Professional Documents
Culture Documents
XGOVERN-mid 2
XGOVERN-mid 2
2. JAPANESE MODEL
- Two dominant legal relationships bet.
Shareholders, customers,
suppliers, creditors, and
employe union.
Administrators, managers,
and shareholders.
- Joint responsibility and balance
3. GERMAN MODEL
- Continental model or European
Model
- Carried out by two groups:
MODELS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Constituent Elements ANGLO-US JAPANESE GERMAN
KEY PLAYERS Three major players – Four key players Banks & Corporate
managers, directors, and Main bank Shareholders (to a lesser
shareholders and called Affiliated company extent)
as the CORPORATE (keiretsu) AG -German Public
GOVERNANCE TRIANGLE. Management Limited Company;
Government Neither Banks nor
Corporations are key
institutional investors.
-increase in ownership
by institutions has
resulted in their
increasing influence.
COMPOSITION OF -includes both INSIDERS -composed almost the -Composition of the
BOD (employed in the insiders Management Board
corporation) and (VORSTAND) and
OUTSIDERS (has no Supervisory board
direct relationship with (AUFSICHTSRAT)
the corporation and its
management).
UK based on
parliamentary acts and
rules
DISCLOSURE US has the most -are relatively stringent, -corporations are
REQUIREMENTS comprehensive but not as stringent as permitted to a mass
disclosure requirements the US. considerable reserves
of any jurisdiction. which enable German
corporations to
Us corporations are understate their value.
required to disclose a
wide range of
information.
- Control on how the available funds will be - Since the principal is delegating power
used or invested is an example of an and responsibility, cautious principals will
agency problem. carry out some type of monitoring
- Managers prefer to use free cash flows to activities to have reassurance that
be invested in additional product decisions are most favorable from the point
diversification while shareholders prefer of view of the principal.
the funds to be declared as dividends, if it ● Conflict of Interest
is backed by income.
- A corporation’s managers can or
Managerial Opportunism
may have personal objectives that
- There are instances wherein compete with the owners’ objectives of
shareholder returns will not be maximized maximization of shareholder wealth.
to the fullest because of unrelated
diversification and growth which leads to -Almost certainly considerable in majority
increased compensation for managers. of large publicly traded corporations
This also reduces the employment risk of because the firm’s managers generally
top managers. own only a small percentage of the
common shares.
Power Supremacy vs. Technical Expertise
- Some corporate investors are just -Shareholders must incur agency costs to
putting their money with expectation of monitor agent’s activity and reduce the
dividend at a certain time. The nature of moral danger problem.
their intention made them rely on the
● Legal Requirements vs. Opportunistic
expertise of the agent.
Behavior
Trust
- The culture of opportunism presented a
- Shareholders have more trust than very strong reflection of the
doubts to the agents and they entrust ineffectiveness of principal-agent
everything as far as operation including relationships and the massive deficiency
charting of of the current agency
theoretical efforts and practices. ➢ Derivative Suit
-The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 - a lawsuit filed by a shareholder on behalf
was enacted by the US Congress of the corporation against a third party.
which imposed new regulations on
public companies and their auditors. SPECIFIC FEATURE
➢ Financial Press