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    Aristotle Metaphysics H6: a dialectic with Platonism VERITY HARTE, In Metaphysics H6 Aristotle raises the following question: ‘What i it then that makes man one? Why is it one and not many, e.g. animal and biped, especially if, as some say, there are animal itself (axbt6 w. Gov) and biped itself (ait 8GxoUv)? (104581417) My aim in this paper is to provide an interpretation of this last chapter of Metaphysics H which demonstrates where and how this question is answer- ed. My hope is that the interpretation I shall present is able to resolve one of the disagreements about the content of this chapter, namely whether the object whose unity is primarily at issue in H6 is the form man or the composite man. HE is a text which is frequently caught in the crossfire of competing interpretations of Aristotle's explanation of substantial unity. It thus seems important to establish how this chapter works justin itself. Before embarking on my interpretation of the chapter, let me begin by way of orientation with what I take to be uncontroversial remarks about Aristotle’s project and strategy in H6. Some uncontroversial remarks about H6 Whether the subject of Aristotle’s question at 45a14-17 is the form man or the composite man is disputed, But it is, I take it, clear that when Aristotle asks what makes man one, the object whose unity is in need of explanation is the object of a definition of man. Thus the chapter begins with a reference to a previously mentioned puzzle concerning definitions and numbers: what is the cause of their unity (45a7-8)? The unity of numbers is not then further addressed in H16. The unity of a definition — as opposed to that of its object ~ is said to be parasitic on the unity of the object of definition: a definition is one by being of one thing (4512-14). Finally, therefore, Aristotle reaches the question with which T began: how is that — i.e, the object of definition ~ one? Having raised the question of what makes the object of definition a unity, the first topic which Aristotle addresses is the unity of a composite. To say 216 Phronesis 1996, Vol. XLU3 (Accepted September 1995) that this is the first topic which Aristotle addresses is simply to describe what happens next, from 45a25ff,! after some important discussion of the An example of intelligible mater, although not described as such, may be drawn from, De An. 429b18-20; here, Aristotle says that ‘the straight’ (10 e008) (an object of vous) is like ‘the snub’ (20 oui6v) — ie. something which cannot be defined without reference ‘to matter. The straight must be considered ‘together with continuity’ (wev& ovvexot), Continuity, therefore, can be considered an example of intelligible matter. [ owe this ‘example to Myles Burnyest. % Ross (1924) ad loc. Tehas been suggested to me that I take the intelligible matter ia the circle example to be figure rather than plane. However, Ihave been persuaded by Det, in hs illuminating discussion of Aristotle's conception of intelligible master (1993) vo. 1, pp.211-14), that 288, ‘The weight of evidence from ‘intelligible matter’ thus seems to me to be overwhelmingly in Rorty’s favour. The reference to intelligible matter com- pletes the discussion of the unity of composites by including intelligible objects. Up to and including lines 45a33-35, therefore, Aristotle talks exclu- sively about the unity of composite. Does this then mean that the genus is matter? Only if Aristotle’s answer to the question, what makes form one?, is, as both Rorty and Ross have assumed, to be found in his discussion of the unity of a composite.™ It is this assumption which I wish to challenge. The Unity of Form Aristotle has asked, what makes the object of a definition of man a unit hhave argued that the object whose unity is at issue is the form man. If this is correct, then the object whose unity is at issue is something which has no ‘matter. In a passage beginning immediately after the reference to intelligi- ble matter which completes the discussion of composite objects, Aristotle turns to consider precisely the unity of things which have no matter, wheth- et perceptible or intelligible (45a36-b7). Here (with one significant depar- ture) is Ross’ translation of this passage. [But ofthe things which have no matter, ether intelligible or perceptible, each is by its very nature essentially a kind of unity, as itis essentially a kind of being ~ a substance, quality, or quantity (which is also why neither “being’ nor ‘one’ is present in thee definitions), and the essence of each of them is by its very nature @ kind of unity as it is a kind of being ~ which is also why none of these has any reason outside itself for being one, nor for being a kind of being; for each is by its the intelligible mater in question is indeed plane o wo dimensional igure. Detel argues that ‘intligblo matter’ in Aristotle refers to n dimensional geometrical objets (n = 0, 3} points, lines, planes, solids, He relates this conception of ineligible matter to the process of geometical abstraction, in the fist stge of which bodies are regarded as having n dimensions. In general, Detl’s argument supports the important point for my purposes, which is that intelligible mattr is brought in as a reference to geometrical objects, and nt, as Ross supposes, asa reference to the genus of physical objects Rorty’s thesis that the genus is matter is no, of course, based solely on his in- tespretaton of H6, Is sein the context ofa reading of Metaph. Z-H which takes 25 to amnounce a project of identifying the compost individual with its essence, a project achieved by incorporating maltrin withthe essence. He takes 210, 11 and 12t0 be the main contibutors in Z to this project and 116 to be is culmination. Iam aot persuaded by this reading, but it would take me too far away from the interpretation of H6 to discuss it at length. AU T claim, therefore, i thatthe itepreation of HG which Ta defending makes it unnecessary and indeed dficlt, to ead its involving an identi cation of geaus with mate. I this interpretation is persuasive, Roy's overall reading is already seriously damaged 289 nature a kind of being and a kind of unity, and not because being or unity is their genus, nor because they are separable from paticulars.* ‘The phrase ‘of each of them’ (in italicised passage) is an addition; it does not render any corresponding Greek phrase. Ross adds ‘of each of them’ ‘on the assumption that what is in question is the unity of the categories per se.” I suggest, however, that this passage rather concerns items in each of the categories which do not have matter. ‘Thus ‘a substance, quality, or quantity’ (45bI-2) refers to items in the categories of substance, quality and quantity, and, by implication, the remaining categories. The “definitions” in which neither “being” nor ‘one’ are present (4562-3) are definitions of any items in the categories. The ‘essence’ referred to at 45b3 introduces the objects of these definitions. Thus ‘the essence of each’ is the essence of items in the categories, and not of each category. ‘Consider, then, essence in the category of substance. What the italicised passage asserts, on my reading, is that essence in the category of substance, like the essence of any item in any of the other categories, is immediately ‘one (£0 Ev) just as itis immediately being. But essence in the category of substance is form, the object of a definition of a substantial item, icc. precisely that entity whose unity is at issue in H6." Thus, the discussion of the unity of things which have no matter, whether perceptible or intelligible, includes a statement of the unity of form.” Ba. Ross (1928), ad loc. My emphasis. In the last line of this transtation (and not because... Ihave adopted Bostock’s translation (1994) ad loc. The point of discrepancy with Ross concems the subject of the genitives in 4567: 008" & zoptoxay Svrwv snagh vi xa" Eeaota. Ross appears to take being and unity asthe subject, giving “nor in the sense that being and unity can exist apart from particulars. Like Bostock, I take the subject whose separability is denied to be the items which have been asserted to be {immediately one. This, I think, makes better sense ofthe point being made here, which I shall discuss below. % The text is this: (1085b3-4) wai xd xy elven eds Bv tC Bony Gooneg mal Ov N. ® Ross (1924), ad loc. Notes on Eta, ad loc. make the same assumption, ® Bames (1985), pp.1650-1, in his revision of Ross’ translation, in fact differs very slightly over the translation of the crucial lines 45b3-4, He gives‘. and an essence is by ‘very nature a kind of unity as itis kind of being,’ This translation makes it easier t0 ‘make my point, taking ‘essence’ to be form. However, it would be wrong to think thet essence” here refers only to form; rather it refers tothe essence of any item in any ofthe categories. Thus Ross’ addition of the phrase ‘of each of them’ (making ‘the essence of teach of them’) is better, although I do not take it in the sense in which Ross intended it Halper (1989) pp. 184-7, although otherwise in contrast tothe general approach of my interpretation in fact canvasses a similar reading of 45a35-b7, but without wanting to ‘commit himself to such an interpretation. Like me, he suggests that the things without ‘matter are items in the categories, and that what is “immediately one” is the essence of items in the categories, including form in the category of substance. (Similarly Loux 290 The framework of Aristotle's answer Form, then, just is immediately one. But surely there is something rather unsatisfying about this response? Further, if this is the conclusion to which the whole chapter has been directed, why is it introduced by a discussion of the unity of a composite? The answers to these two questions are related; I shall take them together. ‘That Aristotle's conclusion is a deflationary one is in keeping with the spirit of the introduction to his response, at 45223-5, where he says: If, as we say, there is, on the one hand, matter, and, on the other hand, form, and cone is potentially, the other actually, then the question will no fonger be thought a difficulty. However, there remains a question, on my interpretation, as to how this framework applies with the result that the problem vanishes. And this is to ask, how, on my interpretation, are the two discussions related: that is, the Buveer, 1 Evepye(g, Gove Ouowv v tmretv Tod Evdg wk aeiov wal x08 BY iva BY vig w Excovov, nai wd Suvi nat xd Evegye(a Ev xibg Bow, Goce ainov oB08y ado mhity & w dos xevfioay tx Suvduens els EvEgveiay. 6a BE 1 Exes Wy, deve exh Bsxeg By n. general. (So Charies (1994) pp.93-99 suggests that one should look ahead to ©6-8 for the necessary expansion of the notions of potentiality and actuality employed in HS.) I shall return in conclusion to the question of how far H6 should be taken as a definitive account ofthe topes it addresses, “© 4517-23. Jaeger (1957) encloses this text in the double square brackets which he uses to indicate ‘added by Aristode’. If he is right, this does not affect my point, as itis still Aristole’s summary. But I prefer the deflationary view of Notes on Eta, ad loc., ‘who suggest that this shows no more than that che end ofthe papyrus rll was tattered. ® ‘See Charles (1994) pp.88-89. Although T am broadly in sympathy with Charles’ reading of tis passage, its noteworthy that what Carles inuoduces as a translation of “the final lines of the chapter’ (p.88) in fact entirely omits a translation of the final sentence ~ 600 88 ui fet Ohny, néevee exh BQ Ev ta, 45023. But this sentence is ‘crucial. tis also, as I read it, entirely compatible with Charles’ overall view, were it not that, on his reading ofthe chapter as a whol, the unity of the composite has taken centre stage atthe expense of those passages discussing the unity of form, And this is $0, even though, on Charles’ reading also, the unity of a composite is derivative of the unity of form. 295 I propose the following translation-cum- interpretation of these lines. First, Aristotle states that ‘as has been said’, the proximate matter and form are the same and one (4518-20). Like Lewis I construe this not as an identity claim (by no means assured by the term ‘same’, tadtOv), but as the claim that there is one and the same thing which the matter and form each is This is the essence, identified at 45833. It is this (the essence, or form) which the matter is potentially and the form is actually, as Aristotle goes on to say (45619). It is in virtue of this essence which the matter is potentially, the form actually, that Aristotle infers that the questions, what is the cause of unity (which I take to be, for a composite)?, and, what is the cause of being one?, are alike (45b19-20). They are alike because being a unified composite is having a unitary form, being one something; and to be one is to be one of @ kind. Aristotle proceeds to explain this himself in the lines which follow (4520-22). There is, however, a discrepancy between different translations of their opening phrase: tv dig tt Exaotov. Charles gives ‘For each indi- ‘vidual is something’ Bostock offers ‘For each thing is one’. However ‘one translates the phrase, its purpose, I take it, is to signal the connection between being one (Ev) and being something (tt). It is this connection which signals the role of a unitary form in securing the unity of a compos- ite, Thus Aristotle continues ‘and what is potentially and what is actually are in some sense one (Ev 31), $0 that there is no other cause except if there is something which brings about the change from potentiality to ac- tuality’ (45b20-22). This last clause refers once again to the role of the ‘maker, just in the case of generated objects. ‘Thus far, then, the closing lines are a faithful summary of the discussion of the unity of the composite as I have construed it, ‘The summary likewise takes the unity of the composite to be grounded in the unity of form. The final line of the chapter provides the punchline, as, in the body of the chapter, do lines 45236-b7: items which have no matter, that is, essences including essence in the category of substance, are without qualification essentially something one (or one something, Ev tt) (45b23). Note that, in the summary, potentiality and actuality are somehow one (xc), whereas form, along with other essences, is without qualification one (&ah@). This is a successful outcome if the chapter's principal focus is the unity of form. It might be a disappointing result if the unity of the composite had been the ® Lewis (1994) pp. 254-5, .20. ® Charles (1994) p. 88. ® Bostock (1994) ad loc. 296 principal target.” This parallelism between the closing summary and my interpretation of the body of the chapter thus far may be taken as a further advantage. Two problems ‘There are, however, two difficulties for my interpretation, which I shall now address. First, consider lines 4533-35: (Of mater, some is ineligible, some perceptible and in a formala (A605) there is always an element of matter, as well as one of actuality, eg. ctcle isa ‘plane figure’. If A6yos here means definition, Aristotle appears to say that matter is al- ways an element of a definition. This would be in conflict with my conten- tion that the object of definition whose unity is at issue is the object of @ definition of form alone. Further, if taken to apply to definitions like “biped animal’, the claim that such a definition always contains an element of ‘matter might be taken to support Rorty’s identification of the genus with matter. This problem, however, may be relatively easily handled. The term 26- ‘yos has a number of senses of which ‘definition’ is only one, Nothing in what I have said need preclude their being different kinds of definitions to which Aristotle refers on different occasions. In context, 2.6yos clearly refers to the kind of definition or quasi-definition of which ‘round bronze’ is an example. ‘Round bronze’ is taken, for the sake of argument, to be a definition, at 45426, and referred to as a h6yos at 45027. ‘Round bronze’ is thus a definition of a composite, or a description of a composite treated as a definition for the sake of the argument. In concluding his remarks about the unity of composites, Aristotle refers again to this use of h6y0s as a definition, or quasi-definition, of a compos- ite. It is true of this kind of h6y/os that one partis matter, the other actuality. But this characterisation of the definition of a composite need have no bearing on the interpretation of the definition of form with which Aristotle ‘began. Indeed, characterising the components of a definition of a composite as matter and actuality leads perfectly into the subsequent discussion of things which have no matter and which, being pure actuality, are immedi- ately one. ° This thought tes in with the eslier suggestion thet the disappointment that remains actually concems the inadequacies of the discussion of the unity of the composite. See 1.47 above. But, on my interpretation, it may not be necessary to suppose that Aristotle takes himself to have said all that he needs fo say on this score. 291 ‘The second difficulty for my interpretation concerns lines 45425- For this difficulty would be the same as would arise if ‘round bronze" were the

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