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Against Critical Realism
Against Critical Realism
Against Critical
Realism
• The concept of ideology has a pivotal position within It has been claimed
Marxist thought; as also does a related distinction between the that the onrological
appearances of things and their essential underlying structures. theories of Roy
If there has been little agreement on what these concepts may have Bhaskar can provide
meant for Marx, we all at least can agree on their importance and guiding principles
indispensability for Marxism. They have of late been the subject for social scientists,
of vigorous and sustained attack by post-Marxists, post- which can help steer
structuralists, and other kinds of relativists, who argue that to them through errors
describe beliefs and descriptions as ideological, distorted or false and misconceptions.
is mistakenly to imply that there is a non-discursive reality to This article argues
which these beliefs and descriptions fail to correspond. that neither Bhaskar's
Many theorists have continued, against the relativist tide, to 'critical realism' nor
see themselves as attempting to accurately describe their subject any overarching
matter, and to criticise and expose mistaken or illusory theories philosophical
and ideologies. Among these theorists some few have been ontology, can
impressed by claims that the ontological theories of Roy Bhaskar provide workable
can provide a philosophical basis for conceptions of ideology and guiding principles
false consciousness that have been put into doubt. According to for social scientific
Bhaskar, his critical realism' also supplies guiding principles for research, and that
the social sciences, which can help steer a path through various such principles are
errors and misconceptions that have hampered them. The aims unnecessary.
of this article will be first, to show that neither critical realism nor
any overarching philosophical ontology can provide workable
general guiding principles for the social sciences, and second, that
there is no need for such principles.
114 Capital & Class»54
imputes to her. She can say instead that reality is such that it
allows us to experience and describe it in terms of constant
conjunctions. She can say that to ask what it is really like beyond
experience and description is meaningless. This would commit
her to acknowledging that reality exists independently of our
thinking about it, but would fall a long way short of the sort of
ontological commitment that Bhaskar regards as inescapable.
Ontology in history
Underlabouring
Economics
Having set out the case against thinking that a set of ontological
commitments can provide guidance in both the natural and social
sciences, I turn now to the particular case of economics, wherein,
as elsewhere, great claims have been made for critical realism. In
the pages of this journal two recent articles, by John Lovering
(1990) and Rajani Kanth (1992), have argued the case for the
efficacy of critical realism as a guiding ontology. Since Lovering's
article is the more substantial of the two, and more accurately
refiects the claims of critical realism,'^ my critical comments will
be directed at that.
Lovering follows Bhaskar in arguing that critical realism can
enable socialist economists to avoid the false dichotomy between
new realism and fiindamentalism. Lovering identifies new realists
as having a number of general commitments: to the social market
as the best means of fulfilling individual needs and preferences,
to individualism, and to the notion of a plurality of contingently
related processes at work within society, each with its own logic
or dynamic, as opposed to any single overriding determination
such as production.
Fundamentalists on the other hand tend to insist on the
overriding importance of the capitalist nature of contemporary
Against Critical Realism 127
I said at the beginning of this article that critical realism will have
seemed attractive to Marxists and others who are anxious to defend
the applicability of concepts such as illtisoriness and ideology from
the attacks of post-structuralists and the like; and who see social
science as attempting to understand the ways things really are
rather than making up stories. Thankfully we can retain such
concepts without the help of critical realism.
When, for example, Marx claims that the commodity form has
the illusory appearance of possessing value as an intrinsic property,
the claimed illtisoriness of the appearance is not dependent on an
Against Critical Realism 131
Earlier drafts of this article were read and commented on by Jonathon Acknowledgement
Michie, Tony Lawson and Chris Arthur. My thanks to them and to
colleagues and students who discussed earlier versions given as papers.
134 Capital & Class*54