SUBJECT: POLITICAL SCIENCE IV

TEACHER: MS. DEEPIKA GAHATRAJ

MODULE: VII, CENTRE-STATE RELATIONSHIP

TENSION AREAS IN CENTRE-STATE RELATIONS (Part 2)

Role of Governor
As our constitution embodies the parliamentary or cabinet system of government of the
British model both for the centre and the states, the Governor imitates Her Majesty, the
Queen, within his microcosm. In all constitutional functions, it is the Council of Ministers,
which acts collectively to aid and advice the Governor in the exercise of his functions
except when he is required to exercise his functions in his discretion {Article 163). This
does not mean that he must accept its advice immediately and automatically. But may ask
his Council of Ministers to reconsider its advice to which he is ultimately bound to accept.
Similarly, while exercising the discretionary powers, the Governor cannot behave like a
despot because the President of India can restrain him or even dismiss him, as a last resort.
The Governor has unique role to play in India’s federal system. But his role has always been
a controversial issue almost ever since the inception of this high office. It has become an
important and irritating ingredient in centre-state relations. The very mode of his
appointment and the misuse of his discretionary powers were the centre of controversy. K.V.
Rao says, “today at the root of all troubles is the simple fact that the Head of the State is
neither chosen by that state nor is he responsible to it, nor removable.” By the very method
of appointment and removal, the Governor becomes subordinate to the President and events
prove that he cannot disobey him. K.V. Rao distinguishes between his role as a ‘link’ and
that of an ‘agent’. His role as a link is more positive than the role as an agent. He cannot be
both these things at the same time. He should be a reflection of the state government, but
not its antithesis nor a spy of the centre. Leaving aside the discussion as to what an ideal
situation would be, the post 1967 period shows that the Governor is today more an agent of
the centre rather than of the state. It is observed that over the years, the parties in power at
the centre misused this institution to serve their vested interests. Their partisan and selfish
acts have reduced the Indian federalism into a mockery of state autonomy. Sudhanshu
Tripathi, a writer felt that “some of the Governors themselves sold to the wishes of political
masters at the centre causing abysmal fall of their constitutional authority.

Discretionary Powers of the Governor

Article 163 makes the Governor sole judge in matters in which he is required to act in his
discretion. The constitution visualizes situations where he is to act in his discretion and not

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on the advice of the Council of Ministers. The decision of the Governor in his discretion
shall be final and the validity of anything done by the Governor shall not be called in
question on the ground that he ought or ought not to have acted in his discretion. Moreover,
what is his discretionary field of activities is also left to his discretion.
Although the phrase ‘in his discretion’ is mentioned in the constitution, the provisions
relating to the exercise of these powers are couched in general and vague terms. K.V. Rao a
noted political scientist lays the blame for this vagueness on the defective composition of
the Constituent Assembly and lack of time at the disposal of the assembly. He says “the
whole set of articles numbering about 20 concerning the state governments were passed in a
hurry in one day that the whole constitution and its structure was envisaged in such a way as
if the Congress and its then High command would be in power for a long time.” The
authority of the Govenor even in the discretionary field is not unrestrained. If it is misused
either because of personal ambitions or as partisan in the currents and cross currents of state
politics, the President can always check him. If necessary, he may even remove him.
Therefore, “discretion has to be exercised so as not to jeopardize the working of
Parliamentary democracy.”
The following are some instances where an opportunity arises for the Governor, to exercise
his discretion.
> He determines whether the government of a state can or cannot be carried on in
accordance with the provisions of the constitution. If he feels that it cannot be carried on, he
can make a report to the President under Art. 356 (1).
> If after the general elections, no single party is able to secure a clear majority or post-
election splits reduce the majority to a minority, the Governor can use his discretion to
determine which party has the best chances of forming a stable government.
> In case, the Governor concludes that none of the parties represented in the legislature is in
a position to form a stable government, he can in his discretion dissolve the legislature and
order fresh elections.
> The Governor can reserve a bill or bills passed by the state legislature for consideration of
the President
> In case, a Ministry refuses to resign following its defeat on a crucial policy issue.
> In case, the Governor finds the Chief Minster’s non-compliance with his advice
tantamounting to a violation of the spirit of the constitution;
> In case, he is satisfied that the Chief Minister has lost his majority in the Assembly.
> In case, the Governor has reasons to believe that, the state government is engaged in
activities, which are likely to endanger national security and social harmony.
It is alleged that several Governors exercised their discretionary powers extensively and
created a good deal of public controversy. They often acted with partisan attitude and as
agents of the party in power at the centre. In the name of discretionary powers, they misused
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their powers with regard to different areas of the administration of the state. They are
discussed below.

(a) Appointing Chief Ministers

The Governor has nothing to do with his discretion in the appointment of the Chief Minister
as long as the political party staking claim for formation of government commands clear
majority. This did not pose any problem till 1967 because the Congress enjoyed a
comfortable majority both at the centre and in the states. The Post-1967 period, posed a
dilemma as the Congress after the General Election of 1967 was reduced to a minority in
eight states. Several questions of importance arose. In case there is a hung assembly and the
situation is fluid, the discretionary role of the Governor becomes very important. Dr. Iqbal
Narayan calls it as the ‘situational discretion.’6 It means if a single party secures majority
seats, then the Governor is left with no choice except appointing the majority party leader
as the Chief Minister of a state. But if no party is able to command the confidence of
majority of Members of the Assembly, then there is an ample scope for the Governor to act
in his discretion. Under these circumstances, should he ask the leader of the single largest
party or group of parties merged in a coalition to form the government.
Noted constitutional experts have supported the view that the leader of the opposition be
invited if he is sure of providing a stable government. K.Subba Rao opines that the leader of
the opposition be invited unless his chances of forming the government are quite bleak. The
term stability is taken to mean not only the numerical superiority of the ruling party but also
its ability to hold on to the majority strength and continuing with it.” In both the above
given cases the problem becomes embarrassing and complicated due to the presence of
independents in the legislature and defections from one party to the other (this problem has
come down to the maximum extent after anti-defection law was made in 1989). No easy
solutions are available and “whichever minority party or group of parties was called upon to
form a government, stood the chance of converting itself into a majority by securing the
support of defectors from other parties by promising ministerial office to the leaders of the
defector.”
A close observation of state politics in India over the years makes it crystal clear that there
is no unanimity of practice whether the Governor of a state has to invite single largest party
leader as the Chief Minister or a leader of the combined front of different political parties.
Here the Governor “may exercise his unlimited discretion in appointing a Chief Minister
either by inviting the leader of the single largest party or alliance in the assembly closest to
majority or may choose the favorite of the centre and give him enough time to muster a
visible majority” as the Governor of Jharkhand did at the behest of centre. This may be the
Congress again in some states and asking it to form the government would be wrong

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because “the voters may or may not have voted in favour of the opposition, but one thing is
clear that they certainly voted against the Congress.”
There are several instances where the governors have adopted divergent norms to guide
their behaviour. In the first general elections held in Madras state in 1952 the Communists,
Socialists, Kissan Mazdoor Party formed a front, gained major seats, and elected T.
Prakasam as their leader. But the Governor, instead of inviting T. Prakasam to form the
government, invited the congress party leader to form the government on the pretext that the
party emerged as a single largest party. Again, in 1967 the Governor of Rajasthan invited the
leader of the largest party, the Congress, ignoring the claim of the United Front, which had
92 out of 184 MLAs at its back. While the same did not happen in some of the cases. For
instance, in 1965, the Governor of Kerala did not invite the leader of the single largest party
CPI to form a government. The same happened in Bengal in 1971, Haryana in 1982 and
Utter Pradesh in 1993 and 1996 (where BJP emerged as the single largest party). It may be
inferred from these examples that the Governors acted in such a way, which is beneficial to
the ruling party at the centre.

REFERENCES:
https://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/84660/12/12_chapter%204.pdf