G.R. No.

127255
G.R. No. 127255 August 14, 1997

JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R.

OSMEÑA, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, AND RONALDO B.
ZAMORA, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA, RODOLFO ALBANO, THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, AND
THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition challenging the

validity of Republic Act No. 8240, which amends certain
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-
called "sin taxes" (actually specific taxes) on the manufacture
and sale of beer and cigarettes.

Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They

brought this suit against respondents Jose de Venecia, Speaker
of the House of Representatives, Deputy Speaker Raul Daza,
Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano, the Executive Secretary, the
Secretary of Finance, and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners
claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is
tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives as H. No.

7198. This bill was approved on third reading on September 12,
1996 and transmitted on September 16, 1996 to the Senate
which approved it with certain amendments on third reading on
November 17, 1996. A bicameral conference committee was
formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and
Senate versions of the bill.

The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the

House at 8 a.m. on November 21, 1996. At 11:48 a.m., after a
recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of the Committee on Ways
and Means, proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech, after
which he was interpellate. Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento was first to
interpellate. He was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to
adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected to the
motion and asked for a head count. After a roll call, the Chair
(Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) declared the presence of a quorum.1
Rep. Arroyo appealed the ruling of the Chair, but his motion was
defeated when put to a vote. The interpellation of the sponsor
thereafter proceeded.

Petitioner Rep. Joker Arroyo registered to interpellate. He was

fourth in the order, following Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento, Rep. Edcel
C. Lagman and Rep. Enrique Garcia. In the course of his
interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise
a question on the quorum, although until the end of his
interpellation he never did. What happened thereafter is shown in
the following transcript of the session on November 21, 1996 of
the House of Representatives, as published by Congress in the
newspaper issues of December 5 and 6, 1996:

MR. ALBANO. MR. Speaker, I move that we now approved

and ratify the conference committee report.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the

motion?

MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none,

approved.

(Gavel)

MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood
up. I want to know what is the question that the Chair asked
the distinguished sponsor.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is

suspended for one minute.

(It was 3:01 p.m.)

(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed.

MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four

o'clock, Wednesday, next week.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned

until four o'clock, Wednesday, next week.
(It was 3:40 p.m.)

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House
of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified
by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as
having been finally passed by the House of Representatives and
by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was
signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22,
1996.

Petitioners claim that there are actually four different version of

the transcript of this portion of Rep. Arroyo's interpellation: (1)
the transcript of audio-sound recording of the proceedings in the
session hall immediately after the session adjourned at 3:40 p.m.
on November 21, 1996, which petitioner Rep. Edcel C. Lagman
obtained from he operators of the sound system; (2) the
transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of
November 21, 1996, as certified by the Chief of the Transcription
Division on November 21, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman;
(3) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m.
of November 21, 1996 as certified by the Chief of the
Transcription Division on November 28, 1996, also obtained by
Rep. Lagman; and (4) the published version abovequoted.
According to petitioners, the four versions differ on three points,
to wit: (1) in the audio-sound recording the word "approved,"
which appears on line 13 in the three other versions, cannot be
heard; (2) in the transcript certified on November 21, 1996 the
world "no" on line 17 appears only once, while in the other
versions it is repeated three times; and (3) the published version
does not contain the sentence "(Y)ou better prepare for a
quorum because I will raise the question of the quorum," which
appears in the other versions.

Petitioners' allegations are vehemently denied by respondents.

However, there is no need to discuss this point as petitioners
have announced that, in order to expedite the resolution of this
petition, they admit, without conceding, the correctness of the
transcripts relied upon by the respondents. Petitioners agree that
for purposes of this proceeding the word "approved" appears in
the transcripts.

Only the proceedings of the House of Representatives on the

conference committee report on H. No. 7198 are in question.
Petitioners' principal argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and
void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House;
that these rules embody the "constitutional mandate" in Art. VI,
§16(3) that "each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings" and that, consequently, violation of the House rules
is a violation of the Constitution itself. They contend that the
certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly
passed is false and spurious.

More specifically, petitioners charge that (1) in violation of Rule

VIII, §35 and Rule XVII, §103 of the rules of the House, 2 the
Chair, in submitting the conference committee report to the
House, did not call for the years or nays, but simply asked for its
approval by motion in order to prevent petitioner Arroyo from
questioning the presence of a quorum; (2) in violation of Rule
XIX, §112, 3 the Chair deliberately ignored Rep. Arroyo's
question, "What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?" and did not repeat Rep.
Albano's motion to approve or ratify; (3) in violation of Rule XVI,
§97,4 the Chair refused to recognize Rep. Arroyo and instead
proceeded to act on Rep. Albano's motion and afterward
declared the report approved; and (4) in violation of Rule XX,
§§121-122, Rule XXI, §123, and Rule XVIII, §109, 5 the Chair
suspended the session without first ruling on Rep. Arroyo's
question which, it is alleged, is a point of order or a privileged
motion. It is argued that Rep. Arroyo's query should have been
resolved upon the resumption of the session on November 28,
1996, because the parliamentary situation at the time of the
adjournment remained upon the resumption of the session.

Petitioners also charge that the session was hastily adjourned at

3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996 and the bill certified by Speaker
Jose De Venecia to prevent petitioner Rep. Arroyo from formally
challenging the existence of a quorum and asking for a
reconsideration.

Petitioners urge the Court not to feel bound by the certification of

the Speaker of the House that the law had been properly passed,
considering the Court's power under Art. VIII, §1 to pass on
claims of grave abuse of discretion by the other departments of
the government, and they ask for a reexamination of Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance, 6 which affirmed the conclusiveness of an
enrolled bill, in view of the changed membership of the Court.

The Solicitor General filed a comment in behalf of all

respondents. In addition, respondent De Venecia filed a
supplemental comment. Respondents' defense is anchored on
the principle of separation of powers and the enrolled bill
doctrine. They argue that the Court is not the proper forum for
the enforcement of the rules of the House and that there is no
justification for reconsidering the enrolled bill doctrine. Although
the Constitution provides in Art. VI, §16(3) for the adoption by
each House of its rules of proceedings, enforcement of the rules
cannot be sought in the courts except insofar as they implement
constitutional requirements such as that relating to three
readings on separate days before a bill may be passed. At all
events, respondents contend that, in passing the bill which
became R.A. No. 8240, the rules of the House, as well as
parliamentary precedents for approval of conference committee
reports on mere motion, were faithfully observed.

In his supplemental comment, respondent De Venecia denies

that his certification of H. No. 7198 is false and spurious and
contends that under the journal entry rule, the judicial inquiry
sought by the petitioners is barred. Indeed, Journal No. 39 of the
House of Representatives, covering the sessions of November 20
and 21, 1996, shows that "On Motion of Mr. Albano, there being
no objection, the Body approved the Conference Committee
Report on House Bill No. 7198." 7 This Journal was approved on
December 2, 1996 over the lone objection of petitioner Rep.
Lagman. 8

After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no

ground for holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of
discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is therefore
dismissed.

First. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to

have been violated in the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely
internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional
requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, §§26-27.
Petitioners do not claim that there was no quorum but only that,
by some maneuver allegedly in violation of the rules of the
House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning
the presence of a quorum.

Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant

to the constitutional provision that "each House may determine
the rules of its proceedings" 9 and that for this reason they are
judicially enforceable. To begin with, this contention stands the
principle on its head. In the decided cases, 10 the constitutional
provision that "each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings" was invoked by parties, although not successfully,
precisely to support claims of autonomy of the legislative branch
to conduct its business free from interference by courts. Here
petitioners cite the provision for the opposite purpose of invoking
judicial review.

But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of

expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire into
allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to
comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there
was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private
individuals. In Osmeña v. Pendatun, 11 it was held: "At any rate,
courts have declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative
bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the
pleasure of the body adopting them.' And it has been said that
'Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their
observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative body.' Consequently, 'mere failure
to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action
(taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of
members have agreed to a particular measure.'"

In United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 12 the rules was stated
thus: "The Constitution empowers each house to determine its
rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional
restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a
reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding
established by the rule and the result which is sought to be
attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are
open to the determination of the House, and it is no
impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be
better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the
validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in
force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not one
which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power,
always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the
limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any
other body or tribunal."

In Crawford v. Gilchrist, 13 it was held: "The provision that each

House shall determine the rules of its proceedings does not
restrict the power given to a mere formulation of standing rules,
or to the proceedings of the body in ordinary legislative matters;
but in the absence of constitutional restraints, and when
exercised by a majority of a constitutional quorum, such authority
extends to a determination of the propriety and effect of any
action as it is taken by the body as it proceeds in the exercise of
any power, in the transaction of any business, or in the
performance of any duty conferred upon it by the Constitution."

In State ex rel. City Loan & Savings Co. v. Moore, 14 the Supreme
Court of Ohio stated: "The provision for reconsideration is no part
of the Constitution and is therefore entirely within the control of
the General Assembly. Having made the rule, it should be
regarded, but a failure to regard it is not the subject-matter of
judicial inquiry. It has been decided by the courts of last resort of
many states, and also by the United States Supreme Court, that a
legislative act will not be declared invalid for noncompliance with
rules."

In State v. Savings Bank, 15 the Supreme Court of Errors of

Connecticut declared itself as follows: "The Constitution declares
that each house shall determine the rules of its own proceedings
and shall have all powers necessary for a branch of the
Legislature of a free and independent state. Rules of proceedings
are the servants of the House and subject to its authority. This
authority may be abused, but when the House has acted in a
matter clearly within its power, it would be an unwarranted
invasion of the independence of the legislative department for
the court to set aside such action as void because it may think
that the House has misconstrued or departed from its own rules
of procedure."

In McDonald v. State, 16 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held:

"When it appears that an act was so passed, no inquiry will be
permitted to ascertain whether the two houses have or have not
complied strictly with their own rules in their procedure upon the
bill, intermediate its introduction and final passage. The
presumption is conclusive that they have done so. We think no
court has ever declared an act of the legislature void for non-
compliance with the rules of procedure made by itself , or the
respective branches thereof, and which it or they may change or
suspend at will. If there are any such adjudications, we decline to
follow them."

Schweizer v. Territory 17 is illustrative of the rule in these cases.

The 1893 Statutes of Oklahoma provided for three readings on
separate days before a bill may be passed by each house of the
legislature, with the proviso that in case of an emergency the
house concerned may, by two-thirds vote, suspend the operation
of the rule. Plaintiff was convicted in the district court of violation
of a law punishing gambling. He appealed contending that the
gambling statute was not properly passed by the legislature
because the suspension of the rule on three readings had not
been approved by the requisite two-thirds vote. Dismissing this
contention, the State Supreme Court of Oklahoma held:

We have no constitutional provision requiring that the

legislature should read a bill in any particular manner. It may,
then, read or deliberate upon a bill as it sees fit. either in
accordance with its own rules, or in violation thereof, or
without making any rules. The provision of section 17
referred to is merely a statutory provision for the direction of
the legislature in its action upon proposed measures. It
receives its entire force from legislative sanction, and it
exists only at legislative pleasure. The failure of the
legislature to properly weigh and consider an act, its
passage through the legislature in a hasty manner, might be
reasons for the governor withholding his signature thereto;
but this alone, even though it is shown to be a violation of a
rule which the legislature had made to govern its own
proceedings, could be no reason for the court's refusing its
enforcement after it was actually passed by a majority of
each branch of the legislature, and duly signed by the
governor. The courts cannot declare an act of the legislature
void on account of noncompliance with rules of procedure
made by itself to govern its deliberations. McDonald v. State,
80 Wis. 407, 50 N.W. 185; In re Ryan, 80 Wis. 414, 50 N.W.
187; State v. Brown, 33 S.C. 151, 11 S.E. 641; Railway Co. v.
Gill, 54 Ark. 101, 15 S.W. 18.

We conclude this survey with the useful summary of the rulings

by former Chief Justice Fernando, commenting on the power of
each House of Congress to determine its rules of proceedings.
He wrote:

Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view

is that they are subject to revocation, modification or waiver
at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are
primarily procedural. Courts ordinary have no concern with
their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to
them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if
the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular
measure. The above principle is subject, however, to this
qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule
affects person other than members of the legislative body
the question presented is necessarily judicial in character.
Even its validity is open to question in a case where private
rights are involved. 18

In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only

those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House,
chose to transfer the dispute to this Court. We have no more
power to look into the internal proceedings of a House than
members of that House have to look over our shoulders, as long
as no violation of constitutional provisions is shown.

Petitioners must realize that each of the three departments of our

government has its separate sphere which the others may not
invade without upsetting the delicate balance on which our
constitutional order rests. Due regard for the working of our
system of government, more than mere comity, compels
reluctance on our part to enter upon an inquiry into an alleged
violation of the rules of the House. We must accordingly decline
the invitation to exercise our power.

Second. Petitioners, quoting former Chief Justice Roberto

Concepcion's sponsorship in the Constitutional Commission,
contend that under Art. VIII, §1, "nothing involving abuse of
discretion [by the other branches of the government] amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction is beyond judicial review." 19
Implicit in this statement of the former Chief Justice, however, is
an acknowledgment that the jurisdiction of this Court is subject
to the case and controversy requirement of Art. VIII. §5 and,
therefore, to the requirement of a justiciable controversy before
courts can adjudicate constitutional questions such as those
which arise in the field of foreign relations. For while Art. VIII, §1
has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry into areas normally
left to the political departments to decide, such as those relating
to national security, 20 it has not altogether done away with
political questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign
relations. As we have already held, under Art. VIII, §1, this Court's
function

is merely [to] check whether or not the governmental

branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits
of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In
the absence of a showing . . . [of] grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the
Court to exercise its corrective power. . . . It has no power to
look into what it thinks is apparent error. 21

If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act
of the legislature void on account merely of noncompliance with
rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does
not present a situation in which a branch of the government has
"gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction" so as to
call for the exercise of our Art. VIII. §1 power.

Third. Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in the House
was "railroaded." They claim that Rep. Arroyo was still making a
query to the Chair when the latter declared Rep. Albano's motion
approved.

What happened is that, after Rep. Arroyo's interpellation of the

sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano
moved for the approval and ratification of the conference
committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the
motion. Then the Chair declared: "There being none, approved."
At the same time the Chair was saying this, however, Rep. Arroyo
was asking, "What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?" The Chair and Rep.
Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo
subsequently objected to the Majority Leader's motion, the
approval of the conference committee report had by then already
been declared by the Chair, symbolized by its banging of the
gavel.

Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the rules of the House,

Rep. Albano's motion for the approval of the conference
committee report should have been stated by the Chair and later
the individual votes of the members should have been taken.
They say that the method used in this case is a legislator's
nightmare because it suggests unanimity when the fact was that
one or some legislators opposed the report.

No rule of the House of Representative has been cited which

specifically requires that in case such as this involving approval of
a conference committee report, the Chair must restate the
motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting. On the other
hand, as the Solicitor General has pointed out, the manner in
which the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was
approval was by no means a unique one. It has basis in legislative
practice. It was the way the conference committee report on the
bills which became the Local Government Code of 1991 and the
conference committee report on the bills amending the Tariff and
Customs Code were approved.

In 1957, the practice was questioned as being contrary to the

rules of the House. The point was answered by Majority Leader
Arturo M. Tolentino and his answer became the ruling of the Chair
Mr. Tolentino said:

Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a

unanimous action of the House. Insofar as the matter of
procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent since I
came here seven years ago, and it has been the procedure in
this House that if somebody objects, then a debate follows
and after the debate, then the voting comes in.

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Speaker, a point of order was raised by the gentleman

from Leyte, and I wonder what his attitude is nor on his point
of order. I should just like to state that I believe that we have
had a substantial compliance with the Rules. The Rule
invoked is not one that refers to statutory or constitutional
requirement, and a substantial compliance, to my mind, is
sufficient. When the Chair announces the vote by saying "Is
there any objection?" and nobody objects, then the Chair
announces "The bill is approved on second reading." If there
was any doubt as to the vote, any motion to divide would
have been proper. So, if that motion is not presented, we
assume that the House approves the measure. So I believe
there is substantial compliance here, and if anybody wants a
division of the House he can always ask for it, and the Chair
can announce how many are in favor and how many are
against. 22

Indeed, it is no impeachment of the method to say that some

other way would be better, more accurate and even more just. 23
The advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly of a
method do not present any matter for judicial consideration. 24 In
the words of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, "this Court cannot
provide a second opinion on what is the best procedure.
Notwithstanding the deference and esteem that is properly
tendered to individual congressional actors, our deference and
esteem for the institution as a whole and for the constitutional
command that the institution be allowed to manage its own
affairs precludes us from even attempting a diagnosis of the
problem." 25

Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of
the Members be taken every time a House has to vote, except
only in the following instances; upon the last and third readings of
: