SUNY Geneseo

Re-defining collective security: can NATO

survive an ever-expanding mandate?
A SENIOR THESES PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
AT GENESEO IN CANDIDACY FOR HONORS IN THE FIELDS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE &
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

DEAN MCGEE
MAY 7, 2009
 1

Introduction

On April 3rd, 2009 the most powerful military alliance in history celebrated its 60th

anniversary. But as NATO leaders crossed the bridge from Baden-Baden, Germany to Strasbourg,

France in a symbolic celebration of unity, soldiers of the Alliance were taking casualties 3,000

miles away. The organization whose raison d’être was once bluntly described as “keeping the

Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down 1” now faces precarious times. On the one

hand, NATO has earned the right to celebrate: It succeeded in its grand purpose by defeating its

Soviet counterpart, standing as a permanent testament to the potential effectiveness of a powerful

collective security organization. On the other hand, the Alliance finds itself bogged down in a

seemingly unwinnable conflict in Afghanistan, with a ballooning mandate and unprecedented

fissures among its member states. Indeed, NATO’s mandate in Afghanistan is so broad that on any

given day the soldiers of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) are either raiding

Taliban holdouts in the Helmand province, or setting up high speed internet access in Kabul via

the NATO Virtual Silk Highway (providing “affordable, high-speed Internet access via satellite to

the academic communities of the Caucasus and Central Asia2”).

This 60-year transition from European defensive alliance to Central Asian internet service

provider demonstrates that extent of NATO’s soul-searching since the collapse of the Soviet

Union. What remains to be seen is whether this post-Cold-War evolution of the Alliance is an

effective use of a powerful collective security organization or a reflection of its stubborn

unwillingness to admit that it may no longer have a vital role to play on the international stage. In

other words, is NATO at 60 still a powerful force for transatlantic security or has its expansion

1
Pond, 175
2
NATO’s Virtual SILK Highway, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_53359.htm
 2

into state-building missions damaged the organization’s capabilities and stretched its purpose

beyond recognition?

This paper outlines a brief history of collective security and collective defense, while

focusing on the evolution of NATO from its inception to its recent failures and accomplishments

in Afghanistan. Special focus will be spent to NATO’s post-cold-war missions leading up to

September 11th, 2001 including Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia and Operation Allied Force

in the former Yugoslavia. Examination of these missions, along with the ISAF, is necessary to

evaluate NATO’s role in re-defining collective security in the 21st Century.

Collective Defense v Collective Security

Increasingly, scholars have distinguished between the once synonymous concepts of

collective defense and collective security. The differences are both “essential” and “readily

confused,” according to David S. Yost, author of NATO Transformed. Essentially “security”,

unlike “defense”, is utilized as a broad, all-encompassing term. Collective defense is simply “an

instrument of states cooperating to seek security from the actual or prospective threats posed by

others” by pledging mutual defense. 3 This was NATO’s original purpose, as outlined in Article

Five of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or
North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they
agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of
individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the
United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith,
individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary,
including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North
Atlantic area…

NATO fit neatly into the collective defense category from 1949 to 1989; but post-Cold War

missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and elsewhere have been different. These actions were

3
Yost, 7
 3

taken against states that did not directly attack North Atlantic Treaty signatories, focusing instead

on humanitarian intervention and state-building purposes. This actions represent a theory of

collective security, not defense, which is more traditionally “rooted in an aspiration to think of

interests beyond those of the nation and its allies and to consider those of international society as

a while – on a regional, if not a global, basis.” 4 While Yost identifies collective defense and

collective security as fundamentally distinct, others accept collective security as an all-

encompassing term. In The Promise of Collective Security, Charles Kupchan argues that “the case

for collective security rests on the claim that regulated, institutionalized balancing predicated on

the notion of all against one provide more stability than unregulated, self-help balancing predicated

on the notion of each for his own.” 5 This broad definition of collective security could relate to

either a collective defense or collective security organization under Yost’s definitions. These

overlapping and sometimes conflicting definitions have caused some to write off collective

security as “an idea that has never been clear and those who remain its enthusiastic supporters do

not know what it means. 6”

Ultimately, to discuss NATO’s role in redefining collective security we must accept a

definition. Martin Wight explains the concept in simplified terms: “by collective security we mean

a system in which any breach of the peace is declared to be of concern to all participating states,

and an attack on one is taken as an attack on all.” 7 Through this definition we can identify the

NATO as an IGO whose purpose was rooted in its role as a defensive alliance but has expanded

its mission to respond to any “breach of the peace” that conflicts with the broader interests of the

Treaty’s signatories.

4
Yost, 9
5
Kupchan/Kupchan, 52
6
Stromberg 251
7
Wight, 149
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A Brief History of Collective Security

The term “collective security” first started to gain widespread use in the 1930s, but the

concept of collective security has been practiced since at least the early Greek city-states. During

the Peloponnesian Wars the Spartans feared increasing aggression by Athens and the Delian

League. In response, they formed the Peloponnesian League: “an intricate alliance and collective

security system designed to deter further Athenian expansion.” 8 As the hegemonic force behind

the alliance, Sparta chaired a Congress of Allies at which issues of security and defense were

debated and motions were passed on a one-vote per state principle, with Sparta holding ultimate

veto power. The league is a classic example of collective security as “if nothing else, all about

balancing and the aggregation of military force against threats to peace.” 9 This alliance, operating

in the 5th century BC, functioned under many of the same principles that many modern collective

security operations: as hegemon-driven alliances bound to defend member states and formed to

protect the broader interests of the powerful state guiding the organization.

As the modern state system began evolved in Europe, collective security organizations

became more common, including the Most Holy League of Venice (1454), the Treaty of London

(1518), the Association of The Hague (1681-1683) and the Quadruple Alliance of 1718). 10 The

1648 Peace of Westphalia, which established states over religion as the ultimate authorities on war

and peace, was also instrumental in the continuing development of collective security, as states

embraced concepts of sovereignty which continue to inform modern collective security debates to

this day.

8
Jackson/Sorensen 62
9
Kupchan/Kupchan 52
10
Wight, 149
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Enlightenment thinkers and philosophers also contributed to the development of the

modern concept of collective security, none more so than Immanual Kant in his treatise Perpetual

Peace, published in 1795 in Konigsberg, Germany. 11 Kant suggested that it was possible to create

an alliance with the capability to enforce peace amongst all nations and attempted to identify the

conditions necessary to see such an alliance come to fruition? And While Perpetual Peace is

distinctively idealistic, Kant was not naïve to realist arguments: “The natural state is one of war.

This does not always mean open hostilities, but at least an unceasing threat of war.” So what can

be done to solve this perpetual state of violence and peril? Kant proposed a complex system of

collective security to establish a state of peace in an international system that seems to only promise

anarchy: “in order [for a state] to be secured against hostility it is not sufficient that hostilities

simply be not committed; and, unless this security is pledged to each by his neighbor… each may

treat his neighbor, from whom he demands this security, as an enemy.” 12 This is the building

block upon which modern collective security is derived, as NATO states pledge to “safeguard the

freedom, common heritage and civilization” of not only their own citizens but all citizens of the

alliance. Kant believed that an alliance of states who pledge security to one another based on just

principles will not go to war with each other. Therefore, as alliances expand, so do the prospects

for peace.

Kant believed such an alliance was possible if states disarmed their national armies and

refrain from exercising their sovereign right to go to war or intervene in another state’s internal

affairs through treaties of mutual non-aggression. Kant makes it clear that, under a system of

international law, the only acceptable wars are those that are clearly defensive. Kant also insisted

that this “perpetual peace” could only be made possible if all states had a republican constitution.

11
Negretto, 3
12
Kant, 3
 6

This basic principle is embodied by of the North Atlantic Treaty’s dedication to “democracy,

individual liberty and the rule of law,” and the alliance’s unofficial demands its member states

have democratic domestic political systems. Kant explains that a republican constitution is

necessary because it proves the state to have originated from the will of the people and, as such,

the authority for war would need to come from the peoples’ representatives. Kant asserts that

“nothing is more natural than that they would be very cautious in commencing such a poor game,

decreeing for themselves all the calamities of war.” Democracies are therefore necessary to his

goal of peace through collective security because the citizens would remain an important check

against sending their sons to fight an unjust war.

Ultimately, Kant came short of suggesting that a global alliance was likely to create

perpetual peace, but he did leave us with a roadmap to reducing international aggression—and

holding aggressive nations accountable—that would remain influential to this day.

The Rise and Fall of the League of Nations

The Kantian concept of perpetual peace was resuscitated after the devastation of World

War I. President Woodrow Wilson, a proponent of Kantian peace argued: “There must be, not a

balance of power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized common

peace.” 13 The fourteenth of President Wilson’s fourteen points for peace held that a “general

association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual

guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike. 14” The

League was established in the first part of the treaty of Versailles and was explained by Wilson as

the following:

The Treaty begins with the Covenant of the League of Nations, which is intended
to operate as a partnership, a permanent partnership, of the great and free self-

13
Woodrow Wilson, “An Address to the Senate,” January 22, 1917,
14
Wilson, President Wilson's Fourteen Points, 1918
 7

governing peoples of the world to stand sponsor for the right and for civilization.
Notice is given in the very first articles of the Treaty that hereafter it will not be a
matter of conjecture whether the other great nations of the world will combine
against a wrongdoer, but a matter of certainty that hereafter nations contemplating
what the Government of Germany contemplated will not have to conjecture
whether Great Britain and France and Italy and the great United States will join
hands against them, but will know that mankind, in serried ranks, will defend to the
last the rights of human beings wherever they are15.

Woodrow Wilson, like Kant, believed that cooperation between “great and free” states was the

first step to establishing world order and peace. The Treaty of Versailles entered into force on

January 10th 1920, ushering in a powerful but ultimately doomed experiment.

Wilson’s attempt to intertwine different national interests together in a common goal of

peace and prosperity was admirable. But the League may have been well ahead of its time and a

bit too idealistic for the American public. This would soon become clear as The United States,

whose president led the League’s creation, did not ratify the treaty in the United States Senate. A

republican controlled Senate rejected Wilson’s plea that America “redeem the world by giving it

liberty and justice . . . before the tribunal of mankind,” 16 arguing that the League’s mandated

defense of foreign nations—and vague systems of international judicial settlement—were

incompatible with the United States Constitution and basic tenants of sovereignty. Many other

states also raised significant concerns over the charter as harmful to their national interests. The

only major European power who seemingly embraced collective security as embodied in the

League of Nations was France, who saw a collective security organization as the only guarantee

against resurrected German militarism at their border. At one point the French even proposed a

standing military available for the Allies to deploy when needed. This idea was largely rejected

15
Wilson, Woodrow Wilson’s Case for the League of Nations 25-26
16
Wilson, Woodrow Wilson’s Case for the League of Nations, 27
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by the League’s membership, and British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin cited the reason for the

failure of this collective security organization as the following:

The real reason, or the main reason, was that we discovered in the process of weeks
that there was no country except the aggressor country which was ready for war ...
If collective action is to be a reality and not merely a thing to be talked about, it
means not only that every country is to be ready for war; but must be ready to go
to war at once. That is a terrible thing, but it is an essential part of collective
security.17

This will be another recurring theme when examining NATO’s role throughout the Cold War and

today, as certain states in the alliance seem unwilling to pull their weight and are simply looking

for the security that comes from falling under the umbrella of the U.S. military. While this may or

may not be true today, Prime Minister Baldwin’s words remind us that the League failed because

of an unwillingness on the part of many to abide by the security pact they had made.

Despite its ultimate failure, the League of Nations would leave a permanent mark on

collective security and international organizations. As Inis L. Claude remarks, “the Wilsonians

clearly succeeded in establishing the conviction that collective security represents a brand of

international morality vastly superior to that incorporated in the balance of power system.” 18 The

rise and fall of the League of Nations would be a beginning, not an end, to efforts on behalf of the

”international morality” envisioned by Wilson.

NATO and the Cold War

The League of Nation’s demise did not mean the end of Kantian and Wilsonian collective

security ideals, but its successor, the United Nations, disavowed many of the principles outlined

in the League. Giving the USSR, United States and China veto power over international security

measures all but guaranteed that the United Nations could not effectively limit aggression by the

17
Library of Congress (1944). Events Leading Up to World War II. Library of Congress. pp. 97.
18
Claude, Power and International Relations, 116
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World’s superpowers. Western Europe appeared to be once again left at the mercy of militarism

to the east (this time Soviet, not German.) Recognizing this, the England and France entered into

The Treat of Dunkirk (1947), a bilateral agreement pledging mutual defense against common

enemies, and the first building block of what would become NATO. One year later, the Brussels

Pact expanded this coalition to include Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Belgium. Stalin’s

blockade of Berlin on June 24th 1948 brought the severity of the Soviet threat out into the open, as

well as the inadequacy of the five state alliance. It became clear that a successful European security

pact would have to include what the League of Nations did not have: fully integrated support from

the United States of America. Paris, London and the other signatories of the Brussels Pact

aggressively lobbied Washington for a pledge of support in the event of Soviet attack. According

to President Truman’s memoirs, these talks almost broke down on the same grounds as the League

of Nations treaty failed the US Senate: “The Brussels Pact nations wanted the North Atlantic pact

to state that, if a member was attacked, the other members would supply all the military and other

aid and assistance in their power. This, of course, implied going to war… an obligation which, in
19
our view of our Constitution, we were not prepared to assume.” The Canadians were also

concerned with this stipulation and entered negotiations with a compromise that would ultimately

become the 11th Article of the North Atlantic Treaty. Article 11 reads in part: “This Treaty shall

be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties on accordance with their respective

constitutional processes.” 20 This compromise was a major step in developing a collective security

framework that did not violate principles of state sovereignty. The League of Nations required

states to go to war regardless of their internal Constitutional constraints, while the United Nations

included veto power for the most powerful states in the system, greatly decreasing its ability to

19
Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, P 249
20
North Atlantic Treaty, http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm
 10

act. The North Atlantic Treaty struck a balance which vastly improved its chances of ratification,

growth and success.

The North Atlantic treaty was finalized and signed on April 4th, 1949 by the Treaty of

Belgium states, the United States and Canada, as well as Iceland, Italy, Portugal, Norway and

Denmark. It was signed, according to then Secretary of State Dean Acheson, with the

understanding that Western Europe would use the security provided to them by the United States

to rebuild their economic and defense capabilities. 21 The resolve of member states was put to the

test, however, on Sunday, June 25, 1950. Communist North Korean soldiers crossed the 38th

parallel and entered the Republic of Korea. If Korean communist troops were on the move, then

Soviet forces would not be far behind. At the time war broke out, the defense capabilities of North

Atlantic Treaty states were “totally inadequate.” 22 And it is at this point where the United States

and her European allies developed plans to give North Atlantic Treaty its “O”—a permanent

integrated military command structure with US military forces stationed on the continent. In May

of 1950, a permanent executive committee of member states was created (the North Atlantic

Council) that begin planning a more organized military force and greater cooperation. In

examining the marginal military capacities of Western Europe the United States, the United States

brought forth a controversial plan to expand the alliance: the rebuilding and reintegration of

German military forces in Europe’s broader defense capabilities. This was not an easy pill for

Great Britain and France to swallow, and the French counter-proposed the creation of a European

Defense Community, in which German soldiers could be used under non-German commanders.

Much like the League of Nations defeat in the US Senate, however, the EDC proposal was defeated

by domestic interests in the French National Assembly who called into question such a

21
Yost, 29
22
Jervis 1980
 11

community’s effect on sovereignty. 23 The debate of the role of the Federal Republic of Germany

in the North Atlantic Treaty continued for four years until the London and Paris agreements were

signed. Under these agreements the Federal Republic of Germany would host American military

forces for as long as necessary, renounce the creation of weapons of mass destruction, and agree

to significant restrictions on its conventional military forces. With these steps the FRG was

integrated in 1955, joining Greece and Turkey as the Alliance’s newest members.

The Soviet Union, having closely monitored the rise of a powerful collective security

organization along the borders of their satellite states quickly acted to create one of their own. The

Warsaw Pact was announced and signed on May 14th, 1955 with some striking similarities to the

North Atlantic Treaty. Article 4 read:

In the event of armed attack in Europe on one or more of the Parties to the Treaty
by any state or group of states, each of the Parties to the Treaty, in the exercise of
its right to individual or collective self-defense in accordance with Article 51 of the
Charter of the United Nations Organization, shall immediately, either individually
or in agreement with other Parties to the Treaty, come to the assistance of the state
or states attacked with all such means as it deems necessary, including armed force.
The Parties to the Treaty shall immediately consult concerning the necessary
measures to be taken by them jointly in order to restore and maintain international
peace and security. 24

But beyond the commitment to self-defense came Article 5, which established “a joint command

of the armed forces…which shall function on the basis of jointly principles.” Just as its western

counterpart had done, the Warsaw Pact authorized Germany to rebuild its military. The German

Democratic Republic (East Germany) was granted statehood and considered a full member of the

pact. Now, perhaps for the first time since Thucydides two powerful collective security

organizations would control the balance of power in world for the next three and a half decades.

23
Edward Furstdon, The European Defence Community: a History 91
24
Warsaw Security Pact, May 14th, 1955 http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/warsaw.asp
 12

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact would remain essentially

stalemated until 1989. Both sides enjoyed the benefits of a nuclear umbrella held by the hegemonic

force behind the alliances. Mutually Assured Destruction ensured the respective alliances could

make no sudden moves against one another without risking nuclear retaliation. Nevertheless, the

Soviets flexed their military might in Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and, most aggressively,

in Afghanistan in 1979. With each act of aggression the NATO alliance strengthened and the

resolve of the West was cemented as they faced an enemy who had infamously threatened to

“bury” them.25 Despite these heightened tensions and ideological divides, the process of détente

remained the most important goal of the Alliance states. A milestone in this process came from

the Commission for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) meeting that led to a grand

conference of all European states (including Canada and the United States) in Helsinki, Finland

from 1973 to 1975. The “Final Act” of the Helsinki Accords was a political declaration that

included promises to refrain from the threat or use of force, give notification before major military

maneuvers, cooperate in the fields of economics, science, technology and the environment and

finally full support of human rights and education.26 Despite this progress the Cold War would

last another fifteen years with NATO and Warsaw Pact nations ready for war at a moment’s notice.

As Ronald Reagan pursued aggressive US policies of rearmament, assertiveness and technological

research in military development, the Soviets could simply not keep up. The West had forced their

counterparts into an “unaffordable arms competition.”27 The Warsaw Pact was dissolved in Prague

of July 1, 1991, and by December 8, 1991, the Belavezha Accords were signed and the Soviet

25
(Time Magazine 1956)
26
(NATO, Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe Final Act 1975)
27
Yost, 46
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Union was officially dissolved. The Communist threat was over, as was NATO’s original reason

for being.

NATO’s Identity Crisis After the Cold War

The end of the Cold War was a triumphant moment for the West and the North Atlantic

Treaty allies, but it raised a pressing question for NATO: what next? If NATO was to have a

purpose, it would have to find one. There was talk of dissolving the Alliance and focusing efforts

on the CSCE as a more inclusive collective security organization that could include Warsaw Pact

states as well. But NATO and the CSCE were different animals. The CSCE organized conferences

and passed non-binding resolutions, while NATO “had a well-developed organization and

command structure, an impressive array of military capabilities, and a track record for

determination in resisting Soviet threats of various types.”28 It did not, however, seem to have a

purpose other than to ensure the United States kept a hands-on approach to issues of European

security. The Alliance found it necessary to develop a plan for continued existence. Throughout

the Cold War NATO had made internal efforts to expand its purpose beyond its focus collective

defense but was unable to pursue these goals under the Soviet threat. As early as 1949, during the

ten year anniversary celebrations of NATO, the organization released an official communiqué

which stated in part that “The North Atlantic Alliance, which has succeeded in maintaining peace

and in safeguarding the security of member countries during the past ten years, remains an essential

condition of their freedom… the council has recognized the need for increased collective action in

regard not only to political consultation and the common defense effort but also to certain aspects

of economic, scientific, cultural and information work” 29 This was an idealistic avenue that NATO

would not have the luxury to pursue during the Cold War. The Harmel Report of 1967 outlined a

28
Yost, 203
29
NAC Communique April 4, 1959, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c590402a.htm
 14

secondary purpose to the alliance: to “pursue the search for progress towards a more stable

relationship in which the underlying political issues can be solved.” 30 These would become some

of the basic principles outlined in a post-Warsaw Pact NATO. The plans to evolve NATO would

become clear through the outcomes of the July 1990 London summit, NATO’s new Strategic

Concept announced in Rome in November 1991, and various other summits and communiqués.

The London summit “moved to restructure NATO’s military forces into true multinational units,

moving away from the geographically based area-defenses of the past.”31 The Alliance would seek

to be an instrument of democratic change and peace on the European continent. The summit

declaration also expressed a desire to lend a hand to former adversaries who were interested in

cooperating towards a peaceful future. The Strategic Concept meetings of 1991 resulted in the

declaration that the Harmel Report’s desire to focus on achieving Alliance objectives through

political means and a trifecta of cooperation, dialogue and defense. The threats to European

security will be more likely to arise from “the serious economic, social and political difficulties,

including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in central and

eastern Europe.” The declaration implied a necessity to handle any conflicts that would affect the

security of the Alliance through “a wide range of contingencies.”32 This would prove prescient,

as as NATO’s first military mission would come in an Eastern European region plagued by ethnic

violence.

Intervention in Bosnia

In June 1992, Alliance states monitoring increasing violence in Bosnia, announced new

plans to “support, on a case-by-case basis in accordance with our own procedures, peace-keeping

30
Harmel Report, 1967 http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b671213a.htm
31
McCalla, 449
32
The Alliance’s Strategic Concept agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the
North Atlantic Council (November, 1991) http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b911108a.htm
 15

activities under the responsibility of the CSCE, including by making available Alliance resources

and expertise.33” A few months later the NATO issued a communique extending that principle to

include United Nations Security Council mandated missions: “for the first time in its history, the

Alliance is taking part in UN peacekeeping and sanctions enforcement operations.” 34 NATO was

taking a bold and calculated step to broaden its mandate by interjecting itself in the deteriorating

situation in the Balkans. NATO would survive as a collective security organization by simply

adapting its purpose based on the most current threat to peace existing in the world. United Nations

Security Council Resolution 713 implemented sanctions against Bosnian Serbs in Serbia-

Montenegro. In February, 1992 The UNSC also created the United Nations Protection Force in

Bosnia (UNPROFOR), which was mandated to control United Nations Protected Areas, ensure

that peace talks could be carried out, protect humanitarian aid efforts, enforce the no fly zone and

to control and monitor borders. 35 Operating under the new guidelines and strategic vision NATO

begin initiating support missions to assist the United Nations’ efforts. Operations Deny Flight and

Sharp Guard in June and April of 1993. The Sharp Guard operation was a naval mission in the

Adriatic Sea to monitor and enforce arms embargoes and sanctions handed down by the UNSC.

This was a remarkable success, with almost 7,500 vessels searched without violations in a three-

year period. 36 Deny Flight was originally an airborne operation to enforce the no-fly zone over

Bosnia-Herzegovina established by UNSC resolution 781. This was a major military undertaking

unlike any that NATO had seen during the Cold War. By January, 1995 over 47,000 flights had

been flown by Alliance aircraft. While this was a significant milestone for NATO it was still only

33
North Atlantic Council communiqué, June 4 1992, 4, 11
34
North Atlantic Council communiqué, December 17, 1992
35
United Nations Security Council Resolution 713,
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/011/17/IMG/NR001117.pdf
36
(Global Security: Operation Sharp Guard 2005)
 16

involved in basic support operations of the UNPROFOR mandate. It would take an increase in

Serbian violence for Alliance members to step up their involvement in the region.

Sixty-eight civilians were killed in Sarajevo’s central market during a deadly artillery

attack by the Serbs in February 1994. NATO stepped up its enforcement of the no-fly zone and

gave an ultimatum to Serbian forces to withdraw their artillery. On February 28th, NATO reached

another milestone when it shot down four Bosnian Serb aircraft for violating the no fly zone. This

was the first time that the Alliance had engaged enemies on a battlefield using deadly force.

NATO’s air power would be extended further with Operation Deliberate Force. The Deliberate

Force bombing campaign was a direct response to the Srebrenica Massacre, the murder of more

than 7,000 refugees by the Army of Republika Srpska in June 1995. This act would later be ruled

a genocide by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.37 The precision

bombing campaign began on August 30th, 1995 and would last for a period of two weeks. These

bombings, held in conjunction with a Croatian offensive against the Serbs, were powerful enough

to bring Milosevic’s forces to their knees38.

The collapse of Serbian military resolve at the hands of NATO forces led to the signing of

the Dayton Accords in November 1995. Those NATO allies who had pushed strongly for action

in Bosnia touted this moment as an important victory. But the signing of the Accords was only

another step in what would be a long, drawn-out mission in Bosnia. During an address to the nation

following the Dayton agreements, President Clinton discussed the Atlantic Alliance’s role in the

future of Bosnia:

America has a responsibility to answer that request [for peace in Bosnia]… I refuse
to send American troops to fight a war in Bosnia, but I believe we must help to

37
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991
http://www.un.org/icty/krstic/Appeal/judgement/krs-aj040419e.pdf
38
Yost, 198
 17

secure the Bosnian peace. The only force capable of getting this job done is NATO,
the powerful military alliance of democracies that has guaranteed our security for
a half century now… We must not turn our backs on Bosnia. 39

The continued NATO involvement in Bosnia would come in the form of the Implementation Force

(IFOR) on December 20th 1995, under Operation Joint Guard and Joint Forge. IFOR was tasked

with monitoring and upholding the Dayton Agreements, which included a cease fire, a call for free

and fair elections, a commitment to human rights, arrest of war criminals and their deportation to

the international war crimes tribunal in the Hague as well as several important territorial mandates.

IFOR incorporated troops from 32 states with 54,000 soldiers on the ground and was eventually

taken over by the Stabilization Force (SFOR) one year later, tasked with much of the same

commitments. The mandates of IFOR-SFOR were defined as the following:

• deterring or preventing a resumption of hostilities or new threats to peace;

• consolidating IFOR's achievements and promoting a climate in which the peace process
could continue to move forward;
• providing selective support to civilian organizations, within its capabilities. 40
This broad mandate hoped to establish a lasting peace that would lead to the eventual withdrawal

of NATO troops. It was crafted to ensure that NATO would be primarily functioning in a military

peacekeeping capacity. Much of the debate surrounding the SFOR throughout the late 1990s is

mirrored by current domestic debates over timetables for withdrawal from Iraq. A vote in the

House of Representatives held in June, 1997 declared that US ground forces should be permanently

withdrawn from Bosnia within the year. 41 This opened up debate within the United States and

with Europe over the possible consequences of a NATO timetable for removing forces. There

39
Clinton, Address to the Nation on Implementation of the Peace Agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, November 17,
1995, (Graham 1997)
40
Peace support operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-6265DBDC-
83A53BE5/natolive/topics_52122.htm
41
Graham, A16
 18

seemed to be no indication that the same ethnic factions would not rush back to war if not for the

presence of international peacekeeping forces. The SFOR mandate would expire in June 1998 but

the North Atlantic Council did not want to withdraw troops if it meant reigniting ethnic tensions.

The Alliance decided to implement an indefinite peacekeeping mission that would undergo review

every six months. Decisions about troop levels and length of the mission could only be determined

by the situation on the ground. Relative peace remained in Bosnia for the nine years of SFOR’s

presence. In what would become a historic moment for both NATO and the European Union, the

Alliance handed over full control of peacekeeping operations to the EU’s Eufor as of December

2nd 2004. 42
NATO retains a base in Sarajevo and will provide technical assistance to EUFOR’s

counter-terrorism and war crimes apprehension efforts.

The missions in Bosnia, though seemingly very successful, strained NATO’s alliance more

than any of the Cold War challenges it had faced. These were uncharted waters and the United

States found many of its European allies dragging their feet throughout the 1990s, wondering if

the Alliance had any business participating in such a mission. The United States, on the other hand,

was originally very hesitant to pursue high-risk missions that could incite a casualty adverse

domestic constituency. The clearest example of this was the IFOR’s decision to seek out and

apprehend war criminals. While the United States provided intelligence and tactical assistance to

these missions, it was the Dutch and the British who took the initiative to apprehend war crimes

suspects who would be brought to The Hague. Eventually American forces would join in the

pursuit and IFOR successfully arrested over 20 suspects. 43 While the transfer of power to the

42
Bosnia and Herzegovina: NATO ends SFOR mission
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/JCDR-67ATYP?OpenDocument
43
Highs and Lows of Nato’s Bosnia mission, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4061047.stm
 19

European Union is reflective of improved security in the state, the remaining necessity for foreign

troops leads many to believe that “nearly a decade after signing the Dayton Accords, the Bosnians

remain incapable of governing themselves.” 44 Despite its flaws the Alliance’s actions in Bosnia

showed that NATO would establish an important role in a post-Cold War era. The Alliance was

willing to move beyond the borders of signatory states and act on behalf of the collective security

of an entire continent. Still, questions remained as to whether the actions necessitated by long

term peacekeeping missions truly fit the words and spirit of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Intervention in Kosovo

NATO’s second major military operation would also be fought in The Balkans. Operation

Allied Force was a response to rising violence against ethnic Albanians in the autonomous

province of Kosovo at the hands of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic. The United Nations

passed an arms embargo (UNSCR 1160) on Yugoslavia due to the increasing tensions between the

Serbian Security Forces and the Kosovo Liberation Army.45 The embargo did little to stem the

violence and again in September the United Nations Security Council passes resolution calling for

a cease fire and withdrawal of Milosevic’s forces. Again, the pleas of the UN were ignored. The

UNSC found its hands tied as Russia continually threatened a veto against any resolution calling

for direct military action against Milosevic, with whom they had strong ties. 46 NATO members

found themselves in an interesting predicament. Their justification for Operations Deny Flight,

Sharp Guard and Deliberate Force had rested on the legitimacy that came with enforcing United

Nations Security Council resolutions. The North Atlantic Council now faced a new challenge in

developing their post Cold War role. Should NATO act when the United Nations Security Council

44
Fukuyama, 7
45
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1160 (1998) http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/98sc1160.htm
46
Norris, XX
 20

does not? After much deliberation the North Atlantic Council decided to deliver the ultimatum that

the UNSC could not. An October, 1998 communiqué stated that if Yugoslav forces did not pull

back from Kosovo, NATO forces would be forced to authorize air strikes against any belligerent

parties. For over a year diplomatic efforts were made by Allied states to avoid military strikes

culminating in the Rambouillet talks, which had the official backing of the North Atlantic Council.

Despite these efforts the situation on the ground deteriorated on a daily basis. Killing sprees at the

hands of both the KLA and Serbian forces were common. The North Atlantic Council used this

time to develop its plans for a military operation should it become necessary. A massacre of 40

unarmed civilians in Racak on January 15th received much public attention and intensified the

pressure on NATO to act. Milosivic remained defiant to the end, repositioning his military along

Kosovo’s territory. On March 24th, forces of the Atlantic Alliance began a precision bombing

campaign aimed at removing Serbian air defenses.

Operation Allied Force had five outlined objectives centered around a vague commitment

to ending violence in Kosovo, creating an international military presence, return of refugees and

displaced persons and assurance of Serbian willingness to respect human rights and work within

the confines of international law. The bombing immediately seemed to strengthen Serbian resolve

and aggression against Kosovar Albanians: “Within days there were reports of massive ethnic

cleansing… thousands of Kosovars were being forced to march to Macedonia and Albania… they

were fleeing into Albania at an astounding rate of 2,000 per hour.” 47 While the hope was that

initial bombings would be enough to bring Milosevic to the bargaining table, the North Atlantic

Council voted unanimously to step up attacks in light of his intransigence. 48 While bombing efforts

increased, so did collateral damage. On May 1st, NATO forces destroyed a civilian bus carrying

47
Norris, 10
48
Operation Allied Force, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/allied_force.htm
 21

49 innocents. On May 8th the air campaign destroyed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and on

May 14th 79 civilians were killed as NATO missiles destroyed a village in southern Kosovo. These

events were demoralizing for the alliance and tested the resolve of those allies who had their doubts

about the mission in the first place. NATO Secretary General Javier Solana remained steadfast in

his determination and Supreme Allied commander Wesley Clark continued to push for increased

efforts by Alliance forces. On June 11th, 1999, Seventy eight days after the initial bombing,

Slobodan Milosevic gave in to allied demands and ordered his demoralized forces to retreat back

to the border. NATO had not suffered a single combat related casualty and the mission was seen

as a decisive victory for Allied forces.

As was the case with Deliberate Force, the end of combat operations was simply the

beginning of a long-term commitment on the part of NATO. UNSCR 1244 authorized NATO

forces to establish the Kosovo Force (KFOR) to “maintain a safe and secure environment and

freedom of movement for all citizens, irrespective of their ethnic origin.”49 50,000 soldiers were

under NATO’s command following the withdrawal of Serbian forces. These troops saw an initial

mandate to act as peacekeeping forces and demilitarize the KLA. They were also under orders to

“support the international humanitarian effort and coordinate with and support the international

civil presence.” As of today the KFOR mission is still operating, but under an expanded mandate.

According to KFOR’s official press releases, “[e]xamples of KFOR involvement can be found in

a variety of sectors such as: public works and utilities, construction, transportation, railway

operations, mine clearance, border security, fire services, protection of international workers, food

distribution, removal of unexploded ordnance, mine-awareness education, medical services,

etc.”50 Providing these services to the people of Kosovo is another example of NATO’s post-Cold

49
NATO’s role in Kosovo, http://www.nato.int/issues/kosovo/index.html
50
KFOR Objectives/Mission http://www.nato.int/KFOR/docu/about/objectives.html
 22

War evolution. What was once a military alliance would now be providing on the ground technical

assistance and direct humanitarian and infrastructure support.

Looking back on operation Allied Force, it becomes clear that despite the military victory,

many of NATO’s efforts failed or were met with limited success. First and foremost were the

failures of the Alliance’s diplomatic efforts. Led by the United States, the North Atlantic Council

was an official backer of the Ramboillet talks. The Ramboillet talks, the Alliance’s main effort to

avoid war, resulted in more intra-alliance bickering than actual negotiating progress. 51 This failure

highlights NATO’s difficulty in adapting one of the key provisions of the Harmel Report, which

called on the Alliance to exercise political and diplomatic might rather than focusing on military

strength. The failure of diplomatic efforts calls into question NATO’s bargaining ability as a

political entity: Can the interests of 28 states truly be represented with one diplomatic voice?

As was the case with operations in Bosnia, European allies were deeply split over the scope

and legitimacy of military action even after they had authorized military force. A contingent of

states, led by the Greeks and Italians, called for an immediate cessation of the bombing campaign

a day after it started, testing NATO’s cohesion beyond what it had ever before experienced. A

brief pause was ordered in the air strikes, frustrated military commanders who were attempting to

carry out the mixed messages they were receiving from the North Atlantic Council. General

Wesley Clark’s described the first phase of bombing against Milosevic’s forces as “pathetic.” 52

The General was frustrated because his original battle plan described more of a “shock and awe”

style campaign but “the conditions of coalition warfare produced a relatively slow, deliberate air

campaign, in contrast to the U.S. preference for high-tempo, continuous operations and

overwhelming levels of force.” The slower style of campaign was necessary to accommodate the

51
Norris, xxi
52
Ibid, 6
 23

consultative and deliberative functions of the coalition and to secure domestic and international

popular support for the operation. 53

Today, 14,000 NATO troops remain active in Kosovo through KFOR. Ironically, the

NATO Foreign Ministers decided at a 2007 conference that KFOR would remain active as long as

United Nations Security Council resolution 1244 required that they should be there. NATO’s

mission in Kosovo had undergone a complete 180-degree turn. The mission that began with a

declaration that UN support was unnecessary because “a limited use of force was justifiable in

support of the purposes laid down by the Security Council but without the Council’s express

authorization when that was the only means to avert an immediate and overwhelming humanitarian

catastrophe 54” is now justifying its existence solely on the basis of a UNSC mandate. This mandate

includes returning IDPs, reconstruction, demining, medical assistance, security of ethnic

minorities and assistance of the United Nations and other international actors to “support the

development of a stable, democratic, multi-ethnic and peaceful Kosovo.” 55 The KFOR mission

remains unchanged even in light of Kosovo’s February 2008 declaration of independence. It is

interesting to note that four NATO states (Spain, Greece, Romania and Slovakia) currently refuse

to recognize Kosovo’s independence.56 While this has not been a point of serious contention in

the Alliance, it is another sign that treaty signatories have become further divided on international

issues since the fall of the Cold War. The Alliance currently has no public plans in the works to

pull out of Kosovo.

1999 Strategic Concept

53
Ibid, 6
54
Shaw, 1047
55
NATO’s role in Kosovo, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm#objectives
56
Spain, Slovakia reject EP resolution, http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-
article.php?yyyy=2009&mm=02&dd=07&nav_id=56975
 24

After military operations in the Balkans had died down, the North Atlantic Council held a

summit to review its mandate under the 1991 New Strategic Concept. The Washington Summit

meetings held in April of 1999 led to a revision of the 1991 document that, according to NATO,

“is the authoritative statement of the Alliance’s objectives and provides the highest level guidance

on the political and military means to be used in achieving them.” 57 Article 25 of the new Strategic

Concept stated that “security is not only a matter of defense capability but also of political

economic, social and environmental stability, development and prosperity.”58 The updated version

of the document focuses Alliance efforts on strengthening the “indivisible” ties between Europe

and North America, strengthening military capabilities to allow for rapid response to crisis

situations and involving itself with arms control and non-proliferation efforts. The Strategic

Concept addressed one of NATO’s biggest criticisms during Allied Force, recognizing the United

Nations Security Council as the primary but not exclusive decision-making body on matters of

military intervention for humanitarian purposes. The document also laid out military guidelines

for operations that stressed keeping forces deployed beyond home territories at “the lowest level

consistent with the requirements of collective defense.”59 In other words, NATO forces should be

kept ready for rapid response and stability operations but would be gradually removed from

situations as necessary following the crisis. The Strategic Concept has not been updated since the

Washington Summit of 1999 and is still the second most important binding treaty document after

the North Atlantic Treaty itself.

Mission in Afghanistan

57
The Strategic Concept of the Alliance, http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb0203.htm
58
NATO’s Strategic Concept, http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?id=1038
59
1999 NATO Strategic Concept, 53
 25

On September 11th, 2001 a North Atlantic Treaty Organization state came under direct attack

for the first time in its history. But this attack was not made by state or opposing military alliance,

but by a regional sub-state actor with various degrees of ties to legitimate and rogue governments.

This moment was a shocking reversal of inter Alliance roles as the organization established by

America to protect Europe from an attack now found its hegemonic protector under fire. Pursuant

to Article 5, the 9/11 hijackings were not just an attack on the World Trade Center and Pentagon

but an attack on Turkey, Great Britain, Poland and all signatory states of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Almost immediately Article 5 was invoked and NATO states prepared for war. But what would

NATO’s role be in supporting the United States? While the alliance offered immediate assistance

to the United States in the wake of the attacks, President George W. Bush did utilize NATO for

the first phase of the war against the Taliban. Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was a United

States military operation of approximately 20,000 troops. 60 Almost 2,000 of those supporting

forces came from North Atlantic Treaty signatories, but operated entirely under the US command

structure. OEF’s primary concerns were to topple the Taliban, eliminate Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan

and take counter-insurgency measures against terrorist remnants. Currently Operation Enduring

Freedom remains as the primary counter-terrorist operation within Afghanistan. Within months,

the United Nations Security Council passed UNSCR 1386 establishing the International Security

Assistance Force. The ISAF, originally limited to operations in Kabul, called upon UN member

states participating in the ISAF to “provide assistance to help the Afghan Interim Authority in the

establishment and training of new Afghan security and armed forces.” 61 Under the UN resolution,

state leadership of the ISAF rotated through in six month shifts, creating an unstable and uncertain

command structure for the troops in Kabul. As the mission in Afghanistan grew increasingly

60
Morelli/Belkin 1
61
UNSCR 1386, http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/6909790.html
 26

dangerous and complex, the North Atlantic Council began to assert its role in the process.

Eventually Afghan President Hamid Karzai requested NATO’s participation at a meeting with UN

representatives62 and on August 11th, 2003 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization took the reigns

of the ISAF, taking on another mission far outside of its original purpose or scope. Two months

later the United Nations Security Council passed resolution 1510, expanding ISAF operations

beyond Kabul to assist the Afghan government wherever it was operating; providing both military

and technical assistance. Just as it was during Operation Deliberate Force, NATO would be acting

as the UN’s military enforcer and chief reconstruction agent on the ground.

As outlined by various governing resolutions of the UNSC, NATO’s official tasks include

training Afghan security forces, securing elections and polling places, combating the international

narcotics trade, disarming militias and providing judicial reform. The counter narcotics efforts,

while not originally within the mandate of the ISAF, have become increasingly important as it is

estimated that the Taliban has received over $100 million directly from poppy crops. 63 Due to

restrictions placed on the ISAF by the Afghan government, however, NATO’s role in counter-

narcotics had been limited to training, intelligence and logistic support to Afghani security units

who would then go in and wipe out the poppy fields. An October 9th 2008 NATO summit in

Brussels decided to authorize ISAF troops to lend direct support to Afghan forces in destroying

opium labs with known ties to the Taliban. While the defense ministers agreed in principle that the

ISAF should be assisting in these efforts, NATO commanders on the ground quickly discovered

that there was a disconnect between the mission set out in Brussels and the willingness of

contributing member states to assist with the operations. Germany, Italy, Poland and Spain, while

62
Morelli/Belkin 4
63
CIA Director Negroponte, “Annual Threat Assessment,” Senate Select committee on Intelligence, January 11,
2007.
 27

publicly and privately supporting the ISAF’s efforts, have all cited constitutional and statutory

restrictions that they claim prohibit their soldiers from participating in foreign counter-narcotics

efforts. 64 This example illustrates a predicament that has plagued the Alliance since it took control

of the ISAF: Many states have placed national caveats on their forces that have limited NATO

commanders in their operational capabilities and created logistical nightmares throughout the

mission.

The list of domestic restrictions on Alliance forces is long. For example, Germany’s

contingent of 3,000 forces are not allowed to patrol on foot (only in armored vehicles) and have

established what is essentially a curfew that prohibits them from carrying out operations at night.

Germany has also demanded that its forces remain in the Northern provinces, far from the border

with Pakistan where the insurgency is strongest. The Italian and Spanish governments will only

allow their forces to enter combat in emergency situations and reserve the right for their

commanders to veto an order from NATO officers. The French originally had similar restrictions.

Only as recently as April 2008, under the leadership of Nicolas Sarkozy, have the French began

deploying combat ready troops for the sole purpose of fighting Taliban insurgents. Turkey has

absolutely proscribed its forces from ever engaging in combat unless they come under direct attack.

The gravity of these restrictions is illustrated by the fact that, of the 42 states currently contributing

to the ISAF, only the quartet of United States, Canada, Britain and the Netherlands allow their

troops to enter combat without political restrictions or caveats. These four states began lobbying

for decreased restrictions and increased burden sharing at the NATO summit in Riga, Latvia in

2006 and their calls have grown increasingly louder. NATO Supreme Allied Commander General

James Jones expressed his frustration saying “It’s not enough to simply provide forces if those

64
Shanker, A6S
 28

forces have restrictions on them that limit them from being effective.” 65 National caveats have

forced General Jones and current Supreme Allied Commander General John Craddock to carefully

shape troop placements and missions to ensure that the forces available to them will actually be

allowed to carry out the orders they are given.

The Alliance has also taken on the task of providing provincial reconstruction teams whose

focus has been on infrastructure development and provision of basic services. The ISAF website

describes the PRTs as “small teams of civilian and military personnel working in Afghanistan’s

provinces to provide security for aid workers and help reconstruction work.” 66 There are currently

26 operating within Afghanistan, which are made up of approximately 50 to 100 soldiers. In

addition to the military forces, US-led PRTs include USAID, State Department and Afghan

Interior Ministry personnel. However, the teams remain dominated by soldiers, many of whom

are not necessarily trained or equipped to carry out the agricultural, educational, diplomatic and

engineering based efforts. Currently there are no official Alliance guidelines for structuring of the

Provincial Reconstruction Teams, leaving each contributing member state to developing their own.

NATO commanders have run into problems with certain PRTs not being as capable as others in

carrying out the commands they are given. Even the PRTs have been susceptible to the problem

of national caveats, as the French, have refused to take part in the missions, arguing that NATO

should not be so heavily involved in the non-security aspects of the state building mission in

Afghanistan. All in all the PRTs have been deemed unreliable by many Alliance commanders.67

Another serious problem facing the Alliance is a lack of boots on the ground. Burden sharing

is becoming an increasingly contentious point of argument at meetings of NATO foreign ministers,

65
Morelli/Belkin, 13
66
ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Teams, http://152.152.94.201/isaf/topics/recon_dev/prts.html
67
Morelli/Belkin 14
 29

especially as US President Barack Obama has made Afghanistan a priority for the United States

Military under his administration. Defense Secretary Robert Gates lobbied in December, 2007 for

an increase of approximately 7,500 combat soldiers, 3,500 trainers for the Afghani Army and 16

combat helicopters. In 2008 the Canadian government threatened Alliance members that they

would withdraw their forces from Afghanistan if fellow NATO states did not increase troop

contributions and begin to remove national caveats on troop deployments. This tactic was met with

limited success as France pledged an additional 720 forces and Germany another 1,000 (pending

approval of the Bundestag).68 General McKiernan has recently insisted that for him to be able to

fight the insurgency and successfully carry out rebuilding missions would require an additional

20,000 troops on the ground. One of the United States’ goals during the anniversary summit was

to leverage President Obama’s widespread popularity in Europe and new commitment to

Afghanistan in order to secure more troop contributions to the ISAF. Obama, addressing a

European audience, made a pressing case for burden sharing during a press conference with

German Chancellor Angela Merkel, reminding the Allies that "This is a joint problem, and it

requires a joint effort." 69 Despite much praise for President Obama’s efforts in Afghanistan and

the closing of the Guantanamo Bay detention center, the quartet of states who have faced the most

casualties walked away disappointed. Only 5,000 additional soldiers will be contributed to the

mission, 2,000 of which will have the sole mandate to train Afghan forces. The remaining 3,000

will return to their home countries following Afghan national elections scheduled for August.

These low numbers can be partially explained by domestic pressures brought about by the war’s

decreasing popularity throughout Europe as well as the worldwide economic crisis restricting

68
Canada Threatens Troop Pullout from Afghanistan, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/north_america/jan-
june08/canadatroops_0128.html
69
Obama asks allies for help in Afghan war, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30025192/
 30

financing for such missions. This is in part because NATO’s budget rules state that the country

contributing forces to an operation must pay all the costs that come with making the contribution.

For example, if Poland wanted to offer additional soldiers but not pay the price associated with

their deployment, it would be a violation of Alliance rules for the United States to pick up the

tab. 70

NATO is not winning the war in Afghanistan. This point has been emphasized increasingly

by both military and political leaders of the Alliance. The 51,000 troops currently serving under

ISAF commander General David McKiernan have faced higher casualties and an increasingly

emboldened resistance since the Alliance took over the mission from the United Nations in 2004.

Adding to the list of problems already on the table for NATO is the recent passage by the Afghan

parliament of a law that would legalize marital rape and otherwise restrict women’s rights.

Canada’s Prime Minister Stephen Harper has warned Afghan President Hamid Karzai that he will

withdraw Canada’s troops if the law is not repealed, stating “This is antithetical to our mission in

Afghanistan.”71 While Karzai has vowed to fight the law, this issue will inevitably reopen yet

another debate within the Alliance. Can an organization that runs on the consensus of Western

states properly carry out a state building mission in which the end product does not reflect their

values? The naysayers argue that this us further evidence that NATO should limit its mandate to

within the European continent.

Other NATO Missions

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is operating beyond the ISAF in Afghanistan and

the KFOR in Kosovo. Currently Alliance forces are operating under NATO command throughout

70
Morelli/Belkin 14
71
President Karzai’s Taleban-style laws for women put troop surge at risk
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article6025362.ece
 31

the globe in various military, training and humanitarian relief efforts. In Iraq, the NATO Training

Mission in Iraq (NTM-I) represents the current work of the Alliance and has been in operation

since June 2004 as mandated by UNSCR 1546 at the request of the Iraqi Government. 72 This

small force of approximately 200 international troops has specialized in training and advising Iraqi

security forces in military police tactics, naval leadership and even English language programs.

NATO also involved itself with the Iraq war leading up to the US invasion in March 2003 with

Operation Display Deterrence. ODD was enacted under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty

(The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity,

political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened) at the request of Turkey.

Alliance forces entered Turkey and erected various defensive mechanisms designed to protect the

member-state from possible Iraqi retaliation. Both missions were enacted after heated debate

within the North Atlantic Council regarding whether NATO should support the mostly US bilateral

military efforts against Iraq.

Operation Active Endeavor, approved under an Article 5 mandate, represents the bulk of

Alliance’s counter terrorism efforts around the globe, focusing on naval operations in the Strait of

Gibraltar and Mediterranean. OAE was approved in the wake of the 9/11 attacks on the United

States (October 26, 2001) and has grown from “providing a modest military presence in an

important stretch of sea into a comprehensive, continuously adapting, counter terrorism operation

throughout the Mediterranean.” 73 The Alliance has taken the mission so far as to develop software

available to governments and shipping companies called Baseline for Rapid, Incremental and

Transformational Experimentation (BRITE) that can be used to map and track naval activity in the

72
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1456
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/381/16/PDF/N0438116.pdf?OpenElement
73
Operation Active Endeabour, http://www.afsouth.nato.int/JFCN_Operations/ActiveEndeavour/Endeavour.htm
 32

Mediterranean. NATO “has established an information collection end exchange mechanism,

surveillance procedures and a database of past maritime traffic that puts us in a position not only

to be aware of what moves on the sea lanes but also to timely assess any indicator of improper

behavior.”74 OAE was NATO’s first long term mission established outside of any particular zone

of conflict.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, largely recognized as the most effective regional

collective security bloc of all time, has created a mission to support its counterpart on the African

continent. The African Union (AU) officially requested NATO assistance with their mission in

Darfur (AMIS and UNAMID) in June 2005. NATO provided training to the African Stabilization

Force, a rapid response force initiated by the African Union to respond to crises on the continent.

NATO also airlifted AU forces and humanitarian aid during operations in Somalia through

December 2007. According to Said Djinnit, African Union Commissioner for Peace and Security,

the two regional IGOs are currently in negotiations over future assistance and partnership in order

to define a more permanent role for the North Atlantic Council:“"NATO has been providing

capacity-building support in Sudan and we are exploring possibilities for expanding the

cooperation into other areas. We are looking to including the long-term cooperation and support

of NATO.” 75 NATO has also been cooperating and coordinating with various African

governments in establishing anti-piracy missions around the Gulf of Aden.

Operation Allied Protector was launched in March, 2009 and has a robust mandate to

pursue pirates and deter piracy off the Horn of Africa. Interestingly, Operation Allied Provider

was the Alliance’s original counter-piracy effort in the Gulf of Aden but was terminated in

74
Ibid
75
African Union looks to long-term cooperation with NATO, http://www.hq.nato.int/docu/update/2007/03-
march/e0302a.html
 33

December 2008. Increased activity of Somali pirates have once again plagued Allied shipping and

security efforts, as Somali pirates have attacked ships from Denmark, the Netherlands, The United

States, Germany, France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Turkey, Greece and Belgium since January, 2008.

An additional 80 ships have been attacked or threatened by pirates in 2009.76 This mission is

expected to see increased US support after the hijacking of the Maersk Alabama received

widespread national attention when twenty-two American servicemen were taken hostage on April

8, 2009. The shooting of three pirates by US Naval snipers has prompted promises of revenge and

increased piracy on the high seas. On April 17th 2008 Dutch commandos operating under Allied

Protector freed twenty Yemeni hostages who had been captured by pirates. One day later NATO

choppers and cruisers engaged and pursued pirates for over seven hours after the pirates threatened

the Dutch owned MV Font Ardenne, a World Food Program delivery ship passing through the Gulf

of Aden. Operation Allied Protector authorizes NATO forces to “Defend, disrupt and protect

against pirate attacks; including boarding operations on suspected pirate or armed robber

vessels,” 77 but does not further authorize (or deny) sailors of the Alliance to detain or kill those

engaging in piracy: “When a ship is part of NATO, the detention of person is a matter for the

national authorities. It stops being a NATO issue and starts being a national issue." 78 Both

Canadian and Dutch national restrictions on detainment demanded the release of the pirates. These

national limitations are potentially very harmful to the long term effectiveness of the anti-piracy

mission as released pirates are expected to rearm and resume operations around the Horn of Africa.

Conclusion

76
NATO Thwarts Hijack off Coast of Somalia, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124013841290332353.html
77
Operation Allied Protector, http://www.manw.nato.int/page_operation_allied_protector.aspx
78
Nato frees pirate hostages, Reuters http:/ /uk.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUKLI170695
 34

NATO’s track record since the collapse of the Cold War has shown a turbulent mix of

impressive military successes followed by the complex problems associated with military led

humanitarian interventions and state-building missions. With each successive mission since the

1991 Strategic Concept was issued, intra-alliance tensions seem to reach new highs, further

complicating decision making in the North Atlantic Council which prides itself on operating

through consensus. However with each long-term mission NATO has taken on it has faced

increasing difficulty in achieving the full cooperation of its members. While the Alliance is not on

the verge of an immediate collapse it may very well be one international crisis away from the

creation of irreconcilable differences that will make consensus impossible.

The more fundamental question is whether NATO should try to save itself. Many

prominent realists, most notably John J. Mearscheimer, have argued that it should not.

Mearscheiemer, in his 1994 essay The False Promise of International Institutions, acknowledged

NATO’s place in history as an institution that “played a role in preventing the outbreak of World

War III” but essentially wrote off NATO off as nothing but “a manifestation of the bipolar

distribution of power in Europe during the Cold War… it was that balance of power, not NATO

per se, that provided the key to maintaining stability on the continent. 79” In other words, the

collapse of the Soviet Union took NATO from a trivially important organization to a completely

obsolete one. But even some of those who admire NATO’s role during the Cold War as well as

its aims for the future have argued that the organization is not right for the missions it is carrying

out:

“NATO has been an extra ordinarily effective organization in locking the US into
Europe militarily and in containing the Soviet Union. But past pre-eminence is no
guide to future purpose and it is the lack of definition of what NATO is for that is

79
Mearscheimer, 14
 35

now producing all the strains… This isn’t a case of: if we didn’t have NATO we’d
have to invent it. The opposite is true. If we didn’t have NATO we’d invent
something quite different at this point” 80

Adrian Hamilton may very well be right in arguing that if NATO did not exist an institution may

have developed more suited for the state-building and humanitarian missions of the Balkans,

Afghanistan and beyond but this is a moot point. NATO does exist; and it is currently operating

around the globe with a mandate that has becoming increasingly robust over the past two decades.

While arguments for disbanding NATO remain far in the background, it is nonetheless becoming

harder to ignore the growing cracks in the Alliance’s relations and capacities that have resulted

from the expansion of mandate.

On the eve of the anniversary talks, President Obama delivered a simple message on the

future of the Transatlantic Alliance, saying: “If NATO becomes everything, it becomes nothing.” 81

This should be NATO’s guiding principle in self-evaluation following the 60th anniversary

celebrations. As heads of state pose and smile for the cameras, the Alliance is under unprecedented

strain and needs to address the flaws inherent openly and honestly in having what increasingly

appears to be an amorphous mandate as an international police force. The North Atlantic Treaty

remains a strong and simple document; however, its application since the Cold War has been at

times weak and convoluted; requiring a stream of new missions, summits and communiqués to

redefine its role. NATO may be able to continue operating as it has, repeatedly re-working its

image and vision to match new threats, so long as its member states remain cohesive in their vision

of the organization. Since the Cold War NATO has essentially remained one step ahead of itself,

80
Hamilton, Time to disband NATO now that the cold war is over?
81
Kern, World Politics Review 2009
 36

interjecting its powerful military force with new missions in new regions before addressing the

core structural issues that inevitably hamper its efforts and long term effectiveness. And while the

organization cannot survive an amorphous mandate, a flexible and more subdued NATO can still

prosper so long as there is a clear framework for success.

The 1999 Strategic Concept under which NATO currently operates outlines broad thematic

issues that the Alliance should tackle without providing the structure necessary to ensure success.

What the Alliance needs more than anything is a set of strict and enforceable principles of military

intervention to solve the lack of cohesion and burden sharing that threatens to destroy NATO from

within. A 1993 article in Foreign Affairs authored by General Colin Powell outlined a vision for

US foreign policy that modeled itself on diplomacy, international cooperation, vital national

security interests, strict consideration of long-term mission consequences and exit strategy as well

as a need for “overwhelming force” applied “quickly and decisively.”82 While the United States

has not held itself to these standards, much of what has come to be known as the Powell Doctrine

is an applicable and viable framework for solving NATO’s key problems.

Powell provides what is essentially a checklist for going to war that would inevitably reign

in NATO’s expansion of mandate. Long term state building missions like that of the ISAF in

Afghanistan would have to be considered vital security interests and troops could not be deployed

without a clear outline of victory and a consideration of a viable exit strategy. While NATO states

seemed eager to contribute to US endeavors in the wake of 9/11, it appears as though many states

dove in without full understanding of the difficulties that would come with a large-scale operation

outside of Europe. Adopting the Powell Doctrine to fit the “vital security interests” of the Alliance

82
Powell, Foreign Affairs 1993
 37

as a whole, it seems, would actually increase sobriety during consensus decision making process

and hopefully decrease the possibility of individual states reneging on their responsibilities.

Additionally, one of the problems witnessed during the early days of Operation Allied

Force was that even after the North Atlantic Council decided that air strikes were the only viable

option, they were unable to execute the military mission without significant political restrictions.

This weakened the initial bombing campaign and frustrated commanders who felt unsure of their

mission and unable to carry out their orders. Under the Powell Doctrine, once the high threshold

for military intervention has been met the mission reaches a point of no return. Overwhelming

force must be applied to defeat the enemy and carry out the already clearly defined mission. This

must become practice for NATO as there can be no place for intra-alliance squabbling that will

jeopardize a mission’s potential for success.

The “overwhelming force” doctrine would also address the problems of national caveats

on troops deployed in combat arenas, as an adaptation of the Powell Doctrine would create higher

levels of expectations and standards for North Atlantic Treaty signatories who had agreed that

military intervention is necessary. Lack of enforcement remains one of NATO’s cores institutional

weaknesses as the North Atlantic Council has no viable means to force states to pull their weight

in Alliance missions. If NATO wishes to remain a significant collective security organization it

must ensure that its members are willing to carry out the objectives that they have deemed worthy

of military force. With the exclusion of domestic constitutional necessities, national caveats that

prevent NATO commanders from doing their job must be eliminated in Afghanistan and all future

missions of the Alliance. This should be a standard adopted not only internally but for prospective

NATO members. States that do not fully participate in the missions they authorize should be
 38

considered by the Alliance to be abrogating their duties and be faced with probation and possible

expulsion from NATO.

Finally, it is important that NATO recognize that it is, at its core, a military based collective

security organization. This should by no means preclude it from taking part in humanitarian and

state-building operations, but its role should nonetheless remain in a strictly military capacity. The

ISAF has often shown their provincial reconstruction teams to lacking in ability to consistently

carry out the demands of the job because they are dominated by military forces lacking in the

training necessary to rebuild the infrastructure of Afghanistan. NATO’s role in Bosnia under IFOR

outlined a much more sensible task for Alliance soldiers. Their job was primarily to keep the peace

and protect UN and other aid workers better suited to carry out such a mission.

NATO’s resilience after the Cold War has proven that it can survive a continuous

redefinition of its role in collective security, but it has also exposed its grave weaknesses in Bosnia,

Kosovo and Afghanistan. For an institution that is establishing its purpose around meeting the

challenges of an increasingly complex and dangerous world, 10 years is far past the expiration date

for such an organization’s guiding bylaws. The changes outlined above need to be adopted within

NATO’s framework as the organization is in desperate need of an update to its Strategic Concept.

An updated and revamped Strategic Concept that outlines strict expectations of members and

details the use of the Powell Doctrine as a future standard for military intervention will strengthen

the Alliance’s effectiveness in dealing with the numerous challenges that lie in Afghanistan and

beyond.

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