The State of U.S.-China Relations

The State of U.S.
-
China Relations
Risks and opportunities for multinationals,
investors, asset managers and policymakers
DECEMBER 2022
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IN THIS REPORT
7 Executive Summary & Dashboard
15 The State of U.S.-China Relations: An Overview
29 Commercial Considerations: Trade, Investment & Supply Chains
38 Issue Spotlight: Taiwan Relations
45 Issue Spotlight: Chinese Attitudes Toward Foreign Investment & Western Brands
52 Methodology
5
Executive Summary
Mutual mistrust is the sole point of agreement mixed, Beijing is unlikely to soften the tariffs it imposes on U.S. goods barring an equivalent
While Chinese enmity toward the United States has softened over the last six months, U.S. olive branch from Washington. Adults in China are paying more attention to the tariffs than
views of China have hardened, such that the two countries are now roughly aligned: Around those in the United States, for whom the tariffs are increasingly out of sight and out of mind:
two-thirds of adults in both countries see the other side as an enemy or unfriendly. The shares of U.S. adults reporting that the tariffs are not impacting their purchasing decisions
Republicans’ views of China are especially negative, and GOP control of the House of have risen over the last year. Should this trend continue, there will be little political impetus for
Representatives could make the political environment for U.S. and Chinese companies compromise in either country. Republicans’ outsize support for tariffs relative to Democrats will
conducting business in each other’s markets even more challenging. Over the past six months, further limit the room for compromise following gains by Republicans in the House of
interest in resolving economic and military tensions has trended down slightly among U.S. Representatives.
adults overall, and more moderately among Republicans (6 percentage points), deadening the
Nancy Pelosi’s Taiwan visit appears to have shifted the paradigm
potential for compromise. Likewise, as Chinese President Xi Jinping heads into his third term in
U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan in August 2022 has inflamed sentiment
office having further consolidated his control over the Chinese Communist Party and its
across a number of issues. Beijing’s militant response to the visit saw a spike in Chinese fears
political agenda, his assertive approach to foreign policy and deep commitment to increased
of escalating military tensions, while the share of U.S. adults, and especially Democrats, who
economic self-reliance are unlikely to offer a reprieve to foreign businesses operating in China.
cite Taiwan as the most important bilateral issue to address has trended upward. Meanwhile,
A recent meeting between Xi and U.S. President Joe Biden on the sidelines of the G-20
Xi’s refusal to rule out the use of force to achieve his long-held goal of “reunification” with
summit sought to calm tensions and restart more consistent high-level dialogue going forward.
Taiwan has forced U.S. businesses to begin planning for the heretofore little-considered
While both sides intimated a shared desire to establish a floor under spiraling relations, the
possibility of an actual Chinese invasion. If China does invade, the U.S. government would
potential for actual compromise in critical areas remains limited.
likely move to sever all bilateral business ties as it did with Russia. Pluralities of U.S. adults
Attitudes toward bilateral investment are hardening express support for equivalent measures in such a scenario. Companies should proceed
Over two-thirds of Americans support at least some restrictions on Chinese businesses cautiously when it comes to maintaining their operations in China should the likelihood of an
operating in the United States, while nearly a fifth support an outright ban on all commercial invasion rise: Given prevailing sentiment, consumers would likely punish them at the cash
operations, notching a 4 percentage point gain over the past six months. Chinese adults, register even if the U.S. government did not immediately force American businesses to exit.
meanwhile, are somewhat less inclined to restrict or altogether ban U.S. business operations in
Intellectual property theft by Chinese companies animates Republicans above all
their country (58% and 9%, respectively). Multinationals with holdings in China should
While Taiwan has been at the center of headlines since August, Republicans are substantially
nevertheless expect Beijing to respond in kind to any concerted efforts emanating from
more concerned about intellectual property theft: Half of them view the issue as “very
Washington that would impose blanket restrictions on Chinese companies’ market access.
important” to address, compared with 42% who feel the same about Taiwan relations.
Tariffs are likely here to stay Republican gains in the House could increase the likelihood of policy action to tackle the issue,
A near majority of U.S. adults (45%) say they favor maintaining existing tariffs on China even if benefiting U.S. businesses worried about IP theft or the risk being forced to hand over their IP
reducing them would relieve inflationary pressures, with the overall share rising over the last as a precondition for doing business in China.
six months among both Democrats and Republicans. While Chinese adults’ opinions are more
The State of U.S.-China Relations 6

Executive Dashboard
The Executive Dashboard leverages relevant data series from this report
to provide a consolidated risk outlook for U.S.-China relations. This section
focuses on six-month trends across the most critical issue areas indicating
how risk has evolved over the second half of 2022, and offers five key
considerations for decision-makers.
7
EXECUTIVE DASHBOARD: RISK OUTLOOK
Risk outlook: present month

Bilateral sentiment across key data series as of November 2022 As U.S.-China relations cool, both countries are aligned in at least one
area: their mistrust of each other. Two-thirds of Chinese adults (66%)
Chinese U.S. and just under two-thirds of U.S. adults (64%) view the other country as
adults adults Democrats Republicans an enemy or unfriendly. Republicans, meanwhile, are more extreme in
their views: 73% view China as an enemy/unfriendly, compared with
Views of the other: enemy/unfriendly 66% 64% 63% 73%
63% of Democrats.
Military
Military tensions: concerned 76% 68% 72% 72% A larger share of U.S. adults are concerned about bilateral economic
tensions than military ones (70% vs. 68%), while Chinese adults are
Military tensions: interested in resolving 79% 73% 79% 73% slightly more concerned about military tensions (76% vs. 73%). Larger
shares of Chinese adults are concerned about both issues than U.S.
Economic
73% 70% 75% 74% adults. (For the above figures, including trends, see Slide 21.)
Economic tensions: concerned
Despite mutual mistrust, people in both countries remain adamant
Economic tensions: interested in resolving 79% 73% 80% 73% about the need to address existing concerns. Chinese adults are more
interested in resolving military tensions, a possible holdover from U.S.
Tariffs: reduce to combat inflation 35% 28% 33% 23% House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August, which raised
the specter of regional military conflict to levels not seen in years. While
Doing business: support complete ban 9% 19% 19% 24% Chinese and U.S. adults both show interest in resolving military and
Commercial
economic tensions (79% for both and 73% for both, respectively),
Doing business: support national security ban 58% 48% 52% 46% neither side shows much enthusiasm for reducing tariffs: Only 35% of
Chinese adults and even fewer U.S. adults (28%) support doing so even
Foreign ownership & acquisition: if it would drive down prices. Bilateral mistrust extends to cross-border
support complete ban 14% 26% 23% 35%
investment but does not yet preclude it: Just 9% of Chinese adults and
Foreign ownership & acquisition: 56% 42% 48% 39% 19% of U.S. adults are interested in fully ring-fencing opposing
support national security ban multinationals’ ability to do business in the other’s market. But a majority
of Chinese adults and a near majority of U.S. adults support national
security-related bans on cross-border commerce.
Surveys conducted Nov. 2-3, 2022, in the United States and Nov. 2-6, 2022, in China, among representative samples of 1,000
adults in each country, with unweighted margins of error of +/-3 percentage points.

EXECUTIVE DASHBOARD: RISK OUTLOOK
Risk outlook: 2H 2022 trajectory

Change in bilateral sentiment across key data series from June 2022 onward Chinese adults’ appraisals of the United States have softened since June, as
reflected by a 13 percentage point drop in the share who view America as an
Chinese U.S. enemy or unfriendly. Over the same period, the share of U.S. adults who hold
adults adults Democrats Republicans the same view of China ticked up slightly, with a more substantial increase
observed among Republicans (+8pp). Concerns about bilateral military
Views of the other: enemy/unfriendly -13pp +3pp -1pp +8pp
tensions increased slightly for both countries (+2pp). The share of U.S. adults
Military
interested in resolving military tensions decreased slightly (-3pp). with

Military tensions: concerned +2pp +2pp +3pp -1pp Republicans trending in an even more hawkish direction (-6pp), signaling a
hardening of political sentiment.
Military tensions: interested in resolving -1pp -3pp -2pp -6pp
Meanwhile, Democrats became slightly less concerned about economic
tensions (-2pp), compared with a negligible shift among U.S. adults overall.
Economic
Economic tensions: concerned +2pp <.50 -2pp -1pp

Likewise, Democrats now show less interest in reducing tariffs (-8pp since
June), suggesting they perceive the little price relief that reducing tariffs could
Economic tensions: interested in resolving <.50 -3pp -2pp -6pp
offer as a drop in the bucket amid historically high inflation. Minor downward
shifts in Republican sentiment are visible on both fronts, suggesting that the
Tariffs: reduce to combat inflation +1pp -2pp -8pp -1pp outcome of the U.S. midterm elections will do little to alter congressional
incentives to dial back the ongoing trade war with China. As economic
Doing business: support complete ban <.50 +4pp +3pp +5pp headwinds battered China’s economy over the summer, Chinese adults grew
Commercial
slightly more likely to favor tariff relief (+1pp), though domestic support for
Doing business: support national security ban -8pp -1pp <.50 -3pp them remains high overall (see previous slide).
Foreign ownership & acquisition: In parallel, U.S. adults’ support for complete bans on Chinese companies’
-2pp -2pp -1pp -6pp ability to do business in the United States ticked up 4 percentage points.
support complete ban
Foreign ownership & acquisition: However, a slight decline in U.S. adults’ support for complete bans on Chinese
-1pp +5pp +6pp +7pp companies’ ability to own and acquire U.S. companies is a rare bright spot.
support national security ban
Collectively, these trends highlight some degree of tension between U.S.
attitudes toward allowing Chinese companies to sell products in America
directly, as well as indirectly via their ownership of U.S. companies.
Surveys conducted monthly among representative samples of 1,000 adults each in China and the United States, with
unweighted margins of error of +/-3 percentage points.

EXECUTIVE DASHBOARD: KEY CONSIDERATIONS
U.S. adults’ views of China hardened over 2H 2022, as did their views of Russia, with the most
pronounced shift visible among Republicans
Shares of Chinese adults who view Shares of U.S. adults who view China and Russia as Prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February, similar majorities of
the U.S. as an enemy/unfriendly and enemies/unfriendly U.S. adults viewed both Russia and China as enemies or unfriendly,
Russia as an ally/friendly with Republicans more inclined to hold negative views of China and
China Russia
Democrats more inclined to hold negative views of Russia. Since
United States Russia the invasion, the shares of U.S. adults who perceive Russia as an
U.S. adults Democrats Republicans
100% enemy/unfriendly have risen sharply, opening a significant gap
100%
between U.S. views of both countries among Democrats and (at
present) a less pronounced gap among Republicans. While
negativity toward Russia among U.S. adults peaked in late spring,
75% 75% perhaps due to Americans’ fatigue with the war effort and rising
energy prices at home, negativity toward China has trended upward
consistently since the beginning of the year.
50% 50% The increase in negative sentiment over the second half of the year
has been especially steep among Republicans, bringing overall
public views of Russia and China somewhat closer together again.
While a moderate gap between U.S. adults’ views of China and
25% 25% Russia persists, Republican control of the House of Representatives
after the midterms risks putting relations on a more antagonistic
footing owing to Republicans’ greater enmity toward China.
0% The war in Ukraine does not appear to have shifted Chinese

0%
2
2
22
22
22
perceptions of Russia, which remain overwhelmingly positive. But Xi
2
2
' 22
22
22
2
22
2
' 22
y '2
y '2
y '2
v '2
v '2
v '2
y '2
v '2
g'
g'
g'
b'
b'
g'
and Putin’s joint declaration of a “no limits” friendship hasn’t

b
b
Ma
Ma
Ma
No
No
No
Au
Au
Au
Ma
Fe
Fe
Fe
No
Au
Fe
especially shifted the needle. The share of Chinese adults holding

negative views of the United States declined in early summer but
Surveys conducted monthly among representative samples of 1,000 adults each in China and the United States, with unweighted has been on an upward trajectory since Pelosi’s Taiwan visit. It
margins of error of +/-3 percentage points.
continues to skew more negative than U.S. views of China.

Global attitudes suggest the long-brewing U.S.-China cold war is now a reality
Global net favorability toward the indicated country
United States China
100%
50%
0%
-50%
-100%
Source: Morning Consult Political Intelligence. Surveys conducted in October 2022 among roughly 1,050-61,000 adults per country, with unweighted margins of error of up to
+/-3 percentage points. Net favorability is the share of adults with a favorable view minus the share with an unfavorable view.
Global attitudes toward the United States and China paint a bleak picture of international In a potential silver lining, many emerging and developed markets continue to hold favorable
relations involving the two countries, suggesting that a U.S.-China cold war has already arrived. views of both the United States and China, suggesting they have thus far resisted attempts by
the two superpowers to force a choice of allegiance to one or the other.
Hostility toward the United States — reflected by negative net favorability — is concentrated in
China and Russia. Negative sentiment toward China, meanwhile, is concentrated in North The fact that many of the world’s major military powers have bifurcated into opposing camps
America (excluding Mexico), Europe, Australia and a number of China’s neighbors. nevertheless suggests the line in the sand has been drawn.
Executive Dashboard: Key Considerations

U.S. adults view intellectual property theft by Chinese companies as the most pressing issue
in bilateral relations, while Chinese adults prioritize military issues
Shares of Chinese and U.S. adults citing each of the following as the most A plurality of U.S. adults are unsure which bilateral issue is
pressing matter to address in bilateral relations: the most pressing to contend with. Among those with an
opinion, Republicans prioritize economic issues including
trade relations and — above all — intellectual property
Chinese adults1 U.S. adults Democrats Republicans theft, which nearly a quarter cite as their most pressing
concern.
Taiwan relations Taiwan relations Republican gains in the House could see a push to
30% 30% address IP issues in ways that offer relief to U.S.
Don't know/ Trade Don't know/ Trade
No opinion relations No opinion relations businesses that have been undercut by Chinese
competitors or forced to hand over IP as the price of
15% 15%
admission to the Chinese market. But any such moves
Business Business would see an aggressive response from Beijing, further
Intellectual conditions Intellectual conditions souring the climate for bilateral trade and investment.
property property
While Democrats and Republicans alike see trade relations
as a critical issue, the former are more likely to cite
geopolitical and human rights issues, including China’s
position on Taiwan and the ongoing repression of civil
Subsidies South Subsidies South
China Sea China Sea liberties in Hong Kong and Xinjiang, as priorities.
Many Chinese adults are similarly unsure of the most

Hong Kong Xinjiang Hong Kong Xinjiang critical issue at stake. A plurality cite security concerns
linked to the U.S. presence in the South China Sea.2
Business conditions and trade relations follow close
Surveys conducted Nov. 2-3, 2022, in the United States and Nov. 2-6, 2022, in China, among representative samples of 1,000 adults in each behind, opening a small window for bilateral cooperation
country, with unweighted margins of error of +/-3 percentage points. given U.S. adults’ concerns about these same issues, even
1. The questions about Hong Kong and Taiwan were not asked in China due to political sensitivities.
2. When fielding in China, we use “Freedom of U.S. navigation in the South China Sea” as an indirect proxy for tensions involving Taiwan, while as tariff relief remains unlikely (see subsequent slides).
recognizing the methodological limitations of this approach

A sizable share of Republicans, and a smaller share of Chinese adults, view a cold war
between the United States and China as an existential threat
Shares reporting they are “very concerned” about each of the following potential When asked about the potential ramifications of U.S.-China relations devolving
risks of a cold war between the United States and China: into a cold war, Republicans are generally more concerned than Democrats, with
U.S. adults Republicans Democrats Chinese adults more than 2 in 5 viewing such a conflict as a threat to the American way of life.
Such fears could, paradoxically, offer a glimmer of hope: Should bilateral relations
continue to deteriorate, public concerns about the existential threat posed by
Threat to my way of life U.S.-China military confrontation could give political leaders in both countries
reason to check their most hawkish impulses. On the other hand, elevated public
concern about threats to each country’s way of life could drive greater public
support for aggressive actions to fend off such threats, leading to a vicious circle
Military conflict of hardening attitudes and further confrontation. At present, our data does not
point definitively in one direction or the other.
While Chinese adults also express concern about threats to their country’s way of
Economic disruption life, the shares who do so are more in line with Democrats at about 3 in 10.
Overall, Chinese adults’ concerns are more evenly spread across the issues at
stake relative to U.S. adults, but they are least concerned about a cold war
turning hot: The smallest share of Chinese adults cite military conflict as a “very
Loss of global influence important” concern compared with U.S. adults, who identify it as their second
greatest concern.
Chinese adults appear to worry that such a conflict would lead to attempts by
More military spending Western nations to isolate China, driving a loss of global influence. Grievances
over China’s historically diminished position on the world stage — a legacy of
Western colonialism and mercantilism that the Chinese government and public
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% are determined to rebuke — have long been animating concerns. But they have
Surveys conducted Nov. 2-3, 2022, in the United States and Nov. 2-6, 2022, in China among representative samples of taken on added salience in Chinese foreign policy as part of Xi Jinping’s
1,000 adults in each country, with unweighted margins of error of +/-3 percentage points. On issues related to China, trademark push for “national rejuvenation.”
Democrats and Republicans often express greater concern than independents, whose milder preferences drag down the
”U.S. adults” share.

If China invades Taiwan, commercial ties will be the first to go

Shares of U.S. adults responding to a series of questions about what actions If China were to invade Taiwan, many U.S. adults would
they want the United States to take if China invades Taiwan support punishing China economically while hesitating to
endorse a military response that could draw the United
Definitely Probably Don't know/No opinion Probably not Definitely not States into a prolonged conflict with a rising military and
nuclear power. As with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, U.S.
Impose sanctions action to sever bilateral business dealings and isolate
27% 26% 31% 10% 7%
Beijing would be on the table in such a scenario.
Ban U.S. investment in China 24% 26% 29% 13% 8%
Businesses with China exposure should note the public’s
Ban Chinese investment in the U.S. 26% 23% 30% 14% 7% expectations in this regard. A majority of U.S. adults favor
imposing sanctions on China (53%), while half support
Ban imports from China 22% 24% 28% 16% 9% banning U.S. investment in China. Near majorities favor
banning Chinese inbound investment (49%), along with
Ban exports to China 21% 25% 30% 15% 10%
both imports and exports (46% each). Companies that do
Send weapons to Taiwan 20% 25% 30% 14% 11% business in China should develop contingency plans to
manage the anticipated fallout from such policies if they do
Enforce a no-fly zone over Taiwan 16% 24% 36% 14% 10% ultimately materialize, even if the near-term likelihood of
Send troops to Asia China invading Taiwan is minimal.
15% 22% 32% 17% 13%
Among possible military responses, 45% of U.S. adults favor
Enforce a naval blockade of China 13% 19% 36% 20% 12%
sending weapons to Taiwan, while less than a third (28%)
Send troops to Taiwan 9% 19% 30% 23% 18% support sending troops to the island. Direct military attacks
on China see the least support, with a majority of U.S.
Launch cyberattacks against China 11% 12% 32% 22% 23% adults (54%) expressing opposition. Just 6% say they would
“definitely” support such a hawkish countermeasure.
Launch military attacks against China 6% 10% 29% 24% 30%
Survey conducted July 18-19, 2022, among a representative sample of 2,210 U.S. adults, with an unweighted margin of error of +/-2
percentage points. Figures may not add up to 100% due to rounding.

SECTION 1
The State of U.S.-China

Relations: An Overview

Section 1: Key Takeaways
U.S. views of China appear to be hardening, especially among Republicans Majorities on both sides yearn for resolution amid a bleak long-term outlook, but
The share of U.S. adults who view China as an enemy or unfriendly has risen slowly but
conditions for compromise seem increasingly unfavorable
steadily over the second half of 2022, peaking in September at 69%. The trend is likely driven Four in 5 Chinese adults now say they want the United States and China to work together to
by China’s belligerent response to U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in reduce military and economic tensions, while just under three-quarters of U.S. adults (73%) feel
August. The uptick has largely been driven by increased Republican animosity: A near majority the same. Political conditions, however, mean tensions are likely to persist in the near term.
(48%) now view China as an outright enemy. Republican control of the House of Chinese President Xi Jinping has just entered an unprecedented third term in office and is
Representatives will likely narrow the window for reconciliation. now free to pursue an even more combative foreign policy after having sidelined his few
remaining rivals in favor of a slate of loyalist appointees, including promotions for several
Chinese negativity has softened slightly in recent months but still outpaces officials known to champion an aggressive “wolf warrior” approach to diplomacy. Washington,
U.S. views meanwhile, looks set for post-midterm political gridlock with a newly divided Congress.
Nonetheless, a recent meeting between Xi and U.S. President Joe Biden on the sidelines of
While Chinese antagonism toward the United States — reflected by the shares who view
the G-20 summit renewed hopes for a slightly less combative relationship between the two
America as an enemy or unfriendly — appears to be softening, it still sits higher than U.S.
countries, or at least their two leaders, even if political realities may circumscribe the
views overall. At present, the two countries’ respective opinions of each other appear to be
possibility for tangible compromises at the policy level.
converging and settling into equilibrium following Pelosi’s Taiwan visit, with around two-thirds
of adults in the United States and China perceiving the other as an enemy/unfriendly.
Public desire for compromise is at odds with a pugnacious Chinese foreign policy
Both sides increasingly fear that military and economic tensions will continue to grounded in collective grievance
escalate in the long term
Most Chinese adults (54%) say the United States regularly bullies their country, while even
Beijing’s aggressive military mobilization appears to have set Chinese adults on edge. The more (58%) want Beijing to go further in asserting itself against international adversaries.
share who are concerned about bilateral military tensions escalating in the long term has Burgeoning Chinese self-confidence may also dampen the impetus for compromise, as
trended sharply upward in recent months, reaching a 2022 high of 63% in November. The Chinese adults appear to be more convinced than U.S. adults that their country would emerge
share of Chinese adults forecasting escalating economic tensions rose even higher, to 70% victorious from a prolonged conflict. A near majority of Chinese (46%) believe their country
the same month. U.S. adults’ concerns about escalating tensions — especially military — have would win in a hypothetical cold war between the two nations, compared with a plurality of
risen recently as well, though Chinese views outpace those of U.S. adults on both metrics. U.S. adults who believe that neither side would win.

BILATERAL RELATIONS: AN OVERVIEW
Most U.S. and Chinese adults see the other side as an enemy or unfriendly, with U.S. views
hardening over 2022
Shares of adults in each country who regard the other as an enemy/unfriendly or an ally/friendly
Ally/friendly Don't know/No opinion Enemy/unfriendly
U.S. adults' views of China Chinese adults' views of the U.S.
100% 100%
75% 75%
50% 50%
25% 25%
0% 0%
22
2
22
22
22
'22
2
2
22
2
22
2
22
'22
2
2
22
y '2
v '2
r '2
r '2
y '2
v '2
r '2
r '2
l '2
l '2
g'
p'
b'
n'
g'
p'
b'
n'
t
t
Ma
Oc
Ap
Ma
Ju
No
Ma
Oc
Au
Ap
Se
Ma
Fe
No
Ju
Ju
Au
Se
Fe
Ju
Surveys conducted monthly among representative samples of 1,000 adults each in China and the United States, with unweighted margins of error of +/-3 percentage points.

The increase in U.S. antagonism toward China over 2022 is most pronounced among
Republicans, posing a risk of further confrontation under a GOP-controlled House
Shares who think China is an enemy/unfriendly or an ally/friendly
Ally/friendly Don't know/No opinion Enemy/unfriendly
Democrats Republicans
100%
75%
50%
25%
0%
Feb '22 May '22 Aug '22 Nov '22 Feb '22 May '22 Aug '22 Nov '22
Surveys conducted monthly among representative samples of 1,000 U.S. adults, including roughly 320-410 Democrats and 260-320 Republicans, with margins of error of up to +/-6 percentage points.

A near majority of Republicans view China as an enemy, compared with over a third of U.S.
adults overall — though mistrust of Iran and Russia is still greater
Shares who think each of following countries is an enemy/unfriendly or an ally/friendly:
Ally Friendly Don't know/No opinion Unfriendly Enemy
China 13% 18% 28% 36% 8% 12% 17% 32% 31% 10% 13% 25% 48%
Iran 6% 23% 17% 50% 7% 20% 19% 48% 6% 18% 14% 60%
Russia 17% 20% 56% 14% 17% 61% 13% 25% 55%
Surveys conducted monthly among representative samples of 1,000 U.S. adults, with unweighted margins of error of +/-3 percentage points. Figures may not add up to 100% due to rounding.

Concerns about economic and military tensions rose over 2H 2022, with an especially
pronounced shift observed among Chinese adults
Shares of U.S. and Chinese adults reporting how concerned they are about the following types of bilateral tensions:
Concerned Don't know/No opinion Not concerned

Military tensions Economic tensions
U.S. adults Chinese adults U.S. adults Chinese adults
100% 100%
75% 75%
50% 50%
25% 25%
0% 0%
2
22
22
2
2
' 22
' 22
2
2
22
22
2
2
' 22
' 22
y '2
y '2
v '2
v '2
y '2
y '2
v '2
v '2
g'
g'
g'
g'
b
b
Ma
Ma
No
No
Au
Au
Ma
Ma
Fe
Fe
No
No
Au
Au
Fe
Fe

Chinese adults have been especially worried about escalating tensions with the United States
since U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in August
Shares of U.S. and Chinese adults who think the following types of bilateral tensions are likely to escalate over the next five years:
Very/somewhat likely Don't know/No opinion Very/somewhat unlikely
Military tensions Economic tensions
U.S. adults Chinese adults U.S. adults Chinese adults

100% 100%
75% 75%
50% 50%
25% 25%
0% 0%
2
22
22
2
2
' 22
' 22
2
2
22
22
2
2
' 22
' 22
y '2
y '2
v '2
v '2
y '2
y '2
v '2
v '2
g'
g'
g'
g'
b
b
Ma
Ma
No
No
Au
Au
Ma
Ma
Fe
Fe
No
No
Au
Au
Fe
Fe

More than 7 in 10 U.S. and Chinese adults agree the two countries should work together to
reduce military and economic tensions
Shares reporting whether the United States and China should work together to
reduce the following types of bilateral tensions:
Strongly agree Somewhat agree Don't know/No opinion Somewhat disagree Strongly disagree
U.S. adults Chinese adults
Economic tensions 38% 35% 17% 6% 36% 44% 13% 7%
Military tensions 43% 30% 17% 7% 34% 46% 14% 6%
Surveys conducted Nov. 2-3, 2022, in the United States and Nov. 2-6, 2022, in China among representative samples of 1,000 adults in each country, with
unweighted margins of error of +/-3 percentage points. Figures may not add up to 100% due to rounding.

Both sides want to improve trade relations. Beyond that, U.S. adults tend to prioritize
economic issues like IP theft, while Chinese adults more often cite tensions involving Taiwan
Shares citing each of the following as the most important issue for the United States and
China to address when it comes to resolving bilateral tensions:
U.S. allegations of intellectual property theft 17% 8%
Trade relations, including tariffs 16% 18%
Taiwan relations 11% Not asked in China

The questions about
U.S. allegations of industrial subsidy usage 8% 9% Taiwan and Hong
Kong were not asked
Treatment of U.S. and Chinese companies 7% 14% in China due to
political sensitivities.
Limits on freedom of expression in Hong Kong 6% Not asked in China
Freedom of U.S. navigation in the South China Sea* 5% 21%
U.S. allegations of human rights abuses in Xinjiang 5% 11%
Don't know/No opinion 25% 19%
Surveys conducted Nov. 2-3, 2022, in the United States and Nov. 2-6, 2022, in China among representative samples of 1,000 adults in each country, with unweighted margins of error of +/-3 percentage points. Figures may
not add up to 100% due to rounding.
*When fielding in China, we use “Freedom of U.S. navigation in the South China Sea” as an indirect proxy for tensions involving Taiwan, while recognizing the methodological limitations of this approach.

Republicans drive U.S. adults’ overall interest in addressing IP theft by Chinese companies,
whereas Democrats prioritize trade. Both sides rank Taiwan relations third
Shares citing each of the following as the most important issue for the United States
and China to contend with when it comes to resolving bilateral tensions:
Trade relations, including tariffs 15% 17%
U.S. allegations of intellectual property theft 13% 24%
Taiwan relations 12% 11%
U.S. allegations of industrial subsidy usage 9% 10%
Treatment of U.S. and Chinese companies 9% 6%
U.S. allegations of human rights abuses in Xinjiang 8% 2%
Limits on freedom of expression in Hong Kong 7% 5%
Freedom of U.S. navigation in the South China Sea 7% 4%
Don't know/No opinion 20% 20%

46% of Americans say relations with China are as bad or worse than U.S.-Soviet relations were
during the Cold War, while 48% of Chinese adults say they’re better
Shares reporting whether U.S.-China relations are better or worse than U.S.-Soviet relations during the Cold War
Much better Somewhat better About the same Don't know/No opinion Somewhat worse Much worse
U.S. adults 9% 24% 26% 21% 12% 8%
Chinese adults 13% 35% 27% 14% 10%
Surveys conducted Nov. 2-3, 2022, in the United States and Nov. 2-6, 2022, in China among representative samples of 1,000 adults in each country, with unweighted margins of error of +/-3 percentage points.
Figures may not add up to 100% due to rounding.

A plurality of Chinese adults believe China would win in a hypothetical cold war with the
United States, while a plurality of U.S. adults believe neither side would prevail
Shares reporting whether the United States or China would win in a hypothetical cold war
United States Neither China Don't know/No opinion
By country By party affiliation
U.S. adults 30% 33% 8% 29% Democrats 35% 32% 9% 24%
Chinese adults 31% 46% 20% Republicans 30% 33% 12% 25%

Nearly equal shares of Chinese adults, and similar shares of Democrats and Republicans, view a
U.S.-China cold war as a threat to their way of life, potentially curbing reckless adventuring
Shares reporting which of the following is the most concerning risk of a hypothetical U.S.-China cold war:
By country By party affiliation

U.S. adults Chinese adults Democrats Republicans
Threat to my way of life 24% 26% Threat to my way of life 24% 30%
Economic disruption 23% 20% Economic disruption 23% 23%
Military conflict 18% 13% Military conflict 19% 17%
More military spending 9% 14% More military spending 11% 8%
Less U.S. influence globally 7% Other 9% Less U.S. influence globally 6% 9%
Don't know/No opinion 20% 18% Don't know/No opinion 17% 13%

Against the backdrop of persistent U.S.-China tensions, most Chinese adults think their
government should take a stronger stand against “foreign bullies”
Shares of Chinese adults reporting whether they agree with the following statements about how China
is treated by foreign countries and how their government should respond:
Strongly agree Somewhat agree Don't know/No opinion Somewhat disagree Strongly disagree
The rest of the world should

46% 21% 31%
show China more respect
China should do more to

31% 27% 31% 8%
stand up to foreign bullies
The United States regularly bullies

32% 22% 30% 4% 13%
China and/or tries to inhibit its rise
Foreign countries regularly bully

24% 25% 30% 9% 11%
China and/or try to inhibit its rise
Survey conducted June 30-July 6, 2022, among a representative sample of 1,000 Chinese adults, with an unweighted margin of error of +/-3 percentage points. Figures may not add up to 100% due to rounding.

SECTION 2
Commercial Considerations:
Trade, Investment & Supply
Chains

U.S. adults — and especially Republicans — are more likely than Chinese adults to U.S. adults are increasingly hostile toward Chinese investment
support existing tariffs imposed on the other country The share of U.S. adults who say they oppose Chinese investment has risen throughout the
Overall, U.S. support for maintaining tariffs despite their inflationary impact has consistently year. Over two-thirds now support some form of ban on Chinese companies doing business in
outpaced Chinese enthusiasm for doing so. Slightly more Chinese adults currently support the United States, with a near majority (48%) favoring a ban on Chinese companies operating
maintaining their country’s tariffs on the United States than support reducing them (38% vs. in sectors of the economy that could pose a national security risk. Nearly a fifth of U.S. adults,
35%). But multiple share crossovers during the last six months highlight potentially deep meanwhile, say they would close the country’s borders to Chinese investment altogether.
Chinese uncertainty toward the tariffs’ value. U.S. support for maintaining tariffs on China in Republicans are even more zealous: Around a quarter (24%) favor an outright ban on Chinese
the face of rising inflation has remained relatively steady throughout the year, rising slightly business operations in America, while over a third (35%) say they would prohibit all
over the last six months to 45% and consistently outpacing the share who say they favor acquisitions of U.S. business by Chinese companies. If after the midterms Washington moves
reducing tariffs to combat inflation (currently 28%). to impose increased restrictions on Chinese companies operating in the United States,
businesses should expect a punitive response from Beijing. In a sign of how strained relations
Perceptions of tariffs’ impact on the economy drive public support for them have become, less than 12% of U.S. adults think Chinese companies should have completely
unfettered access to the American market.
Throughout 2022, a majority of Republicans have expressed support for maintaining existing
tariffs on China, while Democrats have gone back and forth. Both groups’ reasons for
supporting tariffs are somewhat nebulous: While a plurality of U.S. adults (43%) and a near
majority of Republicans (49%) believe existing tariffs help the economy, they are less able to
pinpoint which groups benefit from them the most, with roughly 2 in 5 citing consumers, the
middle class and themselves. Given the issue’s relatively low salience in the United States,
ongoing support for maintaining the tariffs may simply be a function of anchoring bias: Nearly
two-thirds of U.S. adults say they do not feel the effects of the tariffs at the cash register, a
share that has risen throughout the year. Given these dynamics, U.S. businesses should not
expect much political momentum to reduce the tariffs anytime soon, especially under a newly
divided Congress with greater GOP representation in the House of Representatives.

COMMERCIAL CONSIDERATIONS
Chinese adults pay substantially more attention to bilateral trade issues involving tariffs on
American and Chinese goods compared with their U.S. counterparts
Shares reporting how much they have seen, read or heard about each of the following:
A lot Some Not much Nothing at all
The existence of Chinese

11% 29% 26% 34% 20% 41% 24% 15%
tariffs on U.S. goods
Maintenance of Chinese
9% 28% 28% 35% 16% 42% 27% 15%
tariffs on U.S. goods
The existence of U.S.

10% 32% 25% 32% 31% 46% 11% 13%
tariffs on Chinese goods
Maintenance of U.S.
13% 29% 25% 33% 27% 42% 17% 14%
tariffs on Chinese goods

Despite historically elevated inflation, U.S. adults remain more likely than not to support
keeping the existing tariffs on China in place, while Chinese adults continue to waver
Shares reporting whether their government should reduce the tariffs it imposes on the other
country if doing so would combat inflation
Reduce tariffs Don't know/No opinion Maintain tariffs

100%
75%
50%
25%
0%

Over 2022, Republicans expressed consistent support for U.S. tariffs on China. Democrats
have gone back and forth but share Republicans’ views at present
Shares reporting whether the U.S. government should reduce the tariffs it imposes
on China if doing so would combat inflation
Reduce tariffs Don't know/No opinion Maintain tariffs
100%
75%
50%
25%
0%

Pluralities of U.S. adults say tariffs on China help the domestic economy, but smaller shares
perceive benefits for themselves, the middle class or American consumers generally
Shares reporting whether tariffs the U.S. government imposes on China help or hurt the following:
Strongly/somewhat help Don't know/No opinion Strongly/somewhat hurt
The U.S. economy 43% 24% 32% 47% 20% 33% 49% 20% 32%
My economic 39% 28% 32% 46% 24% 30% 43% 25% 32%
well-being
U.S. consumers 39% 25% 36% 47% 21% 32% 40% 22% 38%
The middle class 38% 28% 34% 43% 24% 33% 41% 26% 32%
Survey conducted Nov. 2-3, 2022, among a representative sample of 1,000 U.S. adults, with an unweighted margin of error of +/-3 percentage points. Figures may not add up to 100% due to rounding.

Shares of U.S. adults buying fewer goods because of tariffs on China have decreased
moderately over 2022, which may explain rising public support for them
Shares of adults reporting whether they have bought fewer goods over the past month because of tariffs the
U.S. government imposes on China
Yes No

100%
75%
50%
25%
0%
Feb '22 May '22 Aug '22 Nov '22 Feb '22 May '22 Aug '22 Nov '22 Feb '22 May '22 Aug '22 Nov '22
Surveys conducted monthly among representative samples of 1,000 U.S. adults, with unweighted margins of error of +/-3 percentage points.

48% of U.S. adults support banning Chinese companies that pose a national security risk from
doing business in America, while 24% of Republicans support a blanket ban
Shares reporting whether they would like to see Chinese companies banned from …
Complete ban National security ban No ban Don't know/No opinion
Owning or acquiring U.S. companies 26% 42% 9% 23% 23% 48% 11% 18% 35% 39% 9% 17%
Investing in U.S. companies 23% 44% 11% 22% 21% 49% 14% 16% 28% 43% 10% 19%
Listing on a U.S. stock exchange 22% 45% 10% 24% 20% 48% 12% 19% 30% 44% 10% 16%
Doing business in the United States 19% 48% 12% 21% 19% 52% 12% 17% 24% 46% 13% 16%
Survey conducted Nov. 2-3, 2022, among a representative sample of 1,000 U.S. adults, with an unweighted margin of error of +/-3 percentage points. Figures may not add up to 100% due to rounding.

Shares of Democrats and Republicans expressing support for national security-related bans
on Chinese companies have held relatively steady over 2022
Shares reporting whether they would like to see Chinese companies banned from …
Complete ban National security ban No ban Don't know/No opinion

Doing business in the United States Owning or acquiring U.S. companies
U.S. adults Democrats Republicans U.S. adults Democrats Republicans

100% 100%
75% 75%
50% 50%
25% 25%
0% 0%
2
22
22
22
2
2
' 22
' 22
' 22
2
2
22
22
22
2
2
' 22
' 22
' 22
y '2
y '2
y '2
v '2
v '2
v '2
y '2
y '2
y '2
v '2
v '2
v '2
g'
g'
g'
g'
g'
g'
b
b
Ma
Ma
Ma
No
No
No
Au
Au
Au
Ma
Ma
Ma
Fe
Fe
Fe
No
No
No
Au
Au
Au
Fe
Fe
Fe
Surveys conducted monthly among representative samples of 1,000 U.S. adults, with unweighted margins of error of +/-3 percentage points.

SECTION 3
Issue Spotlight:
Taiwan Relations

U.S. adults increasingly view Taiwan as a critical flashpoint in U.S.-China relations companies, and near majorities support halting bilateral trade and investment. In line with the
U.S. response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, public fear of being drawn into a violent or
Nearly 2 in 5 U.S. adults think resolving bilateral tensions over Taiwan is “very important,”
prolonged conflict far from home likely explains the far smaller shares of adults who support
outpaced only by the share who want to address intellectual property theft by Chinese
direct military intervention: A plurality oppose sending troops to Taiwan, and a majority oppose
companies. The share of U.S. adults citing the Taiwan question as the single most important
launching military counterattacks against China. While a plurality of U.S. adults support sending
issue to tackle in U.S.-China relations, meanwhile, has trended upward over 2022 — particularly
weapons to Taiwan — as the United States continues to do for Ukraine — the measure sees
since August, when U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit thrust U.S. commitments to the
less enthusiastic support than all purely economic interventions.
self-governing island to the forefront of national discourse. To be sure, the share of U.S. adults
who view the issue as the most important one to address in bilateral relations remains low. But
Despite low near-term risks, businesses should not skirt contingency planning lest
the steady uptick in the share of adults holding that view over 2022 is noteworthy.
they be caught off guard
Democrats express the greatest concern about Taiwan, while Republicans, though Chinese President Xi Jinping remains adamant that “reunification” between Taiwan and China
not far behind, are more concerned with business issues is a historical inevitability, per his recent speech at the Communist Party’s 20th National
Congress. Despite expressing a desire to accomplish this through peaceful means, Xi refused
Unsurprisingly given Pelosi’s political affiliation, the upswing in concern about Taiwan relations
to rule out the use of force, especially in the event of perceived foreign interference. Given
has been most pronounced among Democrats: The share citing it as the most important
these dynamics, a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is no longer the tail risk it once was. Accordingly,
bilateral issue to address doubled between July and October. Likewise, when asked to assess
businesses should accelerate their contingency planning, lest they be caught off guard by a
the importance of resolving a range of bilateral issues, a plurality of Democrats (44%) cite
sudden need to decouple from China, as was the case with Russia following its invasion of
Taiwan relations as “very important” to address — a larger share than for any other issue — and
Ukraine. Such planning is especially critical given the complexity and extent of U.S.-China
nearly three-quarters (73%) view Taiwan relations as at least “somewhat important” to contend
business ties.
with. While Republicans are not far behind (at 42% and 68%, respectively), a larger share (50%)
see IP theft as the greater priority.
If China invades Taiwan, commercial ties will be the first to go

More than 3 in 5 U.S. adults support Taiwan’s independence, rising to an overwhelming
majority of 92% among those with an opinion on the matter. Americans are enthusiastic about
severing commercial ties with China if it invades Taiwan. Over half support sanctioning Chinese

ISSUE SPOTLIGHT: TAIWAN RELATIONS
Among U.S. adults’ concerns, only intellectual property theft by Chinese companies outranks
Taiwan relations: 42% say the former issue is “very important” to contend with
Shares of adults reporting how important it is to address bilateral tensions in each of the following areas:
Very important Somewhat important Don't know/No opinion Not that important Not important at all
U.S. allegations of
42% 27% 20% 8% 32% 34% 20% 11%
intellectual property theft
Taiwan relations 39% 27% 21% 9% Not asked in China The questions about
Taiwan and Hong
Trade relations, 38% 33% 19% 8% 33% 40% 18% 9% Kong were not asked
including tariffs
in China due to
Limits on freedom of 36% 28% 23% 9% political sensitivities.
expression in Hong Kong Not asked in China
Treatment of U.S. and 36% 33% 20% 7% 30% 40% 20% 10%
Chinese companies
Freedom of U.S. navigation 32% 31% 22% 9% 36% 34% 18% 10%
in the South China Sea*
U.S. allegations of human 32% 30% 25% 9% 31% 39% 20% 9%
rights abuses in Xinjiang
U.S. allegations of
30% 33% 22% 10% 34% 32% 18% 15%
industrial subsidy usage
Surveys conducted monthly among representative samples of 1,000 adults each in China and the United States, with unweighted margins of error of +/-3 percentage points. Figures may not add up to
100% due to rounding.
*When fielding in China, we use “Freedom of U.S. navigation in the South China Sea” as an indirect proxy for tensions involving Taiwan, while recognizing the methodological limitations of this approach.

Partisanship drives the divergence in U.S. adults’ concerns about intellectual property theft
and Taiwan relations
Shares reporting how important it is to address U.S.-China tensions in each of the following areas:
U.S. allegations of 42% 27% 20% 42% 32% 15% 50% 22% 17%
intellectual property theft
Taiwan relations 39% 27% 21% 44% 29% 15% 42% 26% 18% 11%
Trade relations, 38% 33% 19% 40% 34% 15% 41% 34% 15%
including tariffs
Treatment of U.S. and 36% 33% 20% 39% 37% 15% 39% 33% 17%
Chinese companies
Limits on freedom of 36% 28% 23% 42% 27% 17% 37% 27% 21%
expression in Hong Kong
Freedom of U.S. navigation 32% 31% 22% 35% 37% 16% 35% 29% 20%
in the South China Sea
U.S. allegations of human 32% 30% 25% 38% 31% 19% 33% 28% 24%
rights abuses in Xinjiang
U.S. allegations of 30% 33% 22% 32% 37% 17% 32% 33% 19% 11%
industrial subsidy usage
Surveys conducted monthly among representative samples of 1,000 adults each in China and the United States, with unweighted margins of error of +/-3 percentage points. Figures may not add up to 100%
due to rounding.

The share of U.S. adults citing Taiwan relations as the top bilateral issue to address increased
steadily over 2022, with a noteworthy uptick among Democrats after Pelosi’s visit
Shares citing Taiwan relations as the most important issue for the United States and
China to contend with when it comes to resolving bilateral tensions

20%
The share of Democrats citing Taiwan
relations as the most important issue for
China and the United States to address
ticked up after House Speaker Nancy
15%
Pelosi's visit to the island in August.
10%
5%
0%
Feb '22 May '22 Aug '22 Nov '22 Feb '22 May '22 Aug '22 Nov '22 Feb '22 May '22 Aug '22 Nov '22

Despite placing less importance on the issue, Republicans are more likely than Democrats to
say they support Taiwan’s independence from China
Shares reporting whether they support Taiwan's independence
Strongly support Somewhat support Don't know/No opinion Somewhat oppose Strongly oppose
All U.S. adults 40% 23% 32% 3% 3%
Republicans 43% 23% 27% 3% 4%
Democrats 41% 22% 29% 4% 3%
Independents 35% 23% 40%
Survey conducted July 18-19, 2022, among a representative sample of 2,210 U.S. adults, with an unweighted margin of error of +/-2 percentage points. Figures may not add up to 100% due to rounding.

More U.S. adults than not support economic retaliation to a hypothetical invasion of Taiwan,
while military responses see less support across the board
Shares reporting whether the United States should take each of the following actions if China were to invade Taiwan:
Definitely Probably Don't know/No opinion Probably not Definitely not
Impose sanctions 27% 26% 31% 10% 7%
Ban U.S. investment in China 24% 26% 29% 13% 8%
Ban Chinese investment in the U.S. 26% 23% 30% 14% 7%
Ban imports from China 22% 24% 28% 16% 9%
Ban exports to China 21% 25% 30% 15% 10%
Send weapons to Taiwan 20% 25% 30% 14% 11%
Enforce a no-fly zone over Taiwan 16% 24% 36% 14% 10%
Send troops to Asia 15% 22% 32% 17% 13%
Enforce a naval blockade of China 13% 19% 36% 20% 12%
Send troops to Taiwan 9% 19% 30% 23% 18%
Launch cyberattacks against China 11% 12% 32% 22% 23%
Launch military attacks against China 6% 10% 29% 24% 30%
Survey conducted July 18-19, 2022, among a representative sample of 2,210 U.S. adults, with an unweighted margin of error of +/-2 percentage points. Figures may not add up to 100% due to rounding.

SECTION 4
Issue Spotlight:
Chinese Consumer Attitudes
Toward Foreign Investment
& Western Brands

Even before bilateral sparring over Taiwan in 2022 spooked multinationals, Chinese consumers are still bullish on foreign brands, suggesting domestic
Chinese consumers saw geopolitics as the main driver of foreign exits companies have yet to close the gap on reputation and purchasing appeal
In response to Xi Jinping’s aggressive COVID-19 containment policies, which crippled global While many Chinese believe their country could survive an exodus of foreign brands, they
supply chains routed through China throughout much of 2022, numerous foreign companies have no plans to stop buying from them. Despite bilateral tensions, a majority of Chinese
began to diversify their operations elsewhere. Chinese consumers were unconvinced of these adults say they still plan to purchase foreign goods and services in the coming year.
companies’ motives, however, suggesting that they failed to adequately message their
rationale for relocating. When asked why they believed foreign companies were exiting, At the cash register, pragmatism trumps politics
Chinese consumers were more likely to cite geopolitical influences such as the U.S.-China
Practicality — not geopolitics — explains most Chinese consumers’ persistent demand for
trade war and pressure from foreign governments rather than logistical complications linked to
foreign products. Quality, safety and affordability are the top three drivers of their decisions to
pandemic restrictions.
“buy foreign” rather than domestic, outpacing purchasing decisions linked to concerns about
China’s relationship with specific foreign companies or their countries of origin. Businesses
Most Chinese adults say FDI remains critical for development, but many believe
hoping to court Chinese consumers in this difficult geopolitical environment should take heed
their economy is now resilient enough to survive without it and focus their messaging on these and other product attributes that Chinese consumers care
While Xi has moved to ring-fence foreign investment in some sectors, pushing China’s about.
economy toward greater self-reliance as a strategic hedge, most Chinese are uninterested in
going it alone. Although Xi has incorporated self-reliance into his pitch for “national
rejuvenation,” the public is not fully convinced: Over two-thirds of Chinese adults say foreign
direct investment remains important if China hopes to achieve its developmental goals.
Nevertheless, many Chinese people believe that, if push comes to shove, their country’s
economy is resilient enough to stand on its own. Although more Chinese adults say foreign
exits would cause greater economic pain for China compared with the departing businesses’
home countries (35% vs. 28%), a near majority (47%) believe China would be just fine or even
prosper under such conditions, outpacing those who think China would be negatively
impacted.

ISSUE SPOTLIGHT: FOREIGN INVESTMENT & WESTERN BRANDS
Chinese consumers view foreign companies’ withdrawal decisions as driven by geopolitics

more than logistical challenges linked to China’s COVID-19 policies
Chinese adults reporting why they believe foreign companies are exiting China
Major reason Minor reason Not a reason

The U.S.-China trade war 57% 25% 18%
Lack of respect for China 45% 29% 26%
Pressure from Western governments to withdraw from China 44% 32% 24%
Pandemic-related lockdowns and restrictions 37% 39% 25%
Rising anti-China sentiment abroad 34% 37% 29%
Supply chain issues 30% 40% 30%
Rising costs of doing business due to inflation 29% 46% 25%
Foreign allegations of human rights violations in Xinjiang 28% 38% 34%
It is cheaper to do business in other countries 24% 46% 30%
Difficulty navigating China's regulatory environment 21% 36% 43%
Foreign companies can't compete with local businesses 20% 39% 41%
Cybersecurity 20% 35% 44%
Rising anti-foreign sentiment in China 18% 40% 42%
Difficulty navigating other countries' China-specific regulations 17% 47% 36%
Pressure from the Chinese government to withdraw from China 17% 33% 51%
Insufficient long-term commitment to operating in China 16% 38% 46%
Workers and executives no longer want to live in China 12% 31% 57%
China is unwelcoming to foreign businesses 12% 22% 67%
Survey conducted June 1-6, 2022, among a representative sample of 1,000 Chinese adults, with an unweighted margin of error of +/-3 percentage points. Figures may not add up to 100% due to rounding.

Despite persistent bilateral tensions, nearly 7 in 10 Chinese adults still view foreign direct
investment as important for national growth
Shares reporting how important they believe continued FDI is for China to achieve its development goals
Very important Somewhat important Don't Know/No Opinion Not that important Not important at all
All Chinese adults 15% 54% 18% 9% 3%
Gen Z adults 13% 60% 16% 9%
Millennials 19% 48% 23% 7% 3%
Gen Xers 16% 54% 10% 16% 4%
Baby boomers 63% 31% 6%
Survey conducted June 1-6, 2022, among a representative sample of 1,000 Chinese adults, with an unweighted margin of error of +/-3 percentage points. Figures may not add up to 100% due to rounding. Sample
sizes for certain demographic groups, and for baby boomers specifically, are relatively small; results should therefore be interpreted cautiously.

Chinese consumers think foreign exits will hurt China more than departing businesses’ home
countries, even as half of them claim China will be just fine or even benefit
Shares of Chinese adults reporting how they perceive the impact of foreign companies’ exits at home and abroad
Negative impact No impact Positive impact Don’t know/No opinion

Chinese economy 35% 26% 21% 19%
All Chinese adults
Foreign economies 28% 30% 15% 27%

Gen Z adults

Millennials

Gen Xers

Baby boomers
Foreign economies 23% 28% 49%
Survey conducted June 1-6, 2022, among a representative sample of 1,000 Chinese adults, with an unweighted margin of error of +/-3 percentage points. Figures may not add up to 100% due to rounding. Sample
sizes for certain demographic groups, and for baby boomers specifically, are relatively small; results should therefore be interpreted cautiously.

Slim majorities of Chinese adults across all generations except Gen Z say they’ll purchase
foreign goods in the next year
Shares reporting how likely they are to purchase foreign goods and services in the next 12 months
Very likely Somewhat likely Don't know/No opinion Somewhat unlikely Very unlikely
All Chinese adults 17% 34% 31% 16%
Gen Z adults 14% 21% 50% 14%
Millennials 20% 42% 20% 18%
Gen Xers 17% 40% 18% 17% 7%
Baby boomers 8% 45% 33% 9% 6%
Sample sizes for certain demographic groups, and for baby boomers specifically, are relatively small; results should therefore be interpreted cautiously.

Quality, safety and affordability trump geopolitics as drivers of Chinese demand for foreign
products relative to domestic ones
Share of Chinese adults reporting the importance of each of the following when choosing to purchase foreign goods and/or services:
Higher quality than Chinese products 41% 26% 30% 3%
Higher product safety standards 37% 27% 32% 4%
More affordable 33% 31% 30% 6%
Company has a good relationship with China 33% 28% 31% 6%
More sustainable or environmentally friendly 27% 30% 31% 10%
Greater selection of goods/services 25% 33% 31% 10%
Country has a good relationship with China 24% 35% 32% 8%
Brand has operated in China for a long time 22% 29% 33% 15%
More prestigious or confers higher status 21% 22% 33% 20% 4%
From a country with other companies I like 20% 28% 33% 16% 3%
From a country I like 17% 24% 31% 22% 5%
Popular with Chinese celebrities or influencers 13% 21% 34% 22% 10%
Popular with foreign celebrities or influencers 9% 19% 33% 25% 13%

Methodology
Sampling and data collection

This report relies on data collected through Morning Consult’s
proprietary survey research capabilities. Interviews are conducted online.
Unless otherwise indicated, data derives from a series of monthly surveys conducted
Feb. 11-Nov. 2, 2022, in the United States and Feb. 11-Nov. 6, 2022, in China, among
representative samples of roughly 1,000 adults in each country, with unweighted
margins of error of +/-3 percentage points.
The remaining data derives from stand-alone surveys fielded throughout the year in the
United States and China. Sample sizes and margins of error are indicated in the
methodology statements accompanying each slide.
Weighting and representativeness

Data are weighted to approximate representative samples of U.S. and Chinese adults. The U.S. data
is weighted based on age, gender, educational attainment, race and region. The China data is
weighted based on age, gender, educational attainment and region.
The target populations are the adult (18+) population of the United States and the adult (18+) internet-
using population of China.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS
LEARN MORE
MorningConsult.com
FOLLOW US
@MorningConsult
JASON I. MCMANN, PHD SCOTT MOSKOWITZ, PHD

Head of Geopolitical Risk Analysis Senior Director, APAC MEDIA & SPEAKING
@jimcmann | jmcmann@morningconsult.com @scottymoskowitz | smoskowitz@morningconsult.com INQUIRIES
press@morningconsult.com
Jason I. McMann is the head of Geopolitical Risk Analysis Scott Moskowitz is the Lead Geopolitical Risk Analyst,
at Morning Consult, where he leverages the company’s APAC for decision intelligence company Morning Consult,
high-frequency survey intelligence to advise clients on how where he covers China and the broader APAC region.
to integrate geopolitical risk into their decision-making. Scott leverages the company’s high-frequency survey data
Jason previously served as head of analytics at GeoQuant to advise clients on how best to integrate geopolitical risk The authors would like to thank Chloe Phan
(now part of Fitch Solutions). He holds a Ph.D. from into their decision-making. He holds a Ph.D. from Princeton for report design and Samantha Elbouez for
Princeton University with a dual specialization in University and has many years of experience working and data visualization support.
international political economy and quantitative methods. conducting research in China.
53
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The State of U.S.-China Relations

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The State of U.S.

© 2022 Morning Consult. All rights reserved.

Morning Consult is a global decision intelligence company

Daily tracking of political attitudes

Every day, we gauge public opinion on world leaders,

Monthly tracking of geopolitical

7 Executive Summary & Dashboard

15 The State of U.S.-China Relations: An Overview

29 Commercial Considerations: Trade, Investment & Supply Chains

38 Issue Spotlight: Taiwan Relations

The State of U.S.-China Relations 6

Risk outlook: present month

The State of U.S.-China Relations 8

Risk outlook: 2H 2022 trajectory

interested in resolving military tensions decreased slightly (-3pp). with

Economic tensions: concerned +2pp <.50 -2pp -1pp

The State of U.S.-China Relations 9

0% The war in Ukraine does not appear to have shifted Chinese

and Putin’s joint declaration of a “no limits” friendship hasn’t

especially shifted the needle. The share of Chinese adults holding

The State of U.S.-China Relations 10

Global net favorability toward the indicated country

United States China

Executive Dashboard: Key Considerations

The State of U.S.-China Relations 11

Many Chinese adults are similarly unsure of the most

The State of U.S.-China Relations 12

The State of U.S.-China Relations 13

If China invades Taiwan, commercial ties will be the first to go

The State of U.S.-China Relations 14

The State of U.S.-China

The State of U.S.-China Relations 15

The State of U.S.-China Relations 16

Ally/friendly Don't know/No opinion Enemy/unfriendly

U.S. adults' views of China Chinese adults' views of the U.S.

The State of U.S.-China Relations 17

Ally/friendly Don't know/No opinion Enemy/unfriendly

The State of U.S.-China Relations 18

Ally Friendly Don't know/No opinion Unfriendly Enemy

U.S. adults Democrats Republicans

The State of U.S.-China Relations 19

Concerned Don't know/No opinion Not concerned

The State of U.S.-China Relations 20

Very/somewhat likely Don't know/No opinion Very/somewhat unlikely

Military tensions Economic tensions

U.S. adults Chinese adults U.S. adults Chinese adults

The State of U.S.-China Relations 21

U.S. adults Chinese adults

Economic tensions 38% 35% 17% 6% 36% 44% 13% 7%

Military tensions 43% 30% 17% 7% 34% 46% 14% 6%

The State of U.S.-China Relations 22

U.S. allegations of intellectual property theft 17% 8%

Trade relations, including tariffs 16% 18%

Taiwan relations 11% Not asked in China

Freedom of U.S. navigation in the South China Sea* 5% 21%

U.S. allegations of human rights abuses in Xinjiang 5% 11%

Don't know/No opinion 25% 19%

The State of U.S.-China Relations 23

Trade relations, including tariffs 15% 17%

U.S. allegations of intellectual property theft 13% 24%

Taiwan relations 12% 11%

U.S. allegations of industrial subsidy usage 9% 10%

Treatment of U.S. and Chinese companies 9% 6%