Realist-Constructivism and the India–

Pakistan Conflict: A New Theoretical

Approach for an Old Rivalry

Arndt Michael

The India–Pakistan conflict, one of the oldest unresolved interstate conflicts in the world,
began in 1947 and has shown no signs of abating. Both realist and constructivist
interpretations have offered several differing explanations as to the roots and persistence of
this conflict. The article argues that a realist-constructivist approach as suggested by Samuel
Barkin provides a new and better angle for explaining the genesis, evolution, and persistence
of the India–Pakistan conflict, in addition to allowing prediction of future developments.
Importantly, realist-constructivism combines several different analytical dimensions: It looks
at the way in which power structures affect patterns of normative change in international
relations and, conversely, the way in which a particular set of norms affects power structures.
Both these dimensions have been overlooked as variables that can explain why it will be
difficult to come up with lasting solutions for the India–Pakistan conflict.

Key words: realist-constructivism, international relations theory, Indian foreign policy, Kashmir,
Pakistan foreign policy

印巴冲突始于1947年, 它是世界上历时最长的, 还未解决的国家间冲突之一, 且该冲突没有

任何减弱的迹象。针对该冲突的根源和持久性, 现实主义和建构主义都给出了几个不同的
解释。本文主张, 塞缪尔
巴金（Samuel Barkin）提出的现实建构主义不仅为解释印巴冲
突的起源、发展和持久性提供了新的, 更好的角度, 同时还允许对未来发展进行预测。重要
的是, 现实建构主义结合了几个不同的分析维度：（一方面）它关注了权力结构如何影响
国际关系中规范性变化的模式, 相反地, （另一方面）还关注了一套特定的规范如何影响权
力结构。这些维度作为不同变量能解释为何给印巴冲突想出一个长久的解决方案是如此困
难, 但这些维度都受到了忽视。

关键词： 现实建构主义, 国际关系理论, 印度外交政策, 克什米尔, 巴基斯坦外交政策

Arndt Michael is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Freiburg (Germany), Depart-

ment of Political Science. His book India’s Foreign Policy and Regional Multilateralism
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) received the Arnold-Bergstraesser-Award 2012
for Political Science (University of Freiburg, Germany), the Cecil B. Currey Book Award
2013 from the Association of Third World Studies (ATWS, USA), and the Gisela Bonn
Award 2013 from the German-Indo-Society (Deutsch-Indische-Gesellschaft, Germany).

DOI: 10.1111/aspp.12365
Asian Politics & Policy—Volume 10, Number 1—Pages 100–114
V
C 2018 Policy Studies Organization. Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
 Realist-Constructivism and India–Pakistan Conflict 101

El conflicto entre India y Paquist
an, uno de los conflictos interestatales m
as viejos
sin resolver en el mundo, empez
o en 1947 y no ha mostrado se~ nales de mermar.
Tanto las interpretaciones constructivistas como las realistas han ofrecido diferentes
explicaciones para las ra
ıces y persistencia de este conflicto. El art
ıculo argumenta
que un acercamiento realista constructivista como lo sugiere Samuel Barkin provee
un nuevo y mejor
angulo para explicar la g
enesis, evoluci
on y persistencia del
conflicto entre India y Paquist
an, adem
as de permitir la predicci

on de los futuros
desarrollos. Importantemente, el realismo constructivismo combina varias
dimensiones anal
ıticas diferentes: Examina la forma en que las estructuras de poder
afectan los patrones del cambio normativo en las relaciones internacionales y,
conversamente, la forma en que un set particular de normas afecta las estructuras
de poder. Ambas dimensiones han sido ignoradas como variables que pueden
explicar por qu
e ser
a dif
ıcil encontrar soluciones duraderas para el conflicto entre
India y Paquist
an.

Palabras clave: realismo constructivismo, Teor
ıa de Relaciones Internacionales, pol
ıtica extranjera

en la India, Kashmir, pol
ıtica exterior en Paquist

an

F ollowing the 1947 partition of British India into the two separate states of
India and Pakistan, the latter two have enjoyed an uneasy relationship.
Until 2017, the two states have fought three major wars (1947–1948, 1965, 1971)
and a minor one (1999), as well as having experienced uncountable bilateral
politico-economic crises. This very conflict has now turned into one of the lon-
gest existing interstate conflicts in the world.
Overall, the factors that most scholars have used to explain the India–Paki-
stan conflict are either based on territory, identity, religion, or ideology.
According to explanations focusing on territory, the chief cause of this conflict
is the inability of the two countries to agree on a mutually acceptable settlement
over the state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), a former princely state that origi-
nally acceded to India in 1947. Another explanation for the India–Pakistan con-
flict posits that the two countries’ national identities and religious belief
systems are mutually incompatible and in a state of virtual competition. India’s
identity is based on democratic and secular beliefs, whereas Pakistan’s identity
is based on a nonsecular, Islamic, and authoritarian identity. Related to this,
another argument forwarded is that the India–Pakistan conflict is based on dif-
fering images of nationalism and statehood. The Indian nationalist movement
and postindependence constitution were based on secular and civic national-
ism, while Pakistan was founded based on religious and ethnic nationalism, a
consequence of the “two-nation theory” that argued that Hindus and Muslims
were essentially two completely different nations, both of whom deserved their
own state (Cohen, 2005, pp. 28–31).
The analytical state of affairs of this conflict can be described mostly as
atheoretical, with a focus rather on the roots and historical developments
(Basrur, 2010). To be sure, there are countless realist—and to a lesser degree
neo-realist—interpretations of the India–Pakistan conflict (Chellaney, 1999;
Dixit, 2002, 2003; Ganguly, 2001; Ganguly & Hagerty, 2005; Majumdar, 2004;
Nanda, 2001; Nayar & Paul, 2004; Rajagopalan, 2005), but these are mostly
102 Asian Politics & Policy—Volume 10, Issue 1—2018

based on a political-realist approach, not on a classic International Relations

(IR) realist one. Also, democratic peace theory has been used to explain the
conflict (Russett, 1993) as well as constructivist analyses (Chatterjee, 2008).
From a structural perspective, political scientist T. V. Paul focused on power
asymmetries (Paul, 2006, pp. 600–601) and proposed three crucial factors
responsible for examining the power distribution between the two states,
assessing it as one of truncated asymmetry: military balance, the strategy and
tactics of both states, and the role of great powers as balancers between the
two states. The longevity of this conflict has also been attributed to a lack of
internal or external shocks which could have acted as a catalyst for transform-
ing the conflict (Paul, 2005).
While all the above is expedient in explaining some elements of this ongo-
ing conflict, I argue that a realist-constructivist approach as first outlined by
Barkin (2003, 2010) provides a better angle for explaining the genesis, evolu-
tion, and persistence of the India–Pakistan conflict, in addition to allowing to
predict future developments. This article hence recommends realist-
constructivism as an alternative theory. Essentially, such an approach pro-
vides a fertile amalgamation of both realism and constructivism, incorporat-
ing their different tenets. As Barkin (2010) stated: “Both constructivism and
realism often suffer from a castle syndrome, in which they are seen as para-
digms, as exclusive and self-contained research orientations for the study of
international relations” (p. 154). Instead, realist-constructivism focuses on sev-
eral different analytical dimensions: it looks at the way in which power struc-
tures affect patterns of normative change in international relations and,
conversely, the way in which a set of norms affect power structures (Barkin,
2003, p. 337). More concretely, “the role of a realist-constructivist, then, is to
examine, sceptically from a moral perspective, the interrelationships between
power and international norms” (Barkin, 2003, p. 337). Barkin (2010) further
notes that “the resulting synthesis is one that brings from classical realism a
focus on power politics and on foreign policy, and from constructivism a
focus on, and a methodology for studying, the coconstitution of structures
and agent” (p. 7).
Based on the above, the article is structured as follows: following this
introduction, the second section outlines major tenets of both classic real-
ism and constructivism. The third section then provides a closer look at
the major phases and events of the Indo–Pakistani conflict. The penulti-
mate section applies the tenets of both realism and constructivism to the
conflict. The final section combines the two strands and makes the case for
a synthesis, hence a realist-constructivist analysis of the India–Pakistan
conflict.

World Views Colliding? Major Tenets of Realism

and Constructivism
Although it appears that realism even today remains the most influential par-
adigm in IR, one can certainly not speak of a consistent body of realist-related
ideas and characteristics (Wohlforth, 2008, pp. 131–149). On the contrary, real-
ism is informed by assumptions which are often divergent, with ensuing
 Realist-Constructivism and India–Pakistan Conflict 103

divergent implications. As Snyder (2002) noted: “The field of international rela-

tions now has at least two varieties of ‘structural realism’, probably three kinds
of offensive realism, and several types of defensive realism; in addition to ‘neo-
classical’, ‘contingent’, ‘specific’ and ‘generalist realism’” (pp. 149–150). Histori-
cally, two major approaches toward realism have dominated IR and turned
into paradigms, namely Morgenthau’s classic realism and Waltz’s structural
realism. Classic realism is about the general role of power, the balance of power
in the relations between states, unrestrained autonomy of politics in anarchical
environment, and statecraft. Morgenthau’s realism (1947, 1948) basically used
ideas derived from human nature, regarded as permanent and unchanging, as
an important variable in explaining the behavior of states: States principally
behave like egoistic, self-centered and self-preserving units. Conflicting state
interests collide in the international arena whose major characteristic is anar-
chy. More concretely, according to Robert Gilpin (1986), “[. . .] in the final arbi-
ter of things political is power” (p. 304). Waltz (1988) refers to “self-help,”
which means the nonexistence of a higher sovereign that has the power to
impose order and/or arbitrate disputes. The state is bound to survive amid
competition, always threatened by the possibility of destruction. The one major
and only legitimate interest of a state is its own self-preservation by means of
its own national interest. Security, then, is a major responsibility of the state.
Hence, states are forced to rely on themselves and are compelled to build up
their own power, consider the power of other states, and define their interests
in terms of power. This striving for power is mainly caused by the insecurity of
states in the anarchic international order (Waltz, 1988). The consequence is a
vicious circle: when states attempt to increase their own power, this increase
might threaten other states, which in turn attempt to increase their own
power. All this, in the final analysis, leads to a reduction of the security of
every stakeholder in the system. This “security dilemma” is a prominent
characteristic and lasting trait of the anarchic international order. Concrete
phenomena such as shifting alliances, arms races and all out wars are in their
entirety the consequences of this. Accordingly, questions of ethics for classic
realism are situational and/or contextual, with a definitive absence of any
kind of normative disposition in foreign policy. Instead, states pursue their
national interests which are defined in terms of power. Hence, realism is
based upon the interplay of necessity and pragmatism, turning realism into a
doctrine of statecraft.
Conversely, constructivism is fundamentally a social theory of IR, drawing on
sociological concepts of ideas and norms. Influential IR constructivists include,
for example, Peter Katzenstein (1996), Friedrich Kratochwil (1989), Nicholas
Onuf (1989), or Alexander Wendt (1999). Constructivism focuses on ideas, log-
ics of appropriateness, norms, rules, and discourses. It examines the social and
intersubjective “construction” of international relation, focusing on the relation-
ship between agent and structure. Wendt (1999), for example, argued that
agents and structures are mutually constitutive. Importantly, historical contin-
gency is assumed. The social world for constructivists consists of thoughts,
beliefs, concepts, ideas, languages, signs, or narratives. The social world is
intersubjectively constituted. The construction of this world is done by those
who are part of this world, who live in it and who can influence it. This way of
104 Asian Politics & Policy—Volume 10, Issue 1—2018

constructing the social world takes place in a way that allows those who live in
it to comprehend it; their world is also based on material entities. The latter can
be construed as concepts which receive meaning by the very ideas which are
held about those same entities (Jackson & Sorensen, 2003, pp. 254–255). Impor-
tantly, the beliefs of individuals and/or peoples about sovereignty, statehood,
or national identity are crucial features that ultimately need to be taken into
consideration (Jackson & Sorensen, 2003, p. 255).
In terms of cultures of international politics, Wendt (1999) identified three
different (macro-)levels which he termed Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian.
First, the Hobbesian culture defines the international system in anarchical terms;
it implies power competition and a perpetuation of the images of mutual
enmity held by neighbors. Conversely, and secondly, the Lockean culture
defines order in terms of entitlements and rights and creates prospects of peace
among like-minded and similar states. And third, the Kantian culture of demo-
cratic rationalism can be a genuinely pacifist culture if it is universalized
through the system. Consequently, these three distinct cultures fit with three
unique roles which a state can assume, namely that of an enemy, a rival, and a
friend. Significantly, these cultures are distinctive also in terms of how states
visualize one another. There is always a possibility of change in those images,
and of transformation.
In short, the nation-state for constructivists is constituted through beliefs of a
group of people which are organized as and into a nation. This state is contin-
gent and ideologically constructed. It is based on a belief by the people that
they have constituted a sort of “national community” which has a specific, dif-
ferent identity. Here, states are still unitary actors which possess special identi-
ties and interests and have the capacity for institutionalized collective action.
However, a state articulates and defines such interest based on changeable and,
most importantly, endogenous identities. Identities evolve through basic social
processes. The pursuit of power as well as self-interest is socially constructed
and contingent. In the final analysis, the distribution of capabilities is consti-
tuted by the distribution of interests in the system; those interests, in turn, are
basically ideas. As an important consequence, power, and interests are hence
culturally constituted.
The idea of intersubjectivity has important ramifications, in two distinct
ways: If a community of people (e.g., a nation-state) harbors a positive image of
a (perceived) sense of collective identity, this leads to a process of looking at the
“other.” Taking such a perspective already has the seed of contrasting one’s
own identity with the “other.” Therefore, identities have the power to bind, yet
they can also separate. Constructivism, thus, examines possibilities of coopera-
tion and how to create and possibly sustain relations in the social or political
sphere, despite existing differences toward the “other.” In sum, all ideational
frameworks are necessarily contingent, distinctively historical, and intersubjec-
tively constituted. For constructivist research, it is of utmost significance to take
empirically observable categories of IR—such as trade, commerce, general
capabilities, or institutions—and to examine the role of shared norms, beliefs,
and intersubjective understanding which form the bedrock of these.
Regarding conflicts (interstate, domestic, etc.), these are conceptualized in
normative terms; they can be based on disagreements, disputes, or lack of
 Realist-Constructivism and India–Pakistan Conflict 105

communication. Conflicts are first and foremost ideational, not material; they
might be traceable to diverging interpretations of facts. In a constructivist anal-
ysis, causality which underlies conflicts is contested and takes a backseat vis-

a-vis opposing or dissenting perceptions. In short: conflicts are intimately
related to such perceptions. Politics of identity classify and determine enemies,
friends, or neutrals. Anarchy, as realists argue, is no longer the determining fac-
tor. In concrete terms, the following security-related examples demonstrate the
different emphases of constructivists: National security is analyzed by looking at
the influence of identity, norms, and culture on security-related policies. Simi-
larly, the preconditions and parameters of military intervention are determined
normatively and/or by institutional arrangements. And nuclear weapons and
their related doctrines/policies are evaluated by looking at the parameters of a
specific strategic culture or norms that either prescribe or condition their use.
In sum, realist and constructivist explanations of power and conflict are
based on fundamentally differing perspectives and interpretations. Naturally,
both approaches provide quite different answers to the question of how order
can be upheld or conflicts be solved. Following this general outline of major
tenets of realism and constructivism, the next section will examine major
phases and/or events of the Indo–Pakistani conflict and then continue with a
synthesis of both approaches using the Indo–Pakistani conflict as the matrix of
analysis.

Genesis and Phases of the Indo–Pakistani Conflict, 1947–2017

The history of India’s relations with Pakistan has seen many critical phases.
External actors such as the former Soviet Union, the United States, or China
supported either India or Pakistan, essentially acting as external balancers.
Also, on an individual level, there were several unsuccessful efforts by leaders
to contribute to d
etente in the region. All in all, the problems at the time of par-
tition were vast, encompassing the dispute over the precise demarcation of
boundaries, the minorities’ question, the settlement of evacuee property, the
refugee inflow and outflow, or the sharing of river waters (Brines, 1968).
Besides this, an important ideological component played a decisive role.
Michael Brecher (1959) pointed out that Kashmir symbolized the root of the
conflict, “the final test of the validity of the two-nation theory, the basis of Paki-
stan which rent the subcontinent asunder in 1947” (p. 277).
The Kashmir problem originated in the process of partition. Following the
tribal infiltration from the Pakistani side in October 1947 (the first Indo–Paki-
stani war), the United Nations (UN) Security Council was brought into play by
India which charged Pakistan with an act of aggression (according to Article 35
UN Charter). After accepting Kashmir’s accession on October 26, 1947, then
Governor-General of India, Lord Louis Mountbatten, made it clear that the
question of Kashmir’s accession should be eventually settled by a referendum
(Menon, 1985, pp. 399–400). Pakistan, in principle, agreed to such a plebiscite. It
did, however, also demand that India withdraw its troops, that Sheikh Abdul-
lah’s government, the then government in power, be substituted by a coalition
government and that a plebiscite was to be held under international auspices.
India rejected these conditions. Under UN auspices, a ceasefire was then agreed
106 Asian Politics & Policy—Volume 10, Issue 1—2018

on December 31, 1948. Six years later, the Constituent Assembly of J&K offi-
cially ratified the state’s accession to India in 1954, and the Constitution of J&K
was then adopted finally in November 1956. India formalized this accession of
J&K on January 26, 1957 (Gupta, 1966). What followed was a period of uncer-
tainty, marked by regular small-scale clashes along the border as well as regu-
lar unsuccessful attempts by Pakistan to internationalize the conflict.
Because of international mediation and assistance by the World Bank, the
Indus Waters Treaty was nonetheless concluded between India and Pakistan in
1960 (Sahni, 2006), symbolizing the success of cooperative efforts and defusing
one of the major problems still stemming from the partition. At the same time,
a strategic partnership developed between China and Pakistan in the 1960s,
also a reaction to the Indo–China war of 1962. In 1965, the second Indo–Paki-
stani war took place, leading to the Tashkent Declaration. The situation
between the two countries remained tense, and India subsequently felt com-
pelled to seek the support of the Soviet Union, leading to the Indo–Soviet treaty
of Friendship in August 1971. The third Indo–Pakistani war which took place
shortly afterward, from December 3 to 15, 1971, had a devastating effect on
Pakistan, resulting in a complete military defeat and the separation of the east-
ern wing of its territory, concomitantly leading to the birth of Bangladesh.
However, this secession of East Pakistan in a way consolidated Pakistan’s mili-
tary in the West, essentially narrowing down the capability asymmetry with
India along the international border and in Kashmir. After this war, the Shimla
Agreement was signed in July 1972. It was meant to end the hostilities and pro-
vide for a set of rules governing the relationship. It explicitly ruled out interven-
tion by third parties on the Kashmir issue, and both sides agreed to refrain
from the threat or use of force in violation of the Line of Control (LoC). Clause 4
(II) of the agreement for example states that in J&K and Kashmir the LoC result-
ing from the ceasefire of December 17, 1971 shall be respected by both sides
without prejudice to the recognized position of either side. This clause adds
that “neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally irrespective of mutual differ-
ences and legal interpretation” (Government of India, 1972, pp. 192–193).
The period after the Shimla Agreement saw a slight improvement in bilateral
relation, with diplomatic relations effectively being restored in the second half
of the 1970s during the Janata government. To improve the relations between
the two countries, then Indian foreign minister A. B. Vajpayee officially visited
Pakistan, which led to widespread criticism on both sides and was especially
criticized as the Janata regime lending legitimacy to military rule in Pakistan
which began in 1977. Subsequently, Pakistan suggested a no-war pact in the
early 1980s, but this was rejected by India as it felt that the pact would essen-
tially dilute the Shimla Agreement. The Indian government, in turn, suggested
a treaty of peace, friendship, and cooperation, which was rejected by Pakistan.
Later, a formal agreement on the establishment of a joint commission and sub-
sidiary commissions was signed by the foreign ministers in March 1983. Fol-
lowing this, India–Pakistan relations did not show any significant
improvements for over a decade despite changes of governments in both coun-
tries (Dixit, 1996, pp. 113–140). Pakistani interference in Kashmir and its role in
organizing insurgency in the state continued unabated, and secretary-level
talks were discontinued in 1994.
 Realist-Constructivism and India–Pakistan Conflict 107

In the early 1990s, there were intense consultations between Pakistan and the
United States to find a mutually acceptable compromise that would allow the
United States to resume military and economic assistance to Pakistan, which
had been stopped earlier. Regarding Kashmir, Pakistan attempted time and
again to internationalize the conflict. It tabled a resolution on Kashmir in the
UN Commission for Human Rights at Geneva in February 1994 and sought to
involve the political committee of the UN General Assembly in the Kashmir
issue, but failed.
The India–Pakistan conflict dynamics also affected other issues in the region,
particularly the South Asian regional cooperation efforts in the form of the
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), founded in 1985
after seven years of protracted negotiations between seven states of South Asia,
and a related South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (Michael, 2013, pp. 57–
112). On the bilateral front, attempts at continuing the secretary-level dialogue
proved difficult and experienced permanent up and downs. In 1996, then Prime
Minister Dewe Gowda suggested the resumption of the secretary-level talks
that had been discontinued since 1994. A meeting took place on June 23, 1997
with several areas for dialogue having been identified, including J&K. These
talks already broke down in September 1997. In January 1998, a Tripartite Sum-
mit then took place in Dhaka. Then Prime Minister I. K. Gujral and Nawaz Sha-
rif agreed over new modalities of the dialogue, but no follow-up action took
place.
The nuclear tests conducted by the National Democratic Alliance govern-
ment, led by the Bharatiya Janata Party, on May 11 and 13, 1998, and similar
tests conducted by Pakistan shortly afterward on May 28, changed the strategic
landscape for both countries, again bringing the question of Kashmir into new
focus. India subsequently announced a unilateral moratorium on tests, fol-
lowed by an offer of an agreement on a no-first use of nuclear weapons and
expressed its willingness for nuclear confidence building measures at the bilat-
eral level (Government of India, 1998). Pakistan rejected the Indian proposal for
a no-first use of nuclear weapons agreement.
The much-awaited next meeting between the prime ministers of India and
Pakistan took place on July 29, 1998 and it was agreed to resume the dialogue
process stalled in June. The foreign secretaries held two rounds of talks on July
29, 1998, but failed to reach any sort of conclusion. After the failure of the talks
at the level of the foreign secretaries on the sidelines of the 10th SAARC Sum-
mit in Colombo on July 31, 1998, the Indian and Pakistani prime ministers met
again during the Non-Aligned Movement Summit in Durban early September
to work out the modalities of resuming the bilateral dialogue. An agreement
was later drafted to resume the dialogue under a “two plus six” formulation of
the agenda. There was also an important agreement to start a bus service
between New Delhi and Lahore. This was followed by then Indian Prime
Minister Vajpayee’s famous and much publicized bus trip to Lahore and the
ensuing signing of the Lahore Declaration on February 21, 1999—an attempt to
dramatically improve, if not completely restart bilateral relations, basically
following the ideas expressed in the Shimla Agreement and hence focusing on
solving the Indo–Pakistani problems bilaterally, without third party mediation.
The Lahore Declaration, the joint statement, and the Memorandum of
108 Asian Politics & Policy—Volume 10, Issue 1—2018

Understanding bound both countries to a dialogue process on a wide range of

issues (Government of India, 1999, pp. 16–19).
Soon after the Lahore Declaration, intruders from the Pakistani side, mainly
Taliban mercenaries, aided and assisted by Pakistan’s regular army, crossed the
LoC all along the Kargil sector, in violation of the principles embodied in the
Lahore Declaration (Kargil Review Committee, 2000). The Kargil conflict was
brief and proved completely unsuccessful for Pakistan. Pervez Musharraf sub-
sequently became the new leader of Pakistan on October 12, 1999. He visited
India in July 2001 in response to Vajpayee’s invitation. An India–Pakistan sum-
mit held at Agra during July 15–16, 2001 again discussed a wide range of issues;
however, no progress was made (Government of India, 2002, pp. 8–9). Follow-
ing the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 in the United States, Pakistan
joined the U.S.-led war on terrorism, leading in turn to vast military and eco-
nomic aid for Pakistan by the United States.
All in all, the relations between India and Pakistan only slightly improved
between 2001 and 2016. One important event that took place was that then
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh held personal talks in 2008 with Paki-
stani President Musharraf over J&K. In November 2008, there were terrorist
attacks in Mumbai when 10 members of Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Pakistan-based
Islamic terrorist group, killed 166 civilians, which again led to a drastic increase
in tensions between the two countries. In 2011, there suddenly seemed signs of
a thawing in relations between the two countries: Pakistan declared that it
wished to grant India “most favoured nation” status. In 2012, S. M. Krishna, the
then Indian foreign minister, and Rehman Malik, the then Pakistani interior
minister, signed a new visa agreement which finally enabled people from both
countries to obtain travel visas in the other country. Presently, there are still
regular skirmishes between Indian and Pakistani forces at the LoC in Kashmir.
This uneasy relationship between India and Pakistan has also remained
unchanged under Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in office since May
2014, with a foreign-secretary dialogue having been arranged, yet subsequently
cancelled due to several LoC violations originating from Pakistan in 2016 and
2017.
This brief historic overview needs to be expanded by a closer look at the indi-
vidual defense expenditures as an important indicator for state capacity. Since
1947, Pakistan has devoted a considerable portion of its national resources to
matching or balancing Indian military capabilities, leading Ayesha Jalal (1995)
to describe Pakistan’s political economy as “defense-oriented” rather than
development-oriented (p. 142). Throughout the 1950s, Pakistan spent around
4% of its gross national product (GNP) on defense, seen as an essential invest-
ment by the Pakistani political elite (Papanek, 1967, p. 240). In his study of the
India–Pakistan conflict, Rajagopalan (2005) has provided an account of the dif-
ferences in defense spending over a period of 40 years (p. 157): By the late
1960s, Pakistan’s defense spending took up almost 6% of its GNP, while the
Indian figure was about 3%. In absolute terms, India spent between six and
seven times the amount spent by Pakistan on defense. In 1970, Pakistan spent
5.75% of its GNP on defense, which amounted to US$325 million (in current
US$ value); India, in turn, spent 2.99% of its GNP, amounting to US$2.43 bil-
lion. By 1975, Pakistan was using 6.28% of its GNP on defense (US$622 million),
 Realist-Constructivism and India–Pakistan Conflict 109

while India was using 3.32% of its GNP on defense (US$3.3 billion). Through
the rest of the decade, Pakistan’s defense spending of 5% of its GNP remained
nearly twice as high as India’s. In the 1980s, India’s defense expenditures hov-
ered consistently around 3% of its GNP, while Pakistan raised its defense bud-
get to more than 6%. Indian defense spending has since stayed below 3% of its
GNP through most of the 1990s, but Pakistan’s defense expenditures have
remained at the same level through the 1990s, that is, around 6% of its GNP. In
the period 2010–2014, India spent approximately 2.4% of its GNP on defense,
whereas Pakistan, according to the World Bank and Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute spent 3.4% (World Bank, 2015).
Summing up, the above account and overview shows that the India–Pakistan
conflict has been shaped by a multitude of different and differing factors,
including ideology, territory, the role and actions of neighbors and external
actors such as the United States and the former Soviet Union, differences in
internal and external capabilities and the acts and special role of individual
leaders, to name but a few. The following section will now use these findings
and look at different interpretations of the conflict by realists and constructi-
vists respectively.

Realism versus Constructivism: The India–Pakistan Conflict

A realist interpretation of the India–Pakistan conflict foregoes any potential
endogenous reasons pertaining to the conflict. Instead, the source and develop-
ment of the conflict is entirely exogenously driven, and the state’s interests are
first and foremost regarded as mutually antagonistic (Chellaney, 1999; Rajago-
palan, 2005). Such a realist interpretation regarding the conduct of four wars
leads to looking at diverging interests which have led to perpetuating the con-
flict. The conflict between India and Pakistan could thus be regarded as a prime
model for interstate rivalry, having led to multiple wars and endemic insecurity
between the two states. Regarding state capabilities, India’s economic and mili-
tary superiority over Pakistan is beyond dispute. There are huge disparities in
every index of national power, especially taking the percentage of GNP spent
for defense expenditure into account (see above). In addition, both states border
China, far superior in terms of GNP and power to both. Still, China’s presence
never served as a catalyst for forging alliance between India and Pakistan.
Instead, South Asia has seen a peculiar balance of power pattern manifest itself
in the form of extraregional formal alliances—the United States and Pakistan—
and a quasi-alliance, namely India and the former Soviet Union.
For realists, the Shimla Agreement, the Indus Waters Treaty or any other
form of functional cooperation have no meaning since the real degree of
national power remains virtually untouched. Cooperation hinges on the ques-
tion of relative gains vis-a-vis each other. India, dominating the region, will not
sign an agreement that will decrease its powers, and conversely Pakistan will
not cooperate without receiving adequate benefits. Conflict and contestation
will, thus, mark Indo–Pakistani relations as neither can trust the other. Their
bilateral ties are not conducive to peace or friendship by any form of institu-
tional setting, as demonstrated by the failure of SAARC (Michael, 2017). Both
will remain locked in a state of mutual hostility and focus on balancing, alliance
110 Asian Politics & Policy—Volume 10, Issue 1—2018

formation, deterrence, and other instruments of power, that is, either by the
threat or even the use of force.
The exponentially growing arms budget of the two states and their nuclear
and missile programs, for realists, are a confirmation for the relevance of
“power” as the most important parameter. Regarding nuclear weapons, their
acquisition merely changed balancing capabilities. The bilateral conflict is also
located in the wider strategic setting, namely alliances. India and Pakistan will
thus continue to balance each other militarily. These actions have repercussions
for the capabilities of both states, for example, in terms of the interconnected
structural dynamics in an anarchical international order. India wants to be a
great power on the same level as the United States (or, for that matter, China).
Hence, India will invest and continue to constantly upgrade its military and
increase its military budget for two reasons: to check Pakistan and to eventually
attain the status of a great power. As the logic of anarchy and continuous
attempts to increase one’s power dictate, the India–Pakistan relationship will
remain subject to continuous threats and, if possible, changing alliances.
For a constructivist such as Alexander Wendt (1999), “the deep structure of
anarchy is a cultural or ideational rather than material phenomenon” (p. 43).
Regarding the India–Pakistan relations, cultural interpretations come into play.
Importantly, the respective state elites have created norms and beliefs through
a long-term process of socialization. In turn, this process has made these cul-
tural norms become embedded, and hence durable. For constructivists, the hos-
tility between India and Pakistan is not exogenously determined; instead, the
state policies are constitutive of each other’s images and beliefs. Accordingly,
the conflict is the result of a specific “cultural” interpretation of the origins of
statehood. The rivalry has a relatively strong foundation, as the different claims
of what constitutes nationhood has put both states on completely contradictory
trajectories, in a way leading to a cultural “antithesis.” Territorial differences,
then, are essentially cultural differences. For constructivists, India and Pakistan
are different by definition, for example, of their mutual threats.
It is important to note that there is no singular Indian or Pakistani construc-
tion of “the other”; a Nehruvian and/or Hindu-nationalist definition of Paki-
stan is quite different from each other. The same holds true for the Pakistani
interpretation of what constitutes India (Cohen, 2005). Still, in terms of its ori-
gins, Pakistan came into being on the assumption that the two-nation theory is
valid: Hindu and Muslim communities are different and cannot exist together
in a single nation (Acharya, 2006, p. 162). Conversely, India is, by and large, an
example for secular nationalism and engages with a Muslim population which
clearly exceeds that of Pakistan. Since independence, a “binary” logic has
arisen, with ensuing images of this permanent “binary” confrontation becom-
ing firmly embedded into the culture of both countries, and hence socializing
the people into a specific way of thinking about the “other.” Change, either in
the form of domestic transformation or maybe seismic outside events, never
had a chance to diffuse. What exists is rather a peculiar state identity which has
until today not been reconciled with the idea of a common cultural heritage,
and it is essentially constitutive of the antagonisms and hostility between India
and Pakistan. The nationalism that followed post-1947 in both countries rein-
forced those differences, while completely ignoring historic parallels that once
 Realist-Constructivism and India–Pakistan Conflict 111

existed in the realms of religion, culture, languages, or ethnicity. In such an

environment, following Wendt’s arguments, a Kantian or Lockean culture
could not and will not arise; instead, it is the Hobbesian form that is likely to
persist. In sum, the conflict can be explained because of difference in the inter-
pretation of facts, rather than material differences.

A Synthesis of Approaches: Toward a Realist-Constructivist Reading

of the India–Pakistan Conflict
At first glance, the India–Pakistan conflict contains a multitude of incongru-
ous factors that inhibit a permanent resolution. They include issues such as the
above outlined unsettled territorial claims regarding Kashmir made by both
parties, a general incompatibility of political systems and antagonistic positions
vis-a-vis the respective national identities. As importantly, economic and trade
relations are mostly absent.
Both realism and constructivism have offered explanations as to why this
conflict exists and shows no sign of subsiding. However, both focus on different
explanatory perspectives: Realism functions with a rather straightforward
understanding of the relationship between capabilities and interests. Although
it offers a positivist perspective on state action, it fails to explain why some
states strive to maximize their state power and dominate others, while other
states refrain from doing so. Exogenous patterns cannot account for all inter-
state phenomena. Also, hard indicators alone—for example looking at military
spending or the number of specific weapon systems—cannot account for the
duration of the conflict between the two states. If asymmetric capabilities lead
to conflicts, such conflicts should then logically exist between India and other
neighbors as well (in terms of lesser capabilities, e.g., with Nepal or Sri Lanka,
while in term of higher capabilities, e.g., with China). The dynamics which
underlie interstate relations can be also altered by international regimes (e.g.,
global financial or nuclear regimes) or by “changing” the definition of a prob-
lem. The realist assumption of IR essentially being an arena of recurring pat-
terns of interactions originating from the anarchical architecture of the
international order, conversely, rules out any such possibilities. The structural
logic of an anarchical system couples both India and Pakistan to seek security
and survival against each other. At the same token, the existence of better capa-
bilities should then turn China into a much more hostile neighbor.
Realism does not concern itself with questions related to ethnicity, religion,
and domestic conflicts, particularly identity formation. Without insights on
identity formation and the special relationship between interests and identities,
the Indo–Pakistani conflict cannot be fully accounted for. Understanding the
foreign policy behavior of India and Pakistan requires going beyond alliance
structures and capability matrices. Instead, it necessitates investigating the his-
torical formation of modern state structures in 1947, territorial nationalism and
the claims of ethnic and religious communities, all of which constructivism
does. In addition, one can discern historically related as well as
“institutionalized” fears of an ideationally entrenched Hindu domination, and,
as pointed out, the two-nation theory central to Pakistan’s self-conception. Con-
versely, India has, despite its declared focus on a civic and secular state as well
112 Asian Politics & Policy—Volume 10, Issue 1—2018

as state values, never shown any desire to forego its claim on the Muslim-
dominated Kashmir. Constructivism, conversely, falls short of providing a sat-
isfactory answer to the question why India, despite its unquestionable superior-
ity, has allowed the Pakistan/Kashmir issue to dominate foreign and security
policies and its national security (culture). In terms of capabilities and actual
threat scenarios, Pakistan is no match for India, yet it has become part of India’s
own security outlook and identity.
Accordingly, only the sum of these factors makes the conflict comprehensible
in a much more comprehensive way, with the central assumption to take both
classical realism and constructivism as the appropriate toolbox. According to
Barkin (2010), “constructivism and realism, then, are distinct but compatible
approaches. [. . .] A realist constructivism is a constructivism in which a concern
for power politics, understood as relational rather than structural, is central. It
is also one in which the links to social policy (including, but not limited to, for-
eign policy) are made clear” (p. 169). The synthesis of both approaches hence
looks at power and identity. The contested territorial division—a direct result of
the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947—is the key root of the conflict,
at the crossroads of state power, territory, and identity. Pakistan has clearly ini-
tiated four interstate wars, while over the years India has shown a great deal of
military restraint. Yet, for both countries geopolitics also matters. The Kashmir
valley is of utmost strategic importance for Pakistan’s security, and giving up
its claim on Kashmir would further reduce Pakistan’s territory and Pakistani
access to points of geostrategic and military importance. In terms of power, the
peculiar power asymmetry that has prevailed between the antagonists for half
a century will in the future continue to motivate Pakistan to increase its military
expenditures, because of insecurity and threat perceptions.
From an endogenous standpoint, an identity-based/constructivist explana-
tion provides that Hindus and Muslims have been living together in the Indian
subcontinent for over a millennium. Pakistan contested Kashmir’s accession to
India because most of the population affected was Muslim, and thus, according
to Pakistan’s self-conception, naturally belonged to Pakistan. Conversely, India
was unwilling to give away the part of Kashmir it controlled arguing that such
a concession would be tantamount to a second partition of the subcontinent
based on religion. Today, India cannot afford to give up Kashmir as that could
generate nationalist movement elsewhere in the country. To India, committed
as it has been to a secular democratic state, possession of Kashmir is a virtual
demonstration of the fact that Muslims and Hindus can live together as a peace-
ful community. To Pakistan, possession of Kashmir, with its overwhelming
Muslim population, is vital for the fulfillment of the ideal upon which Pakistan
rests, namely being a state and home for all the Muslims of the subcontinent. At
the same time, Pakistan also cannot compromise as seizing the predominantly
Muslim state from Indian control has been its major foreign policy goal since
the first day of independence, creating an arena of socialization and making
this claim part of its raison d’^etre, inculcated in its population and popular
media since the first Indo–Pakistani war in 1947.
Hence, connecting power and asymmetry arguments with endogenous argu-
ments of identity, domestic state structures, and religion allows for a synthe-
sized interpretation of the India–Pakistan conflict that leaves the narrow
 Realist-Constructivism and India–Pakistan Conflict 113

confines of both approaches taken separately and broadens the analytical spec-
trum. Understood thus, the Indo–Pakistani conflict is a prime example of a
clash of differing, irreconcilable identities and opposing religious convictions in
a world in which power (politics) and geo-strategy invariably continue to domi-
nate. In sum, all the above demonstrates the usefulness of such a synthesized
approach for IR theory and showcases the analytical depth and explanatory
power of realist-constructivism.

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