From Good Soldiers To Psychologically Entitled: Examining When and Why Citizenship Behavior Leads To Deviance

Academy of Management Journal
FROM GOOD SOLDIERS TO PSYCHOLOGICALLY ENTITLED:

EXAMINING WHEN AND WHY CITIZENSHIP BEHAVIOR
LEADS TO DEVIANCE
Journal: Academy of Management Journal
Manuscript ID AMJ-2014-0234.R3
Manuscript Type: Revision
Motivation < Attitudes, Cognitions, and Affect < Organizational Behavior <
Topic Areas, Deviance/counterproductive behaviors < Behavior <
Keywords: Organizational Behavior < Topic Areas, Organizational citizenship behavior
< Behavior < Organizational Behavior < Topic Areas, Quantitative
orientation (General) < Quantitative Orientation < Research Methods
Research has consistently demonstrated that organizational citizenship

behaviors (OCBs) produce a wide array of positive outcomes for employees
and organizations. Recent work, however, suggests that employees often
engage in OCBs not because they want to but because they feel they have
to, and it is not clear if OCBs performed for external motives have the
same positive effects on individuals and organizational functioning as do
traditional OCBs. In this paper, we draw from self-determination and moral
licensing theories to suggest a potential negative consequence of OCB.
Abstract: Specifically, we argue that when employees feel compelled to engage in
OCB by external forces, they will subsequently feel psychologically entitled
for having gone above and beyond the call of duty. Furthermore, these
feelings of entitlement can act as moral credentials that psychologically
free employees to engage in both interpersonal and organizational
deviance. Data from two multi-source field studies and an online
experiment provide support for these hypotheses. In addition, we
demonstrate that OCB-generated feelings of entitlement transcend
organizational boundaries and lead to deviance outside of the organization.
Page 1 of 58 Academy of Management Journal
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11 From Good Soldiers to Psychologically Entitled:
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Examining When and Why Citizenship Behavior
14 Leads to Deviance
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20 Kai Chi Yam
21 National University of Singapore
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bizykc@nus.edu.sg
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25 Anthony C. Klotz
26 Oregon State University
27 anthony.klotz@bus.oregonstate.edu
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30 Wei He
31 Huazhong University of Science and Technology
32 whe@hust.edu.cn
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34 Scott J. Reynolds
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University of Washington
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37 heyscott@uw.edu
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51 Authors’ notes: We thank Associate Editor Carol Kulik and three anonymous reviewers for their
52 tremendously helpful and constructive comments. This research was partly supported by the National
53 Science Foundation of China (71232001; 71402061). Correspondence concerning this article should be
54 addressed to Wei He, the Department of Business Administration, Huazhong University of Science and
55 Technology, China. E-mail: whe@hust.edu.cn.
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Academy of Management Journal Page 2 of 58
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FROM GOOD SOLDIERS TO PSYCHOLOGICALLY ENTITLED: EXAMINING
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5 WHEN AND WHY CITIZENSHIP BEHAVIOR LEADS TO DEVIANCE
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7 ABSTRACT
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9 Research has consistently demonstrated that organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBs)
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12 produce a wide array of positive outcomes for employees and organizations. Recent work,
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14 however, suggests that employees often engage in OCBs not because they want to but because
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they feel they have to, and it is not clear if OCBs performed for external motives have the same
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19 positive effects on individuals and organizational functioning as do traditional OCBs. In this
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21 article, we draw from self-determination and moral licensing theories to suggest a potential
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negative consequence of OCB. Specifically, we argue that when employees feel compelled to
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26 engage in OCB by external forces, they will subsequently feel psychologically entitled for
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28 having gone above and beyond the call of duty. Furthermore, these feelings of entitlement can
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31 act as moral credentials that psychologically free employees to engage in both interpersonal and
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33 organizational deviance. Data from two multi-source field studies and an online experiment
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35 provide support for these hypotheses. In addition, we demonstrate that OCB-generated feelings
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38 of entitlement transcend organizational boundaries and lead to deviance outside of the
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40 organization.
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Keywords:
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45 Organizational citizenship behavior; moral licensing; moral credential; self-determination theory;
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47 external motivation; deviance
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For more than three decades, scholars have generated a great deal of research on the
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6 causes and consequences of organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBs; Organ, 1977; Organ,
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8 Podsakoff, & MacKenzie, 2006). Broadly defined, OCB refers to employee behavior that
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contributes to the effective social and psychological functioning of the organization but is often
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13 discretionary and not rewarded relative to in-role job performance (Organ, 1997; Organ et al.,
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15 2006). OCB is widely regarded as a positive construct (Cameron, Dutton, & Quinn, 2003; Lepine,
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18 Erez, & Johnson, 2002; Luthans & Youssef, 2007; Podsakoff, Whiting, Podsakoff, & Blume,
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20 2009) in part because it was originally conceptualized as a purely discretionary behavior
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22 (Bateman & Organ, 1983). Several scholars, however, have noted that employees often engage
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25 in OCBs because such behaviors are required as part of their job (Morrison, 1994) or because the
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27 behaviors are formally rewarded by the organization (MacKenzie, Podsakoff, & Fetter, 1991).
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To reconcile the differences between these different types of good deeds at work, Organ altered
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32 the definition of OCBs, proposing that employee behaviors need not be discretionary, or
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34 voluntary, to be considered acts of citizenship; instead, they must only be contextual, in the sense
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37 that they contribute to the “organizational context that supports task performance” (1997: 91).
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39 Consistent with Organ’s (1997) redefined version of OCB, ongoing research has
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41 demonstrated that employees often engage in this positive behavior not out of their own
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44 discretion, but because they perceive that they must (Bolino, Klotz, Turnley, & Harvey, 2013).
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46 For example, Bolino, Turnley, Gilstrap, and Suazo (2010) found that employees often engage in
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48 citizenship behaviors because they feel pressured by their organization to do so. Relatedly,
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51 employees may also go above and beyond the call of duty to avoid punishments relative to their
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53 peers (Salamon & Deutsch, 2006). Many employees also view OCBs as simply part of their job
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responsibilities (McAllister, Kamdar, Morrison, & Turban, 2007; Morrison, 2004), and in some
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cases OCBs become expected parts of employees’ jobs over time (Van Dyne & Ellis, 2004;
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6 Vigota-Gadot, 2007). In short, research has demonstrated that employees often perform acts of
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8 citizenship not because they want to, but because they feel like they have to (Bolino et al., 2013)
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or ought to (Organ et al., 2006).
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13 Despite the growing acknowledgement that employees often feel compelled by external
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15 forces to go the extra mile for their organization, the effect of pressuring employees into
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18 performing OCBs is not well understood. A few scholars have theorized that employees will
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20 sometimes react negatively when they feel required to engage in acts of citizenship, perhaps by
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22 engaging in subsequent deviant behavior (Klotz & Bolino, 2013; Spector & Fox, 2010a, 2010b),
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25 but to our knowledge no empirical research has provided a causal link between externally driven
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27 OCBs and negative organizational consequences to support these claims (Organ et al., 2006).
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Accordingly, we draw from self-determination theory (SDT; Ryan & Deci, 2000) and moral
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32 licensing theory (Miller & Effron, 2010; Monin & Miller, 2001) to consider how and when
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34 OCBs may lead employees to subsequently engage in deviance at work or outside of the
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37 workplace. As shown in Figure 1, we suggest that when employees engage in OCBs for
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39 externally regulated reasons (e.g., supervisory demands, compliance with norms, punishment
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41 avoidance; Ryan & Deci, 2000), they develop a sense of entitlement that leads to increased
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44 subsequent deviance on the job and outside of the workplace. To test this model, we conduct
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46 three studies and employ multiple methodologies including a multi-source field study in China, a
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48 two-wave multi-source field study in the United States, and an online experiment.
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51 Our research makes a number of theoretical contributions. First, whereas SDT has
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53 primarily been used to study the positive effect of autonomous motives on employees, our work
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uses a moral credential perspective to extend SDT and lend support to its predictions regarding
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the negative consequences of more organizationally controlled motivation in the workplace
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6 (Gagné & Deci, 2005). Second, we establish a theoretical and empirical basis for linking
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8 entitlement to moral licensing. In doing so, we contribute to the behavioral ethics literature by
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demonstrating the role of motivation in the moral licensing process, and by providing support for
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13 the underlying mechanism of the moral credentialing process (i.e., psychological entitlement).
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15 Third, the results of our studies extend the literature on the consequences of citizenship
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18 behaviors by demonstrating that motives not only influence the extent to which employees
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20 engage in OCBs (Rioux & Penner, 2001; Grant & Mayer, 2009), but also affect employees’
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22 attitudes and behaviors following the good deeds. Finally, we complement recent theoretical
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25 explanations for, and empirical evidence of, the within-person occurrence of OCBs and deviant
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27 behavior in organizations (Dalal, 2005; Dalal, Lam, Weiss, Welch, & Hulin 2009; Spector & Fox,
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2010a, 2010b) by demonstrating one path through which OCB leads to subsequent bad behavior.
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32 --- Insert Figure 1 about here ---
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34 SELF-DETERMINATION THEORY AND OCB
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36 Self-determination theory (SDT) proposes that people engage in motivated behaviors,
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39 like OCBs, due to either autonomous or controlled motives (Gagné & Deci, 2005; Ryan & Deci,
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41 2000). Autonomous motives refer to forces that are intrinsically interesting and enjoyable to
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individuals or are important to their goals and values (Ryan & Deci, 2000), and range from pure
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46 enjoyment of the task (i.e., intrinsic motivation) and accordance with one’s sense of self (i.e.,
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48 integrated regulation) to identifying the instrumental value of the task (i.e., identified regulation).
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51 Controlled motives, in contrast, are characterized by an external locus of causality and range
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53 from ego-centric reasons for engaging in a given behavior, such as bolstering one’s self-worth
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58 expectations (i.e., external regulation; Gagné & Deci, 2005). Importantly, autonomous and
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controlled motivation operate independent of one another and are not opposite ends of a single
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6 continuum (Amabile, Hill, Hennessey, & Tighe, 1994).
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8 In organizations, employees are often compelled to engage in OCBs by any number of
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external forces. OCBs might be referenced in a job description, subtly enforced by the
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13 organizational culture, or informally required by a supervisor (Bolino et al., 2010). In any case,
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15 OCBs are most commonly secondary to the core job tasks (Organ, 1988), and so when
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18 employees are compelled to offer OCBs, research suggests that negative results can emerge. For
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20 example, Gagné and Deci (2005) proposed that to the extent that organizational climates are
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22 controlling in this manner, employees will find OCBs less appealing. More generally, prior
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25 research indicates that to the extent that work tasks are performed for autonomous reasons,
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27 workers experience higher levels of persistence on those given tasks (Grant, Nurmohamed,
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Ashford, & Dekas, 2011; Turban, Tan, Brown, & Sheldon, 2007), but when individuals engage
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32 in tasks driven by controlled motives, they experience lower subsequent interest and engagement
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34 in that work (Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999). Similarly, Judge, Bono, Locke, and Erez (2005)
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37 suggested that employees may feel a “quiet resistance” to these kinds of external demands placed
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39 on them at work (266), and Grant et al. (2011) proposed that employees may begrudge those who
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41 pressure them into work tasks. Consistent with this reasoning, we suggest that when employees
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44 are compelled to offer OCBs, employees may come to believe that they are providing something
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46 above and beyond the needs of the job and have therefore earned something additional to what is
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48 being proffered by the organization. Thus, employees who have been externally compelled or
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51 pressured to engage in OCBs may feel psychologically entitled to some form of recompense
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Psychological entitlement is defined as “the compensation expected as a result of an
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6 individual participating in an employment relationship” (Naumann et al, 2002: 150). Rooted in
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8 economics, the term entitlement refers to a good or service due to a party, but psychological
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entitlement is not necessarily based on an objectively equitable exchange. Naumann et al. (2002)
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13 argued that entitlement perceptions are based on perceptions of reciprocity. Thus, individuals
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15 with strong entitlement perceptions expect organizational rewards and compensation without
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18 having necessarily earned them. In this light, Snow et al. (2001) described psychologically
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20 entitled workers as those who perceive that they deserve “special or unique treatment” relative to
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22 their peers (104). Empirical evidence suggests that psychological entitlement exists not only as a
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25 trait (Campbell, Bonacci, Shelton, Exline, & Bushman 2004; Derber, 1978; Snow et al., 2001)
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27 but also as a state. For instance, Zitek, Jordan, Monin and Leach (2010) demonstrated that
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individuals can feel psychologically entitled when they feel (or remember) that they have been
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32 wronged or treated unfairly. More generally, state psychological entitlement emerges when
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34 individuals feel that their efforts are worth more than what has been offered to them in return.
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37 Thus, relying on the principles of STD, we argue that because employees often engage in OCBs
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39 not because they want to, but because they are driven by external motives to do so, they are more
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41 likely to perceive their OCBs as under-rewarded. Therefore, we argue that employees who
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44 engage in OCBs in response to external demands can experience a sense of psychological
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46 entitlement.
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48 Unlike many aspects of a job that might be associated with issues of entitlement, OCBs
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51 contain a strong moral component. That is, citizenship behaviors are normally viewed as positive
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Indeed, an individual who engages in OCBs can be referred to as a “good soldier” (Organ, 1988).
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Given the moral aspects of OCBs, we suggest that the sense of psychological entitlement an
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6 employee experiences after performing externally motivated OCBs functions in a manner similar
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8 to a psychological license. Thus, in the next section we invoke moral licensing theory to propose
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that an employee who experiences psychological entitlement due to engaging in externally
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13 motivated OCBs may be prone to acting deviantly both within and outside of the organization.
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15 MORAL LICENSING THEORY AND ENTITLEMENT
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18 Broadly speaking, moral licensing theory states that individuals’ current moral behavior
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20 unfolds in the context of past moral behavior such that past good deeds can license future bad
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22 deeds. Numerous studies have provided empirical support for moral licensing theory. For
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25 example, Mazar and Zhong (2010) found that after engaging in good deeds, individuals are more
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27 likely to lie or steal. Furthermore, the moral licensing effect extends beyond actual moral
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behavior to imaginary moral behavior (Khan & Dhar, 2007) and to the moral behavior of one’s
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32 ingroup (Kouchaki, 2011; for a review, see Merritt, Effron, & Monin, 2010). In sum, extant
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34 empirical investigations of moral licensing theory support the idea that “when people can call to
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37 mind previous instances of their own socially desirable or morally laudable behaviors, they will
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39 feel more comfortable taking actions that could be seen as socially undesirable or morally
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41 questionable” (Miller & Effron, 2010: 118).
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44 Several scholars in the moral licensing literature have noted a similarity between moral
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46 licensing and the experience of psychological entitlement. For example, Zhong, Liljenquist, and
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48 Cain (2009) argued that when individuals engage in good deeds, moral licensing produces “a
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51 sense of entitlement to some moral laxity” (2009: 78). In their review of the moral licensing
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53 phenomenon, Merritt et al. (2010) stated that after individuals engage in moral behavior, they
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feel “entitled to transgress” (2010: 348). Relatedly, Sachdeva, Iliev, and Medlin (2009) described
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morally licensed individuals as those who feel “entitled to more than their share (528).”
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6 Collectively, then, many researchers have suggested that the moral license resulting from good
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8 deeds, like OCBs, is akin to a sense of entitlement (Chiou, Yang, & Wan, 2011; Miller & Effon,
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2010; Polman, Pettit, & Wiesenfeld, 2013). We extend this logic to suggest that entitlement
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13 resulting from OCBs is similar to one particular form of moral licensing: moral credentials.
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15 Prior work in moral licensing has identified two unique paths through which moral
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18 licensing can occur: via moral credits or via moral credentials (Miller & Effron, 2010). In the
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20 well-researched moral credits model, the mechanism underlying the moral licensing process is a
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22 dynamic moral self-concept that fluctuates around an equilibrium point (Nisan, 1990, 1991).
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25 When people perform good deeds, their self-concept often rises; when they engage in deviant
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27 behavior, their self-concept can descend. Because people tend to strive for a balanced moral
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equilibrium (Zhong et al., 2009), they are generally motivated to boost their moral self-concept
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32 through good deeds when it is below the equilibrium point (i.e., moral cleansing; Tetlock, Kristel,
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34 Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006), and content to allow it to deflate via
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37 transgressions when it is above the equilibrium point (i.e., moral licensing; Monin & Miller,
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39 2001). Put simply, an individual’s moral self-concept is akin to a bank account; whereas moral
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41 behavior credits the account, immoral behavior debits the account.
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44 The second and less well understood pathway of moral licensing is moral credentials.
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46 When moral licensing occurs via moral credentials, one’s moral self-concept does not fluctuate.
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48 Instead, “one’s behavioral history makes morally questionable deeds seem as if they were not
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51 transgressions at all” (Effron & Monin, 2010: 126). In other words, when people feel that their
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53 past good deeds have established their moral credentials, they do not construe their subsequent
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deviant acts as bad; instead, their credentials entitle them to behave in bad ways without
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discrediting themselves (Merritt, Effron, Fein, Savitsky, Tuller, & Monin, 2010). For example,
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6 hiring a racial minority can help establish the moral credential of being non-prejudiced, and such
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8 a moral credential can legitimatize subsequent unethical behavior via construal. Because moral
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credentialing involves construing less-than-virtuous deeds as benign behavior, this process is
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13 more likely to license “grey” behaviors, such as bad behaviors that are ambiguous in nature, or
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15 somewhat open to being interpreted as not harmful (e.g., interpersonal deviance; Monin & Miller,
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18 2001). When employees engage in OCBs due to external motives, it is unlikely that their moral
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20 self-regard will elevate, given that they have not freely chosen to engage in the good deed at
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22 work (Bradley-Geist, King, Skorinko, Hebl, & McKenna, 2010). Instead, the feeling of
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25 psychological entitlement experienced by those who perform an externally motivated act of
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27 citizenship should function in a manner more similar to a moral credential, which, as we describe
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next, can be generated by lower magnitude good deeds (e.g., externally motivated OCBs) than
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32 moral credits. Exploring interpersonal and organizational deviance through the lens of moral
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34 credentialing is also more appropriate as employees are much more likely to engage in
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37 ambiguously bad rather than outrageously bad behavior in organizations.
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39 Prior research on moral credentials indicates that even good behavior that is not
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41 especially morally laudable (i.e., prosocial behavior of low moral intensity; Jones, 1991) can
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44 generate a moral license via moral credentials. For example, Effron and colleagues (Effron, 2014;
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46 Effron, Miller, & Monin, 2012) found that participants who forewent a racist opportunity were
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48 still able to generate moral credentials that licensed subsequent bad behaviors. Furthermore,
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51 people often preemptively create moral credentials when they need to bolster their character in
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53 order to engage in morally dubious behavior (Merritt et al., 2010). As such, relatively selfish
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motives, such as impression management, can sometimes underlie the formation of moral
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credentials in individuals (Effron & Conway, 2015). Moreover, when anticipating the need for
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6 moral credentials, people are often willing to reinterpret their past behavior as more morally
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8 virtuous than it actually was (Effron, 2014). Extending this line of logic, even when individuals
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engage in good behavior for external reasons, they may still view their prior OCBs as morally
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13 credentialing if needed. In sum, when OCBs are driven by external motives, employees may
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15 nonetheless draw on these acts of citizenship to give them the credentials necessary to license
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18 subsequent deviance.
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20 Consistent with this argument, extant research also suggests that entitlement is generally
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22 associated with negative outcomes. In one study, entitled followers were more likely to engage in
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25 self-serving attributions and to prioritize their own needs above and beyond others in the
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27 organization (Harvey & Martinko, 2009). Behaviorally, scholars have found that entitled
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individuals are more likely to act selfishly (Zitek et al., 2010) and be disrespectful toward others
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32 (Campbell et al., 2004), behaviors that are both cornerstones of workplace deviance (Bennett &
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34 Robinson, 2000). Deviance is defined as “voluntary behavior that violates significant
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37 organizational norms and in so doing threatens the well-being of an organization, its members, or
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39 both” (Robinson & Bennett, 1995: 556). In the workplace, this deviance is likely to manifest in
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41 the form of bad deeds aimed at either fellow organizational members (e.g., incivility) or the
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44 organization in general (e.g., harming an organization’s image; Dalal et al., 2009; Klotz &
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46 Bolino, 2013). For example, an employee pressured to help an absent coworker might
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48 subsequently feel entitled to take an overly long break the next day. In sum, we suggest that the
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51 relationship between OCB and deviant behavior toward coworkers and the organization is
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mediated by feelings of entitlement, when OCBs are performed as a result of external
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6 motivation1. Thus, we propose the following hypotheses.
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8 Hypothesis 1: OCB and external motivation toward OCB will interact to influence
9 psychological entitlement, such that the relationship between OCB and psychological
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entitlement will be positive when external motivation is high, and will not exist when
12 external motivation is low.
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14 Hypothesis 2: Psychological entitlement will mediate the interactive effect of OCB and
15 external motivation toward OCB on (a) interpersonal and (b) organizational deviance,
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such that the indirect effect will be positive when external motivation is high and will not
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18 exist when external motivation is low.
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20 CROSS-DOMAIN MORAL LICENSING
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22 We recognize that moral licensing theory is not the only theory that provides an
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25 explanation of how externally motivated OCBs can lead to interpersonal and organizational
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27 deviance. Most notably, social exchange theory suggests that if employees do not feel fully
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compensated, they may retaliate against their organization (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005;
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32 Skarlicki & Folger, 1997). Unlike these theories, however, moral licensing theory suggests that
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34 when entitlement results from externally-driven OCBs, the employee’s subsequent deviant
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37 behavior will not be limited to the organization’s boundaries.
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39 Miller and Effron (2010) argued that although moral licensing often occurs within the
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41 same domain, good deeds can also license deviant behavior across domains as long as the
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44 behavior involved is still generally characterized by moral interests. In support of this assertion,
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46 Mazar and Zhong (2010) found that participants who purchased environmentally-friendly
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48 products were more likely to allocate resources unfairly to an innocent person, and individuals
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51 who planned to donate blood were more likely to act in a racially prejudiced manner (Cascio &
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55 Interestingly, while the moral credentialing path explains deviant behavior under conditions of external motivation
56 via entitlement, the moral credits path allows for deviant behavior under conditions of autonomous motivation
57 (Klotz & Bolino, 2013). Though this second path is not the subject of this research, we note that moral licensing
58 theory accounts for deviant behavior following OCBs driven by either controlled or autonomous motives.
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Plant, 2015). In other words, research suggests that license-generating behavior and the ensuing
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6 deviance need not always be in the same domain. Extant empirical research provides some
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8 indirect support for this hypothesis. For example, pressure to engage in OCBs has been
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associated with heightened levels of work-life conflict and work-family conflict for employees in
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13 general (Bolino et al., 2010), which is consistent with the notion that OCBs driven by external
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15 motives can potentially disrupt behaviors outside of the workplace. Finally, scholars have argued
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18 that in jobs in which employees are under a great deal of supervision, they do not have the
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20 opportunity to use their moral license at work without facing immediate censure (Kidwell &
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22 Bennett, 1993); as such, these workers will likely choose to use their license in a domain in
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25 which the punishment for deviance is less severe. Taken together, these arguments suggest that
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27 psychological entitlement following externally-driven citizenship behavior can license
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employees to engage in bad deeds outside of the workplace. Thus, in contrast to other theoretical
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32 explanations of employee deviance, only moral licensing theory predicts cross-domain effects of
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34 externally motivated OCBs and psychological entitlement.
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37 Hypothesis 3: Psychological entitlement will mediate the interactive effect of OCB and
38 external motivation toward OCB on non-work deviance, such that the indirect effect will
39 be positive when external motivation is high, and will not exist when external motivation
40 is low.
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RESEARCH OVERVIEW
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45 We conducted three studies to test our theoretical model. In Study 1, we tested
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47 Hypotheses 1, 2a, and 2b in a field setting with multi-source data collected from 345 employees
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50 from 82 workgroups from a variety of industries in China. In Study 2, we collected two-wave
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52 multi-source data from 180 employee-supervisor dyads to extend these findings to non-work
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54 deviance (Hypothesis 3). Finally, in Study 3 we used an experimental design to establish stronger
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causal inferences. Ultimately, results across the three studies with different methodologies
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6 supported our theoretical model.
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8 STUDY 1
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Participants and Procedure
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13 Participants were full-time employees and their leaders from multiple organizations
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15 located in Eastern China. Participants worked in a variety of industries, including manufacturing,
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18 telecommunication, and banking. We intentionally recruited participants from multiple industries
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20 to increase generalizability and to avoid the contextual constraints associated with limited
21
22 industries (Rousseau & Fried, 2001). First, with the permission of an executive manager from
23
24
25 each organization, we asked the human resources managers to randomly select (with a random
26
27 number generator that matches with the employees’ work IDs) five workgroups and four to five
28
29
employees from each workgroup and schedule a time for us to deliver the surveys to them. The
30
31
32 chosen groups were all official departments within the organizations. We gathered all selected
33
34 employees in a large conference room and asked them to complete a pencil-and-paper based
35
36
37 questionnaire that assessed external motivation toward OCB, psychological entitlement,
38
39 interpersonal deviance, organizational deviance, and demographic information. Finally, group
40
41 leaders were gathered to evaluate the OCB of their employees who participated in the survey.
42
43
44 A total of 384 employees from 86 workgroups were invited to complete the surveys. A
45
46 total of 39 participants from four workgroups did not complete the surveys, leaving a final
47
48 sample of 345 employees from 82 workgroups (89.8% response rate). All participants completed
49
50
51 this study on a voluntary basis. The average organizational tenure for the employees (Mage =
52
53 32.05; 50.4% male) was 7.18 years. On average, the 82 group leaders (Mage = 39.39; 67.1% male)
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
1
2
3
had managed their groups for 5.98 years. The mean group size was 16.41 employees, ranging
4
5
6 from 4 to 72 (SD = 13.97).
7
8 Measures
9
10
11
All scale items underwent a back-translation process (c.f. Brislin, 1970) to ensure the
12
13 internal validity of our translated scales.
14
15 OCB. Employees’ OCB was evaluated by the group leaders using Farh, Hackett, and
16
17
18 Liang (2007)’s nine-item OCB scale. We chose this scale because national culture may affect the
19
20 perception and display of OCB. Specifically, because the Chinese culture is dominated by social
21
22 orientation and collectivism, the interpersonal dimension of OCB may be particularly valued.
23
24
25 Accordingly, this scale was developed and validated in China, thus reflecting these national
26
27 differences and ensuring high content validity (Farh, Zhong, & Organ, 2004). A sample item was
28
29
“initiates assistance to coworkers who have a heavy workload” (1 strongly disagree to 7 strongly
30
31
32 agree; α = .95).
33
34 External motivation toward OCB. Because extant measures of external motivation often
35
36
37 have specific reference points (e.g., toward one’s job, one’s education, etc.), we followed the
38
39 literature on motivation (Deci & Ryan, 1985) to develop a five-item external motivation scale
40
41 that specifically examined participants’ motivation for engaging in OCB. We first gave
42
43
44 participants a definition of OCB following Organ’s (1988) conceptualization. We then listed
45
46 several prototypical OCBs in the workplace (e.g., helping coworkers who have been absent) to
47
48 help employees more vividly understand the concept of OCB. A question then asked “most
49
50
51 employees have engaged in some forms of citizenship behavior in your organization. We are
52
53 wondering why do you engage in these behaviors?” (1 strongly disagree to 7 strongly agree; α
54
55
56
= .84). The items are “because I’ll get in trouble if I don’t”, “because that’s what I am supposed
57
58
59
60
1
2
3
to do”, “so that others won’t yell at me”, “so others won’t get mad at me”, and “because others
4
5
6 will reward me.” After our data collection period, Gagne et al. (2014) published a similar six-
7
8 item scale. To check the convergent validity of our scale, we sampled 170 participants on
9
10
11
Amazon Mechanical Turk. This scale correlated significantly and strongly with Gagne et al.’s
12
13 measure (r = .71, p < .01).
14
15 Psychological entitlement. We measured psychological entitlement with a nine-item self-
16
17
18 report scale developed and validated by Campbell et al. (2004). Specifically, we asked
19
20 participants to complete the scale based upon their own beliefs relative to others at their
21
22 organizations (1 strongly disagree to 7 strongly agree). Unfortunately, we were unable to
23
24
25 translate all nine items because some items involved specific cultural references not applicable to
26
27 a non-US sample (e.g., “If I were on the Titanic, I would deserve to be on the first lifeboat”).
28
29
Therefore, participants completed a four-item measure. These four items included “I honestly
30
31
32 feel I’m just more deserving than others”, “great things should come to me”, “I demand the best
33
34 because I’m worth it”, and “I deserve more things in my life” (α = .93).
35
36
37 Interpersonal/organizational deviance. We asked employees to self-report their
38
39 interpersonal/organizational deviance using the 19-item scale developed by Bennett and Robison
40
41 (2000) because these behaviors are usually done privately and without the knowledge of group
42
43
44 leaders. In addition, workplace deviance is commonly self-reported in prior research (Berry,
45
46 Ones, & Sackett, 2007). Seven items assessed interpersonal deviance. A sample item was “made
47
48 fun of someone at work” (α = .87). Twelve items assessed organizational deviance. A sample
49
50
51 item was “taken property from work without permission” (1 never to 7 always; α = .91).
52
53 Control variables. Because our study is correlational in nature, we controlled for several
54
55
56
relevant factors in order to carry out a conservative test of our hypotheses and to rule out
57
58
59
60
1
2
3
alternative explanations. At the individual level, we controlled for employee demographics
4
5
6 because these variables often correlate with workplace deviance (Berry et al., 2007). In addition,
7
8 because negative affect has been theorized as an alternative explanation of the relationship
9
10
11
between OCB and deviance (Dalal et al., 2009; Spector & Fox, 2010a), we controlled for
12
13 employees’ trait negative affect (e.g., irritable, hostile, ashamed) using the Positive and Negative
14
15 Affect Schedule (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). We specifically asked participants “in
16
17
18 general, to what extent do you feel this way?” (1 not at all to 7 very much). Finally, at the group-
19
20 level, we controlled for the demographic attributes of the group leader to ensure that ratings of
21
22 employees’ OCB did not vary as a function of the leaders themselves.
23
24
25 Results
26
27 Preliminary analyses. We first conducted a set of confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs) to
28
29
ensure that the five level-1 latent variables (OCB, external motivation toward OCB,
30
31
32 psychological entitlement, interpersonal deviance, and organizational deviance) had satisfactory
33
34 discriminant validity. The CFA results indicated that the five-factor model had a good fit to the
35
36
37 data, χ2 (314) = 950.32; χ2/df = 3.32; RMSEA= .08; IFI= .93; CFI= .93. Chi-square difference
38
39 tests showed that the five-factor model was superior to a four-factor model where items for
40
41 interpersonal and organizational deviance were set to load on one factor, ∆χ2[4] = 655.10, p < .01.
42
43
44 These results provided construct validity evidence of the five latent variables in the Chinese
45
46 context. Before running the HLM regression, chi-square tests suggested that the between-group
47
48 variances in psychological entitlement, χ2 (81) = 145.31, p < .01, ICC(1) = .15, interpersonal
49
50
51 deviance, χ2 (81) = 127.55, p< .01, ICC(1) = .12, and organizational deviance, χ2 (81) = 214.06, p
52
53 < .01, ICC(1) = .30, were all significant, thereby justifying the use of HLM to test our
54
55
56
hypotheses. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1.
57
58
59
60
1
2
3
Given that our data was nested in nature, we conducted hierarchical linear modeling
4
5
6 (HLM; with HLM 6.06; Raudenbush, Bryk, Cheong, & Congdon, 2004) with restricted
7
8 maximum likelihood estimation method to test our research hypotheses. All explanatory
9
10
11
variables (except gender which is a dummy variable) were standardized, and the individual-level
12
13 variables were grand-mean centered before entered into regressions to reduce potential
14
15 collinearity between the group-level intercept and slope terms (Hoffman & Gavin, 1998).
16
17
18 Although we did not hypothesize a main effect, we first examined whether OCB
19
20 exhibited main effects on interpersonal and organizational deviance. OCB was marginally
21
22 associated with interpersonal deviance (γ = .10, p = .08) and organizational deviance (γ = .10, p
23
24
25 = .05). The IV-to-DV interaction analyses revealed that OCB interacted with external motivation
26
27 to significantly affect organizational deviance (γ = .11, p < .05), but not interpersonal deviance (γ
28
29
= .07, p = .23).
30
31
32 The interaction between OCB and external motivation toward OCB on psychological
33
34 entitlement (H1). To test H1, we conducted a series of HLM regression models. In Model 1, we
35
36
37 entered all control variables. In Model 2, we entered OCB and external motivation as predictors.
38
39 In Model 3, we entered the interaction term, which was significantly related to psychological
40
41 entitlement (γ = .17, p < .05; see Table 2). Following the procedure suggested by Preacher,
42
43
44 Curran, and Bauer (2006), we graphed and calculated two simple slope tests. The relationship
45
46 between OCB and psychological entitlement was significant when external motivation toward
47
48 OCB was high (γ = .33, p < .01), but was not significant when external motivation toward OCB
49
50
51 was low (γ = .003, n.s.; see Figure 2). Thus, H1 was supported.
52
53 ----- Insert Tables 1 and 2 and Figure 2 about here -----
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
1
2
3
Moderated mediation (H2a and H2b). To test H2a and H2b, we followed the
4
5
6 bootstrapping-based analytic approach of Edwards and Lambert (2007) and the statistical
7
8 software of Hayes (2013) to test for a conditional indirect effect (with 10,000 resamples). We
9
10
11
first examined the moderated mediation model with interpersonal deviance as the dependent
12
13 variable. OCB was entered as the independent variable, external motivation toward OCB as the
14
15 first-stage moderator, and psychological entitlement as the mediator. When external motivation
16
17
18 toward OCB was low, the mediated model was not significant (coefficient = -.00, SE = .02, 95%
19
20 CI = -.04 to .03). When external motivation toward OCB was high, however, the mediated model
21
22 was significant (coefficient = .09, SE = .04, 95% CI = .03 to .18). We calculated the index of
23
24
25 moderated mediation (Hayes, 2015), and results revealed that the difference between the two
26
27 coefficients was also significant (coefficient = .11, SE = .08, 95% CI = .03 to .28). Because the
28
29
coefficient was positive, results suggested that OCB led to increased interpersonal deviance via
30
31
32 increased psychological entitlement, but only among those with high external motivation toward
33
34 OCB.
35
36
37 We next examined the moderated mediation model with organizational deviance as the
38
39 dependent variable. When external motivation toward OCB was low, the mediated model was
40
41 not significant (coefficient = -.00, SE = .02, 95% CI = -.04 to .02). When external motivation
42
43
44 toward OCB was high, however, the mediated model was significant (coefficient = .10, SE = .06,
45
46 95% CI = .03 to .24). We calculated the index of moderated mediation, and results revealed that
47
48 the difference between the two coefficients was also significant (coefficient = .10, SE = .06, 95%
49
50
51 CI = .02 to .22). Because the coefficient was positive, results suggested that OCB led to
52
53 increased organizational deviance via increased psychological entitlement, but only among those
54
55
56
with high external motivation toward OCB. Together, these findings support H2a and H2b.
57
58
59
60
1
2
3
Study 1 Discussion
4
5
6 Study 1 provides initial support for our hypotheses. Participants who engaged in OCB for
7
8 external reasons were more likely to display a sense of entitlement and subsequent deviant
9
10
11
behaviors. In the next study, we sought to constructively replicate these findings in several ways.
12
13 First, we adopted a two-wave survey design to boost the internal validity of the design. Second,
14
15 we strengthened the generalizability of our theoretical model by testing our hypotheses in the
16
17
18 United States. Third, we sought to test the cross-domain moral licensing hypothesis, namely
19
20 whether increased psychological entitlement as a result of OCB leads to deviance outside of the
21
22 workplace.
23
24
25 STUDY 2
26
27 Participants and Procedure
28
29
Participants were recruited through the Study Response Project, a non-profit research
30
31
32 project maintained by a large private university in the US (for a detailed description of this data
33
34 collection method, see www.studyresponse.net; for a recent example utilizing this data collection
35
36
37 method, see Yam, Fehr, & Barnes, 2014)2. With the assistance of the Study Response
38
39 administrators, we first pre-screened potential participants to select those that were 1) working
40
41 full-time, 2) willing to invite their supervisors to participate, and 3) willing to complete surveys
42
43
44 at two different time points. To minimize potential self-selection biases, participants were only
45
46 provided with a generic description of the intent of the study during the pre-screening process.
47
48 Administrators from the Study Response Project validated all supervisors’ email addresses.
49
50
51
52
53
54
2
55 The data reported in Study 2 were collected as part of a larger data collection. Findings in other data drawn from
56 the same collection effort have been reported in a separate article (Yam, Fehr, Keng-Highberger, Klotz, & Reynolds,
57 in press). None of the substantive variables in this article (i.e., IVs, mediators, moderators, and DVs) are used in the
58 other article.
59
60
1
2
3
A total of 283 focal employees expressed interest in participating. Surveys were sent to
4
5
6 each of these employees and their corresponding direct supervisors. A total of 180 dyads
7
8 successfully completed the study at both time points (63.6% response rate). On average,
9
10
11
employees were of 38.21 years old, 67.2% male, and 75.8% European-American; supervisors
12
13 were 41.59 years old, 70.1% male, and 76.5% European-American. All participants were
14
15 compensated with $7 at the end of the survey. At Time One (T1), employees completed
16
17
18 measures of external motivation toward OCB and psychological entitlement; supervisors rated
19
20 their employees’ OCB. At Time Two (T2), approximately two weeks later, employees completed
21
22 measures of interpersonal, organizational, and non-work deviance. To ensure measurement
23
24
25 validity, each focal variable was separated by a filler task or page break.
26
27 Measures
28
29
OCB. At T1, supervisors rated employees’ OCBs with the 16-item scale of Lee and Allen
30
31
32 (2002). Eight items captured the interpersonal dimension of OCB, and eight items captured the
33
34 organizational dimension of OCB. With each item, supervisors indicated how frequently the
35
36
37 focal employee engaged in a specific behavior in the past two weeks. Sample items included
38
39 “Help others who have been absent” and “Take action to protect the organization from potential
40
41 problems” (1 = never, 7 = always). Because the two subscales correlated very highly (r = .85, p
42
43
44 < .01), we combined the subscales to form an aggregated measure of OCB (α = .94).
45
46 External motivation toward OCB. We measured external motivation toward OCB at T1
47
48 as in Study 1. We first defined OCB as in Study 1 and asked focal employees to respond to the
49
50
51 five-item scale (α = .90).
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
1
2
3
Psychological entitlement. We measured psychological entitlement at T1 with the scale
4
5
6 developed by Campbell et al. (2014) as in Study 1. Because all subjects were from the United
7
8 States, we were able to utilize the full nine-item measure (α = .89).
9
10
11
Interpersonal/organizational deviance. At T2, employees self-reported their
12
13 interpersonal and organizational deviance with the same scale used in Study 1 (α = .95 and .97,
14
15 respectively).
16
17
18 Non-work deviance. Also at T2, we asked employees to self-report their deviant
19
20 behaviors outside of the organization. After a filler task in which participants were asked to
21
22 complete the Big-Five personality measures (Goldberg et al., 2006), we asked participants to
23
24
25 respond to the same interpersonal deviance scale with an adjusted reference point. Participants
26
27 were asked to respond to the seven interpersonal deviance items directed toward people outside
28
29
of the workplace. A sample item was “cursed at someone outside of work” (α = .96).
30
31
32 Controls. We controlled for demographic information for both supervisors and
33
34 employees and employees’ trait negative affect for the same reasons outlined in Study 1. In
35
36
37 addition, because prior studies have shown that employees’ behaviors are often driven by a mix
38
39 of autonomous and external motivation (e.g., Grant & Mayer, 2009), we controlled for
40
41 autonomous motivation at T1 by asking employees to answer a four-item scale after they have
42
43
44 read the definition of OCB (Grant, 2008). An introductory question then asked: Why do you
45
46 engage in these behaviors at work? A sample item was “because I enjoyed the behavior itself” (α
47
48 = .88).
49
50
51 Results
52
53 Preliminary analyses. We first conducted CFAs to ensure that our focal constructs (OCB,
54
55
56
external motivation, psychological entitlement, interpersonal, organizational, and non-work
57
58
59
60
1
2
3
deviance) had satisfactory discriminant validity. Results suggested that the six-factor structure
4
5
6 had a good fit to the data, χ2 (286) = 622.42; RMSEA= .07; IFI= .93; CFI= .92 and was superior
7
8 to models in which (a) the external motivation and psychological entitlement items were set to
9
10
11
load on a single factor, ∆χ2[4] = 36.40, p < .01 and (b) the three types of deviance were set to load
12
13 on a single factor, ∆χ2[5] = 23.96, p < .01. Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics.
14
15 Although we did not hypothesize a main effect, we first examined whether OCB
16
17
18 exhibited main effects on interpersonal, organizational, or non-work deviance. All main effects
19
20 were not significant (β = .01, p = .88; β = .03, p = .74; β = .08, p = .53). The IV-to-DV
21
22 interaction analyses revealed that OCB interacted with external motivation to significantly affect
23
24
25 interpersonal deviance (β = .15, p < .05), organizational deviance (β = .20, p < .01), and non-
26
27 work deviance (β = .32, p < .01).
28
29
30
The interaction between OCB and external motivation toward OCB on psychological
31
32 entitlement (H1). To test H1, we conducted an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. In
33
34 Model 1, all control variables were entered to predict psychological entitlement. In Model 2, we
35
36
37 entered OCB and external motivation. In Model 3, we entered the interaction term, which
38
39 resulted in a significant change in R2 (R2 = .44, ∆R2 = .03, p < .05) and a significant interaction
40
41 between OCB and external motivation toward OCB predicting psychological entitlement (β = .20,
42
43
44 p < .01; see Table 4 and Figure 3). We then statistically compared these two slopes to zero using
45
46 the simple slope test. When external motivation toward OCB was high, OCB significantly
47
48 predicted higher levels of psychological entitlement (β = .39, p < .01). When external motivation
49
50
51 toward OCB was low, however, OCB did not influence psychological entitlement as the slope
52
53 did not differ significantly from zero (β = -.06, p = .68). These results support H1, suggesting
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
1
2
3
that psychological entitlement only increased for those who engaged in OCB and had high
4
5
6 external motivation for engaging in OCB.
7
8 ----- Insert Tables 3, 4 and Figure 3 about here -----
9
10
11
Moderated mediation (H2a and H2b). To test H2a and H2b, we again followed the
12
13 bootstrapping-based analytic approach of Edwards and Lambert (2007) and the statistical
14
15 software of Hayes (2013) to test for conditional indirect effect (with 10,000 resamples). We first
16
17
18 examined the moderated mediation model with interpersonal deviance as the dependent variable.
19
20 OCB was entered as the independent variable, external motivation toward OCB as the first-stage
21
22 moderator, and psychological entitlement as the mediator. When external motivation toward
23
24
25 OCB was low, the mediated model was not significant (coefficient = .00, SE = .02, 95% CI = -
26
27 .04 to .05). When external motivation toward OCB was high, however, the mediated model was
28
29
significant (coefficient = .05, SE = .03, 95% CI = .003 to .13). We calculated the index of
30
31
32 moderated mediation (Hayes 2013), and results revealed that the difference between the two
33
34 coefficients was also significant (coefficient = .02, SE = .01, 95% CI = .001 to .06). Because the
35
36
37 coefficient was positive, results suggested that OCB led to increased interpersonal deviance via
38
39 increased psychological entitlement, but only among those with high external motivation toward
40
41 OCB.
42
43
44 We next examined the moderated mediation model with organizational deviance as the
45
46 dependent variable. When external motivation toward OCB was low, the mediated model was
47
48 not significant (coefficient = .001, SE = .02, 95% CI = -.04 to .05). When external motivation
49
50
51 toward OCB was high, however, the mediated model was significant (coefficient = .06, SE = .03,
52
53 95% CI = .01 to .14). We calculated the index of moderated mediation, and results revealed that
54
55
56
the difference between the two coefficients was also significant (coefficient = .02, SE = .01, 95%
57
58
59
60
1
2
3
CI = .001 to .06). Because the coefficient was positive, results suggested that OCB led to
4
5
6 increased organizational deviance via increased psychological entitlement, but only among those
7
8 with high external motivation toward OCB. Together, these findings support H2a and H2b,
9
10
11
suggesting that the results obtained in Study 1 are generalizable to a Western work context.
12
13 Cross domain moral licensing (H3). Hypothesis 3 posited that the conditional indirect
14
15 effect of OCB via increased psychological entitlement would extend to deviance outside of the
16
17
18 organization. To test this hypothesis, we utilized the same bootstrapping-based method used
19
20 before, except that non-work deviance was modeled as the dependent variable. Results suggested
21
22 that when external motivation toward OCB was low, the mediated model was not significant
23
24
25 (coefficient = .001, SE = .03, 95% CI = -.05 to .06). When external motivation toward OCB was
26
27 high, however, the mediated model was significant (coefficient = .06, SE = .05, 95% CI = .003
28
29
to .20). We calculated the index of moderated mediation (Hayes, 2013), and results revealed that
30
31
32 the difference between the two coefficients was also significant (coefficient = .02, SES = .02,
33
34 95% CI = .001 to .08). Because the coefficient was positive, results suggested that OCB led to
35
36
37 increased non-work deviance via increased psychological entitlement, but only among those with
38
39 high external motivation toward OCB. This finding supports H3, and suggests that the moral
40
41 licensing effect transcends organizational boundaries.
42
43
44 Study 2 Discussion
45
46 Together, Studies 1 and 2 provide strong support for our theoretical model. While each
47
48 study has its strengths, each also has limitations and neither were able to provide evidence for the
49
50
51 causal relationships proposed in our theoretical model. Therefore, we conducted an experiment
52
53 that tested our moderated mediation argument and addressed some of the limitations discussed
54
55
56
previously. Specifically, we used Gagne et al.’s (2014) scale of external motivation and
57
58
59
60
1
2
3
measured participants’ external motivation toward the specific OCB in which they engaged,
4
5
6 rather than general motivation towards all OCBs. Second, since social exchange theory posits
7
8 that externally-motivated OCB may lead to an imbalance in the social exchange process which
9
10
11
may cause employees to act deviantly, we controlled for social exchange processes in order to
12
13 rule out this alternative explanation of our findings. Finally, we also controlled for participants’
14
15 moral identity after they engaged in OCB to demonstrate the unique mediating role of
16
17
18 psychological entitlement.
19
20 STUDY 3
21
22 Participants and Procedure
23
24
25 We recruited 217 working adults from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) to
26
27 participate in this study (61.3% male; 78.8% Caucasian; Mage = 32.77). Because prior research
28
29
suggests that merely recalling (rather than actually engaging in) good behavior is sufficient for
30
31
32 moral licensing (Merritt et al., 2010), we tested our model by randomly assigning participants to
33
34 recall and write about either 1) past incidents of their OCBs, or 2) what they did at work the prior
35
36
37 day. After the writing task, participants completed measures on external motivation toward OCB,
38
39 psychological entitlement, a manipulation check item, and a behavioral measure of non-work
40
41 deviance.
42
43
44 Manipulation and Measures
45
46 OCB manipulation. We randomly assigned participants to either recall past incidents of
47
48 their OCBs (OCB-recall) or what they did at work the prior day (control). Participants in the
49
50
51 OCB-recall condition received the following instructions:
52
53 At one time or another while working as an employee, most of us may do something that
54 is not required but which is helpful for coworkers or the organization. For example, you
55
56
may have volunteered to help a coworker with his/her work-related problem, or adjusted
57
58
59
60
1
2
3
your work schedule to help accommodate other employers’ requests for time off. In the
4
5 space provided below, please type 3-5 sentences that describe what you did.
6
7 An example of a response from participants in the OCB-recall condition was: “My boss's
8
9 father recently passed away and she went out for a few days. I messaged her and told her that I
10
11
12 would be picking up all of her extra work that I could handle…” An example of a response from
13
14 participants in the control condition was: “At work I wrote a bunch of documents for clients. I
15
16
made phone calls. I answered phones…”
17
18
19 External motivation toward OCB. Gagne et al.’s (2014) workplace motivation scale
20
21 assesses each of the dimensions of work motivation as outlined by SDT. We used the six-item
22
23
24
scale for extrinsic regulation to measure external motivation. We asked participants to
25
26 specifically recall their motive of the behavior they just recalled. Sample items in the external
27
28 motivation scale are “to avoid being criticized by others” and “because I risk losing my job if I
29
30
31 don’t put enough effort in it” (1 strongly disagree to 7 strongly agree; α = .84).
32
33 Psychological entitlement. We measured psychological entitlement with the same nine-
34
35 item measure as in Study 2 (α = .89).
36
37
38 Non-work deviance. Because we wished to examine non-work deviance in a behavioral
39
40 manner, it was necessary to narrow it down to a specific behavior – cheating for extra
41
42
43
compensation. In this study, we measured non-work deviance with a well-validated measure in
44
45 the behavioral ethics literature (Yam, Chen, & Reynolds, 2014; Yam, Reynolds, & Hirsh, 2014).
46
47 Participants were given five math problems to complete, and were asked to find numbers that
48
49
50 would add up to ten. For each correctly solved problem, participants were told that they would
51
52 receive an additional $.50. We provided participants with a computerized calculator to aid their
53
54 calculations. When participants selected 2.77 and 7.15, for example, the program automatically
55
56
57 provided the summation (9.92) to participants to avoid accidental cheating. Unbeknownst to the
58
59
60
1
2
3
participants, none of the five problems were solvable and at the end of the study participants self-
4
5
6 reported the number of unsolvable math problems they “solved”. Non-work deviance was thus
7
8 operationalized as a continuous scale ranging from 0 to 5. Because participants were specifically
9
10
11
cheating from the experimenter, whom is not associated with the participants’ organizations, we
12
13 suggest that this is a valid behavioral measure for non-work deviance. Overall, a total of 57
14
15 (26.3%) participants engaged in non-work deviance, a rate similar to past research which used
16
17
18 this measure.
19
20 Manipulation check. To ensure that participants in the OCB-recall condition recalled
21
22 more OCBs, at the end of the study we asked participants whether the behaviors they recalled
23
24
25 were prosocial (1 strongly disagree to 7 strongly agree).
26
27 Controls. As with previous studies, we controlled for participants’ demographic
28
29
information. In addition, rather than controlling for trait negative affect, we controlled for in-situ
30
31
32 state negative affect (Watson et al., 1988). To isolate the effect of external motivation in our
33
34 hypothesis tests, we also controlled for introjected (e.g., “because it makes me feel proud of
35
36
37 myself”), identified (e.g., “because I personally consider it important to put efforts in this
38
39 behavior”), and intrinsic motivation (e.g., “because I have fun doing it”) using Gagne et al.’s
40
41 scale (2014). In addition, social exchange theory suggests that when employees are forced to
42
43
44 engage in OCB, they may retaliate in order to restore a balance (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005).
45
46 To rule out this alternative explanation, we controlled for social exchange processes using a four-
47
48 item measure (e.g., “my relationship with my supervisor/organization is characterized by mutual
49
50
51 trust”) developed by Colquitt, Baer, Long, and Halvorsen-Ganepola (2014). Finally, prior work
52
53 suggests that movement in one’s moral identity may also explain the moral licensing effect via
54
55
56
the moral credits pathway (Kouchaki, 2011). Because we are interested in examining the moral
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1
2
3
licensing effect via the moral credentials pathway of psychological entitlement, we controlled for
4
5
6 this alternative pathway of moral licensing using Aquino and Reed’s (2002) measure of moral
7
8 identity. Participants were first presented with nine positive moral traits and were asked to
9
10
11
respond to the survey questions. A sample item is “it would make me feel good to be a person
12
13 who has these characteristics”. All control variables were assessed after the experimental
14
15 manipulation and before the measure of psychological entitlement. Finally, all control variables
16
17
18 were assessed with seven-point scales, except for moral identity in which a five-point scale was
19
20 used.
21
22 Results
23
24
25 Descriptive statistics can be found in Table 5.
26
27 As with previous studies, we first examined whether OCB exhibited a main effect on
28
29
non-work deviance. Participants in the OCB-recall condition engaged in more non-work
30
31
32 deviance (M = 1.32, SD = 1.73) than participants in the control condition (M = .51, SD = 1.12), t
33
34 (215) = 4.01, p < .01. The IV-to-DV interaction analyses revealed that OCB interacted with
35
36
37 external motivation to significantly affect non-work deviance (β = .54, p < .01).
38
39 Manipulation check. Participants in the OCB-recall condition indicated that their
40
41 recalled behaviors were more prosocial (M = 5.74, SD = 1.41) than the behaviors of participants
42
43
44 in the control condition (M = 3.97, SD = 1.87), t(215) = 7.90, p < .01, suggesting that our
45
46 manipulation was successful.
47
48 The interaction between OCB and external motivation on psychological entitlement
49
50
51 (H1). We conducted an OLS regression to test H1. In Model 1, all control variables were entered
52
53 to predict psychological entitlement. In Model 2, we entered OCB and external motivation. In
54
55
56
Model 3, we entered the interaction term, which resulted in a significant change in R2 (R2 = .37,
57
58
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60
1
2
3
∆R2 = .02, p < .05) and a significant interaction between OCB and external motivation toward
4
5
6 OCB predicting psychological entitlement (β = .39, p < .05; see Table 6 and Figure 4). We then
7
8 statistically compared these two slopes to zero using the simple slope test. When external
9
10
11
motivation toward OCB was high, OCB significantly predicted higher levels of psychological
12
13 entitlement (β = .30, p < .05). When external motivation toward OCB was low, however, OCB
14
15 did not influence psychological entitlement as the slope did not differ significantly from zero (β
16
17
18 = .04, p = .74). These results support H1, suggesting that psychological entitlement only
19
20 increased for those who engaged in OCB and had high external motivation for engaging in OCB.
21
22 --- Insert Tables 5, 6 and Figure 4 about here ---
23
24
25 Cross domain moral licensing (H3). We utilized the same bootstrapping-based method
26
27 as in Studies 1 and 2 (Hayes, 2013; with 10,000 resamples). Controlling for moral identity, state
28
29
negative affect, social exchange processes, and the other types of motivation, results suggested
30
31
32 that when external motivation toward OCB was low, the mediated model was significant
33
34 (coefficient = .25, SE = .11, 95% CI = .05 to .49). When external motivation toward OCB was
35
36
37 high, the mediated model was also significant (coefficient = .62, SE = .16, 95% CI = .34 to 1.03).
38
39 We calculated the index of moderated mediation, and results revealed that the difference between
40
41 the two coefficients was significant (coefficient = .13, SES = .06, 95% CI = .02 to .27). Because
42
43
44 the coefficient was positive, results suggested that OCB led to increased non-work deviance via
45
46 increased psychological entitlement, and this effect was stronger among those with high external
47
48 motivation toward OCB, providing support for H3.
49
50
51 Post-hoc analyses. Although we controlled for two alternative explanations of our
52
53 findings (i.e., social exchange theory and the moral credits pathway of moral licensing theory),
54
55
56
we were also interested in examining their simultaneously mediating effect with psychological
57
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60
1
2
3
entitlement. Thus, we conducted a three-mediator moderated mediation analysis using the same
4
5
6 bootstrapping-based method (Hayes, 2013). Results indicated that only entitlement mediated the
7
8 effect between OCB and non-work deviance when external motivation was high (coefficient
9
10
11
= .62, SE = .16, 95% CI = .31 to .95). Neither social exchange (coefficient = .05, SE = .04, 95%
12
13 CI = -.01 to .15) nor moral identity (coefficient = .07, SE = .07, 95% CI = -.04 to .24) mediated
14
15 the effect when external motivation was high. These results provide further support for our
16
17
18 theoretical model, affirming the role of psychological entitlement in explaining the relationship
19
20 between OCB and deviance.
21
22 GENERAL DISCUSSION
23
24
25 Although OCBs were originally conceptualized as discretionary in nature, employees
26
27 often engage in them not because they want to, but because they feel compelled to do so by
28
29
extrinsic forces (Bolino et al., 2013; McAllister et al., 2007; Vigota-Gadot, 2006). Despite the
30
31
32 apparent prevalence of non-voluntary OCB, little is known about the effect of compulsory OCB
33
34 on employees’ attitudes and subsequent behaviors. Drawing from moral licensing and self-
35
36
37 determination theories, we demonstrated that OCBs driven by external motivation leave
38
39 employees with a heightened sense of psychological entitlement. We further showed that these
40
41 feelings of entitlement have a licensing effect on employees, freeing them to engage in
42
43
44 subsequent acts of deviance, both within and outside of the organization. Below, we discuss the
45
46 implications of our findings.
47
48 Theoretical Implications
49
50
51 The vast majority of work that has applied SDT has focused on the role of autonomous
52
53 motivation in facilitating beneficial behavior for employees and organizations. The reality
54
55
56
though, is that employee behavior, including OCB, is often under the influence of different forms
57
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1
2
3
of autonomous and external motivation (Grant et al., 2011; Grant & Mayer, 2009). That is,
4
5
6 employees go above and beyond the call of duty at times because they want to, and at other times
7
8 because they feel they have to (Bolino et al., 2013). Yet, beyond evidence suggesting that work
9
10
11
quality may decrease when autonomous motivation is low, we know little about the implications,
12
13 if any, of OCBs driven by external motivation. The results of this set of studies paint a more
14
15 complete picture of how SDT operates in organizations. We demonstrate that acts of citizenship
16
17
18 undertaken for external purposes have a direct effect on employee attitudes and in turn affect
19
20 their subsequent behaviors. Specifically, employees gain a sense of entitlement and engage in
21
22 deviant behaviors when they go above and beyond the call of duty as a result of external
23
24
25 motivation.
26
27 This work also contributes to our understanding of moral licensing in a number of ways.
28
29
First, although prior work has provided evidence that moral licensing occurs at the firm level in
30
31
32 organizations (Orimiston & Wong, 2013) and among families with regard to their home energy
33
34 consumption (Tiefenbeck, Staake, Roth, & Sachs, 2013), Studies 1 and 2 are among the first
35
36
37 investigations to demonstrate the moral licensing effect in organizations. Second, although the
38
39 mechanism via which good deeds lead to subsequent bad behavior has been heavily discussed in
40
41 the moral licensing literature, it has rarely been empirically demonstrated. Here, we provide
42
43
44 support for the mediating mechanism of psychological entitlement as one route through which
45
46 licensing occurs. Most importantly, whereas past research has provided some support for the
47
48 mediating mechanism of the moral credits pathway (e.g., Kouchaki, 2011), we suggest that
49
50
51 psychological entitlement may function as an underlying mechanism of the moral credentialing
52
53 process in moral licensing. Moreover, the results of Study 3 in particular indicate that externally
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55
56
motivated OCBs do not lead to subsequent deviant behavior as a result of elevation in one’s
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1
2
3
moral self-regard, as the moral credits model predicts; instead, our studies provide evidence that
4
5
6 the credentialing pathway of moral licensing is more likely to explain why employees sometimes
7
8 engage in deviance following being pressured into engaging in OCB.
9
10
11
In addition, these studies contribute to our growing understanding of the specific
12
13 conditions under which moral licensing will occur (e.g., Gneezy, Imas, Brown, Nelson, &
14
15 Norton, 2012). Despite these advances in our knowledge of when good deeds will license
16
17
18 subsequent bad behavior, the literature is relatively quiet concerning how the motives associated
19
20 with good deeds influence the extent to which moral licensing ensues. By incorporating the
21
22 predictions of SDT with moral licensing theory, our work highlights another theoretically
23
24
25 grounded condition under which moral licensing is especially likely to occur: when good deeds
26
27 are compelled by external motives. In doing so, the findings of these studies contribute back to
28
29
social psychology by suggesting that, to understand moral licensing, it is important to consider
30
31
32 the degree to which engagement in positive behaviors is self-determined, as it may influence
33
34 whether or not individuals will feel free to engage in subsequent deviant behavior.
35
36
37 Our research pursues a highly relevant yet understudied construct: psychological
38
39 entitlement. Entitlement has been examined in diverse fields such as personality (Campbell et al.,
40
41 2004) and social psychology (Zitek et al., 2010), and only recently in organizational behavior
42
43
44 (Harvey & Martinko, 2009). In this research, psychological entitlement played a critical
45
46 mediating role between one type of behavior and another, and we have both theoretical and
47
48 empirical bases for believing that psychological entitlement can affect a wide range of other
49
50
51 behaviors relevant to the organizational sciences. Thus, we believe that this research constitutes a
52
53 promising first step towards more fully understanding the role of psychological entitlement in the
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56
workplace.
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1
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3
This work also helps to resolve questions arising from theoretical and empirical research
4
5
6 suggesting that within persons, OCBs and deviance co-occur and are sometimes positively
7
8 correlated (Spector & Fox, 2010a). As described earlier, Dalal et al. (2009) found that the within-
9
10
11
person relationship between helping behaviors and deviant acts toward the organization was
12
13 positive and significant. While those authors proposed that the co-occurrence of OCBs and
14
15 deviance could be due to various affective events, these explanations remain theoretical. The
16
17
18 findings of our studies suggest that their results may also be partly due to the presence of
19
20 external motivations underlying helping behaviors. Controlling for trait negative affect in Studies
21
22 1 and 2 further strengthens the validity of this alternative conclusion. In other words, our
23
24
25 research presents an empirically-supported, complementary explanation, of the co-occurrence of
26
27 OCBs and deviance.
28
29
The results of Studies 2 and 3 also shed light on our growing understanding of how the
30
31
32 consequences of employee behavior at work can spillover into their lives outside of work. Prior
33
34 work in social psychology has demonstrated that moral licensing occurs across domains (e.g.,
35
36
37 Mazar & Zhong, 2010), and research in organizational behavior has found that OCB is positively
38
39 associated with family conflict (Bolino & Turnley, 2005). While research has argued that it is the
40
41 resource-depleting quality of good deeds at work that are chiefly responsible for subsequent
42
43
44 related deviance outside of the workplace (Halbesleben, Harvey, & Bolino, 2009), our findings
45
46 suggest that feelings of entitlement operate in a similar mediating fashion as a moral credential,
47
48 and therefore may underlie the connection between going above and beyond the call of duty at
49
50
51 work and conflict outside of work. In doing so, this work empirically demonstrates a previously
52
53 untested mechanism through which employees on the job requirements can negatively influence
54
55
56
their behaviors in non-work domains, thereby causing conflict with family members and peers.
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1
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3
Finally, this paper contributes to the development of a more complete understanding of
4
5
6 the potential negative consequences of OCBs. In a recent review of the dark side of citizenship
7
8 behavior, Bolino and colleagues (2013) called for more research that investigates precisely how
9
10
11
employee motives affect the outcomes of OCBs. Although the idea that OCBs driven by darker
12
13 motives can lead to negative outcomes relative to those driven by prosocial motives has been
14
15 around for some time (Bolino, 1999), this perspective has been criticized (Organ et al., 2006) and
16
17
18 has received little empirical support. Here, we provide some support for the idea that after
19
20 performing OCBs motivated for external reasons, employees may feel entitled to engage in
21
22 behavior that harms the organization.
23
24
25 Practical Implications
26
27 In addition to the theoretical contributions of this work, these findings also provide
28
29
guidance for practitioners. To begin, managers should be keenly aware of the tradeoffs involved
30
31
32 in using external motivation to encourage citizenship behaviors. Although it may not be realistic
33
34 to eliminate inducements for OCBs from the workplace, it is important that managers realize that
35
36
37 in addition to encouraging employees to go above and beyond, these inducements will also likely
38
39 result in employees feeling entitled. As a result, when managers increase pressure on their
40
41 employees to be good citizens, they may inadvertently be freeing them subsequently to behave
42
43
44 like bad apples either on the job or outside of work. If an organization views extrinsic rewards
45
46 for OCBs as a necessity, then the organization should also dedicate resources to more effectively
47
48 communicating ethical standards, monitoring employee behavior, and enforcing ethical conduct.
49
50
51 We suggest, however, that a more effective route would be to de-emphasize the role of extrinsic
52
53 rewards for OCBs. In other words, we believe that the key to avoiding the negative consequences
54
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56
of moral credentials is to create a culture that values and emphasizes the intrinsic value of OCBs.
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1
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3
Per Reynolds’ (2014) discussion of ethical cultures, perceptions of the purpose and value
4
5
6 of OCBs can be managed through different elements of the organization’s culture. For example,
7
8 the organization can more effectively craft and narrate stories of employees engaging in OCBs
9
10
11
not for the external rewards they receive but for the intrinsic value doing so provides. In this
12
13 same vein, top leadership should demonstrate OCBs without being extrinsically compensated for
14
15 doing so (Brown, Treviño & Harrison, 2005). The organization can revisit rituals associated with
16
17
18 OCBs (e.g., distribution of e-mails equating OCBs with extrinsic rewards) and reshape them to
19
20 more fully emphasize the intrinsic value of good behavior. The organization should also learn to
21
22 rely more heavily on informal rewards such as positive feedback and public praise for OCBs.
23
24
25 Finally, OCBs should be formally distributed throughout the organization and not reside in just
26
27 one division or department (e.g., Human Resources). Consistent with Treviño, Weaver, Gibson
28
29
and Toffler (1999) conclusion that organizations that communicate a values-based approach
30
31
32 yield more positive results than organizations adopting a compliance-based approach, we suggest
33
34 that a culture-wide emphasis on the intrinsic value of OCBs can reduce the need for and reliance
35
36
37 on external rewards for OCBs and should thereby reduce the negative and unwanted effects of
38
39 moral credentials.
40
41 Limitations and Future Research
42
43
44 Although we examined our theoretical model thoroughly (conducting both experimental
45
46 and field studies, utilizing both behavioral and other-report measures, etc.), we acknowledge that
47
48 both OCB and deviance have numerous behavioral manifestations. While we have tried to
49
50
51 consider these constructs in their most general forms, we recognize that more unique instances of
52
53 these behaviors may not conform to our theoretical model as the general forms did. For example,
54
55
56
researchers have differentiated different types of OCBs such as relational- versus task-focused
57
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60
1
2
3
(Settoon & Mossholder, 2002) and affiliative versus challenging (Grant & Mayer, 2009). Future
4
5
6 research should explore the consequences of these more unique behaviors when they are driven
7
8 by external motives. Second, although we triangulated our results with cross-cultural samples,
9
10
11
we did not consider culture as an important factor in this phenomenon. We recognize culture’s
12
13 pervasive influence and point to it as potential variable to consider in future research. Third,
14
15 although we controlled for two alternative explanations of our findings in Study 3, there are other
16
17
18 potential indicators of the broader social exchange relationship (e.g., reduced perceptions of
19
20 fairness) not examined and our indicator of social exchange relationship did not differentiate the
21
22 source of imbalanced social exchange (e.g., from the supervisor or organization). Future research
23
24
25 should examine the alternative explanation of social exchange more rigorously with broader
26
27 measures. Despite these limitations, we believe the findings of this research open at least four
28
29
avenues for future research in this area.
30
31
32 First, although our studies showed that the moral licensing effect associated with external
33
34 motivation led to deviant behavior both at work and outside of work, our data also revealed that
35
36
37 engaging in OCB alone (without taking the motives into account) did not lead to increased
38
39 deviance (except in Study 3). The lack of a main effect from OCB to deviance implies that there
40
41 are a number of other moderators that may drive the moral licensing effect and we urge future
42
43
44 researchers to continue explore these boundary conditions. Another implication is that perhaps
45
46 deviance is too distal from OCB. Most extant moral licensing research employed an
47
48 experimental design in which the IVs and DVs were separated by only minutes (e.g., Bradley-
49
50
51 Geist et al., 2010; Monin & Miller, 2001). As a result, organizational scholars must continue to
52
53 consider the underlying psychological mechanisms that drive the link between OCB and
54
55
56
deviance from a moral licensing perspective. Relatedly, although we only examined OCB as the
57
58
59
60
1
2
3
independent variable in this research, other prosocial forms of workplace behavior, such as
4
5
6 constructive voice (Morrison, 2011), can potentially cause the same effects found in our studies.
7
8 Second, future work should explore the conditions under which employees are more
9
10
11
likely to use their license in one domain versus another. For example, people who hold positive
12
13 attitudes about their jobs, their peers and supervisor, or their organization may be more likely to
14
15 seek out a non-work domain in which to engage in morally licensed deviance. As suggested by
16
17
18 Klotz and Bolino (2013), individuals may also avoid using their moral license in a domain that
19
20 conflicts with their identity orientation. In addition, employees also differ in the permeability
21
22 with which the boundaries between their work and personal lives are constructed (Ashforth,
23
24
25 Kreiner, & Fugate, 2000); those with more rigid boundaries between their work and home lives
26
27 should feel less entitled to engage in deviance at home as a result of OCBs at work and vice
28
29
versa. In other words, whether employees view themselves as segmenters/integrators can serve
30
31
32 as a potential moderator of the cross-domain moral licensing. Interestingly, any organizational
33
34 policies that prevent the expression of deviance may in fact paradoxically increase deviance
35
36
37 outside of work, an empirical question that awaits further attention.
38
39 Third, whereas past research has tended to focus on the moral credits pathway and we
40
41 focused on the moral credentials pathway of moral licensing, we encourage future work to
42
43
44 examine these two perspectives in tandem. Our theorizing suggests that individuals’ motivation
45
46 behind their good deeds determines which pathway they may choose to license subsequent
47
48 deviance. Whereas autonomous OCBs may lead to deviance primarily via the moral credits
49
50
51 pathway, we found that externally motivated OCBs led to deviance through a pathway akin to
52
53 moral credentialing. Importantly, however, although psychological entitlement shares many
54
55
56
similarities with moral credentials, they are not identical constructs. Therefore, we encourage
57
58
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1
2
3
scholars to examine other operationalizations of moral credentials to gain a more nuanced
4
5
6 understanding of the different mechanisms underlying moral licensing. Indeed, it may be that
7
8 credits, credentials, and psychological entitlement are three of many slightly different paths
9
10
11
through which morally laudable behavior leads to deviance.
12
13 Fourth and finally, while our results suggest that externally controlled OCBs at work
14
15 licensed deviance outside of the workplace via psychological entitlement, it is not clear the
16
17
18 extent to which moral credentials can account for these findings. Specifically, since we did not
19
20 measure the extent to which OCBs changed employees’ construals of their deviance outside of
21
22 work, we cannot conclude that psychological entitlement operates the same way as credentials
23
24
25 across domains. This is particularly important given that Effron and Monin (2010) argued that
26
27 cross-domain moral licensing is less likely to occur via credentials than via credits. Although our
28
29
studies provide evidence that the licensing that took place was not due to moral credits, future
30
31
32 scholars should continue to examine all possible mechanisms through which cross-domain
33
34 licensing may occur in order to better understand when citizenship at work will lead to
35
36
37 counterproductive behavior at home.
38
39 CONCLUSION
40
41 In this paper, we draw from moral licensing and self-determination theories to explain the
42
43
44
attitudinal and behavioral consequences of externally motivated OCBs. In three studies, we
45
46 demonstrate that employees who are compelled to engage in OCB later display a heightened
47
48 sense of entitlement, which in turn leads to deviance both within and outside of the organization.
49
50
51 Although the literature on external motive-driven workplace behavior is still in its nascence, we
52
53 hope our research is a first step toward a more complete understanding of external motivation
54
55 and its effects on job attitudes and organizational behavior.
56
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5
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3
4
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6
7
8 Table 1. Means, standard deviations, and correlations of the focal variables (Study 1; n = 345 at individual level, n = 82 at
9 group level)
10
11
12
Variables M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
13 Level 1 variables
14 1. Age 32.05 (7.48) —
15 2. Gender1 .50 (.50) .07 —
16 3. Negative affect 2.20 (.83) -.15* -.05 (.88)
17
18
4. OCB 5.44 (1.05) -.05 -.03 -.03 (.95)
19 5. External motivation 3.76 (1.38) .11* .09 .13* -.07 (.84)
20 6. Psychological entitlement 2.78 (1.52) .04 .11* .09 .06 .39** (.93)
21 7. Interpersonal deviance 1.70 (1.04) -.07 .20** .12* .10 .13* .23** (.87)
22 8. Organizational deviance 1.81 (.93) -.07 .10 .33** .11 .19** .32** .40** (.91)
23
Level 2 variables
24
25 1. Leader age 39.39 (6.75) .19 —
26 2. Leader gender .67 (.47) .14 .02
27
28 1
Dummy variable (1 = Male, 0 = Female)
29
30
*p < .05
31 **p < .01
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
1
2
3
Table 2. Summary of HLM results on psychological entitlement (Study 1; n = 345 at the individual level, n = 82 at the group
4
5 level)
6
7
8
9 DV = Psychological Entitlement
10 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
11 Variables γ SE γ SE γ SE
12
13
Intercept 3.42** .37 3.41** .32 3.34** .32
14 Individual-level controls
15 Age .14 .09 .11 .09 .11 .09
16 Gender1 .31 .16 .22 .15 .21 .15
17 Negative affect .12 .08 .05 .08 .05 .08
18
Group-level controls
19
20 Leader age −.19 .11 −.21* .09 −.21* .09
21 Leader gender1 .12 .21 .22 .18 .17 .18
22 Independent variables
23 External motivation .58** .08 .58** .08
24 OCB .15 .08 .17* .08
25
26
Interaction
27 OCB × External motivation .17* .08
28 R2a .00 .17 .02
29
30 1
31 a
32 R2 is calculated based on proportional reduction of error variance due to predictors in the models.
33 * p < .05
34 ** p < .01
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
1
2
3
Table 3. Means, standard deviations, and correlations of the focal variables (Study 2; N = 180 leader-follower dyads)
4
5
6 Variables M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
7 1. OCB 3.65 (.74) (.94)
8
2. External motv. 4.27 (1.52) -.15* (.90)
9
10 3. Psych. entitlement 3.32 (1.16) .05 .59** (.89)
11 4. Inter. deviance 1.45 (.74) .05 .16* .18* (.95)
12 5. Org. deviance 1.47 (.77) .03 .15+ .19** .56** (.97)
13 6. Nonwork deviance 2.09 (1.56) .08 .10 .14+ .55** .41** (.96)
14 7. Follower age 38.21 (9.23) .14 -.53** -.40** .21** .16* .14 (--)
15
16
8. Follower race1 1.50 (1.02) .06 .17* .14 -.05 -.03 -.07 -.15* (--)
17 9. Follower gender2 .67 (.47) -.03 .29** .15* -.18* -.16* -.11 -.27** .06 (--)
18 10. Leader age 41.59 (9.46) .02 -.19* -.09 .15* .16* .14 .15* .10 -.11 (--)
1
19 11. Leader race 1.56 (1.14) .05 .12 -.06 -.03 -.06 -.09 -.15* .06 -.06 -.06 (--)
20 12. Leader gender2 .70 (.46) -.10 .22** -.08 -.16* -.12 -.09 -.06 -.00 .10 -.17* .01 (--)
21
13. Negative affect 3.13 (.90) -.05 -.12 .22** .39** .46** .50** .15* -.07 -.25** .19* -.01 -.13 (.90)
22
23 14. Autonomous motv. 5.62 (.90) .09 -.17* -.21** .02 .08 .03 .13 .14 .02 -.13 .00 -.00 -.12 (.88)
24
1
25 Dummy variable (1 = White, 0 = Others)
26 2
27
28 +
29 p < .10
30 *p < .05
31 **p < .01
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
1
2
3
Table 4. Summary of regression results on psychological entitlement (Study 2; N = 180 leader-follower dyads)
4
5
8
Variables B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β
9
10 Follower age -.05 .01 -.40** -.02 .01 -.18* -.02 .01 -.20**
11 Follower race1 .04 .07 .03 -.01 .07 -.01 -.00 .06 -.01
12 Follower gender2 .05 .16 .02 .20 .15 .08 .24 .15 .10
13 Negative affect .26 .10 .11 .18 .11 .08 .18 .11 .09
14
Autonomous motivation -.37 .09 -.30** -.21 .08 -.17* -.25 .08 -.20**
15
16 Leader age -.01 .01 -.10 -.01 .01 -.08 -.01 .01 -.08
17 Leader race1 -.02 .07 -.02 -.06 .06 -.06 -.06 .06 -.07
18 Leader gender2 -.09 .17 -.04 .08 .15 .03 .06 .15 .02
19 OCB .27 .10 .18** -.61 .30 -.40*
20 External motivation .38 .06 .51** -.37 .25 -.50
21
22 OCB X External motivation .20 .07 1.08**
23 Adjusted R2 .21 .41 .44
24 ∆R2 .38** .03**
25
26 1
Dummy variable (1 = White, 0 = Others)
27 2
28 Dummy variable (1 = Male, 0 = Female)
29 *p < .05
30 **p < .01
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
1
2
3
Table 5. Means, standard deviations, and correlations of the focal variables (Study 3; N = 214)
4
5
6 Variables M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
7 1. OCB1 .52 (.50) (--)
8
2. External motv. 3.31 (1.41) -.08 (.84)
9
10 3. Psych. entitlement 3.13 (1.28) .25** .52** (.91)
11 4. Nonwork deviance .93 (1.52) .27** .45** .49** (--)
12 5. Social exchange 5.20 (1.30) -.06 -.08 -.09 -.16* (.93)
13 6. Introjected motv. 3.85 (1.48) -.07 .31** .12 .18* .24** (.83)
14 7. Identified motv. 5.03 (1.50) .02 .11 -.03 .06 .50** .58** (.93)
15
16
8. Intrinsic motv. 4.03 (1.77) -.12 .14* .09 .15* .36** .55** .52** (.95)
17 9. Negative affect 1.57 (.91) -.02 .10 .10 .15* .08 .09 .07 .06 (.94)
18 10. Moral identity 4.31 (.70) .16* .12 .15* .12 .24** .20** .42** .19** -.04 (.85)
19 11. Gender2 .61 (.49) .03 .02 -.03 -.03 .08 -.05 -.16* -.08 -.01 -.15* (--)
20 12. Age 32.77 (9.44) -.05 -.04 -.16* -.13 -.05 -.11 .03 .08 -.06 .07 .09 (--)
21
13. Race3 .79 (.41) .02 -.17* .15* -.12 -.06 -.07 -.08 -.05 .07 -.03 .02 .14* (--)
22
23
1
24 Dummy variable (1 = Experimental condition; 0 = Control)
2
25 Dummy variable (1 = Male; 0 = Female)
26 3
Dummy variable (1 = White; 0 = Others)
27
28
29 *p < .05
30 **p < .01
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
1
2
3
Table 6. Summary of regression results on psychological entitlement (Study 3; N = 217)
4
5
8
Variables B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β
9
10 Gender 1 -.09 .19 -.03 -.04 .16 -.02 -.01 .16 -.01
11 Age -.01 .01 -.05 -.02 .01 -.10 -.02 .01 -.12*
12 Race2 .13 .08 .12 .10 .07 .09 .10 .07 .08
13 Moral identity -.29 .14 -.15* .00 .12 .00 .02 .12 .01
14
Social exchange .09 .08 .09 .05 .07 .05 .05 .07 .05
15
16 Introjected motivation .19 .08 .22* .03 .07 .04 .03 .07 .03
17 Identified motivation -.15 .09 -.17 -.17 .08 -.20* -.15 .08 -.17*
18 Intrinsic motivation .02 .07 .03 .06 .06 .09 .06 .05 .08
19 State negative affect .14 .08 .12 .08 .07 .07 .09 .07 .07
20 OCB3 .89 .15 .34** .02 .39 .01
21
22 External motivation .47 .06 .52** .32 .08 .35**
23 OCB X External motivation .26 .11 .39*
24 Adjusted R2 .04 .36 .37
25 ∆R2 .31** .02*
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27 1
28 Dummy variable (1 = Male; 0 = Female)
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29 Dummy variable (1 = White; 0 = Others)
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30 Dummy variable (1 = OCB-recall, 0 = Control)
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32 *p < .05
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**p < .01
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8 Figure 1. Theoretical model of the current research
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11 External
12 Motivation toward
13 OCB Interpersonal
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Deviance
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17 H1 H2a
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20 Organizational Psychological Organizational
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Citizenship Behavior Entitlement H2b Deviance
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25 H3
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Non-Work
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Figure 2. The interactive effect between OCB and external motivation on psychological entitlement (Study 1)
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Psychological Entitlement
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15 Low External
16 3 Motivation
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High External
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Motivation
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Low OCB High OCB
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Low
17 3 External
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19 Motivation
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23 Motivation
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17 3 Low
18 External
19 Motivation
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22 2 External
23 Motivation
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28 Control OCB-Recall
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3 AUTHOR BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES
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5 Kai Chi Yam (bizykc@nus.edu.sg) is an assistant professor of management at the National
6 University of Singapore. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Washington. His
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research focuses on behavioral ethics, ethical leadership, and abusive supervision.
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9
10 Anthony C. Klotz (anthony.klotz@oregonstate.edu) is an assistant professor in the College
11 of Business at Oregon State University. He received his Ph.D. from the University of
12 Oklahoma's Price College of Business. His research interests include organizational
13 citizenship behavior, team conflict, and employee resignation.
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15 Wei He (whe@hust.edu.cn) is an assistant professor in the Department of Business
16 Administration at the School of Management at the Huazhong University of Science and
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Technology. He received his Ph.D. from the School of Management at the Huazhong
18
19 University of Science and Technology. His research interests include pay structure,
20 leadership, and employee proactive and deviance behaviors.
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22 Scott J. Reynolds (heyscott@uw.edu) is an associate professor of business ethics and the
23 Weyerhaeuser Faculty Fellow at the Michael G. Foster School of Business at the University
24 of Washington. He earned a Ph.D. from the University of Minnesota in business
25 administration. His research focuses on individual moral decision making.
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From Good Soldiers To Psychologically Entitled: Examining When and Why Citizenship Behavior Leads To Deviance

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From Good Soldiers To Psychologically Entitled: Examining When and Why Citizenship Behavior Leads To Deviance

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Academy of Management Journal

FROM GOOD SOLDIERS TO PSYCHOLOGICALLY ENTITLED:

Journal: Academy of Management Journal

Manuscript Type: Revision

Research has consistently demonstrated that organizational citizenship

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