Ateneo de Manila University

The 1919 and 1935 Rice Crises in the Philippines The Rice Market and Starvation in American
Colonial Times
Author(s): YOSHIHIRO CHIBA
Source: Philippine Studies, Vol. 58, No. 4, Basketball Fandom (december 2010), pp. 523-556
Published by: Ateneo de Manila University
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YOSHIHIRO CHIBA
The 1919 and
1935 Rice Crises
in the
Philippines
The Rice Market
and Starvation
in American
Colonial Times
inthePhilippines
as a partofpoverty
Thisarticleanalyzesstarvation
underAmerican
control,
particularly theperiodofthe1920s to
during
the1930s. It looksintohowthestarvation aboutbythe
was brought
ricecrisesthathappenedin1919 and1935. Ratherthandiscussing
fromstandpoints
poverty distribution
suchas theinequitable oflandand
thisstudyfocusesonthericemarketas a space connecting
unemployment,
phasessuchas trading,
variousdiversified ofproductive
ownership
resources,labor,and policiesas crucialto understanding while
starvation,
emphasizing merchants' It arguesthatthetradingenvironment
activities.
causedthestarvation
oflowerclasses.
KEYWORDS:
RICECRISIS • CHINESE
• TRADING • LANDLORD
MERCHANT • PRICE
POLICY
PHILIPPINE
STUDIES 4 (2010)
58,NO. 523-56 deManila
©Ateneo University

is a studyofstarvation in thePhilippinesunderAmerican
control.Who suffered fromstarvation? Naturallythe poorer
classesdid:sharetenantsand agricultural laborersin ruraldis-
trictsand manualworkers in cities.However,thisarticledoes
This notexaminestarvation itself;ratheritdiscusseshowstarvation
wasbrought aboutbythe"ricecrises"thathappenedin 1919and 1935.The
daily"shortage"of rice in the late 1930swas one of the reasonswhyfood
provisioning could notbe managed.These episodesof crisesled to social
unrest.
Starvation,itmustbe noted,isa partofpoverty. However,unlikefamine,
whichisaccompaniedbya risein mortality, doesnotresultin out-
starvation
right deathsand thus does not easilysurface in Starvation
history. resultsnot
onlyfroman inadequacyoffoodsupply,butalso fromthepeoples inability
to produceor acquirefood.Accordingto AmartyaSen (1981, 1), "starva-
tionstatements areabouttherelationship ofpersonstothecommodity." Sen
emphasizestheimportance ofrecognizing diversified
phasessuchas trading,
of
ownership productive resources, labor, and policiesas crucialto under-
standingwhystarvation happens.This studyfocuseson thericemarketas a
space connecting those differentphaseswhilestressing merchants' activities
thatSen didnotincludein hislistoffactors.
In the late nineteenthcentury, the Philippinesexportedagricultural
productsto Europe and the UnitedStates.Afterthepassageofthe Payne-
AldrichTariff Actof 1909,thePhilippinesreinforced itsfreetraderelations
withtheUnitedStates,exporting an arrayoftropicalstaples,includingsugar,
abaca,cigar, and coconut. The Philippines assumeda subordinate roleinthe
freetradewiththeUnitedStates.ItsverticaltradewiththeUnitedStatesand
Europesimultaneously promotedtradewithotherAsiancountries, and this
occurredsince thelate nineteenth centurybecause theagricultural export
sectorstimulated riceimports (see fig.1). The rice
Philippinesimported par-
ticularlyfrom French Indochina.1 In addition, Americanfreetradecontrib-
utedtothedevelopment ofrice-producing areasinthePhilippines. Frontiers
like Nueva Ecija providedriceto the Bicol regionand theVisayas,which
producedexportcrops,whilealso supplying thericeneedsofManila,which
had becomedependenton thecyclicalexporttrade(Doeppers1984).
Giventhiscontext, a ricecrisiscan be analyzedtheoretically fromtwo
sides. One side is the weakenedabilityof rice consumersto produceor
purchasethecommodity; theotherside concernsriceprices.As thisstudy
524 PHILIPPINE
STUDIES 4 (2010)
58,NO.

1. Rice
Fig. ofthePhilippines,
imports 1910-1938.
Source: ofCustoms
Bureau 1941, 99-100
82-83,
shows,thericecrisiswas promptedbyreducedriceimports because ofthe

activities
political of some landlords who soughthigher rice prices;at the
sametime,therewasalso cropfailure.As regardtheformer, a fewlandlords
increasingly owned a considerablepartofthe landand,eventually, thenum-
berofpoorsharetenantsgrew.However,fromsuchstandpoints as unequal
land distributionand unemployment, scholarshave alreadydiscussedpov-
ertyin thecolonialPhilippines.Thus thisstudyfocuseson themarketand
riceprices.It pointsout thatthetradingenvironment on a basic fooditem
likericecausedthepoverty ofthelowerclasses,mostofwhomlivedpartially
ortotallyin thesubsistencesector(Kerkvliet1993,177-79).To datescholars
havepaid littleattentionto thericemarketand itsrelationto thecrisesthat
occurredin 1919and 1939.Withregardtothe1919ricecrisis,Paul Kratoska
(1990, 115-46) has dealtwithgovernment policiesin theBritishcoloniesof
SoutheastAsia,buthas leftaside the Philippines. Wong(1999, 80-82) has
touchedon the 1919 ricecrisisin hisstudyoftheChineseeconomyin the
Philippines, buthisanalysisis verylimited.
/PHILIPPINE
CHIBA RICE INAMERICAN
CRISES COLONIAL
TIMES 525

In ordertounderstand thericecrisesof1919and of1935,itis important
first
ofall to grasptherelationsofproduction and trading in rice-producing
areas.The provinceofNueva Ecija in theCentralLuzon plainproduceda
largequantity ofriceinthefirst halfofthetwentieth century. Manylandlords
ownedbigproperties on a scaleofmorethan100hectares,calledhaciendas,
wherericeproduction wascarriedoutbypoorsharetenants.The ownersof
thelargericehaciendasin NuevaEcija insisted heavilyon theirowninterests
in marketing palay.They were determined to affectricemarketing and the
ricepricingpolicyofthegovernment. In addition,Chinesemerchants played
a vitalrolein ricetrading. Hence,apart from theduration of a ricecrisis,this
articleconsiderstheentwining ofriceproduction and themarketing system
as crucialto an understanding ofstarvation. MarshallS. McLennan (1973)
alreadytreatedriceproductionin thecontextofeconomicdevelopment in
colonialNueva Ecija; foritspartthisstudyanalyzesin detailthericetrading
patterns ofChinesemerchants.
Althoughthereis no literature on the Philippinerice marketin the
interwar period, Norman G. Owen has analyzedBicolanosubsistence dur-
ingthedepression aftertheFirstWorldWarin relationto riceconsumption
patterns. In the 1920s,Bicolano agricultural activitiesshiftedfromabaca
(Manila hemp) to rice,maize, and camote. In the nextdecade second-
arystapleslike the lattertwocropswereconsumedinsteadof rice,which
reflected poverty. The smallholders in particular suffered fromthisdepres-
sion (Owen 1989,95-114). In Mindanaoand Cebu, dailymealstendedto
shiftfromriceto maize in the 1930s.
The socioeconomicpoliciesof the colonialgovernment also affected
thericemarket.Rice pricepolicies,therefore, mustbe analyzedin termsof
theoverallricemarket, together with the politicaland economicactivities of
bothlandlordsand Chinese merchants. Those policieswerecrucialduring
thericecrisesthattookplace in 1919and 1935.Landlordsinsistedon high
riceprices,whichinfluencedtheeconomicpoliciesofthecentralgovern-
ment.This is notsurprising becauseofthePhilippines^weakstatebutpow-
erfulpoliticaloligarchs(Anderson1988, 10-13; Hutchcroft 1991,420-24;
McCoy 1994,7-19). Nonetheless, with the establishment of theCommon-
wealthofthePhilippinesin themid-1930s, itadoptedsocialpoliciestoassist
agricultural production and ease thestarvation ofthepoorerclassesthrough
thesale ofreliefrice2and theestablishment oftheNationalRice and Corn
Corporation (NARIC). Leon A. Mears and colleagues(1974, 5-12) pointed
526 PHILIPPINE
STUDIES
58,NO.
4 (2010)

out that,priorto the Japaneseinvasion,the NARIC did contribute to the
stabilization
ofriceprices,particularly
through thereductionofseasonaldif-
in Manilas retailriceprices.But,as thisarticleshows,theNARIC
ferentials
did notadequatelyrelievethepoorclassesofdailystarvation, especiallyin
Cebu and Mindanao.
Rice Trading: Evidence from Nueva Ecija Province

Nueva Ecija was the provincethatbecame the mostprominent rice pro-
ducerin thefirst halfofthetwentieth century. Bytheend ofthenineteenth
century, the Nueva of
Ecija municipalities San Isidro,Gapan,and Cabanat-
uan werealreadyconductingtradewithManila.These townsweresituated
alongthePampangaRiver,one ofthechiefrivers intheCentralLuzon plain
(Rajal y Larre1889,292-311). In the late nineteenth century,regulations
on boththe residenceand economicactivities of ethnicChinese werere-
laxed.The Chineseformed thebiggestethnicgroupamongall merchants in
Nueva Ecija and in otherprovinces(Cavada yMéndez de Vigo 1876,1:71).
Theyworkedin thewholesaletradeofimportedgoods(e.g.,cottontextile)
thatwerebroughtfromManila to theprovinces, and theyalso managedre-
tailshops(RajalyLarre1889,292-311).Theirricemillswerecargo-booking
pointsin ricetrading (Wickberg1965,103).
According to the HistoricalData Papers,whichprovideinformation on
ricetrading up to the 1900sin Cabanatuan,one villagecalledTalipapaflour-
ishedwithcommercial activities
toward theend oftheSpanishperiod(Histori-
cal Data Papers, Cabanatuan,1952-1953).Ithadmorethantwelve warehouses,
whichdrewmanyfarmers fromneighboring Aliagaand Talavera municipalities
to sell theirpalay(unhuskedrice)to themerchants and warehouseowners.
Some nativemerchants fromBulacan and Manila also wentto Talipapaby
boat(casco) through thePampangaRiver.Theycarriedvariousgoods,such
as driedfish(tuyo ), smoked fish(tinapá),and vinegar, and exchangedthese
forpalay.These economicactivities wereinterrupted duringthePhilippine
Revolutionand the Philippine-American War. Althoughthoseexchanges
wereresumed afterward, therailroad
linethatconnectedManilatoCabanatuan,
whichbecamethecenter ofNuevaEcija,causedthetrading inTalipapa
activities
to disappearin 1905. 3
In theearly1900sChinesemerchants had notyetestablished theirrice
millsin the middlepartof Nueva Ecija. Rice millsor ricetradingcenters
werescattered throughout theCentralLuzon plain,althoughMalabonwas
CHIBA
/PHILIPPINE
RICE INAMERICAN
CRISES COLONIAL
TIMES 527

the mostimportant municipality forcollectingrice throughout the nine-
teenthcentury(Aragon1820,No.l, 4-6; Doeppers1972,789; Martinezde
Zuñiga 1973,233-34; De los Reyes1994,509-33). Rice production, how-
ever, seemed to haveexpandedgradually in the latenineteenth century(table
1). DuringtheAmericancolonialperiod,thetransport ofricecargoon ships
wasreplacedbyrailroadfreight, whichfurther acceleratedriceproduction.
The railroadline to Cabanatuanaffected thescale and locationofrice
millsas wellas theethnicities ofricemillers.Table 2 showsthenumberof
ricemillsin Cabanatuanand Gapan and fortheentireprovincesofNueva
Ecija and Bulacan in the 1920sand 1930s.I have countedthenumberof
Chinese-managed millsbasedon thename ofowners.As seen in thetable,
ricemillsin NuevaEcija increasedfromtwenty-seven in 1922tothirty-eight
in 1936.Althoughin theminority, Chinese-owned millsalso increasedfrom
sevento twelveduringthisperiod,especiallyin Gapan. The same num-
ber (four)of Chinese-ownedmillswas foundin Cabanatuanin 1922 and
1936.ComparedwithBulacan,Nueva Ecija had fewermillsoverallbuthad
a comparatively higherratioof Chinese-operated millsand highermilling
capacity(Rice Commission1936,44-45).4Because thecommercialactivi-
tiesofnativeresidents wererarein Nueva Ecija up to thebeginningofthe
twentieth century, Chinese merchants foundit relatively easyto establish
ricemillsand buildtrading connectionswithlandlordsand peasants.
Whatkindofmerchants weretheChinesewhocontrolled ricemillsin
Cabanatuanand Gapan?The Manila RailroadCompany,whichplayedthe
roleoftransporting huskedrice(bigas) toManilauntilthe1920s,conducted
an investigationin 1919and founda totalofnineteenChinese-owned mills
intheCentralLuzon plain(sevenin NuevaEcija). The signatures ata meet-
ing of ricewholesalers held in Manila in the same year revealedthat these
rice wholesalersmanagedat leastfourteenChinese-ownedmillsin Cen-
tralLuzon, inclusiveofsixin Nueva Ecija (Manuel Quezon Papers1919a,
1919b).5In addition,an investigationofricetradingin Nueva Ecija carried
out in 1929 showedthat,of the eightbig rice millsin Cabanatuan,seven
had Chineseownersand onlyone wasownedbya Filipino.These Chinese
millsbelongedto big ricewholesalers in Manila (Asuncion1932, 177-93).
Anotherresearchconductedin theearly1930sindicatedtherewerefinan-
cial connectionsbetweenrice millersin Nueva Ecija and rice wholesale
dealersin Manila (Velmonte1936, 382-410). ManyChinese-ownedmills
in Nueva Ecija, whichwereconcentrated in Cabanatuan,werecontrolled
byChinesericewholesalers basedin Manila.
528 PHILIPPINE 4 (2010)

58,NO.
STUDIES

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CHIBA
/PHILIPPINE
RICE
CRISES
INAMERICAN
COLONIAL
TIMES 529

Table 2. Distributionof rice mills,by location and ethnicity,1922
and 1936
1922 1936
LOCATION
TOTAL CHINESE' TOTAL CHINESE'
NuevaEcijaProvince 27 7 38 12_
CabanatuanMunicipality 5 4 7 4
GapanMunicipality 4 17 4
BulacanProvince 42 4 49 2
wasdetermined
"Ethnicity onthenames
based ofowners
Sources:
BureauofInsular
Affairs Rice
1922; Commission 40-50
1936,
How did Chinese merchantsbuy palay fromlandlordsand peasants

suchthattheycould controlricetrading? In 1924theprovincial governor of
Nueva Ecija observedricetrading thereand foundthatChinesemerchants
boughtpalayin severalways,accordingto thesocialclassofthepalayseller.
Frompeasantswho lackedmoneyforsubsistence, Chinese merchants pur-
chased palayat a lowerpricethroughmiddlemen.However,theypaid a
higherpriceto landlordswho werein a stronger positionto bargainfora
highersellingprice(Manuel Quezon Papers1924).Astotheeconomicrela-
tionshipbetweenbig ricemerchants or millersand ricelandlords, another
reportin the mid-1950s on the palaytrade in Nueva Ecija pointed that
out
"therecan hardlybe anycompetition amongmillersbecausethelargemills
usually have theirown separateclientele amonggrowers, builtup in the
courseofmanyyearsofbusinessrelation"(Velmonte1936,390). Landlords
who sold largequantitiesof palay,therefore, werethe important clientele
and formedtheprimary transactions.
Chinese rice millersalso boughtpalaythroughtheirwarehouses.On
receiptofthepalaystock,thesellerwasissueda warehousecertificate called
quedan.Depositories could not onlygeta loan byputtingup quedanorthe
a
ricein storageas collateral,buttheyalso did nothaveto paythewarehouse
charges.Iftheysold palayto othermillers,theyhad to payPO.15 percavan
(palay)as warehousecharges(Le Clerk1927,58).
One reportin the 1920s showedthe variouswaysused by millersto
buy palay and the predominanceof Cabanatuan millersin Nueva Ecija
(Asuncion1932, 177-93). Most smallholdersand landlordssold palay to
millersthrougha systemof cash paymentsratherthanadvances.In this
province, a largeamountofpalaysoldthrough sucha system floweddirectly
530 PHILIPPINE
STUDIES 4 (2010)
58,NO.

to Cabanatuanmillers,notthroughmiddlemen.In addition,Cabanatuan
millersabsorbedpalayfroma widearea withintheprovince.Besidesdirect
withlandlords,
transaction Chinesemerchants in Nueva Erija boughtpalay
through variousmethods, suchas indirect
transactionwithpeasantsthrough
middlemenand purchasethroughwarehousing. Centeredin Cabanatuan,
withlandlordswastheprimetrading
directtransaction practicein the 1920s
and early1930s.As a result,amongCentral Luzon provinces,Nueva Ecija
sentthelargestquantity ofcleaned riceto Manila byrailroadin the 1920s
(Bureau of Commerceand Industry1925,99-100; 1930, 173). However,
in the 1930strucksalso playeda keyrolein transportingricecomingfrom
Nueva Ecija (Corpuz 1999,84).
The Rice Market of the Philippines

EdgarWickberg(1965,45-93, 102-8) and NormanG. Owen (1984, 56-70,
121-38, 182-92) reportedthatChinese residentsin the abaca-producing
provinces ofAlbay,Leyte,and Samarbecamecommission agentsofEuropean
andAmericanmerchants inthelatenineteenth century.Eventuallytheabaca
tradebetweentheBicolregionandManiladeveloped, withshipstransporting
abaca to Manilaand returning to Bicol withcargoesofrice,becauseofdaily
shortages ofriceintheBicolregion.ThereChineseretailshopsboughtabaca
and,in exchange,soldriceand processedgoods.
The Spanishcolonialgovernment inthelatenineteenth century execut-
ed some measuresto anticipateordinary riceshortages. In 1855 riceexport
waspermitted as longas local ricepriceswerepeggedbelowtheprescribed
ceiling,as a preventive measureto protectconsumers.In 1857 the import
tariffon ricewasfinally prohibited (Legarda1999,147,157).Asa result,the
Philippines increased itsrice importsup to the 1870s,and Chinese mer-
chantsofthePhilippinesimported ricefromFrenchIndochina.
During the American colonial regime,boththe U.S. and the Philip-
pine government controlledriceimportthroughtariffs, and theyregulated
thesupplyas wellas thelocal priceofriceuntil1935whentheNARIC was
established.In 1909 one tariff law,enactedby the U.S. Congress,raised
the importtariff on rice in the PhilippinesfromP2.00 to P2.40 per 100
kilograms. This lawalso permitted that,in case ofemergency, thegovernor-
general could restore the import tariffon rice to P2.00 per 100 kilosor to
import riceduty-free (PhilippineLegislature 1910,367,397-99).In addition,
theexperienceofriceshortages during early1900sand in 1912 guided
the
CHIBA
/PHILIPPINE
RICE
CRISES
INAMERICAN
COLONIAL
TIMES 531

thepolicybothon riceimports and pricecontrol(Corpuz 1997,286-87).6
However,theJonesActof1916requiredthePhilippinegovernment tolegis-
lawon tradewithcountriesotherthantheUnitedStates,subject
latea tariff
to theconsentoftheU.S. president (UnitedStatesCongress1917,545-56).
In 1935 thepostofgovernor-general was abolishedwiththeestablishment
ofthePhilippineCommonwealth government, whichheldtheauthority to
enacta tarifflawon rice(UnitedStatesCongress1934,456-65).Atthesame
time, under the Commonwealth theNARIC directly in therice
intervened
tradingsystem.
With the regulationof the importtariffon rice, local rice trading
expanded.The rice-trading centerofthePhilippineswastheTutubanRice
in
Exchange Manila, which was establishedin 1922 by the Philippine-
ChineseRiceMerchants The TutubanRiceExchangewascom-
Association.
posedof ricewholesalers and agentsboth in Manila and theprovinces, and
itsassociationconductedtradeand heldmeetings in Tutuban.The Tutuban
exchangewas theplace whereChinese merchants gatheredand collected
usefulinformation on riceprices,and contributed to maintainChinesenet-
worksofricetradinguntilthelate 1930s(BureauofCommerce1938,55).
In 1923theTutubanexchangemadetheprovision thatthe"members ofthe
Association shallnottransact businessin therailroadstationsbutonlyin the
Exchange or in their regularoffices."
Moreover, Chinese characterswere
used in tradingunderthisexchange(Rice Commission1936,28-30). As a
result,Filipinoscould notparticipate in rice tradingtherebecause of the
abovementioned provisionand theethniclanguagebarrier.
Whatwas therice-consuming marketlikein the 1920s?Table 3 shows
thetoptenprovinces accordingtotheannualaverageamountofriceimport-
ed byshipfromManilafrom1922to 1929.The dataindicateseveralpoints.
First,Leyteand Samarwererice-importing areasbecausetheiroutputofrice
waslimitedcomparedwiththeirpopulationsize. Second,severalprovinces
locatedin the Bicol region,whichmade up thecore ofabaca production,
didimportrice.Third,Cebu and Iloilo,whichwerecentersofregionaltrad-
ing,importeda largeamountof rice fromManila. It is likelythatCebu
and Iloilodid notnecessarily consumeall theimported ricebutreexported
partsofit.Those twocentersalso receivedriceshipments fromPanayIsland,
wherecomplicatedtrading channelswereat work.
Inthericetrading channelsofthePhilippines,particularly the1920s,
during
thericeexported fromCentralLuzon and SouthernTagalogwas consumed
532 PHILIPPINE
STUDIES 4 (2010)
58,NO.

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CHIBA
/PHILIPPINE
RICE INAMERICAN
CRISES COLONIAL
TIMES 533

notonlyin Manila,butalso flowedto thesouthernprovinces.Nueva Ecija
became themostprominent producerofrice,cateringto an enlargedcon-
sumingmarket.Because Bicol and the Visayastendedto produceexport
commoditiessuchas sugarand abaca insteadofrice,theexpansionofthose
exportcropspromotedrice importation fromNueva Ecija. Chinese mer-
chantsplayedtheactiveroleofconnectingbothareas.
The 1919 Rice Crisis

After1914,duringtheoutbreak oftheFirstWorldWar,wholesalericeprices
in Manila wentup in nominalvalue as shownin figure2. In thiscontext,
thePhilippineNationalBankprovidedmoreloansto promoteagricultural
Further,
exports. becauseofthedrainon reservedepositsin thebanksNew
Yorkbranch,theamountofmoneyincirculation inthePhilippinesincreased,
causinginflation.7
Foritspart,thePhilippineshad imported a largequantity
ofricefromFrenchIndochinaup tothe1910s.However,thePhilippines de-
creasedriceimportationafterMarch1919due to thepoorharvest in French
Indochina.In July1919,FrenchIndochinaprohibited riceexports and the
Philippinessufferedfroman increasein riceprices(U.S. WarDepartment
1920,201-2). Rice shortagesand jumpsin ricepricesalso occurredin other
SoutheastAsiancountries;Britishcolonies,includingMalayaand Burma,
implemented variouspoliciesto stabilizethesupplyofrice(Kratoska1990,
115-46).
AlthoughManilaposteda growth in employment and a risein thenom-
inal wage ratein 1917-1918,manyinhabitants of Manila suffered higher
livingcostsbecause of soaringriceprices.8 addition,in 1919-1920,the
In
recessionoftheAmericaneconomyreducedthedemandforcommodities
exportedbythe Philippines.In thecase ofabaca, theaverageexportprice
declinedfromP43.52 per picul to P28.03 per picul (1 picul = 63.25 kg)
(Owen 1984,262-63). As a result,inhabitants oftheabaca-producing areas
suffereda drasticreductionin purchasingpowerand could notbuyricelike
before.Forexample,Ciy Cong Biengand Co.9 had problemsin Bicol.This
Chinese companywas one ofthelargestricedealersin thePhilippines;it
wasengagedin ricewholesalingin Manila and ricemillingin Cabanatuaa,
Nueva Ecija, and also conductedabaca dealing.It had branchesin both
Hong Kong and Bicol. Althoughthe Bicol branchpurchasedabaca in
exchangeforrice,thatexchangebecameimpossibledue tothesteepdecline
ofabaca pricesand theshortsupplyofriceduringthe 1919 ricecrisis.The
534 PHILIPPINE
STUDIES
58,NO.
4 (2010)

2.Manila
Fig. wholesale ofcleaned
prices inpesos
rice, 1913-1925
percavan, » 57kg.).
(1cavan
Source:
Rice
Commission72
1936.
pricegap betweenabaca and ricebecametoolarge,leadingto thetermina-

tionofthispractice.Ciy Cong Biengand Co. sold ricedirectly to residents
for
only consumption (Manuel Quezon Papers 1919c). Thus theshortage of
ricesupplyand theAmericaneconomy'srecessioncaused disorderin rice
trading.
The problemregarding rice consumption was severein otherregions
too.In 1919thePhilippineConstabulary wasplacedon alertin someprov-
incesdue tosocialunrestcausedbythedifficulty ofobtainingrice.The con-
stabularylearnedofactsofarsonthattargeted thehousesand warehousesof
Chinesemerchants, inadditiontoepisodesofoutrageagainstthem(Manuel
Quezon Papers1919d).10 Moreoverone newspaperfrequently reported that
actsofsocialunresttookplace in theareasproducing commodi-
agricultural
tiesforexport,and maize wassubstituted forricein dailymealsmoreoften
thanpreviously ( Weekly Times1919a; Manila Times1919i, 1919k,19191,
1919m,1919n,1919o).
How didthecolonialgovernment respondto the 1919 ricecrisis?After
July1919,thegovernment distributedriceat a lowpricein Manila and the
provinces in orderto restrain
the soaringrice pricesand ensurethe sup-
plyof rice forordinary residents. However,episodesof social unrestwere
in
prompted partby the Philippinegovernment. The Philippinelegislature
CHIBA
/PHILIPPINE
RICE INAMERICAN
CRISES COLONIAL
TIMES 535

enactedtwolawson 21 July1919.Act2868 prohibited monopoly, storage,
and speculationon the tradingand sale of palay,cleaned rice,and maize
duringspecialcircumstances suchas riceshortages. Itsoughttoregulaterice
prices, and obligedmerchants to reportto the government the amountof
bothpalayand cleanedricein storage.Act2869 placed an embargoon rice
exports (U.S. WarDepartment1920,202-4; Manila Times1919a).This lat-
teract wastriggered byan incidentin whicha Chinese merchantexported
rice to Hong Kong whererice priceswerehigherthanin the Philippines
(.Manila Times1919b,1919d;Weekly Times1919a,1919b).
Act2868 wasappliedto all stagesofthetrading channelsand all grades
of qualityas well,thuscompromising sales profit(U.S. War Department
1920,202-4; Philippine Bureau of Commerce and Industry 1923,92-93;
Manila Times1919c).Rice ofbetterqualitydisappearedfromthemarket, a
problempromotedbysocialfriction betweenChineseretailers and Filipino
consumers(Manila Times 1919e, 1919f,1919g, 1919h, 1919m; Sunday
Times1919). To ease the tension,Chinese merchantsand the American
colonial government negotiateda regulatedprice. Finallythe regulated
wholesalepriceofcleanedricewastobe peggedat PI 4.25 percavan,which
was to takeeffectfromAugust1919 to May 1920. However,theintentions
ofChinesemerchants werenotadequatelyreflected in government policies,
so it was difficult
forthemto complywiththe regulationprice (Manuel
Quezon Papers1919c).Government policiesdid notcause ricepricesto go
downbecauseChinesemerchants refrained fromsellingenoughrice.
What connectiondid the peasants,landlords,and merchantsin the
CentralLuzon plainhavewiththesoaringriceprices?The ManilaRailroad
Companyinvestigated a case of ricespeculationinvolving Chinese-owned
millsthat,itwassuspected,wereownedbyricewholesalers in Manila.With
sucha marketstructure, thesericemillerscontrollednotonlythepurchase
of local palaybut also the shipmentof palaystocksfromtheirprovincial
warehouses toManila,basedon fluctuations inprices(ibid.).11The president
ofthePhilippineNationalBank,Samuel Ferguson,wroteto thegovernor-
generalconcerning thelevelofricepriceson 2 April1920.He madeitclear
thatricemillerscouldnotbuypalayata reasonablepriceand thatriceprices
rosehigherbythedaybecauseofspeculationin therice-producing areas:
I findthatthereis speculationandthatthemillsare unableto buy

palay at a reasonablecost and of Philippine
the production riceis,
536 PHILIPPINE
STUDIES 4 (2010)
58,NO.

therefore, I findalso thatthepriceofriceinManilatoday
restricted.
is lower,proportionately,
thanthericewhichcan be milledfrompalay
in
beingpurchasedtoday the provinces.Philippine rice yesterday
reachedthesame priceas SaigonNo.2, thatis,6.60 pesos a piculin
Manila.
Anunusualfeatureis thata considerable

partofthericeis beingheld
bythe producers,thatis,thefarmers, who,insteadof sellingtheir
to
palayoutright the have
mills, depositedit,secureda smalladvance,
and are holdingand willcontinueto holdforhigherprices.Thisis
a considerationwhichhas not prevailedheretofore to myknowl-
edgeandindicatesa businessawakening onthepartofthefarmers.
(Ferguson1920)
Fergusonalso consideredthe increasingamountof moneyin circula-

tionas one ofthereasonswhyricepriceshad gone up. However,because
Act2868 didnotapplyto therice-producing areas,itcould notregulatethe
speculationon storedpalaybylandlordsand peasants.
In August1919,the Manila Merchants'Association, whichwas com-
posed mostlyofnon-Chinesemerchants, pointedout thatlandlordsrather
thanChinesemerchants profitedgreatlyfrom thericecrisis(Manila Times
1919j). Speculationenlargedopportunities forlandlordsto gain a hefty
For the
profit. example, PhilippineAgricultural Congress12 playeda rolein
asserting theirinterests.
Until then, landlordswho owned largesugarfarms
intheVisayashad controlled thiscongressand ensuredcheapricetorestrain
therisein wagesofagricultural laborers.In thefifthPhilippineAgricultural
Congressheld in September1920, however,the "ricegrowers" of Luzon
forcedthesugarlandlordstosupporta protective tariff
on riceand theimmi-
grationof Chinese coolies (U.S. War Department1921a, 16). The sixth
PhilippineAgricultural Congressapprovedthe proposalto the Philippine
legislaturethattheimport tariff
on ricebe raisedfromP2.40toP5.00per100
kilos.It also decidedto requestthe governor-general to restorethe former
importtariff ofP2.40,fromtheearlierP2.00,as a temporary measure.13The
contextofthisresolution reflectedtheinterestsofricelandlords,particularly
in Nueva Ecija, as thatassociationhad adoptedCabanatuanas a modelto
calculatethelevelofimporttariff. That is,thericelandlords, through their
CHIBA
/PHILIPPINE
RICE INAMERICAN
CRISES COLONIAL
TIMES 537

tradeassociation,
appealedto thegovernmentto takemeasuresto raisethe
importtariff
on rice(Manuel Quezon Papers1920),whichwouldbe totheir
advantage.
Rice priceshad been keptat a highlevel untilthe latterhalfof 1920
(Bureau of Commerce and Industry1923, 92-93). Rice importssoon
regainedtheir1918 level,and Manila wholesalerice pricesstartedto go
down.Atthebeginning of 1921,local riceproduction a goodhar-
registered
vestand Manila wholesalericepricesfellrapidlyfromP14.00 percavanin
1920to P7.56 percavanin 1921.However,whenthericepricesreturned to
thelevelpriortothatofthe1919crisis,in thePhilippinelegislature thissitu-
ationwas singledout as a problemofprotection forproducers.In February
1921, the legislaturepassed a law to give the authority
governor-general to
prohibit riceimportation fora specificterm.In thatsameyear,riceimporta-
tionwasactuallyprohibited twice(U.S. WarDepartment1921b,248).
In regardto the importtariff on rice,the Philippinegovernment pro-
posed in 1920 to raisethetariff fromP2.40 to P4.00 per 100 kilosin order
to increaserevenue(U.S. WarDepartment1921a,9; FinanceCommission
1920). Althoughthisproposalwas once rejectedin the Philippinelegisla-
ture,theimporttariff on ricewas finallyrevaluedto be P3.00 per 100 kilos
in 1922,fromthestandpoints ofbothgovernment revenueand protection
forproducers(PhilippineLegislature1922,240-41).
As soon as inflation ended in 1920,the raisingof importtariff on rice
was enforced.Such measurewas intendedto benefitproducersratherthan
consumers. Actually,ricepricesin Manila roserelatively higherthanother
goodsthroughout the 1920s (Doeppers 1984,40). However,because itwas
notnecessary to importa remarkably largeamountofrice,due to thedevel-
opment of Nueva Ecija as a rice producer,the effectofthe risein import
tariffwasnotso severein thelocal market.
In summary, one reasonwhythe 1919 rice crisistookplace was the
decline in the purchasingpowerof rice consumersin the areas produc-
ingexportcropsfortheU.S. market, because oftheU.S. busi-
particularly
nessrecession.Moreover,on thesupplyside,thequantity ofimportedrice
decreaseddrastically at thattime.Ethnicfriction furthercomplicatedthe
foodproblem.Chinese merchants became the focusof social criticism as
ringleaders ofthis crisis. in a
Furthermore, negotiation with the Philippine
government on the regulationof rice prices,theirrequeststendedto be
ignored.In the 1919 rice crisis,Chinese merchants wereprecludedfrom
538 PHILIPPINE
STUDIES 4 (2010)
58,NO.

theprocessofgovernment policymaking;in contrast,
Filipinoricelandlords
usedthecrisisas a leverageto strengthen
theirinfluenceoverricepolicy.
The 1935 Rice Crisis

Philippinerice outputexpandedin the 1920sbecause of the extensionof
cultivated land on thefrontier.As a result,theembargoon riceexportwas
14
liftedin 1927. In addition,sincetheGreatDepressionbrokeout in 1929,
theimporttariff on ricewasraisedfromP3.00 to P5.00 per 100 kilosbythe
Philippinelegislature in 1931 in orderto protectlocal producerswho suf-
feredfroma fallin riceprices(UnitedStatesWar Department1928,208;
PhilippineLegislature1932,417; Tribune1931).
In theearly1930s,unemployment expandedin Manila,and thenum-
berofsharetenantsand agricultural laborersincreasedin ruralareas.That
is, starvationbecame a morecommonstatethanbefore,withthe peasant
movementsurgingparticularly in the two regionsof CentralLuzon and
SouthernTagalog.In thiscontext,anotherrice crisistookplace in 1935.
These eventsgave the Philippinegovernment a chance to establishthe
NARIC and enforcenewpolicieson ricetrading.
Duringthe 1935 ricecrisis,Manilas nominalricepricessoaredin the
latterhalfofthatyear,peakingat P7.61 percavanin November1935 (Rice
Commission1936,71-72). Comparedwiththe 1919 ricecrisis,therisein
Manilas nominalricepricesin 1935wassmall.The impactofthe 1935rice
crisisuponthepeople,however, shouldbe considered, giventhefallinprice
levelsofothergoodsand a shiftin thesocialstructure. Forexample,in the
and
Visayas Bicol, the riseofriceprices wasa serioussocialproblem,in addi-
tionto thecontinuedeconomicdepressionand unemployment. Some peo-
the
ple urged municipalgovernments give to out provisionsfreely(Tribune
1935g).15 In the Central Luzon plain, too,the people marched to demand
reasonablericepricesand a stopto thesocialunrestthatwasbroughtabout
especiallyby incidentsof robbery(Tribune1935c, 1935d, 1935e, 1935g,
1935h,19351,1935o).
In responsethegovernment deliveredthesupplyofreliefriceto Nueva
Ecija and other in
provinces Central Luzon (Tribune1935h,19351,1935m).
Butsomesharetenantscould notevenafford thereliefrice.Insteadofrice,
guava and thelikeweretaken as food in manymunicipalitiesofNuevaEcija
(Tribune19351,1935o).Accordingly one characteristic
ofthe 1935 ricecri-
siswas thatsocialunrestspreadacrosstheCentralLuzon plain in a setting
CHIBA
/PHILIPPINE
RICE INAMERICAN
CRISES COLONIAL
TIMES 539

whereresidents boughtgreater amountsofricethanbefore, whileproducing
itthemselves. The increasein thenumberofsharetenantsand agricultural
laborersalso continuedthroughout the 1930s. In addition,landlordsfre-
quentlyrejectedrequests to advance foodand cash to sharetenantsat that
time,16leadingto thelossofone sourceofsocialsecurity.
Followingthe 1935 rice crisis,the Philippinegovernment established
the Rice Commissionto studythe fluctuation in ricepricesand suggesta
policyplan. The commission the
reported availability of48 millioncavans
ofpalay,whichconsistedof45 millioncavansproducedin 1935and 3 mil-
lion cavanscarriedoverfromthepreviousyear,whichalmostequaled the
estimated amountrequiredtomeetconsumption in 1935.The riceshortage
occurredbecause of theimbalance in rice Speculativericetrad-
distribution.
ingand a decreasein thericeharvest causedbyflooding at theend of 1935
madethesituation worse.17
The Rice Commission, however, did not mentionanything aboutrice
importation as one ofthecausesofsoaringriceprices.Table 1 showsthatrice
output in theentirePhilippines and in NuevaEcija province expandedin the
1920s,withtheprovincial outputaccounting for16to 19percent ofthenational
totalannually.The ratioofdomestic riceoutputtothequantity importedbythe
Philippinesalsoincreased during the1920s.However untilthe1930stheexpan-
sionofbothricelandandriceoutputstagnated. Asseenintable4, theincrease
inriceconsumption intheentirePhilippines wasnotunforeseen due totherise
in population up to the 1930s.Ifthe rice outputhad not increased to meetits
demand,riceconsumption musthavebeenmetthrough increasing imports.
Table 4. Selected data on population and rice consumption,

1918, 1925, 1929, 1938 (1 cavan of cleaned rice = 57 kg.)
PER
CONSUMPTIONSUPPLY
(%) PER
RATE
YEAR POPULATION GROWTH CAPITA CAPITA'
(CAVAN) (CAVAN)
1918 10,314,310 L94 378
1925 11,868,300 2.0 L92 400
1929 12,859,300 2.0 L93 402
1938 16,000,303 2.4 L41 Z60
comprises
"Supply bothdomestic andimported
production rice
Miller
Sources: Rice
1932,565; Commission
1936,60,64; andSpencer
Wernstedt 1967,
631-32
540 PHILIPPINE
STUDIES 4 (2010)
58,NO.

In EastAsiain the 1930stherewasan oversupply ofrice.Itwasparticu-
larlystrikingin FrenchIndochinawhencethePhilippineschieflyimported
rice.Actuallytheexportpricesofricein FrenchIndochinain 1934dropped
to lessthanhalfthepricein 1930,due also to theGreatDepression(Wick-
izerand Bennett1941,92-97, 322-23, 330-31). AlthoughthePhilippiness
annual averageimportof rice was recordedat 1,168,182cavansin 1925-
1929,in 1930-1934itamountedto 222, 200 cavansonly;itsimportfinally
decreasedto 127,544cavansin 1935.In theearly1930s,theloweredimpor-
tationofricewascoupledwithimportprices(inclusiveoftariffs) becoming
higher than Manila wholesale in
prices, spite ofthe fall in exportpricesin
FrenchIndochina(see table 5). Therewereseveralreasonsforthisunusual
development. First,theimporttariffrateon ricewasraisedbythePhilippine
legislaturein 1931.Second,in 1934thePhilippinecurrency linkedtotheU.S.
dollardropped40 percentinvalueagainstgold,thatis,theFrenchIndochina
currency ofgoldstandard(Nagano2003,98-101). These factors prompted a
decreaseof riceimports fromFrenchIndochina.However,thequantitative
expansionofriceimportwasnecessary in the 1930sprecisely becauseithad
become difficult to increaselocal riceproduction. The effectof increased
importrice prices,due to a new tariff rateand a changein the exchange
rate, wasto reduce the ricesupply in the domesticmarket. Actuallyboththe
and
consumption supply of ricehad not increased up to the mid-1930s, and
thedomesticstockofricerecordeda reducedquantity onlyin 1936.
Withregardto thisricecrisis,thePhilippinegovernment called a con-
ferenceof"producers" and Chinesemerchants inAugust1935.The produc-
ersweredefinitely opposed to the plan that rice be importedfromFrench
Indochinawithitstariff cutdown.Chinesemerchants, however, madetheir
attitudes obscure.As to the retailprices,boththe producersand Chinese
merchants werenotagainsta level of P 5.00 per cavan,and so thegovern-
mentjudgedthatbothpartiescould takea profit at thisretailprice.Butthe
government didnottakeup theissueofprotecting producersforthereason
thatboththeproducers and Chinesemerchants helda largeamountofrice
stock(Tribune1935b).In addition, theDepartment ofAgriculture and Com-
mercepursueda temporary reductionin importtariff on ricefromP 5.00 to
P3.00 per 100 kilos,to whichthegovernor-general also agreed.But in the
endthisplanwasnotputintooperation, becauseitwasrecognizedthatthese
measureswouldputtheproducers at a disadvantage in thelocal ricemarket
Tribune
(' 1935d).
CHIBA
/PHILIPPINE
RICE INAMERICAN
CRISES COLONIAL
TIMES 541

Table 5 Importprices, wholesale prices of rice (Manila) and
purchase prices (Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija), 1926-1940
(Pesos per Cavan: Cleaned Rice)
IMPORT
PRICES manuA
WHOLESALE(3)~ (2) PURCHASE (3)- (5)
-ar C-'-F. ,wclu°™"SBS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1926 7.34 9.05 9.32 0. 27 8.6 0.7
1927 10.07 11,78 7.56 -4. 22 ^7 09^
1928 6.36 8.07 7.86 -0. 21 6.9 1.0
1929 6.29 8.00 8.90 0.90 7.8 1.1
193 0 7.84 9.55 6.49 -3. 06 5^5 L0^
1931 5.46 7.17 4.81 -2. 36 3.9 0.9
1932 4. 31 7.16 4.19 -2.97 3.7 0.5
1933 3.32 6.17 4.80 -1. 37 4.3 0.5
1934 4.38 7.23 4.29 -2.94 3.,5 0.8
1935 4. 36 7.21 5.59 -1. 62 4.7 0.9
1936 3.65 6.50 6.46 -0. 04 &1 04^
1937 3.74 6.59 5.48 -1. 11 5.1 0.4
1938 6.07 9.92 6.52 -3. 40 6.1 0.4
1939 4. 58 7.43 6.41 -1. 02 5.9 0.5
1940 3.35 6.20 5.80 -0. 40 n.a. n.a.
(a)Based
onthefirst of
grade Macan brand
after
1936
(b)Purchase
pricesinCabanatuan Nueva
municipality, Ecija
province inthe
arecalculated
amount for
ofpalay 1cavanofcleanedrice, the
consideringpercentage of in
recovery the1930s
Sources:
RiceCommission
1936, Bureau
71-72; ofCensus
andStatistics
1941,
99-100;
Wickizer
andBennett
1941,332-33
on 23 September1935thePhilippinegovernment
To relievestarvation,
issuedAct4198 to sell the importedreliefriceduty-free
(Manuel Quezon
Papers1935a,1936; Tribune rice
1935a).However, landlords, mainlythrough
the LandownersLeague of Nueva Ecija, opposedthe sellingof reliefrice
(Tribune1935f;Rice Commission1936,25).
The BureauofCommercedirectly importedriceforreliefpurposesin
cooperation withtheU.S. consul in Hong Kong.The bureaualso indirectly
boughtrice fromChinese merchantsin the Philippines,such as theYek
Hua TradingCo., Tan Sio and Co., Ciy Cong Biengand Co., and others.
542 PHILIPPINE
STUDIES 4 (2010)
58,NO.

However,the bureauwas forcedto buyimportedrice fromChinese mer-
chantsat highpricesbecause of theirexclusivehold on rice imports.For
example,Ciy Cong Biengand Co. handedover4,000 cavansat P38,177to
theBureauofCommerceon 5 October1935,afterreceiving an orderon 26
September. The priceofriceon thistransaction wasP9.50 percavan,which
wasveryhighcomparedwithwholesalepricesat thattime.Therewerealso
somecasesofChinesemerchants delivering ricetothebureau,althoughno
ordershad beenmade(Department ofJustice 1936).The Philippinegovern-
mentwas putat a disadvantage in buyingthe importedricefromChinese
merchants.
Finally,the Bureau of Commerce imported196,601 cavans from
30 Septemberto 9 December 1935 and sold it as reliefrice throughthe
municipalgovernments at a retailpriceofP5.00 percavan.In somelocali-
ties,however, reliefricewas soldat priceshigherthanthatofdomesticrice
(Tribune1935i;Rice Commission1936,25-27). Actuallythe sellingprice
in Manila continuedto increaseeven afterthe deliveryof reliefrice.The
Manila wholesalepricehad been keptat thelevelofP7.00 percavanuntil
November1935,and itstarted todeclinein Decemberofthesameyearafter
thenewharvest ofrice(Rice Commission1936,72).
The distributionofreliefricewasgeographically biased.The provinces
thatreceivedthe reliefrice wereas follows:Manila Cityand Rizal, 42.8
percent;Bulacan, 12.2 percent;Laguna, 6.5 percent;and Pampanga,6.5
percent(Manuel Quezon Papers1935b,1935c).The ratioto totalamount
ofthe Bicol and theVisayasregions,whichhad alwaysimportedrice,was
low and the CentralLuzon plain conversely receiveda largerquantityof
reliefrice.It was also notedthatsome government officials
sold reliefrice
or
illegally through nepotism( Tribune 193
19351, 5p).
In conclusion,duringthe 1935 ricecrisis,the Philippinegovernment
proposeda temporary reductionin the importtariff on rice,but riceland-
lordswerestrongly opposedto theenforcement ofthispolicy.Althoughas
an alternativemeasurereliefricewaslocallydistributed, thePhilippinegov-
ernment musthavedependedon Chinesemerchants in regardto importing
it fromabroad.Furtherreliefricewas used forthepoorsharetenantsand
agriculturallaborersin theCentralLuzon plainrather thanin Bicoland the
Visayas, which traditionallyimported ricein largequantities.Itseemedthat
thePhilippinegovernment used reliefriceto pacifythepeasantmovement
in CentralLuzon and theSouthernTagalogregions.
CHIBA
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The Establishment and Activity of the NARIC
The risingpeasantmovement and the1935ricecrisiswereprominent issues
intheformation oftheNARIC,whichwasestablished as partoftheNational
DevelopmentCompany. The NARIC's activities
covered thebuying, milling,
andsellingofdomesticrice,besidesobtaining imported rice,inordertoregu-
latebothlevelsofthebuyingpriceofpalayand thesellingpriceofcleaned
rice(Rice Commission1936,3-4; NARIC 1937).Those operations meanta
socialpolicyto improve lifeamongthepoor.The Philippine Commonwealth
government, whichstarted in 1935,becamemoreautonomous from American
controland enforcedtheNARIC s functions. In examining thebusinessof
theNARIC,thissectionconsiders thestructure
ofthePhilippine ricemarket in
thelate1930s.Atthesametime,theNARIC s performance is evaluatedfrom
thestandpoint ofsocialpolicyforthepoor.
The NARIC started operationsin 1936,withitsprimary rolethenbeing
the purchaseof importedrice. The 475,000 bags importedfromFrench
Indochinawereboughtthrough a publictender.Amongfouracceptedcom-
the
panies, ChengSiong Lam and Co. ofManila,in particular, wascontract-
18
ed to import250,000bags(NARIC 1937,25). In 1937theNARIC started
buyingpalaylocally.Ninety-five percentofthetotalamountpurchasedby
the NARIC was boughtat P2.50 per cavan. Of the palayboughtlocally,
1,223,458cavanswereboughtfromNueva Ecija, whichaccountedfor72.7
percentofthetotalamountpurchased.Thisquantity represented 39 percent
ofriceexported fromNuevaEcija toManilaconveyedbytruckand railroad,
whichwasannuallyestimated at 3,133,568cavansat thattime.
The NARIC usuallyboughtpalayfromJanuary to March,immediately
aftertheharvest, in orderto protecttheinterestsofsmallholders and share
tenants.Forexample,itbought1,500,000cavansfromJanuary to March,of
thetotal1,683,457cavansboughtfortheentireyearof 1937(NARIC 1938,
19
25-26). The NARIC s BoardofDirectors, however, had criticized therice
landlordsforengagingin speculationthroughthe seasonalfluctuation of
ricepricesand fornotsellingpalayto theNARIC. According to thegovern-
mentcorporation, thepalaystockin NuevaEcija, exceptforone heldbythe
NARIC, amounted to 717, 803 cavanson 21 April1938; 1,856,972cavans
on 25 April1939; and 2,340,425cavanson 15 May 1940. The NARIC s
palaystockin thesameprovinceamountedto642,071cavans;0 cavans;and
539,000cavans,respectively. AlthoughtheNARIC hardlypurchasedpalay
in 1939,it raisedthebuyingpriceofpalayfromP2.50 to P2.75 per cavan
544 PHILIPPINE
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in 1940,and increasedthepurchasingamountofpalayto 733,400cavans.
Until1940suchactivities could notdecreasethepalaystock,exceptthatof
the NARIC. A managerofthe government corporation pointedout on 17
May 1940 that"anyproducerwhichup to thistimehas notsold to us his
palayat 2.75 pesosis no longera producerbuta speculator"(Manuel Roxas
Papers1939c, 1940a).20The speculationsof rice landlordspreventedthe
NARIC frombuyingenoughpalaythatcouldthenbe soldas cleanedriceto
poorconsumersat a lowprice.
On thesellingofcleanedricein 1937,theNARIC had a problemwith
howtoselltheimported ricestockcarriedoverfromthepreviousyear,which
amountedto morethan377,000cavans.The NARIC had boughtimported
riceatpriceshigherthanthatofthelocal rice,as wellas reliefriceduringthe
1935ricecrisis.To avoida loss,theNARIC soughtto sell itin Hong Kong.
But the sale could notbe realizedafterall; the importedrice was sold at
fromP4.50 to P6.24 in thelocal market. The NARIC could notsellenough
cleanedricebecauseoftoofewmillingfacilities and a narrow marketingout-
let,broughtaboutbycompetition withChinese merchants (Manuel Roxas
Papers1936; NARIC 1938,53-57).
The competition withChinesemerchants affectedthesalesoftheNAR-
IC. In 1937theNARIC s warehousepriceswereP6.65 morethantheP5.48
per cavan averagewholesaleprice in Manila, whichmade it difficult for
thegovernment corporation to sell the cleaned riceat a reasonableprice.
However,theaveragewholesalepricein Manila roseto P6.52 in 1938and,
as a result,thecleanedriceand palaythattheNARIC sold from1 January
to 25 August1938increasedto 1,422,511 cavansestimated in termsofpalay
(Manuel RoxasPapers1938).AlthoughthetotalamountsoldbytheNARIC
from1 January to 30 November1939 was 1,530,196cavans(cleaned rice),
thericeimported fromFrenchIndochinaand Thailandoccupied92.6 per-
centofall sales,becauseoftheinability tosellthedomesticrice.The selling
priceofimported ricewasa littlelowerthantheaveragewholesalepriceof
Manila in 1939 (Manuel RoxasPapers1939b,1939d).
Generallyspeaking,thesellingofthe NARIC s ricehad dependedon
marketpricesthatcould not be controlled.The NARIC was not able to
adequatelyachieve itspurposeof helpingpoor consumerspurchaserice.
However,the NARIC became a majoractorin the rice trade,in addition
to Chinese merchants, and even raisedbuyingpricesin Cabanatuan.The
NARIC musthavetriedtobenefitthericeproducers in ordertosuppressthe
CHIBA
/PHILIPPINE
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CRISES
INAMERICAN
COLONIAL
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peasantmovement,butitseffect
is suspectbecausethelandlordsand small-
holderswouldhavehad moreadvantageoverthesharetenantswhodidnot
haveenoughpalayto sell.
Chinese vis-à-vis Filipino Rice Traders

By using two kindsof historicalmaterials,we considerthe numberof
Chinese merchants and theirdegreeof impacton the rice marketof the
Philippinescomparedwiththatof Filipinomerchants. First,accordingto
theEastAsiaticEconomicInvestigation Bureau(Tokyo),SouthManchuria
RailwaysCo., Filipinomerchants increasedin numberfromthe 1910sup
to 1930 and outnumbered the Chinese in bothretailand wholesaletrade
(Retail:Chinese9,500,Filipino88,040;Wholesale:Chinese3,100,Filipino
3,450).On thequantity ofall commercialdealings,however,theChinese
sharewas40 percent,comparedwiththeFilipinos 30 percent,evenin 1934
(MantetsuTouakeizai-chousa-kyoku1986/1939,84-91).
Second, an investigationof the Philippines^ National Economic
Council (NEC) focusedon thesmallsari-sarior conveniencestore,which
In 1935Chineseowned1,090sari-sari
manylocal peoplepatronized. stores;
492.
Filipinos, The formerhad an 87 percent shareof sales, the latter
a
mere9 percent(NEC 1938,6-9).21As a result,theNEC pointedout that
Chinese controlledbothretailand wholesaletrade,especiallyin riceand
groceries.
whotryto startas ricewholesalersfindthemselvesseri-

Filipinos
bythelackofretailoutlets,theChineseretaildis-
ouslyhandicapped
tributors to do businesswiththeChinesericemillersand
preferring
-
wholesalers
In short,thesmall,individual retailers
Filipino are unableto buytheir
storesupplieson thesame termsas theirforeign competitors.The
treatment
latterreceivepreferential fromtheimporters and whole-
andcan imposeonthembecauseoftheirlongstand-
sale distributors
ingandtheirbigandorganized buying 9, 15-16)
power,(ibid.,
made itclearthatChinesepredominance
This statement in commerce
wasstrong despitethefact
eveninthe1930sbecauseoftheirethnicnetworks,
thatthenumberofFilipinomerchants had increased
duringthatperiod.
546 PHILIPPINE
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Chinesewholesalers also had a greatpowerin importing rice,as in the
case of reliefrice in the 1935 rice crisis,despitethe decreasedamountof
riceimported bythePhilippinesup to theearly1930s.The Philippineshad
imported riceto a largedegreefromFrenchIndochina(BureauofCustoms
22
1941,140). One observer inthelate1920sstatedthatChinesemerchants of
Manila imported ricedirectly fromFrenchIndochinathrough personal ties
withChinesemerchants in Saigon,and theytransported riceon theirownor
bychartered ships(Le Clerk1927,60-61). The NARIC (1938, 54-55) tried
to importricein cooperation withHong Kongmerchants in themid-1930s,
butactuallyfounditdifficult togetricefromabroad.
MostManila wholesalerssold riceon creditto provincialmiddlemen,
who in turnsold itforcash or creditto retailmerchants, evenin the 1930s
(Miller1932,533-45).23The market structureofrice,however, had changed
in theperiodleadingtotheSecondWorldWar.First,thetotalricemarket of
thePhilippinesshrankin the 1930sbecause ofthestagnation in imports as
wellas inproduction. Second, theNARIC becameone ofthemajoractorsin
ricetrading.Third,thegapbetweenthewholesalericepricesin Manilaand
thebuyingpricesbymerchants in Cabanatuan,Nueva Ecija, diminished,
in spiteof a risein the pricesof othergoods in the mid-1930s(see table
5). The Manila wholesalepricesdid notrecoverenough,as comparedwith
thoseoftheperiodpriorto theGreatDepression,and theparticipation of
theNARIC in ricetrading seemedto raiseitsbuyingpricesin Cabanatuan.
These changescreateddisadvantages forChinesemerchants in ricetrading
and,consequently, some ofthemlenta warehouseand a millingfacility to
theNARIC (1938, 30-31).
In addition,some Filipinosmade theirantipathy towardChinese mer-
chantsobvious.The NuevaEcija Rice Growers Association, whichwascom-
posedofricelandlords, blamedChinese merchants fortheirdominationof
ricetrading, and in 1935 proposedto thepresident ofthePhilippineCom-
monwealth, Manuel Quezon, a plan to rationalizethericeindustry (Nueva
Ecija Rice Growers Association 1935; Kerkvliet1977,55). This association
statedthat"theforeign middlemendominateand control95% ofthetrade,
leavingonly5% fortheFilipinos.The vexingproblemwhichconfronts the
riceproducersas wellas theconsumersis theelimination oftheprofiteers,
theforeign middlemen(mostly Chinese)"(Nueva Ecija Rice Growers Asso-
ciation1935).
Sincethericemarket ofthe1930swascharacteristically inconstant short
supply, thePhilippines had toincreasetheamountofriceimports. However,
CHIBA
/PHILIPPINE
RICE
CRISES
INAMERICAN
COLONIAL
TIMES 547

because ofconstraints rice consumerswereburdenednot
on importation,
only with a decline in purchasingpowerbut also witha nationwiderice
shortage.Especiallyin theislandsofCebú, Negros,Bohol,Leyte,and Min-
danao,theburdenofricepricespromoted theconsumption ofmaizeinstead
of rice (Manuel RoxasPapers1940b;Owen 1984, 129-45; 1989,95-106;
Miller1932,211-19); itespeciallydistressedthepoorpeople.Althoughthe
NARIC was likelyto improvethe buyingpriceof palayforlandlordsand
peasants,itcould notprotecttheinterest
ofpoorconsumers.
Conclusion
Untilthe 1920sPhilippinericeimports frommainlandSoutheastAsiatend-
ed to shrinkdue to thegrowth oflocal riceproduction. The tworicecrises
thattookplace betweenthe twoworldwars,however,indicateda depen-
dencyofthePhilippineson riceimports. In comparing thetworicecrises,it
can be observedthatthe 1935ricecrisiswasmorecomplicatedthantheone
of 1919. In 1935 a hightariff ratedecreasedrice imports. Furthermore, in
theCentralLuzon plain,whichyieldedsurplusrice,nota fewsharetenants
and agricultural laborersgotpoorerand wereundertheconditionofhaving
topurchasericefortheirconsumption.
NuevaEcija playeda majorrolein local riceproduction. Ricelandlords
had sold a largeamount of palay tothe millers ormerchants up tothe1920s.
As a result,rice landlordshad deepened theirrelationship withthe rice
market.Rice poured into the tradingcenter of Manila,particularly through
directtransactions ofthoselandlordswithChinesemerchants.
Rice landlordsalsoengagedinpolitical withregard
activity toriceprices.It
beganwiththe1920Philippine AgriculturalCongress,whichsomericelandlords
ofNuevaEcija joined.The congressrequestedthePhilippinelegislature fora
reduction oftheimport tariff
on rice.Otherassociations, whichwerecomposed
ofricelandlords inNuevaEcija,madepolitical claimson pricesandthetrading
ofriceup tothemid-1930s. Although theresponse ofthePhilippine government
to the 1935ricecrisisdidnotdirectly reflectthe claim of rice landlords,the
resultofthericepolicywasshownto be advantageous to ricelandlordsand
smallholders ratherthanto Filipinoconsumers and Chinese merchants.
However, thatthePhilippinegovernment triedtorelievethepoorclasses
ofstarvation through thedistribution of reliefriceand theestablishment of
theNARIC was significant. The NARIC was establishedimmediately after
to
the 1935 rice crisis,partly protect the interestsof small rice producers.
548 STUDIES
PHILIPPINE 4 (2010)
58,NO.

AlthoughtheNARIC was an actoroverthebuyingofpalay,it occupieda
subordinatepositionto Chinesemerchants, whosecontrolon priceitcould
not break.Nevertheless, the price policies of the NARIC became more
advantageous tothelandlordsand smallholders thantothesharetenants,
as
thelatterdid nothaveenoughpalayto sell.The NARIC also failedto pro-
videpoorconsumers cheaprice,due tothespeculationofricelandlordsand
Chinesenetworks on trading.
However,theNARIC s activity surelymade it
moredifficultforChinesemerchants toprofit fromthericebusiness.Under
theJapaneseoccupation,theNARIC wasfirst usedtosecurericeforitsmili-
and
taryadministration, manyFilipinos suffered froman evenmoresevere
foodproblemthanunderAmericanrule(Jose1996).
Abbreviations Used
NARIC National
Rice
andCorn
Corporation
NEC National
Economic
Council
FD-PNLFilipiniana
Divison, National
Philippine Manila
Library,
Notes
Theresearchforthis article
wasdonemainly inthePhilippines
, about fourteenyearsago.Many
Filipinos
supported andencouraged meinmyresearch which
,for I amvery I alsothank
grateful.
theeditor-in-chief
Filomeno V.Aguilar andthemanuscript
]r.y editor, F.Tugado
Angelli ,fortheir
assistance
infinalizing thisarticle
for
publication.
1 Untilthelatter 1910s,thePhilippines
hadimported
ricewithintheBritish zone,
trading mainlyvia
HongKong. Afterward rice
came tobe imported from
directly French IndochinaandThailand.See
Nagano 2001, 273-95.
2 Itwasrice thatthegovernment imported andtried
duty-free tosellata lowprice.
3 During thePhilippineRevolutionandthePhilippine-American
War, wasinterrupted
trading and
many people inLuzonwere reducedtonear famine.
Thesegregation bytheAmerican
policy army
destroyedtheexisting channels
trading and, inaddition,
therevolutionary government levied
a5
percenttaxonsalestoforeignersandoninterprovincial
trade.SeeGuerrero 1977,111.
4 Onthegeographical distribution
ofricemillsinNueva ofthelate1920s,
Ecija seealsoAsuncion
1932,177-93.
5 Chinese ricemillswere situated
asfollows:
AsuncionTanSenguan andCo.,CoOco, SyNang Coin
Baliwag,Bulacan;CoOcoinQuingua, Bulacan;CoOcoinSanIldefonso, Bulacan;Cheng LiaoCoin
SanMiguel,Bulacan; Chusa Chiaco
inAngeles,Pampanga;Chusa ChiacoinMagalang, Pampanga;
AntonioTampoco inTarlac, LeeKeeCoinMoneada,
Tarlac; Tarlac; Cheng LiaoCo,Ong OcoinSan
Nueva
Isidro, CoLecco
Ecija; inSanta Rosa, Nueva Gonzalo
Ecija; CoToco, CiyCong Biengand
Co.,
UyEng Juy,J.M.SyHagan inCabanatuan,Nueva YuBiao
Ecija; SontuaHermanos inBautista,
Pangasinan;andTyCameo Sobrino
inRosales,Pangasinan.
CHIBA
/PHILIPPINE
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6 ThePhilippines hadalready suffered from soaring riceprices in1911because ofreductionin
riceimportation coupled with poor localriceproduction. Asa result, W.Cameron Forbes,then
thegovernor-general, enforced anemergency importation ofrice from Saigon andRangoon. See
Gleeck 1981, 79-80.
7 Ontheinflation duetocredit loan atthattime, seeNagano 2003, 92-96.
8 Suchsmall-scale character andmonoculture ofthePhilippine economy made iteasiertobe
affected bythecyclical influence oftheU.S.economy. Manila hadanimpact onemployment
opportunitiesandwagelevels ofindustries depending onagricultural exports totheU.S.See
Doeppers 1984, 30,36-50, 74-79.
9 Thefounder oftheSiyCong Bieng andCo.migrated from China toManila inthelatenineteenth
century and then engaged inthe sale ofrice and the purchase ofabaca in theBicolregion upto
thebeginning ofthetwentieth century.After the1910s, thiscompany diversified
itsbusiness,
with ricemillinginCabanatuan municipality,Nueva Ecija, andtree fellingandsawing inTayabas
province.SeeWong 1999, 43-44.
10 It wasreported inthenine provinces ofAlbay, Camarines Sur, Iloilo,Bohol, Leyte,Negros
Occidental,Samar, Tayabas, and Zambales.
11 According tothis investigation,theflood that occurred inAugust ofthesameyear puttherice
transportbyrail intoa complete standstill.
Itworsened therice shortage.
12 ThePhilippine AgriculturalCongress wasorganized nationwide in1914, under theadministrative
guidance oftheBureau ofAgriculture. Themembers ofthecongress hadreceived themonthly
The
periodical, Farmer,
Philippine published by the bureau. It printedinformationon themarketing
ofagriculturalproducts.SeeManuel Quezon Papers 1913.
13 Inthesixth PhilippineAgricultural Congress, four persons from Nueva as
Ecijaparticipated
follows:twohacienda owners, Manuel Tinio andSimplicio Ocampo; thesuperintendent ofCentral
Luzon StateUniversity,Kilmer Moe; andtheAmerican landowner, Percy Hill.
SeeGleeck 1981,
88-89. AlsointhePhilippines, animport tariffonricehadbeen P2.40 per100kilos until1918.But
F.B.Harrison, thegovernor-general ofthePhilippines, lowered theimport tariff
onrice toP2.00
per100kilos in1918because hejudged that anincrease inrice pricesimposed hardships onthe
life
oflaborers. SeeManuel Quezon Papers 1918, 1920.
14 In1927"rice producers" requested thegovernor-general tolift theembargo onriceexport,in
order toraise riceprices.Itwasexecuted pertheapproval ofthegovernor-general, althoughin
thePhilippine legislatureonly onesenator supported it.These facts showed that thegovernor-
general hadbroad authority topassa newlaw, buthispower strongly depended onlocalelites.
However, thisremoval ofthe on rice
embargo export did not increasericeprices. Miller
See 1932,
208;United States War Department 1928, 15.
15 InOctober 1935, thedaily newspaper, TheTribune, listed seven provincesashaving thesmallest
stock ofrice:Antique,Cavite, Cebu, Davao, Iloilo,Negros Occidental, andSorsogon. SeeTribune
1935i.
16 Benedict Kerkvliet(1977, 1-60)stresses that such change intherelationshipbetween landlords
andshare tenants hadtaken place allover theCentral Luzon plain sincethe1920s. Forsimilar
casesinBulacan andTarlac provinces, forexample, seeTribune 1935j,1935k.
17 Theamount ofpalay was
output 45,825,100 cavans in 1935 and 41,117,200 cavans in1936,
compared with the annual average of49,874,120 cavans in1930-1934. See RiceCommission
550 PHILIPPINE
STUDIES 4 (2010)
58,NO.

1936,23-27.Onthecausesofsoaring riceprices,
Gov.-Gen.
FrankMurphytookthesame
SeeManuel
standpoint. Quezon Papers1935a.
18 Suchimportationwasalsocarried
outforstores
ofprovisions.
SeeManuel
RoxasPapers1936.
19 Ontheseasonal cycleofpalay for
prices, inCabanatuan,
example, Nueva theyear
Ecija, 1933
recordedthelowest ofP1.51
price percavan inMarchandthehighest ofP2.55
price inJuly.
See
RiceCommission 71.
1936,
20 DuringtheBoard ofDirectors
meetingoftheNARIC inJuly
held itwasreported
1939, that
in
Province
Tarlac therewereonly500cavans held
(palay) by share-tenants cavans
14,000
against
bylandowners.SeeManuel RoxasPapers1939a.
21 Another showed
investigation that
in1925Chineseoccupied ofthetotal
58.1percent numberof
sari-sari
storesinManila.
SeeMantetsu 102-3.
1939/1986,
Touakeizai-chousa-kyoku
22 Intheearly1920s, thepercentageoftransit
tradeviaHongKongtototal
riceimports
ofthe
was 73.8
Philippines percent in1920,45.9 in
percent 1921,34.7 in
percent 1922,18.6 in
percent
1923,and25.9percentin1925.SeeLeClerk 28.
1927,
23 TheManilaricewholesalers
could
borrow moneyfromtheChinaBanking established
Corporation
in1921.Forexample,Alfonso therepresentative
SyCip, ofCiyCong andCo.,hadpowerful
Bieng
connections
with directors
oftheChina Banking SeeMantetsu
Corporation. Touakeizai-chousa-
kyoku1939/1986, 107-16.
98-102,
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University
Yoshihiro Chiba ¡slecturerattheHealth

Sciences ofHokkaido,
University Kanazawa,
1757,
061-0293
Hokkaido,
Toubetsu, Japan.He a
holds Ph.D.
degreeinEconomics onthe
andspecializes
socioeconomic ofthe He
history Philippines.isthe of
author Filipin Toshi
to
Syakai-keizaishi:Nouson
noorinasu
seikatsu-sekai
[City Socioeconomic
andVillage: oftheManila
History Zone]
Regional
Hokkaido
Sapporo: University 2009.
Press, <chibayo@hoku-iryo-u.ac.jp>
556 PHILIPPINE
STUDIES 4 (2010)
58,NO.


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The 1919 and 1935 Rice Crises in the Philippines The Rice Market and Starvation in American

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The 1919 and

1935 Rice Crises

The Rice Market

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shows,thericecrisiswas promptedbyreducedriceimports because ofthe

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Rice Trading: Evidence from Nueva Ecija Province

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528 PHILIPPINE 4 (2010)

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How did Chinese merchantsbuy palay fromlandlordsand peasants

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The Rice Market of the Philippines

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The 1919 Rice Crisis

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pricegap betweenabaca and ricebecametoolarge,leadingto thetermina-

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I findthatthereis speculationandthatthemillsare unableto buy

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Anunusualfeatureis thata considerable

Fergusonalso consideredthe increasingamountof moneyin circula-

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The 1935 Rice Crisis

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Table 4. Selected data on population and rice consumption,

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Chinese vis-à-vis Filipino Rice Traders

whotryto startas ricewholesalersfindthemselvesseri-

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Yoshihiro Chiba ¡slecturerattheHealth

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