The Past and Present Society

The Peace in the Feud

Author(s): Max Gluckman
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Past & Present, No. 8 (Nov., 1955), pp. 1-14
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Past and Present Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/649774 .
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The Peace in the Feud'

WHENEVERAN ANTHROPOLOGICALSTUDY IS MADE OF A WHOLE SOCIETY

or of some smallersocial group,it emphasizesthe greatcomplexity
whichdevelopsin therelations betweenhumanbeings. The customs
ofeachsocietyappearto be designedto complicate socialrelationships
unnecessarily.Institutionalized formsfor developingrelationsof
kinship, forcompelling theobservance through ritualofrightrelations
withthe universe,and so forth,firstdivideand thenreunitemen.
One mightexpectthata small community of just over a thousand
souls could residetogetheron an isolatedPacificislandwitha fairly
simple social organization. In fact such a community is always
elaboratelydividedand cross-dividedby customaryallegiances. I
wish to demonstrate how men quarrelin termsof certainof their
customaryallegiances,but are restrainedfromviolence through
otherconflicting allegianceswhich are also enjoinedon them by
custom. The resultis thatconflicts in one set of relationships,over
a widerrangeof societyor througha longerperiodof time,lead to
the re-establishment of social cohesion. Conflictsare a part of
social life and customappearsto exacerbatetheseconflicts, but in
doing so custom also restrainsthe conflictsfromdestroying the
widersocialorder. I shallexhibitthisprocessthroughtheworking
of thefeud.
All overthe worldthereare societieswhichhave no governmental
institutions. That is, theylack officerswith establishedpowers
to judge on quarrelsand to enforcetheirdecisions,to legislate
and take administrative action to meet emergencies,and to lead
wars of offenceand defence. Yet these societieshave such well-
establishedand well-known codes of moralsand law, of convention
and ritual,thateventhoughtheyhave no writtenhistories, we may
reasonablyassume that theyhave persistedfor manygenerations.
Theyclearlydo notlivein unceasingfearofbreaking up in lawlessness.
We knowthatsomeofthemhaveexistedoverlongperiodswithsome
kind of internallaw and order,and have successfullydefended
themselvesagainstattacksby others:indeed theyincludeturbulent
warriors whoraidedand eventerrorized theirneighbours. Therefore
2Froma broadcastlecturebasedon twobooksby ProfessorE. E. Evans-Pritchard,
The Nuer (Clarendon Press, 194o) and Kinship and Marriage among the Nuer
(Clarendon Press, 1951).
2 PAST AND PRESENT

when anthropologists came to study these societies,they were

immediately confrontedwiththe problemof wheresocial orderand
cohesionlay.
Studiesof societiesin whichprivatevengeanceand self-helpare
the main overtsanctionsagainstinjuryby others,and wherethis
exerciseof self-helpis likelyto lead to the wagingof feuds,have
led to one of the most significantcontributionswhich social
anthropological researchhas made to our understanding of social
relations. Anthropologists have been able to see the situations
which give rise to internecinefights,and, more importantly, to
examinethe mechanismswhichlead to settlements.The critical
resultof theiranalysisis that thesesocietiesare organizedinto a
seriesof groupsand relationships, so that people who are friends
on one basis are enemieson another. Hereinlies social cohesion,
rootedin theconflictsbetweenmen'sdifferent allegiances. I believe
it would be profitable to apply these analysesto those periodsof
European historywhen the feud was still apparentlythe main
instrument forredressof injury. Here I proposeto look at how
feudingarisesand is restrained in Africansocietieswhichhave no
governmental institutions.
The workingof the threatof privatevengeanceand the feudhas
to be exhibitedin a detailedanalysisof a singlesociety. The first
study of this situationin Africawas made by ProfessorEvans-
Pritchardamong the Nuer, a pastoralpeople of the Upper Nile
region. He himselfdid not organize his analysis primarilyto
presentthe argumentin whichI am interested now,so I am going
to describetheNuer witha slightly differentemphasisfromhis own.
The Nuer dwell in the vast plain whichlies aroundthe main
riversin the southernAnglo-Egyptian Sudan. This plain floods
in the monsoonrains untilit is a greatlake, which compelsthe
Nuer to retreatwith their cattle to patches of higherground
wheretheybuildtheirpermanent villagesand cultivatea hazardous
crop of millet. Afterthe rains,the floodfalls,and youngpeople
spreadwidelywiththeherdson the exposedrevivedpastures,since
wateringthe beasts is easy. But the watersdrain away rapidly,
and the plain then becomes a dry, scorchedwaste. The Nuer
and theircattlein thesemostarid monthshave to congregate again
at thoselow-lyingspotswherewateris retained,eitherin pools or
in the dried-upbeds of rivers. Thus groups of Nuer move in
rotationbetweenwet-seasonand dry-season homes. Groupswhich
are separatedby milesof floodat one month,some timelatermay
be campingtogetherat a singlewater-hole;and to reachthisthey
 THE PEACE IN THE FEUD 3

may have had to drive theircattlethroughthe territories of yet

othergroups. It is therefore essentialforthese variousgroupsto
be on some sortof friendly termswithone another,if theyare to
maintain their cattle, and themselves,alive. These ecological
necessitiesforcepeopleto co-operate;and thishelpsto explainhow
the Nuer can be organizedin tribesof 6o,ooo people and more,
withoutany kind of institutedauthority.
The Nuer have a verysimpletechnology. Their countrylacks
ironand stone,and has fewtreesto providewood formanufactures.
They not only depend on theircattleformuch of theirfood,but
also theymakeimportant goodsfromcattle-skins, -horns,and -bones.
Since rinderpestreducedtheirherds,theylive at best just above
subsistence. " It is wistfullyrelatedin one of theirstories,"writes
Evans-Pritchard, " how once upon a time man's stomachled an
independent lifein thebushand livedon smallinsectsroastedbythe
firing of the grasses,for(Nuer say) 'Man was not createdwitha
stomach. It was created apart fromhim.' One day Man was
walkingin the bush and came acrossStomachthereand put it in its
presentplace thatit mightfeedthere. Althoughwhenit lived by
itselfit was satisfiedwith tinymorselsof food,it is now always
hungry. No matterhow muchit eats it is soon cravingformore."
This tale mustsuffice to showhow nearthe Nuer live to starvation.
Food supplies are always short. Particularhouseholdsand even
small areas may suffersevereshortagebecause of cattledisease or
loss ofcrops. They haveto turnto othersforhelp. Again,custom
requiresthatwhena man marrieshe givesfortycattleto his bride's
relatives,thushis own familymaybecomeshortof cattle. He has
to turnto othersforhelp. The narrowmarginof subsistence, and
naturaland social vicissitudeswhich cause crops to fluctuatein
quantityand cattlein numbers,driveNuer to associatewithothers
if theyare to live. But lest this gives a pictureof a starvedand
down-troddenpeople I must add that the Nuer were fiercely
independentwarriors,who resistedthe advance of the Dervishes
and whomthe Britishin the end subdued by bombingtheircattle
fromthe air, while the Nuer were themselvessteadilyinvading
theterritoriesof othertribesand raidingtheseforcattle. They are
as bellicoseamongthemselves.
The narrowlimitsof Nuer economythusforcethemto associate
in fairlypopulous groups for the productionand distribution of
food. In these groups they formhamletsand villages,residing
in districts
whoseinhabitants mustbe formostof thetimein some
sortof peace withone another. Betweensome districts theremust
4 PAST AND PRESENT

also be sufficient fortheirmembersto crosseach

ties of friendship
other'sareas in theirmoves betweenflood-seasonand dry-season
homes. The ecologicalneedsforthisfriendship and peace lessenas
the distancegrows greater,until, between districtson opposite
sides of a tribe,it hardlyexists. Betweenthe different tribesbig
rivers or wide stretchesof uninhabitablecountryform natural
obstacles and political boundaries. Evans-Pritchardbrings out
strongly the close relationbetweenthe politicalorganizationof the
Nuer and thelie oftheirland,and also thewayin whichtheyexploit
thatland.
There are no chiefsin Nuerland,but in each tribethereis an
agnaticclan of aristocrats,
a largenumberof menrelatedto one
anotherby genealogical descentthroughmalesfroma common
founding ancestor.Not all the membersof a clan dwellin the
tribewheretheyare aristocrats,
and eachtribecontains
members
of manyclans. The politicalsignificance
of the clan,is, first,that
a mancannot a womanofhisownclan. Secondly,
marry thevarious
districtsof a tribeare held to be linkedtogetherby theirplace on
theclangenealogy.It works thisway. Twoneighbouring districts
areassociatedthrough twolong-dead brothers,whileanother three
neighbouring districtsare associatedthrough anotherset of three
brothers,whosefather wasbrother to thefather ofthefirstset. In
thisway,thevariousdistricts ofa Nuertribelinkup in largerand
largersectionsbybeinggrouped withmoredistant ancestorsofthe
tribe'saristocratic
clan. If one districtis fighting withanother,
thoserelatedto it in brotherhood unitewithit againstits enemy,
whowillbe joinedbytheirbrother-districts. Butall thesedistricts
mayjoinup withoneanother, ifoneofthemis involved in fighting
witha moredistantsection.Whiletheyare thusallied,feuds
amongthemselves fall undertruce. These large districtsare
thereforecomposedof sectionswhichmayat timesbe hostileto
one another,butuniteagainsta moredistantenemy. Ultimately
all Nuertribesare unitedagainstforeigners; whenforeigners are
notinvolved, theysplitintofeuding primary whichmay,
sections,
whennot fighting each other,splitintosmallerhostilesections,
and so on.
In thisprocessof whatEvans-Pritchard callsfusionof sections
againstlargergroups,andfission intosectionswhennotinvolved
againstthoselargergroups,the Nuer recognizecertainchanges
in therulesofwar. Men ofthesamevillagefight eachotherwith
clubs,notspears. Men of different villagesfighteachotherwith
thespear. Thereis no raiding within thetribeforcattleandit is
 THE PEACE IN THE FEUD 5

recognizedthat a man ought to pay cattle as compensationfor

killinga fellow-tribesman, thoughthisis rarelydone. Nuer tribes
raid one anotherfor cattle,but not forwomenand childrenwho
mustnotbe killed,nor mustgranariesbe destroyed. Whenraiding
foreignpeople,womenand childrenand evenmen can be captured,
womenand childrencan be killed,and granaries can be destroyed.
This is all I am goingto say aboutthelarge-scalepoliticalsystem
of the Nuer. Here fighting can go on, and injuriesneed not be
recompensed, because the groupslive farapart. The feud can be
waged. Peace is notnecessaryto preservelife. Butin morelimited
areas,becauseofthecrossingof cattle-drives and so forth,menhave
to be friendsif theyare to survive. But we know onlytoo well,
fromour own experience,thatthe necessityof friendship of itself
is not enough to achieve friendship.Men quarrel over many
things- cattle,land, women,prestige,indeed over accidents. (I
have seen two Zulu lockin armedcombatbecauseone bumpedinto
anotherin theexcitement ofa war-dance.) Or ifmendo notquarrel,
theyhave differences of opinionabout the rightsand wrongsof a
contract, and thesedifferences have to be settledby some ruleother
than that of bruteforce,if social relationsare to endure. Often,
difficultiesin disputearisenot over whatis the appropriaterule in
a dispute,but overhow the rulesapplyin particularcircumstances.
This is true even of most disputesin our highlydevelopedlegal
system. In effect,both partiesmay claim to be in the right,and
agreement has to be reachedon whichis in theright,and howfarhe
is in the right. Nuer have an establishedcode of law whichsets
out,forexample,whata manshouldpayin cattleto get a bridefrom
her father,and whathe shouldpay to his cuckold,or to the kin of
a man whomhe has slain,or forotheroffences. They have rules
controlling the divisionof inheritances and of cattlereceivedfrom
the husbandsof theirkinswomen. That is, theyhave a code of
law, as a seriesof conventional rulesaboutwhatis rightaction,and
what is wrongfulaction. But they have no legal proceduresor
officials,in the sense that there are no authoritieschargedwith
summoningdisputants,listeningto theircases, and enforcingthe
rules of law againstwrongdoers.And as most men tend to feel
thattheyare in the rightwhenthe disputeis obscure,and plentyof
men are readyto evade theirproperobligationsif theycan, we may
wellaskhowfriendship is maintained despitequarrels. It is herethat
customary ties are important, and the enforcement of thoseties by
beliefsin ritualpunishment. Certaincustomary ties linka number
of mentogether intoa group. But othertiesdividethemby linking
6 PAST AND PRESENT

some of themwithdifferent people who maybe enemiesto thefirst

group. For the Nuer, likeall peoples,do not exploittheirland in
haphazardlots of associates,but in organizedgroups which are
brokenby relationships which cross-linktheirmembersin other
relationships.
The mostimportant tieamongtheNueris thatofagnatickinship-
kinshipby blood throughmales. I have describedhow the larger
districtsareassociatedtogetherbytheideaofthisbondofbrotherhood
and fatherhood. In much smallergroups,the men descended
throughmalesfroma nearbyancestorforma closelyknitcorporate
unit. They own and herdtheircattletogether. They inheritfrom
one another. And,above all, if one of theirmembersis killedthey
mustexactvengeanceforhimagainstthekilleror one of thekiller's
vengeancegroup,or theymustobtainblood-cattlein compensation
forthe deathfromthisvengeancegroup. This is the theory. But
in practice,it seems that among the Nuer this group of agnatic
avengersdoesnotalwaysresidetogether - itis nota localcommunity.
In fact,the vengeancegroupmay well be widelyscattered. Nuer
move about frequently formanyreasons. They may quarrelwith
theirfellowsat home,and so go elsewhere,perhapsto a maternal
uncle. Or they may just go to rich maternaluncles. A man's
mothermaygo in widowhoodto be a concubineto some man in a
distantvillage,and thereher sons grow up, thoughall of them
belongto the dead husband,even if he did not begetthem. This
scatteringof some vengeancegroupsmeans that a conflictarises
betweentheloyaltyof closeagnates,thetie whichabove all demands
solidarity,and the ties whichlinka man withhis local community,
whom he must also supportby customas well as frominterest.
For thoughvengeanceshould be takenby the agnaticgroup,the
local community of thisgroupmobilizesin a battlebehindit. Now
if the vengeancegroupis scatteredit may mean,especiallyin the
thatthe demandforcommunity
smallerdistricts, requires
solidarity
thata man mobilizeswiththe enemiesof his agnates. And in the
oppositesituationsuch an emigrantmemberof the group which
has killedmay be livingamongthe avengers,and be able to have
vengeanceexecutedupon him. I suggest(because Evans-Pritchard
does notmentionthispoint)thathis exposureto killingexertssome
pressureon his kin to tryto compromisethe affair. In addition,
whetherhe remainswherehe is or escapeshome,he is likelyto urge
his kin to offercompensation, since he has manyinterestsin the
placewherehe resides. Conversely, ifa manofthegroupdemanding
vengeance residesamong the killers,he has an interestin securing
 THE PEACE IN THE FEUD 7
thathis kin accept compensation insteadof insistingon blood for
blood. Dispersal of the vengeancegroup may lead to a conflict
betweenlocal and agnaticloyalties,and divide each group against
itself.
But divisionsofpurposein thevengeancegroupare createdabove
all by marriagerules. Practicallyeverysocietyin the worldinsists
thatthereis no matingwithinthe familyof parentsand children.
I thinktheonlyexceptionsarecertainroyalfamilies. Manysocieties
extendthebanson marriageoutsidethefamilyitself,to moredistant
kin. This is theruleanthropologists call' exogamy' - marriage-out.
AmongtheNuer,therulesforbid,underpenaltyof disease,accident
and death,a man to marryany womanof his clan, or any woman
to whomrelationship can be tracedin anylineup to six generations.
The firstrule, banningmarriagein the clan, compelsthe men of
each agnaticvengeancegroup to seek in otheragnaticgroupsfor
their own wives, and for husbands for their sisters. The rules
banningmarriageto othersortsof kin compelthe membersof each
group to spread their marriageswidely through,one assumes,
practically everyagnaticgroupin the local community.To marry
thus,requiresfirstof all some kind of friendship withthoseother
groups. Some Africanpeoplessay of groupsotherthanthe one to
whichtheybelong," They are our enemies;we marrythem"; but
aftermarriagethereis a sortof friendship, thoughit differs
fromthe
main blood-tie. More thanthis,whena man has got a wifefrom
anothergroup,he has an interestin beingfriendswiththatgroup
whichhis fellow-agnates do nothave,thoughtheyregardthemselves
as related. Their wives make them friendlywith other groups.
It is not just sentiment. A womanremainsattachedto her own
kin,and if herhusbandquarrelswiththemshe can makelifepretty
unpleasantforhim. But her ancestorsare also able to affecther
and her children,and hence her husband's well-being. A man's
brother-in-law is maternaluncle to his children,and by customis
required to assist themin manycriticalsituations. He can bless
his nephew,and his curse "is believedto be amongthe worst,if
not the worst,a Nuer can receive,for,unlikethe father,a maternal
unclemaycursea youth'scattle,as wellas his cropsand fishingand
hunting,if he is disobedientor refusesa requestor in some other
way offendshim. The curse may also preventthe nephewfrom
begettingmale children." So forthe welfareof his family,and
the prosperity of his children,each man is led by his interests,
and
compelledbycustom,to seekto be on goodtermswithhiswife'skin.
And he has, as the child of a womanfromyet anothergroup,an
8 PAST AND PRESENT

interestin beingon good termswithhis own mother'skin. Again,

this interestis supportedby customaryrightsto get help, and by
the dangerof suffering mysticalretribution if he does not conform
withthesecustoms. The factthatmenof a singlegroupof agnates
have mothersfromdifferent groups,and marrywives fromstill
othergroups,strikesintothe unityof each vengeance-group.The
loyaltyof agnatesto one another,so strongly enforcedby custom,
conflictswithothercustomary allegiancesto othergroupsandpersons.
Some membersof each warringgrouphave an interestin bringing
about a settlement of quarrels. And these differences of loyalty,
leadingto divisionsin one set of relationships, are institutionalized
in customary modesofbehaviour, and areoftenvalidatedbymystical
beliefs. Thus where customdivides in one set of relationships,
it producescohesion,throughsettlementof quarrels,in a wider
rangeof social life.
Underlying thesecustomary divisions,whichput pressureon the
parties to settle a dispute, the constantpressureof common
is
residence. For commonresidenceimpliesa necessityto co-operate
in maintaining peace, and thatpeace involvessome recognition of
thedemandsoflaw and morality. It also involvesmutualtolerance.
These demandsare backed by the constantintermarriages which
go on in a limitedarea, since men do not commonlymarryat a
distance. Hence the Nuer as individualsare linkedin a wide-flung
web of kinshipties whichspreadsacrossthe land; and new meshes
in thisweb are constantly beingwovenwitheach fruitful marriage.
These webs of ties, centringon individuals,unite membersof
differentagnaticgroups. And alwayslocal groupshave common
local interests.
These commonand localinterests are represented bya categoryof
arbitrators,who may be called on to help settledisputes. The
arbitratorsare ritualexpertswho are called " men of the earth."
They have no forceful powersof coercion. They cannotcommand
mento do anything and expectthemto obey; but theyare political
as well as ritualfunctionaries.If a fightbreaksout, the " man of
the earth" can restorepeace by runningbetweenthe combatants
and hoeingup theearth. The slayerof a manis defiledwithblood,
and can neithereat nor drinkuntilthe " man of the earth" has let
the blood of the dead man out of his body. If' the slayerresides
nearthehomeofthemanhe has killed,he willlivein sanctuary with
the " man of the earth" to avoid deathat the handsof his victim's
kin. The " man of the earth" willthennegotiatebetweenthetwo
groups,and tryto inducethedeceased'skinto acceptcompensation.
 THE PEACE IN THE FEUD 9

This theyare bound in honourto refuse;but eventuallytheywill

yieldwhenthe" manoftheearth" threatens to cursethem. Evans-
Pritchardhimselfneverobservedthisprocess;but he collectedtales
ofthe direeffectsof such a curse.
He foundthat" withina villagedifferences betweenpersonsare
discussedby the elders of the village and agreementis generally
and easily reached and compensationpaid, or promised,for all
are relatedby kinshipand commoninterests. Disputes between
membersof nearbyvillages,betweenwhichthereare manysocial
contactsand ties can also be settledby agreement,but less easily
and with more likelihoodof resortto force." Betweensections
on oppositesides of a tribe,chancesof settlement are less. Hence,
Evans-Pritchard says, " law operatesvery weaklyoutside a very
limitedradius and nowhereveryeffectively."But he shows that
thereis a law, and as we see it is represented in the personof the
" man of the earth." This functionary also representsthe need
forcommunalpeace overa certainarea. Customarypracticeshere
againdividemen,by emphasizing the disturbance aftera homicide:
untilthisis settled,thepartiescannoteat or drinktogether, and they
maynot bothuse the dishesof thirdparties. It soundsas if some
husbandsand wivesmightnot be able to eat together. In fact,to
concealthatone has killeda man is a dreadfuloffencebecauseit is
believedto put the wholedistrictunderriskof a mysticaldisaster.
Clearlytheycannotgo to theirgardensor pasturesin any security.
Some adjustmentmustbe made. it is here thatthe " man of the
earth" acts,throughhis connectionwiththe earth. it seems that
forthe Nuer,as formanyAfricansocieties,the earthhas a mystical
as well as a secularvalue. The secularvalue of the earthlies in
thewayit providesfortheprivateinterests ofindividualsand groups
withinthe largersociety. They make theirliving offparticular
gardens,pasturesand fishing-pools; theybuild theirhomes,make
theirfires,and eat theirmeals on theirown plots of ground;they
beget and rear theirchildrenon the earth. Their ancestorsare
buriedin theearth. Men and groupsdisputeoverparticular pieces
of earthto serve these varied ends. But men live, work,dance,
breed,die, on theearthin thecompanyof othermen. They obtain
theirrightsto earthbyvirtueofmembership ofgroups,and theycan
only maintainthemselvesby virtueof this membership.To live
on the earththeyrequirefriendship withothermen over a certain
area. The earth,undivided,as the basis of society,thus comesto
symbolizenot individualprosperity, and good fortune,
fertility, but
thegeneralprosperity, and good fortune
fertility on whichindividual
10 PAST AND PRESENT

lifedepends. Raindoesnotfallon oneplot,buton an area;locust

swarmsand blightsand famineand epidemicsbringcommunal
disaster,and not individualdisasteralone. With this general
prosperityareassociated peaceandtherecognition ofa moralorder
overa rangeofland. In WestAfrica menworship theEarth,and
inthisworship groups whoareotherwise inhostilerelationsannually
unitein celebration.In Centraland SouthAfricakings,who
symbolize thepoliticalunityoftribes, areidentified withtheearth:
the Barotsewordforkingmeans,'earth.' Andin someAfrican
tribesthereis a dogmathatthekingmustbe killedwhenhisphysical
powersdecline, lestthepowersoftheearthdeclinesimultaneously.
Among theNuer,theritual expertwhois connected withtheearth, in
itsgeneral andwhotherefore
fertility, symbolizesthecommunal need
forpeaceand therecognition ofmoralrights in thecommunity of
men,actsas mediator between warring sections.
Whatemerges,I think,is thatif thereare sufficient conflicts
ofloyaltiesat work,settlement willbe achieved, andlawandsocial
ordermaintained.It is customwhichestablishes thisconflict in
loyalties.Menaretightly boundbycustom, backedbyritualideas,
to theiragnatickin. Ritualideas sanctionthe customary tiesto
maternal kin. As we followEvans-Pritchard's analysis,working
outwards fromtheindividual NuerintothelargerNuersociety, we
seethatatevery pointeachmanis pulledintorelations withdifferent
menas alliesorenemies accordingtothecontext ofthesituation.A
manneedshelpin herding hiscattle:thereforehe mustbe friends
withneighbours withwhomhemaywellquarrel overother matters -
orindeedovertheherding ofcattle. The herding ofcattledemands
thatcertainseparated groupsatsomeseasonsbeinamicable relations.
A mancannot, understringenttaboos,marry hisclosefemale relatives:
thismeansthathe mustbe friendly enoughwithotherpeoplefor
themto givehima wife. He marries herin elaborate ceremonies
andtransfers cattlewhichhe collectsfrom allhiskinandgivesto all
herkin. Theseelaborate ceremoniesandpayments ofcattleestablish
friendshipsforhim. Andthrough his wifehe strikes up alliances
withrelatives-in-lawwhichareinimical toa whole-hearted one-sided
attachment to his own brothers and fellow-members of his clan.
His childrenhaveclosetiesofsentiment withthekinoftheirmother.
Customsupports thesetieswithobligations and mystical threats.
A man'sblood-kin arenotalwayshisneighbours: thetiesofkinship
and localityconflict.Andalltheseties,I repeat, areelaborately set
in customand backedwithritualbeliefs.
Theseallegiances, and a man'sallegiance to his community and
 THE PEACE IN THE FEUD II

its sense of rightdoing, createconflictswhichinhibitthe spreadof

disputeand fighting.There is a conflict betweena man's desireto
serve his own materialends, ruthlessly, and his recognitionof a
code of law and rightdoing underthatcode; and thisconflictappears
in his kinsmen'swillingnessor unwillingness to supporthim in a
quarrel. There is a conflictbetween the assertivenessof each
individualand kin-groupand the interestswhichinduce themto
come to termswiththeirneighbours. This is the conflictwhichis
resolvedthrough theritualcurseofthe" manoftheearth." Custom
lays down the code of law whichestablishes
the natureof rightdoing,
and customordainsthat men shall recogniseties of varyingkinds
of kinship,or of locality,or of severalother sorts. But custom
is effectivein bindingthe Nuer into a community whichmaintains
some kind of order- what Evans-Pritchardcalls "ordered
anarchy"- becausethe obligationsof customlinkmen in different
kindsof relationships.The conflicts betweentheserelationshipsin
longerperiods of time and over wider of
ranges society become
cohesion.
I do notwantto givetheimpression thatvengeanceis nevertaken
and the feudneverwaged. Feud is wagedand vengeance taken
whentheparties livesufficiently
farapart,or aretooweakly related
byseveralties. Evenwhentheyareclosetogether, hot-headedness
anddesiresforprestige mayleadtovengeance andconstant fighting.
Butwheretheyareclosetogether, manyinstitutions andtiesoperate
to exertpressure on thequarrellers to reacha settlement. Again,
thisis not to say thatsettlement of quarrelsis alwaysachieved.
We mustremember thatquarrelsariseout of theverytieswhich
linkmen--ties withthe wife'skin or one's own kin or one's
neighbours.There is onlypressuretowardsthe establishing of
peacefulrelations --or, rather,the re-establishing of peaceful
relationsaftera breach. This pressureis exertedby common
interest
ina modicum ofpeaceovera certain area,whichis necessary
if menareto livein anykindofsecurity andproducefood,marry
intoone another's deal withone another.The conflicts
families,
between theloyaltiesheldbya manthus,ina widerrangeofrelations,
establish
orderandleadto recognition andacceptance ofobligations
withinlaw. As faras each typeof loyaltyis concerned, other
loyaltieslead to divisionsin the ranksof any groupor set of
relationships. Hence the wholesystemdependsforits cohesion
ontheexistencet ofconflicts
insmaller sub-systems. Eachvengeance
groupof agnatickinsmen is dividedby thedifferent maternal and
conjugaland local attachments of individualmembers.
12 PAST AND PRESENT

Clearlythe primary sourceof divisionin the groupsof kinwhich

are characteristic society,is the rulethatmen mustnot
of primitive
marry their clanswomenand other near relatives. But many
societiesby customprefermarriagewith certainsets of kin, and
therefore these show a differentworkingout of politicalprocess.
In one society,thatoftheBedouinof Cyrenaica,marriageis allowed
withinthe vengeancegroup itselfby Islamic law. The analysis
of the resultingsituation,and its connectionwithhabitat,will be
a good testof the above argument. Dr. EmrysPetersis at present
occupiedwiththisstudy. We knowthatthereare societieswhere
feudsoccurin comparatively smallareas;butnoneofthesehavebeen
subjectedto adequateanthropological analysisin termsof the many
ties establishedby custom.
Later studieshave supportedthe main pointsmade by Evans-
Pritchardabout Nuer society. I makebriefreference onlyto one
study. Evans-Pritchard himselfemphasizedthe positiveaspects
of ties linkingmembersof agnaticvengeancegroupsto others:I
have myselfarguedthattheyhavea divisiveeffect withinthegroup,
and thisis wherethe emphasiswas placed by Dr. ElizabethColson
in herstudyof the Tonga of NorthernRhodesia. I cannotpresent
the beautyof her study,but I give a summarystatement of a case
sherecorded- thisis theclearestcaseoftheworking ofthevengeance
threatwhichwe havefromAfrica. A manoftheEland clankilleda
man of the Lion clan. The murdererwas arrestedby the British
and sentto jail: butthe Lions brokeoffall relationswiththe Elands
who lived nearby. Eland men in Lion villages,and Lion men in
Eland villages,told Miss Colson thatin the past theywould have
fledhome:as it was,theLions ostracised theirElandfellow-villagers.
Womenmarriedto men of the othergroupcould not cohabitwith
their husbands or cook for them--which upset the husbands.
Eventually, a son ofan Eland womanbya Lion manfellill and died:
the divinersaid thatthe murderedman's spirithad killedthe child
because blood-moneyhad not been paid. The women began to
exercisepressureon male kin to settlethe matter. The Elands
proffered compensation throughjointrelatives-in-lawof themselves
and the Lions; peace was mpde,and blood-cattlewerepromisedto
compensatefor the homicide. Here again the dispersalof the
vengeancegroup,and themarriages ofits womenwithmenof other
vengeancegroups,produceddivisionsin the ranksof each group,
and exertedpressureforsettlement.The death of a child,which
customblamedon thevengeful spirit,createdthesituationcompelling
a meeting,at which other relativesof the two partiesacted as
intermediaries.
 THE PEACE IN THE FEUD 13

The general I havebeenstating

principle hasbeenlongrecognized
by manyscholars, butothershaveoverlooked its significance. In
theirgreatHistory ofEnglish Law PollockandMaitlandwrotethat
in Anglo-Saxon times" personal injurywasinthefirst placea cause
offeud,or private war,between thekindreds ofthewrongdoer and
ofthepersonwronged."The Shorter Cambridge Mediaeval History
saysthatfeud" produceda stateofincessant privatewarfare in the
community, anddivided thekindreds themselves whentheinjury was
committed byone member againstanother ofthesamegroup." I
doubtthis. The Anglo-Saxon vengeancegroup,called the sib,
whichwas entitledto claimblood-money fora dead man,was
composedof all his kindred, throughmalesand females, up to
sixthcousins. But thegroupwhichresidedand workedtogether
seemsto havebeensomeformofpatriarchal jointfamily; againwe
findthatthevengeance groupdidnotcoincide withthelocalgroup.
Andifyoutraceeachman'skinup to hissixthcousins, theyform a
widelyscattered grouping whichcouldnot mobilize.Each man,
withonlyhisfull-brothers andfull-sisters, wasthecentre ofhisown
sib; and everyindividual was a member ofthesibsofmanyother
people. Indeed,I venture to suggest thatin a long-settled district,
wheretherehad beenmuchintermarrying, almosteveryone would
havebeena member ofeveryone else'ssib. Hencewherevengeance
hadto be taken,or redress enforced, somepeoplewouldhavebeen
members ofbothplaintiff and defendant sibs. Theywouldsurely
haveexerted pressureforjustsettlement. Thisis theposition among
the Kalingasof thePhillipine Islandswhohavea similarkinship
system.Feudsmayhavebeenprosecuted between sibsin separated
or as battlesbetween
districts, localcommunities mobilized behind
noblefamilies.But we mustnottakesagasand talesof feuding
as evidence,fortheymay,likethetalesoftheNuer" manofthe
earth's" curse,standas warnings.Or evenas historical records
theymayhavebeenbetterwarnings.Therewas onlyone lot of
HatfieldsandMcCoysintheKentucky andVirginia hills. Generally,
overa limited area,thereis peaceas wellas warin thethreat ofthe
feud.
This peace arisesfromtheexistenceofmanykindsofrelationships,
and the values attachedto themall by custom. These ties divide
men at one point; but this divisionin a wider group and over a
longerperiod of time leads to the establishment of social order.
In separateddistrictsmen can quarrel. The smallerthe area in-
volved,the morenumerousthe socialties. But as the area narrows
the occasionswhichbreedquarrelsbetweenmen multiply;and here
14 PAST AND PRESENT

itis thattheirconflicting
tiesbothdrawthemapart,andbringthem
into relationshipwithotherpeople who see thatsettlement is
achieved.In thiswaycustomuniteswhereit divides, co-operation
and conflictbalancingeachother. At thewidestrange,cohesion
is stated
inritualterms- supported - where
retribution
bymystical
valuesareunquestioned andaxiomatic.Henceritualreconciliation
and sacrifice of a quarrel,and ritual
oftenfollowthe settlement
methods areusedtoreachadjustment.

Dept.ofSocialAnthropology, Max Gluckman.

ofManchester.
University