direct military inter
vention in Southern Russia came on October 7, 1918, when Clemenceau
designated General Henri Berthelot to head a military mission with
responsibility for operations in Rumania and the Ukraine.4 While an
important task of this expedition was to assure the retreat of German and
Austro-Hungarian forces from the Ukraine and Rumania, Clemenceau's
?
instructions stressed the need [de] r?aliser l'encerclement ?conomique
du bolchevisme et en provoquer la chute ? as a leading priority.5 Already,
on December 23, 1917, the British and French governments had agreed
upon a division of responsibility for Southern Russia that assigned the
Donetz basin, the Crimea and the Ukraine to a French sphere of influence.6
Moreover, Clemenceau set aside a credit of one hundred million francs
to support various anti-Bolshevik activities in Russia.7 But French
assistance to the anti-Bolshevik cause was limited to economic aid and
the dispatch of some military advisors during the first year after the
revolution.
Prospects for a more active and overt intervention increased in the

fall of 1918. A string of Allied military victories in the Balkan theatre
meant that some of these troops would be available for a military expe
dition to Southern Russia. Berthelot was to draw upon these soon to
be released troops, and his responsibilities were broadly defined to enable
him to act beyond the supervision of German and Austrian withdrawal
from occupied Russian territory. His orders required him to supply
military support to local governments and organizations in their struggle
against Bolshevism, and Clemenceau appointed technical advisors to the
mission who would ? contribuer ? la reconstruction du pays
?conomique
en ?tendant son action dans le domaine industriel et commercial. ?8
On the eve of the armistice the French cabinet formally approved plans
for intervention. These broad political and economic goals gave the
French intervention more the appearance of a pre-war colonial expedition
than a conventional military operation.
The selection of General Berthelot to head the Allied military expedi

THE FRENCH INTERVENTION IN SOUTHERN RUSSIA 45
tion posed certain problems for French relations with General Denikin's
Volunteer Army. Berthelot had extensive contacts in Rumania, stem
ming from his experience as head of a French military mission to that
country in 1916-1917. While these connections recommended him for
the Rumanian half of his assignment, they created liabilities among the
white opposition, which suspected him of being pro-Rumanian and there
fore hostile to Russian claims in Bessarabia. Nevertheless, Berthelot
assumed his task with enthusiasm and appeared determined to advance
French interests in both Rumania and Southern Russia. To assure the
Volunteers that French intervention would be on a grand scale, Berthelot
indicated to General Shcherbachev, Denikin's representative to the Allied
powers, that twelve Allied divisions would be available to occupy South
ern Russia and to assist the Volunteer Army in its struggle against the
Bolsheviks. At least Shcherbachev elatedly sent a report along these
lines to General Denikin's headquarters.9 Berthelot's promise apparently
reflected unofficial assurances that he had received in Paris prior to
departure. Events proved these promises to be exaggerated, but Ber
thelot's initial optimism raised excessive hopes among the Volunteers.
As a member of the British military mission to Denikin noted in December,
"General Denikin's staff had prepared a beautiful paper scheme for the
re-conquest of Russia which required eighteen Allied Divisions and
munitions, etc., for half a million Russian troops whom they proposed
to mobilize under the cover of the Allied Divisions. ?10
Berthelot's appointment also created some friction within the com
mand structure of Allied forces in Eastern Europe. In order to bypass
General Franchet d'Esperey, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Army
of the East, toward whom Clemenceau harbored considered antipathy,
Berthe?lot's command was organized independently so that he
reported
directly to Foch and Clemenceau. Franchet d'Esperey grumbled at this
division of military authority, and he differed with Berthelot over pros
pects for a successful intervention in Southern Russia. He warned that
the expedition would have to be massive ? at least ten thousand more
men than had been scheduled for Russian service ? if the promises of
the French government were to be fulfilled. Existing resources in the
Eastern Theatre were insufficient. Many units designated for the
Ukraine fell below normal strength, and Franchet d'Esperey predicted
that Senegalese troops from the colonial army, who were to be part of
the expedition, would find the Russian climate intolerable. He also
warned of war-weariness and poor morale among many units. Some
officers and soldiers had seen eighteen to twenty-four months' duty
without leave, and in their exhausted condition they were susceptible
to the influence of Soviet propaganda. According to the official Greek
history of the intervention, Franchet d'Esperey noted that while French
soldiers fought enthusiastically against the Central Powers and relished
the prospect of victory on the Danube, they viewed any occupation of
the Ukraine with hostility and threatened mutiny. Thus, Franchet
d'Esperey insisted that only volunteers or politically troops
trustworthy
not scheduled for immediate de-mobilization be employed in Russia.11
By the time the expedition was ready to embark for Russia from bases
in the Balkans, Berthelot began to share Franchet d'Esperey's reserva

J. KIM MUNHOLLAND
46
tions. He discovered that only three divisions, not twelve, were imme
available to occupy a wide expanse of territory in the Ukraine,
diately
and one of these divisions could not be employed due to an influenza
its ranks. Berthelot now argued that the intervention
epidemic within
was doomed to fail unless extensive reinforcements arrived promptly
from France.12 Even at this early stage there was a large discrepancy
between what Berthelot had promised the Volunteers and the realities of
French support for military intervention.
The first units of the Allied expedition did not reach Odessa until
December 17 or Sebastopol until Christmas day. From the moment
of their arrival French military commanders became entangled in the
rivalries of Southern Russia. After the armistice a
complex political
three-way competition for Allied support in the Ukraine emerged between
Hetm?n Skoropadsky, whose government in Kiev had been supported
a newly formed Ukrainian whose
by the Central Powers, directorate,
forces were commanded by Simon Petliura, and elements who
military
looked to Denikin's Volunteer Army, mainly aristocrats, landholders
and the wealthier bourgeoisie of the cities, to restore their position in a
"
large Russian state "one and indivisible. By the time the French went
ashore in Odessa, the authority of Skoropadsky had completely disinte
grated. This left the intense conflict between the Directorate, which
favored at least an autonomous Ukraine, and the Volunteers, who showed
no patience for Ukrainian nationalist feeling. In the meantime, Bolshe
vik forces had invaded the Ukraine and were marching upon Kiev. In
the eyes of French officers this danger was immediate to Ukrainians and
Volunteers alike and required cooperation if it were to be checked.
Prior to the French army's appearance in the Ukraine, French rela
tions with the Volunteers had already been influenced by the activities
of diplomatic agents on the spot, notably at the Jassy Conference.
Between November 16 and December 6 various anti-Bolshevik political
leaders met with Allied representatives in the Rumanian city of Jassy
and, later, in Odessa in what proved to be an abortive effort to formulate a
common program of political action and strategy in connection with
Allied intervention. The Russian delegations to Jassy agreed that Allied
intervention was essential to the re-establishment of a Russian state, but
they disagreed over the political structure for any provisional Russian
and were clearly hostile to any Ukrainian nationalist claims.
government
the conference lacked official recognition from the Allies and
Although
was barren of practical results, one of the French representatives to the
conference, a self-styled vice-consul from Kiev named Emile Henno,
created the impression that France was strongly committed to support
for General Denikin's Volunteer Army rather than the Ukrainian national
ists of the Directorate. Indeed, the Russian delegates at Jassy took
Allied intervention for granted and assumed that it would be on a massive
scale.13 The conference thus revealed the unduly optimistic hopes held
the Volunteers concerning Allied support for their claims, and it
by
also revealed the difficulty of finding a common program for the various
anti-Bolshevik factions. These internal disagreements became a major
source of frustration for the French military commanders when they
arrived in the Ukraine. The French officers could not understand why

differences could not be set aside in the face of the need to defeat the
Bolshevik forces.
When French units first reached Odessa on the 17th, they discovered
an uneasy truce in the city between a smattering of Polish soldiers,
Volunteers commanded by General Grishin-Almazov, a handful of French
marines, and the much larger Ukrainian force of Simon Petliura, which
occupied most of the city. Grishin-Almazov assured the French of
protection as the Allied troops began embarking on the morning of the
18th. From the beginning skirmishes developed between the Volunteers
and the Petliurians in certain points in the city, and a salvo from French
warships in the harbor was needed to restore order. In negotiations
with representatives from the Ukrainian army that day, General Borius,
the commander of the French expedition, secured the withdrawal of
Petliura's troops outside the city. General Borius then announced that
Odessa was under French protection, and he appointed Grishin-Almazov
military governor of the city. This decision increased the impression
of French support for the Volunteer cause and collaboration between
the Allies and Denikin.
In the next few weeks the French expedition, augmented by a size
able Greek contingent and smaller units of Polish, Rumanian and Czech
troops, seized Nikolaev, Kherson and Tiraspol so that Allied forces
controlled an arc of territory in the Western Ukraine along the northern
shore of the Black Sea between the Dniester and Dniepr rivers. In
January General d'Anselme arrived in Odessa to assume command over
operations in the Western Ukraine, and he quickly established contacts
with Simon Petliura. At Kherson and Nikolaev, d'Anselme's representa
tives arranged with Petliura's troops for a peaceful transfer of power to
French authority. The French command later justified this decision on
the ground that Petliurians controlled the communication lines with
Odessa, and the only alternative to negotiation was a direct and perhaps
bloody confrontation. D'Anselme's decision to negotiate with Petliura
enraged the Volunteers who accused the French of treachery for dealing
with Ukrainian nationalists. D'Anselme replied that the Volunteers
lacked any authority in the region, and military necessity rather than any
political consideration dictated his decision. In response to Denikin's
complaint about his dealings with Petliura, d'Anselme observed that
his relations with the Directorate were of a purely military character.14
The occupation of Kherson and Nikolaev was crucial for the protec
tion of Odessa and the security of vital supplies and military stores
in Nikolaev itself. As evidence of his good faith, d'Anselme pointed out
to Denikin's representatives that he had declined Petliura's offer to
place the entire Ukraine under French protection. But d'Anselme
insisted from the outset that his instructions required that he cooperate
with all patriotic elements, not just the Volunteers, opposing the Bol
sheviks.15
Relations between the Volunteers and the French command began
inauspiciously. The French officers did not feel bound by whatever
commitments Henno may have made to the Volunteers in their dispute
with the Ukrainian nationalists. The task of the intervention was rela
tively straightforward: to assist all elements engaged in a struggle against

Bolshevism. In the eyes of the French command in Odessa the Volun

teers appeared to be unpromising material as a nucleus for an anti
Bolshevik front. Expecting to find a fighting force, the French complai
ned that the Volunteers were too few in numbers and too unpopular to be
of much military value. D'Anselme later claimed that the Volunteers
were extremely unpopular with the Ukrainian peasants who identified
Denikin's allies with the detested old regime. ?Entre les volontaires et
le peuple ?, he observed, ? c'est une haine v?ritable, sauvage. ?16 He noted
that it was not his task to impose Czardom or the Volunteers upon the
people of the Ukraine. Even Franchet d'Esperey found the political
attitudes of the Volunteers too reactionary for his conservative tastes,
and he blamed them for alienating the local population.17 French officers
later attributed the failure of intervention to their links with reactionary
elements associated with the old order.18
In addition, mutual hatreds and distrust among the Russian oppo
sition blocked effective agreement on a common policy, and d'Anselme
despaired of uniting various groups whose opinions ranged from the
Czarist inclinations of the Volunteers to the socialists sitting on the
municipal councils of Odessa, Nikolaev and Kherson. What made his
task difficult, he lamented, was the mutual hatreds of these groups for
each other. These divisions threatened to defeat the formation of any
anti-Bolshevik front. The disunity that had enabled the Bolsheviks to
triumph in the first place continued to weaken the Russian opposition.
?Les Russes n'ont rien appris ?, Berthelot warned his superiors in Paris,
? ni de la guerre, ni de leur r?volution. ?19
At the same time French officers did not disguise their disgust at the
behavior and fighting qualities of the Volunteer army and its officers'
corps. The Volunteer officers in Odessa behaved with a remarkable
and arrogance in the eyes of the French. ? Ils
irresponsibility jouent,
comme par le pass?, ? one
boivent et s'amusent report noted, with little
regard for the impression that this behavior created.20 Admiral Amet,
the commander of the French squadron in the Black Sea, became convinc
ed that Denikin's Volunteer ? ne constitue pas en r?alit? une force
Army
s?rieuse et que les ?l?ments qui entourent son chef ne sont pas d'un
moral ? la hauteur de la t?che qui leur incombe. ?21 The Volunteer
Army appeared unduly top-heavy according to Colonel Freydenberg,
General d'Anselme's chief of staff, who described the Volunteers as a
parody of Cond?'s army, being composed nine-tenths of officers and
? aucune racine dans le ?22 Once they had been set up
n'ayant peuple.
in Odessa, d'Anselme observed, the Volunteers preferred governance to
fighting. He also noted the preponderance of officers among Denikin's
followers, including nine active duty admirals who were in charge of the
port at Odessa.23
? L'arm?e Denikine est une g?ne plut?t qu'une aide, ?
Franchet cabled at one ? Elle a tous les d?fauts de
d'Esperey point.
l'ancienne Arm?e russe et n'en a pas les qualit?s. ?24 As for Denikin
himself, General Berthelot concluded, ? En r?alit?, cet homme est un
m?galomane. ?25 A French diplomat later reported that such views
were characteristic of the great majority of French army and naval offi
cers, which he attributed to the French officers' superficial acquaintance
? la soci?t? tr?s
with Russian affairs and their contact with sp?ciale de

[quelques] postes du sud, ?26 a veiled reference to the socialists of the

municipal councils.
Certainly French disdain for the fighting qualities of the Volunteers
and their leaders did not improve relations. The Volunteers complained
bitterly of French arrogance and objected violently to the French com
mand's willingness to deal with their political rivals in the Ukraine.
Above all, Denikin's representatives denounced the high-handed behavior
of Colonel Freydenberg, accusing him of behaving as if he were in colonial
territory. Denikin repeatedly objected to French policies and deplored
French unwillingness to recognize the Volunteers as the legitimate
authority in the Ukraine. On the other hand, the French hope that the
Volunteers would provide the main fighting force in the Ukraine quickly
evaporated as the officers sourly assessed the potential strength of their
allies.
The French command also had to face the unpopularity of the Allies
in the Ukraine. The inhabitants of Kherson, for example, quickly
revealed an intense hostility toward the Allied intervention and resented
the inclusion of Greek troops among the occupation forces. Colonel
Lejay, the commander of the Allied forces at Nikolaev and Kherson,
reported that the people of Kherson did not disguise their anger at the
Allies for bringing in Greek troops whose presence they regarded as a
humiliation and an insult to their national pride.27 Nor were the French
any more popular. The entire town of Kherson was pro-Bolshevik and
anti-French, according to d'Anselme, and reports from his local command
ers complained the population had fallen prey to Bolshevik propaganda
and had openly demonstrated its sympathy for the Soviets.28 Not only
at Kherson but, ? en Crim?e comme en Russie m?ridionale, la
partout,
population russe se rallie au bolchevisme et nous est hostile ?, Franchet
d'Esperey cabled in exasperation.29 The French arrived in Southern
Russia expecting local support for the occupation and discovered instead
a hostility that exposed the expedition to the possibility of an anti
foreign uprising. The French commanders realized that they could not
hope to overcome the resistance of an entire population. The experience
of some officers with colonial warfare made them aware that collaboration
from local elements in such conditions was essential for success, yet in
Southern Russia they could count neither upon the Volunteers nor upon
the support nor even the neutrality of the Ukrainian people.
The hostility of the local population also contributed to a further
deterioration in morale among the Allied troops. The French command
feared that the war-weariness of several units made them susceptible to
the appeals of Bolshevik doctrines. Certainly there was an abundance
of polemical material available. Shortly after the Allied troops appeared
in the Ukraine, Soviet authorities sent a propaganda mission, headed by
Captain Jacques Sadoul, south to persuade French soldiers that they had
no interest in fighting the Bolsheviks and should, instead, turn against
a common class enemy. Sadoul was a reserve officer in the French Army
who had been attached to the French military mission in Russia at the
time of the revolution. He remained behind and rallied to the Bolsheviks
when the French military and diplomatic missions left Russia in the
summer of 1918. Sadoul's pamphlet, ?Vive la des Soviets, ?
R?publique
4

and other publications of the French Communist Group based in Kiev

were later found among the possessions of French soldiers and sailors
who participated in the Black Sea's mutiny.30 In Odessa the military
retaliated against the authors of this literature when they summarily
executed Jeanne Laborbe, a member of the French Communist Group
in Southern Russia, on March 3. One French military account claimed
that the Bolsheviks employed money, women and pamphlets in a well
financed and orchestrated effort to incite mutiny, and another complained
that in the absence of news and information from France, ?Nos soldats,
travaill?s par une propagande bolchevique intense, ne songent plus qu'?
leur retour en France et estiment, en g?n?ral, qu'ils n'ont pas ? se battre
contre un pays avec lequel la France n'est pas officiellement en ?tat de
guerre. ?31 Franchet lamented that his troops had become
d'Esperey
contaminated, and he blamed the Jewish population of Odessa for
spreading Bolshevik notions among the occupation forces.32
While evidence of Bolshevik propaganda could be found throughout
Southern Russia, it was not clear that these efforts were decisive in under
mining the morale of Allied troops. The propaganda campaign played
upon a war-weariness among soldiers whose morale already was depressed
and whose enthusiasm for continuing the war in Russia was non-existent.
Soviet propaganda exploited war-weariness; it did not create it. When
a number of French units later refused to fight, one officer wrote, ? II
para?trait que nos soldats ne voulaient pas se battre contre les bolcheviks,
non parce qu'ils sont bolcheviks eux-m?mes, mais simplement parce qu'ils
trouvaient stupide de se battre. ?33 Not only rank and file soldiers but
French officers themselves displayed pessimism and a lack of enthusiasm
for the intervention. On his initial inspection tour of Odessa in February,
Berthelot observed that many officers showed considerable reluctance
to become involved in Russia. ?Nos hommes ?, he noted, ? et m?me les
officiers montrent une grande ? s'avancer dans la Russie, ?
r?pugnance
and morale for the entire expeditionary force ? est loin d'?tre satisfai
sant ?34. Allied troops wanted only to occupy territory, not risk their
lives in battle, since the war was now over.35 As Colonel Freydenberg
stated, ?No French soldier who saved his life after the Marne and Verdun
would want to lose it on the fields of Russia. ?36 Disillusionment with
intervention increased as officers and soldiers alike realized that the
entire population of Southern Russia looked upon their presence with
undisguised hostility. As one officer in Sebastopol declared, Bolshevik
propaganda had little effect upon the troops, but the hostile attitude of
the local population had a profound impact.37
The absence of reinforcements further increased the French com
mand's scepticism about intervention. Six weeks after the initial
landing in Odessa, Berthelot complained that he had less than three
thousand men for the occupation of all of the Ukraine. Many of the
units were actually reduced to two-thirds strength so that the number
of troops was less than appeared on paper. Due to insufficient forces
the French had been unable to prevent the Soviet occupation of Kiev.38
As one report noted, the French government could not expect to impose
its will in the Ukraine with a few thousand soldiers when a German army
of five hundred thousand had failed to maintain order the previous

year.39 By this time Berthelot was convinced that the expedition would
fail without a massive infusion of reliable troops. Recognizing the
unpopularity of intervention among the French units, Berthelot recom
mended extra pay bonuses to soldiers willing to serve in Russia. More
over, Berthelot now insisted upon twenty divisions for Russian service,
including eight Rumanian, three Greek and nine "very reliable" French
divisions. If the French government were not prepared for intervention
on this scale, he warned, the only alternative was the formation of a
cordon sanitaire from the Black Sea to the Baltic.40 Berthelot insisted
that reinforcements had to be sent at once since manpower shortages
increased the sense of despair over the intervention. Such was the mes
sage carried directly to Paris by Lt. Colonel Huntziger of Franchet d'Es
perey's staff in early March. Either the French government had to
make the necessary sacrifices for a large-scale military intervention, he
insisted, or ? envisager la retraite rapide de tous nos ?l?ments, quelles
que puissent ?tre les cons?quences morales imm?diates. ?41
It was unlikely, however, that the French command in Southern
Russia would receive the desired reinforcements. In December the
Clemenceau government faced severe criticism in the French Chamber
from the French socialists for the intervention policy, and Stephen
Pich?n, Clemenceau's foreign minister, had promised that French aid
would be limited. At the peace conference both President Wilson and
Prime Minister Lloyd George discouraged any ambitions for an extensive
military intervention. Foch presented an elaborate plan for intervention
to the council of ministers in February, but it was speedily rejected.
Given the hostile attitude of the French left and the reservations of
Clemenceau's allies in Paris, it was unlikely that any massive Allied
intervention could be made.
Moreover, just as Huntziger was delivering his message in Paris, the
Allied forces found themselves under severe military pressure in the
Western Ukraine. A pro-Bolshevik army commanded by the flam
boyant Ataman Grigorev began an advance toward Kherson and Nikolaev
in late February, and by early March he was at the gates of the cities.
The approach of Grigorev's troops alarmed French officers who knew the
limits of their resources. The garrison at Kherson consisted of no more
than one hundred and fifty French and seven hundred Greek troops
supported by a few hundred Volunteers of questionable reliability.
They fought an army estimated to be between ten and twelve thousand.42
At Nikolaev there was a German garrison of approximately twelve thou
sand, but they were of doubtful value to the Allied cause. French officers
suspected the Germans of sympathy for the local Bolsheviks and cited
incidents of fraternization between German soldiers and Bolsheviks in
Nikolaev. French officers complained that the German staff in Kharkov
supported the Bolsheviks, and German officers and men were supposedly
manning Grigorev's armored trains.43 Whatever the accuracy of these
reports, it was clear that the Germans had no desire to join the Allies in
a crusade against Bolshevism.
The challenge came on the evening of March 1-2 when Grigorev tele
phoned the Greek captain commanding the railway station at Kherson
and demanded that in view of Allied weaknesses the expedition should

withdraw and Kherson be surrendered. Otherwise, he threatened the

Allies with massacre and annihilation. When the Greek officer declined
this offer, Grigorev ordered an attack the following morning. His forces
were beaten back by Greek troops with artillery support from French
warships in the port. The arrival of two more Greek companies enabled
the Allies to counterattack on the 6th, and in the evening French and
Greek troops repulsed an attempted Bolshevik penetration from the east.
The next day, however, Grigorev resumed the attack, and this time he
successfully breached Allied defenses from the west and north, severing
Allied land communications with Nikolaev. Moreover, the population
inside Kherson rose up in support of the Bolsheviks and began firing upon
Allied troops. One French commander complained that women and
children aided partisans by sniping at Allied troops in Kherson.44 French
morale collapsed under the combined pressure of Bolshevik attacks and
the harrassment of the local inhabitants. On the 8th two French com
panies sent as reinforcements refused to fight upon their arrival. On the
gth Grigorev attacked all along the city limits, driving the Greek defenders
back. The railway station and an Allied armored train fell into the hands
of the attacking Bolsheviks who also succeeded in capturing the landing
dock in the port, cutting off any Allied retreat. The surrounded soldiers
took refuge in the citadel in the center of the city.
The Allied position in Kherson was desperate, and Lt. Colonel C?a
vieres, whom d'Anselme had sent as his personal representative, informed
Odessa that evacuation was necessary as soon as the troops in the citadel
could be freed. French warships in the harbor began an intense bom
bardment on the afternoon of the gth, enabling a batallion of recently
arrived Greek troops to get ashore and recapture the embarkation area.
In the early evening these forces reached the citadel, liberating the
encircled French and Greek soldiers. That evening the Allied force
embarked from Kherson, and the following day French vessels steamed
away, leaving the city to the victorious Grigorev.45 In the course of
the Allied bombardment a warehouse containing two thousand local
citizens, who had been rounded up by the Greeks, was set ablaze and over
five hundred of these prisoners lost their lives.46 Kherson was a resound
ing defeat for the Allies, and the experience left a lasting impression upon
the French commanders. The internal uprising against the Allies in the
city in effect meant that soldiers were combatting both Grigorev's regular
troops and partisan or guerrilla-style forces within the city. This internal
danger made the Allied position doubly dangerous.
With his victory in Kherson as a stimulus, Grigorev lost no time in
turning to his next objective, Nikolaev. His initial attempt to take
the city on March 7 had failed, but with the fall of Kherson his forces
were now free for an attack upon Nikolaev with its important military
supplies and shipyards. The imbalance between the Allies and Grigo
rev's army was even greater in Nikolaev than at Kherson. There were
some five hundred Greek troops and two depleted companies of French
soldiers in Nikolaev to face the onrushing bands of Ataman Grigorev.
To be sure, approximately twelve thousand German soldiers were in the
city, but the French rightfully assumed that the Germans would refuse
to fight. The local population was as hostile to the Allied presence as

the citizens of Kherson had been. The French command in the city
feared that an uprising would occur as Grigorev's troops began their
attack. From a strategic standpoint the loss of Kherson meant that the
southern and eastern approaches to Nikolaev were exposed and could not
be defended. Consequently, d'Anselme wired Colonel Lejay to prepare
an immediate evacuation of the city.47 Rear Admiral Exelmans, local
commander of the French naval force, and Colonel Lejay promptly began
negotiations with the spokesman for the Ukrainian Communist Directo
rate, a Latvian named Ego, for a truce that would allow an evacuation of
German and Allied troops.48 The embarkation began the next day with
the Allied force, mainly Greek soldiers, departing on the 14th, and the
last of the German troops left on French transports on the 16th.49 The
evacuation was peaceful and without incident or major conflict with
Grigorev's troops.
Although the Allies had ordered the Germans to remove all military
equipment and goods from Nikolaev, most of their war material was
turned over to the Bolsheviks. At the same time, considerable Allied
equipment fell into the hands of the Ataman, much to the dismay of Foch
in Paris. Exelmans and d'Anselme insisted that they did not have time
to remove or destroy military stores in Nikolaev due to the need for a
hasty retreat. This sudden withdrawal was necessary, they maintained,
to avoid an internal uprising within the city and to escape a bloody and
costly battle that would have destroyed a city that the French presum
ably had come to rescue from the ravages of Bolshevism. Their task was
to avoid any clash with the workers in the city and evacuate as quickly as
possible.50 However precipitous the flight from Nikolaev, the French
had at least escaped a repetition of the fighting and demoralization that
had occurred at Kherson.
The defeat at Kherson and the evacuation of Nikolaev were decisive
blows to French intervention. The Allies now hastily retreated toward
Odessa where they hoped to establish a defensive perimeter. Grigorev,
exuberant at his triumph and his army swollen with new recruits tasting
victory, quickly pressed on toward Odessa. Within Odessa news of
Allied defeats produced a growing panic, and incidents of sabotage
against French installations in the city became more frequent. The
French army's reputation as victors over Germany had been badly
damaged, and French officers reported an increased Bolshevik prestige
among the local population of Odessa as a result.51 At the same time
refugees flooded into the city ahead of Grigorev's advance. The loss of
Kherson and Nikolaev brought a constriction of the perimeter of Allied
occupation, and this meant a lesser hinterland from which the Allies
could draw provisions to feed the refugees and citizens of Odessa. Stra
tegically, Odessa was now exposed and vulnerable to attack from without
and to an uprising from within.
In explaining the retreat from Kherson and Nikolaev, General Ber
thelot observed that the opposition the Allies faced was at least ten times
more numerous than Allied forces.52 He again demanded that massive
reinforcements be sent promptly if the intervention were to be salvaged.
Moreover, Grigorev's troops impressed the French officers with their
and military skill. ? de Kherson a ?t? suivant les
discipline L'attaque

r?gles de la guerre moderne, sous la protection de l'artillerie, ?53 leading

Franchet d'Esperey to suspect the presence of German advisors with
Grigorev's army. D'Anselme also remarked that the Bolshevik troops
were very well commanded and perfectly disciplined.54 Despite Gri
gorev's reputation as an adventurer, French officers noted that he imposed
severe discipline upon his own troops in dealing with civilians, threaten
ing to shoot anyone caught pillaging.55 French officers realized that
they had been overwhelmed by a larger and surprisingly disciplined
military force.
General Berthelot also blamed ? l'attitude des Alle
?nigmatique
mands, ? the morale of certain Allied units, and the general hostility
poor
of the civilian population for the debacle at Kherson and Nikolaev.56
The Greek contingent had fought well at Kherson against difficult odds
and had borne the brunt of the casualties suffered. French losses included
four soldiers killed and twenty-two wounded, or about 18 percent of those
engaged; whereas the total Greek casualties, including those missing in
action, amounted to about 35 percent of the seven hundred troops involv
ed in the operation. The French noted, however, that Greek units
lacked sufficient officers and greatly resented being commanded by
French officers at a time when French soldiers refused to risk their lives.57
In addition to the two companies that refused to fight at Kherson, the
naval command reported incidents of indiscipline aboard the Mirabeau
at about this time. But it was the hostility of the local population in
Kherson and Nikolaev that convinced many French soldiers that the
intervention was hopeless. General d'Anselme claimed that the entire
city and countryside around Kherson had risen up against the Allied
forces and rallied to the Bolsheviks, and in his report to Clemenceau
Franchet d'Esperey stressed the overwhelming numbers of Grigorev's
army and the hostility of the population as the two factors principally
responsible for the defeat.58
The officers most directly involved in the Kherson and Nikolaev
episodes concluded that in the absence of adequate reinforcements the
government should consider abandoning the intervention. General
Berthelot asked on the 16th to be relieved of his command when he real
ized that the promised support for the intervention was unlikely to appear.
Although health reasons usually have been cited as explanation for Ber
thelot's request, Franchet d'Esperey's telegram to Foch made it clear
that General Berthelot had become tired and discouraged by the situation
in the Ukraine.59 In his dispatch on the evacuation of Nikolaev and
Kherson, Berthelot recommended that Russia be left to its own devices
and that France encourage development of a defensive front from the
Black Sea to the Baltic anchored in a strong Rumania and Poland.60
Colonel Lejay came out firmly against continuation of the intervention.
What the French faced in Southern Russia, he declared, was a national
movement that expressed itself in a general uprising against the Allies
whose presence was thoroughly detested.61 The most pointed call for
withdrawal came from Rear Admiral Exelmans, who advised his supe
? fran?ais doit agir en
riors, Je crois sinc?rement que le gouvernement
grand en Russie comme j'ai agi en petit ? Nikolaev tant au point de vue
de vue militaire, ? and from the scene.
politique qu'au point depart

Exelmans insisted that the Bolsheviks gave the appearance of order and
discipline; French soldiers wanted no more of combat on alien soil; and
he concluded the French government should extricate itself by seeking
an accommodation with the Bolsheviks.62 Vice-Admiral Amet reached
the same conclusion as his subordinate. Only by negotiating a with
drawal with the Bolsheviks could the French government ? nous
d?gager
un peu de la lamentable situation o? nous nous sommes laiss?s entra?ner
en Russie par un d?sir de la sauver de l'anarchie que n'accompagnait pas
la volont? de l'effort n?cessaire pour r?aliser ce g?n?reux sentiment. ?63
French had promised more than they could deliver.64 Captain Ber
thelot, nephew of the general, submitted his analysis of the situation to
his uncle's staff; he recommended that if there was nothing to be done
militarily, then the alternative was to come to terms with the Bolshe
viks.65 Already, then, as Allied troops fell back toward Odessa French
officers on the spot were urging withdrawal from Southern Russia alto
gether.
Nevertheless, the French command appeared determined to hold
Odessa. On the 13th d'Anselme commenced preparations for the city's
defense, and the following day a cable arrived from Clemenceau that
ordered the city held.66 Yet the perimeter of Allied control was further
reduced on the 18th when Bolshevik forces overran Berezovka, forty
miles northeast of Odessa. The Bolshevik army, estimated by the French
at ten to seventeen thousand, outflanked thinly-held defenses guarded
by Algerian and Greek troops. Fearing that they would be cut off from
their retreat to Odessa, these Allied units fled in disarray and left behind
their equipment, including three Renault tanks. The few Volunteers in
Berezovka refused to fight, according to reports from disgusted French
officers. Shortly afterward the Bolsheviks scored a further success at
Ochakov where the Volunteers fled before a few thousand armed peasants,
according to French accounts, and had to be evacuated by French
gunboats.67
By this point the French command had become convinced that
neither its own soldiers nor its allies were reliable any longer, and, despite
the construction of defense works around Odessa, prospects for the city's
defense were grim. To be sure the Allies counted a total force of some
twenty-five thousand troops in the city along with four thousand Volun
teers, but this force now faced an estimated thirty to forty thousand
soldiers under Grigorev's orders. French intelligence reported that the
Bolsheviks were capable of putting an additional fifty thousand armed
workers into the streets of Odessa.68 The French command feared that
the workers of the city awaited a signal from the approaching Bolshevik
army to turn against the Allies. From the southwest d'Anselme received
reports of local uprisings that threatened communication lines with
Rumania. As to the city's potential defenders, the French command
regarded the Volunteers as useless and assigned them the task of patrol
ling the streets. The morale of most Allied units in Southern Russia
was extremely poor. Evidence of indiscipline occurred at Tiraspol to
the northwest, and rumors of military mutinies spread quickly through
Odessa itself.69
Certainly conditions within the city were desperate; much of the

population had been living without heat, electricity or adequate food

since the French had appeared in December. Inflation was running out
of control as prices skyrocketed for scarce necessities. The Allied occupa
tion brought little relief and no benefit to the ordinary citizens of Odessa.
Bitter feuding over administrative control of the city brought relations
between the French and the Volunteers to a breaking point, making
cooperation nearly impossible. Recriminations flourished on both sides
as the Volunteers accused the French of arrogance, and the French
charged the Volunteers with stubbornness, pride and virtual cowardice.
With the prospect of an uprising in the city itself added to these troubles,
the defensive perimeter under construction looked far from secure to the
nervous d'Anselme.
When Franchet d'Esperey arrived in Odessa on March 20 for an in
spection tour, d'Anselme presented a candid assessment of prospects for
the city's defense. He observed that poor morale and the danger of
revolt complicated his task, but he expected that the city could be held
at least temporarily. However, the loss of supply and revenue from the
countryside meant that supporting the swollen population would be
extremely difficult.70 In effect, the defeats at Kherson and Nikolaev
made the provisioning of Odessa difficult, if not impossible. Given the
tactical advantages held by the Allies in defending entrenched positions,
the military situation did not seem hopeless, at least on paper, and the
Allies could bring in supplies and reinforcements by sea. Yet there were
only eight to ten days' food reserves on hand for a population that had
swollen from four hundred thousand to over one million. D'Anselme
and Franchet d'Esperey concluded that evacuation was unavoidable.
Although Franchet d'Esperey assured the Volunteers that he intended
to defend Odessa, he privately agreed with d'Anselme that the evacuation
should be prepared, and on the 21st he issued instructions on how this
would be accomplished, should the order be given. On the 23rd he
cabled Paris that as a result of his inspection tour he concluded that
Odessa could be held only with difficulty, given the limited number of
troops available, and these Allied soldiers had no desire to fight. He
called for a "liquidation" of the Ukrainian intervention; he announced
that Allied troops would fall back toward Bessarabia, and civilians would
be taken off by ship unless the situation improved rapidly. On the
25th d'Anselme issued detailed orders in preparation for the possible
departure, and the following day Franchet d'Esperey cabled Clemenceau
and Foch that the situation in Southern Russia and Hungary had become
very serious and would only get worse in the immediate future.71 Not
only were Bolshevik partisans threatening Odessa, but at this time a
communist government under Bela Kun had seized power in Hungary.
The absence of supplies and reinforcements, the danger of an internal
revolt, the uncertain reliability of Allied troops, Grigorev's numerical
superiority and, now, the danger of a hostile government in Hungary, all
pointed toward a prompt retreat from Odessa.
Throughout these preparations, the French command gave every
public indication of an intention to defend Odessa. A premature
announcement of withdrawal from Odessa would lead to panic in the city.
Nevertheless, the Greek commanders began to worry about the French

resolution to remain. In a report to Athens, General K. X. Nider warned

that the Allies lacked the means for an effective defense of the city, and
on the 26th he requested Greek transports to prepare for the embarkation
of Greeks in Odessa if necessary. In a conversation with General d'An
selme the French commander gave General Nider no indication of any
plans to abandon Odessa, but he did suggest that Nider might seek
authorization for an evacuation. Greek officers feared a repetition of
Kherson in which the Russians had turned against both the Greek troops
and the local Greek residents with particular violence. As with the
French, the Greek commanders feared an internal insurrection in the city
that would turn against all foreign intruders.72 The Greeks also shared
the French conviction that the Volunteers were of little value, and in the
face of a hostile population in the Ukraine there was no alternative to
ending the ill-fated intervention.
Although they did not admit preparations to their Greek allies, the
French were determined to leave Odessa. In response to Franchet
d'Esperey's telegrams and warnings, Clemenceau cabled on March 29
that the Allies in Paris had agreed to the withdrawal.73 It had taken
over a week for Paris to respond to the initial warnings from the east.
On April 1 Franchet d'Esperey ordered d'Anselme to depart according
to the plan that had been prepared on the 25th. The following day
d'Anselme gave a preliminary order for the embarkation of certain groups,
presumably to relieve pressure on the food supply in the city. This was
a pretext to begin full evacuation, and d'Anselme's order produced a
panic among civilians seeking berths on ships sailing from the port.
The retreat from Odessa was accomplished in stages between April 3
and 6. First Allied and Russian civilians who wished to leave and could
get space on transports departed. Once civilians had left, the military
garrison under General Borius' orders retreated behind the Dniester on
April 6. Greek troops under General Vlacopoulos assumed respon
sibility for protection of the Odessa-Bielajeska rail line. By April 6 the
city had been completely vacated by the Allies save in the port area
where the last detachments were withdrawn by ship the next morning.74
The French account of the departure from Odessa leaves an impression
of a smooth operation in which nearly thirty thousand troops and their
equipment retired from the city, along with some fifty thousand civilians.
Under the circumstances the French command believed that the operation
had been relatively well prepared. Negotiations with Bolshevik repre
sentatives forestalled a feared insurrection, and a truce permitted time
to remove a number of civilians ? perhaps not all who wished to leave ?
from the city. At least, the impression is that the departure was far
more orderly than at Kherson and Nikolaev.
Other perspectives on the manner of the French retreat are far less
sanguine. The Volunteers deplored the apparently precipitate decision
to withdraw and claimed that it was unnecessary. The French command
had, in fact, practiced deliberate deception and reached its decision
without consulting their Russian allies or giving the slightest prior
warning. The preliminary order of the 2nd touched off frantic demands
for space aboard the transports, and the scene at the docks was one of
extreme confusion and desperation. Western accounts sympathetic to

KIM MUNHOLLAND
58 J.
the Volunteer cause accuse the French of high-handedness, claiming that

the Allies numerical and were better
" enjoyed superiority "incomparably
armed. Indeed, according to Kenez, the French behavior was inexcus
able throughout: "Their combination of ignorance, arrogance and coward
ice made their policies extremely unattractive."75 Certainly the hasty
withdrawal and French deception left a legacy of anger at the French
among the Volunteers that has reappeared in the historical accounts of
the French retreat.
There is little doubt that the French acted in a high-handed fashion
toward the Volunteers. Denikin received notification of the withdrawal
from Franchet d'Esperey after the event. Throughout their occupation
of Odessa and its environs the French officers demonstrated little regard
for the Volunteers, and the abrupt decision to depart reflected a disdain
for France's erstwhile allies in Southern Russia. The decision was made
primarily on the basis of the military's calculations of prospects for a
successful defense of Odessa and a strong desire to escape a repetition of
Kherson. In their judgment, whatever the sentiments of the Volunteers,
a rapid evacuation was necessary to avoid a military debacle and a bloody
uprising in the city.
Observers at the time and scholars subsequently have disagreed over
the need and reasons offered for the French evacuation of Odessa. Since
the French departed before engaging in a combat for the city, the claim
that Odessa was in fact defensible cannot be settled one way or another.76
At the time French diplomatic representatives in Constantinople cited
Franchet d'Esperey to the effect that the military situation was excellent,
and d'Anselme had informed Franchet d'Esperey that the city could be
defended. At Nikolaev and again at Odessa the Allies avoided conflict
before being fully tested. On the other hand, the Allies suffered clear
defeats, largely due to inferior numbers, at Kherson and Berezovka.
D'Anselme himself argued that there was no hope of checking the Bolshe
vik military advance with his demoralized troops. He insisted that if
the Allies had held Nikolaev and Kherson, the problem of getting supplies
into Odessa would have been less acute. Despite the loss of the Odessa
hinterland, however, d'Anselme estimated that sufficient supply might
have been provided by sea; thus he concluded that the evacuation was
due more to the unfavorable military situation than to an absence of
His assessment was blunt: "We have fled a military debacle."77
supply.
The question of whether or not inadequate supply was the decisive
factor leading to withdrawal is an issue that also is beyond clear resolu
tion on the basis of the evidence from those involved at the time. In
his correspondence with Paris and in the explanation that he belatedly
offered Denikin, Franchet d'Esperey cited the limited reserves to feed
the swollen population of Odessa as an important consideration in the
decision to abandon the city.78 French reports complained that the
Americans wished to be paid in gold for the grain that they had stored
in Constantinople. On the other hand, a member of the municipal
council in Odessa claimed that the lack of provisions and the American
demands for gold payment were inadequate excuses for the retreat since
the Americans had agreed to send an additional ten days' supply of grain,
and this shipment arrived in port on the day that the order to evacuate

was issued.79 Additional troop reinforcements were also en route to

Odessa as the decision to withdraw was being taken. In a sense, the
debate over whether an absence of supply or an untenable
military
situation forced the evacuation detracts from the main point, which was
the French command's conviction that the intervention was a hopeless
cause.
The absence of provisions, the threat of an internal uprising in the
city, inadequate manpower and low morale among the troops all weighed
upon the decision to evacuate, but the crucial element was the final conclu
sion of the French command that little could be gained from remaining
in Odessa. Above all, as municipal councillor Rautenberg observed,
the French command simply had enough; they regarded the situation
as irretrievable and gave the impression that they wanted out at any
cost.80 Certainly the feeling spread among French officers that they were
being asked to pull chestnuts out of the fire for the Volunteers, and neither
officers nor enlisted men had any desire to continue the war and risk their
lives on behalf of a movement for which they had little respect and which
commanded little support among the Ukrainians. Perhaps the attitude
of the French officers was best summarized by Colonel Freydenberg who
observed that the French expedition had come to Southern Russia under
three false assumptions: that the Volunteers were a "national army"
representing a majority of the people; that the Russian people welcomed
Allied intervention against Bolshevik brigands and terrorists; and that
the conquest would be the work of the Volunteer Army, requiring only
moral and technical assistance from the French. Instead, the Ukrainians
preferred the Bolsheviks to the Volunteers; the local population resented
Allied intervention; and the Volunteers showed little will to fight.81
The French military intervention in the Ukraine was a sobering lesson
in the perils of intervening in another nation's civil wars.
The Odessa evacuation left the Crimea as the remaining area of direct
French military intervention. Clemenceau had urged that the French
hold the Crimea as a bastion for future action in Southern Russia, again
creating the impression of a firm French commitment.82 Yet from the
outset the French presence in the Crimea had been marked by the same
difficulties that plagued the Ukrainian intervention. The local White
Russian government in the Crimea was in the hands of liberals who tried
to establish a tolerant administration that recognized the diverse interests
of the people of the region. However, this government had turned to
the Volunteer Army for military support and in so doing became asso
ciated with reactionary elements who had little sympathy for the liberal
views of the government. Despite good intentions, the Crimean govern
ment and, particularly, the Volunteers became increasingly unpopular.
In addition, the local population was openly hostile to Allied intervention.
The combination of local hostility and intramural quarrels between the
Volunteers and local interests repeated the depressing pattern that the
French had encountered in the Ukraine, and French officers despaired of
forging an effective anti-Bolshevik front from these unpromising conditions.
Although there were estimated some five to six thousand Volunteers
in the Crimea, the French command considered them of little military
value. Allied forces were limited to a total of two thousand five hundred

6o J. KIM MUNHOLLAND
troops at the beginning of April. The diversion of troops originally

scheduled for Odessa raised this total to some five thousand by April 14,
but two thousand of these were described by French officers as "unen
thusiastic" Greek troops.83 French units displayed no greater enthusiasm
for their Crimean role as revealed in reports of continued grumbling and
threats of mutiny. Again the French command observed that the refusal
of Algerian troops to embark at Constanza for Sebastopol provided dramat
ic evidence of widespread disenchantment among French units. Over
half of the French troops in Sebastopol were colonial soldiers, including
Algerian and Senegalese, who lacked adequate numbers of French non
commissioned officers to command them. Their discipline was uncertain,
and the three metropolitan French battalions in the city were described
as weak.84
Even as Odessa was being evacuated, the situation in the Crimea had
become precarious. On April 3 Bolshevik troops broke through the
Perekop isthmus where, to French disgust, the Volunteers offered no more
than token resistance. This force advanced rapidly on Simferopol,
forcing the evacuation of the Crimean government on the 8th. From
this point the Crimean government's authority ceased to be effective.
Meanwhile Colonel Trousson, the French commander in Sebastopol,
appointed a defense committee for the city with himself as military com
mander. The former Volunteer military governor, General Subbotin,
was demoted to serve as Trousson's assistant, a move that placed the
Volunteers under French command. When a quarrel broke out between
Trousson and the Russians over the financial reserves of the Crimean
government, relations between the Allies and the Volunteers reached a
nadir. Trousson accused the Volunteers of plundering the funds of the
Crimean government, and he confiscated some eleven million rubles held
by the Crimean authorities and the Volunteers.85
In the meantime the Bolsheviks were approaching Sebastopol and
on the 14th reached the outskirts of the city. On the 16th they began
an attack upon the city, but that evening artillery fire from French
warships caused the attackers to withdraw.86 The following day a truce
was arranged that was to last until April 25. During this time the French
agreed to turn the governance of Sebastopol over to the local Soviets on
April 19, and the truce would permit an orderly evacuation of Allied
forces from the city.87
The decision to evacuate Sebastopol, like Odessa and Nikolaev, was
taken prior to a clear test of strength. There was no doubt, though,
that the French regarded the defense of Sebastopol as uncertain at best.
Admiral Amet reported on April 10 that the Volunteers had been com
pletely defeated in the Crimea; panic had broken out among the wealthier
citizens of Sebastopol, and there was a distinct possibility of an uprising
in the city. Daily demonstrations against the intervention were taking
place, and workers refused to obey French orders or the orders of the
Volunteers.88 French officers reported that the local population intensely
disliked the wealthy bourgeoisie and landholders who had turned to the
French for support.89 In any event, Admiral Amet warned Franchet
d'Esperey that there were insufficient troops for the defense of Sebastopol,
and on April 13 he requested permission to evacuate in view of the diffi

THE FRENCH INTERVENTION IN SOUTHERN RUSSIA 6l
culties in provisioning the city, the disillusionment of Allied troops and

the hostility of the local population. The following day Franchet d'Es
perey cabled Paris that the situation in the Crimea was serious, and he
argued the Allies should evacuate in good order before they were com
pelled to retreat in haste as had been the case in Odessa. In reply,
Clemenceau approved the evacuation whenever Franchet d'Esperey
decided such action was necessary.90
According to terms of the armistice, the Soviets were scheduled to
take control of Sebastopol on the 19th. Thus the French command was
already committed to a transfer of power and to an evacuation when
mutinies erupted aboard several French vessels on the 19th. The centers
of the mutiny were the battle cruiser France and Admiral Amet's flagship,
Jean Bart. Unrest spread to other ships as the sailors demanded an
immediate return to France and an end to the intervention. The next
day, the 20th, Easter Sunday, a number of sailors landed in Sebastopol
and participated in a large demonstration that expressed support for the
Soviet government and opposition to Allied intervention. The French
naval command sent a detachment of marines and some Greek soldiers
ashore to disperse the demonstration. The Allied troops fired on the
crowd and in the m?l?e two civilians were killed, four soldiers and six
civilians were wounded. On the 21st French officers negotiated with the
leaders of the mutiny and promised a prompt evacuation. On the 23rd,
the France departed from the Sebastopol roadstead, fulfilling the promise
of the French command and carrying the ringleaders of the mutiny to
court martials in France.
The Black Sea's mutinies have acquired legendary dimension among
Marxist historians, largely as a result of Andr? Marty's somewhat exag
gerated claims contained in his two accounts, La r?volte de la mer Noire
and Les heures glorieuses de la mer Noire, and as a result of the martyrdom
of those sailors condemned by military tribunals. There is no doubt that
the mutinies were serious and extensive. The Sebastopol episode marked
a climax in a series of mutinies and a rather extensive indiscipline among
troops throughout the Ukrainian and Crimean interventions. The
French command was well aware of the low morale and war-weariness
among French troops. Whether this attitude reflected a widespread
sympathy for Bolshevism is less clear. The majority of the French
soldiers had no desire to fight in Russia and demanded repatriation.
Some fully supported the Bolsheviks, and the demonstration in Sebas
topol revealed a degree of political support for the Russian Revolution
that was of considerable significance. But it is not clear that a majority
of the soldiers and sailors were prepared to embrace the revolution at
this point. Above all, it is an exaggeration to claim that the mutiny in
Sebastopol forced the evacuation. The general unreliability of the troops
was an important consideration in the French command's decision to
withdraw from both Odessa and the Crimea, but the decision on Sebas
topol evacuation already had been taken by the time the mutiny broke
out on the France and Jean Bart. At least French reports maintained
that the Sebastopol mutiny resulted from the actions of a few pro
Bolshevik leaders who exploited the general war-weariness to be found
among the French sailors and soldiers.91

Franchet d'Esperey formally approved the evacuation of Sebastopol

and declared that the intervention was over; and, on the 21st, Clemenceau
somewhat regretfully accepted this decision. Although there was specu
lation, particularly among the French diplomatic corps in Constantinople,
that Sebastopol might have been defended, Franchet d'Esperey's decision,
combined with the mutinies, decided the outcome of the intervention.
The armistice that had been signed was extended on April 25 to give the
French more time to arrange the evacuation of military forces and the
removal of civilians who wished to depart. On the 28th the evacuation
of Sebastopol was completed, and Bolshevik troops entered the city the
following day.
The Sebastopol episode revealed not only hostility among the soldiers,
but the officers as well were infected with a sense of discouragement.
One report noted frustration among lower-ranking officers who had little
to do and could see no purpose to the intervention. Above all, these
officers again echoed the French command's disenchantment with the
Volunteers and with the quarrelling among the White Russian opposi
tion.92 On the other hand, the Bolsheviks gave an impression of stability
and order, imposing sanctions against pillaging in the Crimea, just as
had been done in the Ukraine. Not only lower-ranking officers, but
some of the expedition's leaders became influenced by views current
among the rank and file, according to Franchet d'Esperey. He requested
replacements for Generals Nerel and Borius who in his estimation "no
longer possessed the indispensable spirit and energy" necessary to com
mand troops involved in the intervention.93 With the mutinies of
April 19-20 Admiral Amet concluded that the game was definitely lost
in Southern Russia.94 Outnumbered, disliked by the local population
and now completely disheartened, the French command saw no alter
native to withdrawal.
The Crimean evacuation ended direct French military intervention
in Southern Russia, and this decision brought French relations with the
Volunteers to a low point. General Denikin bitterly complained that the
French, contrary to their promises, had abandoned the Volunteers and
had ordered the evacuation without informing him of their intention.95
Relations with the Volunteers had deteriorated seriously enough to re
quire some effort at patching things up in Paris. On April 4 a meeting
was held at the Quai d'Orsay to regulate matters between General Deni
kin and the French command in Southern Russia.96
The effort to repair relations with the Volunteers was too little and
too late. The French command had arrived in Southern Russia uncertain
of the support that it could expect from the Volunteers and other anti
Bolshevik groups. The French government's unwillingness to fulfill the
optimistic expectations and promises made about the size of Allied inter
vention deceived the Volunteers and also confirmed the French command
ers' convictions that the policy of intervention was doomed. The
scepticism of the military leadership was apparent from the outset and
intensified in the course of intervention. The legacy was one of frustra
tion on all Allied sides and bitter resentment from the Soviets. The
Volunteers blamed the French for the failure of intervention at this
stage, and French officers scarcely disguised their contempt for the

Volunteers. The Bolsheviks acquired a lasting memory of France

leading a crusade to unseat them from power. Later, when the fortunes
of war turned more favorably for Denikin's forces, Franchet d'Esperey
developed some enthusiasm about chances for a successful intervention.
But the French government had learned its lesson, and in the summer of
1919, while Denikin's army scored impressive victories in the Ukraine,
Clemenceau restricted the scope of intervention to military supply and
economic aid, along with some advisors. The risk of active, direct mili
tary intervention by French forces was not to be taken again.
Many considerations went into the French decision to withdraw from
Southern Russia, but certainly the views of the military commanders
weighed heavily. Conditions that the French officers encountered in
Southern Russia held little promise of success. While the French officers
may have been unfamiliar with the intricacies of White Russian politics,
as their critics later claimed, they certainly understood that these dis
agreements hampered their own efforts to build a solid anti-Bolshevik
front. Above all, they accurately sensed that the local population
preferred the Bolsheviks to the Volunteers and a possible restoration of
the old order. The French command knew that it was operating in a
hostile environment. Moreover, the officers had to consider the military
implications of intervention from the perspective of their own organi
zation. Allied forces had been greatly outnumbered at Kherson and suf
fered a military defeat. After this, the French command was wary of
risking another military debacle, even when the odds were somewhat
more favorable, as in Odessa. The officers understood the danger of an
internal uprising against foreign intrusion, were sensitive to outside
intervention, and they also acknowledged the fragile morale of the units
that they commanded. When the uncertainty of supply and reinforce
ment from Paris is added to this equation, it is not surprising that the
French command preferred a hasty withdrawal to the danger of an even
greater military debacle and the possibility of more extensive mutinies
that might result in a complete collapse of discipline. In short, the
pessimism of the French military command was a decisive element in
the French decision to withdraw Allied forces from direct intervention
and turn instead to indirect aid to Denikin's army and the creation of
a diplomatic cordon sanitaire as alternative policies to be employed
against the Bolsheviks after the spring of 1919.
Minneapolis, 1980.
Abbreviations :
AMAEF Archives du minist?re des Affaires ?trang?res fran?ais

ShA Service historique de l'Arm?e (Vincennes)
i. A. I. Gukovskii, Frantsuzskaia interventsiia na iuge Rossii
I?18-1919 (Mos
cow, :
1928) passim. '
2. Peter Kenez, The Civil War in Southern Russia, i?i?-i?20 (Berkeley, 1977)
179 ; John S. Reshetar, The Ukrainian revolution, 191J-1?20 (Princeton, 1952) : 234.

3- Terry L. Smart, ? French intervention in the Ukraine, ?

1918-1919 (unpu
blished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Kansas, 1968) : xix.
4. G?n?ral Jean Bernachot, Les arm?es fran?aises en Orient l'armistice
apr?s
de igi8 2 : 66-71.
(Paris, 1970),
5. Pr?sident du Conseil, ministre de la Guerre ? M. le G?n?ral commandant en
chef des arm?es d'Orient, 27 oct. 1918 in La guerre entre les Alli?s et la Russie
(1?18-IQ20), documents r?unis par E. Moulis et E. Bergonier 1937) : 160-161.
(Paris,
6. J. S. Reshetar, op. cit. : 234.
7. Pr?s, du Cons., min. de la Guerre, au 5 avr. 1919,
t?l?gr. g?n. Berthelot,
AMAEF, Eur. i?i8-i?2Q, Russie 299.
8. Min. des Af?aires ?tr. ? M. le Pr?s, du Cons., min. de la Guerre, 7 d?c. 1918,
AMAEF, Eur. i?i8-i?2?, Russie 56.
9. George A. Brinkley, The Volunteer army and Allied intervention in South
Russia, : 77.
igij-i?2j (Notre Dame, 1966)
10. Memorandum on his Russian India Office
by Major Keyes experiences,
Library (London), Keyes Collection, Mss. Eur. F 131/12a.
11. J. Bernachot, op. cit., 2 : 68-69 ;Ghenikan Stratou, Thieuthinsis
Epiteleiou
Istorias-Stratou, To Ellinikon ekstrateutikon soma eis mesimvirinin Rosiea (Athens,
: I5 iN. Diomidis-Petsalis, ?Hellenism in Southern Russia and the Ukrainian
I955)
: their effect on the Pontus ?Balkan Studies, :
campaign question (1919), 13.2 (1972)
230.
12. op. cit., 2 : 67, 69.
J. Bernachot,
13. Robert H. McNeal, ? The Conference of Jassy : an fiasco of the anti
early
Bolshevik ? in S. Curtiss, in honor
movement, John ed., Essays of Geroid Tanquary
Robinson (Leiden, 1963) : 235-236.
?Minute sur les relations entre le G?n?ral Denikin et le G?n?ral Berthelot, ?
14.
20 mar. 1919, AMAEF, Eur. igig-ig2g, Russie 228.
? sur les relations du commandant militaire ? Odessa avec
15. Rapport fran?ais
les gouvernements locaux du au 6 avr. ? 20 mai 1919, AMAEF,
14 janv. 1918,
Eur. igi8-ig2g, Russie 230.
16. Ibid.
17. G?n. Franchet d'Esperey au G?n. Foch 29 mar.
(Constantinople) (Paris),
1919, AMAEF, Eur. igi8-ig2Q, Russie 229.
18. ?Note de renseignements sur l'?vacuation d'Odessa, ? 5. 5.
Justice, Service
de Renseignements, 12 avr. 1919, ibid.
19. G?n. Berthelot ? M. le min. de la Guerre, 17 f?v. 1919, ShA, 20N273.
20. ? Situation en Russie du sud vu par du G?n?ral Berthelot, ?
l'?tat-major
17 mar. 1919, AMAEF, Eur. igi8-ig2g, Russie 228.
21. Quoted by M. Defranee, Haut Commissaire de la France en Orient, ?
M. le min. des Affaires ?tr., 3 mai 1919, AMAEF, Eur. igi8-ig2g, Russie 230.
22. Rapport du Lt. Col. Freydenberg, ? : ?vacuation d'Odessa
Renseignements
et pays ukrainiens, ? 22 avr. 1919, ShA, 7N651.
? sur les relations du commandement militaire ? Odessa..., ?
23. Rapport fran?ais
quoted.
24. J. Bernachot, op. cit., 2 : 109-110.
? M. le min. de la Guerre, ? sur la situation en
25. G?n. Berthelot Rapport
Russie m?ridionale, ? 17 f?v. 1919, ShA, 20N273.
26. M. Defrance ? M. le min. des Af?aires ?tr., 3 mai 1919, AMAEF, Eur. igi8
ig2g, Russie 230.
27. Col. au G?n. Berthelot, 17 mar. 1919, AMAEF, Eur. igi8-ig2g,
Lejay
Russie 228.
28. G?n. d'Anselme au G?n. Berthelot, 14 mar. 1919, ShA, 20N273.
29. G?n. Franchet d'Esperey ? M. le min. de la Guerre, 14 avr. 1919, AMAEF,
? rendu hebdomadaire, ? 2e Bureau, 22 juin 1919, ShA,
30. Compte 20N753-3.
?Note sur la question d'Odessa, ? 20 mar. 1919, AMAEF, Eur.
31. igi8-ig2g,
Russie 228.
32. G?n. Franchet d'Esperey ? M. le min. de la Guerre, 14 f?v. 1919, ShA,
20N721.
aNote sur
la situation en la Russie du Sud, ? 19 avr. 1919, AMAEF, Eur.
33.
igi8-ig2g, Russie 229.
34. G?n. Berthelot ? M. le min. de la Guerre, 19 f?v. 1919, ShA, 20N273.

35- ?Bulletin de Renseignements, ? Cdt. ? Constantinople ? M. le min. de

Sup.
la Guerre, 21 mar. 1919, ibid.
36. John M. Thompson, Russia, Bolshevism and the Versailles peace (Princeton,
: 12, citing
1966) A. I. Gukovskii, op. cit. : 123.
Lt. Col. ? de mission, ? avr. 1919, ShA,
37. Mougin, Rapport 30 20N273.
38. G?n. Berthelot ? M. le min. de la Guerre, 17 f?vr. 1919, ; same to
quoted
same, 7 f?v. 1919, ShA, 7N651.
39. Adm. Lejay ? M. le min. de la Marine, 17 mar. 1919, AMAEF, Eur. igi8
ig2g, Russie 228.
40. G?n. Berthelot ? M. le min. de la Guerre, 7 f?v. 1919, quoted ; ? Situation
en Russie du sud vu par de G?n?ral Berthelot, ?
l'?tat-major quoted.
? du Lt. Col. Huntziger de l'?tat-major de M. le G?n?ral Franchet
41. Rapport
sur le tour du 8 au 9 mars, ? 19 mar. 1919, AMAEF, Eur.
d'Esperey d'inspection
i?i8-ig2g, Russie 228.
42. G?n. Franchet d'Esperey au G?n. Foch 29 mar.
(Constantinople) (Paris),
1919, quoted.
43. G?n. Franchet d'Esperey ? M. le Pr?s, du Cons, et min. de la Guerre, 18 mar.
1919, AMAEF, Eur. igi8-ig2g, Russie 821.
44. G?n. d'Anselme au G?n. Berthelot, 14 mar. 1919, quoted.
45. J. Bernachot, op. cit., 2 : 102.
46. Arthur E. Adams, Bolsheviks in the Ukraine : the second
campaign, igi8
igig (New Haven, : 177.
1963)
48. Contre-Amiral Exelmans ? M. le Vice-Amiral de la deuxi?me escadre
(Amet), 18 mar. 1919, ShA, 6N231 (Fonds and AMAEF, Eur.
Clemenceau), igi8
ig2g, Russie 230.
50. Vice-Am. Amet ? M. le min. de la Marine, 31 mars 1919, AMAEF, Eur.
igi8-iQ2g, Russie 821.
? sur le conflit entre les autorit?s militaires et russes, ?
51. Rapport fran?aises
12 avr 1919, AMAEF, Eur. Russie 229.
igi8-ig2g,
52. G?n. Berthelot ? M. le min. de la Guerre, 12 mar. 1919, quoted.
53. G?n. Franchet d'Esperey ? M. le Pr?s, du Cons, et min. de la Guerre, 18 mar.
1919, quoted.
54. G?n. d'Anselme au G?n. Berthelot, 21 f?v. 1919, ShA, 20N273.
55. A. E. Adams, op. cit. : 44 ; Contre-Amiral Exelmans ? M. le Vice-Amiral
de la deuxi?me escadre (Amet), 18 mar. 1919, quoted.
56. G?n. Berthelot ? M. le min. de la Guerre, 12 mar. 1919, quoted ; J. Ber
nachot, op. cit., 2 : 110.
?Note sur la question ? 20 mar. Eur.
57. d'Odessa, 1919, AMAEF, igi8-ig2g,
Russie 228.
58. G?n. Franchet d'Esperey ? M. le Pr?s, du Cons, et min. de la Guerre,
18 mar. 1919, quoted.
59. Same to same, 16 mar. 1919, AMAEF, Eur. igi8-ig2g, Russie 228.
60. Voir 56.
61. Col. au G?n. Berthelot, 19 mar. 1919, AMAEF, Eur.
Lejay igi8-ig2g,
Russie 229.
62. Contre-Amiral Exelmans ? M. le Vice-Amiral de la deuxi?me escadre (Amet),
18 mars 1919, quoted.
63. Vice-Am. Amet ? M. le min. de la Marine, 31 mar. 1919, ShA, 6N231 (Fonds
Clemenceau).
64. G?n. Franchet d'Esperey au G?n. Foch, 19 mar. 1919, AMAEF, Eur. igi8
ig2Q, Russie 228.
? sur la mission du Berthelot du G?n?ral
65. Rapport Capitaine aupr?s Denikin,
? mar.
du 14 jan. au Ier mars 1919, 4 1919, ibid.
66. Clemenceau (Paris) t?l?gr. au G?n. Berthelot, 14 mar. 1919, ShA, 20N273.
67. G?n. Berthelot ? M. le min. de la Guerre, 19 mar. 1919, ibid.
?Note sur la ? 20 mar.
69. question d'Odessa, 1919, quoted.
70. G?n. Franchet d'Esperey ? M. le min. de la Guerre, 15 avr. 1919, AMAEF,
?Note sur la ? 20 mar.
71. question d'Odessa, 1919, quoted.

72. G?n?ral K. X. Nider report from Odessa, March 26 and 29, 1919, in Gheni
kon Epiteleiou, op. cit. : 331, 335. The author thanks Professor Theofanis Stavrou
of the University of Minnesota for bringing the Greek documents to his attention
and providing translations ; see also N. Petsalis-Diomidis, art. cit. : 240-241.
73. Clemenceau t?l?gr. au G?n. Franchet d'Esperey, 29 mar. 1919, ShA,
20N273 ; same to same (copy), AMAEF, Eur. igi8-ig2g, Russie 228.
74. J. Bernachot, op. cit., 2 : 141-146.
75. P. Kenez, op. cit. : 190.
that Odessa was defensible but the question of supply short
76. Smart argues
age was decisive ;T. L. Smart, op. cit. : 125, 137, 140.
77. M. Chevilly (Constantinople), ? M. le min. des Af?aires ?tr., 14 avr. 1919,
AMAEF, Eur. igi8-ig2g, Russie 229, citing d'Anselme.
? M. le min. de la Guerre, 22 mai
78. G?n. Franchet d'Esperey 1919, AMAEF,
Eur. Russie ; see also, du Lt. Col. ? Rensei
igi8-ig2g, Rapport Freydenberg,
: ?vacuation d'Odessa et pays ukrainiens, ? 22 avr. 1919, quoted.
gnements
? de Pierre membre du conseil d'Odessa, ?
79. Rapport Rautenberg, municipal
21 mai 1919, AMAEF, Eur. Russie 231.
igi8-ig2g,
80. Ibid.
81. Rapport du Lt. Col. ? ? 22 avr. 1919,
Freydenberg, Renseignements...,
quoted.
82. Clemenceau au G?n. Franchet d'Esperey, 2 avr. 1919, AMAEF,
t?l?gr.
83. Vice-Am. Amet ? M. le min. de la Marine, avr. 1919, AMAEF, Eur. igi8
ig2g, Russie 230.
84. G?n. Franchet d'Esperey au G?n. Foch, 15 avr. 1919, AMAEF, Eur. igi8
ig2g, Russie 229.
85. G. A. Brinkley, op. cit. : 135-137 ;P. Kenez, op. cit. : 201.
86. ? Note le ministre : ?vacuation de Sebastopol ? AMAEF,
pour (s.d.),
Eur. igi8-ig2Q, Russie 230.
87. G?n. Franchet d'Esperey t?l?gr. au G?n. Foch, 20 avr. 1919, et ? Compte
rendu de l'entretien entre Col. Trousson et le d?l?gu? sur l'?vacuation
bolchevique
de Sebastopol, ? 16 avr. 1919, AMAEF, Eur. Russie 822.
igi8-ig2g,
88. Vice-Am. Amet ? M. le min. de la Marine, 10 avr. 1919, AMAEF, Eur. igi8
ig2g, Russie 821.
? sur l'?vacuation de la Crim?e, ?
89. M. Defranee (Constantinople), Rapport
3 mai 1919, AMAEF, Eur. igi8-ig2g, Russie 230.
avr. 1919, quoted ; ? Note le ministre : ?vacuation de Sebastopol ?
14 pour (s.d.),
quoted.
91. ? du Lt. de Vaisseau Carslade ? M. le ministre de la Marine, ?
Rapport
3 mai 1919, ibid.
? sur une mission ? 30 avr.
92. Lt. Col. Mougin, Rapport d'inspection, 1919,
quoted.
3 mai 1919, AMAEF, Eur. igi8-ig2g, Russie 230.
94. Vice-Am. Amet ? M. le min. de la Marine, 3 mai 1919, ibid.
95. G?n. Franchet ? M. le Pr?s, du Cons, et min. de la Guerre, 6 mai
d'Esperey
1919, ibid.
96. G. A. Brinkley, op. cit. : 139.


Ehess

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

You might also like

Ehess

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Ehess

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

EHESS

The French Army and Intervention in Southern Russia. 1918-1919

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.15 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 21:22:44 PM

THE FRENCH ARMY AND INTERVENTION

Allied intervention in the Russian Revolution and civil war continues

Although any attempt to improve the tarnished image of French

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.15 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 21:22:44 PM

of influence) gains from a limited investment. Essential to this policy

Prospects for a more active and overt intervention increased in the

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.15 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 21:22:44 PM

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.15 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 21:22:44 PM

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.15 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 21:22:44 PM

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.15 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 21:22:44 PM

Bolshevism. In the eyes of the French command in Odessa the Volun

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.15 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 21:22:44 PM

[quelques] postes du sud, ?26 a veiled reference to the socialists of the

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.15 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 21:22:44 PM

and other publications of the French Communist Group based in Kiev

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.15 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 21:22:44 PM

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.15 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 21:22:44 PM

withdraw and Kherson be surrendered. Otherwise, he threatened the

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.15 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 21:22:44 PM

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.15 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 21:22:44 PM

r?gles de la guerre moderne, sous la protection de l'artillerie, ?53 leading

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.15 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 21:22:44 PM

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.15 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 21:22:44 PM

population had been living without heat, electricity or adequate food

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.15 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 21:22:44 PM

resolution to remain. In a report to Athens, General K. X. Nider warned

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.15 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 21:22:44 PM

the Volunteer cause accuse the French of high-handedness, claiming that

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.15 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 21:22:44 PM

was issued.79 Additional troop reinforcements were also en route to

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.15 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 21:22:44 PM

troops at the beginning of April. The diversion of troops originally

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.15 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 21:22:44 PM

culties in provisioning the city, the disillusionment of Allied troops and

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.15 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 21:22:44 PM

Franchet d'Esperey formally approved the evacuation of Sebastopol

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.15 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 21:22:44 PM

Volunteers. The Bolsheviks acquired a lasting memory of France

AMAEF Archives du minist?re des Affaires ?trang?res fran?ais

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.15 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 21:22:44 PM

3- Terry L. Smart, ? French intervention in the Ukraine, ?

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.15 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 21:22:44 PM

35- ?Bulletin de Renseignements, ? Cdt. ? Constantinople ? M. le min. de

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.15 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 21:22:44 PM

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.15 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 21:22:44 PM

You might also like