UNIVERSITY OF GHANA

(All rights reserved)

SCHOOL OF LAW
SEMESTER 2021/2022
ACADEMIC YEAR

COURSE SYLLABUS

FLAW 208/318 LAW OF TORTS II

(3 CREDITS)

Death in Relation to Torts

Baker, Chapter 28
Street, Chapter 26
Civil Liability Ac 1963 (Act 176).
Kumado, Chapter 26; pp 221-232

1. Death may create or extinguish liability. At common law the death of a human
could not be complained of as an injury. The maxim is: Actio personalis moritur cum
persona. Baker v. Bolton (1808) 170 E.R. 1033; Addai v. Boakye II (1912) 2 G.L.R. 147.
See statutory amendments in s.1 and s.2 of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1846. Act held
 to be applicable to Ghana by Ollennu J. in Nyadu v. Pabi 7th March 1961.
(Unreported). Now the governing act is thLee Civil Liability Act 1963.

2. The 1846 Act provided for the survival of causes of action. This action was to be
brought by the executor or administrator within 6 months of the death or else by all
or any of the dependants within 12 months of the death for the benefit of all.

Only one action could be brought.

As to the novelty of this cause of action: See Lord Blackburn in Seward v. The Vera Cruz
(1884) 10 App. Cas. 59 at pp. 70-1.

If the deceased had lost his cause of action before his death, for instance, by accord and
satisfaction then the dependants could not sue. Read v. Gt Eastern Rly. (1868) L.R. 3 Q.B.
555.

However, if the agreement merely limited the amount the deceased would have recovered
but left him a cause of action then relatives could sue. Nunan v. Southern Rly. Co. [1924] 1
K.B. 223.

The 1846 Act was held in Blake v. Midland Rly. Co. (1852) 18 Q.B. 93 to protect pecuniary
loss only. See also Hesse v. Accra Municipal Council (1964) G.L.R. 399.

Funeral expenses were not recoverable.

Dependants could only claim for reasonable expectation of pecuniary advantage but not for
a speculative possibility. Manu v. Kakraba (1962) 1 G.LR 341; Addai v. A-G (1976) 2 G.L.R
412; Taff Vale Ryl. Co. v. Jenkins [1913] A.C. 1; Cf. Barnett v. Cohen [1921] 2 K.B. 461.

Benefits accruing by virtue of a business relationship are not to be taken into account. Sykes
v. N.E. Rly. Co (1875) 32 L.T. 199; (1875) L.J.C.P. 191; Burgess v Florence Nightingale Hosp.
[1955] 1 Q.B. 349; Hay v. Hughes (1975) Q.B 790; Peacock v. Amusement Equipment Ltd.,
(1954) 2 All E.R. 689.

3. Calculation of the Damages:

The basis of the calculation is to be found in Davies v. Powell Duffryn Ass. [1942] A.C. 601 at
p.612. Take the deceased’s wages, deduct his personal expenses, turn this into a lump sum
by taking a certain number of years purchase and then tax it down by having regard to the
uncertainties of life. Damages may be assessed on behalf of (1) the dependants or (2) the
estate. The second method is the more popular. See Davies v. Powell Duffryn Ass. [1942]
A.C. 601 and Amakom Sawmill Co. v. Mansah [1963] 1G.L.R. 368; Baiden v. Solomon [1963]
1 G.L.R. 488. See Date-Bah on Laryea v. Adjei (1971) 8 U.G.L.J. 145; Baaye v. Prempeh High
Court 28/1/63 (Unreported), de Graft Johnson v. Ghana Commercial Bank, [1977] 1 G.L.R.
179, Awuku v Mumuni and Sulemana [2014] 70 GMJ 144, Emmanuel Charway v Kwame
Tweneboah Koduah and Francis Boateng CA Koforidua A.D 2018 (H1/09/2018)
(Unreported);

An action on behalf of the Estate of a deceased person is now maintainable under Part IV of
the Civil Liability Act. See ss.22-28. Here the courts are guided by the financial limits set in
Benham v. Gambling [1941] A.C. 157 and now Naylor v. Yorkshire Electricity Board [1967] 2
All E.R. 1; (1968) A.C. 529; (1967) 2. W.L.R. 1114, as applied in Shell Company v. Ayimavor
(1971) 1 G.L.R.51.

You may recover for shortened expectation of life – Flint v. Lovell (1935) 1 K.B 354.

4. The Effect of the 1963 Civil Liability Act

The Act basically reproduces the effect of the 1846 Act with certain important amendments:

i. Class of dependants is now greatly extended – see s.15 and schedule 1

ii. An action may now be brought within 3 years of the death
iii. Damages recoverable include mental suffering. (This provision was to last for
only 3 years).

Shell Co. v. Ayimavor [1971] 1 G.L.R. 51

McKenzie v. Yeboah [1972] 4 R.G.L. 65
Laryea v. Adjei C.A. 23RD March 1970 (Unreported)
See A.K. Fiadjoe: (1972) 4 R.G.L. 143.
iv. As before, only one action may be brought – s.16(2), for the benefit of all s.16(4).
v. If there is no personal representative or if there is one who has not commenced
action within 6 months, then all or any of the dependants may bring the action –
s.16(3).
vi. The rules of contributory negligence still apply – s.21.

NB.: Students must read Mckenzie v. Yeboah in full for an understanding of the Civil Liability
Act 1963. Also look at N.L.C.D 322 and the Limitation Decree.

5. Death Extinguishing Liability

This is provided for in s.24 of the Civil Liability Act. Accordingly, the death of a party would
extinguish:

i. a cause of action for breach of promise to Marry

ii. a cause of action for seduction
iii. a cause of action for inducing one spouse to leave or remain apart from the
other;
iv. a cause of action for damages for adultery; or
v. a claim for compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Ordinance
(Cap.94).
Scancom Ltd v Adinyira, 1, CA [2016-20170 1 GLR, 1

Sir.Prof. Kofi Kumado/Mr. Kwame Gyan/Dr. AtupareDr. Kweku Ainuson/Ms. Rachel

Haizel/Dr. Obri