1. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan ( G.R. No. 104768.

July 21, 2003 )

Constitutional Law; Revolutionary Governments; Bill of Rights; International Law; The resulting
government following the EDSA Revolution in February 1986 was indisputably a revolutionary
government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that the
revolutionary government, as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under
international law.—The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. As succinctly stated in
President Aquino’s Proclamation No. 3 dated 25 March 1986, the EDSA Revolution was “done in defiance of
the provisions of the 1973 Constitution.” The resulting government was indisputably a revolutionary
government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that the revolutionary
government, as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under international law.

During the interregnum—i.e., after the actual and effective take-over of power by the revolutionary
government up to 24 March 1986 (immediately before the adoption of the Provisional Constitution)—
a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a
constitution nor a Bill of Rights then.—We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not
operative during the interregnum. However, we rule that the protection accorded to individuals under the
Covenant and the Declaration remained in effect during the interregnum. During the interregnum, the
directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme law because no constitution limited
the extent and scope of such directives and orders. With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the
successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the revolutionary
government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of
Rights because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum.

Sequestration Orders; To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution remained operative
during the interregnum would render void all sequestration orders issued by the PCGG before the
adoption of the Freedom Constitution.—To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution
remained operative during the interregnum would render void all sequestration orders issued by the
Philippine Commission on Good Government (“PCGG”) before the adoption of the Freedom Constitution. The
sequestration orders, which direct the freezing and even the take-over of private property by mere executive
issuance without judicial action, would violate the due process and search and seizure clauses of the Bill of
Rights. During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary government bound
by no constitution. No one could validly question the sequestration orders as violative of the Bill of Rights
because there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum. However, upon the adoption of the Freedom
Constitution, the sequestered companies assailed the sequestration orders as contrary to the Bill of Rights of
the Freedom Constitution.

International Law; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“Covenant”); Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (“Declaration”); Even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the
Covenant and the Declaration, almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.—
Thus, to rule that the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution remained in force during the interregnum, absent
a constitutional provision excepting sequestration orders from such Bill of Rights, would clearly render all
sequestration orders void during the interregnum. Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipino
people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the Declaration, almost the same rights found in the Bill of
Rights of the 1973 Constitution. The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure
government, assumed responsibility for the State’s good faith compliance with the Covenant to which the
Philippines is a signatory. Article 2(1) of the Covenant requires each signatory State “to respect and to ensure
to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present
Covenant.” Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary government had the duty to insure that
“[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence.” The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2)
that “[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.” Although the signatories to the Declaration did
not intend it as a legally binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has interpreted the Declaration
as part of the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the State. Thus, the
revolutionary government was also obligated under international law to observe the rights of individuals
under the Declaration.

The Declaration is part of customary international law, and that Filipinos as human beings are proper
subjects of the rules of international law laid down in the Covenant.—The revolutionary government did not
repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during the interregnum. Whether the revolutionary government
could have repudiated all its obligations under the Covenant or the Declaration is another matter and is not
the issue here. Suffice it to say that the Court considers the Declaration as part of customary international law,
and that Filipinos as human beings are proper subjects of the rules of international law laid down in the
Covenant. The fact is the revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration in the
same way it repudiated the 1973 Constitution. As the de jure government, the revolutionary government
could not escape responsibility for the State’s good faith compliance with its treaty obligations under
international law.

It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution on 25 March 1986 that the directives and
orders of the revolutionary government became subject to a higher municipal law that, if contravened,
rendered such directives and orders void.—It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution on
25 March 1986 that the directives and orders of the revolutionary government became subject to a higher
municipal law that, if contravened, rendered such directives and orders void. The Provisional Constitution
adopted verbatim the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution. The Provisional Constitution served as a self-
limitation by the revolutionary government to avoid abuses of the absolute powers entrusted to it by the
people.

ELIZABETH DIMAANO, petitioner, vs. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents. (G.R. No. 176783. June 27, 2012)

Sheriff’s Fee; The imposition of the sheriff’s fee is not a penalty for some wrong but an assessment for the cost
of the sheriff’s service in collecting the judgment amount.—The imposition of the sheriff’s fee is not a penalty
for some wrong that Dimaano had done. It is an assessment for the cost of the sheriff’s service in collecting
the judgment amount for her benefit. Its collection is authorized under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, thus: x x x x SEC. 3. Persons authorized to collect legal fees.—Except as otherwise provided in this
rule, the officers and persons hereinafter mentioned, together with their assistants and deputies, may
demand, receive, and take the several fees hereinafter mentioned x x x. x x x x SEC. 10. Sheriffs, PROCESS
SERVERS and other persons serving processes.—x x x (l) For money collected by him x x x by order,
execution, attachment, or any other process, judicial or extrajudicial which shall immediately be turned over
to the Clerk of Court.

Actual Damages; The order to pay a party the money owed him and the order to pay another the money
unlawfully taken from him are both awards of actual or compensatory damages.—The order to pay a party
the money owed him and the order to pay another the money unlawfully taken from him are both awards of
actual or compensatory damages. They compensate for the pecuniary loss that the party suffered and proved
in court. The recipients of the award, whether for money owed or taken from him, benefit from the court’s
intervention and service in collecting the amount. As the Sandiganbayan correctly said, what determines the
assessment of the disputed court fee is the fact that the court, through valid processes, ordered a certain sum
of money to be placed in the hands of the sheriff for turnover to the winning party. Dimaano vs.
Sandiganbayan, 675 SCRA 278, G.R. No. 176783 June 27, 2012

3. Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance System (G.R. No. 122156. February 3, 1997)

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL
CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE
COUNSEL, respondents.

Statutory Construction; A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right
conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an
examination and.construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to
the legislature for action.—Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles.
Their provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who
merely establish an outline of government providing for the different departments of the governmental
machinery and securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. A provision which lays down a
general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a
provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling
legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or
protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is selfexecuting if the nature and extent of the
right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by
an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred
to the legislature for action.

Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self executing.—As against constitutions of the
past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in
effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of
statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a
legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If
the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature
would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be
cataclysmic.

The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not
necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing—the rule is that a self-executing
provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation
must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more
available.—In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate
the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision,
prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the
rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right.
The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-
executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such
legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or
liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-
executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any
legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it
more available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional
provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.

A constitutional provision may be selfexecuting in one part and non-self-executing in another.—Respondents

also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the
first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not selfexecuting. The argument is
flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact measures to
encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and
the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national
jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be
selfexecuting as it does not by its language require any legislation in order to give preference to qualified
Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. A
constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in another.

National Economy and Patrimony; When the Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it
means just that—qualified Filipinos shall be preferred.—On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the
1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further
guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not
require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution
mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony,
the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that—qualified Filipinos shall be preferred.

When the Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances, an action may be
maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject—such right
enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance.—And when our Constitution declares that a right
exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding
the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce
such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from
which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.

Manila Hotel; Manila Hotel has become a landmark—a living testimonial of Philippine heritage.—Manila
Hotel has become a landmark—a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an
American hotel when it first opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino. Formerly a
concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant events which have shaped
Philippine history. It was called the Cultural Center of the 1930’s. It was the site of the festivities during the
inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth, Dubbed as the Official Guest House of the Philippine
Government it plays host to dignitaries and official visitors who are accorded the traditional Philippine
hospitality. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for
it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have
actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from
the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands.

Filipino First Policy; Words and Phrases; The term “qualified Filipinos” as used in the Constitution also
includes corporations at least 60% of which is owned by Filipinos.— Consequently, we cannot sustain
respondents’ claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold is only
51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon which the building
stands. The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified Filipinos as used in our Constitution also includes
corporations at least 60% of which is owned by Filipinos. This is very clear from the proceedings of the 1986
Constitutional Commission. Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference on
qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be
declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they
under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are
mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be
known to all the bidders and other interested parties.

ln the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of
rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of
a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity.
And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are
to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution.

4. KNIGHTS OF RIZAL, petitioner, vs. DMCI HOMES, INC., DMCI PROJECT DEVELOPERS, INC., CITY OF
MANILA, NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR CULTURE AND THE ARTS, NATIONAL MUSEUM, and NATIONAL
HISTORICAL COMMISSION OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. (G.R. No. 213948. April 25, 2017)

Historic Sites and Facilities; Ordinance No. 8119; It is clear that the standards laid down in Section 47 of
Ordinance No. 8119 only serve as guides, as it expressly states that “the following shall guide the
development of historic sites and facilities.” A guide simply sets a direction or gives an instruction to be
followed by property owners and developers in order to conserve and enhance a property’s heritage values.
—It is clear that the standards laid down in Section 47 of Ordinance No. 8119 only serve as guides, as it
expressly states that “the following shall guide the development of historic sites and facilities.” A guide simply
sets a direction or gives an instruction to be followed by property owners and developers in order to
conserve and enhance a property’s heritage values.

Torre de Manila; There is nothing in Sections 47 and 48 of Ordinance No. 8119 that disallows the construction
of a building outside the boundaries of a historic site or facility, where such building may affect the
background of a historic site.—Section 47 of Ordinance No. 8119 specifically regulates the “development of
historic sites and facilities.” Section 48 regulates “large commercial signage and/or pylon.” There is nothing in
Sections 47 and 48 of Ordinance No. 8119 that disallows the construction of a building outside the boundaries
of a historic site or facility, where such building may affect the background of a historic site. In this case, the
Torre de Manila stands 870 meters outside and to the rear of the Rizal Monument and “cannot possibly
obstruct the front view of the [Rizal] Monument.” Likewise, the Torre de Manila is not in an area that has been
declared as an “anthropological or archeological area” or in an area designated as a heritage zone, cultural
property, historical landmark, or a national treasure by the NHCP.

Constitutional Law; Arts and Culture; Section 15, Article XIV of the Constitution, which deals with the subject
of arts and culture, provides that “[t]he State shall conserve, promote and popularize the nation’s historical
and cultural heritage and resources.”—Section 15, Article XIV of the Constitution, which deals with the
subject of arts and culture, provides that “[t]he State shall conserve, promote and popularize the nation’s
historical and cultural heritage and resources x x x.” Since this provision is not self-executory, Congress
passed laws dealing with the preservation and conservation of our cultural heritage. One such law is Republic
Act No. 10066, or the National Cultural Heritage Act of 2009, which empowers the National Commission for
Culture and the Arts and other cultural agencies to issue a cease and desist order “when the physical integrity
of the national cultural treasures or important cultural properties [is] found to be in danger of destruction or
significant alteration from its original state.” This law declares that the State should protect the “physical
integrity” of the heritage property or building if there is “danger of destruction or significant alteration from
its original state.” Physical integrity refers to the structure itself — how strong and sound the structure is. The
same law does not mention that another project, building, or property, not itself a heritage property or
building, may be the subject of a cease and desist order when it adversely affects the background view, vista,
or sight line of a heritage property or building. Thus, Republic Act No. 10066 cannot apply to the Torre de
Manila condominium project.

Historic Sites and Facilities; Ordinance No. 8119; Torre de Manila; Nowhere is it found in Ordinance No. 8119
or in any law, ordinance, or rule for that matter, that the construction of a building outside the Rizal Park is
prohibited if the building is within the background sight line or view of the Rizal Monument.—In the present
case, nowhere is it found in Ordinance No. 8119 or in any law, ordinance, or rule for that matter, that the
construction of a building outside the Rizal Park is prohibited if the building is within the background sight
line or view of the Rizal Monument. Thus, there is no legal duty on the part of the City of Manila “to consider,”
in the words of the Dissenting Opinion, “the standards set under Ordinance No. 8119” in relation to the
applications of DMCI-PDI for the Torre de Manila since under the ordinance these standards can never be
applied outside the boundaries of Rizal Park. While the Rizal Park has been declared a National Historical Site,
the area where Torre de Manila is being built is a privately-owned property that is “not part of the Rizal Park
that has been declared as a National Heritage Site in 1995,” and the Torre de Manila area is in fact “well-
beyond” the Rizal Park, according to NHCP Chairperson Dr. Maria Serena I. Diokno. Neither has the area of the
Torre de Manila been designated as a “heritage zone, a cultural property, a historical landmark or even a
national treasure.”

Nuisance; Torre de Manila; It can easily be gleaned that the Torre de Manila is not a nuisance per se. The
Torre de Manila project cannot be considered as a “direct menace to public health or safety.”—It can easily be
gleaned that the Torre de Manila is not a nuisance per se. The Torre de Manila project cannot be considered
as a “direct menace to public health or safety.” Not only is a condominium project commonplace in the City of
Manila, DMCI-PDI has, according to the proper government agencies, complied with health and safety
standards set by law. DMCI-PDI has been granted the following permits and clearances prior to starting the
project: (1) Height Clearance Permit from the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines; (2) Development
Permit from the HLURB; (3) Zoning Certification from the HLURB; (4) Certificate of Environmental
Compliance Commitment from the Environment Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources; (5) Barangay Clearance; (6) Zoning Permit; (7) Building Permit; and (8) Electrical and
Mechanical Permit.

The authority to decide when a nuisance exists is an authority to find facts, to estimate their force, and to
apply rules of law to the case thus made. The Supreme Court (SC) is no such authority. It is not a trier of facts.
—The authority to decide when a nuisance exists is an authority to find facts, to estimate their force, and to
apply rules of law to the case thus made. This Court is no such authority. It is not a trier of facts. It cannot
simply take the allegations in the petition and accept these as facts, more so in this case where these
allegations are contested by the respondents. The task to receive and evaluate evidence is lodged with the
trial courts. The question, then, of whether the Torre de Manila project is a nuisance per accidens must be
settled after due proceedings brought before the proper Regional Trial Court. The KOR cannot circumvent the
process in the guise of protecting national culture and heritage.

4.MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN, petitioners, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA, in their
capacities as founding members of the People’s Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA), respondents. (G.R. No. 127325. March 19, 1997)

The system of initiative on the Constitution under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-
executory.—The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed, the system of initiative on the Constitution under
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory. Has Congress “provided” for the
implementation of the exercise of this right? Those who answer the question in the affirmative, like the
private respondents and intervenor Senator Roco, point to us R.A. No. 6735. There is, of course, no other
better way for Congress to implement the exercise of the right than through the passage of a statute or
legislative act.

R.A. No. 6735; Statutory Construction; Under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6735, the people are not accorded the
power to “directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution” through the system
of initiative—they can only do so with respect to “laws, ordinances, or resolutions.”—Contrary to the
assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments
to the Constitution. The said section reads: SECTION 2. Statement and Policy.—The power of the people
under a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part,
the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the
requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed. (Italics supplied) The inclusion of the
word “Constitution” therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is neither germane nor relevant to said
section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national laws and local laws, ordinances,
and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative
on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to
“directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution” through the system of
initiative. They can only do so with respect to “laws, ordinances, or resolutions.”

If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to
the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the
primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws.—While the Act provides
subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle
III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply
means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If Congress
intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy
of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution
is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws.

Words and Phrases; “National Initiative” and “Local Initiative,” Explained; The Court cannot accept the
argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is subsumed under the subtitle on National
Initiative and Referendum.—We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is subsumed under the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum because it is national in
scope. Our reading of Subtitle II (National Initiative and Referendum) and Subtitle III (Local Initiative and
Referendum) leaves no room for doubt that the classification is not based on the scope of the initiative
involved, but on its nature and character. It is “national initiative,” if what is proposed to be adopted or
enacted is a national law, or a law which only Congress can pass. It is “local initiative” if what is proposed to
be adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance, or resolution which only the legislative bodies of the governments
of the autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays can pass.

R.A. No. 6735 delivered a humiliating blow to the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution by
merely paying it a reluctant lip service.—Curiously, too, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and
care in providing for the details in the implementation of initiative and referendum on national and local
legislation thereby giving them special attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to do so on the system of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution. There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more
important or the paramount system of initiative. R.A. No. 6735 thus delivered a humiliating blow to the
system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant lip service. The
foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential
terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this
substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by “empowering” the COMELEC “to promulgate such rules
and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act.

R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy the requirements in subordinate legislation insofar as initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned.—Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate
legislation. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.

COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, is void.—It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate
rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to
the Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on
the COMELEC’s power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and
regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of
the Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the
“completeness” and the “sufficient standard” tests.

5. Lambino vs. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 174153, G.R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006)

Constitutional Law; Amendments and Revisions of the Constitution; People’s Initiative; The essence of
amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” is that the entire proposal
on its face is a petition by the people—first, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal, and,
second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition; The full text of the
proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it, and if so attached,
the petition must state the fact of such attachment.—The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition” is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people.
This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire
proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the
proposal must be embodied in a petition. These essential elements are present only if the full text of the
proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete
proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition” only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. The full
text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so
attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several
millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing.
Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time constraint, to prove that every one of the millions of
signatories had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing.

Same; Same; Same; While the Constitution does not expressly state that the petition must set forth the full
text of the proposed amendments, the deliberations of the framers of the Constitution clearly show that the
framers intended to adopt the relevant American jurisprudence on people’s initiative.— Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution does not expressly state that the petition must set forth the full text of the proposed
amendments. However, the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly show that the framers
intended to adopt the relevant American jurisprudence on people’s initiative. In particular, the deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal that the framers intended that the people must first see the
full text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign on a petition containing
such full text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 6735, the Initiative and Referendum Act that Lambino
vs. Commission on Elections the Lambino Group invokes as valid, requires that the people must sign the
“petition x x x as signatories.”

An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people the full text of the
proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people.—The
signature sheets do not explain this discrimination against the Senators. The 6.3 million people who signed
the signature sheets could not have known that their signatures would be used to discriminate against the
Senators. They could not have known that their signatures would be used to limit, after 30 June 2010, the
interim Parliament’s choice of Prime Minister only to members of the existing House of Representatives. An
initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people the full text of the
proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people. That is
why the Constitution requires that an initiative must be “directly proposed by the people x x x in a petition”—
meaning that the people must sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. On so
vital an issue as amending the nation’s fundamental law, the writing of the text of the proposed amendments
cannot be hidden from the people under a general or special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and
unelected individuals. The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly propose amendments to
the Constitution. This Court trusts the wisdom of the people even if the members of this Court do not
personally know the people who sign the petition. However, this trust emanates from a fundamental
assumption: the full text of the proposed amendment is first shown to the people before they sign the
petition, not after they have signed the petition.

“Amendment” and “Revision,” Distinguished; Words and Phrases; The framers of the Constitution intended,
and wrote, a clear distinction between “amendment” and “revision” of the Constitution.—There can be no
mistake about it. The framers of the Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear distinction between
“amendment” and “revision” of the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that only Congress or a
constitutional convention may propose revisions to the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that a
people’s initiative may propose only amendments to the Constitution. Where the intent and language of the
Constitution clearly withhold from the people the power to propose revisions to the Constitution, the people
cannot propose revisions even as they are empowered to propose amendments.

Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering the principle of
separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances, and there is also revision if the change alters the
substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of the constitution;
Amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle
involved; Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects
only the specific provision being amended.—Courts have long recognized the distinction between an
amendment and a revision of a constitution. One of the earliest cases that recognized the distinction
described the fundamental difference in this manner: [T]he very term “constitution” implies an instrument of
a permanent and abiding nature, and the provisions contained therein for its revision indicate the will of the
people that the underlying principles upon which it rests, as well as the substantial entirety of the instrument,
shall be of a like permanent and abiding nature. On the other hand, the significance of the term “amendment”
implies such an addition or change within the lines of the original instrument as will effect an improvement,
or better carry out the purpose for which it was framed. (Emphasis supplied) Revision broadly implies a
change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or
the system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the
constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand,
amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle
involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects
only the specific provision being amended.

Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group’s initiative is a revision and not merely
an amendment; A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three
great co-equal branches of government in the present Constitution is reduced into two; A shift from the
present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution
—merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the structure of the government.—
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group’s initiative is a revision and not merely
an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group’s proposed changes overhaul two articles—Article VI on
the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive—affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution.
Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to
parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. A change in the structure of government is a
revision of the Constitution, as when the three great co-equal branches of government in the present
Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift from the
present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the
Constitution.

The express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution contradict the Lambino Group’s
theory—any theory advocating that a proposed change involving a radical structural change in government
does not constitute a revision justly deserves rejection.—The express intent of the framers and the plain
language of the Constitution contradict the Lambino Group’s theory. Where the intent of the framers and the
language of the Constitution are clear and plainly stated, courts do not deviate from such categorical intent
and language. Any theory espousing a construction contrary to such intent and language deserves scant
consideration. More so, if such theory wreaks havoc by creating inconsistencies in the form of government
established in the Constitution. Such a theory, devoid of any jurisprudential mooring and inviting
inconsistencies in the Constitution, only exposes the flimsiness of the Lambino Group’s position. Any theory
advocating that a proposed change involving a radical structural change in government does not constitute a
revision justly deserves rejection.

Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution without affecting any
other section or article, the change may generally be considered an amendment and not a revision.—We can
visualize amendments and revisions as a spectrum, at one end green for amendments and at the other end
red for revisions. Towards the middle of the spectrum, colors fuse and difficulties arise in determining
whether there is an amendment or revision. The present initiative is indisputably located at the far end of the
red spectrum where revision begins. The present initiative seeks a radical overhaul of the existing separation
of powers among the three co-equal departments of government, requiring far-reaching amendments in
several sections and articles of the Constitution. Where the proposed change applies only to a specific
provision of the Constitution without affecting any other section or article, the change may generally be
considered an amendment and not a revision. For example, a change reducing the voting age from 18 years to
15 years is an amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipino ownership of mass media
companies from 100 percent to 60 percent is an amendment and not a revision. Also, a change requiring a
college degree as an additional qualification for election to the Presidency is an amendment and not a
revision.

Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions of a constitution, a deliberative
body with recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake a revision.—Since a revision of a constitution
affects basic principles, or several provisions of a constitution, a deliberative body with recorded proceedings
is best suited to undertake a revision. A revision requires harmonizing not only several provisions, but also
the altered principles with those that remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorize deliberative
bodies like constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions to undertake revisions. On the other hand,
constitutions allow people’s initiatives, which do not have fixed and identifiable deliberative bodies or
recorded proceedings, to undertake only amendments and not revisions.

Initiative and Referendum Act (R.A. No. 6735); Judicial Review; There is no need to revisit the Court’s ruling
in Santiago v. Commission on Elections, 270 SCRA 106 (1997), declaring R.A. No. 6735 “incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to cover the system of initiative to amend the
Constitution—an affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present petition; The
Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the constitutionality of a statute if the case before the Court can
be resolved on some other grounds.—The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the
basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people’s
initiative to amend the Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Court’s ruling in Santiago declaring RA
6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to cover the system of initiative
to amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present
petition. Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not
comply with the requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments to the
Constitution. This Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the constitutionality of a statute if the case
before the Court can be resolved on some other grounds. Such avoidance is a logical consequence of the well-
settled doctrine that courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if the case can be resolved on
some other grounds.

Certiorari; Commission on Elections; For following the Court’s ruling, no grave abuse of discretion is
attributable to the COMELEC.—In dismissing the Lambino Group’s initiative petition, the COMELEC en banc
merely followed this Court’s ruling in Santiago and People’s Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA) v. COMELEC. For following this Court’s ruling, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the
COMELEC. On this ground alone, the present petition warrants outright dismissal. Thus, this Court should
reiterate its unanimous ruling in PIRMA: The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of
discretion could be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA
therein, it appearing that it only complied with the dispositions in the Decisions of this Court in G.R. No.
127325, promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of June 10, 1997.

Same; Same; Same; A revolving-door constitution does not augur well for the rule of law in the country.—The
Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land, deserves the utmost respect and obedience of all the citizens
of this nation. No one can trivialize the Constitution by cavalierly amending or revising it in blatant violation
of the clearly specified modes of amendment and revision laid down in the Constitution itself. To allow such
change in the fundamental law is to set adrift the Constitution in unchartered waters, to be tossed and turned
by every dominant political group of the day. If this Court allows today a cavalier change in the Constitution
outside the constitutionally prescribed modes, tomorrow the new dominant political group that comes will
demand its own set of changes in the same cavalier and unconstitutional fashion. A revolving-door
constitution does not augur well for the rule of law in this country.

As the ultimate guardian of the Constitution, this Court is sworn to perform its solemn duty to defend and
protect the Constitution, which embodies the real sovereign will of the people. Incantations of “people’s
voice,” “people’s sovereign will,” or “let the people decide” cannot override the specific modes of changing the
Constitution as prescribed in the Constitution itself. Otherwise, the Constitution—the people’s fundamental
covenant that provides enduring stability to our society—becomes easily susceptible to manipulative changes
by political groups gathering signatures through false promises. Then, the Constitution ceases to be the
bedrock of the nation’s stability.

6. Magallona vs. Ermita Magallona vs. Ermita,( 655 SCRA 476, G.R. No. 187167 August 16, 2011 )

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III); UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the
acquisition or loss of territory.—UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a
multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters
[12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive
economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits.
UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-long negotiations among United Nations members to codify
norms regulating the conduct of States in the world’s oceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and
archipelagic States’ graduated authority over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along their coasts.

Archipelagic Baselines of the Philippines (Republic Act No. 9522); Baselines laws such as RA 9522 are
enacted by United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) States parties to mark-out specific
basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as
geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf.—Baselines
laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out specific basepoints along their
coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to
measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS III on archipelagic
States like ours could not be any clearer: Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the
contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf.—The breadth of the territorial sea,
the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf shall be measured from
archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47.

Baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS III) States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental
shelves.—Baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with
precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of
the international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States
parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the
jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33),
and the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and
continental shelf (Article 77).

RA 9522 increased the Philippines’ total maritime space by 145,216 square nautical miles.—Petitioners’
assertion of loss of “about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters” under RA 9522 is similarly
unfounded both in fact and law. On the contrary, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of basepoints, increased
the Philippines’ total maritime space (covering its internal waters, territorial sea and exclusive economic
zone) by 145,216 square nautical miles.

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III); Congress’ decision to classify the Kalayaan
Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal as ‘Regime[s] of Islands’ manifests the Philippine State’s
responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III.—Far from surrendering the
Philippines’ claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress’ decision to classify the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal as “‘Regime[s] of Islands’ under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article
121” of UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine State’s responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda
obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any “naturally formed area of land, surrounded
by water, which is above water at high tide,” such as portions of the KIG, qualifies under the category of
“regime of islands,” whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.

7. In the matter of South China Sea

Pertinent to the foregoing is the recent decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in regard to the
expansive claims of China to large portions of South China Sea or West Philippine Sea. These claimes were
considered by the Philippines to have violated its own rights and entitlement to the EEZ under the UNCLOS.
In the decision the arbitral tribunal upheld the contentions of the Philippines and concluded that there was
no legal basis for China to claim historic rights to resources within the sea areas falling within the so - called
“nine dash line” which included areas claimed by the Philippines. The tribunal declared: that, as between the
Philippines and China, China’s claims to historic rights, or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction, with respect
to the maritime areas of the South China Sea encompassed by the relevant part of the ‘nine-dash line’ are
contrary to the Convention and without lawful effect to the extent that they exceed the geographic and
substantive limits of China’s maritime entitlements under the Convention. The Tribunal concludes that the
Convention superseded any historic rights or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction in excess of the limits
imposed therein and the questionable acts of China, such as excluding Philippine fisherman from the area as
well as the land reclamations and construction of man-made ng structures, were in breach of its obligations
under UNCLOS.

8. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC), petitioner, vs. SPOUSES

VICENTE ABECINA and MARIA CLEOFE ABECINA, respondents. G.R. No. 206484. (June 29, 2016.)

Political Law; State Immunity from Suit; The State may not be sued without its consent.—The State may not
be sued without its consent. This fundamental doctrine stems from the principle that there can be no legal
right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends. This generally accepted principle
of law has been explicitly expressed in both the 1973 and the present Constitutions. But as the principle itself
implies, the doctrine of state immunity is not absolute. The State may waive its cloak of immunity and the
waiver may be made expressly or by implication.

It became necessary to distinguish between the State’s sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and its
private, commercial, and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). Presently, state immunity restrictively extends
only to acts jure imperii while acts jure commercial activities gradually expanded beyond its sovereign
function as regulator and governor. The evolution of the State’s activities and degree of participation in
commerce demanded a parallel evolution in the traditional rule of state immunity. Thus, it became necessary
to distinguish between the State’s sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and its private, commercial,
and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). Presently, state immunity restrictively extends only to acts jure
imperii while acts jure gestionis are considered as a waiver of immunity.

Constitutional Law; Communications; The Philippines recognizes the vital role of information and
communication in nation building.—The Philippines recognizes the vital role of information and
communication in nation building. As a consequence, we have adopted a policy environment that aspires for
the full development of communications infrastructure to facilitate the flow of information into, out of, and
across the country. To this end, the DOTC has been mandated with the promotion, development, and
regulation of dependable and coordinated networks of communication. The DOTC encroached on the
respondents’ properties when it constructed the local telephone exchange in Daet, Camarines Norte. The
exchange was part of the RTDP pursuant to the National Telephone Program. We have no doubt that when
the DOTC constructed the encroaching structures and subsequently entered into the FLA with Digitel for their
maintenance, it was carrying out a sovereign function. Therefore, we agree with the DOTC’s contention that
these are acts jure imperii that fall within the cloak of state immunity. However, as the respondents
repeatedly pointed out, this Court has long established in Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, 40
SCRA 464 (1971), Amigable v. Cuenca, 43 SCRA 360 (1972), the 2010 case Heirs of Mateo Pidacan and
Romana Bigo v. ATO, 629 SCRA 451, and more recently in Vigilar v. Aquino, 639 SCRA 772 (2011), that the
doctrine of state immunity cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen.

Political Law; State Immunity from Suit; The Department’s entry into and taking of possession of the
respondents’ property amounted to an implied waiver of its governmental immunity from suit.—We hold,
therefore, that the Department’s entry into and taking of possession of the respondents’ property amounted
to an implied waiver of its governmental immunity from suit. We also find no merit in the DOTC’s contention
that the RTC should not have ordered the reconveyance of the respondent spouses’ property because the
property is being used for a vital governmental function, that is, the operation and maintenance of a safe and
efficient communication system. The exercise of eminent domain requires a genuine necessity to take the
property for public use and the consequent payment of just compensation. The property is evidently being
used for a public purpose. However, we also note that the respondent spouses willingly entered into a lease
agreement with Digitel for the use of the subject properties.

9. Republic vs. Hidalgo, 534 SCRA 619, G.R. No. 161657 October 4, 2007

Due Process; Due process, in its procedural aspect, guarantees in the minimum the opportunity to be heard.—
Deprivation of procedural due process is obviously the petitioner’s threshold theme. Due process, in its
procedural aspect, guarantees in the minimum the opportunity to be heard. Grave abuse of discretion,
however, cannot plausibly be laid at the doorstep of the respondent judge on account of his having issued the
default order against the petitioner, then proceeding with the hearing and eventually rendering a default
judgment. For, what the respondent judge did hew with what Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court
prescribes and allows in the event the defending party fails to seasonably file a responsive pleading.

Certiorari; Grave Abuse of Discretion; The act of the respondent judge in rendering the default judgment after
an order of default was properly issued cannot be struck down as a case of grave abuse of discretion; What
connotes the term “grave abuse of discretion.”—While the ideal lies in avoiding orders of default, the policy of
the law being to have every litigated case tried on its full merits, the act of the respondent judge in rendering
the default judgment after an order of default was properly issued cannot be struck down as a case of grave
abuse of discretion. The term “grave abuse of discretion,” in its juridical sense, connotes capricious, despotic,
oppressive or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse must be of
such degree as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, as where the power is exercised in a capricious manner. The word “capricious,” usually used in tandem
with “arbitrary,” conveys the notion of willful and unreasoning action.

The mere issuance by the trial court of the order of default followed by a judgment by default can easily be
sustained as correct and doubtless within its jurisdiction.—Under the premises, the mere issuance by the trial
court of the order of default followed by a judgment by default can easily be sustained as correct and
doubtless within its jurisdiction. Surely, a disposition directing the Republic to pay an enormous sum without
the trial court hearing its side does not, without more, vitiate, on due procedural ground, the validity of the
default judgment. The petitioner may have indeed been deprived of such hearing, but this does not mean that
its right to due process had been violated. For, consequent to being declared in default, the defaulting
defendant is deemed to have waived his right to be heard or to take part in the trial.
10. University of the Philippines vs. Dizon, ( 679 SCRA 54, G.R. No. 171182 August 23, 2012)

Schools; University of the Philippines; The University of the Philippines (UP) is a government instrumentality,
performing the State’s constitutional mandate of promoting quality and accessible education.—Irrefragably,
the UP is a government instrumentality, performing the State’s constitutional mandate of promoting quality
and accessible education. As a government instrumentality, the UP administers special funds sourced from
the fees and income enumerated under Act No. 1870 and Section 1 of Executive Order No. 714, and from the
yearly appropriations, to achieve the purposes laid down by Section 2 of Act 1870, as expanded in Republic
Act No. 9500. All the funds going into the possession of the UP, including any interest accruing from the
deposit of such funds in any banking institution, constitute a “special trust fund,” the disbursement of which
should always be aligned with the UP’s mission and purpose, and should always be subject to auditing by the
COA.

Trust Funds; Words and Phrases; Presidential Decree No. 1445 defines a “trust fund” as a fund that officially
comes in the possession of an agency of the government or of a public officer as trustee, agent or
administrator, or that is received for the fulfillment of some obligation.—Presidential Decree No. 1445
defines a “trust fund” as a fund that officially comes in the possession of an agency of the government or of a
public officer as trustee, agent or administrator, or that is received for the fulfillment of some obligation. A
trust fund may be utilized only for the “specific purpose for which the trust was created or the funds
received.”

Constitutional Law; The Constitution strictly mandated that “(n)o money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”—Indeed, an appropriation by Congress was required
before the judgment that rendered the UP liable for moral and actual damages (including attorney’s fees)
would be satisfied considering that such monetary liabilities were not covered by the “appropriations
earmarked for the said project.” The Constitution strictly mandated that “(n)o money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”

11. Republic vs. National Labor Relations Commission (Third Division), 787 SCRA 90, G.R. No. 174747
March 9, 2016

Administrative Agencies; Commission on Audit; Jurisdiction; Under Section 26 of the State Auditing Code, the
Commission on Audit (COA) has jurisdiction over the settlement of debts and claims “of any sort” against
government.—Under Section 26 of the State Auditing Code, the Commission on Audit has jurisdiction over the
settlement of debts and claims “of any sort” against government: Section 26. General jurisdiction.—The
authority and powers of the Commission shall extend to and comprehend all matters relating to auditing
procedures, systems and controls, the keeping of the general accounts of the Government, the preservation of
vouchers pertaining thereto for a period of ten years, the examination and inspection of the books, records,
and papers relating to those accounts; and the audit and settlement of the accounts of all persons respecting
funds or property received or held by them in an accountable capacity, as well as the examination, audit, and
settlement of all debts and claims of any sort due from or owing to the Government or any of its subdivisions,
agencies and instrumentalities. The said jurisdiction extends to all government-owned or -controlled
corporations, including their subsidiaries, and other selfgoverning [sic] boards, commissions, or agencies of
the Government, and as herein prescribed, including nongovernmental entities subsidized by the
government, those funded by donation through the government, those required to pay levies or government
share, and those for which the government has put up a counterpart fund or those partly funded by the
government. Republic vs. National Labor Relations Commission (Third Division), 787 SCRA 90, G.R. No.
174747 March 9, 2016

12. NPC Drivers and Mechanics Association (NPC DAMA) vs. National Power Corporation (NPC)

Labor Law; Labor Contracts; Collective Bargaining Agreements; In Sundowner Development Corporation v.
Drilon, 180 SCR 14 (1989), the Supreme Court (SC) ruled that unless expressly assumed, labor contracts such
as employment contracts and collective bargaining agreements are not enforceable against a buyer of an
enterprise, labor contracts being in personam, thus binding only between the seller-employer and its
employees.—The settled rule is that an employer who terminates the employment of its employees without
lawful cause or due process of law is liable for illegal dismissal. When the EPIRA mandated the NPC’s
privatization, it directed the sale, disposition, change and transfer of ownership and control of NPC’s assets
and IPP contracts for the purpose of pooling funds to liquidate NPC’s liabilities. This transaction is akin to an
asset sale-type corporate acquisition in the law of mergers and acquisitions where one entity — the seller —
sells all or substantially all of its assets to another — the buyer. In SME Bank, Inc. v. De Guzman, 707 SCRA 35
(2013), we held that the rule in asset sales is that the employees may be separated from their employment,
but the seller is liable for the payment of separation pay; on the other hand, the buyer in good faith is not
required to retain the affected employees in its service, nor is it liable for the payment of their claims. This is
consistent with Our ruling in Sundowner Development Corporation v. Drilon, 180 SCRA 14 (1989), that
unless expressly assumed, labor contracts such as employment contracts and collective bargaining
agreements are not enforceable against a buyer of an enterprise, labor contracts being in personam, thus
binding only between the seller-employer and its employees. Following these rules, the NPC, as employer, is
liable for the illegal dismissal and, in effect, the payment of the petitioners’ entitlement.

Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation; Jurisdiction; Without a doubt, Power Sector
Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM) is statutorily mandated not only to privatize the
National Power Corporation’s (NPC’s) generation assets, but also to manage the proceeds obtained from
privatization including its net profits and use these proceeds to settle all of NPC’s financial obligations,
without exception.—PSALM was created under the EPIRA for the principal purpose of privatizing the NPC’s
generation assets, real estate and other disposable assets, and IPP contracts with the ultimate objective of
liquidating all NPC’s financial obligations and stranded contract costs. It is empowered to take possession of,
administer, and conserve, and subsequently sell or dispose the assets transferred to it pursuant to its
established purpose. In 2012, PSALM disclosed that the joint boards of directors of the NPC and PSALM
authorized utilization of the privatization proceeds to pay the NPC’s principal and other financial obligations.
The proceeds from privatization shall include not only the proceeds from sale and disposition of NPC’s
generation and other disposable assets but also the proceeds from NPC’s net profits. Without a doubt, PSALM
is statutorily mandated not only to privatize NPC’s generation assets, but also to manage the proceeds
obtained from privatization including its net profits and use these proceeds to settle all of NPC’s financial
obligations, without exception. This blanket responsibility is evident from PSALM’s role even in the
settlement of the NPC’s Contingent Liabilities. Under the Deed of Transfer, while the NPC shall retain sole
responsibility of a Contingent Liability, PSALM shall nonetheless provide for a mechanism to allow the NPC to
satisfy the claim through, for example, a reserve fund or a provision under the Operation and Maintenance
Agreement or any other agreement to be entered into by the parties. Thus, whether or not the NPC has been
finally determined to be liable for the claim, PSALM must see to it that the same is settled.
Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001; Restructuring; Section 4, Rule 33 of the Electric Power Industry
Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA) Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR), which provides that the “funds
necessary to cover the separation pay” of all the National Power Corporation (NPC) employees displaced as a
result of the restructuring plan “shall be provided either by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
or from the NPC’s corporate funds.”—Clearly, PSALM cannot now turn its back on an obligation that is both
contractual and statutory. Although the liability was initially imposed upon the NPC as the petitioners’
employer, the responsibility for its satisfaction now rests with PSALM. This ruling is not affected by Section 4,
Rule 33 of the EPIRA IRR, which provides that the “funds necessary to cover the separation pay” of all NPC
employees displaced as a result of the restructuring plan “shall be provided either by the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) or from the NPC’s corporate funds.” As it now stands, after privatization, We find
that the NPC’s corporate funds are largely within PSALM’s control. Prior to the EPIRA, the NPC performed and
derived corporate funds from three main functions: generation, transmission, and missionary electrification.
Upon privatization, the NPC divested its generation and transmission assets but continued operations as to its
missionary electrification function.

Commission on Audit; Jurisdiction; Backwages; The back payment of any compensation to public officers and
employees cannot be done through a writ of execution. The Commission on Audit (COA) has exclusive
jurisdiction to settle “all debts and claims of any sort due from or owing to the Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities.”—While PSALM is directly liable for the payment of the
petitioners’ entitlement, the proper procedure to enforce a judgment award against the government is to file
a separate action before the COA for its satisfaction. We have consistently ruled that the back payment of any
compensation to public officers and employees cannot be done through a writ of execution. The COA has
exclusive jurisdiction to settle “all debts and claims of any sort due from or owing to the Government or any
of its subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities.” The proper procedure to enforce a judgment award
against the government is to file a separate action before the COA for its satisfaction.

Same; Same; Same; To enforce the satisfaction of the judgment award, the amount of which has been
provisionally computed in the National Power Corporation (NPC) List and Computation, the petitioners must
now go before the Commission on Audit (COA) and file a separate money claim against the NPC and the
Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM).—The NPC List and Computation is by
no means final and binding either on the Court or the COA, regardless of the petitioners’ acceptance and
admission of the same. It is still subject to the COA’s validation and audit procedures. To enforce the
satisfaction of the judgment award, the amount of which has been provisionally computed in the NPC List and
Computation, the petitioners must now go before the COA and file a separate money claim against the NPC
and PSALM. Whether the claim shall be allowed or disallowed is for the COA to decide, subject only to the
remedy of appeal by petition for certiorari to this Court.

Government Employees; Dismissal from Service; Restructuring; The established rule is that an illegally
dismissed civil service employee shall be entitled to reinstatement plus backwages; However, when an
entirely new setup takes the place of the entity’s previous corporate structure, the abolition of positions and
offices cannot be avoided, thus, making reinstatement impossible. In which case, separation pay shall be
awarded in lieu of reinstatement.—The established rule is that an illegally dismissed civil service employee
shall be entitled to reinstatement plus backwages. This rule is echoed in Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6656,
which relates specifically to illegal dismissals due to a government agency restructuring plan found to be
invalid. However, when an entirely new setup takes the place of the entity’s previous corporate structure, the
abolition of positions and offices cannot be avoided, thus, making reinstatement impossible. In which case,
separation pay shall be awarded in lieu of reinstatement. The award of separation pay in illegal dismissal
cases is an accepted deviation from the general rule of ordering reinstatement because the law cannot exact
compliance with what is impossible. Under the law, the separation pay in lieu of reinstatement due to each
petitioner shall be either the: (1) Separation pay under the EPIRA and the NPC’s restructuring plan; or (2)
Separation gratuity under Republic Act No. 6656, depending on their qualifications.

Same; Same; Same; Separation Pay; Republic Act (RA) No. 6656, the general law governing corporate
reorganizations in the civil service, provides that the separation pay due to entitled civil service employees
separated pursuant to a reorganization plan shall be the appropriate separation pay and retirement and other
benefits under existing laws, which in this case is the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA)
mandating the National Power Corporation (NPC) restructuring plan.—Republic Act No. 6656, the general
law governing corporate reorganizations in the civil service, provides that the separation pay due to entitled
civil service employees separated pursuant to a reorganization plan shall be the appropriate separation pay
and retirement and other benefits under existing laws, which in this case is the EPIRA mandating the NPC’s
restructuring plan. A person is qualified to receive separation benefits under the NPC’s restructuring plan if
the following requirements concur: (a) he/she is an official or employee whose employment was severed
pursuant to the privatization of the NPC; (b) he/she has rendered at least one year of service as of June 26,
2001; (c) he/she must not have qualified or opted to retire under existing laws; and (d) if a casual or
contractual employee, he/she must have had his/her appointment approved or attested to by the CSC. If
qualified, the employee shall receive separation pay under the NPC’s restructuring plan, which is equal to one
and one-half months’ salary for every year of service in the government. To clarify, the formula to compute
the amount of separation pay has three components, viz.: (a) base amount, consisting of the monthly salary;
(b) multiplier of one and one-half months or 1.5; and (c) length of service.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Contractual Employees; If the person is a contractual employee whose appointment
was not approved by the Civil Service Commission (CSC), etc., but was separated pursuant to the
restructuring, he/she is not qualified to receive the separation pay under the National Power Corporation’s
(NPC’s) restructuring plan but is nonetheless entitled to a separation gratuity provided in Republic Act (RA)
No. 6656 in the amount equivalent to one (1) month basic salary for every year of service.—If the person does
not meet all the above mentioned requirements (i.e., he/she is a contractual employee whose appointment
was not approved by the CSC, etc.) but was separated pursuant to the restructuring, he/she is not qualified to
receive the separation pay under the NPC’s restructuring plan but is nonetheless entitled to a separation
gratuity provided in Republic Act No. 6656 in the amount equivalent to one month basic salary for every year
of service.

Same; Same; Illegal Dismissal; Backwages; An illegally dismissed government employee is entitled to
backwages from the time of his illegal dismissal until his reinstatement because he is considered as not
having left his office.—We have consistently ruled that an illegally dismissed government employee is
entitled to backwages from the time of his illegal dismissal until his reinstatement because he is considered as
not having left his office. Following Galang v. Land Bank of the Philippines, 649 SCRA 574 (2011), backwages
shall be computed based on the most recent salary rate upon termination.

Same; Same; Separation Pay; The computation of separation pay is based on the length of the employee’s
service; and the computation of backwages is based on the actual period when the employee was unlawfully
prevented from working.—To be clear, the computation of separation pay is based on the length of the
employee’s service; and the computation of backwages is based on the actual period when the employee was
unlawfully prevented from working. While these two awards are reckoned from different dates, both are
computed in the present case until September 14, 2007 or the date of

retirement, whichever is earlier. The period of overlap is proper because the period where backwages are
awarded must be included in the computation of separation pay.

Same; Same; Backwages; Petitioners who were subsequently: (a) rehired by the National Power Corporation
(NPC), (b) absorbed by Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM) or Transco, or
(c) transferred or employed by other government agencies, are not entitled to backwages.—We rule that
petitioners who were subsequently: (a) rehired by the NPC, (b) absorbed by PSALM or Transco, or (c)
transferred or employed by other government agencies, are not entitled to backwages. Moreover, to award
full backwages even to those who remained employed as a direct result of the 2003 reorganization amounts
to unjust enrichment and damage to the government.

Same; Same; Same; Petitioners who were neither rehired by the National Power Corporation (NPC) or
absorbed by Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM) or Transco pursuant to
the 2003 reorganization and subsequently employed in the private sector shall be entitled to full backwages.
—Petitioners who were neither rehired by the NPC or absorbed by PSALM or Transco pursuant to the 2003
reorganization and subsequently employed in the private sector shall be entitled to full backwages (applying
Bustamante v. National Labor Relations Commission, 265 SCRA 61 [1996], and Equitable Banking
Corporation v. Sadac, 490 SCRA 380 [2006]).

Same; Same; Same; Backwages should include other monetary benefits attached to the employee’s salary
following the principle that an illegally dismissed government employee who is later reinstated is entitled to
all the rights and privileges that accrue to him/her by virtue of the office he/she held.—We have also ruled
that backwages should include other monetary benefits attached to the employee’s salary following the
principle that an illegally dismissed government employee who is later reinstated is entitled to all the rights
and privileges that accrue to him/her by virtue of the office he/she held.

Same; Same; Same; Separation Pay; While the petitioners are entitled to separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement, backwages, and other wage adjustments, the amount they shall receive must be reduced by
any separation pay each of them has already received under the separation plan.—While the petitioners are
entitled to separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, backwages, and other wage adjustments, the amount they
shall receive must be reduced by any separation pay each of them has already received under the separation
plan. NPC Drivers and Mechanics Association (NPC DAMA) vs. National Power Corporation (NPC), 845 SCRA
487, G.R. No. 156208 November 21, 2017

13. BUISAN VS COMMISSION ON AUDIT

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Section 5 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court requires, among others,
that in a petition for review of judgments and final orders or resolutions of Commission on Audit (COA), the
petition should be verified and contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in the fourth
paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.—Section 5 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court requires, among others, that in a
petition for review of judgments and final orders or resolutions of COA, the petition should be verified and
contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in the fourth paragraph of Section 3, Rule
46, viz.: SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of noncompliance with requirements.—x x x. x x x x The
petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a sworn certification that he has not theretofore
commenced any other action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or
different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he
must state the status of the same; and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has
been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any
other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency
thereof within five (5) days therefrom. x x x x The failure of the petitioner to comply any of the requirements
shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.

Same; Same; Certification Against Forum Shopping; In the case of natural persons, the rule requires the
parties themselves to sign the certification against forum shopping.—In the case of natural persons, the rule
requires the parties themselves to sign the certification against forum shopping. The reason for such
requirement is that the petitioner himself knows better than anyone else whether a separate case has been
filed or pending which involves substantially the same issues. In this case, the certification against forum
shopping in the filing of this petition was neither signed by the petitioners nor their counsel, but by the mayor
of their town who is not even one of the petitioners in this case. Evidently, the petitioners failed to comply
with the certification against forum shopping requirement absent any compelling reason as to warrant an
exception based on the circumstances of the case.

Political Law; State Immunity from Suit; It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the
juristic concept of sovereignty that the State, as well as its government, is immune from suit unless it gives its
consent.—The fundamental law of the land provides that the State cannot be sued without its consent. It is a
fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the State, as
well as its government, is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. The rule, in any case, is not absolute
for it does not say that the State may not be sued under any circumstances. The doctrine only conveys that
“the state may not be sued without its consent”; its clear import then is that the State may at times be sued.
Suits filed against government agencies may either be against incorporated or unincorporated agencies. In
case of incorporated agencies, its suability depends upon whether its own organic act specifically provides
that it can sue and be sued in Court.

Same; Same; The Doctrine of Non-Suability clothes the  Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)
from being held responsible for alleged damages it performed in consonance with its mandated duty.—As the
State’s engineering and construction arm, the DPWH exercises governmental functions that effectively
insulate it from any suit, much less from any monetary liability. The construction of the Project which was for
the purpose of minimizing the perennial problem of flood in the area of Tunggol, Montawal, Maguindanao, is
well within the powers and functions of the DPWH as mandated by the Administrative Code of 1997. Hence,
the Doctrine of Non-Suability clothes the DPWH from being held responsible for alleged damages it
performed in consonance with its mandated duty. Nowhere does it appear in the petition that the State has
given its consent, expressly or impliedly, to be sued before the courts. The failure to allege the existence of the
State’s consent to be sued in the complaint is a fatal defect, and on this basis alone, should cause the dismissal
of the complaint.

Administrative Agencies; Commission on Audit; Jurisdiction; Rule II, Section 1(b) of the 2009 Revised Rules of
Procedure of the Commission on Audit (COA) specifically enumerated those matters falling under COA’s
exclusive jurisdiction, which include “money claims due from or owing to any government agency.” Rule VIII,
Section 1(a) further provides that COA shall have original jurisdiction over money claims against the
Government, among others.—Undeniably, the petitioners’ money claims which were only filed with the
DPWH in 2004 or even in 2001 had already prescribed. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor
General, “[i]t will be the height of injustice for respondent DPWH to be confronted with stale claims, where
verification on the plausibility of the allegations remains difficult, either because the condition of the alleged
inundation of crops has changed, or the physical impossibility of accounting for the lost and damaged crops
due to the considerable lapse of time.” On the other hand, “[l]aches has been defined as the failure or neglect,
for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence could or
should have been done earlier.” In the case at bar, laches has set in as the elements thereof are present.
Firstly, the premature opening by the DPWH of the Project allegedly causing flash floods, and damaging the
petitioners’ properties took place in 1989 or even in 1992. Secondly, the petitioners took 15 years to assert
their rights when they formally filed a complaint in 2004 against the DPWH. Thirdly, as the petitioners failed
to file a formal suit for their claims before the COA, there is an apparent lack of notice that would give the
DPWH the opportunity to defend itself. Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Section 26 of
Presidential Decree No. 1445, which were the applicable laws at the time the cause of action arose, the COA
has primary jurisdiction over money claims against government agencies and instrumentalities. Moreover,
Rule II, Section 1(b) of the 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA specifically enumerated those matters
falling under COA’s exclusive jurisdiction, which include “money claims due from or owing to any government
agency.” Rule VIII, Section 1(a) further provides that COA shall have original jurisdiction over money claims
against the Government, among others. Therefore, the petitioners’ money claims have prescribed and are
barred by laches for their failure to timely file the petition with the COA.

Same; Same; Same; The Commission on Audit (COA) is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent,
and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government
funds.—Even if the Court sets aside the technical and procedural issues in the interest of substantive justice,
the instant petition must be denied. The COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent, and
disallow irregular, un-

necessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It is tasked to be

vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the government’s and, ultimately, the people’s
property. The exercise of its general audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the
check and balance system inherent in our form of government.

Political Law; Separation of Powers; It is the general policy of the Supreme Court (SC) to sustain the decision
of administrative authorities, especially one that was constitutionally created like herein respondent
Commission on Audit (COA), not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers, but also of their
presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce.—It is the general policy of the Court to sustain
the decision of administrative authorities, especially one that was constitutionally created like herein
respondent COA, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers, but also of their presumed
expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. It is, in fact, an oft-repeated rule that findings of
administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality when the decision and order are not
tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion. Buisan vs.
Commission on Audit, 816 SCRA 346, G.R. No. 212376 January 31, 2017

14. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. ERNESTO ROXAS, respondent.

Administrative Agencies; National Housing Authority; Under Section 6(i) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 757,
which was its charter, the National Housing Authority (NHA) could sue and be sued.—The mantle of the
State’s immunity from suit did not extend to the NHA despite its being a government-owned and -controlled
corporation. Under Section 6(i) of Presidential Decree No. 757, which was its charter, the NHA could sue and
be sued. As such, the NHA was not immune from the suit of Roxas.

Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Section 12 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 757 has authorized the National Housing
Authority (NHA) to “determine, establish and maintain the most feasible and effective program for the
management or disposition of specific housing or resettlement projects undertaken by [it],” and “[u]nless
otherwise decided by the Board, completed housing or resettlement projects shall be managed and
administered by [it].”—Section 12 of Presiden-

tial Decree No. 757 has authorized the NHA to “determine, establish and maintain the most feasible and
effective program for the management or disposition of specific housing or resettlement projects undertaken
by [it],” and “[u]nless otherwise decided by the Board, completed housing or resettlement projects shall be
managed and administered by [it].” The execution of the contract to sell by the NHA conformably with the
main relief under the judgment would be in the ordinary course of the management or disposition of the
Dagat-dagatan Development Project undertaken by the NHA. In other words, the NHA possessed the legal
competence and authority to directly afford the main relief without Roxas needing to first submit to the COA
the contract to sell for review and approval. To maintain otherwise is to unconstitutionally grant to the COA
the power of judicial review in respect of the decision of a court of law.

Same; Same; Same; Section 26 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1445 specifically vested in the Commission on
Audit (COA) the power, authority and duty to examine, audit and settle “all debts and claims of any sort” due
from or owing to the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including
government-owned and -controlled corporations with original charters.—Settling or paying off the secondary
relief for the attorney’s fees of P30,000.00, being a monetary obligation of the NHA, would not be in the usual
course of the activities of the NHA under its charter. That such relief was the consequence of the suit that
granted the main relief did not matter. Pursuant to Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 1445, Roxas should
first bring it to the COA prior to its enforcement against the NHA. Indeed, Section 26 specifically vested in the
COA the power, authority and duty to examine, audit and settle “all debts and claims of any sort” due from or
owing to the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-
owned and -controlled corporations with original charters.

Same; Commission on Audit; Jurisdiction; The audit jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit (COA) extends to
all government-owned or -controlled corporations, their subsidiaries, and other self-governing boards,
commissions, or agencies of the Government, as well as to all nongovernmental entities subsidized by the
Government, or funded by donations through the Government, or required to pay levies or government share,
or for which the Government has put up a counterpart fund, or those partly funded by the Government.—As
the

text of the legal provision plainly shows, the audit jurisdiction of the COA extends to all government-owned or
-controlled corporations, their subsidiaries, and other self-governing boards, commissions, or agencies of the
Government, as well as to all nongovernmental entities subsidized by the Government, or funded by
donations through the Government, or required to pay levies or government share, or for which the
Government has put up a counterpart fund, or those partly funded by the Government. There is no distinction
as to the class of claims. Ubi lex non distinguish nec nos distinguere debemos. Indeed, a general term or
phrase should not be reduced into parts and one part distinguished from the other so as to justify its
exclusion from the operation of the law. In other words, there should be no distinction in the application of a
statute where none is indicated. Corollary to this rule is the principle that where the law does not make any
exception, the courts may not exempt something therefrom, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary.

Immunity from Suit; The universal rule remains to be that the State, although it gives its consent to be sued
either by general or special law, may limit the claimant’s action only up to the completion of proceedings
anterior to the stage of execution.—There is no question that the NHA could sue or be sued, and thus could be
held liable under the judgment rendered against it. But the universal rule remains to be that the State,
although it gives its consent to be sued either by general or special law, may limit the claimant’s action only
up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution. In other words, the power of the court
ends when the judgment is rendered because government funds and property may not be seized pursuant to
writs of execution or writs of garnishment to satisfy such judgments. The functions and public services of the
State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public fund from their legitimate and
specific objects, and as appropriated by law. The rule is based on obvious considerations of public policy.
Indeed, the disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required
by law. National Housing Authority vs. Roxas, 773 SCRA 358, G.R. No. 171953 October 21, 2015

15. Arigo vs. Swift

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Locus Standi; Words and Phrases; Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a
court of justice on a given question.”—Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question.” Specifically, it is “a party’s personal and substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result” of the act being challenged, and “calls for more than just a generalized
grievance.” However, the rule on standing is a procedural matter which this Court has relaxed for
nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so requires,
such as when the subject matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest.

Constitutional Law; Balance and Healthful Ecology; In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., 224 SCRA
792 (1993), the Supreme Court (SC) recognized the “public right” of citizens to “a balanced and healthful
ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental
law.”—In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., 224 SCRA 792 (1993), we recognized the “public right”
of citizens to “a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history, is
solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.” We declared that the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental
importance with intergenerational implications. Such right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Class Suit; On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners
minors in Oposa, this Court ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the
enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in representation of their own and future generations.—
On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court ruled that not only
do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in
representation of their own and future generations. Thus:

Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no
difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding
generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be
based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature.”
Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia,
the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral,
land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration,
development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. Needless to
say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full
enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors’ assertion of their right to a
sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection
of that right for the generations to come.

Constitutional Law; State Immunity from Suit; This traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a State
from being sued in the courts of another State without the former’s consent or waiver has evolved into a
restrictive doctrine which distinguishes sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) from private,
commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis).—This traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a
State from being sued in the courts of another State without the former’s consent or waiver has evolved into a
restrictive doctrine which distinguishes sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) from private,
commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). Under the restrictive rule of State immunity, State immunity
extends only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the
proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or
economic affairs.

Same; International Law; International Law of the Sea; Words and Phrases; The international law of the sea is
generally defined as “a body of treaty rules and customary norms governing the uses of the

sea, the exploitation of its resources, and the exercise of jurisdiction over maritime regimes.—The
international law of the sea is generally defined as “a body of treaty rules and customary norms governing the
uses of the sea, the exploitation of its resources, and the exercise of jurisdiction over maritime regimes. It is a
branch of public international law, regulating the relations of states with respect to the uses of the oceans.”
The UNCLOS is a multilateral treaty which was opened for signature on December 10, 1982 at Montego Bay,
Jamaica. It was ratified by the Philippines in 1984 but came into force on November 16, 1994 upon the
submission of the 60th ratification.

Same; Same; Same; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; The United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) gives to the coastal State sovereign rights in varying degrees over the different
zones of the sea which are: 1) internal waters, 2) territorial sea, 3) contiguous zone, 4) exclusive economic
zone, and 5) the high seas. It also gives coastal States more or less jurisdiction over foreign vessels depending
on where the vessel is located.—The UNCLOS is a product of international negotiation that seeks to balance
State sovereignty (mare clausum) and the principle of freedom of the high seas (mare liberum). The freedom
to use the world’s marine waters is one of the oldest customary principles of international law. The UNCLOS
gives to the coastal State sovereign rights in varying degrees over the different zones of the sea which are: 1)
internal waters, 2) territorial sea, 3) contiguous zone, 4) exclusive economic zone, and 5) the high seas. It also
gives coastal States more or less jurisdiction over foreign vessels depending on where the vessel is located.

Same; Same; State Immunity from Suit; Visiting Forces Agreement; Writ of Kalikasan; The waiver of State
immunity under the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special
civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan.—The VFA is an agreement which
defines the treatment of United States troops and personnel visiting the Philippines to promote “common
security interests” between the US and the Philippines in the region. It provides for the guidelines to govern
such visits of military personnel, and further defines the rights of the United States and the Philippine
government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and
exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.

The invocation of US federal tort laws and even common law is thus improper considering that it is the VFA
which governs disputes involving US military ships and crew navigating Philippine waters in pursuance of the
objectives of the agreement. As it is, the waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal
jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In
fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case against a person charged with
a violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately: SEC. 17. Institution of separate actions.—The
filing of a petition for the issuance of the writ of kalikasan shall not preclude the filing of separate civil,
criminal or administrative actions.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A ruling on the application or non-application of criminal jurisdiction
provisions of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) to US personnel who may be found responsible for the
grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of
Kalikasan.—In any case, it is our considered view that a ruling on the application or non-application of
criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding
of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan. We
also find it unnecessary at this point to determine whether such waiver of State immunity is indeed absolute.
In the same vein, we cannot grant damages which have resulted from the violation of environmental laws.
The Rules allows the recovery of damages, including the collection of administrative fines under R.A. No.
10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal action charging the same violation
of an environmental law.

Same; Same; Foreign Relations; It is settled that “the conduct of the foreign relations of our government is
committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative — ‘the political’ — departments of the
government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to
judicial inquiry or decision.”—A rehabilitation or restoration program to be implemented at the cost of the
violator is also a major relief that may be obtained under a judgment rendered in a citizens’ suit under the
Rules, viz.: RULE 5 SECTION 1. Reliefs in a citizen suit.—If warranted, the court may grant to the plaintiff
proper reliefs which shall include the protec-

tion, preservation or rehabilitation of the environment and the payment of attorney’s fees, costs of suit and
other litigation expenses. It may also require the violator to submit a program of rehabilitation or restoration
of the environment, the costs of which shall be borne by the violator, or to contribute to a special trust fund
for that purpose subject to the control of the court. In the light of the foregoing, the Court defers to the
Executive Branch on the matter of compensation and rehabilitation measures through diplomatic channels.
Resolution of these issues impinges on our relations with another State in the context of common security
interests under the VFA. It is settled that “[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our government is
committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative — ‘the political’ — departments of the
government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to
judicial inquiry or decision.”

SERENO,  CJ., Concurring Opinion:

Constitutional Law; International Law; Visiting Forces Agreement; Treaties; View that acts done pursuant to
the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) take the nature of governmental acts, since both the United States and
Philippine governments recognize the VFA as a treaty with corresponding obligations, and the presence of
these two Naval Officers and the warship in Philippine waters fell under this legal regime.—In this case, the
two Naval Officers were acting pursuant to their function as the commanding officers of a warship, traversing
Philippine waters under the authority of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). While the events beg the
question of what the warship was doing in that area, when it should have been headed towards Indonesia, its
presence in Philippine waters is not wholly unexplainable. The VFA is a treaty, and it has been affirmed as
valid by this Court in Bayan v. Zamora, 342 SCRA 449 (2000), and affirmed in Lim v. Executive Secretary, 380
SCRA 739 (2002), and Nicolas v. Romulo, 578 SCRA 438 (2009). It has, in the past, been used to justify the
presence of United States Armed Forces in the Philippines. In this respect therefore, acts done pursuant to the
VFA take the nature of governmental acts, since both the United States and Philippine governments recognize
the VFA as a treaty with corresponding obligations, and the presence of these two Naval Officers and the
warship in Philippine waters fell under this legal regime.

Same; Same; State Immunity from Suit; View that under the regime of international law, there is an added
dimension to sovereign immunity exceptions: the tort exception.—Under the regime of international law,
there is an added dimension to sovereign immunity exceptions: the tort exception. Whether this has evolved
into a customary norm is still debatable; what is important to emphasize is that while some states have
enacted legislation to allow the piercing of sovereign immunity in tortuous actions, the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976 of the United States (FSIA) contains such privilege. Specifically, the FSIA contains
exceptions for (1) waiver; (2) commercial activity; (3) expropriation; (4) property rights acquired through
succession or donation; (5) damages for personal injury or death or damage to or loss of property; (6)
enforcement of an arbitration agreement; (7) torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking,
or the provision of material support to such an act, if the state sponsors terrorism; and (8) maritime lien in a
suit for admiralty based on commercial activity.

Same; Same; Same; View that immunity, unlike in other jurisdictions, is determined not by the courts of law
but by the executive branches.—In Vinuya v. Romulo, 619 SCRA 533 (2010), we stated that “the question
whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a
foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the
courts but to the political branches.” Immunity then, unlike in other jurisdictions, is determined not by the
courts of law but by the executive branches.
Same; Same; Same; View that the basic concept of state immunity is that no state may be subjected to the
jurisdiction of another state without its consent.—The basic concept of state immunity is that no state may be
subjected to the jurisdiction of another state without its consent. According to Professor Ian Brownlie, it is “a
procedural bar (not a substantive defence) based on the status and functions of the state or official in
question.” Furthermore, its applicability depends on the law and procedural rules of the forum state.

Same; Same; Same; Writ of Kalikasan; View that should the Court issue the Writ, it could possibly entail
international responsibility for breaching the jurisdictional immunity of a sovereign state.—No exception
exists in Philippine or international law that

would remove the immunity of the United States in order to place it under the jurisdiction of Philippine
courts. The Writ of Kalikasan is a compulsory writ, and its issuance initiates a legal process that would
circumvent the internationally established rules of immunity. Should the Court issue the Writ, it could
possibly entail international responsibility for breaching the jurisdictional immunity of a sovereign state.

LEONEN,  J., Concurring Opinion:

Writ of Kalikasan; View that the writ of kalikasan is not an all-embracing legal remedy to be wielded like a
political tool.—The writ of kalikasan is not an all-embracing legal remedy to be wielded like a political tool. It
is both an extraordinary and equitable remedy which assists to prevent environmental catastrophes. It does
not replace other legal remedies similarly motivated by concern for the environment and the community’s
ecological welfare. Certainly, when the petition itself alleges that remedial and preventive remedies have
occurred, the functions of the writ cease to exist. In case of disagreement, parties need to exhaust the political
and administrative arena. Only when a concrete cause of action arises out of facts that can be proven with
substantial evidence may the proper legal action be entertained.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Class Suits; Citizen’s Suits; View Citizen’s suits are procedural devices that
allow a genuine cause of action to be judicially considered in spite of the social costs or negative externalities
of such initiatives. This should be clearly distinguished in our rules and in jurisprudence from class suits that
purport to represent the whole population and unborn generations.—Citizen’s suits are suits brought by
parties suffering direct and substantial injuries; although in the environmental field, these injuries may be
shared with others. It is different from class suits brought as representative suits under Oposa v. Factoran,
224 SCRA 792 (1993). In my view, there is need to review this doctrine insofar as it allows a
nonrepresentative group to universally represent a whole population as well as an unborn generation
binding them to causes of actions, arguments, and reliefs which they did not choose. Generations yet unborn
suffer from the legal inability to assert against false or unwanted representation. Citizen’s suits are
procedural devices that allow a genuine cause of action to be judicially considered in spite of

the social costs or negative externalities of such initiatives. This should be clearly distinguished in our rules
and in jurisprudence from class suits that purport to represent the whole population and unborn generations.
The former is in keeping with the required constitutional protection for our people. The latter is dangerous
and should be used only in very extraordinary or rare situations. It may be jurisprudentially inappropriate.
Constitutional Law; International Law; State Immunity from Suit; View that the doctrine of sovereign
immunity is understood as a basic right extended to states by other states on the basis of respect for
sovereignty and independence.—The doctrine of sovereign immunity evolves out of the theory and practice
of sovereignty and the principle par in parem non habet jurisdictionem. Its particular contours as an
international norm have evolved far beyond the form it took when the theory of absolute sovereignty was
current. Contemporarily, it is understood as a basic right extended to states by other states on the basis of
respect for sovereignty and independence. There appears to be a consensus among states that sovereign
immunity as a concept is legally binding. However, there remains to be a lack of international agreement as to
how it is to be invoked and the extent of immunity in some cases.

Same; Same; Same; View that this doctrine of relative jurisdictional immunity (sovereign immunity) of states
and their agents becomes binding in our jurisdiction as international law only through Section 2 of Article II
or Section 21 of Article VII of the Constitution.—This doctrine of relative jurisdictional immunity (sovereign
immunity) of states and their agents becomes binding in our jurisdiction as international law only through
Section 2 of Article II or Section 21 of Article VII of the Constitution. Article XVII, Section 3 of the Constitution
is a limitation on suits against our state. It is not the textual anchor for determining the extent of jurisdictional
immunities that should be accorded to other states or their agents. International law may have evolved
further than the usual distinction between acta jure imperii and acta jure gestionis. Indications of state
practice even of public respondents show that jurisdictional immunity for foreign states may not apply to
certain violations of jus cogens rules of international customary law. There can be tort exemptions provided
by statute and, therefore, the state practice of an agent’s sovereign being sued in our courts.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; Environmental Cases; View that the “environmental” nature of
this petition, based upon the alleged violation of the Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park Act, by itself does not and
should not automatically render the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases applicable; This means that
even in environmental cases, Rule 3, Sections 2, 3, or 12 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure should still also
apply.—The “environmental” nature of this petition, based upon the alleged violation of the Tubbataha Reefs
Natural Park Act, by itself does not and should not automatically render the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases applicable. At best, it must be reconciled with rules on parties as contained in the Rules
of Court. This is to preclude a situation where the interpretation of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases results in a ruling inconsistent or contrary to established legal concepts. It is my position that unless the
remedy sought will serve the purpose of preventing an environmental catastrophe, the traditional procedural
route should be taken. This means that even in environmental cases, Rule 3, Sections 2, 3, or 12 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure should still also apply.

Same; Same; Real Party-in-Interest; View that a real party-in-interest is a litigant whose right or interest
stands to benefit or get injured by the judgment of the case.—A real party-in-interest is a litigant whose right
or interest stands to benefit or get injured by the judgment of the case. The interest referred to must be
material interest, founded upon a legal right sought to be enforced. They bring a suit because the act or
omission of another has caused them to directly suffer its consequences. Simply put, a real party-in-interest
has a cause of action based upon an existing legal right-duty correlative.
Same; Same; Representatives; Environmental Cases; View that in environmental cases, Section 3 of Rule 3 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure may be used to bring a suit, provided that two (2) elements concur: a) the
suit is brought on behalf of an identified party whose right has been violated, resulting in some form of
damage, and b) the representative authorized by law or the Rules of Court to represent the victim.—A
“representative” is not the party who will actually benefit or suffer from the judgment of the case. The rule
requires that the beneficiary be identified as he or she is deemed the real party-in-interest. This means that
acting in a representative capacity does not turn into a real party-in-interest someone who is other

wise an outsider to the cause of action. This rule enumerates who may act as representatives, including those
acting in a fiduciary capacity. While not an exhaustive list, it does set a limit by allowing only those who are
“authorized by law or these Rules.” In environmental cases, this section may be used to bring a suit, provided
that two elements concur: a) the suit is brought on behalf of an identified party whose right has been violated,
resulting in some form of damage, and b) the representative authorized by law or the Rules of Court to
represent the victim.

Same; Same; Citizen’s Suits; View that a citizen’s suit that seeks to enforce environmental rights and
obligations may be brought by any Filipino who is acting as a representative of others, including minors or
generations yet unborn.—A citizen’s suit that seeks to enforce environmental rights and obligations may be
brought by any Filipino who is acting as a representative of others, including minors or generations yet
unborn. As representatives, it is not necessary for petitioners to establish that they directly suffered from the
grounding of the USS Guardian and the subsequent salvage operations. However, it is imperative for them to
indicate with certainty the injured parties on whose behalf they bring the suit. Furthermore, the interest of
those they represent must be based upon concrete legal rights. It is not sufficient to draw out a perceived
interest from a general, nebulous idea of a potential “injury.”

Same; Same; Same; Environmental Cases; View that since environmental cases necessarily involve the
balancing of different types and degrees of interests, allowing anyone from the present generation to
represent others who are yet unborn poses three (3) possible dangers.—“Minors and generations yet
unborn” is a category of real party in interest that was first established in Oposa v. Factoran, 224 SCRA 792
(1993). In Oposa v. Factoran, this court ruled that the representatives derived their personality to file a suit
on behalf of succeeding generations from “intergenerational responsibility.” The case mirrored through
jurisprudence the general moral duty of the present generation to ensure the full enjoyment of a balanced
and healthful ecology by the succeeding generations. Since environmental cases necessarily involve the
balancing of different types and degrees of interests, allowing anyone from the present generation to
represent others who are yet unborn poses three possible dangers. First, they run the risk of foreclosing
arguments of others who are unable to take part in the suit, putting into question its representativeness.
Second, varying interests may potentially result in arguments that are bordering on political issues, the
resolutions of which do not fall upon this court. Third, automatically allowing a class or citizen’s suit on behalf
of “minors and generations yet unborn” may result in the oversimplification of what may be a complex issue,
especially in light of the impossibility of determining future generation’s true interests on the matter.
Same; Same; Res Judicata; View that the doctrine of res judicata bars parties to litigate an issue more than
once, and this is strictly applied because “the maintenance of public order, the repose of society . . . require
that what has been definitely determined by competent tribunals shall be accepted as irrefragable legal
truth.”—Res judicata renders conclusive between the parties and their privies a ruling on their rights, not just
for the present action, but in all subsequent suits. This pertains to all points and matters judicially tried by a
competent court. The doctrine bars parties to litigate an issue more than once, and this is strictly applied
because “the maintenance of public order, the repose of society . . . require that what has been definitely
determined by competent tribunals shall be accepted as irrefragable legal truth.”

Same; Same; Same; View that considering the effect of res judicata, the ruling in Oposa v. Factoran has opened
a dangerous practice of binding parties who are yet incapable of making choices for themselves, either due to
minority or the sheer fact that they do not yet exist.—Considering the effect of res judicata, the ruling in
Oposa v. Factoran has opened a dangerous practice of binding parties who are yet incapable of making
choices for themselves, either due to minority or the sheer fact that they do not yet exist. Once res judicata
sets in, the impleaded minors and generations yet unborn will be unable to bring a suit to relitigate their
interest.

Same; Same; Class Suits; View that in a class suit, petitioners necessarily bring the suit in two capacities: first,
as persons directly injured by the act or omission complained of; and second, as representatives of an entire
class who have suffered the same injury.—In a class suit, petitioners necessarily bring the suit in two
capacities: first, as persons directly injured by the act or omission complained of; and second, as
representatives of an entire class who have suf-

fered the same injury. In order to fully protect all those concerned, petitioners must show that they belong in
the same universe as those they seek to represent. More importantly, they must establish that, in that
universe, they can intervene on behalf of the rest.

Same; Same; Same; Environmental Cases; View that not all environmental cases need to be brought as class
suits.—Not all environmental cases need to be brought as class suits. There is no procedural requirement that
majority of those affected must file a suit in order that an injunctive writ or a writ of kalikasan can be issued.
It is sufficient that the party has suffered its own direct and substantial interest, its legal basis is cogent, and it
has the capability to move forward to present the facts and, if necessary, the scientific basis for its analysis for
some of these cases to be given due course.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Wvil prorit of Kalikasan; View that the writ of kalikasan is a remedy that covers
environmental damages the magnitude of which transcends both political and territorial boundaries.—The
writ of kalikasan is a remedy that covers environmental damages the magnitude of which transcends both
political and territorial boundaries. It specifically provides that the prejudice to life, health, or property
caused by an unlawful act or omission of a public official, public employee, or a private individual or entity
must be felt in at least two cities or provinces. The petition for its issuance may be filed on behalf of those
whose right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, provided that the group or organization which
seeks to represent is duly accredited.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Temporary Environmental Protection Order; View that a Temporary
Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) is an order which either directs or enjoins a person or government
agency to perform or refrain from a certain act, for the purpose of protecting, preserving, and/or
rehabilitating the environment.—A TEPO is an order which either directs or enjoins a person or government
agency to perform or refrain from a certain act, for the purpose of protecting, preserving, and/or
rehabilitating the environment. The crucial elements in its issuance are the presence of “extreme urgency”
and “grave injustice and irreparable injury” to the applicant. Petitioners hinge the basis for this prayer on the
salvage operations conducted immediately after the incident. The remedy is no longer available considering
that all activities to remove the grounded USS Guardian have been concluded. Furthermore, the Notice to
Mariners No. 011-2013 issued by the Philippine Coast Guard on January 29, 2013 effectively set the metes
and bounds of the damaged area. This notice also prohibited “leisure trips to Tubbataha” and advised “all
watercrafts transitting the vicinity to take precautionary measures.”

Constitutional Law; International Law; State Immunity from Suit; View that immunity does not necessarily
apply to all the foreign respondents should the case have been brought in a timely manner, with the proper
remedy, and in the proper court.—It is my position that doctrine on relative jurisdictional immunity of
foreign states or otherwise referred to as sovereign immunity should be further refined. I am of the view that
immunity does not necessarily apply to all the foreign respondents should the case have been brought in a
timely manner, with the proper remedy, and in the proper court. Those who have directly and actually
committed culpable acts or acts resulting from gross negligence resulting in the grounding of a foreign
warship in violation of our laws defining a tortious act or one that protects the environment which implement
binding international obligations cannot claim sovereign immunity. Some clarification may be necessary to
map the contours of relative jurisdictional immunity of foreign states otherwise known as the doctrine of
sovereign immunity. The doctrine of sovereign immunity can be understood either as a domestic or an
international concept.

Same; Same; Same; View that there appears to be a consensus among states that sovereign immunity as a
concept is legally binding.—Under international law, sovereign immunity remains to be an abstract concept.
On a basic level, it is understood as a basic right extended to states by other states on the basis of respect for
sovereignty and independence. There appears to be a consensus among states that sovereign immunity as a
concept is legally binding. Nevertheless, legal scholars observe that there remains to be a lack of agreement as
to how it is to be invoked or exercised in actual cases. Finke presents: States accept sovereign immunity as a
legally binding concept, but only on a very abstract level. They agree on the general idea of immunity, but
disagree on the extent to which they actually must grant immunity in a specific case.

Same; Same; Same; European Convention on State Immunity; Words and Phrases; View that in the Council of
Europe’s explanatory report, sovereign immunity is defined as “a concept of international law, which has
developed out of the principle par in parem non habet imperium, by virtue of which one State is not subject to
the jurisdiction of another State.”—The European Convention on State Immunity is a treaty established
through the Council of Europe on May 16, 1972. In the Council of Europe’s explanatory report, sovereign
immunity is defined as “a concept of international law, which has developed out of the principle par in parem
non habet imperium, by virtue of which one State is not subject to the jurisdiction of another State.” The
treaty arose out of the need to address cases where states become involved in areas of private law: For many
years State immunity has occupied the attention of eminent jurists. It is also the object of abundant case law.
The development of international relations and the increasing intervention of States in spheres belonging to
private law have posed the problem still more acutely by increasing the number of disputes opposing
individuals and foreign States. There are, at present, two theories, that of absolute State immunity which is
the logical consequence of the principle stated above and that of relative State immunity which is tending to
predominate on account of the requirement of modern conditions. According to this latter theory, the State
enjoys immunity for acts jure imperii but not for acts jure gestionis, that is to say when it acts in the same way
as a private person in relations governed by private law. This divergence of opinion causes difficulties in
international relations. States whose courts and administrative authorities apply the theory of absolute State
immunity are led to call for the same treatment abroad.

Same; Same; Visiting Forces Agreement; View that the extent of the Visiting Forces Agreement’s (VFA’s)
categorization as between the Philippine and United States government — either as a “treaty”/

“executive agreement” or as a matter subject to international comity — remains vague.—In sum, the extent of
the VFA’s categorization as between the Philippine and United States government — either as a
“treaty”/“executive agreement” or as a matter subject to international comity — remains vague. Nevertheless,
it is certain that the United States have made a political commitment to recognize the provisions and execute
their obligations under the VFA. This in-

cludes respecting jurisdictional issues in cases involving an offense committed by a US military personnel.

Same; Same; State Immunity from Suit; There appears to be a general recognition that foreign states are to be
afforded immunity on account of equality of states, but the “practice” lacks uniformity.—There appears to be
a general recognition that foreign states are to be afforded immunity on account of equality of states, but the
“practice” lacks uniformity. Finke points out that the doctrine as exercised by different states suffers from
“substantial disagreement on detail and substance.” The inconsistencies in state practice render the
possibility of invoking international comity even more problematic.

Same; Same; Same; View that the International Court of Justice’s position that sovereign immunity remains
applicable even if the action is based upon violations of international law should be limited only to acts during
armed conflict.—In sum, the International Court of Justice’s position that sovereign immunity remains
applicable even if the action is based upon violations of international law should be limited only to acts during
armed conflict. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy) also referred to actions commited
during World War II and especially referred to the situation of international law at that time. The majority
reflected the attitude that sovereign immunity is a customary norm. It, however, recognizes that uniformity in
state practice is far from the consensus required to articulate specific rules pertaining to other circumstances
— such as transgressions of foreign warships of domestic legislation while granted innocent passage. It
impliedly accepted that states enjoyed wide latitude to specify their own norms.

Same; Same; Same; View that as a principle of international law, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is
deemed automatically incorporated in our domestic legal system as per Article II, Section 2 of the
Constitution.—Sovereign immunity is a doctrine recognized by states under the international law system.
However, its characterization as a principle is more appropriate in that “the extent to which foreign states are
awarded immunity differs from state to state.” This appears to be an accepted arrangement in light of the
different state immunity laws all over the world. As it stands, states are allowed to draw the line in the
application of sovereign immunity in cases involving foreign states and their agents. As a principle of

international law, it is deemed automatically incorporated in our domestic legal system as per Article II,
Section 2 of the Constitution. Considering this leeway, along with the urgency and importance of the case at
hand, the Philippines is, therefore, free to provide guidelines consistent with international law, domestic
legislation, and existing jurisprudence.

Same; Same; Same; View that tortious acts or crimes committed while discharging official functions are also
not covered by sovereign immunity.—Shauf v. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 713 (1990), evolved the doctrine
further as it stated that “[the] rational for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as
an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.” Tortious acts or crimes committed while discharging official
functions are also not covered by sovereign immunity. Quoting the ruling in Chavez v. Sandiganbayan, 193
SCRA 282 (1991), this court held American naval officers personally liable for damages in Wylie v. Rarang,
209 SCRA 357 (1992), to wit:. . . The petitioners, however, were negligent because under their direction they
issued the publication without deleting the name “Auring.” Such act or omission is ultra vires and cannot be
part of official duty. It was a tortious act which ridiculed the private respondent.

Same; Same; Same; View that the Philippines has no law on the application of sovereign immunity in cases of
damages and/or violations of domestic law involving agents of a foreign state.—As it stands, the Philippines
has no law on the application of sovereign immunity in cases of damages and/or violations of domestic law
involving agents of a foreign state. But our jurisprudence does have openings to hold those who have
committed an act ultra vires responsible in our domestic courts.

Same; Same; Same; View that immunity does not necessarily apply to all the foreign respondents should the
case have been brought in a timely manner, with the proper remedy, and in the proper court.—Considering
the flexibility in international law and the doctrines that we have evolved so far, I am of the view that
immunity does not necessarily apply to all the foreign respondents should the case have been brought in a
timely manner, with the proper remedy, and in the proper court. Those who have directly and actually
committed culpable acts or acts

resulting from gross negligence resulting in the grounding of a foreign warship in violation of our laws
defining a tortious act or one that protects the environment which implement binding international
obligations cannot claim sovereign immunity. Arigo vs. Swift, 735 SCRA 102, G.R. No. 206510 September 16,
2014

16. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS ERMITA

Constitutional Law; Republicanism; Public Officers; Public Accountability and Transparency; Right to
Information; A transparent government is one of the hallmarks of a truly republican state; History has been a
witness to the fact that the power to withhold information lends itself to abuse, hence, the necessity to guard
it zeal-ously.—A transparent government is one of the hallmarks of a truly republican state. Even in the early
history of republican thought, however, it has been recognized that the head of government may keep certain
information confidential in pursuit of the public interest. Explaining the reason for vesting executive power in
only one magistrate, a distinguished delegate to the U.S. Constitutional Convention said: “Decision, activity,
secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man, in a much more eminent degree
than the proceedings of any greater number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities
will be diminished.” History has been witness, however, to the fact that the power to withhold information
lends itself to abuse, hence, the necessity to guard it zealously.

Same; Judicial Review; Requisites.—Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of
judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge the validity of
the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota of the case.

Same; Same; Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464); Locus Standi; Legislators; The Senate, including its
individual members, has a substantial and direct interest over the outcome of the controversy and is the
proper party to assail the constitutionality of E.O. 464; Indeed, legislators have standing to maintain inviolate
the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to
question the validity of any official action which they claim infringes their prerogatives as legislators.—That
the Senate of the Philippines has a fundamental right essential not only for intelligent public decision-making
in a democratic system, but more especially for sound legislation is not disputed. E.O. 464, however, allegedly
stifles the ability of the members of Congress to access information that is crucial to law-making. Verily, the
Senate, including its individual members, has a substantial and direct interest over the outcome of the
controversy and is the proper party to assail the constitutionality of E.O. 464. Indeed, legislators have
standing to maintain inviolate the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office
and are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which they claim infringes their
prerogatives as legislators.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Party-list representatives likewise are allowed to sue to question the
constitutionality of E.O. 464, it being sufficient that a claim is made that E.O. 464 infringes on their
constitutional rights and duties as members of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and
conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws.—In the same vein, party-list representatives
Satur Ocampo (Bayan Muna), Teodoro Casiñ o (Bayan Muna), Joel Virador (Bayan Muna), Crispin Beltran
(Anak-pawis), Rafael Mariano (Anakpawis), and Liza Maza (Gabriela) are allowed to sue to question the
constitutionality of E.O. 464, the absence of any claim that an investigation called by the House of
Representatives or any of its committees was aborted due to the implementation of E.O. 464 notwithstanding,
it being sufficient that a claim is made that E.O. 464 infringes on their constitutional rights and duties as
members of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the
implementation of laws.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A national political party likewise meets the standing requirement, provided
that it has obtained three seats in the House of Representatives in a national elections, which entitles it to
participate in the legislative process.—The national political party, Bayan Muna, likewise meets the standing
requirement as it obtained three seats in the House of Representatives in the 2004 elections and is, therefore,
entitled to participate in the legislative process consonant with the declared policy underlying the party list
system of affording citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties who lack well-defined political constituencies to contribute to the formulation and enactment of
legislation that will benefit the nation. As Bayan Muna and Representatives Ocampo, et al. have the standing
to file their petitions, passing on the standing of their co-petitioners COURAGE and CODAL is rendered
unnecessary.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Citizen Suits; It is well-settled that when suing as a citizen, the interest of the
petitioner in assailing the constitutionality of laws, presidential decrees, orders, and other regulations, must
be direct and personal.—It is well-settled that when suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner in
assailing the constitutionality of laws, presidential decrees, orders, and other regulations, must be direct and
personal. In Franciso v. House of Representatives, 415 SCRA 44, 136 (2003), this Court held that when the
proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement
of personal interest.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Political Parties; The allegation that E.O. 464 hampers a political party’s legislative
agenda is vague and uncertain, and at best is only “generalized interest” which it shares with the rest of the
political parties; Concrete injury, whether actual or threatened, is that indispensable element of a dispute
which serves in part to cast it in a form traditionally capable of judicial resolution.—As for petitioner PDP-
Laban, it asseverates that it is clothed with legal standing in view of the transcendental issues raised in its
petition which this Court needs to resolve in order to avert a constitutional crisis. For it to be accorded
standing on the ground of transcendental importance, however, it must establish (1) the character of the
funds (that it is public) or other assets involved in the case, (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a
constitutional or statu-

tory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government, and (3) the lack of
any party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised. The first and last
determinants not being present as no public funds or assets are involved and petitioners in G.R. Nos. 169777
and 169659 have direct and specific interests in the resolution of the controversy, petitioner PDP-Laban is
bereft of standing to file its petition. Its allegation that E.O. 464 hampers its legislative agenda is vague and
uncertain, and at best is only a “generalized interest” which it shares with the rest of the political parties.
Concrete injury, whether actual or threatened, is that indispensable element of a dispute which serves in part
to cast it in a form traditionally capable of judicial resolution. In fine, PDP-Laban’s alleged interest as a
political party does not suffice to clothe it with legal standing.

Same; Same; Same; Case or Controversy Requirement; E.O. 464 does not require either deliberate
withholding of consent or an express prohibition issuing from the President in order to bar officials from
appearing before Congress; It would be a sheer abandonment of duty if the Supreme Court would refrain
from passing on the constitutionality of E.O. 464.—The Court finds respondents’ assertion that the President
has not withheld her consent or prohibited the appearance of the officials concerned immaterial in
determining the existence of an actual case or controversy insofar as E.O. 464 is concerned. For E.O. 464 does
not require either a deliberate withholding of consent or an express prohibition issuing from the President in
order to bar officials from appearing before Congress. As the implementation of the challenged order has
already resulted in the absence of officials invited to the hearings of petitioner Senate of the Philippines, it
would make no sense to wait for any further event before considering the present case ripe for adjudication.
Indeed, it would be sheer abandonment of duty if this Court would now refrain from passing on the
constitutionality of E.O. 464.

Same; Presidency; Congress; Separation of Powers; Checks and Balances; Power of Inquiry; Congress has
authority to inquire into the operations of the executive branch, and its power of inquiry extends to executive
officials who are the most familiar with and informed on executive operations.—Since Congress has authority
to inquire into the operations of the executive branch, it would be incongruous to hold that the power of
inquiry does not extend to executive officials who are the most familiar with and informed on executive
operations. As discussed in Arnault, the power of inquiry, “with process to enforce it,” is grounded on the
necessity of information in the legislative process. If the information possessed by executive officials on the
operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has
the right to that information and the power to compel the disclosure thereof.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Executive Privilege; Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation,
there are still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of
“executive privilege.”—Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to
the power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of “executive privilege.” Since this term figures
prominently in the challenged order, it being mentioned in its provisions, its preambular clauses, and in its
very title, a discussion of executive privilege is crucial for determining the constitutionality of E.O. 464.

Same; Same; Executive Privilege; Words and Phrases; The phrase “executive privilege” is not new in this
jurisdiction; Executive privilege has been defined as “the power of the Government to withhold information
from the public, the courts, and the Congress,” as well as “the right of the President and high-level executive
branch officers to withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public.”—The phrase
“executive privilege” is not new in this jurisdiction. It has been used even prior to the promulgation of the
1986 Constitution. Being of American origin, it is best understood in light of how it has been defined and used
in the legal literature of the United States. Schwartz defines executive privilege as “the power of the
Government to withhold information from the public, the courts, and the Congress.” Similarly, Rozell defines
it as “the right of the President and high-level executive branch officers to withhold information from
Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public.” Executive privilege is, nonetheless, not a clear or unitary
concept.It has encompassed claims of varying kinds. Tribe, in fact, comments that while it is customary to
employ the phrase “executive privilege,” it may be more accurate to speak of executive privileges “since
presidential refusals to furnish information may be actuated by any of at least three distinct kinds of
considerations, and may be

asserted, with differing degrees of success, in the context of either judicial or legislative investigations.”
Same; Same; Same; Varieties of Executive Privilege.—One variety of the privilege, Tribe explains, is the state
secrets privilege invoked by U.S. Presidents, beginning with Washington, on the ground that the information
is of such nature that its disclosure would subvert crucial military or diplomatic objectives. Another variety is
the informer’s privilege, or the privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of persons who furnish
information of violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement of that law. Finally, a generic
privilege for internal deliberations has been said to attach to intragovernmental documents reflecting
advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental
decisions and policies are formulated.

Same; Same; Same; In determining the validity of a claim of privilege, the question that must be asked is not
only whether the requested information falls within one of the traditional privileges, but also whether that
privilege should be honored in a given procedural setting.—That a type of information is recognized as
privileged does not, however, necessarily mean that it would be considered privileged in all instances. For in
determining the validity of a claim of privilege, the question that must be asked is not only whether the
requested information falls within one of the traditional privileges, but also whether that privilege should be
honored in a given procedural setting.

Same; Same; Same; Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is
recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character; The extraordinary
character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in
favor of disclosure.—From the above discussion on the meaning and scope of executive privilege, both in the
United States and in this jurisdiction, a clear principle emerges. Executive privilege, whether asserted against
Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive
character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending
on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition
that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive
officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines
heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.

Same; Same; Same; Congress; Power of Inquiry; Question Hour; In the context of a parliamentary system of
government, the “question hour” has a definite meaning—it is a period of confrontation initiated by
Parliament to hold the Prime Minister and the other ministers accountable for their acts and the operation of
the government, corresponding to what is known in Britain as the question period.—In the context of a
parliamentary system of government, the “question hour” has a definite meaning. It is a period of
confrontation initiated by Parliament to hold the Prime Minister and the other ministers accountable for their
acts and the operation of the government, corresponding to what is known in Britain as the question period.
There was a specific provision for a question hour in the 1973 Constitution which made the appearance of
ministers mandatory. The same perfectly conformed to the parliamentary system established by that
Constitution, where the ministers are also members of the legislature and are directly accountable to it. An
essential feature of the parliamentary system of government is the immediate accountability of the Prime
Minister and the Cabinet to the National Assembly. They shall be responsible to the National Assembly for the
program of government and shall determine the guidelines of national policy. Unlike in the presidential
system where the tenure of office of all elected officials cannot be terminated before their term expired, the
Prime Minister and the Cabinet remain in office only as long as they enjoy the confidence of the National
Assembly. The moment this confidence is lost the Prime Minister and the Cabinet may be changed.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; The framers of the 1987 Constitution removed
the mandatory nature of appearance by department heads during the question hour in the present
Constitution so as to conform more fully to a system of separation of powers.—The framers of the 1987
Constitution removed the mandatory nature of such appearance during the question hour in the present
Constitution so as to conform more fully to a system of separation of powers. To that extent, the question
hour, as it is presently understood in this jurisdiction, departs from the question period of the parliamentary
system. That department heads may not

be required to appear in a question hour does not, however, mean that the legislature is rendered powerless
to elicit information from them in all circumstances. In fact, in light of the absence of a mandatory question
period, the need to enforce Congress’ right to executive information in the performance of its legislative
function becomes more imperative.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are
implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the
President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a
matter of duty, but when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is “in aid of legislation”
under Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in
Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29 (1950); The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory
process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.—Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while
closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power
of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is
to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a
question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which
it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief
Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such
instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their
appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is “in aid of
legislation” under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault. In fine, the
oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is
performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with the intent discerned from the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department
heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege—they are not exempt by the mere fact
that they are department heads.—Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive
officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of
powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of
Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. When Congress exercises its
power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of
privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official
may be exempted from this power—the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the
reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of
the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned
by a long-standing custom. By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from this
power of inquiry. Unlike the Presidency, judicial power is vested in a collegial body; hence, each member
thereof is exempt on the basis not only of separation of powers but also on the fiscal autonomy and the
constitutional independence of the judiciary. This point is not in dispute, as even counsel for the Senate, Sen.
Joker Arroyo, admitted it during the oral argument upon interpellation of the Chief Justice.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Executive Order No. 464; Section 1 of E.O. 464, in view of its specific
reference to Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution and the absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of
legislation, must be construed as limited in its application to appearances of department heads in the
question hour contemplated in said Section 22, but could not be applied to appearances of department heads
in inquiries in aid of legislation; The requirement to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it
is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face.—Section 1, in view of its specific reference to
Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution and the absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation,
must be construed as limited in its application to appearances of department heads in the question hour
contemplated in the provision of said

Section 22 of Article VI. The reading is dictated by the basic rule of construction that issuances must be
interpreted, as much as possible, in a way that will render it constitutional. The requirement then to secure
presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its
face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question
hour is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads
in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the
department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by
the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Execu-tive privilege is properly invoked in relation to
specific categories of information and not to categories of persons; The reference in Sec. 2(b) of E.O. 464 to
persons being “covered by the executive privilege” may be read as an abbreviated way of saying that the
person is in possession of information which is, in the judgment of the head of office concerned, privileged as
defined in Section 2(a).—Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to
secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is
broad. It covers all senior officials of executive departments, all officers of the AFP and the PNP, and all senior
national security officials who, in the judgment of the heads of offices designated in the same section (i.e.
department heads, Chief of Staff of the AFP, Chief of the PNP, and the National Security Adviser), are “covered
by the executive privilege.” The enumeration also includes such other officers as may be determined by the
President. Given the title of Section 2—“Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege”—, it is evident
that under the rule of ejusdem generis, the determination by the President under this provision is intended to
be based on a similar finding of coverage under executive privilege. En passant, the Court notes that Section
2(b) of E.O. 464 virtually states that executive privilege actually covers persons. Such is a misuse of the
doctrine. Executive privilege, as discussed above, is properly invoked in relation to specific categories of
information and not to categories of persons. In light, however, of Sec. 2(a) of E.O. 464 which deals with the
nature, scope and coverage of executive privilege, the reference to persons being “covered by the executive
privilege” may be read as an abbre-

viated way of saying that the person is in possession of information which is, in the judgment of the head of
office concerned, privileged as defined in Section 2(a). The Court shall thus proceed on the assumption that
this is the intention of the challenged order.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; While there is no Philippine case that directly addresses the issue whether
executive privilege may be invoked against Congress, it is gathered from Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,
384 SCRA 152 (2002), that certain information in the possession of the executive may validly be claimed as
privileged even against Congress, such as Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions during
closed-door Cabinet meetings.—While there is no Philippine case that directly addresses the issue of whether
executive privilege may be invoked against Congress, it is gathered from Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,
384 SCRA 152, 189 (2002), that certain information in the possession of the executive may validly be claimed
as privileged even against Congress. Thus, the case holds: There is no claim by PEA that the information
demanded by petitioner is privileged information rooted in the separation of powers. The information does
not cover Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings
which, like internal-deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of
either house of Congress, are recognized as confidential. This kind of information cannot be pried open by a
co-equal branch of government. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of
publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-making of
those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power. This is not the situation in the instant
case. (Emphasis and italics supplied) Section 3 of E.O. 464, therefore, cannot be dismissed outright as invalid
by the mere fact that it sanctions claims of executive privilege. This Court must look further and assess the
claim of privilege authorized by the Order to determine whether it is valid.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; While the validity of claim of privilege must be assessed on a case to case
basis, examining the ground invoked therefor and the particular circumstances surrounding it, there is, in an
implied privilege, a defect that renders it invalid per se; Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the
executive

considers the requested information privileged; A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an
obligation to disclose information, must be clearly asserted.—While the validity of claims of privilege must be
assessed on a case to case basis, examining the ground invoked therefor and the particular circumstances
surrounding it, there is, in an implied claim of privilege, a defect that renders it invalid per se. By its very
nature, and as demonstrated by the letter of respondent Executive Secretary quoted above, the implied claim
authorized by Section 3 of E.O. 464 is not accompanied by any specific allegation of the basis thereof (e.g.,
whether the information demanded involves military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings,
etc.). While Section 2(a) enumerates the types of information that are covered by the privilege under the
challenged order, Congress is left to speculate as to which among them is being referred to by the executive.
The enumeration is not even intended to be comprehensive, but a mere statement of what is included in the
phrase “confidential or classified information between the President and the public officers covered by this
executive order.” Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested
information privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of office,
has determined that it is so, and that the President has not overturned that determination. Such declaration
leaves Congress in the dark on how the requested information could be classified as privileged. That the
message is couched in terms that, on first impression, do not seem like a claim of privilege only makes it more
pernicious. It threatens to make Congress doubly blind to the question of why the executive branch is not
providing it with the information that it has requested. A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from
an obligation to disclose information, must, therefore, be clearly asserted.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; Due respect for a co-equal branch of government
demands no less than a claim of privilege clearly stating the grounds therefor.—Due respect for a co-equal
branch of government, moreover, demands no less than a claim of privilege clearly stating the grounds
therefor. Apropos is the following ruling in McPhaul v. U.S., 364 U.S. 372, 81 S.Ct. 138, 5 L.Ed. 2d 136 (1960):
We think the Court’s decision in United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 70 S. Ct. 724, is highly relevant to these
questions. For it is as true here as it was there, that ‘if (petitioner) had legitimate reasons for failing to
produce the records of

the association, a decent respect for the House of Representatives, by whose authority the subpoenas issued,
would have required that (he) state (his) reasons for noncompliance upon the return of the writ. Such a
statement would have given the Subcommittee an opportunity to avoid the blocking of its inquiry by taking
other appropriate steps to obtain the records. ‘To deny the Committee the opportunity to consider the
objection or remedy is in itself a contempt of its authority and an obstruction of its processes. His failure to
make any such statement was “a patent evasion of the duty of one summoned to produce papers before a
congressional committee[, and] cannot be condoned.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the
claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to
protect.—Upon the other hand, Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim
with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect. A
useful analogy in determining the requisite degree of particularity would be the privilege against self-
incrimination. Thus, Hoffman v. U.S. declares: “The witness is not exonerated from answering merely because
he declares that in so doing he would incriminate himself—his say-so does not of itself establish the hazard of
incrimination. It is for the court to say whether his silence is justified, and to require him to answer if ‘it
clearly appears to the court that he is mistaken.’ However, if the witness, upon interposing his claim, were
required to prove the hazard in the sense in which a claim is usually required to be established in court, he
would be compelled to surrender the very protection which the privilege is designed to guarantee. To sustain
the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked,
that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous
because injurious disclosure could result.” x x x

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b)
is invalid per se since it is not asserted but merely implied.—The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O.
464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of
providing precise
and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the
President has not given her consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the
withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of each case. It severely frustrates the power
of inquiry of Congress. In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; No infirmity can be imputed to Section 2(a) of E.O. 464 as it merely provides
guidelines, binding only on the heads of office mentioned in Section 2(b), on what is covered by executive
privilege.—No infirmity, however, can be imputed to Section 2(a) as it merely provides guidelines, binding
only on the heads of office mentioned in Section 2(b), on what is covered by executive privilege. It does not
purport to be conclusive on the other branches of government. It may thus be construed as a mere expression
of opinion by the President regarding the nature and scope of executive privilege.

Same; Same; Same; Right to Information; The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation
to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the
public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.—Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually
provides that, once the head of office determines that a certain information is privileged, such determination
is presumed to bear the President’s authority and has the effect of prohibiting the official from appearing
before Congress, subject only to the express pronouncement of the President that it is allowing the
appearance of such official. These provisions thus allow the President to authorize claims of privilege by mere
silence. Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary to the exceptional nature of the privilege.
Executive privilege, as already discussed, is recognized with respect to information the confidential nature of
which is crucial to the fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of the executive branch, or in those
instances where exemption from disclosure is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive
responsibilities. The doctrine of executive privilege is thus premised on the fact that certain informations
must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by
definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity
must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.

Same; Same; Same; Delegation of Powers; In light of the highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court
finds it essential to limit to the President the power to invoke the privilege, though she may authorize the
Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must state
that the authority is “By order of the President,” which means that he personally consulted with her.—In light
of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the President the
power to invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on
her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must state that the authority is “By order of the President,”
which means that he personally consulted with her. The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be
wielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy. In other words, the President may not
authorize her subordinates to exercise such power. There is even less reason to uphold such authorization in
the instant case where the authorization is not explicit but by mere silence. Section 3, in relation to Section
2(b), is further invalid on this score.
Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; When an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter
which, in his own judgment, might be covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to
inform the President or the Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking the privilege.—When an
official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own judgment, might be covered by
executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the President or the Executive Secretary of
the possible need for invoking the privilege. This is necessary in order to provide the President or the
Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of executive
privilege. If, after the lapse of that reasonable time, neither the President nor the Executive Secretary invokes
the privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect the failure of the official to appear before Congress and
may then opt to avail of the necessary legal means to compel his appearance.

Same; Same; Same; Executive Order No. 464; Section 3 of E.O. 464 is essentially an authorization for implied
claims of executive privilege, for which reason it must be invalidated—that such authorization is partly
motivated by the need to ensure respect for such officials does not change the infirm nature of the
authorization itself.—The Court notes that one of the expressed purposes for requiring officials to secure the
consent of the President under Section 3 of E.O. 464 is to ensure “respect for the rights of public officials
appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation.” That such rights must indeed be respected by Congress is an echo
from Article VI Section 21 of the Constitution mandating that “[t]he rights of persons appearing in or affected
by such inquiries shall be respected.” In light of the above discussion of Section 3, it is clear that it is
essentially an authorization for implied claims of executive privilege, for which reason it must be invalidated.
That such authorization is partly motivated by the need to ensure respect for such officials does not change
the infirm nature of the authorization itself.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Right to Information; Power of Inquiry; There are clear distinctions between the
right of Congress to information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern.—There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between the right of
Congress to information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his
right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress.
Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials.
These powers belong only to Congress and not to an individual citizen. Thus, while Congress is composed of
representatives elected by the people, it does not follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in every
exercise of its power of inquiry, the people are exercising their right to information.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted
in public, any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information which being presumed to
be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public concern.—To the extent that investigations in aid
of legislation are generally conducted in public, however, any executive issuance tending to unduly limit
disclosures of information in such

investigations necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of
legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public concern. The citizens are thereby denied access to
information which they can use in formulating their own opinions on the matter before Congress—opinions
which they can then communicate to their representatives and other government officials through the
various legal means allowed by their freedom of expression. Thus holds Valmonte v. Belmonte, 170 SCRA 256
[1989]: It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end
that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people’s will. Yet, this open dialogue can be
effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only
when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information relating
thereto can such bear fruit.(Emphasis and italics supplied) The impairment of the right of the people to
information as a consequence of E.O. 464 is, therefore, in the sense explained above, just as direct as its
violation of the legislature’s power of inquiry.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Publication; Due Process; While E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the
executive branch, it does not follow that the same is exempt from the need for publication—it is a matter of
public interest which members of the body politic may question before the Supreme Court; Due process
requires that the people should have been apprised of this issuance before it was implemented.—While E.O.
464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it does not follow that the same is exempt from the need
for publication. On the need for publishing even those statutes that do not directly apply to people in general,
Tañ ada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 (1986), states: The term “laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those
of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that
do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a
relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law
does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of
such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the political
forums or, if he is a proper party, even in courts of justice. (Emphasis and italics sup-

plied) Although the above statement was made in reference to statutes, logic dictates that the challenged
order must be covered by the publication requirement. As explained above, E.O. 464 has a direct effect on the
right of the people to information on matters of public concern. It is, therefore, a matter of public interest
which members of the body politic may question before this Court. Due process thus requires that the people
should have been apprised of this issuance before it was implemented.

Republicanism; Right to Information; What republican theory did accomplish was to reverse the old
presumption in favor of secrecy, based on the divine right of kings and nobles, and replace it with a
presumption in favor of publicity, based on the doctrine of popular sovereignty.—The infirm provisions of
E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without need
of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking
said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. That is
impermissible. For “[w]hat republican theory did accomplish . . . was to reverse the old presumption in favor
of secrecy, based on the divine right of kings and nobles, and replace it with a presumption in favor of
publicity, based on the doctrine of popular sovereignty. (Italics supplied)” Resort to any means then by which
officials of the executive branch could refuse to divulge information cannot be presumed valid. Otherwise, we
shall not have merely nullified the power of our legislature to inquire into the operations of government, but
we shall have given up something of much greater value—our right as a people to take part in government.
Senate of the Philippines vs. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 169777, G.R. No. 169659, G.R. No. 169660, G.R. No.
169667, G.R. No. 169834, G.R. No. 171246 April 20, 2006
17. KMU VS DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NEDA

The Court's Ruling

The petitions are without merit.

On the Alleged Usurpation of Legislative Power

Section 2 of EO 420 provides, "Coverage. - All government agencies and government-owned and controlled
corporations issuing ID cards to their members or constituents shall be covered by this executive order." EO
420 applies only to government entities that issue ID cards as part of their functions under existing laws.
These government entities have already been issuing ID cards even prior to EO 420. Examples of these
government entities are the GSIS,3 SSS,4 Philhealth,5 Mayor's Office,6LTO,7 PRC,8 and similar government
entities.

Section 1 of EO 420 directs these government entities to "adopt a unified multi-purpose ID system." Thus, all
government entities that issue IDs as part of their functions under existing laws are required to adopt a
uniform data collection and format for their IDs. Section 1 of EO 420 enumerates the purposes of the uniform
data collection and format, namely:

A. To reduce costs and thereby lessen the financial burden on both the government and the public brought
about by the use of multiple ID cards and the maintenance of redundant database containing the same or
related information;

b. To ensure greater convenience for those transacting business with the government and those availing of
government services;

c. To facilitate private businesses and promote the wider use of the unified ID card as provided under this
executive order;

d. To enhance the integrity and reliability of government-issued ID cards; andcralawlibrary

e. To facilitate access to and delivery of quality and effective government service.

In short, the purposes of the uniform ID data collection and ID format are to reduce costs, achieve efficiency
and reliability, insure compatibility, and provide convenience to the people served by government entities.

Section 3 of EO 420 limits the data to be collected and recorded under the uniform ID system to only 14
specific items, namely: (1) Name; (2) Home Address; (3) Sex; (4) Picture; (5) Signature; (6) Date of Birth; (7)
Place of Birth; (8) Marital Status; (9) Name of Parents; (10) Height; (11) Weight; (12) Two index fingers and
two thumbmarks; (13) Any prominent distinguishing features like moles or others; and (14) Tax
Identification Number.
These limited and specific data are the usual data required for personal identification by government entities,
and even by the private sector. Any one who applies for or renews a driver's license provides to the LTO all
these 14 specific data.

At present, government entities like LTO require considerably more data from applicants for identification
purposes. EO 420 will reduce the data required to be collected and recorded in the ID databases of the
government entities. Government entities cannot collect or record data, for identification purposes, other
than the 14 specific data.

Various laws allow several government entities to collect and record data for their ID systems, either
expressly or impliedly by the nature of the functions of these government entities. Under their existing ID
systems, some government entities collect and record more data than what EO 420 allows. At present, the
data collected and recorded by government entities are disparate, and the IDs they issue are dissimilar.

In the case of the Supreme Court,9 the IDs that the Court issues to all its employees, including the Justices,
contain 15 specific data, namely: (1) Name; (2) Picture; (3) Position; (4) Office Code Number; (5) ID Number;
(6) Height; (7) Weight; (8) Complexion; (9) Color of Hair; (10) Blood Type; (11) Right Thumbmark; (12) Tax
Identification Number; (13) GSIS Policy Number; (14) Name and Address of Person to be Notified in Case of
Emergency; and (15) Signature. If we consider that the picture in the ID can generally also show the sex of the
employee, the Court's ID actually contains 16 data.

In contrast, the uniform ID format under Section 3 of EO 420 requires only "the first five items listed" in
Section 3, plus the fingerprint, agency number and the common reference number, or only eight specific data.
Thus, at present, the Supreme Court's ID contains far more data than the proposed uniform ID for
government entities under EO 420. The nature of the data contained in the Supreme Court ID is also far more
financially sensitive, specifically the Tax Identification Number.

Making the data collection and recording of government entities unified, and making their ID formats
uniform, will admittedly achieve substantial benefits. These benefits are savings in terms of procurement of
equipment and supplies, compatibility in systems as to hardware and software, ease of verification and thus
increased reliability of data, and the user-friendliness of a single ID format for all government entities.

There is no dispute that government entities can individually limit the collection and recording of their data
to the 14 specific items in Section 3 of EO 420. There is also no dispute that these government entities can
individually adopt the ID format as specified in Section 3 of EO 420. Such an act is certainly within the
authority of the heads or governing boards of the government entities that are already authorized under
existing laws to issue IDs.

A unified ID system for all these government entities can be achieved in either of two ways. First, the heads of
these existing government entities can enter into a memorandum of agreement making their systems
uniform. If the government entities can individually adopt a format for their own ID pursuant to their regular
functions under existing laws, they can also adopt by mutual agreement a uniform ID format, especially if the
uniform format will result in substantial savings, greater efficiency, and optimum compatibility. This is purely
an administrative matter, and does not involve the exercise of legislative power.

Second, the President may by executive or administrative order direct the government entities under the
Executive department to adopt a uniform ID data collection and format. Section 17, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution provides that the "President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and
offices." The same Section also mandates the President to "ensure that the laws be faithfully executed."

Certainly, under this constitutional power of control the President can direct all government entities, in the
exercise of their functions under existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data collection and ID format to achieve
savings, efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and convenience to the public. The President's constitutional
power of control is self-executing and does not need any implementing legislation.

Of course, the President's power of control is limited to the Executive branch of government and does not
extend to the Judiciary or to the independent constitutional commissions. Thus, EO 420 does not apply to the
Judiciary, or to the COMELEC which under existing laws is also authorized to issue voter's ID cards. 10 This
only shows that EO 420 does not establish a national ID system because legislation is needed to establish a
single ID system that is compulsory for all branches of government.

The Constitution also mandates the President to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. There are
several laws mandating government entities to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in general, improve
public services.11 The adoption of a uniform ID data collection and format under EO 420 is designed to reduce
costs, increase efficiency, and in general, improve public services. Thus, in issuing EO 420, the President is
simply performing the constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.

Clearly, EO 420 is well within the constitutional power of the President to promulgate. The President has not
usurped legislative power in issuing EO 420. EO 420 is an exercise of Executive power - the President's
constitutional power of control over the Executive department. EO 420 is also compliance by the President of
the constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.

Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them. In issuing EO 420, the President
did not make, alter or repeal any law but merely implemented and executed existing laws. EO 420 reduces
costs, as well as insures efficiency, reliability, compatibility and user-friendliness in the implementation of
current ID systems of government entities under existing laws. Thus, EO 420 is simply an executive issuance
and not an act of legislation.

The act of issuing ID cards and collecting the necessary personal data for imprinting on the ID card does not
require legislation. Private employers routinely issue ID cards to their employees. Private and public schools
also routinely issue ID cards to their students. Even private clubs and associations issue ID cards to their
members. The purpose of all these ID cards is simply to insure the proper identification of a person as an
employee, student, or member of a club. These ID cards, although imposed as a condition for exercising a
privilege, are voluntary because a person is not compelled to be an employee, student or member of a club.

What require legislation are three aspects of a government maintained ID card system. First, when the
implementation of an ID card system requires a special appropriation because there is no existing
appropriation for such purpose. Second, when the ID card system is compulsory on all branches of
government, including the independent constitutional commissions, as well as compulsory on all citizens
whether they have a use for the ID card or not. Third, when the ID card system requires the collection and
recording of personal data beyond what is routinely or usually required for such purpose, such that the
citizen's right to privacy is infringed.

In the present case, EO 420 does not require any special appropriation because the existing ID card systems
of government entities covered by EO 420 have the proper appropriation or funding. EO 420 is not
compulsory on all branches of government and is not compulsory on all citizens. EO 420 requires a very
narrow and focused collection and recording of personal data while safeguarding the confidentiality of such
data. In fact, the data collected and recorded under EO 420 are far less than the data collected and recorded
under the ID systems existing prior to EO 420.

EO 420 does not establish a national ID card system. EO 420 does not compel all citizens to have an ID card.
EO 420 applies only to government entities that under existing laws are already collecting data and issuing ID
cards as part of their governmental functions. Every government entity that presently issues an ID card will
still issue its own ID card under its own name. The only difference is that the ID card will contain only the five
data specified in Section 3 of EO 420, plus the fingerprint, the agency ID number, and the common reference
number which is needed for cross-verification to ensure integrity and reliability of identification.

This Court should not interfere how government entities under the Executive department should undertake
cost savings, achieve efficiency in operations, insure compatibility of equipment and systems, and provide
user-friendly service to the public. The collection of ID data and issuance of ID cards are day-to-day functions
of many government entities under existing laws. Even the Supreme Court has its own ID system for
employees of the Court and all first and second level courts. The Court is even trying to unify its ID system
with those of the appellate courts, namely the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax Appeals.

There is nothing legislative about unifying existing ID systems of all courts within the Judiciary. The same is
true for government entities under the Executive department. If government entities under the Executive
department decide to unify their existing ID data collection and ID card issuance systems to achieve savings,
efficiency, compatibility and convenience, such act does not involve the exercise of any legislative power.
Thus, the issuance of EO 420 does not constitute usurpation of legislative power.

On the Alleged Infringement of the Right to Privacy

All these years, the GSIS, SSS, LTO, Philhealth and other government entities have been issuing ID cards in the
performance of their governmental functions. There have been no complaints from citizens that the ID cards
of these government entities violate their right to privacy. There have also been no complaints of abuse by
these government entities in the collection and recording of personal identification data.

In fact, petitioners in the present cases do not claim that the ID systems of government entities prior to EO
420 violate their right to privacy. Since petitioners do not make such claim, they even have less basis to
complain against the unified ID system under EO 420. The data collected and stored for the unified ID system
under EO 420 will be limited to only 14 specific data, and the ID card itself will show only eight specific data.
The data collection, recording and ID card system under EO 420 will even require less data collected, stored
and revealed than under the disparate systems prior to EO 420.

Prior to EO 420, government entities had a free hand in determining the kind, nature and extent of data to be
collected and stored for their ID systems. Under EO 420, government entities can collect and record only the
14 specific data mentioned in Section 3 of EO 420. In addition, government entities can show in their ID cards
only eight of these specific data, seven less data than what the Supreme Court's ID shows.

Also, prior to EO 420, there was no executive issuance to government entities prescribing safeguards on the
collection, recording, and disclosure of personal identification data to protect the right to privacy. Now, under
Section 5 of EO 420, the following safeguards are instituted:

A. The data to be recorded and stored, which shall be used only for purposes of establishing the identity of a
person, shall be limited to those specified in Section 3 of this executive order;

b. In no case shall the collection or compilation of other data in violation of a person's right to privacy be
allowed or tolerated under this order;

c. Stringent systems of access control to data in the identification system shall be instituted;

d. Data collected and stored for this purpose shall be kept and treated as strictly confidential and a personal
or written authorization of the Owner shall be required for access and disclosure of data;

e. The identification card to be issued shall be protected by advanced security features and cryptographic
technology;
f. A written request by the Owner of the identification card shall be required for any correction or revision of
relevant data, or under such conditions as the participating agency issuing the identification card shall
prescribe.

On its face, EO 420 shows no constitutional infirmity because it even narrowly limits the data that can be
collected, recorded and shown compared to the existing ID systems of government entities. EO 420 further
provides strict safeguards to protect the confidentiality of the data collected, in contrast to the prior ID
systems which are bereft of strict administrative safeguards.

The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by government entities. Some one
hundred countries have compulsory national ID systems, including democracies such as Spain, France,
Germany, Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg, and Portugal. Other countries which do not have national ID
systems, like the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, the Nordic Countries and Sweden,
have sectoral cards for health, social or other public services. 12 Even with EO 420, the Philippines will still fall
under the countries that do not have compulsory national ID systems but allow only sectoral cards for social
security, health services, and other specific purposes.

Without a reliable ID system, government entities like GSIS, SSS, Philhealth, and LTO cannot perform
effectively and efficiently their mandated functions under existing laws. Without a reliable ID system, GSIS,
SSS, Philhealth and similar government entities stand to suffer substantial losses arising from false names and
identities. The integrity of the LTO's licensing system will suffer in the absence of a reliable ID system.

The dissenting opinion cites three American decisions on the right to privacy, namely, Griswold v.
Connecticut,13U.S. Justice Department v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 14 and Whalen v.
Roe.15 The last two decisions actually support the validity of EO 420, while the first is inapplicable to the
present case.

In Griswold, the U.S. Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a state law that prohibited the use and
distribution of contraceptives because enforcement of the law would allow the police entry into the
bedrooms of married couples. Declared the U.S. Supreme Court: "Would we allow the police to search the
sacred precincts of the marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is
repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship." Because the facts and the issue
involved in Griswold are materially different from the present case, Griswold has no persuasive bearing on
the present case.

In U.S. Justice Department, the issue was not whether the State could collect and store information on
individuals from public records nationwide but whether the State could withhold such information from the
press. The premise of the issue in U.S. Justice Department is that the State can collect and store in a central
database information on citizens gathered from public records across the country. In fact, the law authorized
the Department of Justice to collect and preserve fingerprints and other criminal identification records
nationwide. The law also authorized the Department of Justice to exchange such information with "officials of
States, cities and other institutions." The Department of Justice treated such information as confidential. A
CBS news correspondent and the Reporters Committee demanded the criminal records of four members of a
family pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Freedom of
Information Act expressly exempts release of information that would "constitute an unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy," and the information demanded falls under that category of exempt information.

With the exception of the 8 specific data shown on the ID card, the personal data collected and recorded
under EO 420 are treated as "strictly confidential" under Section 6(d) of EO 420. These data are not only
strictly confidential but also personal matters. Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution grants the "right
of the people to information on matters of public concern." Personal matters are exempt or outside the
coverage of the people's right to information on matters of public concern. The data treated as "strictly
confidential" under EO 420 being private matters and not matters of public concern, these data cannot be
released to the public or the press. Thus, the ruling in U.S. Justice Department does not collide with EO 420
but actually supports the validity EO 420.

Whalen v. Roe is the leading American case on the constitutional protection for control over information. In
Whalen, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of a New York law that required doctors to furnish the
government reports identifying patients who received prescription drugs that have a potential for abuse. The
government maintained a central computerized database containing the names and addresses of the patients,
as well as the identity of the prescribing doctors. The law was assailed because the database allegedly
infringed the right to privacy of individuals who want to keep their personal matters confidential. The U.S.
Supreme Court rejected the privacy claim, and declared:

Disclosures of private medical information to doctors, to hospital personnel, to insurance companies, and to
public health agencies are often an essential part of modern medical practice even when the disclosure may
reflect unfavorably on the character of the patient. Requiring such disclosures to representatives of the State
having responsibility for the health of the community does not automatically amount to an impermissible
invasion of privacy. (Emphasis supplied)ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ

Compared to the personal medical data required for disclosure to the New York State in Whalen, the 14
specific data required for disclosure to the Philippine government under EO 420 are far less sensitive and far
less personal. In fact, the 14 specific data required under EO 420 are routine data for ID systems, unlike the
sensitive and potentially embarrassing medical records of patients taking prescription drugs. Whalen,
therefore, carries persuasive force for upholding the constitutionality of EO 420 as non-violative of the right
to privacy.

Subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decisions have reiterated Whalen. In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri
v. Danforth,16 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of a law that required doctors performing abortions
to fill up forms, maintain records for seven years, and allow the inspection of such records by public health
officials. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that "recordkeeping and reporting requirements that are reasonably
directed to the preservation of maternal health and that properly respect a patient's confidentiality and
privacy are permissible."

Again, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 17 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a law
that required doctors performing an abortion to file a report to the government that included the doctor's
name, the woman's age, the number of prior pregnancies and abortions that the woman had, the medical
complications from the abortion, the weight of the fetus, and the marital status of the woman. In case of state-
funded institutions, the law made such information publicly available. In Casey, the U.S. Supreme Court
stated: "The collection of information with respect to actual patients is a vital element of medical research,
and so it cannot be said that the requirements serve no purpose other than to make abortion more difficult."

Compared to the disclosure requirements of personal data that the U.S. Supreme Court have upheld in
Whalen, Danforth and Casey as not violative of the right to privacy, the disclosure requirements under EO 420
are far benign and cannot therefore constitute violation of the right to privacy. EO 420 requires disclosure of
14 personal data that are routine for ID purposes, data that cannot possibly embarrass or humiliate anyone.

Petitioners have not shown how EO 420 will violate their right to privacy. Petitioners cannot show such
violation by a mere facial examination of EO 420 because EO 420 narrowly draws the data collection,
recording and exhibition while prescribing comprehensive safeguards. Ople v. Torres 18 is not authority to
hold that EO 420 violates the right to privacy because in that case the assailed executive issuance, broadly
drawn and devoid of safeguards, was annulled solely on the ground that the subject matter required
legislation. As then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban noted in his concurring opinion
in Ople v. Torres, "The voting is decisive only on the need for appropriate legislation, and it is only on this
ground that the petition is granted by this Court."
EO 420 applies only to government entities that already maintain ID systems and issue ID cards pursuant to
their regular functions under existing laws. EO 420 does not grant such government entities any power that
they do not already possess under existing laws. In contrast, the assailed executive issuance in Ople v. Torres
sought to establish a "National Computerized Identification Reference System," 19 a national ID system that did
not exist prior to the assailed executive issuance. Obviously, a national ID card system requires legislation
because it creates a new national data collection and card issuance system where none existed before.

In the present case, EO 420 does not establish a national ID system but makes the existing sectoral card
systems of government entities like GSIS, SSS, Philhealth and LTO less costly, more efficient, reliable and user-
friendly to the public. Hence, EO 420 is a proper subject of executive issuance under the President's
constitutional power of control over government entities in the Executive department, as well as under the
President's constitutional duty to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. Executive Order No. 420 is declared VALID.

18. ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Change of Name; The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification; A change of name is a privilege, not a right.—The State has an interest in the names borne by
individuals and entities for purposes of identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for
change of name are controlled by statutes. In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 376.
No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.

Same; Clerical Error Law (RA 9048); Administrative Law; Jurisdictions; RA 9048 now governs the change of
first name, and vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or
municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned; The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change
of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries
in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is
first filed and subsequently denied—in sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name
are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.—RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests
the power and authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar
or consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name
is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to
exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for
change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. It likewise lays down the corresponding venue, form
and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily
administrative in nature, not judicial.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Sex Change; A change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status—RA
9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment.— Petitioner’s basis in
praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to make his first name
compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of name
does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status. RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the
ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared
purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest. Before a person can
legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason
justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official
name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his
true and official name.

Same; Same; A petition in the trial court in so far as it prays for change of first name is not within that court’s
primary jurisdiction as the petition should be filed with the local civil registrar concerned, namely, where the
birth certificate is kept.—The petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first
name was not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local
civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper
remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the
proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More
importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all. For all
these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his first
name was concerned.

Same; Same; Sex Change; No law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of
sex reassignment; Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere
clerical or typographical error—it is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court.—Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a “clerical or typographical error” is: SECTION 2.
Definition of Terms.—As used in

this Act, the following terms shall mean: x x x      x x x      x x x (3) “Clerical or typographical error” refers to a
mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in
the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the
like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by
reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change
of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied) Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil
registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for
which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the
Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of
the Civil Code.

Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Statutory Construction; No reasonable interpretation of Art. 407 of
the Civil Code can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment; To
correct simply means “to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from” while to change means “to
replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute.”—The
acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur
after birth. However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the
correction on the ground of sex reassignment. To correct simply means “to make or set aright; to remove the
faults or error from” while to change means “to replace something with something else of the same kind or
with something that serves as a substitute.” The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries
therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.

Same; Same; Same; Same; “Status” refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum
total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership.
—“Status” refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and
incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership. The status of a person in
law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily
terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The
comprehensive term status… include such matters as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to
have rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption,
emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even succession. (emphasis supplied)

Same; Same; Same; Same; A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations—it is a part of
a person’s legal capacity and civil status; There is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex
reassignment and its effects.—A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part
of a person’s legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides: ART.
413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws. But there
is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioner’s
cause.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Civil Register Law (Act 3753); Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a
historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth—thus, the sex of a person is determined at
birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant;
Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex
made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.—Under the Civil Register Law, a
birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person
is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the
genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination
of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; When words are not defined in a statute they are to
be given their common and ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent; The words “sex,”
“male” and “female” as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all
other laws) should therefore be understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative
intent to the contrary; Sex is defined as “the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a
male from a female” or “the distinction between male and female”; The words “male” and “female” in
everyday understanding do not include persons who have undergone sex reassignment; While a person may
have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law
authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason.— When words are not defined in
a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative
intent. The words “sex,” “male” and “female” as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil
registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their common and ordinary usage, there
being no legislative intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as “the sum of peculiarities of
structure and function that distinguish a male from a female” or “the distinction between male and female.”
Female is “the sex that produces ova or bears young” and male is “the sex that has organs to produce
spermatozoa for fertilizing ova.” Thus, the words “male” and “female” in everyday understanding do not
include persons who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, “words that are employed in a statute
which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context
compels to the contrary.” Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early
1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term “sex” as used then is something alterable
through surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be included in the
category “female.” For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and
appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in
the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of
the entries in his birth certificate.

Same; Same; Same; Marriage; To grant the changes in name and sex sought by petitioner will substantially
reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations—it will allow the union of a man with
another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual).—The
changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and

public policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first
step towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social
institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman. One of its essential
requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female. To grant the
changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family
relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-
female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as
the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code
and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, among others.
These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if
petitioner’s petition were to be granted.

Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; Judicial Legislation; Article 9 of the Civil Code which mandates that
“[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the
law” is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation; In our system of government, it is for the
legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the
effects of sex reassignment.—It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that “[n]o judge or court shall
decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law.” However, it is not a
license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to
make or amend it. In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to
determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for
legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are statutebased.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex
reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact
legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege; The Supreme Court
cannot enact a law where no law exists.—To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of
first name and for correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds
may be invoked, what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature
intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex
to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the
conferment of that privilege. It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a
person may be recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to
fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can
only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation do
not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is
indeed an ordeal, but the remedies involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature,
not by the courts.—Petitioner pleads that “[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness,
contentment and [the] realization of their dreams.” No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there
are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of
social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks
involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts. Silverio vs.
Republic, 537 SCRA 373, G.R. No. 174689 October 19, 2007

19. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, the
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC), and the MANILA
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY (MIAA), petitioners, vs. HON. HENRICK F. GINGOYON, In his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 117, Pasay City and PHILIPPINE
INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO., INC., respondents.

Eminent Domain; Judgments; The Court in the 2004 Resolution in the case of Agan v. Philippine International
Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO), 420 SCRA 575 (2004), prescribed mandatory guidelines which the
Government must observe before it could acquire the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal
III (NAIA 3) facilities.—The pronouncement in the 2004 Resolution is especially significant to this case in two
aspects, namely: (i) that PIATCO must receive payment of just compensation determined in accordance with
law and equity; and (ii) that the government is barred from taking over NAIA 3 until such just compensation
is paid. The parties cannot be allowed to evade the directives laid down by this Court through any mode of
judicial action, such as the complaint for eminent domain. It cannot be denied though that the Court in the
2004 Resolution prescribed mandatory guidelines which the Government must observe before it could
acquire the NAIA 3 facilities. Thus, the actions of respondent judge under review, as well as the arguments of
the parties must, to merit affirmation, pass the threshold test of whether such propositions are in accord with
the 2004 Resolution.
Same; Same; The case at bar is a highly unusual case, whereby the Government seeks to expropriate a
building complex constructed on land which the State already owns—there is an inherent illogic in the resort
to eminent domain on property already owned by the State.—The Government has chosen to resort to
expropriation, a remedy available under the law, which has the added benefit of an

integrated process for the determination of just compensation and the payment thereof to PIATCO. We
appreciate that the case at bar is a highly unusual case, whereby the Government seeks to expropriate a
building complex constructed on land which the State already owns. There is an inherent illogic in the resort
to eminent domain on property already owned by the State. At first blush, since the State already owns the
property on which NAIA 3 stands, the proper remedy should be akin to an action for ejectment.

Same; Same; Admittedly, eminent domain is not the sole judicial recourse by which the Government may have
acquired the NAIA 3 facilities while satisfying the requisites in the 2004 Resolution though eminent domain
may be the most effective, as well as the speediest means by which such goals may be accomplished.—The
right of eminent domain extends to personal and real property, and the NAIA 3 structures, adhered as they
are to the soil, are considered as real property. The public purpose for the expropriation is also beyond
dispute. It should also be noted that Section 1 of Rule 67 (on Expropriation) recognizes the possibility that the
property sought to be expropriated may be titled in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, although
occupied by private individuals, and in such case an averment to that effect should be made in the complaint.
The instant expropriation complaint did aver that the NAIA 3 complex “stands on a parcel of land owned by
the Bases Conversion Development Authority, another agency of [the Republic of the Philippines].”
Admittedly, eminent domain is not the sole judicial recourse by which the Government may have acquired the
NAIA 3 facilities while satisfying the requisites in the 2004 Resolution. Eminent domain though may be the
most effective, as well as the speediest means by which such goals may be accomplished. Not only does it
enable immediate possession after satisfaction of the requisites under the law, it also has a built-in procedure
through which just compensation may be ascertained. Thus, there should be no question as to the propriety
of eminent domain proceedings in this case.

Same; Same; Rule 67 merely requires the Government to deposit with an authorized government depositary
the assessed value of the property for expropriation for it to be entitled to a writ of possession; The staging of
expropriation proceedings in this case with the exclusive use of Rule 67 would allow for the Government to
take over the NAIA 3 facilities in a fashion that directly rebukes our 2004 Resolu-

tion in Agan.—As can be gleaned from the above-quoted texts, Rule 67 merely requires the Government to
deposit with an authorized government depositary the assessed value of the property for expropriation for it
to be entitled to a writ of possession. On the other hand, Republic Act No. 8974 requires that the Government
make a direct payment to the property owner before the writ may issue. Moreover, such payment is based on
the zonal valuation of the BIR in the case of land, the value of the improvements or structures under the
replacement cost method, or if no such valuation is available and in cases of utmost urgency, the proffered
value of the property to be seized. It is quite apparent why the Government would prefer to apply Rule 67 in
lieu of Republic Act No. 8974. Under Rule 67, it would not be obliged to immediately pay any amount to
PIATCO before it can obtain the writ of possession since all it need do is deposit the amount equivalent to the
assessed value with an authorized government depositary. Hence, it devotes considerable effort to point out
that Republic Act No. 8974 does not apply in this case, notwithstanding the undeniable reality that NAIA 3 is a
national government project. Yet, these efforts fail, especially considering the controlling effect of the 2004
Resolution in Agan on the adjudication of this case. It is the finding of this Court that the staging of
expropriation proceedings in this case with the exclusive use of Rule 67 would allow for the Government to
take over the NAIA 3 facilities in a fashion that directly rebukes our 2004 Resolution in Agan. This Court
cannot sanction deviation from its own final and executory orders.

Same; R.A. No. 8974; It is the plain intent of Republic Act No. 8974 to supersede the system of deposit under
Rule 67 with the scheme of “immediate payment” in cases involving national government infrastructure
projects.—If Section 2 of Rule 67 were to apply, PIATCO would be enjoined from receiving a single centavo as
just compensation before the Government takes over the NAIA 3 facility by virtue of a writ of possession.
Such an injunction squarely contradicts the letter and intent of the 2004 Resolution. Hence, the position of the
Government sanctions its own disregard or violation the prescription laid down by this Court that there must
first be just compensation paid to PIATCO before the Government may take over the NAIA 3 facilities. Thus, at
the very least, Rule 67 cannot apply in this case without violating the 2004 Resolution. Even assuming that
Rep. Act No. 8974 does not govern in this case, it does not necessar-

ily follow that Rule 67 should then apply. After all, adherence to the letter of Section 2, Rule 67 would in turn
violate the Court’s requirement in the 2004 Resolution that there must first be payment of just compensation
to PIATCO before the Government may take over the property. It is the plain intent of Republic Act No. 8974
to supersede the system of deposit under Rule 67 with the scheme of “immediate payment” in cases involving
national government infrastructure projects.

Same; Same; Just Compensation; Standards of Just Compensation; Separation of Powers; The appropriate
standard of just compensation is a substantive matter, and it is well within the province of the legislature to
fix the standard.—It likewise bears noting that the appropriate standard of just compensation is a substantive
matter. It is well within the province of the legislature to fix the standard, which it did through the enactment
of Republic Act No. 8974. Specifically, this prescribes the new standard in determining the amount of just
compensation in expropriation cases relating to national government infrastructure project, as well as the
payment of the provisional value as a prerequisite to the issuance of a writ of possession. Of course, rules of
procedure, as distinguished from substantive matters, remain the exclusive preserve of the Supreme Court by
virtue of Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution. Indeed, Section 14 of the Implementing Rules
recognizes the continued applicability of Rule 67 on procedural aspects when it provides “all matters
regarding defenses and objections to the complaint, issues on uncertain ownership and conflicting claims,
effects of appeal on the rights of the parties, and such other incidents affecting the complaint shall be resolved
under the provisions on expropriation of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.”

Same; Same; National Government Infrastructure Projects; Words and Phrases; R.A. No. 8974 is intended to
cover expropriation proceedings intended for national government infrastructure projects. Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 8974 explains what are considered as “national government projects.”—Republic Act No.
8974 is entitled “An Act To Facilitate The Acquisition Of Right-Of-Way, Site Or Location For National
Government Infrastructure Projects And For Other Purposes.” Obviously, the law is intended to cover
expropriation proceedings intended for national government infrastructure projects. Section 2 of Republic
Act No. 8974 explains what are considered as “national government projects.” “Sec. 2. National Gov-
ernment Projects.—The term “national government projects” shall refer to all national government
infrastructure, engineering works and service contracts, including projects undertaken by governmentowned
and controlled corporations, all projects covered by Republic Act No. 6957, as amended by Republic Act No.
7718, otherwise known as the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Law, and other related and necessary activities,
such as site acquisition, supply and/or installation of equipment and materials, implementation, construction,
completion, operation, maintenance, improvement, repair and rehabilitation, regardless of the source
offending.”

Same; Same; There can be no doubt that PIATCO has ownership rights over the facilities which it had financed
and constructed.—As acknowledged in the 2003 Decision, the development of NAIA 3 was made pursuant to
a build-operate-and-transfer arrangement pursuant to Republic Act No. 6957, as amended, which pertains to
infrastructure or development projects normally financed by the public sector but which are now wholly or
partly implemented by the private sector. Under the build-operate-and-transfer scheme, it is the project
proponent which undertakes the construction, including the financing, of a given infrastructure facility. In
Tatad v. Garcia, the Court acknowledged that the operator of the EDSA Light Rail Transit project under a BOT
scheme was the owner of the facilities such as “the rail tracks, rolling stocks like the coaches, rail stations,
terminals and the power plant.” There can be no doubt that PIATCO has ownership rights over the facilities
which it had financed and constructed. The 2004 Resolution squarely recognized that right when it mandated
the payment of just compensation to PIATCO prior to the takeover by the Government of NAIA 3. The fact that
the Government resorted to eminent domain proceedings in the first place is a concession on its part of
PIATCO’s ownership. Indeed, if no such right is recognized, then there should be no impediment for the
Government to seize control of NAIA 3 through ordinary ejectment proceedings.

Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Right-of-Way,” “Site,” and “Location,” Explained; The Court cannot accept
the Government’s proposition that the only properties that may be expropriated under Rep. Act No. 8974 are
parcels of land—R.A. No. 8974 contemplates within its coverage such real property constituting land,
buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil.—There is no doubt that the NAIA 3 is not,
under any sensible contemplation, a

“right-of-way.” Yet we cannot agree with the Government’s insistence that neither could NAIA 3 be a “site” or
“location.” The petition quotes the definitions provided in Black’s Law Dictionary of “location” as the specific
place or position of a person or thing and ‘site’ as pertaining to a place or location or a piece of property set
aside for specific use.’ ” Yet even Black’s Law Dictionary provides that “[t]he term [site] does not of itself
necessarily mean a place or tract of land fixed by definite boundaries.” One would assume that the
Government, to back up its contention, would be able to point to a clear-cut rule that a “site” or “location”
exclusively refers to soil, grass, pebbles and weeds. There is none. Indeed, we cannot accept the Government’s
proposition that the only properties that may be expropriated under Republic Act No. 8974 are parcels of
land.] Republic Act No. 8974 contemplates within its coverage such real property constituting land, buildings,
roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 8974, which sets the
declaration of the law’s policy, refers to “real property acquired for national government infrastructure
projects are promptly paid just compensation.” Section 4 is quite explicit in stating that the scope of the law
relates to the acquisition of “real property,” which under civil law includes buildings, roads and constructions
adhered to the soil.
Same; Same; Equal Protection Clause; Any sub-classifications of real property and divergent treatment based
thereupon for purposes of expropriation must be based on substantial distinctions, otherwise the equal
protection clause of the Constitution is violated—there may be perhaps a molecular distinction between soil
and the inorganic improvements adhered thereto, yet there are no purposive distinctions that would justify a
variant treatment for purposes of expropriation.—The law classifies the NAIA 3 facilities as real properties
just like the soil to which they are adhered. Any subclassifications of real property and divergent treatment
based thereupon for purposes of expropriation must be based on substantial distinctions, otherwise the equal
protection clause of the Constitution is violated. There may be perhaps a molecular distinction between soil
and the inorganic improvements adhered thereto, yet there are no purposive distinctions that would justify a
variant treatment for purposes of expropriation. Both the land itself and the improvements thereupon are
susceptible to private ownership independent of each other, capable of pecuniary estimation, and if taken
from the owner, considered as a deprivation of property. The owner

of improvements seized through expropriation suffers the same degree of loss as the owner of land seized
through similar means. Equal protection demands that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. For purposes of expropriation, parcels
of land are similarly situated as the buildings or improvements constructed thereon, and a disparate
treatment between those two classes of real property infringes the equal protection clause.

Same; Same; Just Compensation; Unlike in the case of Rule 67, the application of Republic Act No. 8974 will
not contravene the 2004 Resolution, which requires the payment of just compensation before any takeover of
the NAIA 3 facilities by the Government.—Even as the provisions of Rep. Act No. 8974 call for that law’s
application in this case, the threshold test must still be met whether its implementation would conform to the
dictates of the Court in the 2004 Resolution. Unlike in the case of Rule 67, the application of Republic Act No.
8974 will not contravene the 2004 Resolution, which requires the payment of just compensation before any
takeover of the NAIA 3 facilities by the Government. The 2004 Resolution does not particularize the extent
such payment must be effected before the takeover, but it unquestionably requires at least some degree of
payment to the private property owner before a writ of possession may issue. The utilization of Republic Act
No. 8974 guarantees compliance with this bare minimum requirement, as it assures the private property
owner the payment of, at the very least, the proffered value of the property to be seized. Such payment of the
proffered value to the owner, followed by the issuance of the writ of possession in favor of the Government, is
precisely the schematic under Republic Act No. 8974, one which facially complies with the prescription laid
down in the 2004 Resolution. Clearly then, we see no error on the part of the RTC when it ruled that Republic
Act No. 8974 governs the instant expropriation proceedings.

Same; Same; Same; R.A. No. 8974 permits an expedited means by which the Government can immediately
take possession of the property without having to await precise determination of the valuation. Section 4(c)
of Rep. Act No. 8974 states that in case the completion of a government infrastructure project is of utmost
urgency and importance, and there is no existing valuation of the area concerned, the implementing agency
shall immediately pay the owner of the property its proffered value.—Admittedly, there is no way, at least

for the present, to immediately ascertain the value of the improvements and structures since such valuation is
a matter for factual determination. Yet Republic Act No. 8974 permits an expedited means by which the
Government can immediately take possession of the property without having to await precise determination
of the valuation. Section 4(c) of Republic Act No. 8974 states that “in case the completion of a government
infrastructure project is of utmost urgency and importance, and there is no existing valuation of the area
concerned, the implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property its proffered value,
taking into consideration the standards prescribed in Section 5 [of the law].” The “proffered value” may strike
as a highly subjective standard based solely on the intuition of the government, but Republic Act No. 8974
does provide relevant standards by which “proffered value” should be based, as well as the certainty of
judicial determination of the propriety of the proffered value.

Same; Same; Same; In ascertaining the proffered value adduced by the Government, the amount of P3 Billion
as the amount deposited characterized in the complaint as “to be held by [Land Bank] subject to the [RTC’s]
orders,” should be deemed as controlling.—Still, such intention the Government may have had as to the entire
US$62.3 Million is only inferentially established. In ascertaining the proffered value adduced by the
Government, the amount of P3 Billion as the amount deposited characterized in the complaint as “to be held
by [Land Bank] subject to the [RTC’s] orders,” should be deemed as controlling. There is no clear evidence
that the Government intended to offer US$62.3 Million as the initial payment of just compensation, the
wording of the Land Bank Certification notwithstanding, and credence should be given to the consistent
position of the Government on that aspect. In any event, for the RTC to be able to justify the payment of
US$62.3 Million to PIATCO and not P3 Billion Pesos, he would have to establish that the higher amount
represents the valuation of the structures/improvements, and not the BIR zonal valuation on the land
wherein NAIA 3 is built. The Order dated 5 January 2005 fails to establish such integral fact, and in the
absence of contravening proof, the proffered value of P3 Billion, as presented by the Government, should
prevail.

Same; Same; Same; R.A. No. 8974 plainly requires direct payment to the property owner, and not a mere
deposit with the authorized government depositary—without such direct payment, no writ of

possession may be obtained.—The Government submits that assuming that Republic Act No. 8974 is
applicable, the deposited amount of P3 Billion should be considered as the proffered value, since the amount
was based on comparative values made by the City Assessor. Accordingly, it should be deemed as having
faithfully complied with the requirements of the statute. While the Court agrees that P3 Billion should be
considered as the correct proffered value, still we cannot deem the Government as having faithfully complied
with Republic Act No. 8974. For the law plainly requires direct payment to the property owner, and not a
mere deposit with the authorized government depositary. Without such direct payment, no writ of possession
may be obtained.

Same; Same; Same; While the RTC did direct the LBPBaclaran to immediately release the amount of US$62
Million to PIATCO, it should have likewise suspended the writ of possession, nay, withdrawn it altogether,
until the Government shall have actually paid PIATCO, which is the inevitable consequence of the clear
command of R.A. No. 8974.—The Court thus finds another error on the part of the RTC. The RTC authorized
the issuance of the writ of possession to the Government notwithstanding the fact that no payment of any
amount had yet been made to PIATCO, despite the clear command of Republic Act No. 8974 that there must
first be payment before the writ of possession can issue. While the RTC did direct the LBP-Baclaran to
immediately release the amount of US$62 Million to PIATCO, it should have likewise suspended the writ of
possession, nay, withdrawn it altogether, until the Government shall have actually paid PIATCO. This is the
inevitable consequence of the clear command of Republic Act No. 8974 that requires immediate payment of
the initially determined amount of just compensation should be effected. Otherwise, the overpowering
intention of Republic Act No. 8974 of ensuring payment first before transfer of repossession would be
eviscerated.

Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; R.A. No. 8974 is plainly clear in imposing the requirement of
immediate prepayment, and no amount of statutory deconstruction can evade such requisite—R.A. No. 8974
enshrines a new approach towards eminent domain that reconciles the inherent unease attending
expropriation proceedings with a position of fundamental equity; Under the new modality prescribed by
Republic Act No. 8974, the private owner sees immedi-

483

VOL. 478, DECEMBER 19, 2005

483

Republic vs. Gingoyon

ate monetary recompense with the same degree of speed as the taking of his/her property.—Republic Act No.
8974 represents a significant change from previous expropriation laws such as Rule 67, or even Section 19 of
the Local Government Code. Rule 67 and the Local Government Code merely provided that the Government
deposit the initial amounts antecedent to acquiring possession of the property with, respectively, an
authorized Government depositary or the proper court. In both cases, the private owner does not receive
compensation prior to the deprivation of property. On the other hand, Republic Act No. 8974 mandates
immediate payment of the initial just compensation prior to the issuance of the writ of possession in favor of
the Government. Republic Act No. 8974 is plainly clear in imposing the requirement of immediate
prepayment, and no amount of statutory deconstruction can evade such requisite. It enshrines a new
approach towards eminent domain that reconciles the inherent unease attending expropriation proceedings
with a position of fundamental equity. While expropriation proceedings have always demanded just
compensation in exchange for private property, the previous deposit requirement impeded immediate
compensation to the private owner, especially in cases wherein the determination of the final amount of
compensation would prove highly disputed. Under the new modality prescribed by Republic Act No. 8974, the
private owner sees immediate monetary recompense with the same degree of speed as the taking of his/her
property.
Same; Same; Same; The expedited procedure of payment, as highlighted under R.A. No. 8974, is inherently
more fair, especially to the layperson who would be hard-pressed to fully comprehend the social value of
expropriation in the first place.—While eminent domain lies as one of the inherent powers of the State, there
is no requirement that it undertake a prolonged procedure, or that the payment of the private owner be
protracted as far as practicable. In fact, the expedited procedure of payment, as highlighted under Republic
Act No. 8974, is inherently more fair, especially to the layperson who would be hard-pressed to fully
comprehend the social value of expropriation in the first place. Immediate payment placates to some degree
whatever ill-will that arises from expropriation, as well as satisfies the demand of basic fairness. The Court
has the duty to implement Republic Act No. 8974 and to direct compliance with the requirement of
immediate payment in this case. Accordingly, the Writ of Possession dated 21 December 2004 should be held
in abey-

ance, pending proof of actual payment by the Government to PIATCO of the proffered value of the NAIA 3
facilities, which totals P3,002,125,000.00.

Same; Possession; There are critical reasons for the Court to view the 2004 Resolution less stringently, and
thus allow the operation by the Government of NAIA 3 upon the effectivity of the Writ of Possession.—The
RTC, in its 10 January 2005 Omnibus Order, expressly stated that it was not affirming “the superfluous part of
the Order [of 4 January 2005] prohibiting the plaintiffs from awarding concessions or leasing any part of
NAIA [3] to other parties.” Still, such statement was predicated on the notion that since the Government was
not yet the owner of NAIA 3 until final payment of just compensation, it was obviously incapacitated to
perform such acts of ownership. In deciding this question, the 2004 Resolution in Agan cannot be ignored,
particularly the declaration that “[f]or the government to take over the said facility, it has to compensate
respondent PIATCO as builder of the said structures.” The obvious import of this holding is that unless
PIATCO is paid just compensation, the Government is barred from “taking over,” a phrase which in the
strictest sense could encompass even a bar of physical possession of NAIA 3, much less operation of the
facilities. There are critical reasons for the Court to view the 2004 Resolution less stringently, and thus allow
the operation by the Government of NAIA 3 upon the effectivity of the Writ of Possession. For one, the
national prestige is diminished every day that passes with the NAIA 3 remaining mothballed. For another, the
continued non-use of the facilities contributes to its physical deterioration, if it has not already. And still for
another, the economic benefits to the Government and the country at large are beyond dispute once the NAIA
3 is put in operation.

Same; Same; Once the Writ of Possession is effective, the Government itself is authorized to perform the acts
that are essential to the operation of the NAIA 3 as an international airport terminal, and these would include
the repair, reconditioning and improvement of the complex, maintenance of the existing facilities and
equipment, installation of new facilities and equipment, provision of services and facilities pertaining to the
facilitation of air traffic and transport, and other services that are integral to a modern-day international
airport.—Republic Act No. 8974 provides the appropriate answer for

the standard that governs the extent of the acts the Government may be authorized to perform upon the
issuance of the writ of possession. Section 4 states that “the court shall immediately issue to the
implementing agency an order to take possession of the property and start the implementation of the
project.” We hold that accordingly, once the Writ of Possession is effective, the Government itself is
authorized to perform the acts that are essential to the operation of the NAIA 3 as an international airport
terminal upon the effectivity of the Writ of Possession. These would include the repair, reconditioning and
improvement of the complex, maintenance of the existing facilities and equipment, installation of new
facilities and equipment, provision of services and facilities pertaining to the facilitation of air traffic and
transport, and other services that are integral to a modern-day international airport.

Same; Same; Republic v. Tagle, 299 SCRA 549 (1998), may concede that the Government is entitled to
exercise more than just the right of possession by virtue of the writ of possession, yet it cannot be construed
to grant the Government the entire panoply of rights that are available to the owner.—The Government’s
position is more expansive than that adopted by the Court. It argues that with the writ of possession, it is
enabled to perform acts de jure on the expropriated property. It cites Republic v. Tagle, as well as the
statement therein that “the expropriation of real property does not include mere physical entry or occupation
of land,” and from them concludes that “its mere physical entry and occupation of the property fall short of
the taking of title, which includes all the rights that may be exercised by an owner over the subject property.”
This conclusion is indeed lifted directly from statements in Tagle, but not from the ratio decidendi of that
case. Tagle concerned whether a writ of possession in favor of the Government was still necessary in light of
the fact that it was already in actual possession of the property. In ruling that the Government was entitled to
the writ of possession, the Court in Tagle explains that such writ vested not only physical possession, but also
the legal right to possess the property. Continues the Court, such legal right to possess was particularly
important in the case, as there was a pending suit against the Republic for unlawful detainer, and the writ of
possession would serve to safeguard the Government from eviction. At the same time, Tagle conforms to the
obvious, that there is no transfer of ownership as of yet by virtue of the writ of possession. Tagle may concede
that the Gov-

ernment is entitled to exercise more than just the right of possession by virtue of the writ of possession, yet it
cannot be construed to grant the Government the entire panoply of rights that are available to the owner.
Certainly, neither Tagle nor any other case or law, lends support to the Government’s proposition that it
acquires beneficial or equitable ownership of the expropriated property merely through the writ of
possession.

Same; Just Compensation; The proper judicial attitude is to guarantee compliance with the primordial right to
just compensation.—Lim serves fair warning to the Government and its agencies who consistently refuse to
pay just compensation due to the private property owner whose property had been expropriated. At the same
time, Lim emphasizes the fragility of the rights of the Government, as possessor pending the final payment of
just compensation, without diminishing the potency of such rights. Indeed, the public policy, enshrined
foremost in the Constitution, mandates that the Government must pay for the private property it
expropriates. Consequently, the proper judicial attitude is to guarantee compliance with this primordial right
to just compensation.

Same; Same; The sixty (60)-day period prescribed in Republic Act No. 8974 gives teeth to the law’s avowed
policy “to ensure that owners of real property acquired for national government infrastructure projects are
promptly paid just compensation.”—R.A. No. 8974 mandates a speedy method by which the final
determination of just compensation may be had. Section 4 provides: “In the event that the owner of the
property contests the implementing agency’s proffered value, the court shall determine the just
compensation to be paid the owner within sixty (60) days from the date of filing of the expropriation case.
When the decision of the court becomes final and executory, the implementing agency shall pay the owner the
difference between the amount already paid and the just compensation as determined by the court.” We hold
that this provision should apply in this case. The sixty (60)-day period prescribed in Republic Act No. 8974
gives teeth to the law’s avowed policy “to ensure that owners of real property acquired for national
government infrastructure projects are promptly paid just compensation.” In this case, there already has been
irreversible delay in the prompt payment of PIATCO of just compensation, and it is no longer possible for the
RTC to determine the just compensation due PIATCO within sixty (60) days

from the filing of the complaint last 21 December 2004, as contemplated by the law. Still, it is feasible to
effectuate the spirit of the law by requiring the trial court to make such determination within sixty (60) days
from finality of this decision, in accordance with the guidelines laid down in Rep. Act No. 8974 and its
Implementing Rules.

Same; Same; Commissioners; The appointment of commissioners under Rule 67 may be resorted to, even in
expropriation proceedings under Republic Act No. 8974, since the application of the provisions of Rule 67 in
that regard do not conflict with the statute, but the standards to be observed for the determination of just
compensation are provided not in Rule 67 but in the statute.—It must be noted that Republic Act No. 8974 is
silent on the appointment of commissioners tasked with the ascertainment of just compensation. This
protocol though is sanctioned under Rule 67. We rule that the appointment of commissioners under Rule 67
may be resorted to, even in expropriation proceedings under Republic Act No. 8974, since the application of
the provisions of Rule 67 in that regard do not conflict with the statute. As earlier stated, Section 14 of the
Implementing Rules does allow such other incidents affecting the complaint to be resolved under the
provisions on expropriation of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Even without Rule 67, reference during trial to a
commissioner of the examination of an issue of fact is sanctioned under Rule 32 of the Rules of Court. But
while the appointment of commissioners under the aegis of Rule 67 may be sanctioned in expropriation
proceedings under Republic Act No. 8974, the standards to be observed for the determination of just
compensation are provided not in Rule 67 but in the statute. In particular, the governing standards for the
determination of just compensation for the NAIA 3 facilities are found in Section 10 of the Implementing
Rules for Republic Act No. 8974, which provides for the replacement cost method in the valuation of
improvements and structures.

Same; Same; Same; Nothing in Rule 67 or Republic Act No. 8974 requires that the RTC consult with the
parties in the expropriation case on who should be appointed as commissioners—what Rule 67 does allow
though is for the parties to protest the appointment of any of these commissioners, as provided under Section
5 of the Rule.—Nothing in Rule 67 or Republic Act No. 8974 requires that the RTC consult with the parties in
the expropriation case on who

should be appointed as commissioners. Neither does the Court feel that such a requirement should be
imposed in this case. We did rule in Municipality of Talisay v. Ramirez that “there is nothing to prevent [the
trial court] from seeking the recommendations of the parties on [the] matter [of appointment of
commissioners], the better to ensure their fair representation.” At the same time, such solicitation of
recommendations is not obligatory on the part of the court, hence we cannot impute error on the part of the
RTC in its exercise of solitary discretion in the appointment of the commissioners. What Rule 67 does allow
though is for the parties to protest the appointment of any of these commissioners, as provided under Section
5 of the Rule. These objections though must be made filed within ten (10) days from service of the order of
appointment of the commissioners. In this case, the proper recourse of the Government to challenge the
choice of the commissioners is to file an objection with the trial court, conformably with Section 5, Rule 67,
and not as it has done, assail the same through a special civil action for certiorari. Considering that the
expropriation proceedings in this case were effectively halted seven (7) days after the Order appointing the
commissioners, it is permissible to allow the parties to file their objections with the RTC within five (5) days
from finality of this decision.

Courts; Judges; Disqualification and Inhibition of Judges; The disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of
his/her judicial power and should not be allowed on the basis of mere speculations and surmises—to be
disqualifying, the bias and prejudice must be shown to have stemmed from an extrajudicial source and result
in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the
case.—The disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his/her judicial power and should not be allowed on
the basis of mere speculations and surmises. It certainly cannot be predicated on the adverse nature of the
judge’s rulings towards the movant for inhibition, especially if these rulings are in accord with law. Neither
could inhibition be justified merely on the erroneous nature of the rulings of the judge. We emphasized in
Webb v. People: “To prove bias and prejudice on the part of respondent judge, petitioners harp on the alleged
adverse and erroneous rulings of respondent judge on their various motions. By themselves, however, they
do not sufficiently prove bias and prejudice to disqualify respondent judge. To be disqualifying, the bias and
prejudice must be shown to have stemmed from an ex-

trajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned
from his participation in the case. Opinions formed in the course of judicial proceedings, although erroneous,
as long as they are based on the evidence presented and conduct observed by the judge, do not prove
personal bias or prejudice on the part of the judge. As a general rule, repeated rulings against a litigant, no
matter how erroneous and vigorously and consistently expressed, are not a basis for disqualification of a
judge on grounds of bias and prejudice. Extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or
corrupt purpose, in addition to the palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order itself.
Although the decision may seem so erroneous as to raise doubts concerning a judge’s integrity, absent
extrinsic evidence, the decision itself would be insufficient to establish a case against the judge. The only
exception to the rule is when the error is so gross and patent as to produce an ineluctable inference of bad
faith or malice.”

Same; Same; Same; The motu proprio amendment by a court of an erroneous order previously issued may be
sanctioned depending on the circumstances, in line with the long-recognized principle that every court has
inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its
jurisdiction, an inherent power that includes the right of the court to reverse itself especially when in its
honest opinion it has committed an error or mistake in judgment, and that to adhere to its decision will cause
injustice to a party litigant.—Neither are we convinced that the motu proprio issuance of the 4 January 2005
Order, without the benefit of notice or hearing, sufficiently evinces bias on the part of Hon. Gingoyon. The
motu proprio amendment by a court of an erroneous order previously issued may be sanctioned depending
on the circumstances, in line with the long-recognized principle that every court has inherent power to do all
things reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction. Section 5(g),
Rule 135 of the Rules of Court further recognizes the inherent power of courts “to amend and control its
process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice,” a power which Hon. Gingoyon noted
in his 10 January 2005 Omnibus Order. This inherent power includes the right of the court to reverse itself,
especially when in its honest opinion it has committed an error or mistake in

judgment, and that to adhere to its decision will cause injustice to a party litigant. Certainly, the 4 January
2005 Order was designed to make the RTC’s previous order conformable to law and justice, particularly to
apply the correct law of the case. Of course, as earlier established, this effort proved incomplete, as the 4
January 2005 Order did not correctly apply Republic Act No. 8974 in several respects. Still, at least, the 4
January 2005 Order correctly reformed the most basic premise of the case that Republic Act No. 8974
governs the expropriation proceedings.

Same; Same; Same; Every losing litigant in any case can resort to claiming that the judge was biased, and
he/she will gain a sympathetic ear from friends, family, and people who do not understand the judicial
process but the test in believing such a proposition should not be the vehemence of the litigant’s claim of bias,
but the Court’s judicious estimation, as people who know better than to believe any old cry of “wolf!,”
whether such bias has been irrefutably exhibited.—The Court should necessarily guard against adopting a
standard that a judge should be inhibited from hearing the case if one litigant loses trust in the judge. Such
loss of trust on the part of the Government may be palpable, yet inhibition cannot be grounded merely on the
feelings of the party-litigants. Indeed, every losing litigant in any case can resort to claiming that the judge
was biased, and he/she will gain a sympathetic ear from friends, family, and people who do not understand
the judicial process. The test in believing such a proposition should not be the vehemence of the litigant’s
claim of bias, but the Court’s judicious estimation, as people who know better than to believe any old cry of
“wolf!,” whether such bias has been irrefutably exhibited. The Court acknowledges that it had been previously
held that “at the very first sign of lack of faith and trust in his actions, whether well-grounded or not, the judge
has no other alternative but to inhibit himself from the case.” But this doctrine is qualified by the entrenched
rule that “a judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation, but when circumstances appear
that will induce doubt to his honest actuations and probity in favor of either party, or incite such state of
mind, he should conduct a careful selfexamination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the
people’s faith in the Courts of Justice is not impaired.” And a selfassessment by the judge that he/she is not
impaired to hear the case will be respected by the Court absent any evidence to the contrary.

CARPIO, J., Separate Opinion:

Separation of Powers; Courts; Procedural Rules; Congress has no power to amend or repeal rules of
procedure.—Congress has no power to amend or repeal rules of procedure adopted by the Supreme Court.
However, Congress can enact laws on substantive matters which are the subject of court procedures. Thus,
Congress can prescribe the initial or minimum amount for just compensation in expropriation cases, and
require immediate payment of such initial or minimum amount as condition for the immediate takeover of
the property by the government. The rules of procedure, like Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, must adjust
automatically to such new laws on substantive matters. Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974, mandating
immediate payment to the property owner of the foil zonal or proffered value prior to takeover by the
government, is a substantive requirement in expropriation cases. Thus, Section 4 must apply to all
expropriation cases under RA No. 8974 involving the acquisition of real property, like the NAIA Terminal III,
for “national government projects.”

PUNO, J., Separate Opinion:

Eminent Domain; Courts; Judgments; With due respect, the majority’s effort to reconcile Agan v. PIATCO and
the inherent power of the State to expropriate private property is strained and unnecessary for there is
nothing in Agan where it can be deduced that the right of the State to expropriate the subject property has
been impaired or diminished.—The majority opinion took excruciating pains to reconcile our Decision in
Agan and the inherent right of the State to expropriate private property. With due respect, the effort is
strained and unnecessary for there is nothing in Agan where it can be deduced that the right of the State to
expropriate the subject property has been impaired or diminished. In Agan, we simply held: “x x x This Court,
however, is not unmindful of the reality that the structures comprising the NAIA IPT III facility are almost
complete and that funds have been spent by PIATCO in their construction. For the government to take over
the said facility, it has to compensate respondent PIATCO as builder of the said structures. The compensation
must be just and in accordance with law and equity for the government cannot unjustly enrich itself at the
expense of PIATCO and its investors.

Same; Same; Separation of Powers; Procedural Rules; Following Article VIII, section 5(5) of the 1987
Constitution and the Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 301 SCRA 96 (1999), Rule 67 cannot be repealed or
amended by Congress.—Rule 67 is the rule this Court promulgated to govern the proceedings in
expropriation cases filed in court. It has been the undeviating rule for quite a length of time. Following Article
VIII, section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution and the Echegaray jurisprudence, Rule 67 cannot be repealed or
amended by Congress. This prohibition against non-repeal or non-amendment refers to any part of Rule 67
for Rule 67 is pure procedural law. Consequently, the Court should not chop Rule 67 into pieces and hold that
some can be changed by Congress but others can be changed. The stance will dilute the rule making power of
this Court which can not be allowed for it will weaken its institutional independence.

Same; Same; It is of judicial notice that despite Agan,the subject case has reached the international arbitral
tribunals where the government and the private respondent have filed charges and countercharges—there is
evident need to avoid the issues pestering the parties from further multiplying and for new proceedings to be
started in other courts, lest public interest suffer further irretrievable prejudice.—On December 12, 2005, the
Solicitor General filed a Supplemental Manifestation and Motion. The Solicitor General informed the Court
about an Order dated December 2, 2005 of the High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, London * * * To
be sure, the said Order is not yet final. Be that as it may, the Court cannot turn a blind eye to this new wrinkle
of the case at bar. It is of judicial notice that despite Agan, the subject case has reached the international
arbitral tribunals where the government and the private respondent have filed charges and countercharges.
There is evident need to avoid the issues pestering the parties from further multiplying and for new
proceedings to be started in other courts, lest public interest suffer further irretrievable prejudice. Towards
this end, it is respectfully submitted that the Court should exercise its power to compel the parties to
interplead pursuant to Rule 62 and invoke the need for orderly administration of justice. The parties may be
given reasonable time to amend their pleadings in the trial court.
CORONA, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Eminent Domain; Separation of Powers; The Court erroneously allowed for the expropriation of Ninoy
Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT 3) through a procedure set forth in an
unconstitutional law.—The majority ruled that RA 8974 should apply. It ordered the national government
and its co-petitioners to immediately pay the just compensation for NAIA IPT3 before taking over the facility.
In so doing, the majority may have unwittingly further delayed, if not virtually foreclosed, the expropriation
of NAIA IPT3. I submit it erroneously allowed the procedure set forth in an unconstitutional law. The majority
allowed Congress to encroach upon the rule-making power which the Constitution has reserved exclusively
to this Court. And it may have created another white elephant as a result.

Same; The majority opinion effectively disregarded necessity for the expropriation of Ninoy Aquino
International Airport Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT 3).—There is no denying that a project like NAIA IPT3
is long overdue, such that the prestige of the entire country before the international community is at stake.
Politics and narrow vested interests have a peculiar way of extirpating the most salutary and beneficial
ventures in this country. The undertaking appears headed for the same fate unless this Court intervenes and
exercises its judicial discretion to settle the destructive impasse. Shall this Court watch in silence while the
parties claw at each other before international arbitration bodies? The majority opinion effectively
disregarded this necessity.

Same; Judgments; Law of the Case; The majority opinion ruled that RA 8974 applies in this case. It premised
its conclusion on the argument that the application of Rule 67 will violate this Court’s 2004 resolution in
Agan, the alleged governing law of the case; It is incorrect to say that Agan constitutes the law of the case—
the law of the case finds application only in the same case between the parties but this case (which refers to
the expropriation of NAIA IPT3) is irrefutably not the same as Agan (which was about the validity of the so-
called “PIATCO contracts”).—The ruling is basically flawed as it is grounded on a wrong premise. It is
incorrect to say that Agan constitutes the law of the case. The “law of the case” doctrine is defined as a term
applied to an established rule that, when an appel-

late court passes on a question and remands the case to the lower court for further proceedings, the question
there settled becomes the law of the case on subsequent appeal. Unlike the doctrine of stare decisis, the
doctrine of the law of the case operates only in the particular case. The law of the case finds application only
in the same case between the parties. This case (which refers to the expropriation of NAIA IPT3) is irrefutably
not the same as Agan (which was about the validity of the so-called “PIATCO contracts”). Hence, the
pronouncements in Agan cannot constitute the law of the case here.

Same; Same; Just Compensation; There is something seriously wrong with the argument that R.A. 8974 is the
only legal and equitable way to compensate PIATCO in accordance with our 2004 resolution—the application
of Rule 67 in the expropriation proceedings of NAIA IPT3 is in consonance with Agan.—The majority opinion
claims that “the staging of expropriation proceedings in this case with the exclusive use of Rule 67 would
allow for the government to take over the NAIA 3 facilities in a fashion that directly rebukes our 2004
resolution in Agan (which) mandated that there must be first payment of just compensation before the
Government could take over the NAIA IPT3 facilities.” This is very misleading. The full text of the relevant
statement of the Court in its 2004 resolution in Agan is as follows: “This Court, however, is not unmindful of
the reality that the structures comprising the NAIA [IPT3] facility are almost complete and that funds have
been spent by PIATCO in their construction. For the government to take over the facility, it has to compensate
respondent PIATCO as builder of the said structures. The compensation must be just and in accordance with
law and equity for the government can not unjustly enrich itself at the expense of PIATCO and its investors.”
(emphasis supplied) Clearly, the resolution only requires that PIATCO be given just compensation as a
condition for any government take-over of NAIA IPT3. The just compensation should be in accordance with
law and equity. There is something seriously wrong with the argument that RA 8974 is the only legal and
equitable way to compensate PIATCO in accordance with our 2004 resolution. The application of Rule 67 in
the expropriation proceedings of NAIA IPT3 is in consonance with Agan. The determination and payment of
just compensation pursuant to Rule 67 are in accordance with law. Under Rule 67, PIATCO will be given FULL
JUST COMPENSATION by the government for the taking of NAIA IPT3. That is mandatory. The Constitution
itself ordains it

Under Rule 67, there is no way the government can unjustly enrich itself at the expense of PIATCO. Section 9
of Rule 67 ensures this by requiring the payment of interest from the time government takes possession of
the property.

Same; Same; Same; If the majority opinion were to pursue its argument to its logical conclusion, no takeover
can be had without payment of the just compensation itself not merely of a value corresponding to what it
vaguely referred to as “some degree of payment”—payment of the proffered value is not enough since the
proffered value is definitely not equivalent to just compensation.—I dare say the majority opinion actually got
caught up in a self-contradiction. At first, it claimed that the 2004 resolution in Agan laid down the following
directives: (1) PIATCO must receive payment of just compensation determined in accordance with law and
equity, and (2) the government is barred from taking over NAIA IPT3 until such just compensation is paid. It
continued to argue that the 2004 resolution requires the payment of just compensation before the takeover of
NAIA IPT3 facilities. Subsequently, however, it backtracked and stated that “the 2004 resolution does not
particularize the extent such payment must be effected before the takeover, but it actually requires at least
some degree of payment to the private owner before a writ of possession may issue.” However, neither the
proffered value nor the zonal valuation under RA 8974 is equivalent to just compensation. If the majority
opinion were to pursue its argument to its logical conclusion, no takeover can be had without payment of the
just compensation itself, not merely of a value corresponding to what it vaguely referred to as “some degree
of payment.”

Same; Same; Same; Obiter Dictum; Words and Phrases; The footnote in City of Iloilo v. Legaspi, 444 SCRA 269
(2004)—on the alleged repeal by RA No. 8974—was not in any way necessary to resolve any of the issues in
that case, thus merely part of an obiter dictum.—Respondent judge’s theory about Rule 67’s supposed repeal
by RA 8974 was totally devoid of factual and legal basis. RA 8974 did not repeal Rule 67 at all. The
Constitution will not allow it. In fact, neither its repealing clause nor any of its provisions even mentioned or
referred to the Rules of Court, whether on expropriation or anything else. But even assuming (but not
conceding) that respondent judge’s theory had been based on an implied repeal, still there would have been
no legal justification for it. The footnote in City of Iloilo
was not in any way necessary to resolve any of the issues in that case. Respondent judge should be reminded
of our pronouncement in City of Manila v. Entote that a remark made or opinion expressed by a judge in a
decision upon a cause, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon the question before the court, or
upon a point not necessarily involved in the determination of the cause, is obiter dictum lacking the force of
an adjudication. An obiter dictum is an opinion entirely unnecessary for the decision of the case and is not
binding as precedent. Not only was there no pronouncement from us in City of Iloilo about Rule 67’s repeal by
RA 8974, we in fact applied Rule 67 in that case. The Court invoked Section 1 of Rule 67 in resolving the issue
of the sufficiency in form and substance of the amended complaint for expropriation and Section 2 of the
same Rule in holding that the City of Iloilo was not in estoppel since it simply followed the procedure that a
prior hearing was not required before a writ of possession could be issued. Indeed, the Court could not even
have applied RA 8974 in City of Iloilo because it did not involve a project of the national government but that
of a local government unit, thus requiring the application of RA 7160 (the Local Government Code).

Same; Just Compensation; Separation of Powers; The legislature now has no power to annul modify or
augment the Rules of Court.—Any talk of repeal (whether express or implied) by legislative enactment of the
rules of procedure duly promulgated by this Court goes against the Constitution itself. The power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure was granted by the Constitution to this Court to
enhance its independence. It is no longer shared by this Court with Congress. The legislature now has no
power to annul, modify or augment the Rules of Court. We expressly declared in Echegaray v. Secretary of
Justice that the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure.

Same; Same; Same; Procedural and Substantive Law; Words and Phrases; There is no question that the
appropriate standard of just compensation is a substantive matter, not procedural but the manner of
determining just compensation (including how it shall be paid and under what conditions a writ of possession
may be issued) is a matter of procedure, not of substantive law; If a rule or statute

creates a right or takes away a vested right, it is substantive, but if it operates as a means of implementing an
existing right, then it is procedural.—A perusal of the so-called “Guidelines for Expropriation Proceedings”
provided for under Section 4 of RA 8974 shows that the “guidelines” radically alter the rules for expropriation
under Rule 67. The majority even declared that “RA 8974 represents a significant change from previous
expropriation laws such as Rule 67. . . .” The majority however failed to realize that such change brought
about by a legislative enactment subverts the fundamental law and defeats the constitutional intent to
strengthen the independence of this Court. There is no question that the appropriate standard of just
compensation is a substantive matter, not procedural. However, the manner of determining just
compensation (including how it shall be paid and under what conditions a writ of possession may be issued)
is a matter of procedure, not of substantive law. If a rule or statute creates a right or takes away a vested
right, it is substantive. If it operates as a means of implementing an existing right, then it is procedural. The
provisions of Rule 67 neither vest a new power on the State nor create a new right in favor of the property
owner. Rule 67 merely provides the procedure for the State’s exercise of eminent domain and, at the same
time, ensures the enforcement of the right of the private owner to receive just compensation for the taking of
his property. It is purely a matter of procedure. It is therefore exclusively the domain of this Court. The
Constitution prohibits Congress from transgressing this sphere. Congress cannot legislate the manner of
payment of just compensation. Neither can Congress impose a condition on the issuance of a writ of
possession. Yet that is what RA 8974 precisely does.
Same; Same; Same; I am disheartened that the majority opinion is in effect sanctioning the arrogation of
judicial power by Congress.—The records of the 11th Congress which enacted RA 8974 reveal that Congress
intended to revise and amend Rule 67. The Senate deliberations quoted at the beginning of this dissenting
opinion show this legislative intent. I am therefore disheartened that the majority opinion is in effect
sanctioning the arrogation of judicial power by Congress. In denying the petition, the majority effectively
sustained respondent judge’s repeal theory. Thus, they allowed Congress to infringe on the Court’s rule-
making power, a power vested by the Constitution exclusively on this Court.

Same; Same; National Infrastructure Projects; Obviously, the NAIA IPT3 is not a right of way, site or location
for any national government infrastructure project but the infrastructure itself albeit still under construction;
R.A. 8974 does not apply to the expropriation of NAIA IPT3, and there being no special law on the matter,
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court governs the procedure for its expropriation.—Here, the expropriation of NAIA
IPT3 falls under the second category since petitioners seek to take private property for a purpose other than
for a right-of-way, site or location for a national government project. Unfortunately, the majority sided with
respondent judge and completely disregarded the fact that NAIA IPT3 was the national government
infrastructure project itself and ruled instead that it was the right-of-way, site or location of a national
government project. That was wrong and the reasoning was even more difficult to understand. True, under
Section 2(d) of the IRR of RA 8974 defining “national government projects,” an airport (which NAIA IPT3
essentially is) is specifically listed among the national government projects for which expropriation
proceedings may be initiated under the law. However, the law and its IRR also provide that the expropriation
should be for the purpose of providing for a right of way, site or location for the intended national
government project. A national government project is separate and distinct from the purpose of
expropriation. Otherwise, there would have been no need to define them separately. Thus, respondent judge
erred when he equated one with the other and obliterated the clear distinction made by the law. Moreover,
under Section 2(e) of the IRR, the specific objects or purposes of expropriation were lumped as ‘ROW which is
defined as the “right-of-way, site or location, with defined physical boundaries, used for a national
government project.” Obviously, the NAIA IPT3 is not a right of way, site or location for any national
government infrastructure project but the infrastructure itself albeit still under construction. The
construction (and now the completion) of NAIA IPT3 never required the acquisition of private property for a
right of way, site or location since the terminal, including all its access roads, stands completely on
government land. Conformably, RA 8974 does not apply to the expropriation of NAIA IPT3. And there being
no special law on the matter, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court governs the procedure for its expropriation.

Same; Same; Grave Abuse of Discretion; Respondent judge’s orders which were issued with grave abuse of
discretion.—I refuse to

join the majority who turned a blind eye on respondent judge’s orders which were issued with grave abuse of
discretion. Respondent judge should not have issued his disputed orders without any motion by PIATCO.
There were very compelling reasons why. Considering that respondent judge knew or should have known
how extremely controversial NAIA IPT3 had become, he should have granted the parties unimpeded
opportunity to confront each other on the propriety of releasing such a huge amount to the owner of the
property under expropriation. There were in fact still so many pending contentious issues on which the
parties had taken radically opposite positions, such as whether it was respondent PIATCO alone that was
entitled to payment or whether there were other parties like Takenaka Corporation (to be discussed later in
this decision) that had valid claims thereon and, if so, how much each was entitled to. Furthermore, inasmuch
as petitioners had been vigorously complaining that they were never really able to inspect and evaluate the
structural integrity and real worth of NAIA IPT3, respondent judge should have at least tried to determine the
reasonableness of petitioners’ provisional deposit and therefore, he ought not to have been in such a hurry to
order the release of petitioners’ funds to PIATCO which was not even asking for it. In other words, all the
foregoing warning signs considered, he should have been more circumspect, deliberate and careful in
handling the case.

Same; Same; Same; Respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when he ordered the release not
only of the provisional deposit (as computed under Rule 67) but also of the entire bank balance of petitioner
MIAA—he exercised discretion in a matter where no discretion was allowed.—Section 2 of Rule 67
categorically prescribes the amount to be deposited with the authorized government depositary as the pre-
condition for the issuance of a writ of possession. This is the assessed value of the property for purposes of
taxation. The figure is exact and permits the court no discretion in determining what the provisional value
should be. Respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when he ordered the release not only of
the provisional deposit (as computed under Rule 67) but also of the entire bank balance of petitioner MIAA.
He exercised discretion in a matter where no discretion was allowed. Respondent judge thus disregarded
established rules by unilaterally increasing the amount of the provisional deposit required for the issuance of
the writ of possession. This Court has had occasions in the past where we denounced the acts of trial courts in
unilaterally increasing such provisional deposits. After issuing the writ of possession, the provisional deposit
is fixed and the court can no longer change it.

Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Proffered Value,” Explained; The majority opinion unduly enlarged the
concept of proffered value when it extended the same to improvements or structures.—Even the reference to
the proffered value by the majority opinion is inappropriate. The law is clear that such proffered value applies
only “[i]n case the completion of a national government project is of utmost urgency and importance, and
there is no existing valuation of the area concerned.” The majority opinion recognizes the correctness of the
position of the Solicitor General that zonal valuations are only for parcels of land and, hence, there can be no
zonal valuation for improvements or structures such as an airport terminal like NAIA IPT3. Since it is
impossible for improvements or structures to have an existing valuation, then there can be no proffered value
for NAIA IPT3 to speak of. The fact that the proffered value does not apply to improvements is buttressed by
the provisions of RA 8974. The law provides that in the determination of the proffered value, the standards
prescribed in Section 5 of RA 8974 shall be taken into consideration. Section 5 expressly refers to “Standards
for the Assessment of the Value of the Land Subject of Expropriation Proceedings or Negotiated Sale.” On the
other hand, the valuation of improvements and/or structures is separately governed by Section 7 of the law.
To reiterate, the determination of the proffered value categorically refers to Section 5 on the valuation of the
land, not to valuation of improvements or structures under Section 7. Thus, the majority opinion unduly
enlarged the concept of proffered value when it extended the same to improvements or structures.

Same; Same; Same; “Taking,” Construed; Full payment of just compensation, though a condition precedent for
the transfer of title or ownership, is not a condition precedent for the taking of the property.—Title remains
with the owner until just compensation is fully paid. This is only proper to protect the rights of the property
owner. But that is not the point here. The issue is whether or not the expropriating authority has the right to
enter and use the property even prior to full payment. In other words, can the property be taken and used
even before full payment of just compensation? Yes. Full payment of just compensation, though a condition
precedent for the

transfer of title or ownership, is not a condition precedent for the taking of the property. As discussed earlier,
an important element of taking is that the owner’s right to possess and exploit the land (in other words, his
beneficial ownership of it) is transferred to and thenceforth exercised by the expropriator.

Courts; Judges; Inhibition and Disqualification of Judges; Where a case has generated a strained personal
relationship, animosity and hostility between the party or his counsel and the judge that the former has lost
confidence in the judge’s impartiality or the latter is unable to display the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge, it is a violation of due process for the judge not to recuse himself from hearing the case.—A judge, like
Caesar’s wife, must be above suspicion. He must hold himself above reproach and suspicion. At the very first
sign of lack of faith and trust in his actions, whether well-grounded or not, the judge has no other alternative
but to inhibit himself from the case. That way, he avoids being misunderstood. His reputation for probity and
objectivity is maintained. Even more important, the ideal of an impartial administration of justice is
preserved. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen and perceived to be done. Besides, where a
case has generated a strained personal relationship, animosity and hostility between the party or his counsel
and the judge that the former has lost confidence in the judge’s impartiality or the latter is unable to display
the cold neutrality of an impartial judge, it is a violation of due process for the judge not to recuse himself
from hearing the case. Due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of that objectivity on the part of a judge
sufficient to reassure litigants of his being fair and just.

Eminent Domain; Just Compensation; Parties; The defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the
owners of the property condemned. They include all other persons owning, occupying, or claiming to own the
property; Petitioners should be ordered to amend their complaint for expropriation to include as defendants
Takenaka Corporation and all other parties who occupy, own or claim to own any part of or interest in NAIA
IPT3.—Just compensation is not due to the owner alone: “The defendants in an expropriation case are not
limited to the owners of the property condemned. They include all other persons owning, occupying, or
claiming to own the property. When [property] is taken by eminent domain, the owner . . . is not necessarily
the only person who is entitled to compensation. In American jurisdiction, the term ‘owner’ when employed
in statutes

relating to eminent domain to designate the persons who are to be made parties to the proceeding, refer, as is
the rule in respect of those entitled to compensation, to all those who have lawful interest in the property to
be condemned, including a mortgagee, a lessee and a vendee in possession under an executory contract.
Every person having an estate or interest at law or in equity in the land taken is entitled to share in the award.
If a person claiming an interest in the land is not made a party, he is given the right to intervene and lay claim
to the compensation.” In accordance with the foregoing rule, petitioners should be ordered to amend their
complaint for expropriation to include as defendants Takenaka Corporation and all other parties who occupy,
own or claim to own any part of or interest in NAIA IPT3.

Same; Same; Police Power; The government could have pursued the options available to it under the 2004
resolution in Agan, which included the filing in this Court of a motion for the determination of just
compensation, as well as the take over of NAIA IPT3 in the exercise of its police power.—The government got
entangled in the present legal controversy as a result of its decision to resort to expropriation proceedings for
the take-over of NAIA IPT3. It could have avoided this imbroglio had it pursued the options available to it
under the 2004 resolution in Agan. Among these options was the filing in this Court of a motion for the
determination of just compensation. Immediately after the 2004 resolution was promulgated, the right,
purpose and propriety of expropriation could not have been seriously contested. The sole issue that remained
was the amount of just compensation to be paid. Thus, a motion could have easily been filed to determine the
just compensation for the facility. The Court could have then appointed a panel of commissioners in
accordance with Section 5 of Rule 67 and the problem could have been completely resolved. Another option
the government could have taken at that time was to take over NAIA IPT3 in the exercise of its police power.
Thereafter, it could have bidded out the facility’s operations. PIATCO could have then been paid from the
revenues from the winning bidder.

Same; Same; It is disturbing that the majority opinion allows PIATCO to take hold of the money without giving
the government the opportunity to first inspect the facility thoroughly to ascertain its structural integrity and
to make a preliminary valuation.—RA 8974 provides that there should be immediate payment direct to the
prop-

erty owner prior to the take over of the property. Pursuant thereto, the majority opinion ordered the
payment of the proffered value to PIATCO as a condition for the implementation of the writ of possession
earlier issued by respondent judge. On the other hand, Rule 67 requires only the making of a down payment
in the form of a provisional deposit. It cannot be withdrawn without further orders from the court, i.e., until
just compensation is finally determined. It is disturbing that the majority opinion allows PIATCO to take hold
of the money without giving the government the opportunity to first inspect the facility thoroughly to
ascertain its structural integrity and to make a preliminary valuation. With the money already in its
possession, PIATCO may make use of the same in whatever way it may see fit. I dread to think what will
happen if the government later on decides to back out after finding either irremediable structural defects or
an excessively bloated valuation, such that it will cost more to put NAIA IPT3 in operational readiness than to
build (or develop) and operate another airport. What happens then? Will not the government be left holding
an empty bag—losing no less than US$ 53 million for an inoperable facility?

Same; Same; Rather than striking the desired balance between legitimate State interests and private rights,
the majority opinion sacrifices public interest in favor of individual benefit.—While the procedure under RA
8974 is (as the majority opinion describes it) “eminently more favorable to the property owner than Rule 67,”
it is clearly onerous to the government. In contrast, Rule 67 will be advantageous to the government without
being cumbersome to the private owner. It provides a procedure that is sensitive to the government’s
financial condition and, at the same time, fair and just to the owner of the property. In ordering the
application of RA 8974, the majority opinion favors the interests of PIATCO over that of the government.
Rather than striking the desired balance between legitimate State interests and private rights, it sacrifices
public interest in favor of individual benefit. The majority opinion constantly and unabashedly proclaims the
objectives of RA 8974—to benefit the property owner and to expedite expropriation proceedings for national
government projects. The majority opinion tilted the balance in favor of private interest to the prejudice of
the common good. Moreover, besides being erroneous, resort to RA 8974 will be counter-productive and self-
defeating. Republic vs. Gingoyon, 478 SCRA 474, G.R. No. 166429 December 19, 2005
20. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant, vs. FLORENCIO M. REYES,1 Officer-in-
Charge, and RENE DE GUZMAN, Clerk, Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, Guimba, Nueva Ecija,
respondents.

Courts; Court Personnel; Administrative Investigations; A resolution of the Supreme Court should not be
construed as a mere request, and should be complied with promptly and completely—failure to comply
betrays, not only a recalcitrant streak in character, but also disrespect for the lawful order and directive of the
Court.—As correctly observed by the OCA, De Guzman has shown his propensity to defy the directives of this
Court. However, at this juncture, we are no longer wont to countenance such disrespectful behavior. As we
have categorically declared in Office of the Court Administrator v. Clerk of Court Fe P. Ganzan, MCTC, Jasaan,
Claveria, Misamis Oriental, 600 SCRA 17 (2009): x x x A resolution of the Supreme Court should not be
construed as a mere request, and should be complied with promptly and completely. Such failure to comply
betrays, not only a recalcitrant streak in character, but also disrespect for the lawful order and directive of the
Court. Furthermore, this contumacious conduct of refusing to abide by the lawful directives issued by the
Court has likewise been considered as an utter lack of interest to remain with, if not contempt of, the system.
Ganzan’s transgression is highlighted even more by the fact that she is an employee of the Judiciary, who,
more than an ordinary citizen, should be aware of her duty to obey the orders and processes of the Supreme
Court without delay. x x x

Court Personnel; Dangerous Drugs Act; Drugs Test; Mandatory but random drug testing of officers and
employees of both public and private offices is valid and constitutional.—Anent the use of illegal drugs, we
have upheld in Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board the validity and constitutionality of the
mandatory but random drug testing of officers and employees of both public and private offices. As regards
public officers and employees, we specifically held that: Like their counterparts in the private sector,
government officials and employees also labor under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the
Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the
public service. And if RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that
it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional demand, are required to be accountable at all
times to the people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.

Same; Same; Same; In A.M. No. 06-1-01-SC dated 17 January 2006, the Court has adopted guidelines for a
program to deter the use of dangerous drugs and institute preventive measures against drug abuse for the
purpose of eliminating the hazards of drug abuse in the Judiciary, particularly in the first and second level
courts.—Parenthetically, in A.M. No. 06-1-01-SC dated January 17, 2006, the Court has adopted guidelines for
a program to deter the use of dangerous drugs and institute preventive measures against drug abuse for the
purpose of eliminating the hazards of drug abuse in the Judiciary, particularly in the first and second level
courts. The objectives of the said program are as follows: 1. To detect the use of dangerous drugs among
lower court employees, impose disciplinary sanctions, and provide administrative remedies in cases where
an employee is found positive for dangerous drug use. 2. To discourage the use and abuse of dangerous drugs
among first and second level court employees and enhance awareness of their adverse effects by information
dissemination and periodic random drug testing. 3. To institute other measures that address the menace of
drug abuse within the personnel of the Judiciary.

Same; Same; As dispensers of justice, all members and employees of the Judiciary are expected to adhere
strictly to the laws of the land, one of which is Republic Act No. 9165 which prohibits the use of dangerous
drugs.—In the instant administrative matter, De

Guzman never challenged the authenticity of the Chemistry Report of the Nueva Ecija Provincial Crime
Laboratory Office. Likewise, the finding that De Guzman was found positive for use of marijuana and shabu
remains unrebutted. De Guzman’s general denial that he is not a drug user cannot prevail over this
compelling evidence. The foregoing constitutes more than substantial evidence that De Guzman was indeed
found positive for use of dangerous drugs. In Dadulo v. Court of Appeals, 521 SCRA 357 (2007), we held that
“(a)dministrative proceedings are governed by the ‘substantial evidence rule.’ Otherwise stated, a finding of
guilt in an administrative case would have to be sustained for as long as it is supported by substantial
evidence that the respondent has committed acts stated in the complaint. Substantial evidence is more than a
mere scintilla of evidence. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise.” This Court
is a temple of justice. Its basic duty and responsibility is the dispensation of justice. As dispensers of justice,
all members and employees of the Judiciary are expected to adhere strictly to the laws of the land, one of
which is Republic Act No. 9165 which prohibits the use of dangerous drugs.

Same; Same; The legislative policy as embodied in Republic Act No. 9165 in deterring dangerous drug use by
resort to sustainable programs of rehabilitation and treatment must be considered in light of the Supreme
Court’s constitutional power of administrative supervision over courts and court personnel—the legislative
power cannot limit the Court’s power to impose disciplinary actions against erring justices, judges and court
personnel.—Two justices disagree with the majority opinion. They opine that the Court’s action in this case
contravenes an express public policy, i.e., “imprisonment for drug dealers and pushers, rehabilitation for their
victims.” They also posit that De Guzman’s failure to properly perform his duties and promptly respond to
Court orders precisely springs from his drug addiction that requires rehabilitation. Finally, they state that the
Court’s real strength is not in its righteousness but in its willingness to understand that men are not perfect
and that there is a time to punish and a time to give a chance for contrition and change. However, the
legislative policy as embodied in Republic Act No. 9165 in deterring dangerous drug use by resort to
sustainable programs of rehabilitation and treatment must be considered in light of this Court’s constitutional
power of administrative supervision over courts and court personnel. The legislative power imposing policies
through laws is not unlimited and is subject to the substantive and constitutional limitations that set
parameters both in the exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation. As such, it cannot
limit the Court’s power to impose disciplinary actions against erring justices, judges and court personnel.
Neither should such policy be used to restrict the Court’s power to preserve and maintain the Judiciary’s
honor, dignity and integrity and public confidence that can only be achieved by imposing strict and rigid
standards of decency and propriety governing the conduct of justices, judges and court employees. Office of
the Court Administrator vs. Reyes, 621 SCRA 511, A.M. No. P-08-2535(Formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 04-2022-P
and A.M. No. 04-434-RTC) June 23, 2010
21. BAGUAN M. MAMISCAL, complainant, vs. CLERK OF COURT MACALINOG S. ABDULLAH, SHARI’A
CIRCUIT COURT, MARAWI CITY, respondent.

Administrative Law; Public Officers; Civil Registrar; The civil registrar is the person charged by law for the
recording of vital events and other documents affecting the civil status of persons.—The civil registrar is the
person charged by law for the recording of vital events and other documents affecting the civil status of
persons. The Civil Registry Law embraces all acts of civil life affecting the status of persons and is applicable
to all persons residing in the Philippines.

Same; Court Personnel; Clerks of Court; The Clerk of Court of the Shari’a Circuit Court enjoys the privilege of
wearing two (2) hats: first, as Clerk of Court of the Shari’a Circuit Court, and second, as Circuit Registrar
within his territorial jurisdiction.—It becomes apparent that the Clerk of Court of the Shari’a Circuit Court
enjoys the privilege of wearing two hats: first, as Clerk of Court of the Shari’a Circuit Court, and second, as
Circuit Registrar within his territorial jurisdiction. Although the Constitution vests the Court with the power
of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, this power must be taken with due regard to
other prevailing laws.

Same; Complaints; Well-settled is the rule that what controls is not the designation of the offense but the
actual facts recited in the complaint.—It becomes apparent that this Court does not have jurisdiction to
impose the proper disciplinary action against civil registrars. While he is undoubtedly a member of the
Judiciary as Clerk of Court of the Shari’a Circuit Court, a review of the subject complaint reveals that Mamiscal
seeks to hold Abdullah liable for registering the divorce and issuing the CRD pursuant to his duties as Circuit
Registrar of Muslim divorces. It has been said

that the test of jurisdiction is the nature of the offense and not the personality of the offender. The fact that
the complaint charges Abdullah for “conduct unbecoming of a court employee” is of no moment. Well-settled
is the rule that what controls is not the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the complaint.
Verily, unless jurisdiction has been conferred by some legislative act, no court or tribunal can act on a matter
submitted to it.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction, or the power and authority of a court to hear, try and decide a
case must first be acquired by the court or an adjudicative body over the subject matter and the parties in
order to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits.—It bears to stress at this point that this Court
can resolve the foregoing jurisdictional issue even if the matter of jurisdiction was never raised by any of the
parties. Jurisprudence is replete with rulings that jurisdiction, or the power and authority of a court to hear,
try and decide a case must first be acquired by the court or an adjudicative body over the subject matter and
the parties in order to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits. Elementary is the distinction
between jurisdiction over the subject matter and jurisdiction over the person. Jurisdiction over the subject
matter is conferred by the Constitution or by law. In contrast, jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the
court by virtue of the party’s voluntary submission to the authority of the court or through the exercise of its
coercive processes. Jurisdiction over the person is waivable unlike jurisdiction over the subject matter which
is neither subject to agreement nor conferred by consent of the parties.

Administrative Law; Public Officers; National Statistician; At present, the National Statistician is empowered
by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10625, as Civil Registrar-General to exercise technical supervision of civil
registrars.—The system of civil registration was first established in the Philippines by the revolutionary
government on June 18, 1898 or barely six days after the declaration of the country’s independence from
Spain on June 12, 1898. Originally, the system was decentralized in the sense that civil registration was purely
a local government responsibility. It was only on February 27, 1931, when C.A. No. 3753 took effect and
centralized the system of civil registration in the country. Under this law, the director of the National Library
was made responsible as the Civil Registrar-General to exercise technical supervision and ensure the proper

establishment and maintenance of our civil registry system. Then, following C.A. No. 591, the duties exercised
by the director of National Library with regard to matters concerning the system of civil registration were
transferred to the Bureau of Census and Statistics. This bureau subsequently became the NSO, whose
Administrator concurrently served as the Civil Registrar-General. At present, the National Statistician is
empowered by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10625, as Civil Registrar-General to exercise technical supervision of
civil registrars.

Same; Same; Civil Registrars; It was only with the advent of the Local Government Code (LGC) that the power
of administrative supervision over civil registrars was devolved to the municipal and city mayors of the
respective local government units (LGUs).—It was only with the advent of the Local Government Code that
the power of administrative supervision over civil registrars was devolved to the municipal and city mayors
of the respective local government units. Under the “faithful execution clause” embodied in Section 455(b)(1)
(x) and Section 444(b)(1)(x) of the Local Government Code, in relation to Section 479 under Article IX, Title V
of the same Code, the municipal and city mayors of the respective local government units, in addition to their
power to appoint city or municipal civil registrars are also given ample authority to exercise administrative
supervision over civil registrars.

Administrative Agencies; Civil Service Commission; The Civil Service Commission (CSC), as the central
personnel agency of the government, has the power to appoint and discipline its officials and employees and
to hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal.—At this
juncture, it should be remembered that the authority of the Mayor to exercise administrative supervision
over C/MCRs is not exclusive. The Civil Service Commission (CSC), as the central personnel agency of the
government, has the power to appoint and discipline its officials and employees and to hear and decide
administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal. Under Section 9 of the Revised
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, the CSC is granted original concurrent jurisdiction
over administrative cases. Thus: Section 9. Jurisdiction of Heads of Agencies.—The Secretaries and heads of
agencies, and other instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall have original concurrent
jurisdiction with the Commission over their respective officers and employees.
Leonen, J., Concurring Opinion:

Political Law; Separation of Powers; View that each department of the government has exclusive cognizance
of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.—Separation of powers is basic in our
constitutional design. As explained by this court in the landmark case of Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63
Phil. 139 (1936): The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains
not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government
has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does
not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution
intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided
for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government.

Same; Same; View that a careful consideration of the complaint reveals that Abdullah is being held to account
for acts committed in the course of his performance of functions, not as clerk of court but as a circuit (or civil)
registrar. He is therefore being charged, not in his capacity as an officer performing judicial functions, but as
an officer performing executive functions. In accordance with the principle of separation of powers thus, the
task of disciplining Abdulla does not fall upon the Supreme Court (SC).—The complaint subject of the present
administrative matter charges respondent Macalinog S. Abdullah with partiality, violation of due process,
dishonesty, and conduct unbecoming of a court employee. Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution
provides for this court’s “administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.” However, a
careful consideration of the complaint reveals that Abdullah is being held to account for acts committed in the
course of his performance of functions, not as clerk of court but as a circuit (or civil) registrar. He is therefore
being charged, not in his capacity as an officer performing judicial functions, but as an officer performing
executive functions. In accordance with the principle of separation of powers

thus, the task of disciplining Abdulla does not fall upon this court. As ably pointed out by Justice Jose C.
Mendoza, Article 81 of Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws
provides that clerks of court of Shari’a Circuit Courts shall also acts as circuit registrars. In Justice Mendoza’s
language thus, clerks of court of Shari’a Circuit Courts wear “two hats”: a judicial hat, in respect of their being
clerks of court; and an executive one, in respect of their being registrars. Indeed, disciplining civil registrars is
well beyond the power of this court.

Same; Same; View that the statutory provisions which vest executive functions in clerks of court of the Shari’a
Circuit Courts dangerously transgress the fundamental constitutional boundaries between departments.—
Clearly, the statutory provisions which vest executive functions in clerks of court of the Shari’a Circuit Courts
dangerously transgress the fundamental constitutional boundaries between departments. It creates an
enclave within the judiciary that is not subject to the disciplinary power of this court but of executive bodies.
Had it been raised as an issue in this case, I would have had no hesitation to vote that they be declared
unconstitutional. But, this is not the lis mota of the present case.
 22. DATU ZALDY UY AMPATUAN, ANSARUDDIN ADIONG, REGIE SAHALI-GENERALE, petitioners, vs.
HON. RONALDO PUNO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
Government and alter-ego of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and anyone acting in his stead and
on behalf of the President of the Philippines, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP), or any of
their units operating in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), and PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE, or any of their units operating in ARMM, respondents.

Administrative Law; State of Emergency; The Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) Secretary
did not take over the administration or operations of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).
—The DILG Secretary did not take over control of the powers of the ARMM. After law enforcement agents
took respondent Governor of ARMM into custody for alleged complicity in the Maguindanao massacre, the
ARMM Vice-Governor, petitioner Ansaruddin Adiong, assumed the vacated post on December 10, 2009
pursuant to the rule on succession found in Article VII, Section 12, of RA 9054. In turn, Acting Governor
Adiong named the then Speaker of the ARMM Regional Assembly, petitioner Sahali-Generale, Acting ARMM
Vice-Governor. In short, the DILG Secretary did not take over the administration or operations of the ARMM.

Same; Same; The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three
places mentioned; the calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is
a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President; she did not need a congressional authority to
exercise the same.—The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the
three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to

exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in
such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a congressional
authority to exercise the same.

Same; Same; It is clearly to the President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for
calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence; Unless it is shown that such
determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the court will accord respect to the President’s
judgment.—While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the President’s exercise of the
above power, it would generally defer to her judgment on the matter. As the Court acknowledged in
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81 (2000), it is clearly to the President that the
Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress
lawless violence. Unless it is shown that such determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the
Court will accord respect to the President’s judgment. Ampatuan vs. Puno, 651 SCRA 228, G.R. No. 190259
June 7, 2011

532 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

 Southern Cross Cement Corporation vs. Cement Manufacturers Association of the Philippines

35
SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. CEMENT MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION OF
THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, THE SECRETARY OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, respondents.
Safeguard Measures Act (SMA) (Republic Act [R.A.] No. 8800);Taxation; Court of Tax
Appeals; Jurisdictions; Words and Phrases; Under Section 29 of R.A. No. 8800, there are three requisites to
enable the CTA to acquire jurisdiction over the petition for review contemplated therein—(i) there must be a
ruling by the DTI Secretary, (ii) the petition must be filed by an interested party adversely affected by the ruling;
and (iii) such ruling must be “in connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure; “Obviously, there are
differences between “a ruling for the imposition of a safeguard measure,” and one issued “in connection with the
imposition of a safeguard measure, “the latter contemplating not only one kind of ruling but a myriad of rulings
issued “in connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure.”—Under Section 29, there are three
requisites to enable the CTA to acquire jurisdiction over the petition for review contemplated therein: (i)
there must be a ruling by the DTI Secretary; (ii) the petition must be filed by an interested party adversely
affected by the ruling; and (iii) such ruling must be “in connection with the imposition of a safeguard
measure.” Obviously, there are differences between “a ruling for the imposition of a safeguard measure,” and
one issued “in connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure.” The first adverts to a singular type of
ruling, namely one that imposes a safeguard measure. The second does not contemplate only one kind of
ruling, but a myriad of rulings issued “in connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is the express provision of Section 29, and not the Supreme Court, that
mandates CTA jurisdiction to be broad enough to encompass more than just a ruling imposing the safeguard
measure; A ruling issued “in connection with” the imposi-
_______________

* EN BANC.

533

VOL. 465, AUGUST 3, 2005

Southern Cross Cement Corporation vs. Cement Manufacturers Association of the Philippine

tion of a safeguard measure would be one that bears some relation to the imposition of a safeguard
measure—rulings which modify, suspend or terminate a safeguard measure are necessarily in connection with
the imposition of a safeguard measure.—Respondents argue that the Court has given an expansive
interpretation to Section 29, contrary to the established rule requiring strict construction against the
existence of jurisdiction in specialized courts. But it is the express provision of Section 29, and not this Court,
that mandates CTA jurisdiction to be broad enough to encompass more than just a ruling imposing the
safeguard measure. The key phrase remains “in connection with.” It has connotations that are obvious even to
the layman. A ruling issued “in connection with” the imposition of a safeguard measure would be one that
bears some relation to the imposition of a safeguard measure. Obviously, a ruling imposing a safeguard
measure is covered by the phrase “in connection with,” but such ruling is by no means exclusive. Rulings
which modify, suspend or terminate a safeguard measure are necessarily in connection with the imposition of
a safeguard measure. So does a ruling allowing for a provisional safeguard measure. So too, a ruling by the
DTI Secretary refusing to refer the application for a safeguard measure to the Tariff Commission. It is clear
that there is an entire subset of rulings that the DTI Secretary may issue in connection with the imposition of
a safeguard measure, including those that are provisional, interlocutory, or dispositive in character. By the
same token, a ruling not to impose a safeguard measure is also issued in connection with the imposition of a
safeguard measure.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Whether the ruling under review calls for the imposition or non-imposition of
the safeguard measure, the common question for resolution still is whether or not the tariff should be imposed
an—issue definitely fraught with a tax dimension and the determination of which question will call upon the
same kind of expertise that a specialized body as the CTA presumably possesses.—Philcemcor imputes
intelligent design behind the alleged intent of Congress to limit CTA review only to impositions of the general
safeguard measures. It claims that there is a necessary tax implication in case of an imposition of a tariff
where the CTA’s expertise is necessary, but there is no such tax implication, hence no need for the assumption
of jurisdiction by a specialized agency, when the ruling rejects the imposition of a safeguard measure. But of
course, whether the ruling under review calls for the imposition or
534

534 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Southern Cross Cement Corporation vs. Cement Manufacturers Association of the Philippine

non-imposition of the safeguard measure, the common question for resolution still is whether or not
the tariff should be imposed—an issue definitely fraught with a tax dimension. The determination of the
question will call upon the same kind of expertise that a specialized body as the CTA presumably possesses.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; It is likewise settled in statutory construction that an
interpretation that would cause inconvenience and absurdity is not favored.—In response to the Court’s
observation that the setup proposed by respondents was novel, unusual, cumbersome and unwise, public
respondents invoke the maxim that courts should not be concerned with the wisdom and efficacy of
legislation. But this prescinds from the bogus claim that the CTA may not exercise judicial review over a
decision not to impose a safeguard measure, a prohibition that finds no statutory support. It is likewise
settled in statutory construction that an interpretation that would cause inconvenience and absurdity is not
favored. Respondents do not address the particular illogic that the Court pointed out would ensue if their
position on judicial review were adopted. According to the respondents, while a ruling by the DTI Secretary
imposing a safeguard measure may be elevated on review to the CTA and assailed on the ground of errors in
fact and in law, a ruling denying the imposition of safeguard measures may be assailed only on the ground
that the DTI Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion. As stressed in the  Decision, “[c]ertiorari is a
remedy narrow in its scope and inflexible in its character. It is not a general utility tool in the legal workshop.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Department of Trade and Industry; Tariff Commission; Considering that the
Tariff Commission is an instrumentality of the government, its actions (as opposed to those undertaken by the
DTI Secretary under the SMA) are not beyond the pale of certiorari jurisdiction.—It is incorrect to say that
the Decision bars any effective remedy should the Tariff Commission act or conclude erroneously in making
its determination whether the factual conditions exist which necessitate the imposition of the general
safeguard measure. If the Tariff Commission makes a negative final determination, the DTI Secretary, bound
as he is by this negative determination, has to render a decision denying the application for safeguard
measures citing the Tariff Commission’s findings as basis. Necessarily then, such negative determination of
the Tariff Commission being an integral part of the DTI Secretary’s ruling would be
535

VOL. 465, AUGUST 3, 2005

Southern Cross Cement Corporation vs. Cement Manufacturers Association of the Philippine

open for review before the CTA, which again is especially qualified by reason of its expertise to
examine the findings of the Tariff Commission. Moreover, considering that the Tariff Commission is an
instrumentality of the government, its actions (as opposed to those undertaken by the DTI Secretary under
the SMA) are not beyond the pale of certiorari jurisdiction. Unfortunately for Philcemcor, it hinged its cause
on the claim that the DTI Secretary’s actions may be annulled on certiorari, notwithstanding the explicit grant
of judicial review over that cabinet member’s actions under the SMA to the CTA.
Same; Same; Same; Due Process; The due process protection does not shield those who remain purposely
blind to the express rules that ensure the sporting play of procedural law.—Philcemcor argues that assuming
this Court’s interpretation of Section 29 is correct, such ruling should not be given retroactive effect,
otherwise, a gross violation of the right to due process would be had. This erroneously presumes that it was
this Court, and not Congress, which vested jurisdiction on the CTA over rulings of non-imposition rendered by
the DTI Secretary. We have repeatedly stressed that Section 29 expressly confers CTA jurisdiction over
rulings in connection with the imposition of the safeguard measure, and the reassertion of this point in
the Decision was a matter of emphasis, not of contrivance. The due process protection does not shield those
who remain purposely blind to the express rules that ensure the sporting play of procedural law.
 Same; Same; Presidency;  Delegation of Powers; Tariff Powers;Concerning as they do the foreign
importation of products into the Philippines, these safeguard measures fall within the ambit of Section 28(2),
Article VI of the Constitution.—The safeguard measures imposable under the SMA generally involve duties on
imported products, tariff rate quotas, or quantitative restrictions on the importation of a product into the
country. Concerning as they do the foreign importation of products into the Philippines, these safeguard
measures fall within the ambit of Section 28(2), Article VI of the Constitution, which states:  The Congress may,
by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it
may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts
within the framework of the national development program of the Government.
536
536 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Southern Cross Cement Corporation vs. Cement Manufacturers Association of the Philippine

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Basic Postulates on the Grant of Tariff Powers to the President.—The

Court acknowledges the basic postulates ingrained in the provision, and, hence, governing in this case. They
are: (1) It is Congress which authorizes the President to impose tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage
and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts. Thus, the authority cannot come from the Finance
Department, the National Economic Development Authority, or the World Trade Organization, no matter how
insistent or persistent these bodies may be. (2) The authorization granted to the President must be embodied
in a law. Hence, the justification cannot be supplied simply by inherent executive powers. It cannot arise from
administrative or executive orders promulgated by the executive branch or from the wisdom or whim of the
President. (3) The authorization to the President can be exercised only within the specified limits set in the law
and is further subject to limitations and restrictions which Congress may impose. Consequently, if Congress
specifies that the tariff rates should not exceed a given amount, the President cannot impose a tariff rate that
exceeds such amount. If Congress stipulates that no duties may be imposed on the importation of corn, the
President cannot impose duties on corn, no matter how actively the local corn producers lobby the President.
Even the most picayune of limits or restrictions imposed by Congress must be observed by the President.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Without Section 28(2), Article VI of the Constitution, the executive
branch has no authority to impose tariffs and other similar tax levies involving the importation of foreign goods.
—There is one fundamental principle that animates these constitutional postulates. These impositions under
Section 28(2), Article VI fall within the realm of the power of taxation, a power which is within the sole province
of the legislature under the Constitution. Without Section 28(2), Article VI, the executive branch has no authority
to impose tariffs and other similar tax levies involving the importation of foreign goods. Assuming that Section
28(2) Article VI did not exist, the enactment of the SMA by Congress would be voided on the ground that it
would constitute an undue delegation of the legislative power to tax. The constitutional provision shields
such delegation from constitutional infirmity, and should be recognized as an exceptional grant of legislative
power to the President, rather than the affirmation of an inherent executive power.
537
VOL. 465, AUGUST 3, 2005

Southern Cross Cement Corporation vs. Cement Manufacturers Association of the Philippine

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Power of Control; The authority delegated to the President under

Section 28(2), Article VI may be exercised, in accordance with legislative sanction, by the alter egos of the
President, such as department secretaries—for purposes of the President’s exercise of power to impose tariffs
under Article VI, Section 28(2), it is generally the Secretary of Finance who acts as his alter ego .—The Court
recognizes that the authority delegated to the President under Section 28(2), Article VI may be exercised, in
accordance with legislative sanction, by the alter egos of the President, such as department secretaries.
Indeed, for purposes of the President’s exercise of power to impose tariffs under Article VI, Section 28(2), it is
generally the Secretary of Finance who acts as alter ego of the President. The SMA provides an exceptional
instance wherein it is the DTI or Agriculture Secretary who is tasked by Congress, in their capacities as alter
egos of the President, to impose such measures. Certainly, the DTI Secretary has no inherent power, even
as alter ego of the President, to levy tariffs and imports.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Tariff Commission; Both the Tariff Commission and the DTI
Secretary may be regarded as agents of Congress within their limited respective spheres, as ordained in the SMA,
in the implementation of the said law which significantly draws its strength from the plenary legislative power
of taxation—indeed, even the President may be considered as an agent of Congress for the purpose of imposing
safeguard measures; When Congress tasks the President or his/her alter egos to impose safeguard measures
under the delineated conditions, the President or the alter egos may be properly deemed as agents of Congress to
perform an act that inherently belongs as a matter of right to the legislature.—Concurrently, the tasking of the
Tariff Commission under the SMA should be likewise construed within the same context as part and parcel of
the legislative delegation of its inherent power to impose tariffs and imposts to the executive branch, subject
to limitations and restrictions. In that regard, both the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary may be
regarded as agents of Congress within their limited respective spheres, as ordained in the SMA, in the
implementation of the said law which significantly draws its strength from the plenary legislative power of
taxation. Indeed, even the President may be considered as an agent of Congress for the purpose of imposing
safeguard measures. It is Congress, not the President, which possesses inherent powers to impose tariffs and
imposts. With-
538

538 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

 Southern Cross Cement Corporation vs. Cement Manufacturers Association of the Philippine

out legislative authorization through statute, the President has no power, authority or right to impose
such safeguard measures because taxation is inherently legislative, not executive. When Congress tasks the
President or his/her  alter egos to impose safeguard measures under the delineated conditions, the President or
the alter egos  may be properly deemed as agents of Congress to perform an act that inherently belongs as a
matter of right to the legislature. It is basic agency law that the agent may not act beyond the specifically
delegated powers or disregard the restrictions imposed by the principal. In short, Congress may establish the
procedural framework under which such safeguard measures may be imposed, and assign the various offices
in the government bureaucracy respective tasks pursuant to the imposition of such measures, the task
assignment including the factual determination of whether the necessary conditions exists to warrant such
impositions. Under the SMA, Congress assigned the DTI Secretary and the Tariff Commission their respective
functions in the legislature’s scheme of things.
Same; Same; Tariff Commission;  The positive final determination by the Tariff Commission operates as
an indispensable requisite to the imposition of the safeguard measure.—There is no question that Section 5 of
the SMA operates as a limitation validly imposed by Congress on the presidential authority under the SMA to
impose tariffs and imposts. That the positive final determination operates as an indispensable requisite to the
imposition of the safeguard measure, and that it is the Tariff Commission which makes such determination,
are legal propositions plainly expressed in Section 5 for the easy comprehension for everyone but
respondents.
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Statutes are not designed for the easy comprehension of the
five-year old child—certainly, general propositions laid down in statutes need not be expressly qualified by
clauses denoting exclusivity in order that they gain efficacy.—Statutes are not designed for the easy
comprehension of the five-year old child. Certainly, general propositions laid down in statutes need not be
expressly qualified by clauses denoting exclusivity in order that they gain efficacy. Indeed, applying this
argument, the President would, under the Constitution, be authorized to declare martial law despite the
absence of the invasion, rebellion or public safety requirement just because the first paragraph of Section 18,
Article VII fails to state the magic word “only.”
539
VOL. 465, AUGUST 3, 2005

Southern Cross Cement Corporation vs. Cement Manufacturers Association of the Philippine

Same; Same; Same; Same; Nothing in the SMA obliges the DTI Secretary to adopt the recommendations
made by the Tariff Commission—even if the Tariff Commission makes a positive final determination, the DTI
Secretary may opt not to impose a general safeguard measure, or choose a different type of safeguard measure
other than that recommended by the Tariff Commission.—Nothing in the SMA obliges the DTI Secretary to
adopt the recommendations made by the Tariff Commission. In fact, the SMA requires that the DTI Secretary
establish that the application of such safeguard measures is in the public interest, notwithstanding the Tariff
Commission’s recommendation on the appropriate safeguard measure upon its positive final determination.
Thus, even if the Tariff Commission makes a positive final determination, the DTI Secretary may opt not to
impose a general safeguard measure, or choose a different type of safeguard measure other than that
recommended by the Tariff Commission.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It will not be difficult, especially as to heavily-debated legislation, for two sides
with contrapuntal interpretations of a statute to highlight their respective citations from the legislative debate
in support of their particular views; It is evident from the text of Section 5 that there must be a positive final
determination by the Tariff Commission that a product is being imported into the country in increased
quantities (whether absolute or relative to domestic production), as to be a substantial cause of serious injury or
threat to the domestic industry.—It will not be difficult, especially as to heavily-debated legislation, for two
sides with contrapuntal interpretations of a statute to highlight their respective citations from the legislative
debate in support of their particular views. A futile exercise of second-guessing is happily avoided if the
meaning of the statute is clear on its face. It is evident from the text of Section 5 that there must be a positive
final determination by the Tariff Commission that a product is being imported into the country in increased
quantities (whether absolute or relative to domestic production), as to be a substantial cause of serious injury or
threat to the domestic industry. Any disputation to the contrary is, at best, the product of wishful thinking.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Public Officers; The Court cannot give controlling effect to the statements of
any public officer in serious denial of his duties if the law otherwise imposes the duty on the public office or
officer.—The Separate Opinion considers as highly per-
540

540 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Southern Cross Cement Corporation vs. Cement Manufacturers Association of the Philippine

suasive of former Tariff Commission Chairman Abon, who stated that the Commission’s findings are
merely recommendatory. Again, the considered opinion of Chairman Abon is of no operative effect if the
statute plainly states otherwise, and Section 5 bluntly does require a positive final determination by the Tariff
Commission before the DTI Secretary may impose a general safeguard measure. Certainly, the Court cannot
give controlling effect to the statements of any public officer in serious denial of his duties if the law
otherwise imposes the duty on the public office or officer.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Secretary of Justice; The DOJ Secretary is the alter ego of the President
with a stated mandate as the head of the principal law agency of the government. —If we are to render
persuasive effect on the considered opinion of the members of the Executive Branch, it bears noting that the
Secretary of the Department of Justice rendered an Opinion wherein he concluded that the DTI Secretary
could not impose a general safeguard measure if the Tariff Commission made a negative final determination.
Unlike Chairman Abon’s impromptu remarks made during a hearing, the DOJ Opinion was rendered only after
a thorough study of the question after referral to it by the DTI. The DOJ Secretary is the  alter ego of the
President with a stated mandate as the head of the principal law agency of the government. As the DOJ
Secretary has no denominated role in the SMA, he was able to render his Opinion from the vantage of
judicious distance. Should not his Opinion, studied and direct to the point as it is, carry greater weight than
the spontaneous remarks of the Tariff Commission’s Chairman which do not even expressly disavow the
binding power of the Commission’s positive final determination?
Same; Same; Administrative Law;  Delegation of Powers; The authorization made by Congress in the SMA
to the DTI and Agriculture Secretaries was made in contemplation of their capacities as alter egos of the
President.—Preliminarily, we should note that none of the parties question the designation of the DTI or
Agriculture secretaries under the SMA as the imposing authorities of the safeguard measures, even though
Section 28(2) Article VI states that it is the President to whom the power to impose tariffs and imposts may
be delegated by Congress. The validity of such designation under the SMA should not be in doubt. We
recognize that the authorization made by Congress in the SMA to the DTI and Agricul-
541

VOL. 465, AUGUST 3, 2005

Southern Cross Cement Corporation vs. Cement Manufacturers Association of the Philippine

ture Secretaries was made in contemplation of their capacities as alter egosof the President.
Same; Same; Same; Tariff Commission; Congress in enacting the SMA and prescribing the roles to be
played therein by the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary did not envision that the President, or his/her
alter ego, could exercise supervisory powers over the Tariff Commission—the Tariff Commission does not fall
under the administrative supervision of the DTI.—Notwithstanding, Congress in enacting the SMA and
prescribing the roles to be played therein by the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary did not envision
that the President, or his/her alter ego, could exercise supervisory powers over the Tariff Commission. If truly
Congress intended to allow the traditional “alter ego” principle to come to fore in the peculiar setup
established by the SMA, it would have assigned the role now played by the DTI Secretary under the law
instead to the NEDA. The Tariff Commission is an attached agency of the National Economic Development
Authority, which in turn is the independent planning agency of the government. The Tariff Commission does
not fall under the administrative supervision of the DTI. On the other hand, the administrative relationship
between the NEDA and the Tariff Commission is established not only by the Administrative Code, but
similarly affirmed by the Tariff and Customs Code.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Only very recently have our statutes directed any significant interplay
between the Tariff Commission and the DTI, with the enactment in 1999 of Republic Act No. 8751 on the
imposition of countervailing duties and Republic Act No. 8752 on the imposition of anti-dumping duties, and of
course the promulgation a year later of the SMA—the long-standing tradition has been for the Tariff
Commission and the DTI to proceed independently in the exercise of their respective functions.—Under the Tariff
and Customs Code, no similar role or influence is allocated to the DTI in the matter of imposing tariff duties.
In fact, the long-standing tradition has been for the Tariff Commission and the DTI to proceed independently
in the exercise of their respective functions. Only very recently have our statutes directed any significant
interplay between the Tariff Commission and the DTI, with the enactment in 1999 of Republic Act No. 8751
on the imposition of countervailing duties and Republic Act No. 8752 on the imposition of anti-dumping
duties, and of course the promulgation a year later of the SMA. In all these three laws, the Tariff Commission
is tasked, upon referral of the matter by
542

542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Southern Cross Cement Corporation vs. Cement Manufacturers Association of the Philippine

the DTI, to determine whether the factual conditions exist to warrant the imposition by the DTI of a
countervailing duty, an anti-dumping duty, or a general safeguard measure, respectively. In all three laws, the
determination by the Tariff Commission that these required factual conditions exist is necessary before the
DTI Secretary may impose the corresponding duty or safeguard measure. And in all three laws, there is no
express provision authorizing the DTI Secretary to reverse the factual determination of the Tariff
Commission.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The SMA indubitably establishes that the Tariff Commission is no mere flunky
of the DTI Secretary when it mandates that the positive final recommendation of the former be indispensable to
the latter’s imposition of a general safeguard measure—what the law indicates instead is a relationship of
interdependence between two bodies independent of each other under the Administrative Code and the SMA
alike; The argument that the usual rules on administrative control and supervision apply between the Tariff
Commission and the DTI as regards safeguard measures is severely undercut by the plain fact that there is no
long-standing tradition of administrative interplay between these two entities.—In fact, the SMA indubitably
establishes that the Tariff Commission is no mere flunky of the DTI Secretary when it mandates that the
positive final recommendation of the former be indispensable to the latter’s imposition of a general safeguard
measure. What the law indicates instead is a relationship of interdependence between two bodies
independent of each other under the Administrative Code and the SMA alike. Indeed, even the ability of the
DTI Secretary to disregard the Tariff Commission’s recommendations as to the particular safeguard measures
to be imposed evinces the independence from each other of these two bodies. This is properly so for two
reasons—the DTI and the Tariff Commission are independent of each other under the Administrative Code;
and impropriety is avoided in cases wherein the DTI itself is the one seeking the imposition of the general
safeguard measures, pursuant to Section 6 of the SMA. Thus, in ascertaining the appropriate legal milieu
governing the relationship between the DTI and the Tariff Commission, it is imperative to apply foremost, if
not exclusively, the provisions of the SMA. The argument that the usual rules on administrative control and
supervision apply between the Tariff Commission and the DTI as regards safeguard measures is severely
undercut by the plain fact that there
543

VOL. 465, AUGUST 3, 2005

Southern Cross Cement Corporation vs. Cement Manufacturers Association of the Philippine

is no long-standing tradition of administrative interplay between these two entities.

Same; Same; Same; Same; While within the administrative apparatus, the Tariff Commission appears to
be a lower rank relative to the DTI, this does not necessarily mean that the DTI has the intrinsic right, absent
statutory authority, to reverse the findings of the Tariff Commission.—Within the administrative apparatus, the
Tariff Commission appears to be a lower rank relative to the DTI. But does this necessarily mean that the DTI
has the intrinsic right, absent statutory authority, to reverse the findings of the Tariff Commission? To insist
that it does, one would have to concede for instance that, applying the same doctrinal guide, the Secretary of
the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) has the right to reverse the rulings of the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB) or the issuances of the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA). As with the Tariff Commission-DTI,
there is no statutory authority granting the DOST Secretary the right to overrule the CAB or the PCA, such
right presumably arising only from the position of subordinacy of these bodies to the DOST. To insist on such
a right would be to invite department secretaries to interfere in the exercise of functions by administrative
agencies, even in areas wherein such secretaries are bereft of specialized competencies.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Considering that the power to impose tariffs in the first place is not inherent
in the President but arises only from congressional grant, we should affirm the congressional prerogative to
impose limitations and restrictions on such powers which do not normally belong to the executive in the first
place; Congress in enacting the SMA and prescribing the roles to be played therein by the Tariff Commission and
the DTI Secretary did not envision that the President, or his/her alter ego could exercise supervisory powers over
the Tariff Commission.—The Separate Opinion asserts that the SMA created a functional relationship between
the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary, sufficient to allow the DTI Secretary to exercise alter
ego powers to reverse the determination of the Tariff Commission. Again, considering that the power to
impose tariffs in the first place is not inherent in the President but arises only from congressional grant, we
should affirm the congressional prerogative to impose limitations and restrictions on such powers which do
not normally belong to the executive in the first
544

544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

 Southern Cross Cement Corporation vs. Cement Manufacturers Association of the Philippine

place. Nowhere in the SMA does it state that the DTI Secretary may impose general safeguard
measures without a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission, or that the DTI Secretary may
reverse or even review the factual determination made by the Tariff Commission. Congress in enacting the
SMA and prescribing the roles to be played therein by the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary did not
envision that the President, or his/her alter ego could exercise supervisory powers over the Tariff
Commission. If truly Congress intended to allow the traditional alter ego principle to come to fore in the
peculiar setup established by the SMA, it would have assigned the role now played by the DTI Secretary under
the law instead to the NEDA, the body to which the Tariff Commission is attached under the Administrative
Code.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The administrative control and supervision exercised by the head of an
executive department should only be over those subordinate offices that are attached to the department, or
which are, under statute, relegated under its supervision and control.—The Court has no issue with upholding
administrative control and supervision exercised by the head of an executive department, but only over those
subordinate offices that are attached to the department, or which are, under statute, relegated under its
supervision and control. To declare that a department secretary, even if acting as  alter ego of the President,
may exercise such control or supervision over all executive offices below cabinet rank would lead to absurd
results such as those adverted to above. As applied to this case, there is no legal justification for the DTI
Secretary to exercise control, supervision, review or amendatory powers over the Tariff Commission and its
positive final determination. In passing, we note that there is, admittedly, a feasible mode by which
administrative review of the Tariff Commission’s final determination could be had, but it is not the procedure
adopted by respondents and now suggested for affirmation. This mode shall be discussed in a forthcoming
section.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The definition of the structure of the executive branch of government, and the
corresponding degrees of administrative control and supervision, is not the exclusive preserve of the executive—
it may be effectively be limited by the Constitution, by law, or by judicial decisions.—The Separate
Opinion asserts that the President, or his/her alter ego cannot be made a mere rubber
545

VOL. 465, AUGUST 3, 2005

Southern Cross Cement Corporation vs. Cement Manufacturers Association of the Philippine

stamp of the Tariff Commission since Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution denominates the Chief
Executive exercises control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices. But let us be clear that such
“executive control” is not absolute. The definition of the structure of the executive branch of government, and
the corresponding degrees of administrative control and supervision, is not the exclusive preserve of the
executive. It may be effectively be limited by the Constitution, by law, or by judicial decisions.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The bare fact is that the administrative superstructure, for all its
unwieldiness, is mere putty in the hands of Congress—the legislature has the concurrent power to reclassify or
redefine the executive bureaucracy, including the relationship between various administrative agencies, bureaus
and departments, and ultimately, even the power to abolish executive departments and their components,
hamstrung only by constitutional limi-tations.—The bare fact is that the administrative superstructure, for all
its unwieldiness, is mere putty in the hands of Congress. The functions and mandates of the particular
executive departments and bureaus are not created by the President, but by the legislative branch through
the Administrative Code. The President is the administrative head of the executive department, as such
obliged to see that every government office is managed and maintained properly by the persons in charge of
it in accordance with pertinent laws and regulations, and empowered to promulgate rules and issuances that
would ensure a more efficient management of the executive branch, for so long as such issuances are not
contrary to law. Yet the legislature has the concurrent power to reclassify or redefine the executive
bureaucracy, including the relationship between various administrative agencies, bureaus and departments,
and ultimately, even the power to abolish executive departments and their components, hamstrung only by
constitutional limitations. The DTI itself can be abolished with ease by Congress through deleting Title X,
Book IV of the Administrative Code. The Tariff Commission can similarly be abolished through legislative
enactment.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The same Congress, which has the putative authority to abolish the Tariff
Commission or the DTI, is similarly empowered to alter or expand its functions through modalities which do not
align with established norms in the bureaucratic structure.—Congress can enact additional tasks or
responsibilities on
546

546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Southern Cross Cement Corporation vs. Cement Manufacturers Association of the Philippine

either the Tariff Commission or the DTI Secretary, such as their respective roles on the imposition of
general safeguard measures under the SMA. In doing so, the same Congress, which has the putative authority to
abolish the Tariff Commission or the DTI, is similarly empowered to alter or expand its functions through
modalities which do not align with established norms in the bureaucratic structure. The Court is bound to
recognize the legislative prerogative to prescribe such modalities, no matter how atypical they may be, in
affirmation of the legislative power to restructure the executive branch of government.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Assuming there is a conflict between the specific
limitation in Section 28 (2), Article VI of the Constitution and the general executive power of control and
supervision, the former prevails in the specific instance of safeguard measures such as tariffs and imposts, and
would thus serve to qualify the general grant to the President of the power to exercise control and supervision
over his/her subalterns.—Assuming there is a conflict between the specific limitation in Section 28 (2), Article
VI of the Constitution and the general executive power of control and supervision, the former prevails in the
specific instance of safeguard measures such as tariffs and imposts, and would thus serve to qualify the
general grant to the President of the power to exercise control and supervision over his/her subalterns. Thus,
if the Congress enacted the law so that the DTI Secretary is “bound” by the Tariff Commission in the sense the
former cannot impose general safeguard measures absent a final positive determination from the latter the
Court is obliged to respect such legislative prerogative, no matter how such arrangement deviates from
traditional norms as may have been enshrined in jurisprudence. The only ground under which such
legislative determination as expressed in statute may be successfully challenged is if such legislation
contravenes the Constitution. No such argument is posed by the respondents, who do not challenge the
validity or constitutionality of the SMA.
Same; Same; Same; Same; International Law; General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT)
Agreement on Safeguards; Our treaty obligations dissuade the State for now from implementing default
protectionist trade measures such as tariffs, and allow the same only under specified conditions; To insulate the
factual determination from political pressure, and to assure that it be conducted
547

VOL. 465, AUGUST 3, 2005

Southern Cross Cement Corporation vs. Cement Manufacturers Association of the Philippine

by an entity especially qualified by reason of its general functions to undertake such investigation,
Congress deemed it necessary to delegate to the Tariff Commission the function of ascertaining whether or not
the those factual conditions exist to warrant the atypical imposition of safeguard measures.—We see no reason
to deviate from these observations, and indeed can add similarly oriented comments. Corollary to the
legislative power to decree policies through legislation is the ability of the legislature to provide for means in
the statute itself to ensure that the said policy is strictly implemented by the body or office tasked so tasked
with the duty. As earlier stated, our treaty obligations dissuade the State for now from implementing default
protectionist trade measures such as tariffs, and allow the same only under specified conditions. The
conditions enumerated under the GATT Agreement on Safeguards for the application of safeguard measures
by a member country are the same as the requisites laid down in Section 5 of the SMA. To insulate the factual
determination from political pressure, and to assure that it be conducted by an entity especially qualified by
reason of its general functions to undertake such investigation, Congress deemed it necessary to delegate to
the Tariff Commission the function of ascertaining whether or not those factual conditions exist to warrant
the atypical imposition of safeguard measures. After all, the Tariff Commission retains a degree of relative
independence by virtue of its attachment to the National Economic Development Authority, “an independent
planning agency of the government,” and also owing to its vaunted expertise and specialization.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Since there is no convincing demonstration that the SMA contravenes the
Constitution, the Court is wont to respect the administrative regimen propounded by the law, even if it allots the
Tariff Commission a higher degree of puissance than normally expected.—Even assuming that this prescribed
setup made little sense, or seemed “uncommonly silly,” the Court is bound by propriety not to dispute the
wisdom of the legislature as long as its acts do not violate the Constitution. Since there is no convincing
demonstration that the SMA contravenes the Constitution, the Court is wont to respect the administrative
regimen propounded by the law, even if it allots the Tariff Commission a higher degree of puissance than
normally expected. It is for this reason that the traditional conceptions of administrative review or quasi-
judicial power cannot control in this case. Indeed, to apply the latter concept
548

548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Southern Cross Cement Corporation vs. Cement Manufacturers Association of the Philippine

would cause the Court to fall into a linguistic trap owing to the multi-faceted denotations the term
“quasi-judicial” has come to acquire.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Tariff Commission is not empowered to hear actual cases or controversies
lodged directly before it by private parties.—Under the SMA, the Tariff Commission undertakes formal
hearings, receives and evaluates testimony and evidence by interested parties, and renders a decision is
rendered on the basis of the evidence presented, in the form of the final determination. The final
determination requires a conclusion whether the importation of the product under consideration is causing
serious injury or threat to a domestic industry producing like products or directly competitive products,
while evaluating all relevant factors having a bearing on the situation of the domestic industry. This process
aligns conformably with definition provided by Black’s Law Dictionary of “quasi-judicial” as the “action,
discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain
the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their
official action, and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.” However, the Tariff Commission is not
empowered to hear actual cases or controversies lodged directly before it by private parties. It does not have
the power to issue writs of injunction or enforcement of its determination. These considerations militate
against a finding of quasi-judicial powers attributable to the Tariff Commission, considering the
pronouncement that “quasi-judicial adjudication would mean a determination of rights privileges and duties
resulting in a decision or order which applies to a specific situation.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; A declaration that the Tariff Commission possesses quasi-judicial powers, even
if ascertained for the limited purpose of exercising its functions under the SMA, may have the unfortunate effect
of expanding the Commission’s powers beyond that contemplated by law.—A declaration that the Tariff
Commission possesses quasi-judicial powers, even if ascertained for the limited purpose of exercising its
functions under the SMA, may have the unfortunate effect of expanding the Commission’s powers beyond that
contemplated by law. After all, the Tariff Commission is by convention, a fact-finding body, and its role under
the SMA, burdened as it is with factual determination, is but a mere continuance
549

VOL. 465, AUGUST 3, 2005

Southern Cross Cement Corporation vs. Cement Manufacturers Association of the Philippine

of this tradition. However, Congress through the SMA offers a significant deviation from this traditional
role by tying the decision by the DTI Secretary to impose a safeguard measure to the required positive factual
determination by the Tariff Commission. Congress is not bound by past traditions, or even by the
jurisprudence of this Court, in enacting legislation it may deem as suited for the times. The sole benchmark
for judicial substitution of congressional wisdom is constitutional transgression, a standard which the
respondents do not even attempt to match.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It would be highly irregular to substitute what the law clearly provides for a
dubious setup of no statutory basis that would be readily susceptible to rank chicanery.—Nothing in the SMA
authorizes the DTI Secretary, after making the preliminary determination, to personally oversee the
investigation, hear out the interested parties, or receive evidence. In fact, the SMA does not even require the
Tariff Commission, which is tasked with the custody of the submitted evidence, to turn over to the DTI
Secretary such evidence it had evaluated in order to make its factual determination. Clearly, as Congress
tasked it to be, it is the Tariff Commission and not the DTI Secretary which acquires the necessary intimate
acquaintance with the factual conditions and evidence necessary for the imposition of the general safeguard
measure. Why then favor an interpretation of the SMA that leaves the findings of the Tariff Commission bereft
of operative effect and makes them subservient to the wishes of the DTI Secretary, a personage with lesser
working familiarity with the relevant factual milieu? In fact, the bare theory of the respondents would
effectively allow the DTI Secretary to adopt, under the subterfuge of his “discretion,” the factual
determination of a private investigative group hired by the industry concerned, and reject the investigative
findings of the Tariff Commission as mandated by the SMA. It would be highly irregular to substitute what the
law clearly provides for a dubious setup of no statutory basis that would be readily susceptible to rank
chicanery.
Same; Same; Same; Same; While the general safeguard measures may operate to the better interests of
the domestic cement industries, its deprivation of cheaper cement imports may similarly work to the detriment
of these other domestic industries and correspondingly, the national interest.—The SMA guarantees the right of
all concerned parties to be heard, an elemental requirement of due process,
550
 550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Southern Cross Cement Corporation vs. Cement Manufacturers Association of the Philippine

by the Tariff Commission in the context of its investigation. The DTI Secretary is not similarly
empowered or tasked to hear out the concerns of other interested parties, and if he/she does so, it arises
purely out of volition and not compulsion under law. Indeed, in this case, it is essential that the position of
other than that of the local cement industry should be given due consideration, cement being an
indispensable need for the operation of other industries such as housing and construction. While the general
safeguard measures may operate to the better interests of the domestic cement industries, its deprivation of
cheaper cement imports may similarly work to the detriment of these other domestic industries and
correspondingly, the national interest. Notably, the Tariff Commission in this case heard the views on the
application of representatives of other allied industries such as the housing, construction, and cement-bag
industries, and other interested parties such as consumer groups and foreign governments. It is only before
the Tariff Commission that their views had been heard, and this is because it is only the Tariff Commission
which is empowered to hear their positions. Since due process requires a judicious consideration of all
relevant factors, the Tariff Commission, which is in a better position to hear these parties than the DTI
Secretary, is similarly more capable to render a determination conformably with the due process
requirements than the DTI Secretary.
Same; Same; Same; Same; There is no evident legislative intent by the authors of the SMA to provide for a
procedure of administrative review.—The Court has been emphatic that a positive final determination from
the Tariff Commission is required in order that the DTI Secretary may impose a general safeguard measure,
and that the DTI Secretary has no power to exercise control and supervision over the Tariff Commission and
its final determination. These conclusions are the necessary consequences of the applicable provisions of the
Constitution, the SMA, and laws such as the Administrative Code. However, the law is silent though on
whether this positive final determination may otherwise be subjected to administrative review. There is no
evident legislative intent by the authors of the SMA to provide for a procedure of administrative review. If
ever there is a procedure for administrative review over the final determination of the Tariff Commission,
such procedure must be done in a manner that does not contravene or disregard legislative
551

VOL. 465, AUGUST 3, 2005

Southern Cross Cement Corporation vs. Cement Manufacturers Association of the Philippine
 prerogatives as expressed in the SMA or the Administrative Code, or fundamental constitutional
limitations.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Even if conceding that the Tariff Commission’s findings may be
administratively reviewed, the DTI Secretary has no authority to review or modify the same.—Fatally for the
present petitions, such administrative review cannot be conducted by the DTI Secretary. Even if conceding
that the Tariff Commission’s findings may be administratively reviewed, the DTI Secretary has no authority to
review or modify the same. We have been emphatic on the reasons—such as that there is no traditional or
statutory basis placing the Commission under the control and supervision of the DTI; that to allow such
would contravene due process, especially if the DTI itself were to apply for the safeguard measures motu
proprio. To hold otherwise would destroy the administrative hierarchy, contravene constitutional due
process, and disregard the limitations or restrictions provided in the SMA.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Assuming administrative review were available, it is the NEDA that may
conduct such review following the principles of administrative law, and the NEDA’s decision in turn is reviewable
by the Office of the President.—Assuming administrative review were available, it is the NEDA that may
conduct such review following the principles of administrative law, and the NEDA’s decision in turn is
reviewable by the Office of the President. The decision of the Office of the President then effectively
substitutes as the determination of the Tariff Commission, which now forms the basis of the DTI Secretary’s
decision, which now would be ripe for judicial review by the CTA under Section 29 of the SMA. This is the only
way that administrative review of the Tariff Commission’s determination may be sustained without violating
the SMA and its constitutional restrictions and limitations, as well as administrative law. In bare theory, the
NEDA may review, alter or modify the Tariff Commission’s final determination, the Commission being an
attached agency of the NEDA. Admittedly, there is nothing in the SMA or any other statute that would prevent
the NEDA to exercise such administrative review, and successively, for the President to exercise in turn
review over the NEDA’s decision.
Same; National Economy and Patrimony; Preferential Use of Filipino Labor, Materials and Goods; By no
means does Section 12, Article XII of the Constitution dictate that the Court favor the domes-
552

552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Southern Cross Cement Corporation vs. Cement Manufacturers Association of the Philippine

tic industry in all competing claims that it may bring before this Court—if it were so, judicial proceedings
in this country would be rendered a mockery, resolved as they would be, on the basis of the personalities of the
litigants and not their legal positions.—In response to our citation of Section 28(2), Article VI, respondents
elevate two arguments grounded in constitutional law. One is based on another constitutional provision,
Section 12, Article XII, which mandates that “[t]he State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor,
domestic materials and locally produced goods and adopt measures that help make them competitive.” By no
means does this provision dictate that the Court favor the domestic industry in all competing claims that it
may bring before this Court. If it were so, judicial proceedings in this country would be rendered a mockery,
resolved as they would be, on the basis of the personalities of the litigants and not their legal positions.
Same; Same; Same; The duty imposed on by Section 12, Article XII falls primarily with Congress, which in
that regard enacted the SMA, a law designed to protect domestic industries from the possible ill-effects of our
accession to the global trade order.—The duty imposed on by Section 12, Article XII falls primarily with
Congress, which in that regard enacted the SMA, a law designed to protect domestic industries from the
possible ill-effects of our accession to the global trade order. Inconveniently perhaps for respondents, the
SMA also happens to provide for a procedure under which such protective measures may be enacted. The
Court cannot just impose what it deems as the spirit of the law without giving due regard to its letter.
Same; Same; Same; More accurately, the purpose of the SMA is to provide a process for the protection or
safeguarding of domestic industries that have duly established that there is substantial injury or threat thereof
directly caused by the increased imports—domestic industries are not entitled to safeguard measures as a
matter of right or influence.—In like-minded manner, the Separate Opinion loosely states that the purpose of
the SMA is to protect or safeguard local industries from increased importation of foreign products. This
inaccurately leaves the impression that the SMA ipso facto unravels a protective cloak that shelters all local
industries and producers, no matter the conditions. Indeed, our country has knowingly chosen to accede to
the world trade regime, as expressed in the GATT and
553

VOL. 465, AUGUST 3, 2005

Southern Cross Cement Corporation vs. Cement Manufacturers Association of the Philippine

WTO Agreements, despite the understanding that local industries might suffer ill-effects, especially
with the easier entry of competing foreign products. At the same time, these international agreements were
designed to constrict protectionist trade policies by its member-countries. Hence, the median, as expressed
by the SMA, does allow for the application of protectionist measures such as tariffs, but only after an
elaborate process of investigation that ensures factual basis and indispensable need for such measures. More
accurately, the purpose of the SMA is to provide a process for the protection or safeguarding of domestic
industries that have duly established that there is substantial injury or threat thereof directly caused by the
increased imports. In short, domestic industries are not entitled to safeguard measures as a matter of right or
influence.
Same; Taxation;  Police Power; Delegation of Powers; Tariff Powers; The motivation behind many
taxation measures is the implementation of police power goals.—Respondents also make the astounding
argument that the imposition of general safeguard measures should not be seen as a taxation measure, but
instead as an exercise of police power. The vain hope of respondents in divorcing the safeguard measures
from the concept of taxation is to exclude from consideration Section 28(2), Article VI of the Constitution.
This argument can be debunked at length, but it deserves little attention. The motivation behind many
taxation measures is the implementation of police power goals. Progressive income taxes alleviate the margin
between rich and poor; the so-called “sin taxes” on alcohol and tobacco manufacturers help dissuade the
consumers from excessive intake of these potentially harmful products. Taxation is distinguishable from
police power as to the means employed to implement these public good goals. Those doctrines that are
unique to taxation arose from peculiar considerations such as those especially punitive effects of taxation,
and the belief that taxes are the lifeblood of the state. These considerations necessitated the evolution of
taxation as a distinct legal concept from police power. Yet at the same time, it has been recognized that
taxation may be made the implement of the state’s police power.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Police power, however “illimitable” in theory, is still exercised within
the confines of implementing legislation.—Even assuming that the SMA should be construed exclusively as a
police power measure, the Court recognizes that
554

554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Southern Cross Cement Corporation vs. Cement Manufacturers Association of the Philippine

police power is lodged primarily in the national legislature, though it may also be exercised by the
executive branch by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power. Considering these premises, it is clear
that police power, however “illimitable” in theory, is still exercised within the confines of implementing
legislation. To declare otherwise is to sanction rule by whim instead of rule of law. The Congress, in enacting
the SMA, has delegated the power to impose general safeguard measures to the executive branch, but at the
same time subjected such imposition to limitations, such as the requirement of a positive final determination
by the Tariff Commission under Section 5. For the executive branch to ignore these boundaries imposed by
Congress is to set up an ignoble clash between the two co-equal branches of government. Considering that the
exercise of police power emanates from legislative authority, there is little question that the prerogative of
the legislative branch shall prevail in such a clash.
Judicial Review; Nationalism; Parties well have the right to drape themselves in the colors of the flag yet
these postures hardly advance legal claims, or nationalism for that matter—the fineries of the costume pageant
are no better measure of patriotism than simple obedience to the laws of the Fatherland.—Respondents well
have the right to drape themselves in the colors of the flag. Yet these postures hardly advance legal claims, or
nationalism for that matter. The fineries of the costume pageant are no better measure of patriotism than
simple obedience to the laws of the Fatherland. And even assuming that respondents are motivated by
genuine patriotic impulses, it must be remembered that under the setup provided by the SMA, it is the facts,
and not impulse, that determine whether the protective safeguard measures should be imposed. As once
orated, facts are stubborn things; and whatever may be our wishes, our inclinations, or the dictates of our
passions, they cannot alter the state of facts and evidence.
Same; Same; It is our goal as judges to enforce the law, and not what we might deem as correct economic
policy.—It is our goal as judges to enforce the law, and not what we might deem as correct economic policy.
Towards this end, we should not construe the SMA to unduly favor or disfavor domestic industries, simply
because the law itself provides for a mechanism by virtue of which the claims of these industries are
thoroughly evaluated before they are favored or
555

VOL. 465, AUGUST 3, 2005

Southern Cross Cement Corporation vs. Cement Manufacturers Association of the Philippine

disfavored. What we must do is to simply uphold what the law says. Section 5 says that the DTI
Secretary shall impose the general safeguard measures upon the positive final determination of the Tariff
Commission. Nothing in the whereas clauses or the invisible ink provisions of the SMA can magically delete
the words “positive final determination” and “Tariff Commission” from Section 5.
Courts; Jurisdictions; Jurisdiction is necessarily the power to decide a case, and a court which does not
have the power to adjudicate a case is one that is bereft of jurisdiction.—The Court of Appeals’ Decision was
annulled precisely because the appellate court did not have the power to rule on the petition in the first place.
Jurisdiction is necessarily the power to decide a case, and a court which does not have the power to
adjudicate a case is one that is bereft of jurisdiction. We find no reason to disturb our earlier finding that the
Court of Appeals’ Decision is null and void.
PANGANIBAN, J., Separate Opinion:

Safeguard Measures Act (SMA) (R.A. No. 8800); Judicial Review; I respectfully submit that, absent any
patent violation of laws or grave abuse of discretion, the top trade official should be given the widest discretion
to be able to promote the best interest of the country in the field of trade, industry and investments.—I
respectfully submit that, absent any patentviolation of laws or grave abuse of discretion, the top trade official
should be given the widest discretion to be able to promote the best interest of the country in the field of
trade, industry and investments. I believe that this Court should not interfere unnecessarily in commercial
and economic policies, but allow our executive officials to meet head-on the vicissitudes of international trade
competition spawned by globalization, deregulation and liberalization. As will be demonstrated later on, I
firmly submit that law, justice, equity, reason, logic, national interest and common sense impel the
maintenance of this Court’s policy of laissez-faire. In short, the judiciary should be deferential to the powers
residing in, and respectful of the actions taken by, the top government official who has primary responsibility for
the commercial development of the nation.
 Same; I respectfully submit that the DTI secretary has the power to impose safeguard measures even if
the Tariff Commission (TC) does not recommend such imposition.—While I agree that the
556

556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Southern Cross Cement Corporation vs. Cement Manufacturers Association of the Philippine

CTA has jurisdiction to review the DTI Secretary’s decision either imposing or not imposing a
safeguard measure, I respectfully disagree, however, that the said cabinet official is bound by the
recommendations of the Tariff Commission and may thus impose a safeguard measure only when it so
recommends. I respectfully submit that the DTI Secretary has the power to impose safeguard measures even if
the TC does not recommend such imposition. Same; Judicial Review; While RA 8800 does not explicitly state
which rulings of the DTI secretary are reviewable by way of a petition for review with the CTA, the Rules of Court
and settled jurisprudence provide that only judgments or final orders disposing of the merits of a case may be
the subject of appeals or petitions for review.—It is a legal truism, however, that interlocutory orders are not
subject to an appeal or a petition for review until the main case is finally resolved on the merits. RA 8800 does
not explicitly state which rulings of the DTI secretary are reviewable by way of a petition for review with the
CTA. However, the Rules of Court and settled jurisprudence provide that only judgments or final orders
disposing of the merits of a case may be the subject of appeals or petitions for review. Since RA 8800 does not
amend the extant Rules (assuming arguendo that Congress had the power to amend the Rules of Court), they
must be applied to the intended appeals.
Same; Same; I agree with the Resolution that the available remedy at this time is to file a new application
for the imposition of a definitive safeguard measure, if warranted under the present circumstances.—In any
event, as the determination of the case is dependent on current pertinent econometric data and their effects
on the domestic industry, the peculiar circumstances make a ruling on the merits inadvisable at this time. The
original application for a safeguard measure was filed way back in 2001, and it has been almost four years
since the imposition of the provisional safeguard measure. The cement import statistics on record may no
longer be relevant at present. I agree with the Resolution that the available remedy at this time is to file a new
application for the imposition of a definitive safeguard measure, if warranted under the present
circumstances.
Same; Taxation;  While primarily intended to protect domestic industries, safeguard measures are
incidentally revenue-generating and generally in the nature of, though not always equivalent to, tariff
impositions—they may consist of a tariff increase, duty, tariff-rate
557

VOL. 465, AUGUST 3, 2005

 Southern Cross Cement Corporation vs. Cement Manufacturers Association of the Philippine

quota, quantitative restriction, adjustment measure or a combination of these.—While primarily

intended to protect domestic industries, safeguard measures are incidentally revenue-generating and
generally in the nature of, though not always equivalent to, tariff impositions. They may consist of a tariff
increase, duty, tariff-rate quota, quantitative restriction, adjustment measure or a combination of these. In the
determination of their imposition, the following factors are to be taken into consideration: rate and amount of
increase in the importation of the product concerned; share of the domestic market taken by the increased
imports; and changes in the level of sales, production, productivity, capacity utilization, profits and losses, and
employment. Most of these factors involve data analysis which, by virtue of the highly specialized technical
expertise of the CTA, must be more familiar to it than to the CA.
Same; Same; Court of Tax Appeals; Jurisdictions; Section 7(a)(7) of RA 9282 merely restates in clearer
language Section 29 of RA 8800—between the enactment of RA 8800 in 2000 and RA 9282 in 2004, there has
been no significant supervening change in circumstances in our economic or trade environments or even in our
judicial structure, which would justify Congress to add to the jurisdiction of the CTA the review of the non-
imposition of a safeguard measure.—Contrary to the contention of the solicitor general, Section 7(a)(7) of RA
9282 merely restates in clearer language Section 29 of RA 8800. Undeniably, the imperfect craftsmanship of
the latter has spawned some ambiguity. I believe that Congress did not mean to add, via Section 7(a)(7) of RA
9282, a new matter to the jurisdiction of the CTA. For all along, the legislative intent has been to vest in the
CTA the power to review the imposition or non-imposition of safeguard measures. Between the enactment of
RA 8800 in 2000 and RA 9282 in 2004, there has been no significant supervening change in circumstances in
our economic or trade environments or even in our judicial structure, which would justify Congress to add to
the jurisdiction of the CTA the review of the non-imposition of a safeguard measure. The only significant
intervening event that seems worth considering is the present proceeding, which precisely reveals an
ambiguity that Congress did not intend when it enacted RA 8800. Section 7(a)(7) of RA 9282 now explicitly
expresses the law’s intent.
Same; Courts; Judicial Review;  Generally, the Supreme Court cannot review a legally inexistent judgment.
—Because the CA
558

558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Southern Cross Cement Corporation vs. Cement Manufacturers Association of the Philippine

wrongly exercised its limited certiorari power, its June 5, 2003 Decision was rendered without
jurisdiction and, hence, null and void. Held to be dead limbs on the judicial tree are void judgments, which
should be disregarded or ignored. Likewise, the DTI Decision dated June 25, 2003, issued pursuant to the void
CA judgment, is necessarily invalid. A void judgment is worthless and has no legal effect. It cannot be the
source of any right or the creator of any obligation. Thus, all acts performed pursuant to it and all claims
emanating from it have no legal effect. Accordingly, the present Petition, which seeks a review of a void
Decision of the CA should, in the ordinary course, also be dismissed. Generally, this Court cannot review a
legally inexistent judgment.
Same; Delegation of Powers; Tariff Powers; Tariff Commission; The theory that Congress may delegate
the power to fix tariffs to both the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary “as agents of Congress” plainly
violates Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution.—Under this constitutional provision, to no other official,
except the President, is the authority to fix tariff rates, quotas, imposts and other duties allowed to be
delegated. However, the Resolution authored by Justice Tinga theorizes that Congress may delegate such
power to fix tariffs to both the Tariff Commission and the DTI secretary, “as agents of Congress.” I believe that
this theory plainly violates the aforequoted Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution. I respectfully
submit that the only constitutional way to uphold the DTI secretary’s imposition of tariffs under RA 8800 is to
apply the alter ego principle. In other words, the DTI secretary imposes safeguard measures (like tariffs,
import quotas, quantitative restriction, etc.) only in representation and as an alter ego of the President in the
field of trade and investment matters. Thus, the law must be construed as delegating to the President—
through the latter’s alter ego on trade—the power to impose safeguard measures.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Power of Control; Since the Tariff Commission is an agency in the Executive
Department, necessarily subject to the control and supervision of the President, its decisions and
recommendations cannot tie the hands of the Chief Executive with finality.—The power of control includes the
right to modify or set aside a decision of a subordinate officer. Since the Tariff Commission is an agency in the
Executive Department, it is necessarily subject to the control and supervision of the President. Hence, its
559

VOL. 465, AUGUST 3, 2005

Southern Cross Cement Corporation vs. Cement Manufacturers Association of the Philippine

decisions and recommendations cannot tie the hands of the Chief Executive with finality.
Consequently, the DTI head, acting as the President’s agent pursuant to RA 8800, may affirm, modify or
reverse the Tariff Commission’s recommendation. To repeat, such plenary power of control cannot be
restricted by a mere statute passed by Congress.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; RA 8800 could not have intended that the alter ego of the President be
a mere rubber stamp who would be compelled to enforce the recommendations of a purely investigatory agency
in the Executive Department.—As the cabinet official and alter ego of the President on trade, industry and
investment-related matters, the DTI head necessarily has sufficient latitude and discretion in the pursuit of the
Department’s mandate. On the other hand, being primarily a fact-finder, the Tariff Commission is limited to
submitting its report and recommendations to the referring agency. In this scheme of tasking, absent any
clear and direct provision of the Constitution, the TC’s mere recommendation cannot bind the cabinet official,
much less the President. As the solicitor general aptly suggests, RA 8800 could not have intended that the
alter ego of the President be a mere rubber stamp who would be compelled to enforce the recommendations
of a purely investigatory agency in the Executive Department.
Same; Same; Same; Same; More precisely, when the DTI secretary reviews (and ultimately affirms,
modifies or reverses) the recommendation of the Tariff Commission, he or she does so, not as one who is higher
than the Commission in the administrative stratum, but as the alter ego of the President who, by constitutional
fiat, is the only official to whom the authority to impose such measures may be delegated by Congress.—That the
TC was placed under the administrative supervision of the NEDA does not give the latter the sole power to
review the Commission’s reports. Precisely, RA 8800 creates a functional relationship between the
Commission and the DTI secretary. It provides for the administrative interplay between the two agencies—
but only with regard to the application of general safeguard measures. More precisely, when the DTI
secretary reviews (and ultimately affirms, modifies or reverses) the recommendation of the Commission, he
or she does so, not as one who is higher than the Commission in the administrative stratum, but as the  alter
ego of the President who, by constitutional fiat, is the only official to whom
560

560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Southern Cross Cement Corporation vs. Cement Manufacturers Association of the Philippine

the authority to impose such measures may be delegated by Congress.

Same; Same; Same; Same; To be consistent with Section 28, Article VI of the Constitution, R.A. 8800 must
be understood to mean that in delegating the authority to impose safeguard measures, Congress designated the
DTI secretary, being the President’s subaltern or alter ego on trade matters.—Elementary is the rule that the
power to tax is inherent upon the State, but can be exercised only by Congress, unless allowed by the
Constitution to be conferred upon another qualified government instrumentality. The power to fix tariff rates
also lies in the legislature. However, the delegation of that power to the President is permissible, under
Section 28 of Article VI of the Constitution, as earlier mentioned. RA 8800 must be construed in harmony with
the said constitutional provision. In delegating to the DTI secretary the power to impose safeguard measures,
Congress could have done so only within the constitutional restriction. The legislature could not have simply
chosen the DTI secretary and the Tariff Commission as its agents in imposing the measure. Its delegation of
the power to impose tariffs to whomsoever it chose (other than the President) was beyond its constitutional
authority. To read the law in such a manner would inevitably result in the statute’s unconstitutionality. To be
consistent with the constitutional clause, the law must be understood to mean that in delegating the authority
to impose safeguard measures, Congress designated the DTI secretary, being the President’s subaltern or
alter ego on trade matters. Again, Congress could not have directly constituted the cabinet official as its own
agent, because the Constitution categorically limited the delegation of such authority to the President. The
fundamental law expressly states that Congress may authorize the President (and names no other official) to
impose (subject to limitations and restrictions that it may specify) tariffs, quotas, duties and other imposts.
For the legislature to delegate the authority to another official or entity, such as the Tariff Commission, and to
completely disregard or do away with the President would be a blatant contravention of the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The DTI secretary—as the President’s alter ego on trade matters may
exercise, in the President’s stead, the same prerogative of affirmation, modification or reversal over any action of
the Commission.—Clearly then, in imposing a
561

VOL. 465, AUGUST 3, 2005

Southern Cross Cement Corporation vs. Cement Manufacturers Association of the Philippine

safeguard measure, the DTI secretary acts as the President’s alter ego. Because the President’s power
of control over any office in the Executive Department cannot be restricted or degraded by Congress, by the
same reasoning the exercise by the alter ego of such power of control over actions of the Tariff Commission
cannot be constitutionally curtailed by Congress. Otherwise stated, the President—through the constitutional
power of control over the Executive Department—has the prerogative to affirm, modify or reverse any action
of the Tariff Commission. Thus, the DTI secretary—as the President’s alter ego on trade matters—may
exercise, in the President’s stead, the same prerogative of affirmation, modification or reversal over any
action of the Commission.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Public interest is something in which the public or
community at large has some pecuniary interest affecting their legal rights or liabilities, and there are no
definite parameters by which it may be established solely by judicial authorities—its determination is
indubitably a political question, addressed to a policy maker who is answerable to the people, not a fact finder or
investigatory body that has no electoral mandate.—These are the substantial conditions or limitations
specified by the law for the imposition by the DTI head (or, principally, the President) of a safeguard measure.
The Tariff Commission is tasked to determine the presence of the first two conditions—matters that may be
ascertained by factual examination. The final factor is left to the discretion of the DTI secretary.  Public
interest is something in which the public or community at large has some pecuniary interest affecting their
legal rights or liabilities. Because it concerns the general public, its determination is not quantifiable in exact
terms. There are no definite parameters by which it may be established solely by judicial authorities. Its
determination is indubitably a political question; thus, it is addressed to a policy maker who is answerable to
the people, not a fact finder or investigatory body that has no electoral mandate.
Actions;  Forum Shopping; The penalties imposed upon erring lawyers who engaged in forum shopping
ranged from severe censure to suspension from the practice of law, in order to make them realize the seriousness
of the consequences and implications of their abuse of the judicial process and disrespect for judicial authority. —
Failure to comply with the non-forum shopping requirements in Section 5 of
562

562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Southern Cross Cement Corporation vs. Cement Manufacturers Association of the Philippine

Rule 7 does not, however, automatically warrant the dismissal of the case with prejudice. The Rule
states that the dismissal is without prejudice; with prejudice, only upon motion and after hearing. And there
must be evidence that the erring party and counsel committed willful and deliberate acts amounting to forum
shopping as to warrant the summary dismissal of the case and the imposition of direct contempt and the
appropriate administrative sanctions. In previous cases, the penalties imposed upon erring lawyers who
engaged in forum shopping ranged from severe censure to suspension from the practice of law, in order to
make them realize the seriousness of the consequences and implications of their abuse of the judicial process
and disrespect for judicial authority. Based on the foregoing tenets, I believe that petitioner’s counsels should
be sanctioned with severe censure.
Courts; Judicial Review;  The principal duty of the judiciary is to adjudicate actual controversies involving
rights and obligations of persons—it has no business interfering in the realm of policy making.—The principal
duty of the judiciary is to adjudicate actual controversies involving rights and obligations of persons; it has no
business interfering in the realm of policy making. Basic is the rule that courts should adopt a hands-off
approach with respect to non-judicial concerns of government. The only ground upon which they can review
apparently policy questions is when an act of an agency or instrumentality of government, including the
Presidency and Congress, is blatantly contrary to law or the Constitution or clearly tainted with grave abuse
of discretion. In these exceptional instances, it becomes the bounden duty of the Court to nullify the act.
 G.R. No. 177597. July 16, 2008.*
BAI SANDRA S. A. SEMA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN,
respondents.
G.R. No. 178628. July 16, 2008.*
PERFECTO F. MARQUEZ, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Constitutional Law; Writs of Prohibition; The writ of prohibition is appropriate to test the constitutionality
of election laws, rules and regulations.—The Writ of Prohibition is Appropriate to Test the Constitutionality of
Election Laws, Rules and Regulations.  The purpose of the writ of Certiorari is to correct grave abuse of
discretion by “any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.” On the other hand,
the writ of Mandamus will issue to compel a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person to perform an act
“which the law specifically enjoins as a duty.” True, the COMELEC did not issue Resolution No. 7902 in the
exercise of its judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Nor is there a law which specifically enjoins the COMELEC to
exclude from canvassing the votes cast in Cotabato City for representative of “Shariff Kabunsuan Province
with Cotabato City.” These, however, do not justify the outright dismissal of the petition in G.R. No. 177597
because Sema also prayed for the issuance of the writ of Prohibition and we have long recognized this writ as
proper for testing the constitutionality of election laws, rules, and regulations.
Same; Delegation of Powers; There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in
the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local
government units.—There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the
Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local
government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative
bodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards and
_______________

* EN BANC.
701
VOL. 558, JULY 16, 2008

Sema vs. Commission on Elections

provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to
provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction,
subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite
requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, under the Local Government Code, “only x x
x an Act of Congress” can create provinces, cities or municipalities.
Same; Election Laws; Each City with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province,
shall have at least have one representative in the House of Representatives.—There is no provision in the
Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional legislative bodies of the power to create
municipalities and barangays, provided Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is followed. However, the
creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution provides, “Each
city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative” in the House of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution provides, “Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may
hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following
election to at least one Member x x x.”
Same; A province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate Section 5(3), Article
VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution .—A province cannot be
created without a legislative district because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as well
as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a population of
250,000 or more cannot also be created without a legislative district. Thus, the power to create a province, or
a city with a population of 250,000 or more, requires also the power to create a legislative district. Even the
creation of a city with a population of less than 250,000 involves the power to create a legislative district
because once the city’s population reaches 250,000, the city automatically becomes entitled to one
representative under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to
the Constitution. Thus, the power to create a province or city inherently involves the power to create a
legislative district.
702
702 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Sema vs. Commission on Elections

Same; Congress; Delegation of Powers; The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes
the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones.—Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in
Congress the power to increase, through a law, the allowable membership in the House of Representatives.
Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative
districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises
these powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that regional or local legislative
bodies enact. The allowable membership of the House of Representatives can be increased, and new
legislative districts of Congress can be created, only through a national law passed by Congress. In Montejo v.
COMELEC, 242 SCRA 415 (1995), we held that the “power of redistricting x x x is traditionally regarded as
part of the power (of Congress) to make laws,” and thus is vested exclusively in Congress.
Same; Same; An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the
membership of the superior legislative body.—This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to
create or reapportion legislative districts is logical. Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its
allowable membership or in its incumbent membership through the creation of legislative districts must be
embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact such a law. It would be anomalous for regional or local
legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts for a national legislature like Congress. An
inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the membership of the
superior legislative body.
Same; Same; Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions, expressly
or impliedly, to create or reapportion legislative districts for Congress.—Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution authorizes autonomous regions, expressly or impliedly, to create or reapportion legislative
districts for Congress. On the other hand, Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054 amending the ARMM Organic Act,
provides, “The Regional Assembly may exercise legislative power x x x except on the following matters: x x x (k)
National elections. x x x.” Since the ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws relating
to national elections, it cannot create a legislative district whose representative is elected in national
elections. Whenever Congress enacts a law creat-
703
VOL. 558, JULY 16, 2008
 Sema vs. Commission on Elections

ing a legislative district, the first representative is always elected in the “next national elections” from
the effectivity of the law.
Same; Same; The power to create or reapportion legislative districts cannot be delegated by Congress but
must be exercised by Congress itself.—Neither the framers of the 1987 Constitution in adopting the provisions
in Article X on regional autonomy, nor Congress in enacting RA 9054, envisioned or intended these disastrous
consequences that certainly would wreck the tri-branch system of government under our Constitution.
Clearly, the power to create or reapportion legislative districts cannot be delegated by Congress but must be
exercised by Congress itself. Even the ARMM Regional Assembly recognizes this.
Same; Local Autonomy; Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM); It is axiomatic that organic acts
of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the constitution.—It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous
regions cannot prevail over the Constitution. Section 20, Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that
the legislative powers of regional assemblies are limited “[w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the
provisions of the Constitution and national laws, x x x.” The Preamble of the ARMM Organic Act (RA 9054) itself
states that the ARMM Government is established “within the framework of the Constitution.” This follows
Section 15, Article X of the Constitution which mandates that the ARMM “shall be created x x x within the
framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines.”
Same; Same; The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Regional Assembly cannot create a
province without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that every province shall have a
legislative district.—We rule that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void for being contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and
Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
Only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily
includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Section 5, Article VI of
the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly
cannot create a
704
704 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Sema vs. Commission on Elections

province without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that every province shall have
a legislative district. Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office like
the office of a district representative of Congress because the legislative powers of the ARMM Regional
Assembly operate only within its territorial jurisdiction as provided in Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution. Thus, we rule that MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.
Same; Republic Act No. 9054; Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054 declared unconstitutional
insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create
provinces and cities.—Wherefore, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao the power to create provinces and cities. Thus, we declare VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act
No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. Consequently, we rule that COMELEC Resolution No.
7902 is VALID.
TINGA,  J., Dissenting and Concurring Opinion:
 Courts; Appeals; It is cardinal that the Court’s power of judicial review may be exercised in constitutional
cases only if all the following requisites are complied with: 1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case or
controversy; 2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; 3) the
exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and 4) the constitutional question is the lis mota
of the case.—It is clear that both petitioners rely on constitutional issues in support of their petitions as they
posit that under the Constitution Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to its own separate legislative district. It is
cardinal that the Court’s power of judicial review may be exercised in constitutional cases only if all the
following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case or
controversy; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the
exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the  lis
mota of the case.
705
VOL. 558, JULY 16, 2008

Sema vs. Commission on Elections

Election Laws; Sema’s prior avowal that she was running for the Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City
legislative district, and her campaign for election to that district, belie the existence of injury on her part caused
by the COMELEC resolution that affirmed that very legislative district.—It would indeed be difficult to assess
injury for purposes of locus standi  on the part of Sema by reason of the assailed COMELEC Resolution, which
after all, reaffirms the very legislative district whose seat in Congress she had sought to be elected to. Her
standing to raise the present petition is materially affected by her express consent and active campaign for
election from the legislative district which she now seeks to invalidate. A party challenging the
constitutionality of a law, act or statute must show “not only that the law is invalid, but also that he or she has
sustained or is in immediate, or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement,” that party has been or is about to be, denied some right or privilege to which he or she is
lawfully entitled. Sema’s prior avowal that she was running for the Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City
legislative district, and her campaign for election to that district, belie the existence of injury on her part
caused by the COMELEC resolution that affirmed that very legislative district.
Same; Commission on Elections (COMELEC); The COMELEC does not have the requisite power to call
elections, as the same is part of the plenary legislative power.—Marquez does not have a valid cause of action
before this Court. His prayer is to compel the COMELEC to provide for new congressional elections for
Cotabato City.The relief sought does not lie simply because Rep. Dilangalen, by virtue of his electoral victory,
lawfully represents the City in addition to the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. From another perspective, the
COMELEC does not have the requisite power to call elections, as the same is part of the plenary legislative
power. Only Congress, which was not impleaded as a party to Marquez’s petition, has the power to set
congressional elections only for Cotabato City, if ever. Even assuming that Congress was impleaded, it would
be improper for this Court to compel Congress by judicial fiat to pass a law or resolution for the holding of
such elections.
Constitutional Law; Delegation of Powers; A logical corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the
principle of non-delegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim potestas delegata non delegare potest
(what has been delegated cannot be delegated).—The
706
706 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Sema vs. Commission on Elections

 Constitution expressly vests legislative power in the Congress of the Philippines, consisting of a Senate
and a House of Representatives. Traditionally, the delegation of Congress of its legislative powers had been
frowned upon. “A logical corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of
powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim potestas delegata non delegare potest (what has been delegated
cannot be delegated). This is based on the ethical principle that such delegated power constitutes not only a
right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not
through the intervening mind of another.”
Same; Same; The strict application of the non-delegation doctrine has in recent times, been relaxed, if not
minimized altogether, particularly in the context of regulatory jurisdiction of administrative agencies.—The
strict application of the non-delegation doctrine has, in recent times, been relaxed, if not minimized
altogether, particularly in the context of regulatory jurisdiction of administrative agencies. In every
industrialized nation, administrative agencies, which are generally part of the executive branch, have been
granted considerable lawmaking power. “Given the volume and variety of interactions in today’s society, it is
doubtful if the legislature can promulgate laws that will deal adequately with and respond promptly to the
minutiae of everyday life. Hence, the need to delegate to administrative bodies—the principal agencies tasked
to execute laws in their specialized fields—the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a
given statute and effectuate its policies.” In the context of delegation of legislative powers to local
governments, a noted authority on the subject has this to say: The state legislative power—that is, the
exercise of the policy-making judgment and discretion on state matters that state constitutions vest and
recognize in the legislature—cannot be delegated to some other person or body but must rest with the
legislature itself. Thus, the legislature cannot delegate to a commission the power to determine the form of
government, powers and functions of proposed municipalities since these matters require legislative
judgment. But the details of organization of its own government can be left to a municipality, limited only by
general state law; and such basic state powers as the police power, taxing power, and power of eminent
domain can be, and almost always are, delegated to local governments for their use for local purposes. The
rule against delegation of state legislative authority is no barrier
707
VOL. 558, JULY 16, 2008

Sema vs. Commission on Elections

to the delegation of powers of local self government to local units. x x x

Same; Same; Nothwithstanding the exceptions that have been carved to the rule of non-delegation, it bears
notice that while our Constitution broadly endows legislative powers to Congress it also specifically conditions
the emergence of certain rights, duties and obligations upon the enactment of a law oriented towards such
constitutional predicate.—Notwithstanding the exceptions that have been carved to the rule of non-
delegation, it bears notice that while our Constitution broadly endows legislative powers to Congress it also
specifically conditions the emergence of certain rights, duties and obligations upon the enactment of a law
oriented towards such constitutional predicate. These include the prohibition of political dynasties as may be
defined by law, the reasonable conditions prescribed by law relating to full public disclosure of all the State’s
transactions involving public interest; the manner by which Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired;
the date of regular elections for members of Congress; the manner of conduct of special elections to fill in
congressional vacancies; the authorization of the President to exercise emergency powers; the system for
initiative and referendum; the salaries of the President and Vice-President; the creation and allocation of
jurisdiction of lower courts; and on many other matters of grave import.
Same; Same; As to those powers which would normally fall within the plenary legislative power, the
Constitution has decided to doubly emphasize that it is the Congress which is so empowered to perform such
tasks.—May these specified functions be delegated by Congress to another body? These specific functions are
non-delegable, for they are textually committed by the Constitution to Congress. Perhaps it is possible to
segregate these particular functions to those which would, even absent constitutional definition, anyway fall
within the plenary legislative power, and those which are not plenary in nature but were especially
designated to Congress by the Constitution. Still, in either case, only Congress, and no other body, can carry
out that function. As to those powers which would normally fall within the plenary legislative power, the
Constitution has decided to doubly emphasize that it is the Congress which is so empowered to perform such
tasks. With respect to the non-plenary functions assigned to Congress, it is clear that the assignment im-
708
708 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Sema vs. Commission on Elections

plies the delegation by the Constitution to Congress of specific, wholly original functions.
Same; Same; Local Autonomy; The guarantee of local autonomy is actualized through a local government
code that delineates the structure and powers of local governments, and through constitutional measures that
entitle local government units to generate their own revenue stream and assure the same to their fair share in
the national internal revenue.—Section 2, Article X guarantees that the territorial and political subdivisions in
the Philippines shall enjoy local autonomy. The guarantee of local autonomy is actualized through a local
government code that delineates the structure and powers of local governments, and through constitutional
measures that entitle local government units to generate their own revenue stream and assure the same to
their fair share in the national internal revenue. Local government rule, in constitutional contemplation, is a
live being that exists to counterbalance the rule of the national government, and is not a mere palliative
established in the Constitution to soothe the people with the illusion of having a more direct say in their
governance.
Same; Local Autonomy; The idea behind the constitutional provisions for autonomous regions is to allow
the separate development of peoples with distinctive cultures and traditions.—In Disomangcop v. Datumanong,
444 SCRA 203 (2004), the Court explained at length the vital constitutional purposes of local autonomy: x x x
According to Commissioner Jose Nolledo, Chairman of the Committee which drafted the provisions, it “is an
indictment against the status quo of a unitary system that, to my mind, has ineluctably tied the hands of
progress in our country . . . our varying regional characteristics are factors to capitalize on to attain national
strength through decentralization.” The idea behind the Constitutional provisions for autonomous regions is
to allow the separate development of peoples with distinctive cultures and traditions. These cultures, as a
matter of right, must be allowed to flourish.
Same; Same; On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution, contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just
administrative autonomy to these regions.—On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution, contem-
709
VOL. 558, JULY 16, 2008

Sema vs. Commission on Elections

plates the grant of political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy to these regions. Thus, the
provision in the Constitution for an autonomous regional government with a basic structure consisting of an
executive department and a legislative assembly and special courts with personal, family and property law
jurisdiction in each of the autonomous regions [Art. X, sec. 18].
Same; Same; It should be emphasized that local autonomy cannot be in denigration of the Constitution .—
Unfortunately, the majority gives short shrift to the considerations of local autonomy, even as such paradigm
partakes of a constitutional mandate. If anything, these provisions should dissuade against a reflexive
dismissal of the provisions of the Organic Acts. It should be emphasized that local autonomy cannot be in
denigration of the Constitution. It is repeatedly emphasized within Article X that the grant of local autonomy
and the subsequent exercise of powers by the autonomous government must remain within the confines of
the Constitution. At the same time, if there is no constitutional bar against the exercise of the powers of
government by the autonomous government in Muslim Mindanao, particularly by the Regional Assembly,
then there is no basis to thwart the constitutional design by denying such powers to that body.
Same; Same; Delegations of Powers; Considering the constitutional mandate of local autonomy for Muslim
Mindanao, it can be said that such delegation is in furtherance of the constitutional design.—May such power be
delegated by Congress to a local legislative body such as the Regional Assembly? Certainly, nothing in the
Constitution bars Congress from doing so. In fact, considering the constitutional mandate of local autonomy
for Muslim Mindanao, it can be said that such delegation is in furtherance of the constitutional design.
Same; Same; Same; Republic Act 9054; Attuned with enhanced local government rule, Congress had,
through Rep. Act No. 9054, taken the bold step of delegating to a local legislative assembly the power to create
provinces, albeit prudently withholding any ability to create legislative districts as well .—It bears
reemphasizing that the Constitution also actualizes a preference for local government rule, and thusly
provides: The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization
710
710 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Sema vs. Commission on Elections

with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local
government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election,
appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters
relating to the organization and operation of the local units. Attuned with enhanced local government rule,
Congress had, through Rep. Act No. 9054, taken the bold step of delegating to a local legislative assembly the
power to create provinces, albeit prudently withholding any ability to create legislative districts as well.
Same; Same; Republic Act No. 9054; The subsequent passage of Rep. Act No. 9054 granted to the Regional
Assembly the power, function and responsibility to create provinces and other local government units which had
been exercised by the National Government.—Section 17, Article X states that “[a]ll powers, functions, and
responsibilities not granted by this Constitution or by law to the autonomous regions shall be vested in the
National Government.” The original Organic Act for Muslim Mindanao did not grant to the regional
government the power to create provinces, thus at that point, such power was properly exercised by the
National Government. But the subsequent passage of Rep. Act No. 9054 granted to the Regional Assembly the
power, function and responsibility to create provinces and other local government units which had been
exercised by the National Government.
Same; Republic Act No. 9054; It bears noting that there is no contention presented thus far that the
creation of Shariff Kabunsuan was not in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code
(LGC), thus this aspect of unconstitutionality of Rep. Act No. 9054 may not be material to the petitions at bar.—It
bears noting that there is no contention presented thus far that the creation of Shariff Kabunsuan was not in
accordance with the criteria established in the LGC, thus this aspect of unconstitutionality of Rep. Act No.
9054 may not be material to the petitions at bar.
Same; Congress; Congress does not have any express or plenary legislative power to create legislative
districts, except by reapportionment.—How exactly does a legislative district come into being? In theory,
Congress does not have any express or plenary legislative power to create legislative districts, except by
reapportionment. Under the Constitution, such reapportionment occurs within three
711
 VOL. 558, JULY 16, 2008

Sema vs. Commission on Elections

years following the return of the census, but this Court has likewise recognized that reapportionment
can also be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. Still, even in exercising this
limited power through the constitutionally mandated reapportionment, Congress cannot substitute its own
discretion for the standards set forth in Section 5, Article VI. And should general reapportionment made by
Congress violate the parameters set forth by the Constitution, such act may be invalidated by the Court, as it
did in Macias v. COMELEC,  3 SCRA 1 (1961).
Same; Same; The Constitution clearly provided that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than 250 members unless otherwise provided by law.—The Court has previously recognized that such law
increasing the membership of the House of Representatives need not be one specifically devoted for that
purpose alone, but it may be one that creates a province or charters a city with a population of more than
250,000. In Tobias v. Abalos, 239 SCRA 106 (1994), the Court pronounced that the law converting
Mandaluyong into a city could likewise serve the purpose of increasing the composition of the House of
Representatives: As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of
representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5 (1),
as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly
provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, “unless
otherwise provided by law.” The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present composition of
Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the
increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.
Same; Same; Delegation of Powers; The power to increase the composition of the House of Representatives
is restricted by the Constitution to a law passed by Congress, which may not delegate such law-making power to
the Regional Assembly.—I have already pointed out that when the Constitution specifically designates a
particular function to Congress, only Congress may exercise such function, as the same is non-delegable. The
power to increase the composition of the House of Representatives is restricted by the Constitution to a law
passed by Congress, which may not delegate such law-making power to the Regional Assembly. If we were to
rule that Congress
712
712 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Sema vs. Commission on Elections

may delegate the power to increase the composition of the House of Representatives, there would be no
impediment for us to similarly rule that those other specific functions tasked by the Constitution to Congress
may be delegated as well. To repeat, these include gravely important functions as the enactment of a law
defining political dynasties; the enactment of reasonable conditions relating to full public disclosure of all the
State’s transactions involving public interest; the manner by which Philippine citizenship may be lost or
reacquired; the date of regular elections for members of Congress; the provision for the manner of conduct of
special elections to fill in congressional vacancies; the authorization of the President to exercise emergency
powers; the prescription of a system for initiative and referendum; the salaries of the President and Vice-
President; and the creation and allocation of jurisdiction of lower courts.
Same; Republic Act No. 9054; Even as Section 19 of Rep. Act 9054 constitutionally authorizes the Regional
Assembly to create provinces, there are legal limitations that constrict the discretion of that body to exercise
such power.—Even as Section 19 of Rep. Act No. 9054 constitutionally authorizes the Regional Assembly to
create provinces, there are legal limitations that constrict the discretion of that body to exercise such power. I
had earlier identified as unconstitutional the discretion of the Regional Assembly to create local government
units based on a lower standard than that prescribed under the LGC. Another clear limitation is that the
creation of provinces cannot be authorized without the ratification through a plebiscite by the people affected
by such act, a requirement imposed by the Organic Act itself and by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

NPC Drivers and Mechanics Association (NPC-DAMA) vs. National Power Corporation (NPC)

G.R. No. 156208. September 26, 2006.*

NPC DRIVERS AND MECHANICS ASSOCIATION, (NPC DAMA), represented by Its President ROGER S. SAN
JUAN, SR., NPC EMPLOYEES & WORKERS UNION (NEWU) – NORTHERN LUZON REGIONAL CENTER,
represented by its Regional President JIMMY D. SALMAN, in their own individual capacities and in behalf of
the members of the associations and all affected officers and employees of National Power Corporation (NPC),
ZOL D. MEDINA, NARCISO M. MAGANTE, VICENTE B. CIRIO, JR., NECITAS B. CAMAMA, in their individual
capacities as employees of National Power Corporation, petitioners, vs. THE NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION (NPC), NATIONAL POWER BOARD OF DIRECTORS (NPB), JOSE ISIDRO N. CAMACHO as
Chairman of the National Power Board of Directors (NPB), ROLANDO S. QUILALA, as President—Officer-
incharge/CEO of National Power Corporation and Member of National Power Board, and VINCENT S. PEREZ,
JR., EMILIA T. BONCODIN, MARIUS P. CORPUS, RUBEN S. REINOSO, JR., GREGORY L. DOMINGO and NIEVES L.
OSORIO, respondents.
 Administrative Law; Delegation of Powers; The department secretaries composing the National Power
Board of Directors (NPB) cannot delegate their duties as members of the NPB, much less their power to vote and
approve board resolutions, because it is their personal judgment that must be exercised in the fulfillment of such
responsibility.—We agree with petitioners. In enumerating under Section 48 those who shall compose the
National Power Board of Directors, the legislature has vested upon these persons the power to exercise their
judgment and discretion in running the affairs of the NPC. Discretion may be defined as “the act or the liberty
to decide according to the principles of justice and one’s ideas of what is right and proper under the
circumstances, without willfulness or favor. Discretion, when applied to public functionaries, means a power
or right conferred upon them by law of acting officially in certain circumstances, according to the dictates of
their own judgment and conscience, uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of others. It is to be
presumed that in naming the respective department heads as members of the board of directors, the
legislature chose these secretaries
_______________

* FIRST DIVISION.

139

VOL. 503, SEPTEMBER 26, 2006

NPC Drivers and Mechanics Association (NPC-DAMA) vs. National Power Corporation (NPC

of the various executive departments on the basis of their personal qualifications and acumen which
made them eligible to occupy their present positions as department heads. Thus, the department secretaries
cannot delegate their duties as members of the NPB, much less their power to vote and approve board
resolutions, because it is their personal judgment that must be exercised in the fulfillment of such
responsibility.
Same; Same; The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment and discretion
does not preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of practical administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates,
so long as it is the legally authorized official who makes the final decision through the use of his own personal
judgment.—Respondents’ assertion to the contrary is not tenable. The ruling in the case cited by respondents
to support their contention is not applicable in the case at bar. While it is true that the Court has determined
in the case of American Tobacco Company v. Director of Patents, 67 SCRA 287 (1975), that a delegate may
exercise his authority through persons he appoints to assist him in his functions, it must be stressed that the
Court explicitly stated in the same case that said practice is permissible only when  the judgment and
discretion finally exercised are those of the officer authorized by law.According to the Court, the rule that
requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment and discretion does not preclude him from
utilizing, as a matter of practical administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates, so long as it is the legally
authorized official who makes the final decision through the use of his own personal judgment.
Same; Same; Where it is the representatives of the secretaries of the different executive departments and
not the secretaries themselves who exercised judgment in passing the assailed Resolution, this violated the duty
imposed upon the specifically enumerated department heads to employ their own sound discretion in exercising
the corporate powers of the National Power Corporation.—In the case at bar, it is not difficult to comprehend
that in approving NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125, it is the representatives of the secretaries
of the different executive departments and not the secretaries themselves who exercised judgment in passing
the assailed Resolution, as shown by the fact that it is the signatures of the respective representatives that are
affixed to the questioned Resolutions. This, to our mind, violates the duty imposed upon the specifically
enumerated department heads to employ their own sound discretion in exercising the corporate powers of
the NPC. Evidently, the votes cast by these mere representatives in favor of the adoption of the said
Resolutions must not be considered in determining whether or not the necessary number of votes was
garnered in order that the assailed
140

140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

NPC Drivers and Mechanics Association (NPC-DAMA) vs. National Power Corporation (NPC

Resolutions may be validly enacted. Hence, there being only three valid votes cast out of the nine board
members, namely those of DOE Secretary Vincent S. Perez, Jr.; Department of Budget and Management
Secretary Emilia T. Boncodin; and NPC OIC-President Rolando S. Quilala, NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and
No. 2002-125 are void and are of no legal effect.
 G.R. No. 169507. January 11, 2016.*
 
AIR CANADA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.
Taxation; Air Transportation; Petitioner, as an offline international carrier with no landing rights in the
Philippines, is not liable to tax on Gross Philippine Billings under Section 28(A)(3) of the 1997 National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC).—At the outset, we affirm the Court of Tax Appeals’ ruling that petitioner, as an offline
international carrier with no landing rights in the Philippines, is not liable to tax on Gross Philippine Billings
under Section 28(A)(3) of the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code: SEC. 28. Rates of Income Tax on Foreign
Corporations.—(A) Tax on Resident Foreign Corporations.—. . . . (3) International Carrier.—An international
carrier doing business in the Philippines shall pay a tax of two and one-half percent (2 1/2%) on its ‘Gross
Philippine Billings’ as defined hereunder: (a) International Air Carrier.—‘Gross Philippine Billings’ refers to the
amount of gross revenue derived from carriage of persons, excess baggage, cargo and mail originating from the
Philippines in a continuous and uninterrupted flight, irrespective of the place of sale or issue and the place of
payment of the ticket or passage document: Provided, That tickets revalidated, exchanged and/or indorsed to
another international airline form part of the Gross Philippine Billings if the passenger boards a plane in a
port or point in the Philippines: Provided, further, That for a flight which originates from the Philippines, but
transshipment of passenger takes place at any port outside the Philippines on another airline, only the aliquot
portion of the cost of the ticket corresponding to the leg flown from the Philippines to the point of
transshipment shall form part of Gross Philippine Billings. (Emphasis supplied) Under the foregoing
provision, the tax attaches only when the carriage of persons, excess baggage, cargo, and mail originated from
the Philippines in a continuous and uninterrupted flight, regardless of where the passage documents were
sold. Not having flights to and from the Philippines, petitioner is clearly not liable for the Gross Philippine
Billings tax.
_______________

*  SECOND DIVISION.
 
 
132
132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Air Canada vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Same; Resident Foreign Corporation; Petitioner falls within the definition of resident foreign corporation
under Section 28(A)(1) of the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), thus, it may be subject to thirty-two
percent (32%) tax on its taxable income.—Petitioner, an offline carrier, is a resident foreign corporation for
income tax purposes. Petitioner falls within the definition of resident foreign corporation under Section 28(A)
(1) of the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code, thus, it may be subject to 32% tax on its taxable
income. x x x The definition of “resident foreign corporation” has not substantially changed throughout the
amendments of the National Internal Revenue Code. All versions refer to “a foreign corporation engaged in
trade or business within the Philippines.” Commonwealth Act No. 466, known as the National Internal
Revenue Code and approved on June 15, 1939, defined “resident foreign corporation” as applying to “a
foreign corporation engaged in trade or business within the Philippines or having an office or place of
business therein.” Section 24(b)(2) of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
6110, approved on August 4, 1969, reads: Sec. 24. Rates of tax on corporations.—. . . (b) Tax on foreign
corporations.—. . . (2) Resident corporations.—A corporation organized, authorized, or existing under the laws
of any foreign country, except a foreign life insurance company, engaged in trade or business within the
Philippines, shall be taxable as provided in subsection (a) of this section upon the total net income received in
the preceding taxable year from all sources within the Philippines.
Same; Same; Doing Business; Words and Phrases; The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of
Republic Act (RA) No. 7042 clarifies that “doing business” includes “appointing representatives or distributors,
operating under full control of the foreign corporation, domiciled in the Philippines or who in any calendar year
stay in the country for a period or periods totaling one hundred eighty (180) days or more.”—Republic Act No.
7042 or the Foreign Investments Act of 1991 also provides guidance with its definition of “doing business”
with regard to foreign corporations. Section 3(d) of the law enumerates the activities that constitute doing
business: d. the phrase “doing business” shall include soliciting orders, service contracts, opening offices,
whether called “liaison” offices or branches; appointing representatives or distributors domiciled in the
Philippines or who in any calendar year stay in the country for a period or periods totalling one hundred
eighty (180) days or more; participating in the
 
 
133
VOL. 778, JANUARY 11, 2016

Air Canada vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

 management, supervision or control of any domestic business, firm, entity or corporation in the
Philippines; and any other act or acts that imply a continuity of commercial dealings or arrangements, and
contemplate to that extent the performance of acts or works, or the exercise of some of the functions normally
incident to, and in progressive prosecution of, commercial gain or of the purpose and object of the business
organization: Provided, however, That the phrase “doing business” shall not be deemed to include mere
investment as a shareholder by a foreign entity in domestic corporations duly registered to do business,
and/or the exercise of rights as such investor; nor having a nominee director or officer to represent its
interests in such corporation; nor appointing a representative or distributor domiciled in the Philippines
which transacts business in its own name and for its own account[.] (Emphasis supplied) While Section 3(d)
above states that “appointing a representative or distributor domiciled in the Philippines which transacts
business in its own name and for its own account” is not considered as “doing business,” the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 7042 clarifies that “doing business” includes “appointing
representatives or distributors, operating under full control of the foreign corporation, domiciled in the
Philippines or who in any calendar year stay in the country for a period or periods totaling one hundred
eighty (180) days or more[.]”
Air Transportation; Offline Carrier; Words and Phrases; An offline carrier is “any foreign air carrier not
certificated by the [Civil Aeronautics] Board, but who maintains office or who has designated or appointed
agents or employees in the Philippines, who sells or offers for sale any air transportation in behalf of said foreign
air carrier and/or others, or negotiate for, or holds itself out by solicitation, advertisement, or otherwise sells,
provides, furnishes, contracts, or arranges for such transportation.”—An offline carrier is “any foreign air
carrier not certificated by the [Civil Aeronautics] Board, but who maintains office or who has designated or
appointed agents or employees in the Philippines, who sells or offers for sale any air transportation in behalf of
said foreign air carrier and/or others, or negotiate for, or holds itself out by solicitation, advertisement, or
otherwise sells, provides, furnishes, contracts, or arranges for such transportation.” “Anyone desiring to
engage in the activities of an offline carrier [must] apply to the [Civil Aeronautics] Board for such authority.”
Each offline carrier must file with the Civil Aeronautics
 
 
134
134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Air Canada vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Board a monthly report containing information on the tickets sold, such as the origin and destination of
the passengers, carriers involved, and commissions received. Petitioner is undoubtedly “doing business” or
“engaged in trade or business” in the Philippines.
Taxation; Resident Foreign Corporation; Petitioner is a resident foreign corporation that is taxable on its
income derived from sources within the Philippines.—Aerotel performs acts or works or exercises functions
that are incidental and beneficial to the purpose of petitioner’s business. The activities of Aerotel bring direct
receipts or profits to petitioner. There is nothing on record to show that Aerotel solicited orders alone and for
its own account and without interference from, let alone direction of, petitioner. On the contrary, Aerotel
cannot “enter into any contract on behalf of [petitioner Air Canada] without the express written consent of
[the latter,]” and it must perform its functions according to the standards required by petitioner. Through
Aerotel, petitioner is able to engage in an economic activity in the Philippines. Further, petitioner was issued
by the Civil Aeronautics Board an authority to operate as an offline carrier in the Philippines for a period of
five years, or from April 24, 2000 until April 24, 2005. Petitioner is a resident foreign corporation that is
taxable on its income derived from sources within the Philippines. Petitioner’s income from sale of airline
tickets, through Aerotel, is income realized from the pursuit of its business activities in the Philippines.
Same; Same; Air Transportation; International air carrier[s] maintain[ing] flights to and from the
Philippines . . . shall be taxed at the rate of two and one-half percent (2 1⁄2%) of its Gross Philippine Billings[;]
while international air carriers that do not have flights to and from the Philippines but nonetheless earn income
from other activities in the country [like sale of airline tickets] will be taxed at the rate of thirty-two percent
(32%) of such [taxable] income.—In the earlier case of South African Airways v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 612 SCRA 665 (2010), this court held that Section 28(A)(3)(a) does not categorically exempt all
international air carriers from the coverage of Section 28(A)(1). Thus, if Section 28(A)(3)(a) is applicable to a
taxpayer, then the general rule under Section 28(A)(1) does not apply. If, however, Section 28(A)(3)(a) does
not apply, an international air carrier would be liable for the tax under Section 28(A)(1). This court in  South
African Airways declared that the correct interpretation of
 
 
135
VOL. 778, JANUARY 11, 2016

Air Canada vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

these provisions is that: “international air carrier[s] maintain[ing] flights to and from the Philippines . . .
shall be taxed at the rate of 2 1/2% of its Gross Philippine Billings[;] while international air carriers that do
not have flights to and from the Philippines but nonetheless earn income from other activities in the country
[like sale of airline tickets] will be taxed at the rate of 32% of such [taxable] income.”
Same; Tax Treaties; Words and Phrases; A tax treaty is an  agreement entered into between sovereign
states “for purposes of eliminating double taxation on income and capital, preventing fiscal evasion, promoting
mutual trade and investment, and according fair and equitable tax treatment to foreign residents or
nationals.”—A tax treaty is an agreement entered into between sovereign states “for purposes of eliminating
double taxation on income and capital, preventing fiscal evasion, promoting mutual trade and investment,
and according fair and equitable tax treatment to foreign residents or nationals.”  Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. S.C. Johnson and Son, Inc., 309 SCRA 87 (1999), explained the purpose of a tax treaty: The purpose
of these international agreements is to reconcile the national fiscal legislations of the contracting parties in
order to help the taxpayer avoid simultaneous taxation in two different jurisdictions. More precisely, the tax
conventions are drafted with a view towards the elimination of international juridical double taxation, which
is defined as the imposition of comparable taxes in two or more states on the same taxpayer in respect of the
same subject matter and for identical periods. The apparent rationale for doing away with double taxation is
to encourage the free flow of goods and services and the movement of capital, technology and persons
between countries, conditions deemed vital in creating robust and dynamic economies. Foreign investments
will only thrive in a fairly predictable and reasonable international investment climate and the protection
against double taxation is crucial in creating such a climate.
Same; Same; Pacta Sunt Servanda; Words and Phrases; Pacta sunt servanda is a fundamental international
law principle that requires agreeing parties to comply with their treaty obligations in good faith .—Observance
of any treaty obligation binding upon the government of the Philippines is anchored on the constitutional
provision that the Philippines “adopts the generally accepted princi-
 
 
 136
136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Air Canada vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

ples of international law as part of the law of the land[.]” Pacta sunt servanda is a fundamental
international law principle that requires agreeing parties to comply with their treaty obligations in good faith.
Same; Same; Same; The application of the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) must be
subject to the provisions of tax treaties entered into by the Philippines with foreign countries .—The application
of the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code must be subject to the provisions of tax treaties
entered into by the Philippines with foreign countries. In Deutsche Bank AG Manila Branch v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 704 SCRA 216 (2013), this court stressed the binding effects of tax treaties. It dealt with the
issue of “whether the failure to strictly comply with [Revenue Memorandum Order] RMO No. 1-2000 will
deprive persons or corporations of the benefit of a tax treaty.”
Air Transportation; General Sales Agent; Words and Phrases; Section 3 of Republic Act (RA) No. 776, as
amended, also known as The Civil Aeronautics Act of the Philippines, defines a general sales agent as “a person,
not a bona fide employee of an air carrier, who pursuant to an authority from an airline, by itself or through an
agent, sells or offers for sale any air transportation, or negotiates for, or holds himself out by solicitation,
advertisement or otherwise as one who sells, provides, furnishes, contracts or arranges for, such air
transportation.”—Section 3 of Republic Act No. 776, as amended, also known as The Civil Aeronautics Act of
the Philippines, defines a general sales agent as “a person, not a bona fide employee of an air carrier, who
pursuant to an authority from an airline, by itself or through an agent, sells or offers for sale any air
transportation, or negotiates for, or holds himself out by solicitation, advertisement or otherwise as one who
sells, provides, furnishes, contracts or arranges for, such air transportation.” General sales agents and their
property, property rights, equipment, facilities, and franchise are subject to the regulation and control of the
Civil Aeronautics Board. A permit or authorization issued by the Civil Aeronautics Board is required before a
general sales agent may engage in such an activity.
Same; Same; Aerotel is a dependent agent of petitioner pursuant to the terms of the Passenger General
Sales Agency Agreement executed between the parties.—Aerotel is a dependent agent of petitioner pursuant to
the terms of the Passenger General Sales Agency
 
 
137
VOL. 778, JANUARY 11, 2016

Air Canada vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Agreement executed between the parties. It has the authority or power to conclude contracts or bind
petitioner to contracts entered into in the Philippines. A third party liability on contracts of Aerotel is to
petitioner as the principal, and not to Aerotel, and liability to such third party is enforceable against
petitioner. While Aerotel maintains a certain independence and its activities may not be devoted wholly to
petitioner, nonetheless, when representing petitioner pursuant to the Agreement, it must carry out its
functions solely for the benefit of petitioner and according to the latter’s Manual and written instructions.
Aerotel is required to submit its annual sales plan for petitioner’s approval. In essence, Aerotel extends to the
Philippines the transportation business of petitioner. It is a conduit or outlet through which petitioner’s
airline tickets are sold.
Taxation; Income Taxation; Income attributable to Aerotel or from business activities effected by petitioner
through Aerotel may be taxed in the Philippines.—Under Article VII (Business Profits) of the Republic of the
Philippines-Canada Tax Treaty, the “business profits” of an enterprise of a Contracting State is “taxable only in
that State[,] unless the enterprise carries on business in the other Contracting State through a permanent
establishment[.]” Thus, income attributable to Aerotel or from business activities effected by petitioner
through Aerotel may be taxed in the Philippines. However, pursuant to the last paragraph of Article VII in
relation to Article VIII (Shipping and Air Transport) of the same Treaty, the tax imposed on income derived
from the operation of ships or aircraft in international traffic should not exceed 1 1/2% of gross revenues
derived from Philippine sources.
Same; Tax Treaties; Tax treaties form part of the law of the land, and jurisprudence has applied the
statutory construction principle that specific laws prevail over general ones.—While petitioner is taxable as a
resident foreign corporation under Section 28(A)(1) of the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code on its
taxable income from sale of airline tickets in the Philippines, it could only be taxed at a maximum of 1 1/2% of
gross revenues, pursuant to Article VIII of the Republic of the Philippines-Canada Tax Treaty that applies to
petitioner as a “foreign corporation organized and existing under the laws of Canada[.]” Tax treaties form part
of the law of the land, and jurisprudence has applied the statutory construction principle that specific laws
prevail over general ones. The Republic of the Philip-
 
 
138
138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Air Canada vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

pines-Canada Tax Treaty was ratified on December 21, 1977 and became valid and effective on that date.
On the other hand, the applicable provisions relating to the taxability of resident foreign corporations and the
rate of such tax found in the National Internal Revenue Code became effective on January 1, 1998. Ordinarily,
the later provision governs over the earlier one. In this case, however, the provisions of the Republic of the
Philippines-Canada Tax Treaty are more specific than the provisions found in the National Internal Revenue
Code.
Same; Tax Refund; In an action for the refund of taxes allegedly erroneously paid, the Court of Tax Appeals
(CTA) may determine whether there are taxes that should have been paid in lieu of the taxes paid .—In SMI-ED
Philippines Technology, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,739 SCRA 691 (2014), we have ruled that “[i]n
an action for the refund of taxes allegedly erroneously paid, the Court of Tax Appeals may determine whether
there are taxes that should have been paid in lieu of the taxes paid.” The determination of the proper category
of tax that should have been paid is incidental and necessary to resolve the issue of whether a refund should
be granted.
Same; “Tax” and “Debt,” Distinguished.—Philex Mining Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
294 SCRA 687 (1998), ruled that “[t]here is a material distinction between a tax and debt. Debts are due to
the Government in its corporate capacity, while taxes are due to the Government in its sovereign capacity.”
Rejecting Philex Mining’s assertion that the imposition of surcharge and interest was unjustified because it
had no obligation to pay the excise tax liabilities within the prescribed period since, after all, it still had
pending claims for VAT input credit/refund with the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
 Same; Offsetting; The taxpayer cannot simply refuse to pay tax on the ground that the tax liabilities were
offset against any alleged claim the taxpayer may have against the government.—In sum, the rulings in those
cases were to the effect that the taxpayer cannot simply refuse to pay tax on the ground that the tax liabilities
were offset against any alleged claim the taxpayer may have against the government. Such would merely be in
keeping with the basic policy on prompt collection of taxes as the lifeblood of the government. Here, what is
involved is a denial of a taxpayer’s refund claim on
 
 
139
VOL. 778, JANUARY 11, 2016

Air Canada vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

account of the Court of Tax Appeals’ finding of its liability for another tax in lieu of the Gross Philippine
Billings tax that was allegedly erroneously paid.

G.R. No. 190582.  April 8, 2010.*

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY represented herein by its Chair, DANTON REMOTO, petitioner,  vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Party-List System; The enumeration of marginalized and under-
represented sectors is not exclusive.—As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
Commission on Elections, 359 SCRA 698 (2001), “the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented
sectors is not exclusive.” The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a
particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Same; Same; Same; Aside from Commission on Elections’ (COMELEC’s) moral objection and the belated
allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not
qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under Republic Act No. 7941 or the
guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani.—We find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with
the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELEC’s moral objection and the belated
allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladladis
not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the
guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang Ladlad’s morality, or lack
thereof.
Same; Same; Same; It was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.—Our Constitution
provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is “government
neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsis-
_______________

* EN BANC.
33
VOL. 618, APRIL 8, 2010
 Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections

tent with this policy of neutrality.” We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment
clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
Same; Same; Same; Through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps homosexuals themselves, have
borne the brunt of societal disapproval.—We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual
conduct, and perhaps homosexuals themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is not difficult
to imagine the reasons behind this censure—religious beliefs, convictions about the preservation of marriage,
family, and procreation, even dislike or distrust of homosexuals themselves and their perceived lifestyle.
Nonetheless, we recall that the Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently,
therefore, these “generally accepted public morals” have not been convincingly transplanted into the realm of
law.
Election Law; Party-List System; Civil Law; “Nuisance,” Defined.—Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a
nuisance as “any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or
disregards decency or morality,” the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or
any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings.
Same; Same; Evidence; A mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil
or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.—A violation of Article 201 of the
Revised Penal Code, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs
to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of
public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of
liability or culpability.
Same; Same; Moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion
of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system.—We hold that moral disapproval, without more, is
not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list
system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’sregistration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of
dislike and disapproval of
34
34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections

homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest. Respondent’s blanket
justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves as a
class, not because of any particular morally reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting that implicates our
equal protection clause.
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Party-List System; Equal Protection Clause; Recent jurisprudence has
affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, the Supreme Court will
uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate government end .—Recent
jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we
will uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate government end.
In Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 446 SCRA 299 (2004), we declared
that “[i]n our jurisdiction, the standard of analysis of equal protection challenges x x x have followed the
‘rational basis’ test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative classifications and a reluctance to
invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Law of general application should apply with equal force to Lesbian, Gay,
Bisexual and Transgender (LGBTs), and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as
other marginalized and under-represented sectors.—From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian,
gay, bisexual, and transgender have the same interest in participating in the party-list system on the same
basis as other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is equally burdensome. Hence,
laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the
party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.
Same; Same; Freedom of Expression; Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a
democratic society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also to those that
offend, shock or disturb.—Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic
society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also to those that offend,
shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate
35
VOL. 618, APRIL 8, 2010

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections

aim pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its
views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no
better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one.
Same; Same; Same; Freedom of Association; Only if a political party incites violence or puts forward policies
that are incompatible with democracy does it fall outside the protection of the freedom of association guarantee.
—A political group should not be hindered solely because it seeks to publicly debate controversial political
issues in order to find solutions capable of satisfying everyone concerned. Only if a political party incites
violence or puts forward policies that are incompatible with democracy does it fall outside the protection of
the freedom of association guarantee.
Same; Party-List System; Equal Protection Clause; The principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of
general application relating to elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation.—The
principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general application relating to elections be applied
equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation. Although sexual orientation is not specifically
enumerated as a status or ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights
Committee has opined that the reference to “sex” in Article 26 should be construed to include “sexual
orientation.” Additionally, a variety of United Nations bodies have declared discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation to be prohibited under various international agreements.
Same; Same; Same; Yogyakarta Principles; Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta
Principles, consisting of a declaration formulated by various international law professors, are—at best—de lege
ferenda—and do not constitute binding obligations on the Philippines.—Using even the most liberal of lenses,
these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a declaration formulated by various international law professors,
are—at best—de lege ferenda—and do not constitute binding obligations on the Philippines. Indeed, so much
of contemporary international law is characterized by the “soft law” nomenclature, i.e., international law is
full of principles that promote international cooperation, harmony, and respect for human
36
36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections

rights, most of which amount to no more than well-meaning desires, without the support of either State
practice or opinio juris.
PUNO, C.J., Separate Concurring Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Party-List System; View that the assailed Resolutions of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) run afoul of the non-establishment clause of the Constitution.—The assailed
Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) run afoul of the non-establishment clause of the
Constitution. There was cypher effort on the part of the COMELEC to couch its reasoning in legal—much less
constitutional—terms, as it denied Ang Ladlad’s petition for registration as a sectoral party principally on the
ground that it “tolerates immorality which offends religious (i.e., Christian and Muslim) beliefs.” To be sure,
the COMELEC’s ruling is completely antithetical to the fundamental rule that “[t]he public morality expressed
in the law is necessarily secular[,] for in our constitutional order, the religion clauses prohibit the state from
establishing a religion, including the morality it sanctions.”
Same; Same; Same; View that the assailed resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) are
violative of the constitutional directive that no religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political
rights.—The assailed resolutions of the COMELEC are violative of the constitutional directive that no religious
test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. Ang Ladlad’s right of political participation
was unduly infringed when the COMELEC, swayed by the private biases and personal prejudices of its
constituent members, arrogated unto itself the role of a religious court or worse, a morality police.
Same; Same; Same; View that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) capitalized on Ang
Ladlad’s definition of the term “sexual orientation,” as well as its citation of the number of Filipino men who
have sex with men, as basis for the declaration that the party espouses and advocates sexual immorality; This
position would deny homosexual and bixesual individuals a fundamental element of personal identity and a
legitimate exercise of personal liberty.—The COMELEC capitalized on Ang Ladlad’s definition of the term
“sexual orientation,” as well as its citation of the number of Filipino men who have sex with men, as basis for
the declaration that the party espouses and advocates sexual immorality. This position, how-
37
VOL. 618, APRIL 8, 2010

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections

ever, would deny homosexual and bisexual individuals a fundamental element of personal identity and a
legitimate exercise of personal liberty. For, the “ability to [independently] define one’s identity that is central
to any concept of liberty” cannot truly be exercised in a vacuum; we all depend on the “emotional enrichment
from close ties with others.”
Same; Same; Same; View that at the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.—It has been said that freedom extends beyond
spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression,
and certain intimate conduct. These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by
the due process clause. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning,
of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes
of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.
Same; Same; Same; View that a classification based on gender or sexual orientation is a quasi-suspect
classification, as to trigger a heightened level of review.—The ponencia of Mr. Justice Del Castillo refused to
characterize homosexuals and bisexuals as a class in themselves for purposes of the equal protection clause.
Accordingly, it struck down the assailed Resolutions using the most liberal basis of judicial scrutiny, the
rational basis test, according to which government need only show that the challenged classification is
rationally related to serving a legitimate state interest. I humbly submit, however, that a classification based
on gender or sexual orientation is a quasi-suspect classification, as to trigger a heightened level of review.
Same; Same; Same; View that gay persons are entitled to heightened constitutional protection despite some
recent political progress.—It would not be difficult to conclude that gay persons are entitled to heightened
constitutional protection despite some recent political progress. The discrimination that they have suffered
has been so pervasive and severe—even though their sexual orientation has no bearing at all on their ability
to contribute to or perform in
 38
38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections

society—that it is highly unlikely that legislative enactments alone will suffice to eliminate that
discrimination.
Same; Same; Same; View that any state action singling lesbians, gays, bisexuals and trans-genders out for
disparate treatment is subject to heightened judicial scrutiny to ensure that it is not the product of historical
prejudice and stereotyping.—It is therefore respectfully submitted that any state action singling lesbians, gays,
bisexuals and trans-genders out for disparate treatment is subject to heightened judicial scrutiny to ensure
that it is not the product of historical prejudice and stereotyping.
Same; Same; Same; View that the position that the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT)
community cannot participate in the party-list system because it is not a “marginalized and underrepresented
sector” is belied by the Supreme Court ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. COMELEC, where the
Court held that the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive .—It has been
suggested that the LGBT community cannot participate in the party-list system because it is not a
“marginalized and underrepresented sector” enumerated either in the Constitution or Republic Act No. (RA)
7941. However, this position is belied by our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC, 359
SCRA 698 (2001), where we clearly held that the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors
in RA 7941 is not exclusive.
CORONA, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Party-List System; View that the party-list system is essentially a tool for
the advancement of social justice with the fundamental purpose of affording opportunity to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors to participate in the shaping of public policy and the crafting of national laws .—The
party-list system is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. It is essentially a tool for the advancement of
social justice with the fundamental purpose of affording opportunity to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors to participate in the shaping of public policy and the crafting of national laws. It is premised on the
proposition that the advancement of the interests of the marginalized sectors contributes to the advancement
of the common good and of our nation’s democratic ideals.
39
VOL. 618, APRIL 8, 2010

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections

Same; Same; Same; Congress; View that the Constitution left the matter of determining the groups or
sectors that may qualify as “marginalized” to the hands of Congress.—The Constitution left the matter of
determining the groups or sectors that may qualify as “marginalized” to the hands of Congress. Pursuant to
this constitutional mandate, RA 7941 or the Party-List System Act was enacted in 1995.
Same; Same; Same; View that the Supreme Court stressed that the party-list system is reserved only for
those sectors marginalized and underrepresented in the past.—In Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party, 359
SCRA 698 (2001), the Court stressed that the party-list system is reserved only for those sectors marginalized
and underrepresented in the past (e.g., labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, professionals and even those
in the underground movement who wish to come out and participate). They are those sectors traditionally
and historically marginalized and deprived of an opportunity to participate in the formulation of national
policy although their sectoral interests are also traditionally and historically regarded as vital to the national
interest.
Same; Same; Same; View that the concept of marginalized and underrepresented sectors under the party-
list scheme has been carefully refined by concrete examples involving sectors deemed to be significant in our
legal tradition.—The concept of marginalized and underrepresented sectors under the party-list scheme has
been carefully refined by concrete examples involving sectors deemed to be significant in our legal tradition.
They are essentially sectors with a constitutional bond, that is, specific sectors subject of specific provisions in
the Constitution, namely, labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth,
veterans, fisherfolk, elderly, handicapped, overseas workers and professionals.
Same; Same; Same; View that marginalized sectors should be given a say in governance through the party-
list system, not simply because they desire to say something constructive but because they deserve to be heard on
account of their traditionally and historically decisive role in Philippine society.—The long-muffled voices of
marginalized sectors must be heard because their respective interests are intimately and indispensably
woven into the fabric of the na-
40
40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections

tional democratic agenda. The social, economic and political aspects of discrimination and
marginalization should not be divorced from the role of a particular sector or group in the advancement of
the collective goals of Philippine society as a whole. In other words, marginalized sectors should be given a
say in governance through the party-list system, not simply because they desire to say something
constructive but because they deserve to be heard on account of their traditionally and historically decisive
role in Philippine society.
Same; Same; Same; View that the majority’s decision is cryptic and wanting when it makes short shrift of
the issue of whether petitioner is a marginalized and underrepresented sector.—The enumeration of sectors
considered as marginalized and underrepresented in the fundamental law and in the implementing law (RA
7941) cannot be without significance. To ignore them is to disregard the texts of the Constitution and of RA
7941. For, indeed, the very first of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party’s eight guidelines for screening party-
list participants is this: the parties, sectors or organizations “must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941.” For this reason, I submit the majority’s decision
is cryptic and wanting when it makes short shrift of the issue of whether petitioner is a marginalized and
underrepresented sector in the following manner.
Same; Same; Same; View that marginalized sectors qualified to participate in the party-list system but not
mentioned in Section 5(2), Article VI are “such other sectors as may be provided by law” duly enacted by
Congress.—Marginalized sectors qualified to participate in the party-list system but not mentioned in Section
5(2), Article VI are “such other sectors as may be provided by law” duly enacted by Congress. It is also
consistent with the basic canon of statutory construction, ejusdem generis, which requires that a general word
or phrase that follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class, the general word or
phrase should be construed to include, or to be restricted to persons, things or cases, akin to, resembling, or
of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned.
Same; Same; Same; View that even assuming that petitioner was able to show that the community of
lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transsexuals (LGBT) is underrepresented, it cannot be properly con-
41
VOL. 618, APRIL 8, 2010

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections

 sidered as marginalized under the party-list system.—Even assuming that petitioner was able to show
that the community of lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transsexuals (LGBT) is underrepresented, it cannot be
properly considered as marginalized under the party-list system. First, petitioner is not included in the
sectors mentioned in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 5 of RA 7941. Unless an overly
strained interpretation is resorted to, the LGBT sector cannot establish a close connection to any of the said
sectors. Indeed, petitioner does not even try to show its link to any of the said sectors. Rather, it represents
itself as an altogether distinct sector with its own peculiar interests and agenda.
Same; Same; Same; View that only sectors expressly or closely related to those sectors mentioned in Section
5 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 are qualified to participate in the party-list system.—In this instance, Congress,
in the exercise of its authority under Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, enacted RA 7941. Sections 2,
3(d) and (5) of the said law instituted a policy when it enumerated certain sectors as qualified marginalized
and underrepresented sectors under the party-list system. Respect for that policy and fidelity to the Court’s
duty in our scheme of government require us to declare that only sectors expressly mentioned or closely
related to those sectors mentioned in Section 5 of RA 7941 are qualified to participate in the party-list system.
Same; Same; Same; View that until and unless Congress amends the law to include the Lesbian, Gay,
Bisexual and Transgender (LGBTs) and other sectors in the party-list system, deference to Congress’
determination on the matter is proper.—The Court is called upon to exercise judicial restraint in this case by
strictly adhering to, rather than expanding, legislative policy on the matter of marginalized sectors as
expressed in the enumeration in Section 5 of RA 7941. The Court has no power to amend and expand Sections
2, 3(d) and 5 of RA 7941 in the guise of interpretation. The Constitution expressly and exclusively vests the
authority to determine “such other [marginalized] sectors” qualified to participate in the party-list system to
Congress. Thus, until and unless Congress amends the law to include the LGBT and other sectors in the party-
list system, deference to Congress’ determination on the matter is proper.
Same; Same; Same; View that the party-list system was not designed as a tool to advocate tolerance and
acceptance of any and all
42
42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections

socially misunderstood sectors.—While bigotry, social stereotyping and other forms of discrimination
must be given no place in a truly just, democratic and libertarian society, the party-list system has a well-
defined purpose. The party-list system was not designed as a tool to advocate tolerance and acceptance of any
and all socially misunderstood sectors. Rather, it is a platform for the realization of the aspirations of
marginalized sectors whose interests are, by nature and history, also the nation’s but which interests have
not been sufficiently brought to public attention because of these sectors’ underrepresentation.
Same; Same; Same; View that Congress was given by the Constitution full discretion to determine what
sectors may qualify as marginalized and underrepresented, the Court’s task is to respect that legislative
determination by strictly adhering to it.—Congress was given by the Constitution full discretion to determine
what sectors may qualify as marginalized and underrepresented. The Court’s task is to respect that legislative
determination by strictly adhering to it. If we effectively and unduly expand such congressional
determination, we will be dabbling in policy-making, an act of political will and not of judicial judgment.
ABAD, J., Separate Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Party-List System; View that the underlying policy of Republic Act No.
7941 or The Party-List System Act is to give the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society an
opportunity to take a direct part in enacting the laws of the land.—The underlying policy of R.A. 7941 or The
Party-List System Act is to give the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society an opportunity to
take a direct part in enacting the laws of the land. In Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), 359 SCRA 698 (2001), the Court laid down guidelines for accreditation, but these seem
to leave the COMELEC like everyone else even more perplexed and dumbfounded about what organizations,
clubs, or associations can pass for sectoral parties with a right to claim a seat in the House of Representatives.
The Court can, in adjudicating this case, unravel some of the difficulties.
Same; Same; Same; View that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) erred when it denied Ang Ladlad’s
petition for sectoral party accreditation on religious and moral grounds—the COMELEC
43
VOL. 618, APRIL 8, 2010

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections

has never applied these tests on regular candidates for Congress.—Here, I fully agree that the COMELEC
erred when it denied Ang Ladlad’s petition for sectoral party accreditation on religious and moral grounds.
The COMELEC has never applied these tests on regular candidates for Congress. There is no reason for it to
apply them on Ang Ladlad. But the ponencia already amply and lucidly discussed this point.
Same; Same; Same; View that a reading of Ang Bagong Bayani will show that, based on the Court’s reading,
neither the Constitution nor Republic Act No. 7941 intends the excessively limited coverage that the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) now suggests.—The COMELEC’s proposition imposes an unwarranted restriction
which is inconsistent with the purpose and spirit of the Constitution and the law. A reading of  Ang Bagong
Bayani will show that, based on the Court’s reading, neither the Constitution nor R.A. 7941 intends the
excessively limited coverage that the COMELEC now suggests. In fact, the Court said in that case that the list in
R.A. 7941 is not exclusive. Thus, while the party-list system is not meant for all sectors of society, it was
envisioned as a social justice tool for the marginalized and underrepresented in general.
Same; Same; Same; View that Congress did not provide a definition of the term “marginalized and
underrepresented.”—Congress did not provide a definition of the term “marginalized and underrepresented.”
Nor did the Court dare provide one in its decision in Ang Bagong Bayani. It is possible, however, to get a sense
of what Congress intended in adopting such term. No doubt, Congress crafted that term—marginalized and
underrepresented—from its reading of the concrete examples that the Constitution itself gives of groupings
that are entitled to accreditation. These examples are the labor, the peasant, the urban poor, the indigenous
cultural minorities, the women, and the youth sectors. Fortunately, quite often ideas are best described by
examples of what they are, which was what those who drafted the 1987 Constitution did, rather than by an
abstract description of them.
Same; Same; Same; View that an interpretation that will allow concretely or specifically defined groups to
seek election as a separate party-list sector by itself will result in riot and redundancy in the mix of sectoral
parties grabbing seats in the House of Representatives.—An interpretation that will allow concretely or
specifically defined
44
44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections

groups to seek election as a separate party-list sector by itself will result in riot and redundancy in the
mix of sectoral parties grabbing seats in the House of Representatives. It will defeat altogether the objectives
of the party-list system. If they can muster enough votes, the country may have a party-list of pedicab drivers
and another of tricycle drivers. There will be an irrational apportionment of party-list seats in the legislature.
Same; Same; Same; View that applying the universally accepted estimate that one out of every 10 persons is
a Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBTs) of a certain kind, the Filipino LGBTs should now stand at
about 8.7 million.—In this case, Ang Ladlad represents men and women who identify themselves as lesbians,
gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered persons (LGBTs). Applying the universally accepted estimate that one out
of every 10 persons is an LGBT of a certain kind, the Filipino LGBTs should now stand at about 8.7 million.
Despite this, however, they are by and large, subtly if not brutally, excluded from the mainstream,
discriminated against, and persecuted. That the COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad’s petition on religious and
moral grounds is proof of this discrimination.
Same; Same; Same; View that Ang Ladlad has amply proved that it meets the requirements for sectoral
party accreditation—their members are in the vulnerable class like the women and the youth.—Ang Ladlad has
amply proved that it meets the requirements for sectoral party accreditation. Their members are in the
vulnerable class like the women and the youth. Ang Ladlad represents a narrow definition of its class (LGBTs)
rather than a concrete and specific definition of a sub-group within the class (group of gay beauticians, for
example). The people that Ang Ladlad seeks to represent have a national presence.

G.R. No. 204819. April 8, 2014.*

JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor children, LUCIA
CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER,
INC., petitioners, vs. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary,
Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON.
ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, respondents. 
G.R. No. 204934. April 8, 2014.*
ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES, INC. [ALFI], represented by its President, Maria
Concepcion S. Noche, Spouses Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B. Luistro, Jose S. Sandejas & Elenita S.A. Sandejas,
Arturo M. Gorrez & Marietta C. Gorrez, Salvador S. Mante, Jr. & Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M. Bautista &
Maria Felisa S. Bautista, Desiderio Racho & Traquilina Racho, Fernand Antonio A. Tansingco & Carol Anne C.
Tansingco for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Therese Antonette C. Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose
C. Tansingco, Miguel Fernando C. Tangsingco, Carlo Josemaria C. Tansingco & Juan Paolo C. Tansingco,
Spouses Mariano V. Araneta & Eileen Z. Araneta for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Ramon
Carlos Z. Araneta & Maya Angelica Z. Araneta, Spouses Renato C. Castor & Mildred C. Castor for themselves
and on behalf of their minor children, Renz Jeffrey C. Castor, Joseph Ramil C. Castor, John Paul C. Castor &
Raphael C. Castor, Spouses Alexander R. Racho & Zara Z. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor
children Margarita Racho, Mikaela Racho, Martin Racho, Mari Racho & Manolo Racho, Spouses Alfred R. Racho
& Francine V. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor children Michael Racho,
147
Mariana Racho, Rafael Racho, Maxi Racho, Chessie Racho & Laura Racho, Spouses David R. Racho & Armilyn A.
Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor child Gabriel Racho, Mindy M. Juatas and on behalf of her
minor children Elijah Gerald Juatas and Elian Gabriel Juatas, Salvacion M. Monteiro, Emily R. Laws, Joseph R.
Laws & Katrina R. Laws, petitioners, vs. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T.
ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture
and Sports, HON. CORAZON SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Development, HON.
MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ARSENIO M. BALISACAN, Socio-Economic Planning
Secretary and NEDA Director-General, THE PHILIPPINE COMMISSION ON WOMEN, represented by its
Chairperson, Remedios Ignacio-Rikken, THE PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION, represented
by its President Eduardo Banzon, THE LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its
President Alfonso Umali, THE LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Oscar
Rodriguez, and THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Donato
Marcos, respondents. 
G.R. No. 204957. April 8, 2014.*
TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE VISAYAS, INC. and VALERIANO S. AVILA, petitioners, vs. HON. PAQUITO
N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education; and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, respondents.
 
148
G.R. No. 204988. April 8, 2014.*
SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, INC., represented by Dr. Nestor B. Lumicao, M.D., as President and in his
personal capacity, ROSEVALE FOUNDATION INC., represented by Dr. Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D., as member of
the school board and in his personal capacity, ROSEMARIE R. ALENTON, IMELDA G. IBARRA, CPA, LOVENIA P.
NACES, Phd., ANTHONY G. NAGAC, EARL ANTHONY C. GAMBE and MARLON I. YAP, petitioners, vs.OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA,
JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management; HON.
ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government,
respondents. 
G.R. No. 205003. April 8, 2014.*
EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR., petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and HON.
SOLICITOR GENERAL, respondents. 
G.R. No. 205043. April 8, 2014.*
EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE CATHOLIC XYBRSPACE APOSTOLATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
petitioners, vs. DOH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA, FDA DIRECTOR SUZETTE H. LAZO, DBM SECRETARY
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, DILG SECRETARY MANUEL A. ROXAS II, DECS SECRETARY ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
respondents. 
G.R. No. 205138. April 8, 2014.*
PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF XSEMINARIANS, INC. (PAX), herein represented by its National President, Atty.
Ricardo
149
M. Ribo, and in his own behalf, Atty. Lino E.A. Dumas, Romeo B. Almonte, Osmundo C. Orlanes, Arsenio Z.
Menor, Samuel J. Yap, Jaime F. Mateo, Rolly Siguan, Dante E. Magdangal, Michael Eugenio O. Plana, Bienvenido
C. Miguel, Jr., Landrito M. Diokno and Baldomero Falcone, petitioners, vs.  HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON.
ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education, HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, HON.
CORAZON J. SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Development, HON. ARSENIO
BALISACAN, Director-General, National Economic and Development Authority, HON. SUZETTE H. LAZO,
Director-General, Food and Drug Administration, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation, and THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Philippine Commission on Women, respondents. 
G.R. No. 205478. April 8, 2014.*
REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D., JACQUELINE H. KING, M.D., CYNTHIA T. DOMINGO, M.D., AND JOSEPHINE
MILLADO-LUMITAO, M.D., collectively known as Doctors For Life, and ANTHONY PEREZ, MICHAEL ANTHONY
G. MAPA, CARLOS ANTONIO PALAD, WILFREDO JOSE, CLAIRE NAVARRO, ANNA COSIO, and GABRIEL DY
LIACCO collectively known as Filipinos For Life, petitioners, vs. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive
Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management; HON.
ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary of the
Department of Education; and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
Government, respondents.
150
G.R. No. 205491. April 8, 2014.*
SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. TATAD AND MARIA FENNY C. TATAD & ALA F. PAGUIA, for themselves, their
Posterity, and the rest of Filipino posterity, petitioners, vs.  OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT of the Republic of the
Philippines, respondent. 
G.R. No. 205720. April 8, 2014.*
PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc., represented by Lorna Melegrito, as Executive Director, and in her
personal capacity, JOSELYN B. BASILIO, ROBERT Z. CORTES, ARIEL A. CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I. GATDULA,
CRISTINA A. MONTES, RAUL ANTONIO A. NIDOY, WINSTON CONRAD B. PADOJINOG, RUFINO L. POLICARPIO
III, petitioners, vs.OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Secretary, Department of Education and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and
Local Government, respondents. 
G.R. No. 206355. April 8, 2014.*
MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION, INC., ATTY. RAMON PEDROSA, ATTY. CITA BORROMEO-GARCIA, STELLA
ACEDERA, ATTY. BERTENI CATALUÑ A CAUSING, petitioners, vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, respondents. 
G.R. No. 207111. April 8, 2014.*
JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M. IMBONG, ANTHONY VICTORIO B. LUMICAO, JOSEPH MARTIN Q. VERDEJO,
151
ANTONIA EMMA R. ROXAS and LOTA LAT-GUERRERO, petitioners, vs. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON.
ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, respondents. 
G.R. No. 207172. April 8, 2014.*
COUPLES FOR CHRIST FOUNDATION, INC., SPOUSES JUAN CARLOS ARTADI SARMIENTO AND FRANCESCA
ISABELLE BESINGA-SARMIENTO, AND SPOUSES LUIS FRANCIS A. RODRIGO, JR. and DEBORAH MARIE
VERONICA N. RODRIGO, petitioners, vs.  HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO
B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department
of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON.
MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, respondents. 
G.R. No. 207563. April 8, 2014.*
ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and ABDULHUSSEIN M. KASHIM, petitioners, vs. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of Health, and HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary of the Department of Education, respondents. 
Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our
system of government, which obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. —
In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the actions of the Executive and the
Legislature, it is often sought that the Court temper its exercise of judicial power
152
and accord due respect to the wisdom of its co-equal branch on the basis of the principle of separation of
powers. To be clear, the separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government, which
obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.
Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines; (b) the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines; and (c) the judicial
power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. The
Constitution has truly blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, the allotment of powers among the
three branches of government.
 Same; Same; Judicial Review; The Constitution impresses upon the Supreme Court to respect the acts
performed by a co-equal branch done within its sphere of competence and authority, but at the same time,
allows it to cross the line of separation — but only at a very limited and specific point — to determine whether
the acts of the executive and the legislative branches are null because they were undertaken with grave abuse of
discretion.—In times of social disquietude or political instability, the great landmarks of the Constitution are
apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In order to address this, the Constitution impresses
upon the Court to respect the acts performed by a co-equal branch done within its sphere of competence and
authority, but at the same time, allows it to cross the line of separation — but only at a very limited and
specific point — to determine whether the acts of the executive and the legislative branches are null because
they were undertaken with grave abuse of discretion. Thus, while the Court may not pass upon questions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of the RH Law, it may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave
abuse of discretion results. The Court must demonstrate its unflinching commitment to protect those
cherished rights and principles embodied in the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four
exacting requisites, viz.: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus
standi; (c) the question of constitutional-
153
ity must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of
the case.—In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, “judicial review is
essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers
among the three great departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries
of authority and control between them. To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of
participation — or instrument of intervention — of the judiciary in that balancing operation. Lest it be
misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled authority to rule on just any
and every claim of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial
review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz.: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the
petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.
Same; Same; Same; Actual Case or Controversy; Words and Phrases; An actual case or controversy means
an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest
the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.—An actual case or controversy means an
existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest
the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. The rule is that courts do not sit to adjudicate
mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy
must be justiciable — definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal
interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one
hand, and a denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical
question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through
a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts.
Same; Same; Same; Same; For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that
something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture,
and the petitioner must allege the existence of an
154
immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action.—Corollary to the
requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.
For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been
accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner
must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action.
He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of
the act complained.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Facial Challenges; While the Supreme Court has withheld the application of
facial challenges to strictly penal statutes, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free
speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights.—In this jurisdiction, the
application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with some
modifications. While this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statutes, it
has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious
freedom, and other fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its
counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not
only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also  to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the framers of Our
Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the
Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Locus Standi; Words and Phrases; Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a
personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the challenged governmental act; The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the
statute grounded on a violation of the rights of third persons not before the court.—Locus standi or legal
standing is defined as a personal and
155
substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of
the challenged governmental act. It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. In relation to locus standi, the “as applied challenge”
embodies the rule that one can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his
own rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a
violation of the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against
third-party standing.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Reproductive Health Law; The Reproductive Health (RH) Law drastically affects
the constitutional provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of religion and expression and other
constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of contraception and reproductive health
have already caused deep division among a broad spectrum of society, the Supreme Court entertains no doubt
that the petitions raise issues of transcendental importance warranting immediate court adjudication.—In view
of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to the bench and bar, the
issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects the
constitutional provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of religion and expression and other
constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of contraception and reproductive health
have already caused deep division among a broad spectrum of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the
petitions raise issues of transcendental importance warranting immediate court adjudication. More
importantly, considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue,
the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away before taking action. The Court cannot, and should not,
exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights enshrined in the Constitution are being imperilled to be
violated. To do so, when the life of either the mother or her child is at stake, would lead to irreparable
consequences.
Same; Statutes; One-Subject-One-Title Rule; The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the
title of a law must not be “so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be
156
informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either
in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in
omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act.”—The one subject/one title rule
expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be “so uncertain that the average person reading it
would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is
misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced
in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act.” Considering the
close intimacy between “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” which bears to the attainment of
the goal of achieving “sustainable human development” as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to
believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.
Reproductive Health Law; The use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the Philippines is not
of recent vintage.—As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the
Philippines is not of recent vintage. From the enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled “An Act To Regulate The
Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices” on June 18, 1966, prescribing rules
on contraceptive drugs and devices which prevent fertilization, to the promotion of male vasectomy and tubal
ligation, and the ratification of numerous international agreements, the country has long recognized the need
to promote population control through the use of contraceptives in order to achieve long-term economic
development. Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and other family planning methods
evolved from being a component of demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of public
health, particularly, reproductive health.
Same; Life begins at fertilization.—The ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization. In
answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the particular phrase of Section 12
which reads: Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the
unbornfrom conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the
157
youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government. Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is
undisputable because before conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For said reason, it is no surprise that
the Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to conception or when life begins. The problem has
arisen because, amazingly, there are quarters who have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that
conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the view that life begins at implantation. Hence,
the issue of when life begins. In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is
synonymous with “fertilization” of the female ovum by the male sperm. On the other side of the spectrum are
those who assert that conception refers to the “implantation” of the fertilized ovum in the uterus.
Same; Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Laws; It is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution
emphasized that the State shall provide equal protection to both the mother and the unborn child from the
earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and the female ovum.
—It is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution emphasized that the State shall provide equal protection
to both the mother and the unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon fertilization or
upon the union of the male sperm and the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers of the
Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from enacting measures that would allow it determine when
life begins.
Same; Same; Contraceptives; The Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives for
being unconstitutional; Contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive and
thus prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the female
ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus,
constitutionally permissible.—The Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives for
being unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, spearheading the need to have a
constitutional provision on the right to life, recognized that the determination of whether a contraceptive
device is an abortifacient is a question of fact which should be left to the courts to decide on based on
established evidence. From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill
158
or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely,
contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and those that
similarly take action prior to fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally
permissible.
Same; Conception; Words and Phrases; Mosby’s Medical, Nursing, and Allied Health Dictionary defines
conception as “the beginning of pregnancy usually taken to be the instant a spermatozoon enters an ovum and
forms a viable zygote”; The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics), used by medical
schools in the Philippines, also concludes that human life (human person) begins at the moment of fertilization
with the union of the egg and the sperm resulting in the formation of a new individual, with a unique genetic
composition that dictates all developmental stages that ensue.—That conception begins at fertilization is not
bereft of medical foundation. Mosby’s Medical, Nursing, and Allied Health Dictionary defines conception as “the
beginning of pregnancy usually taken to be the instant a spermatozoon enters an ovum and forms a viable
zygote.” It describes fertilization as “the union of male and female gametes to form a zygote from which the
embryo develops.” The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics), used by medical
schools in the Philippines, also concludes that human life (human person) begins at the moment of
fertilization with the union of the egg and the sperm resulting in the formation of a new individual, with a
unique genetic composition that dictates all developmental stages that ensue. Similarly, recent medical
research on the matter also reveals that: “Human development begins after the union of male and female
gametes or germ cells during a process known as fertilization (conception). Fertilization is a sequence of
events that begins with the contact of a sperm (spermatozoon) with a secondary oocyte (ovum) and ends
with the fusion of their pronuclei (the haploid nuclei of the sperm and ovum) and the mingling of their
chromosomes to form a new cell. This fertilized ovum, known as a zygote, is a large diploid cell that is the
beginning, or primordium, of a human being.”
Same; Same; In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and
more importantly, following the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a
zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well-defined
moment
159
of conception, that is, upon fertilization.—In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood
under medical parlance, and more importantly, following the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the
undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being
commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization.
Same; Same While the Supreme Court has opted not to make any determination when life begins, it finds
that the Reproductive Health (RH) Law itself clearly mandates that protection be afforded from the moment of
fertilization.—The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life
of the unborn from conception was to prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. It
was so clear that even the Court cannot interpret it otherwise. This intent of the Framers was captured in the
record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. x x x A reading of the RH Law would show
that it is in line with this intent and actually proscribes abortion. While the Court has opted not to make any
determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that protection
be afforded from the moment of fertilization. As pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH Law is replete with
provisions that embody the policy of the law to protect to the fertilized ovum and that it should be afforded
safe travel to the uterus for implantation. Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under
Article 256 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes the destruction or expulsion of the fertilized ovum.
Same; Abortifacients; In carrying out its declared policy, the Reproductive Health (RH) Law is consistent in
prohibiting abortifacients.—In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in prohibiting
abortifacients. To be clear, Section 4(a) of the RH Law defines an abortifacient as: Section 4. Definition of
Terms—x x x x (a) Abortifacientrefers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus
inside the mother’s womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s
womb upon determination of the FDA. As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be
afforded from the moment of fertilization. By using the word “or,” the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or
devices that prevent implantation, but also those that in-
160
duce abortion and those that induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb. Thus, an
abortifacient is any drug or device that either: (a) Induces abortion; or (b) Induces the destruction of a fetus
inside the mother’s womb; or (c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s
womb, upon determination of the FDA.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; As defined by the Reproductive Health (RH) Law, any drug or device that
induces abortion, that is, which kills or destroys the fertilized ovum or prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and
be implanted in the mother’s womb, is an abortifacient.—Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners,
the Court finds that the RH Law, consistent with the Constitution, recognizes that the fertilized ovum already
has life and that the State has a bounden duty to protect it. The conclusion becomes clear because the RH
Law, first, prohibits any drug or device that induces abortion (first kind), which, as discussed exhaustively
above, refers to that which induces the killing or the destruction of the fertilized ovum, and, second, prohibits
any drug or device the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb (third kind). By
expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother’s womb is an abortifacient (third kind), the RH Law does not intend to mean at all that life only begins
only at implantation, as Hon. Lagman suggests. It also does not declare either that protection will only be
given upon implantation, as the petitioners likewise suggest. Rather, it recognizes that: one, there is a need to
protect the fertilized ovum which already has life, and two, the fertilized ovum must be protected the moment
it becomes existent — all the way until it reaches and implants in the mother’s womb. After all, if life is only
recognized and afforded protection from the moment the fertilized ovum implants — there is nothing to
prevent any drug or device from killing or destroying the fertilized ovum prior to implantation. From the
foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to the fertilized ovum, the RH Law does not
sanction abortion. To repeat, it is the Court’s position that life begins at fertilization, not at implantation.
When a fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine wall, its viability is sustained but that instance of
implantation is not the point of beginning of life. It started earlier. And as defined by the RH Law,  any drug or
device that induces abortion, that is, which kills or de-
161
stroys the fertilized ovum or prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother’s womb, is an abortifacient.
Same; Contraceptives; Evidently, with the addition of the word “primarily,” in Section 3.01(a) and (j) of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Law (RH-IRR) is indeed ultra vires. It contravenes Section 4(a) of
the Reproductive Health (RH) Law and should, therefore, be declared invalid. There is danger that the insertion
of the qualifier “primarily” will pave the way for the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the
life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution. —
Evidently, with the addition of the word “primarily,” in Section 3.01(a) and (j) of the RH-IRR is indeed  ultra
vires. It contravenes Section 4(a) of the RH Law and should, therefore, be declared invalid. There is danger
that the insertion of the qualifier “primarily” will pave the way for the approval of contraceptives which may
harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the
Constitution. With such qualification in the RH-IRR, it appears to insinuate that a contraceptive will only be
considered as an “abortifacient” if its sole known effect is abortion or, as pertinent here, the prevention of the
implantation of the fertilized ovum. For the same reason, this definition of “contraceptive” would permit the
approval of contraceptives which are actually abortifacients because of their fair-sale mechanism.
Same; Same; Consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in line with the principle
that laws should be construed in a manner that its constitutionality is sustained, the Reproductive Health (RH)
Law and its implementing rules must be consistent with each other in prohibiting abortion. —Indeed, consistent
with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in line with the principle that laws should be
construed in a manner that its constitutionality is sustained, the RH Law and its implementing rules must be
consistent with each other in prohibiting abortion. Thus, the word “primarily” in Section 3.01(a) and (j) of the
RH-IRR should be declared void. To uphold the validity of Section 3.01(a) and (j) of the RH-IRR and prohibit
only those contraceptives that have the primary effect of being an abortive would effectively “open the
floodgates to the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution.”
162
Same; Same; With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate safeguards to ensure the public that only
contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public.—The legislative intent in the enactment of the
RH Law in this regard is to leave intact the provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There is no intention at all to do away
with it. It is still a good law and its requirements are still in to be complied with. Thus, the Court agrees with
the observation of respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated
proliferation of contraceptives since the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and
devices will still require the prescription of a licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists
adequate safeguards to ensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe are made available to the
public.
Same; Same; In the distribution by the Department of Health of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must
consider the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4729, which is still in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives
that it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual
dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and devices will done following a prescription of a qualified medical
practitioner.—In the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider the
provisions of R.A. No. 4729, which is still in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will procure shall
be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual dispensation of these
contraceptive drugs and devices will done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner. The
distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not be indiscriminately done. The public health must be
protected by all possible means. As pointed out by Justice De Castro, a heavy responsibility and burden are
assumed by the government in supplying contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be held accountable for
any injury, illness or loss of life resulting from or incidental to their use.
Same; Same; The Supreme Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal
contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient.—At this point, the Court is of the
strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal contraceptives and intrauterine devices are safe
and non-
163
abortifacient. The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug Formulary
in the EDL by using the mandatory “shall” is to be construed as operative only after they have been tested,
evaluated, and approved by the FDA. The FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a
particular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and non-abortifacient. The provision of the
third sentence concerning the requirements for the inclusion or removal of a particular family planning
supply from the EDL supports this construction.
Constitutional Law; Separation of Church and State; Generally, the State cannot meddle in the internal
affairs of the church, much less question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and
discriminate against another.—The principle of separation of Church and State was, thus, enshrined in Article
II, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, viz.: Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual respect. Generally, the State cannot
meddle in the internal affairs of the church, much less question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It
cannot favor one religion and discriminate against another. On the other hand, the church cannot impose its
beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot demand that the nation follow its
beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the country. Consistent with the principle that not
any one religion should ever be preferred over another, the Constitution in the above-cited provision utilizes
the term “church” in its generic sense, which refers to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any other house of
God which metaphorically symbolizes a religious organization. Thus, the “Church” means the religious
congregations collectively.
Same; Religious Freedom; Free Exercise Clause; Establishment Clause; The constitutional assurance of
religious freedom provides two guarantees: the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. —In short,
the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the Establishment Clause and
the Free Exercise Clause. The establishment clause “principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any
religion or favoring any religion as against other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among
religious groups.” Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state religion and the use of public resources
for the support or prohibition of a religion. On the other hand, the basis of the free
164
exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience. Under this part of religious
freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly interfering with the outside manifestations of one’s
belief and faith.
Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality; In case of conflict between the free exercise clause
and the State, the Supreme Court adheres to the doctrine of benevolent neutrality.—In case of conflict between
the free exercise clause and the State, the Court adheres to the doctrine of benevolent neutrality. This has
been clearly decided by the Court in Estrada v. Escritor, 492 SCRA 1 (2006), (Escritor) where it was stated
“that benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and
framework underlying the Philippine Constitution.” In the same case, it was further explained that:
The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental actions, accommodation of
religion may be allowed, not to promote the government’s favored form of religion, but to allow individuals
and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. “The purpose of accommodation is to remove a
burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s religion.” “What is sought under the  theory
of accommodation is not a declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from
its application or its ‘burdensome effect,’ whether by the legislature or the courts.” In ascertaining the limits
of the exercise of religious freedom, the compelling state interest test is proper. Underlying the compelling
state interest test is the notion that free exercise is a fundamental right and that laws burdening it should be
subject to strict scrutiny.
Same; Reproductive Health Law; Religious Freedom; While the Supreme Court stands without authority to
rule on ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to determine whether the
Reproductive Health (RH) Law contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom.—In the case at bench, it is not
within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of contraceptives or one’s participation in the
support of modern reproductive health measures is moral from a religious standpoint or whether the same is
right or wrong according to one’s dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters dealing with “faith,
practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church...are unquestionably
ecclesiastical matters which
165
are outside the province of the civil courts.” The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and
secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench should be understood only
in this realm where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands without authority to rule on
ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to determine whether the RH
Law contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom.
Same; Same; Same; The State is not precluded to pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being
dictated upon by the policies of any one religion.—In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts
what the government can do with religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do with the
government. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for
everyone, nor can they not cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would
cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establishing a state religion. Consequently, the
petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot enhance its population control program
through the RH Law simply because the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs.
Indeed, the State is not precluded to pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by
the policies of any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience.
The demarcation line between Church and State demands that one render unto Caesar the things that are
Caesar’s and unto God the things that are God’s.
Same; Same; Same; Compelling Interest Test; The conscientious objector’s claim to religious freedom would
warrant an exemption from obligations under the Reproductive Health Law, unless the government succeeds in
demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the accomplishment of an important secular objective. —In a
situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by government legislation or practice,
the compelling state interest test in line with the Court’s espousal of the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in
Escritor, finds application. In this case, the conscientious objector’s claim to religious freedom would warrant
an exemption from obligations under the RH Law, unless the government succeeds in demonstrating a more
compelling state interest in the accomplishment of an important secular objective. Necessarily so,
166
the plea of conscientious objectors for exemption from the RH Law deserves no less than strict scrutiny.
Same; Same; Same; The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the Reproductive Health
Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector.—The Court is of the view that the
obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious
objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on modern
reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as
he has been compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas
(Commissioner Bernas) has written, at the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of
the human conscience. Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is, however, a
false compromise because it makes pro-life health providers complicit in the performance of an act that they
find morally repugnant or offensive. They cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what they cannot do directly.
One may not be the principal, but he is equally guilty if he abets the offensive act by indirect participation.
Same; Same; Same; In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on
one hand, and the interest of the State, on the other, to provide access and information on reproductive health
products, services, procedures and methods to enable the people to determine the timing, number and spacing of
the birth of their children, the Supreme Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of health providers,
whether public or private, should be accorded primacy.—In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and
moral convictions of individuals, on one hand, and the interest of the State, on the other, to provide access and
information on reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods to enable the people to
determine the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is of the strong view that
the religious freedom of health providers, whether public or private, should be accorded primacy.
Accordingly, a conscientious objectorshould be exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If
he would be compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of “the
principle of non-coercion” enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.
167
Same; Same; Same; The punishment of a healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a
patient to another, or who declines to perform reproductive health procedure on a patient because incompatible
religious beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the Supreme Court cannot allow.—The
Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law endeavour to ensure compliance. Without set
consequences for either an active violation or mere inaction, a law tends to be toothless and ineffectual.
Nonetheless, when what is bartered for an effective implementation of a law is a constitutionally-protected
right the Court firmly chooses to stamp its disapproval. The punishment of a healthcare service provider, who
fails and/or refuses to refer a patient to another, or who declines to perform reproductive health procedure
on a patient because incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which
the Court cannot allow.
 Same; Same; Same; The protection accorded to other conscientious objectors should equally apply to all
medical practitioners without distinction whether they belong to the public or private sector.—The
conscientious objection clause should be equally protective of the religious belief of public health officers.
There is no perceptible distinction why they should not be considered exempt from the mandates of the law.
The protection accorded to other conscientious objectors should equally apply to all medical practitioners
without distinction whether they belong to the public or private sector. After all, the freedom to believe is
intrinsic in every individual and the protective robe that guarantees its free exercise is not taken off even if
one acquires employment in the government.
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free
exercise clause of the conscientious objectors, however few in number.—The Court finds no compelling state
interest which would limit the free exercise clause of the conscientious objectors, however few in number.
Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can
justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy
of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. Freedom of religion means more than just the
freedom to believe. It also means the freedom to act or not to act according to what one believes. And this
freedom is violated when one is compelled to act against one’s belief or is prevented from acting according to
one’s belief.
168
Same; Same; In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the doctor is
morally obliged always to try to save both lives. If, however, it is impossible, the resulting death to one should not
be deliberate.—In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the doctor is
morally obliged always to try to save both lives. If, however, it is impossible, the resulting death to one should
not be deliberate. Atty. Noche explained: Principle of Double-Effect.—May we please remind the principal
author of the RH Bill in the House of Representatives of the principle of double-effect wherein intentional
harm on the life of either the mother of the child is never justified to bring about a “good” effect. In a conflict
situation between the life of the child and the life of the mother, the doctor is  morally obliged always to try to
save both lives. However, he can act in favor of one (not necessarily the mother) when it is medically
impossible to save both, provided that no direct harm is intended to the other. If the above principles are
observed, the loss of the child’s life or the mother’s life is not intentional and, therefore, unavoidable. Hence,
the doctor would not be guilty of abortion or murder. The mother is never pitted against the child because
both their lives are equally valuable. Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures
endangering the life of the child may be resorted to even if is against the religious sentiments of the medical
practitioner. As quoted above, whatever burden imposed upon a medical practitioner in this case would have
been more than justified considering the life he would be able to save.
Same; Same; Police Power; Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15 as a condition for the issuance
of a marriage license, the Supreme Court finds the same to be a reasonable exercise of police power by the
government; All the law requires is for would-be spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning
breastfeeding and infant nutrition.—Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15 as a condition for the
issuance of a marriage license, the Court finds the same to be a reasonable exercise of police power by the
government. A cursory reading of the assailed provision bares that the religious freedom of the petitioners is
not at all violated. All the law requires is for would-be spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood, family
planning breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not even mandate the type of family planning methods to
be included in the seminar, whether they be natural or artificial. As
169
correctly noted by the OSG, those who receive any information during their attendance in the required
seminars are not compelled to accept the information given to them, are completely free to reject the
information they find unacceptable, and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without the
intervention of the State.
Reproductive Health Law; Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter
which belongs to the couple, not just one of them.—Section 3, Art. XV of the Constitution espouses that the
State shall defend the “right of the spouses to found a family.” One person cannot found a family. The right,
therefore, is shared by both spouses. In the same Section 3, their right “to participate in the planning and
implementation of policies and programs that affect them” is equally recognized. The RH Law cannot be
allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making. By giving absolute authority to the spouse who would
undergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse from participating in the decision would drive a wedge
between the husband and wife, possibly result in bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and the family,
all for the sake of reducing the population. This would be a marked departure from the policy of the State to
protect marriage as an inviolable social institution. Decision-making involving a reproductive health
procedure is a private matter which belongs to the couple, not just one of them. Any decision they would
reach would affect their future as a family because the size of the family or the number of their children
significantly matters. The decision whether or not to undergo the procedure belongs exclusively to, and
shared by, both spouses as one cohesive unit as they chart their own destiny. It is a constitutionally
guaranteed private right. Unless it prejudices the State, which has not shown any compelling interest, the
State should see to it that they chart their destiny together as one family.
Same; Parental Consent; Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the minor,
who will be undergoing a procedure, is already a parent or has had a miscarriage.—Equally deplorable is the
debarment of parental consent in cases where the minor, who will be undergoing a procedure, is already a
parent or has had a miscarriage. Section 7 of the RH law provides: SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning.—x x x. No
person shall be denied information and access to family planning services, whether natural or
artificial: Provided, That minors will not be allowed access to modern
170
methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s except when the
minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. There can be no other interpretation of this provision
except that when a minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage, the parents are excluded from the
decision-making process of the minor with regard to family planning. Even if she is not yet emancipated, the
parental authority is already cut off just because there is a need to tame population growth. It is precisely in
such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care, advice, and guidance of her own parents. The
State cannot replace her natural mother and father when it comes to providing her needs and comfort. To say
that their consent is no longer relevant is clearly anti-family. It does not promote unity in the family. It is an
affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family as an inviolable social institution.
Same; Same; Compelling State Interest; The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the
role of parents in the care and custody of a minor child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had
a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a state substitution of their parental authority.—To
insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental control over their minor-child or
the right of the spouses to mutually decide on matters which very well affect the very purpose of marriage,
that is, the establishment of conjugal and family life, would result in the violation of one’s privacy with respect
to his family. It would be dismissive of the unique and strongly-held Filipino tradition of maintaining close
family ties and violative of the recognition that the State affords couples entering into the special contract of
marriage to as one unit in forming the foundation of the family and society. The State cannot, without a
compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the care and custody of a minor child, whether or
not the latter is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a state
substitution of their parental authority.
Same; Access to Information; Principle of Double Effect; Insofar as access to information is concerned, the
Supreme Court finds no constitutional objection to the acquisition of information by the minor referred to under
the exception in the second paragraph of Section 7 that would enable her to take proper care of her own body
and that of her unborn child. After all, Section 12, Article II of the Constitution
171
mandates the State to protect both the life of the mother as that of the unborn child. —There must be a
differentiation between access to information about family planning services, on one hand, and access to the
reproductive health procedures and modern family planning methods themselves, on the other. Insofar as
access to information is concerned, the Court finds no constitutional objection to the acquisition of
information by the minor referred to under the exception in the second paragraph of Section 7 that would
enable her to take proper care of her own body and that of her unborn child. After all, Section 12, Article II of
the Constitution mandates the State to protect both the life of the mother as that of the unborn child.
Considering that information to enable a person to make informed decisions is essential in the protection and
maintenance of ones’ health, access to such information with respect to reproductive health must be allowed.
In this situation, the fear that parents might be deprived of their parental control is unfounded because they
are not prohibited to exercise parental guidance and control over their minor child and assist her in deciding
whether to accept or reject the information received.
Same; Same; Right to Life; No person should be denied the appropriate medical care urgently needed to
preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to life.—As in the case of the conscientious objector, an
exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. In
such cases, the life of the minor who has already suffered a miscarriage and that of the spouse should not be
put at grave risk simply for lack of consent. It should be emphasized that no person should be denied the
appropriate medical care urgently needed to preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to life. In this
connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii) should be struck down. By effectively limiting the
requirement of parental consent to “only in elective surgical procedures,” it denies the parents their right of
parental authority in cases where what is involved are “non-surgical procedures.” Save for the two exceptions
discussed above, and in the case of an abused child as provided in the first sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii),
the parents should not be deprived of their constitutional right of parental authority. To deny them of this
right would be an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family.
Same; Any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the Reproductive Health (RH) Law is premature because
the Department of Educa-
172
tion, Culture and Sports (DECS) has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health
education.—Suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is  premature because
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate
reproductive health education. One can only speculate on the content, manner and medium of instruction that
will be used to educate the adolescents and whether they will contradict the religious beliefs of the
petitioners and validate their apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature of this particular issue,
the Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.
Statutes; Principle of Void for Vagueness; A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to
its application.—A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its application. It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle. Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a statute are vague, words must not only be
taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in relation to other parts of the statute. It is a
rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part of it
must be construed together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment.
Constitutional Law; Reproductive Health Law; Equal Protection of the Law; To provide that the poor are to
be given priority in the government’s reproductive health care program is not a violation of the equal protection
clause; It should be noted that Section 7 of the Reproductive Health (RH) Law prioritizes poor and marginalized
couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the
contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the poor to reduce their number. —To provide that the poor are
to be given priority in the government’s reproductive health care program is not a violation of the equal
protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Consti-
173
tution which recognizes the distinct necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged by providing
that they be given priority in addressing the health development of the people. Thus: Section 11. The State
shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make
essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be
priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall
endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers. It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes
poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. There is,
therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the poor to reduce their number.
While the RH Law admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above, sanction abortion. As
Section 3(l) explains, the “promotion and/or stabilization of the population growth rate is incidental to the
advancement of reproductive health.”
Same; Same; Involuntary Servitude; Clearly, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon reproductive
healthcare service providers to render pro bono service against their will. While the rendering of such service
was made a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Supreme Court does not consider the same to be
an unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived
legitimate state interest.—The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bonoservices envisioned in Section 17
can hardly be considered as forced labor analogous to slavery, as reproductive health care service providers
have the discretion as to the manner and time of giving pro bono services. Moreover, the OSG points out that
the imposition is within the powers of the government, the accreditation of medical practitioners with
PhilHealth being a privilege and not a right. The point of the OSG is well-taken. It should first be mentioned
that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of
the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Like the legal
profession, the practice of medicine is not a right but a privileged burdened with conditions as it directly
involves the very lives of the people. A fortiori, this power includes the power of Congress to prescribe the
qualifications for the practice of professions or trades which affect the public welfare, the public health, the
public morals, and the public safety; and to regu-
174
late or control such professions or trades, even to the point of revoking such right altogether. Moreover,
as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force, threats,
intimidation or other similar means of coercion and compulsion. A reading of the assailed provision, however,
reveals that it only encourages private and nongovernment reproductive healthcare service providers to
render pro bonoservice. Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should they
choose to do otherwise. Private and non-government reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy
the liberty to choose which kind of health service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or
whether to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to render pro
bono service against their will. While the rendering of such service was made a prerequisite to accreditation
with PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same to be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary
incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest.
Same; Same; From the declared policy of the Reproductive Health (RH) Law, it is clear that Congress
intended that the public be given only those medicines that are proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient,
and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research standards.—The functions,
powers and duties of the FDA are specific to enable the agency to carry out the mandates of the law. Being the
country’s premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety of food and medicines available to the public, the
FDA was equipped with the necessary powers and functions to make it effective. Pursuant to the principle of
necessary implication, the mandate by Congress to the FDA to ensure public health and safety by permitting
only food and medicines that are safe includes “service” and “methods.” From the declared policy of the RH
Law, it is clear that Congress intended that the public be given only those medicines that are proven medically
safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research
standards.
Same; Same; The fact that the Reproductive Health (RH) Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local
governments can be equally applied to the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The RH Law does
not infringe upon its autonomy.—The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local
governments can
175
be equally applied to the ARMM. The RH Law does not infringe upon its autonomy. Moreover, Article III,
Sections 6, 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 9054, or the organic act of the ARMM, alluded to by petitioner  Tillah to justify
the exemption of the operation of the RH Law in the autonomous region, refer to the policy statements for the
guidance of the regional government. These provisions relied upon by the petitioners simply delineate the
powers that may be exercised by the regional government, which can, in no manner, be characterized as an
abdication by the State of its power to enact legislation that would benefit the general welfare. After all,
despite the veritable autonomy granted the ARMM, the Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as
they now stand, reject the notion of imperium et imperio in the relationship between the national and the
regional governments. Except for the express and implied limitations imposed on it by the Constitution,
Congress cannot be restricted to exercise its inherent and plenary power to legislate on all subjects which
extends to all matters of general concern or common interest.
Same; Same; Abortion; The Reproductive Health (RH) Law does not sanction the taking away of life. It does
not allow abortion in any shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the population control program of the
government by providing information and making non-abortifacient contraceptives more readily available to
the public, especially to the poor.—Unless, a natural right has been transformed into a written law, it cannot
serve as a basis to strike down a law. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 407 SCRA 10 (2003), the very case cited
by the petitioners, it was explained that the Court is not duty-bound to examine every law or action and
whether it conforms with both the Constitution and natural law. Rather, natural law is to be used sparingly
only in the most peculiar of circumstances involving rights inherent to man where no law is applicable. At any
rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life. It does not allow abortion in
any shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the population control program of the government by providing
information and making non-abortifacient contraceptives more readily available to the public, especially to
the poor.
Same; Same; In general, the Supreme Court does not find the Reproductive Health (RH) Law as
unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal,
affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices, and supplies.—In general, the Court
does not find the RH
176
Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient,
effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices, and supplies. As
earlier pointed out, however, the religious freedom of some sectors of society cannot be trampled upon in
pursuit of what the law hopes to achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a
recognition that man stands accountable to an authority higher than the State. In conformity with the
principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group cannot be allowed to impose its beliefs on the
rest of the society. Philippine modern society leaves enough room for diversity and pluralism. As such,
everyone should be tolerant and open-minded so that peace and harmony may continue to reign as we exist
alongside each other.
Same; Same; Separation of Powers; It is not the province of the judiciary to look into the wisdom of the law
nor to question the policies adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it the business of this Tribunal to remedy
every unjust situation that may arise from the application of a particular law. It is for the legislature to enact
remedial legislation if that would be necessary in the premises.—Indeed, at the present, the country has a
population problem, but the State should not use coercive measures (like the penal provisions of the RH Law
against conscientious objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-interference in the
wisdom of a law. x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its duty is to say
what the law is as enacted by the lawmaking body. That is not the same as saying what the law should be or
what is the correct rule in a given set of circumstances. It is not the province of the judiciary to look into the
wisdom of the law nor to question the policies adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it the business of this
Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that may arise from the application of a particular law. It is for the
legislature to enact remedial legislation if that would be necessary in the premises. But as always, with apt
judicial caution and cold neutrality, the Court must carry out the delicate function of interpreting the law,
guided by the Constitution and existing legislation and mindful of settled jurisprudence. The Court’s function
is therefore limited, and accordingly, must confine itself to the judicial task of saying what the law is, as
enacted by the lawmaking body.
 
177
Sereno, CJ., Opinyong Sumasang-ayon at Sumasalungat:
Constitutional Law; Reproductive Health Law; Hierarchy of Rights; Sa aking pananaw sa herarkiya ng mga
karapatang pantao, walang hihigit pa sa karapatang mabuhay, at nasasalamin ng ating Saligang Batas ang
ganitong paniniwala; Wala sa takda ng Saligang Batas at Republic Act No. 10354 (The Responsible Parenthood
and Reproductive Health Act of 2012), o RH Law, ang pagkitil ng buhay.—Sa herarkiya ng mga karapatang
pantao, walang hihigit pa sa karapatang mabuhay, at nasasalamin ng ating Saligang Batas ang ganitong
paniniwala. Ayon dito, pantay na pangangalagaan ng pamahalaan ang buhay ng ina at ang buhay na kanyang
dinadala. Bakas sa adhikaing ito ang pagkilala sa malaking bahaging ginagampanan ng ina sa pagbibigay ng
buhay. Kaya’t sasalungatin ko ang bigkasin ng aking mga kapatid na Mahistrado, na ang pagpapalaya sa
pasiya ng may-katawan ay kumikitil ng buhay ng kapwa-taong isisilang pa lamang. Wala sa takda ng Saligang
Batas at Republic Act No. 10354 (The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012), o RH Law,
ang pagkitil ng buhay. Ngunit inuunawa rin nito ang karapatan ng mag-asawa na magpalaki ng kanilang
pamilya ng may dangal sa buhay. Napakahalaga din sa pananaw ng Saligang Batas at ng RH Law ang
kalusugan ng pamayanan, lalung-lalo na ang kalusugan ng mga ina o magiging ina ng pamayanang ito. Kaya’t
mahalaga na ang bawat interpretasyon ng RH Law ay ayon sa ikabubuti ng pamilyang Pilipino at kalusugan ng
ina.
Same; Same; Compelling Interest Test; Religious Freedom; Sa aking pananaw hindi ako sumasang-ayon na
nararapat gamitin ang compelling state interest test upang tiyakin ang legalidad ng Reproductive Health (RH)
Law — partikular na ang paggarantiya ng pamahalaan sa ligtas, mabisa, abot-kaya, de-kalidad, naaayon sa
batas at hindi abortifacient na reproductive health care services, methods, devices at supplies para sa lahat, pati
na ang mahalagang kaalaman ukol dito — sa kadahilanang buo ang pagkilala ng RH Law sa religious freedom,
kaya’t hindi na kailangan ang test na ito.—Hindi ako sumasang-ayon na nararapat gamitin ang compelling
state interest test upang tiyakin ang legalidad ng RH Law — partikular na ang paggarantiya ng pamahalaan sa
ligtas, mabisa, abot-kaya, de-kalidad, naaayon sa batas at hindi abortifacient na reproductive health care
services, methods, devices at supplies para sa lahat, pati na ang mahalagang kaalaman ukol dito — sa kadahi-
178
lanang buo ang pagkilala ng RH Law sa religious freedom, kaya’t hindi na kailangan ang test na ito.
Same; Same; Same; Sa aking pananaw ginamit ang compelling state interest test sa Estrada v. Escritor, 408
SCRA 1 (2003), upang malaman kung ang respondent doon ay nararapat na bigyan ng exemption laban sa
kasong administratibo bunga ng pakikisama niya sa lalaking hindi niya asawa ayon sa Civil Code. —Ginamit
ang compelling state interest test sa Estrada v. Escritor, 408 SCRA 1 (2003), upang malaman kung ang
respondent doon ay nararapat na bigyan ng exemption laban sa kasong administratibo bunga ng pakikisama
niya sa lalaking hindi niya asawa ayon sa Civil Code. Karaniwan, bilang kawani ng pamahalaan, mahaharap
ang respondent sa kasong disgraceful and immoral conduct. Bagkus, inilahad ng respondent na bagama’t
walang basbas ng pamahalaang sibil ang kanilang pagsasama, may basbas naman ito ng kanilang relihiyon
na Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society. Kaya’t hindi siya nararapat na sampahan
ng kasong administratibo bunga nito.
Same; Same; Same; Sa aking pananaw kapag hindi nanaig ang interes ng pamahalaan, magbibigay ng
exemption sa patakaran ang Korte Suprema para sa mga mamamayang naninindigan para sa kanilang
religious freedom.—Malinaw sa Estrada v. Escritor, 408 SCRA 1 (2003), na sa ilalim ng compelling state
interest test, ipinagtutunggali ang religious freedom ng mga mamamayan at ang interes ng pamahalaan sa
pagpapatupad ng patakarang sinasabing nagpapahirap sa religious convictions ng ilan. Kapag hindi nanaig ang
interes ng pamahalaan, magbibigay ng exemption sa patakaran ang Korte Suprema para sa mga
mamamayang naninindigan para sa kanilang religious freedom. Isinaad din sa Estrada v. Escritor na
nakagawian na ng Korte Suprema na magbigay ng exemption sa halip na magpawalang-bisa ng mga patakaran
ng pamahalaan pagdating sa usapin ng religious freedom. Hindi ito ang sitwasyon sa ilalim ng RH Law. Ayon sa
petitioners, katumbas ng isang pagkakasala sa ilalim ng kanilang relihiyon ang pagsasagawa ng serbisyo ukol
sa modern family planning methods at pagbibigay ng payo ukol dito. Labag ito sa religious freedom ng
mga conscientious health professionals na naniniwalang likas na masama ang contraception. Dahil dito,
nararapat na ipawalang-bisa ang RH Law. At, ayon sa mga kapatid kong Mahistrado, walang  compelling state
interest para payagan ang pamahalaang pilitin ang health professionals na luma-
179
bag sa kanilang paniniwala. Ang totoo, walang paglabag sa paniniwala na pinapataw ang RH Law.
Same; Same; Religious Freedom; Opt-Out Clause; Sa aking pananaw sa ilalim ng opt-out clause na
nakapaloob sa Section 7 ng Reproductive Health (RH) Law, hindi obligadong magdulot ng serbisyo kaugnay sa
modern family planning methods ang mga non-maternity specialty hospitals at mga ospital na pagmamay-ari
at pinatatakbo ng mga religious groups.—Nakalimutan ng petitioners ang kabuuan ng RH Law. Batid ng
Kongreso na maaaring makasagasa sa paniniwala at ikaligalig ng ilang medical professionals ang kautusang ito
sa RH Law. Dahil mismo dito kaya nag-ukit ang Kongreso ng exemption sa RH Law para sa mga conscientious
objectorssa pamamagitan ng “opt-out clause.” Sa ilalim ng opt-out clause na nakapaloob sa Section 7 ng RH
Law, hindi obligadong magdulot ng serbisyo kaugnay sa modern family planning methods ang mga non-
maternity specialty hospitals at mga ospital na pagmamay-ari at pinatatakbo ng mga religious groups. Sa
kabilang banda, pinahahalagahan sa ilalim ng Section23(a)(3) ng RH Law ang conscientious
objection ng health care service providers batay sa kanilang ethical o religious beliefs. Ayon dito, exemptedsila
sa kaparusahan na ipapataw sa mga tatangging magdulot ng reproductive health care services at magbigay ng
mahalagang kaalaman ukol dito.
Same; Same; Same; Sa aking pananaw wala dapat pagtutol sa atas ng Reproductive Health (RH) Law na
ituro ng mga conscientious objector ang mga pasyente sa pinakamalapit na health facility o health care service
provider na makatutulong sa kanila.—Ayon sa Decision, walang idinudulot na paglabag sa religious
freedom ang pag-uutos sa mga ikakasal na dumalo sa mga seminar ukol sa responsible parenthood, family
planning, breastfeeding at infant nutrition dahil hindi naman sila obligadong sumunod sa mga ituturo dito.
Hindi rin masama ang pagbibigay-daan na mabigyan ng mahalagang kaalaman tungkol sa family planning
services ang mga menor de edad na may anak o nagkaroon ng miscarriage para matutunan nila ang mga bagay
na makatutulong sa kanila upang pangalagaan ang kanilang katawan at anak o dinadala. Kung gayon, at
kahalintulad ng nasabing sitwasyon, wala rin dapat pagtutol sa atas ng RH Law na ituro ng mga  conscientious
objector ang mga pasyente sa pinakamalapit na health facilityo health care service provider na makatutulong
sa kanila.
180
Same; Same; Same; Sa aking pananaw hindi maituturing na dagdag pasanin ng medical professionals ang
duty to refer sa ilalim ng Reproductive Health (RH) Law.—Sa kanilang pagpasok sa propesyon, tinanggap ng
mga medical professionals ang mga moral values at kaakibat na katungkulan sa mga pasyente. Isa dito ang
napapanahong duty to refer sa ibang health facility o health care service provider kung batid nila na dahil sa
kanilang religious beliefs, hindi nila maaaring ihatid ang serbisyong hinihingi o kinakailangan ng pasyente.
Upang mapanatili ang ethical practice, hinihikayat ng mga pantas ang mga conscientious objectors na
maglingkod kalapit ang ibang medical professionals na hindi conscientious objectors upang maayos na
mapanatili ang isang referral system para masigurado na maibibigay sa pasyente ang mga pangangailangan
nitong hindi kayang tugunan ng conscientious objector. Mahalaga ito upang masiguro na tuloy-tuloy ang
serbisyong pangkalusugan para sa mga taong nangangailangan nito. Dahil dito, hindi maituturing na dagdag
pasanin ng medical professionals ang duty to refer sa ilalim ng RH Law. Likas na ito sa kanilang propesyon. Sa
katunayan, nasa kapangyarihan ng Kongreso ang maglatag ng mga alituntunin at dagdag na pasanin sa
propesyon ng medisina ayon sa police power nito upang isulong ang public health. At, inuunawa ng RH Law na
dahil sa religious convictions, hindi maaaring isagawa ng isang medical professional ang serbisyo ukol
sa modern family planning methodskahit hinihingi pa ng pasyente. Dahil dito, pinapayagan sila na tumanggi ng
pasyente at papuntahin ito sa ibang medical professional na makatutulong dito.
Same; Same; Same; Sa aking pananaw kung tutuusin, maituturing na paglabag sa sinumpaang tungkulin
ng mga medical professionals ang pagtangging magturo ng pasyente sa ibang medical professional.—Kung
tutuusin, maituturing na paglabag sa sinumpaang tungkulin ng medical professionals ang pagtangging
magturo ng pasyente sa ibang mga medical professional. Maaari itong maging basehan ng disciplinary
action laban sa kanila. Ayon sa isang lathalain, dahil ang mga medical professionals ay napapaloob sa
isang monopoly sa paghahatid ng serbisyong pangkalusugan, ang ilan sa kanila na mas pinahahalagahan ang
kanilang religious interestsnang walang pakundangan sa kapakanan ng kanilang pasyente ay nababalot sa
isang matinding conflict of interest. Kilala ang dakilang propesyong ito sa pagpapakasakit para sa ikabubuti ng
ibang tao, kaya naman ang pagtanggi kahit sa pagtuturo na lamang sa ibang
181
health facility o health care service provider ay maituturing na pagkait ng serbisyong pangkalusugan sa
mga pasyente.
Same; Same; Sa aking pananaw ipinagbabawal ng Section 23(a)(1) ang pagkakait ng mahalagang
kaalaman, pagbabawal sa pagpapalaganap nito o sadyaang pagbibigay ng maling impormasyon kaugnay ng
mga programa at serbisyo ukol sa reproductive health, karapatan ng lahat sa informed choice at ang
paggarantiya ng pamahalaan sa ligtas, mabisa, abot-kaya, de-kalidad, naaayon sa batas at hindi abortifacient
na family planning methods.—Sa puntong ito, nais kong linawin na ipinagbabawal ng Section 23(a)(1) ang
pagkakait ng mahalagang kaalaman, pagbabawal sa pagpapalaganap nito o sadyaang pagbibigay ng maling
impormasyon kaugnay ng mga programa at serbisyo ukol sa reproductive health, karapatan ng lahat
sa informed choice at ang paggarantiya ng pamahalaan sa ligtas, mabisa, abot-kaya, de-kalidad, naaayon sa
batas at hindi abortifacientna family planning methods. Sa kabilang banda, ipinagbabawal naman
ng Section 23(a)(2) ang pagtangging magsagawa ng ligtas at naaayon sa batas na reproductive health
procedures dahil lamang sa ang taong naghahangad nito, bagama’t nasa hustong edad, ay hindi
makapagpakita ng pahintulot ng kanyang asawa o magulang. Hindi nito ipinagbabawal ang pagtangging
magsagawa ng reproductive health procedures dahil sa kanilang religious beliefs.
Same; Same; Sa aking pananaw bagama’t maaaring parusahan ang iba kung sila ay tatangging
magsagawa ng de-kalidad na health care services o tatangging magbigay ng mahalagang kaalaman ukol dito,
pinapayagan ang mga conscientious objector na tumanggi kung wala sa emergency condition o hindi serious
case ang pasyente.—Kung conscientious objector ang health care service provider, mapapasailalim siya
sa Section 23(a)(3) na nagsasabing isasaalang-alang at irerespeto ang kanilang ethical o religious beliefs. Ayon
dito, bagama’t maaaring parusahan ang iba kung sila ay tatangging magsagawa ng de -kalidad na health care
services o tatangging magbigay ng mahalagang kaalaman ukol dito, pinapayagan ang mga conscientious
objector na tumanggi kung wala sa emergency condition o hindi serious case ang pasyente. Hindi parurusahan
ng batas ang mga conscientious objector na tumanggi, at kabilang ito sa exemption na inilatag ng RH Law para
sa kanila.
Same; Same; Due Process; Sa aking pananaw bukod sa mga karapatang ginagarantiya ng Bill of Rights,
saklaw ng due process
182
clause ang lahat ng bahagi ng buhay ng tao. Kabilang na rito ang karapatan ng sariling pagpapasiya. —
Mayroong pangunahing karapatan, at pangangailangan, ang lahat ng tao sa sariling pagpapasiya. Biniyayaan
ng kaisipan ang lahat ng tao upang malayang maipahayag ang kanyang saloobin, makabuo ng sariling
pananaw at makapagpasiya para sa kanyang kinabukasan. Sa ilalim ng ating Saligang Batas,
pinangangalagaan ng due process clause ang garantiya ng kalayaan sa bawat Pilipino. Nagsasabi ito na walang
sinuman ang maaaring bawian ng buhay, kalayaan at ari-arian nang hindi ayon sa paraang inilatag sa batas.
Panangga ng mga mamamayan ang due process clause sa hindi makatuwirang pamamalakad at pagsamsam ng
pamahalaan. Gayunpaman, “[t]he Due Process Clause guarantees more than fair process, and the ‘liberty’ it
protects includes more than the absence of physical restraint.” Nagtatakda ang due process clause ng limitasyon
sa kapangyarihan ng pamahalaan pagdating sa mga karapatan ng mamamayan. Bukod sa mga karapatang
ginagarantiya ng Bill of Rights, saklaw ng due process clause ang lahat ng bahagi ng buhay ng tao. Kabilang na
rito ang karapatan ng sariling pagpapasiya.
Same; Same; Sa aking pananaw sa ilalim ng Reproductive Health (RH) Law, ihahandog sa lahat ang
mahalagang impormasyon ukol sa modern family planning methods. Ipinapalagay na paglilimian ng asawang
sasailalim sa procedure ang mga magiging epekto nito sa kanya at sa kanyang mahal sa buhay.—Sa ilalim ng
RH Law, ihahandog sa lahat ang mahalagang impormasyon ukol sa modern family planning methods.
Ipinapalagay din na paglilimian ng asawang sasailalim sa procedure ang mga magiging epekto nito sa kanya at
sa kanyang mahal sa buhay. Kung magdesisyon siya na sumailalim sa napiling reproductive health procedure,
hindi ito dapat hadlangan ng sinuman. Bahagi pa rin ito ng informed consentna pundasyon ng RH Law.
Same; Same; Sa aking pananaw walang anumang nakasulat sa Reproductive Health (RH) Law na
humahadlang sa pagsali ng asawa sa pagtimbang ng mga pagpipiliang modern family planning methods, at
pagpapasiya kung ano ang pinakamabuti para sa kanyang asawa.—Walang anumang nakasulat sa RH Law na
nag-aalis sa mag-asawa ng kanilang karapatang bumuo ng pamilya. Sa katunayan, tinitiyak nito na ang mga
maralita na nagnanais magkaroon ng anak ay makikinabang sa mga payo, kagamitan at nararapat
na procedures para matulungan silang maglihi at maparami ang mga
183
anak. Walang anumang nakasulat sa batas na nagpapahintulot sa pamahalaan na manghimasok sa
pagpapasiya “[that] belongs exclusively to, and [is] shared by, both spouses as one cohesive unit as they chart
their own destiny.” Walang anumang nakasulat sa RH Law na humahadlang sa pagsali ng asawa sa pagtimbang
ng mga pagpipiliang modern family planning methods, at pagpapasiya kung ano ang pinakamabuti para sa
kanyang asawa. Kung may epekto man ang RH Law, ito ay ang pagpapatibay ng makatotohanang sanggunian
sa pagitan ng mag-asawang pantay na magpapasiya ukol sa isang bagay na magtatakda ng kanilang
kinabukasan.
Same; Same; Sa aking pananaw hindi angkop na manghimasok ang Korte Suprema sa katanungan kung
ang Reproductive Health (RH) Law ay isang population control measure sapagkat ang Kongreso lamang ang
makasasagot sa tanong kung ano ang nag-udyok dito sa pagbuo ng nasabing batas.—Hindi angkop na
manghimasok ang Korte Suprema sa katanungan kung ang RH Law ay isang population control
measure sapagkat ang Kongreso lamang ang makasasagot sa tanong kung ano ang nag-udyok dito sa pagbuo
ng nasabing batas. Ang tanging dapat pagtuunan ng pansin ng Korte Suprema ay kung ang batas at ang mga
nilalaman nito ay alinsunod sa itinatakda ng Saligang Batas. Masasabi nating ispekulasyon lamang ang
paghusga sa hangarin ng Kongreso na handa itong sirain ang parental authority upang isulong lamang
ang population control. Pasintabi po, hindi maaaring ganito ang tono ng Korte Suprema patungo sa Kongreso.
Same; Same; Parental Authority; Sa aking pananaw pinag-uukulan ng ilang karapatan at tungkulin ang
mga magulang kaugnay sa kanilang mga anak na wala pa sa tamang gulang. Maaaring talikuran o ilipat ang
parental authority at responsibility ayon lamang sa mga halimbawang nakasaad sa batas.—“[P]arental
authority and responsibility include the caring for and rearing of unemancipated children for civic consciousness
and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical character and well -being.” Pinag-
uukulan ng ilang karapatan at tungkulin ang mga magulang kaugnay sa kanilang mga anak na wala pa sa
tamang gulang. Maaaring talikuran o ilipat ang parental authority at responsibilityayon lamang sa mga
halimbawang nakasaad sa batas. Mabibinbin o mapuputol ito ayon lamang sa mga sitwasyong nakasaad
sa Family Code.
184
 Same; Same; Same; Sa aking pananaw sa ilalim ng Reproductive Health (RH) Law, hindi pinagbabawalan
ang mga menor de edad na may anak o nagkaroon ng miscarriage na humingi ng payo sa kanilang magulang,
at hindi pinagbabawalan ang mga magulang na magbigay nito.—Walang anumang nakasulat sa RH Law na
nagsasabing napuputol ang parental authority kapag ang menor de edad ay may anak na o nagkaroon
ng miscarriage. Hindi nito dinadagdagan ang mga halimbawang nakasaad sa Family Code ukol sa pagkawala
ng parental authority. Walang anumang nakasulat sa batas na nagbibigay kapangyarihan sa pamahalaan
upang humalili sa ina at ama sa pagdamay at pagtugon sa mga pangangailangan ng kanilang mga menor de
edad. Kailanma’y hindi kaya at hindi maaaring gawin ito ng pamahalaan, hindi lamang dahil hindi ito
praktikal ngunit dahil walang makatutumbas sa inaasahang pagmamahal ng magulang. Sa ganitong pagsubok
sa buhay ng isang menor de edad, higit lalo niyang kailangan ang “comfort, care, advice and guidance from her
own parents.” Sa ilalim ng RH Law, hindi pinagbabawalan ang mga menor de edad na may anak o nagkaroon
ng miscarriage na humingi ng payo sa kanilang magulang, at hindi pinagbabawalan ang mga magulang na
magbigay nito. Ipinapalagay na hangad lamang ng mga magulang ang makabubuti para sa kanilang anak.
Same; Same; Same; Sa aking pananaw sa pagsasabi na hindi kailangan ang parental consent ng mga
menor de edad na may anak o nagkaroon ng miscarriage bago mabigyan ang mga ito ng modern family
planning services, pinanghihimasukan ng pamahalaan ang ugnayan sa pagitan ng menor de edad at ang
nilapitan nitong medical health professional.—Sa pagsasabi na hindi kailangan ang parental consent ng mga
menor de edad na may anak o nagkaroon ng miscarriage bago mabigyan ang mga ito ng modern family
planning services, pinanghihimasukan ng pamahalaan ang ugnayan sa pagitan ng menor de edad at ang
nilapitan nitong medical health professional. Kadalasan, pinagkakaitan ng reproductive health services ng mga
pribado at pampublikong health professionals ang mga menor de edad dahil sa kaisipang masyado pa silang
mga bata para magkaroon ng kaalaman sa mga bagay ukol sa kanilang sekswalidad. Ang paghingi ng parental
consent ang madalas na dahilan upang tanggihan ang ganitong pagsangguni ng mga kabataan. Minsan nga,
hinihiya pa ang mga ito. Ngunit kailangang tandaan na nagdalang-tao
185
na ang mga menor de edad na ito, at hindi na masasabing wala silang muwang pagdating sa mga bagay
na sekswal.
Same; Same; Age and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education; Sa aking pananaw upang
mapangalagaan ang karapatan ng mga kabataan na magkaroon ng mahalagang kaalaman ukol sa kanilang
kalusugan, ipinag-uutos ng RH Law ang pagtuturo ng age- and development-appropriate reproductive health
education sa lahat ng pribado at pampublikong paaralan.—Bahagi ng RH Law ang paninindigan ng
pamahalaan na ang mga kabataan ay active rights holders, at katungkulan ng pamahalaan na siguraduhin na
matatamasa nila ang kanilang mga karapatan nang walang diskriminasyon. Upang mapangalagaan ang
karapatan ng mga kabataan na magkaroon ng mahalagang kaalaman ukol sa kanilang kalusugan, ipinag-uutos
ng RH Law ang pagtuturo ng age-and development-appropriate reproductive health education sa lahat ng
pribado at pampublikong paaralan.
Same; Same; Sa aking pananaw hindi ako sang-ayon sa Decision na walang totoong pagkakaiba sa pagitan
ng pribado at pampublikong health officers. Naniniwala ako na napakalaki ng pagkakaiba sa pagitan nila at
nagmumula ito sa kadahilanang inaasahan ang mga pampublikong health officers bilang frontline sa
paghahatid ng serbisyong pangkalusugan.—Hindi ako sang-ayon sa Decision na walang totoong pagkakaiba sa
pagitan ng pribado at pampublikong health officers. Naniniwala ako na napakalaki ng pagkakaiba sa pagitan
nila at nagmumula ito sa kadahilanang inaasahan ang mga pampublikong health officers bilang frontline sa
paghahatid ng serbisyong pangkalusugan. Bilang public officers, may pananagutan sila sa taong-bayan sa lahat
ng oras, at nararapat na maglingkod sila nang may dangal, katapatan, kahusayan, ganap-taglay ang pagiging
makabayan at makatarungan, at payak ang pamumuhay. Maaari din nating banggitin na ang sambayanan ang
nagpapasahod sa kanila. Sa pamamagitan ng paglilingkod ng mga pampublikong health
officers naisasakatuparan ng pamahalaan ang tungkulin nito na pangalagaan ang kalusugan ng mga
mamamayan, lalo na ang mga maralitang bahagya na ngang makabili ng sapat na pagkain sa araw-araw.
 Same; Same; Equal Protection of the Law; Sa aking pananaw hindi karapat-dapat na sabihing lumalabag
sa equal protection clause ng ating Saligang Batas ang Reproductive Health (RH) Law
186
at Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) nito.—Sa gayon, hindi karapat-dapat na sabihing lumalabag
sa equal protection clause ng ating Saligang Batas ang RH Law at IRR nito. Kaugnay nito, tinutuligsa ang
sumusunod na bahagi ng Section 5.24 ng IRR ng RH Law: Provided, That skilled health professionals such as
provincial, city, or municipal health officers, chiefs of hospital, head nurses, supervising midwives, among
others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the
RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors. (Emphasis supplied)
Itinatadhana nito na hindi maaaring maging conscientious objectors ang mga pampublikong skilled health
professionals na mismong inatasang magsagawa ng mga kautusan at programa sa ilalim ng RH Law at IRR
nito. Malinaw ang dahilan nito. Walang makabuluhang pagsasakatuparan ng RH Law, at pangangalaga
sa reproductive health ng sambayanan, kung hahayaan ang mga provincial, city, o municipal health officers,
chiefs of hospital, head nurses at supervising midwives — iyong mga itinuturing na nasa frontline ng paghahatid
ng serbisyong pangkalusugan — na tumangging magbigay ng reproductive health care services at mahalagang
kaalaman ukol dito. Makikitang hindi discriminatory ang nasabing probisyon kapag inilapat ang test of
reasonableness. Sakop lamang nito ang mga public skilled health professionals na inatasang isagawa ang mga
kautusan at programa sa ilalim ng RH Law at IRR nito. Makikita na iyon lamang mga may  management
prerogative at kapangyarihang mag-impluwensiya ng pamamalakad ng kanilang institusyon ang hindi
maaaring tumangging maghatid ng reproductive health care services at mahalagang kaalaman ukol dito.
Malinaw ang pagkakaiba nila sa ibang pampublikong health professionals na maaaring maging conscientious
objectors.
Same; Same; Sa aking pananaw pagdating sa reproductive health programs, magiging kahangalan para sa
pamahalaan kung hahayaan nito na sariling mga kawani ang humadlang sa pamamagitan ng paglalatag ng
mga salungat na patakaran gamit ang makinarya ng pamahalaan.—Bilang mga kawani ng pamahalaan,
nalalagay sa isang pambihirang katayuan ang mga public officers para isakatuparan ang mga nilalayon ng
pamahalaan. Dahil dito, malaki ang nakaatang na responsibilidad sa kanila upang ilunsad ang mga balakin ng
pamahalaan. Pagdating sa reproductive health programs, magiging kahangalan para sa pamahalaan kung
haha-
187
yaan nito na sariling mga kawani ang humadlang sa pamamagitan ng paglalatag ng mga salungat na
patakaran gamit ang makinarya ng pamahalaan. Samakatuwid, hindi dapat payagang tumalikod sa tungkulin
ang isang public officer na mismong inatasang isagawa ang mga kautusan at programa sa ilalim ng RH Law at
IRR nito, o biguin nito ang paglulunsad ng isang reproductive health program.
Same; Same; PhilHealth Accreditation; Sa aking pananaw alalahanin ng lahat na pribilehiyo at hindi
karapatan ang magkaroon ng PhilHealth accreditation kaya’t tama lang na isukli ng gynecologists at
obstetricians ang 48 oras na pro bono service sa maralita upang mapangalagaan ang kanilang reproductive
health.—Masasabing isa lamang sa family planning information and
services ang contraceptives at contraception na tinututulan ng mga conscientious objectors. Mayroon pang
labing-isang bahagi ng reproductive health care na kasunod nito. Maaaring gamitin ng mga reproductive
health care service providers ang mga libreng serbisyo na mapapaloob sa anumang bahagi ng reproductive
health care upang mabuo ang 48 oras na kakailanganin nila para sa kanilang PhilHealth accreditation. Maaari
ngang ibuhos ng conscientious objector ang lahat ng 48 oras sa pagpapalaganap ng natural family planning
method. Alalahanin ng lahat na pribilehiyo at hindi karapatan ang magkaroon ng PhilHealth
accreditationkaya’t tama lang na isukli ng gynecologists at obstetricians ang 48 oras na pro bono service sa
maralita upang mapangalagaan ang kanilang reproductive health. Kung tutuusin, reproductive health care ng
mga pasyente ang pangunahing pinagtutuunan ng pansin ng mga gynecologists at obstetricians. Kung bibigyan
sila ng exemption sa Section 17 dahil conscientious objector sila, ang tanging magiging epekto nito ay hindi nila
kakailanganing magbigay ng anumang libreng serbisyo. Kung gayon, mawawalan ng saysay ang layunin ng
pamahalaan sa ilalim ng RH Law na ihatid sa mga maralitang mamamayan ang kadalubhasaan ng mga
pribadong reproductive health care service providers.
Same; Same; Sa aking pananaw pinapayagan ang lahat ng methods of contraception hangga’t ang mga ito
ay ligtas, naaayon sa batas, aprobado ng medical professionals at alinsunod sa Islamic Shariah.—Pinapayagan
ang lahat ng methods of contraception hangga’t ang mga ito ay ligtas, naaayon sa batas, aprobado ng medical
professionals at alinsunod sa Islamic Shariah. Wala ring nakikitang pagtutol ang Shariah sa pakahulugan
ng International Conference on Population and Development sa reproductive health, pati na ang
188
mga prinsipyo nito ukol sa pagpapasiya sa dami at pag-aagwat ng mga anak, pagkakaroon ng kaalaman
ukol sa sariling sekswalidad, pagiging ligtas sa mga sakit kaugnay sa reproduction, at pagkakaroon
ng safe at satisfying sex life sa pagitan ng mag-asawa. Kung susukatin ang mga adhikain ng RH Law batay
sa religious freedom ng mga Muslim, na bumubuo sa limang porsiyento ng mga Pilipino, wala itong hatid na
ligalig o pasanin.
Carpio, J., Concurring Opinion:
Reproductive Health Law; View that the Supreme Court is simply not competent to declare when human life
begins, whether upon fertilization of the ovum or upon attachment of the fertilized ovum to the uterus wall. —I
concur in the ponencia of Justice Jose Catral Mendoza. However, my opinion is that at this stage, the Court is
simply not competent to declare when human life begins, whether upon fertilization of the ovum or upon
attachment of the fertilized ovum to the uterus wall. The issue of when life begins is a scientific and medical
issue that cannot be decided by this Court without the proper hearing and evidence. This issue has not even
been settled within the scientific and medical community.
Same; View that whether life begins upon fertilization or upon implantation of the fertilized ovum on the
uterus wall, R.A. No. 10354 protects both asserted starting points of human life. Absent a definitive consensus
from the scientific and medical community, the Supreme Court cannot venture to pronounce which starting
point of human life is correct.—R.A. No. 10354, however, protects the ovum upon its fertilization without
saying that life begins upon fertilization. This should be sufficient for purposes of resolving this case — for
whether life begins upon fertilization or upon implantation of the fertilized ovum on the uterus wall, R.A. No.
10354 protects both asserted starting points of human life. Absent a definitive consensus from the scientific
and medical community, this Court cannot venture to pronounce which starting point of human life is correct.
We can only reiterate what Section 12, Article II of the Constitution provides, that the State shall “equally
protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.”
Same; Constitutional Law; View that Section 12, Article II of the Constitution is repeated in Section 2 of R.A.
No. 10354; R.A. No. 10354 protects the fertilized ovum by prohibiting services, methods,
189
devices or supplies that prevent its implantation on the uterus wall.—Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution is repeated in Section 2 of R.A. No. 10354. The law does not provide a definition of conception.
However, the law is replete with provisions that embody the policy of the State to protect the travel of the
fertilized ovum to the uterus wall. In fact, the law guarantees that the State will provide access only to
“medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health care services,
methods, devices, supplies which do not prevent the implantation of a fertilized ovum as determined by the
Food and Drug Administration.” R.A. No. 10354 protects the fertilized ovum by prohibiting services, methods,
devices or supplies that prevent its implantation on the uterus wall.
Leonardo-De Castro, J., Concurring Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Statutes; Facial Challenges; Words and Phrases; View that a facial challenge is a
constitutional challenge asserting that a statute is invalid on its face as written and authoritatively construed,
when measured against the applicable constitutional doctrine, rather than against the facts and circumstances
or a particular case.—In general, a facial challenge is a constitutional challenge asserting that a statute is
invalid on its face as written and authoritatively construed, when measured against the applicable
constitutional doctrine, rather than against the facts and circumstances or a particular case. The inquiry uses
the lens of relevant constitutional text and principle and focuses on what is within the four corners of the
statute, that is, on how its provisions are worded. The constitutional violation is visible on the face of the
statute. Thus, a facial challenge is to constitutional law what res ipsa loquitur is to facts — in a facial
challenge, lex ipsa loquitur: the law speaks for itself. The Government, invoking Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 369
SCRA 394 (2001), argues that legitimate facial attacks upon legislation constitute a rare exception to the
exercise of this Court’s jurisdiction. This is the conventional wisdom and it is principally based on the
American Salernorule that a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the law
would be valid. It has been previously pointed out, however, that the American Salerno rule has not been met
with unanimity in the American legal community. It has also been pointed out that Philippine jurisprudence
“has traditionally
190
deigned to nullify or facially invalidate statutes or provisions thereof without need of considering
whether ‘no set of circumstances exists under which the [law or provision] would be valid.”’
Reproductive Health Law; View that the moment of conception is reckoned from fertilization; that the
fertilized ovum, known as zygote, is the beginning of a human being; and that the theory of implantation as the
beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific mooring or basis as it pertains not to the beginning of life but
to the viability of the fetus.—I fully concur with the comprehensive and exhaustive discussion in the majority
opinion penned by the Honorable Justice Jose Catral Mendoza, as to the plain meaning and jurisprudential
and medical foundation of the Court’s conclusion that the moment of conception is reckoned from
fertilization; that the fertilized ovum, known as zygote, is the beginning of a human being; and that the theory
of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific mooring or basis as it pertains not to
the beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum is able to attach or implant itself to
the uterine wall because it is a living human being. The majority opinion aptly quoted with favor the following
statement of the Philippine Medical Association: The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote
is a human organism and that the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well defined
“moment of conception.” This conclusion is objective, consistent with the factual evidence, and independent
of any specific ethical, moral, political, or religious view of human life or of human embryos.
Same; View that Section 9 should be read to mean that there is no legal compulsion to include hormonal
contraceptives, injectables and devices in the National Drug Formulary unless they are safe, legal and non-
abortifacient, which obligatory preconditions must be determined by the appropriate government agency, in this
case the Food and Drug Administration (FDA); The government should be accountable or held liable whenever
deleterious consequences to the health or life of the unborn or the mother result from the latter’s availment of
government supplied contraceptive drugs or devices and the government’s inability to provide adequate medical
attention or supervision dictated by the individual health condition or a woman beneficiary.—Since Section 9
admits that only safe, legal and non-abortifacient contraceptives, injectables and devices can be lawfully
included in the National Drug Formulary, I join the majority opinion
191
in holding that Section 9 should be read to mean that there is no legal compulsion to include hormonal
contraceptives, injectables and devices in the National Drug Fomulary unless they are safe, legal and non-
abortifacient, which obligatory preconditions must be determined by the appropriate government agency, in
this case the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). I concur in principle with Justice Mariano C. del Castillo’s
opinion that the FDA must formulate stringent and transparent rules of procedure in the screening,
evaluation and approval of all contraceptive drugs and devices to ensure that they are safe, non-abortifacient
and legal or compliant with the mandate of the Constitution and the law. The government should be
accountable or held liable whenever deleterious consequences to the health or life of the unborn or the
mother result from the latter’s availment of government supplied contraceptive drugs or devices and the
government’s inability to provide adequate medical attention or supervision dictated by the individual health
condition of a woman beneficiary.
 Same; View that I agree with Justice Mendoza’s ponencia and Justice del Castillo’s objection to Section 3.01
of the Reproductive Health (RH) Law’s Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) that the latter cannot redefine
the term “abortifacient” by the addition of the word “primarily.”—I also agree with Justice Mendoza’s ponencia
and Justice del Castillo’s objection to Section 3.01 of the RH Law’s Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)
that the latter cannot redefine the term “abortifacient” by the addition of the word “primarily” as follows:
Section 3.01. For purposes of these Rules the terms shall be defined as follows: a) Abortifacient refers to any
drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb upon determination of the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA). (Emphasis supplied) As reworded, it will allow the approval of
contraceptives which has a secondary effect of inducing abortion or the destruction of the fetus or the
prevention of implantation of the fertilized ovum in the mother’s womb. This secondary effect is the fail-safe
mechanism, which is contrary to Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution and Section 4(a) of the RH
Law.
Same; Precautionary Principle; View that the precautionary principle seeks to protect the rights of the
present generation as well as to enforce intergenerational responsibility, that is, the present
192
generation should promote sustainable development and act as stewards or caretakers of the environment
for the benefit of generations yet unborn.—The precautionary principle seeks to protect the rights of the
present generation as well as to enforce intergenerational responsibility, that is, the present generation
should promote sustainable development and act as stewards or caretakers of the environment for the
benefit of generations yet unborn. In its essence, the precautionary principle calls for the exercise of caution
in the face of risk and uncertainty. It acknowledges the pcculiar circumstances surrounding environmental
cases in that “scientific evidence is usually insufficient, inconclusive or uncertain and preliminary scientific
evaluation indicates that there are reasonable grounds for concern’’ that there are potentially dangerous
effects on the environment, human, animal, or planet health. For this reason, the precautionary principle
requires those who have the means, knowledge, power, and resources to take action to prevent or mitigate
the harm to the environment or to act when conclusively ascertained understanding by science is not yet
available.
Same; Same; Principle of Prudence; Constitutional Law; Right to Life; Right to Health; View that in the face
of the conflicting claims and findings presented by the parties, and considering that the right to health is
inextricably intertwined with the right to life, it is proper to refer to the principle of prudence, which is the
principle relied on by the framers of the 1987 Constitution on matters affecting the right to life. —The right to
health, which is an indispensable element of the right to life, deserves the same or even higher degree of
protection. Thus, if it is scientifically plausible but uncertain that any foreign substance or material ingested
or implanted in the woman’s body may lead to threats or serious and irreversible damage to her or her
unborn child’s right life or health, care should be taken to avoid or diminish that threat. The principle of
prudence requires that such a rule be adopted in matters concerning the right to life and health. In the face of
the conflicting claims and findings presented by the parties, and considering that the right to health is
inextricably intertwined with the right to life, it is proper to refer to the principle of prudence, which is the
principle relied on by the framers of the 1987 Constitution on matters affecting the right to life. Thus, any
uncertainty on the adverse effects of making contraceptives universally accessible on the life and health of the
people, especially of women, should be resolved in a way that will promote life and health.
193
Same; Same; Same; View that considering the relevant medical issues and health concerns in connection
with contraceptives and devices, the regulated framework under Republic Act No. 4729 where contraceptive
drugs and devices are sold, dispensed or distributed only by duly licensed drug stores or pharmaceutical
companies pursuant to a doctor’s prescription is no doubt more in harmony with the principle of prudence and
the precautionary principle than the apparently unrestricted or universal access approach under the RH Law.—
Republic Act No. 4729 provides for a controlled access policy and requires that the sale, dispensation or
distribution of any contraceptive drug or device should be made only by a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company pursuant to a doctor’s prescription. On the other hand, with its thrust of providing
universal access to contraceptives, the RH Law gives the impression that it requires, under pain of criminal
prosecution, even persons other than doctors of medicine (such as nurses, midwives, public health workers,
and barangay health workers) to distribute contraceptives. Considering the relevant medical issues and
health concerns in connection with contraceptives and devices, the regulated framework under Republic Act
No. 4729 where contraceptive drugs and devices are sold, dispensed or distributed only by duly licensed drug
stores or pharmaceutical companies pursuant to a doctor’s prescription is no doubt more in harmony with
the principle of prudence and the precautionary principle than the apparently unrestricted or universal
access approach under the RH Law. This is so as the bodies of women may react differently to said drugs or
devices depending on many factors that only a licensed doctor is capable of determining. Thus, the universal
access policy should be read as qualified by the regulated framework under Republic Act No. 4729 rather
than as impliedly repealing the said law.
Same; Constitutional Law; Religious Freedom; View that the guarantee of free exercise of religion
proscribes the imposition of substantial burden upon the said right absent any compelling state interest to
justify the same.—The guarantee of free exercise of religion proscribes the imposition of substantial burden
upon the said right absent any compelling state interest to justify the same. A governmental restriction
substantially burdens religious freedom when it bans behavior that the objectors see as religiously
compelled, or mandates behavior that the objectors see as religiously prohibited. Requiring people to do
something that “is forbidden by [their] faith”
194
qualifies as a substantial burden on religious practice. “While the compulsion may be indirect, the
infringement upon free exercise is nonetheless substantial” and that is so even where the relevant “conduct
proscribed by a religious faith” is indirect complicity in other conduct, and the complicity line that the
religious claimant draws appears inconsistent or unsound to the reviewing court because “[i]t is not for
[secular courts] to say that the line [the claimant] drew was an unreasonable one.” Thus, the law recognizes
that requiring a person to do something that he or she sincerely sees as sinful is a “substantial burden” on
his/her religion, and people’s definition of “sinful” often includes sins of complicity and not just sins of direct
action.
Same; Same; Same; Freedom of Speech; View that Section 23(a)(1) requires the doctor or health care
service provider to make a compelled speech, a speech that may be against the doctor’s spiritual belief or
professional opinion. Moreover, the threat of criminal sanction enhances the chilling effect of the law and serves
to deter a health care service provider from expressing his professional views or exercising his religious
reservations.—Section 23(a)(1) effectively compels the doctor or health care provider to make a speech that
promotes the Government’s RH Law program, particularly the use of contraceptive drugs and devices,
regardless of the doctor’s religious conviction or well-considered professional opinion. lt dictates upon the
doctor what should. be said and what should not be said in matters of reproductive health. In other words,
Section 23(a)(1) requires the doctor or health care service provider to make a compelled speech, a speech
that may be against the doctor’s spiritual belief or professional opinion. Moreover, the threat of criminal
sanction enhances the chilling effect of the law and serves to deter a health care service provider from
expressing his professional views or exercising his religious reservations.
Same; Same; Freedom of Speech; View that the Reproductive Health (RH) Law dictates upon the doctor
what to tell his/her patients in matters of family planning, and threatens the doctor with criminal prosecution in
case of noncompliance.—Indeed, “a society that tells its doctors under pain of criminal penalty what they may
not tell their patients is not a free society.” The RH Law, however, precisely does that to our society. It dictates
upon the doctor what to tell his/her patients in matters of family planning, and threatens the doctor with
criminal prosecution in case of non-compliance. Laws of
195
this sort pose the inherent risk that the Government seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory goal,
but to suppress unpopular ideas or information or to manipulate the public debate through coercion rather
than persuasion.
 Same; Same; Same; View that Section 23(a)(1) of the Reproductive Health (RH) Law, a tool to promote the
universal access policy established in Section 7 of that law, constitutes an undue and unconstitutional restriction
of the freedom of speech.—The Government also failed to show that speech may be compelled or restrained
because there is substantial danger that the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to
prevent. There is no demonstration of evil consequences sought to be prevented which are substantive,
extremely serious and highly imminent. In other words, no clear and present danger to be prevented has been
established. All told, Section 23(a)(1) of the RH Law, a tool to promote the universal access policy established
in Section 7 of that law, constitutes an undue and unconstitutional restriction of the freedom of speech.
Same; Same; View that the Reproductive Health (RH) Law as worded contradicts the constitutional
text of the Family Provisions as well as the established constitutional principles on the family.—The RH
Law as worded contradicts the constitutional text of the Family Provisions as well as the established
constitutional principles on the family. The pertinent policy declarations are contained in Section 2 of
the RH Law quoted hereunder: SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.—x x x Moreover, the State recognizes and
guarantees the promotion of gender equality, gender equity, women empowerment and dignity as a
health and human rights concern and as a social responsibility. The advancement and protection of
women’s human rights shall be central to the efforts of the State to address reproductive health care.
x x x x x x x x x The State likewise guarantees universal access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient,
effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health care services, methods, devices, supplies
which do not prevent the implantation of a fertilized ovum as determined by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) and relevant information and education thereon according to the priority
needs of women, children and other underprivileged sectors, giving preferential access to those
identified through the National Household Targeting System for Poverty Reduction (NHTS-PR) and
other government measures
196
of identifying marginalization, who shall be voluntary beneficiaries of reproductive health care, services
and supplies for free.
Same; Same; Parental Consent; View that the overly liberal stance or the Reproductive Health (RH) Law as
regards the access of minors, who are already parents or have had a miscarriage, to modern family planning
methods without need of parental consent is contrary to the provision of Section 12, Article II of the 1987
Constitution.—The overly liberal stance or the RH Law as regards the access of minors, who are already
parents or have had a miscarriage, to modern family planning methods without need of parental consent is
contrary to the provision of Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution. It is also seriously doubtful if the
elimination of the requirement for parental consent with redound to the best interest of the class of minors
mentioned in the RH Law.
Same; Same; View that the constitutionality of the Reproductive Health (RH) Law ought to be judged based
on its implications on the relevant and treasured values of the Filipino society as shown by the Filipino people’s
history and tradition as enshrined in the Constitution.—The constitutionality of the RH Law ought to be judged
based on its implications on the relevant and treasured values of the Filipino society as shown by the Filipino
people’s history and tradition as enshrined in the Constitution. These cherished values are as follows: the
sanctity of the family; the natural joint right of the spouses to found a family; the natural and primary right
and duty of parents in the rearing of their children; and the right to health or the people, particularly of
women; and the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. These transcendental values
include the protection of the freedom of religion and freedom of speech.
Brion, J., Separate Concurring Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; Judicial Power; View that the 1987 Constitution, through the
2nd paragraph of its Section 1, confirms that judicial power is wider than the power of adjudication that it
traditionally carried (by using the word “includes”) and at the same time incorporated the basic requirements
for adjudication in the traditional concept, namely, the presence of “actual controversies,” based on “rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable.”—In addition, the 1987 Constitution, through the
 197
2nd paragraph of its Section 1, confirms that judicial power is wider than the power of adjudication that
it traditionally carried (by using the word “includes”) and at the same time incorporated the basic
requirements for adjudication in the traditional concept, namely, the presence of “actual controversies,” based
on “rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.” The confirmation expressly mentions that the
power is granted to “courts of justice” and, aside from being a power, is imposed as a duty of the courts. Thus,
the Constitution now lays the courts open to the charge of failure to do their constitutional duty when and if
they violate the obligations imposed in Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Section 5, Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution further fleshes out the irreducible “powers” of the Supreme Court in terms of
its original, appellate, and review adjudicative powers and its other non-adjudicative powers. In so doing,
Section 5 also confirmed the extent of the constitutionally-granted adjudicative power of the lower courts
that Congress has the authority to create (by defining, prescribing and apportioning their jurisdictions), as
well as the grant of administrative, executive and quasi-legislative powers to the Supreme Court, all within the
sphere of its judicial operations.
Same; Same; Same; View that judicial power is extended over the very powers exercised by other branches
or instrumentalities of government when grave abuse of discretion is present.—A completely new one, to the
concept of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution is the power “to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.” This new power is innovative since its recognition is separate from the
traditional adjudicative power that Section 1 earlier confirms and which Section 5 in part fleshes out. It is
likewise a definitive expansion of judicial power as its exercise is not over the traditional justiciable cases
handled by judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals. Notably, judicial power is extended over the very powers
exercised by other branches or instrumentalities of government when grave abuse of discretion is present. In
other words, the expansion empowers the judiciary, as a matter of duty, to inquire into acts of lawmaking by
the legislature and into law implementation by the executive when these other branches act with grave abuse
of discretion.
198
Same; Same; Same; View that under our constitutional regime, the judicial department is the only organ of
government tasked to guard and enforce the boundaries and limitations that the people had put in place in
governing themselves.—Under our constitutional regime, the judicial department is the only organ of
government tasked to guard and enforce the boundaries and limitations that the people had put in place in
governing themselves. This constitutional duty of the Court has been expanded by the additional power of
judicial review under the 1987 Constitution to “determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.”
Same; Reproductive Health Law; Principle of Double Effect; View that while the Reproductive Health (RH)
Law generally protects and promotes the unborn’s right to life, its Section 9 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) fail in their fidelity to the Constitution and to the very terms of the RH Law itself. For one, it
fails to adopt the principle of double effect under Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution. —I agree with
the ponencia that the RH law protects and promotes the right to life of the unborn by its continued
prohibition on abortion and distribution of abortifacients. I do recognize, however, that while the RH law
generally protects and promotes the unborn’s right to life, its Section 9 and its IRR fail in their fidelity to the
Constitution and to the very terms of the RH Law itself. For one, it fails to adopt the principle of double effect
under Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, as more fully discussed below. For these reasons, I cannot
wholly concur that the RH law and its IRR, as they came to this Court, were fully protective of the right to life
of the unborn. In fact, the Court should lay down guidelines, culled from a constitutionally-valid RH Law, of
what the government can actually procure and distribute under the RH law, consistent with its authority
under this law and Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
Same; Same; View that although Section 12, Article II of the Constitution does not consider the unborn a
person, its terms reflect the framers’ clear intent to convey an utmost respect for human life that is not merely
co-extensive with civil personality.—Although Section 12, Article II of the Constitution does not consider the
unborn a person, its terms reflect the framers’ clear intent to convey an
199
utmost respect for human life that is not merely co-extensive with civil personality. This intent requires
the extension of State protection to the life of the unborn from conception. To be precise, Section 12, Article II
of the 1987 Constitution provides: Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect
and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the
mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the
rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of
the Government.
Same; Same; View that unlike the ponencia, I take the view that the question of when the life of the unborn
begins cannot strictly be answered with reference to time, i.e., the exact time the sperm cell fertilized the egg cell.
—Unlike the ponencia, I take the view that the question of when the life of the unborn begins cannot strictly be
answered with reference to time, i.e., the exact time the sperm cell fertilized the egg cell. But other than this
uncertainty, the germinal stage of prenatal development that transpires (after the union of the sperm cell and
the egg cell and the combination of their genetic material materialized to form the fertilized egg or the zygote)
is not debatable.
Same; Same; View that since the constitutional intent is to protect the life of the unborn, and the fertilized
egg (or the zygote) already exhibits signs and characteristics of life, then this fertilized egg is already entitled to
constitutional protection.—Since the constitutional intent is to protect the life of the unborn, and the fertilized
egg (or the zygote) already exhibits signs and characteristics of life, then this fertilized egg is already entitled
to constitutional protection. I say this even if this fertilized egg may not always naturally develop into a baby
or a person. I submit that for purposes of constitutional interpretation, every doubt should be resolved in favor
of life, as this is the rule of life, anywhere, everywhere; any doubt should be resolved in favor of its protection
following a deeper law that came before all of us — the law commanding the preservation of the human specie.
This must have been the subconscious reason why even those who voted against the inclusion of the second
sentence of Section 12 in Article II of the Constitution conceded that a fertilized ovum — the word originally
used prior to
200
its substitution by the word “unborn” — is possessed of human life although they disagreed that
a right to life itself should be extended to it in the Constitution.
Same; Same; Principle of Double Effect; View that the mandate to equally protect the life of the mother and
the life of the unborn child from conception under Section 12, Article II of the Constitution is self-executing to
prevent and prohibit the state from enacting legislation that threatens the right to life of the unborn child.—I
submit that the mandate to equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn child from
conception under Section 12, Article II of the Constitution is self-executing to prevent and prohibit the state
from enacting legislation that threatens the right to life of the unborn child. To my mind, Section 12, Article II
should not be read narrowly as a mere policy declaration lest the actual intent of the provision be effectively
negated. While it is indeed a directive to the State to equally protect the life of the mother and the unborn
child, this command cannot be accomplished without the corollary and indirect mandate to the State to inhibit
itself from enacting programs that contradict protection for the life of the unborn.
Same; Same; Abortion; View that the clear intent of the Framers was to prevent both Congress and the
Supreme Court from making abortion possible.—The framers did not only intend to prevent the Supreme
Court from having a Philippine equivalent of a Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) decision, they also
unequivocally intended to deny Congress the power to determine that only at a certain stage of prenatal
development can the constitutional protection intended for the life unborn be triggered. In short, the clear
intent of the Framers was to prevent both Congress and the Supreme Court from making abortion possible.
Same; Same; View that since conception was equated with fertilization, as borne out by Records of the
Constitutional Commission, a fertilized egg or zygote, even without being implanted in the uterus, is therefore
already entitled to constitutional protection from the State.—Based on paragraph number 6 of the Medical
Experts’ Declaration, abortion is the termination of established pregnancy and that abortifacients, logically,
terminate this pregnancy. Under paragraph number 5, pregnancy is established only afterthe implantation of
the blastocysts or the fertilized egg. From this medical viewpoint, it is clear that prior to implantation, it is
premature to talk about
201
abortion and abortifacient as there is nothing yet to abort. If the constitutional framers simply intended to
adopt this medical viewpoint in crafting Section 12, Article II, there would have been no real need to insert the
phrase “from conception.” This should be obvious to a discerning reader. Since conception was equated with
fertilization, as borne out by Records of the Constitutional Commission, a fertilized egg or zygote, even
without being implanted in the uterus, is therefore already entitled to constitutional protection from the
State.
Same; Same; Principle of Double Effect; View that the general rule is that both the life of the unborn and the
life of the mother should be protected. However, in case of exceptional conflict situations, the life of one may be
preferred over the life of the other where it becomes medically necessary to do so.—To me, the general rule is
that both the life of the unborn and the life of the mother should be protected. However, in case of exceptional
conflict situations, the life of one may be preferred over the life of the other where it becomes medically
necessary to do so. The principle of double effect recognizes that in some instances, the use or administration
of certain drugs that are abortifacient-capable are necessary in order to save the life of the mother. The use in
administration of these drugs in these instances is and should be allowed by Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution since the policy is equal protection.
Reproductive Health Law; Department of Health; View that as the lead agency in the implementation of the
Reproductive Health (RH) Law, the Department of Health (DOH) is tasked to ensure people’s access to medically
safe, non-abortifacient, legal, quality and affordable reproductive health goods and services.—As the lead
agency in the implementation of the RH law, the Department of Health (DOH) is tasked to “[e]nsure people’s
access to medically safe, non-abortifacient, legal, quality and affordable reproductive health goods and
services[.]” This is consistent with the RH law’s policy which “guarantees universal access [only] to medically-
safe [and] non-abortifacient” contraceptives. The law also provides that these contraceptives “do not prevent
the implantation of a fertilized ovum as determined by the” FDA. Accordingly, DOH is tasked to procure and
distribute to local government units (LGUs) family planning supplies for the whole country and to monitor
their usage. Once delivered to the LGUs, the responsible health officials “shall assume responsibility for the
supplies” and
202
ensure their distribution in accordance with DOH guidelines. For this purpose, a regional officer
appointed by the DOH shall oversee the supply chain management of reproductive health supplies and/or
health products in his or her respective area. The RH law also authorizes LGUs to implement its own
procurement, distribution and monitoring program “consistent with the overall provisions of this Act and the
guidelines of the DOH.”
Same; Abortion; View that as a matter of exception, the government should be able to procure and
distribute abortifacients or drugs with abortifacient properties but solely for the purpose of saving the life of the
mother.—As a matter of exception, the government should be able to procure and distribute abortifacients or
drugs with abortifacient properties but solely for the purpose of saving the life of the mother. Specifically, the
procurement and distribution of these abortifacients may be allowed only in emergency cases and should
thus be made under medical supervision. The IRR of the RH law defines an “emergency” as a condition or
state of a patient wherein based on the objective findings of a prudent medical officer on duty for the day
there is immediate danger and where delay in initial support and treatment may cause loss of life or cause
permanent disability to the patient.
Same; Parental Rights; Mandatory Reproductive Health Education Program; View that we cannot declare
that the mandatory Reproductive Health (RH) education program does not violate parental rights when the
curriculum that could possibly supplant it is not yet in existence.—We cannot, without first examining the
actual contents of the curriculum and the religious beliefs and personal convictions of the parents that it
could affect, declare that the mandatory RH education is consistent with the Constitution. In other words, we
cannot declare that the mandatory RH education program does not violate parental rights when the
curriculum that could possibly supplant it is not yet in existence. Given the primacy of the natural and
fundamental rights of parents to raise their children, we should not pre-empt a constitutional challenge
against its possible violation, especially since the scope and coercive nature of the RH mandatory education
program could prevent the exercise of these rights.
Same; Same; View that pursuant to this natural right and duty of parents over the person of their minor
children, parental authority and responsibility include the caring for and rearing them for civic
203
consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-
being.—The relationship created by and resulting from a family naturally extends to and involves other
personal decisions that relate to child rearing and education. Parents have the natural right, as well as the
moral and legal duty, to care for their children, see to their proper upbringing and safeguard their best
interest and welfare. These array of personal decisions are protected by the constitutional right to privacy to
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion. Pursuant to this natural right and duty of parents over the
person of their minor children, parental authority and responsibility include the caring for and rearing them
for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical character and
well-being.
Same; Same; View that while parents are given a wide latitude of discretion and support in rearing their
children, their well-being is of course a subject within the State’s constitutional power to regulate. —While
parents are given a wide latitude of discretion and support in rearing their children, their well-being is of
course a subject within the State’s constitutional power to regulate. Specifically, the Constitution tasked the
State to promote and protect their moral, spiritual, intellectual and social development, and to recognize and
support their vital role in nation-building. In this undertaking, the State acts in its capacity as parens patriae.
Concededly, the State — as parens patriae — has the right and duty to minimize the risk of harm, arising from
the acquisition of knowledge from polluted sources, to those who are as yet unable to take care of themselves
fully. In other words, the family itself and the rights of parenthood are not completely beyond regulation;
parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child’s welfare, including, to some extent, matters of
conscience and religious conviction are not totally beyond State authority. It is in this area that the parents’
right to raise their children and the State’s interest in rearing the youth clash
Same; Same; Mandatory Reproductive Health Education Program; View that a mandatory reproductive
health education program in public schools does not violate parental privacy if they allow parents to review and
excuse their children from attending the program, or if the State shows a compelling state interest to override
the parents’ choice and compel them to allow their children to attend the program.—A mandatory reproductive
health education pro-
204
gram in public schools does not violate parental privacy if they allow parents to review and
excuse their children from attending the program, or if the State shows a compelling state interest to
override the parents’ choice and compel them to allow their children to attend the program.
Same; View that one obvious discouraging effect of controlled population growth is on the economy of some
of these countries which now have to secure foreign labor to balance their finances.—The Philippines to be sure,
is not the first country to use contraceptives and the mixed results from countries that have long travelled
this road are, to my mind, not very encouraging. One obvious discouraging effect of controlled population
growth is on the economy of some of these countries which now have to secure foreign labor to balance their
finances. This development has been a boon for a country like the Philippines with a fast-growing population;
we are enjoying now the benefits of our fast-growing population through the returns our migrating Filipino
workers bring back to the Philippines from their work in labor-starved countries. This has become possible
because host countries like Japan and the more economically advanced European countries need workers to
man their industries and supply their economies. Another economic effect is on retirement systems that have
been burdened by predominantly aging populations. For this same reason, some countries even face
impending economic slowdown in the middle term unless they can effectively remedy their manpower
shortage.
Same; Constitutional Law; Freedom of Speech; View that broken down to its elements, Section 23(a)(1) of
the Reproductive Health (RH) Law penalizes health care providers who (1) knowingly withhold information
about programs and services on reproductive health; (2) knowingly restrict the dissemination of these programs
and services; or (3) intentionally provide incorrect information regarding them; By penalizing these expressive
acts, Section 23 imposes a subsequent punishment on speech, which as a counterpart to the prohibition against
prior restraint, is also generally prohibited under the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression. —
Broken down to its elements, Section 23(a)(1) of the RH law penalizes health care providers who (1)
knowingly withhold information about programs and services on reproductive health; (2) knowingly restrict
the dissemination of these programs and services; or (3) intentionally provide incorrect information
regarding them. These prohibited acts
205
are, by themselves, communicative and expressive, and thus constitute speech. Intentionally providing
incorrect information cannot be performed without uttering, verbally or otherwise, the information that the
RH Law deems to be incorrect. The information that is illegal to withhold or restrict under Section 23 also
constitutes speech, as it is an expression of data and opinions regarding reproductive health services and
programs; thus, the prerogative to not utter these pieces of information also constitutes speech. By penalizing
these expressive acts, Section 23 imposes a subsequent punishment on speech, which as a counterpart to the
prohibition against prior restraint, is also generally prohibited under the constitutional guarantee of freedom
of expression. Without an assurance that speech would not be subsequently penalized, people would hesitate
to speak for fear of its consequences; there would be no need for prior restraints because the punishment
itself would effectively serve as a chilling effect on speech.
Same; Same; Same; View that Section 23(a)(1) of the Reproductive Health Law violates the right of health
practitioners to speak in public about reproductive health and should simply be struck down. —Jurisprudence in
the United States regarding the speech of medical practitioners has drawn a distinction between speech in the
course of their practice of medicine, and speech in public. When a doctor speaks to his patient, his speech may
be subjected to reasonable regulation by the state to ensure the accuracy of the information he gives his
patient and the quality of healthcare he provides. But when the doctor speaks to the public, his speech
becomes protected speech, and the guarantees against prior restraint and subsequent punishment applies to
his expressions that involves medicine or any other topic. This distinction is not provided in Section 23(a)(1)
of the RH Law, and we cannot create a distinction in the law when it provides none. Thus,  I submit that
Section 23(a)(1) violates the right of health practitioners to speak in public about reproductive health and
should simply be struck down.
Del Castillo, J., Concurring and Dissenting:
Constitutional Law; Judicial Power; View that the Supreme Court cannot remain an idle spectator or a
disinterested referee when constitutional rights are at stake.—The path that we, as a nation, will take has
already been decided by Congress, as representatives of the people, under our system of government. The
task before the
206
Court, then, is not to say which path we ought to take but to determine if the chosen path treads on
unconstitutional grounds. But this is not all. For the Court, which was once generally a passive organ in our
constitutional order, has been given expanded powers under the present Constitution. It is now not only its
right but its bounden duty to determine grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch, instrumentality
or agency of government, and, equally important, it has been given the power to issue rules for the protection
and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court cannot, therefore, remain an idle spectator or a
disinterested referee when constitutional rights are at stake. It is its duty to protect and defend constitutional
rights for otherwise its raison d’etre will cease.
 Same; Reproductive Health Law; Contraceptives; View that absent a clear and unequivocal constitutional
prohibition on the manufacture, distribution, and use of contraceptives, there is nothing to prevent Congress
from adopting a national family planning policy provided that the contraceptives that will be used pursuant
thereto do not harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception, which is synonymous to fertilization,
under Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution.—I am fully in accord with the result reached by the ponencia.
Absent a clear and unequivocal constitutional prohibition on the manufacture, distribution, and use of
contraceptives, there is nothing to prevent Congress from adopting a national family planning
policy provided that the contraceptives that will be used pursuant thereto do not harm or destroy the life of
the unborn from conception, which is synonymous to fertilization, under Article II, Section 12 of the
Constitution. The plain meaning of this constitutional provision and the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission bare this out.
Same; Same; View that history will judge the Supreme Court on what it did or did not do to protect the life
of the unborn from conception/fertilization.—The framers of, and the people who ratified the Constitution set
in bold and deft strokes the protection of the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization because it is
precious, sacred and inviolable. For as long as this precept remains written in our Constitution, our solemn
duty is to stay the course in fidelity to the most cherished values and wisdom of those who came before us
and to whom we entrusted the writing and ratification of our Constitution. History will judge this Court on
what it did or did not do to protect the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization. There is,
207
therefore, no other recourse but for this Court to act in defense of the life of the unborn.
Same; Same; View that the framers were unequivocal in their intent to define “conception” as the
fertilization of the egg by the sperm and to accord constitutional protection to the life of the unborn from the
moment of fertilization.—The framers were unequivocal in their intent to define “conception” as the
fertilization of the egg by the sperm and to accord constitutional protection to the life of the unborn from the
moment of fertilization. The plain meaning of the term “conception,” as synonymous to fertilization, based on
dictionaries and medical textbooks, as aptly and extensively discussed by the ponencia, confirm this
construction. In addition, petitioners correctly argue that the definition of “conception,” as equivalent to
fertilization, was the same definition prevailing during the 1980’s or at around the time the 1987 Constitution
was ratified. Hence, under the rule of constitutional construction, which gives weight to how the term was
understood by the people who ratified the Constitution, “conception” should be understood as fertilization.
Same; Same; View that the protection of the life of the unborn under Article II, Section 12 of the
Constitution is a self-executing provision.—The protection of the life of the unborn under Article II, Section 12
is a self-executing provision because: (1) It prevents Congress from legalizing abortion; from passing laws
which authorize the use of abortifacients; and from passing laws which will determine when life begins other
than from the moment of conception/fertilization; (2) It prevents the Supreme Court from making a Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) ruling in our jurisdiction; and (3) It obligates the Executive to ban contraceptives
which act as abortifacients or those which harm or destroy the unborn from conception/fertilization. Article
II, Section 12 is, thus, a direct, immediate and effective limitation on the three great branches of government
and a positive command on the State to protect the life of the unborn.
Same; Same; Right to Life; View that the framers repeatedly treated or referred to the right to life of the
unborn as a fundamental right and thereby acknowledged that the unborn is a proper subject of a constitutional
right.—Article II, Section 12 recognized a sui generis constitutional right to life of the unborn. The framers
repeatedly treated or referred to the right to life of the unborn as a fundamental
208
right and thereby acknowledged that the unborn is a proper subject of a constitutional right. That this
right is founded on natural law and is self-executing further provides the unmistakable basis and intent to
accord it the status of a constitutional right. However, it is sui generis because, unlike a person who possesses
the right to life, liberty and property, the unborn’s fundamental right is solely limited to the right to life as was
the intention of the framers. Clearly, then, Article II, Section 12 recognized a sui generisright to life of the
unborn from conception/fertilization and elevated it to the status of a constitutional right.
 Same; Same; View that because the unborn has been accorded a constitutional right to life from
conception/fertilization under Article II, Section 12, this right falls within the ambit of the Court’s power to issue
rules for the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the
Constitution.—Because the unborn has been accorded a constitutional right to life from
conception/fertilization under Article II, Section 12, this right falls within the ambit of the Court’s power to
issue rules for the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the
Constitution: Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: x x x x (5) Promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, x x x. Rules of procedure of special courts
and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. This
is significant because it imposes upon this Court the duty to protect such right pursuant to its rule-making
powers. In recent times, the Court acknowledged that the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature under Article II, Section 16 of the Constitution,
though found in the Declaration of Principles and Policies (like the subject right to life of the unborn) and not
in the Bill of Rights, may be given flesh pursuant to the power of the Court to issue rules for the protection
and enforcement of constitutional rights. It, thus, proceeded to promulgate the rules governing the Writ
of Kalikasan.
Reproductive Health Law; Contraceptives; View that the Reproductive Health (RH) Law repeatedly
emphasizes that the contraceptives which will be made available under the law should be non-abortifacient. —
The RH Law is to be commended for its zealous protection of the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization. It repeatedly emphasizes that the contraceptives which will be made
209
available under the law should be non-abortifacient. It prohibits the use of abortifacients and penalizes
the use thereof. Thus, it cannot be said that the law violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution.
Same; Same; Abortifacient; Words and Phrases; View that as defined in the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR), a drug or device is considered an abortifacient if it “primarily” induces abortion or the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother’s womb; where “primarily” means that the drug or device has no other known effect
aside from abortion.—I agree that the insertion of the qualifier “primarily” will open the floodgates to the
approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in
violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution. As defined in the IRR, a drug or device is considered an
abortifacient if it “primarily” induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb; where “primarily” means
that the drug or device has no other known effect aside from abortion. In other words, under the IRR, a
contraceptive will only be considered as an “abortifacient” if its sole known effect is abortion or, as pertinent
here, the prevention of the implantation of the fertilized ovum. Consequently, a drug or device which (a)
prevents fertilization, (b) but does not provide a 100% guarantee of such prevention, and (c) has a fail-safe
mechanism which will prevent the implantation of the fertilized ovum in case fertilization still occurs will not
be considered an “abortifacient” because the known effect thereof is not solely prevention of implantation
since (1) it primarily prevents fertilization and (2) only secondarily prevents the implantation of the fertilized
ovum in case fertilization still occurs.
Same; Same; View that although the Reproductive Health (RH) Law does not provide a definition of
“contraceptive,” a reasonable and logical deduction is that “contraceptive” (or allowable contraceptive to be
more precise) is the opposite of “abortifacient” as defined under the RH Law.—Although the RH Law does not
provide a definition of “contraceptive,” a reasonable and logical deduction is that “contraceptive” (or
allowable contraceptive to be more precise) is the opposite of “abortifacient” as defined under the RH Law.
This seems to be the tack adopted by the IRR in defining “contraceptive.” However, the IRR’s definition of
“contraceptive” again added the qualifier
210
“primarily.” For similar reasons with the previous discussion on the IRR’s definition of “abortifacient,”
this definition of “contraceptive” opens the floodgates to the approval of contraceptives which are actually
abortifacients because of their fail-safe mechanism. Hence, the qualifier “primarily” in Section 3.01(j) is,
likewise, void.
Same; Same; Constitutional Law; View that the power to disapprove the rules of procedure of quasi-judicial
bodies is significant in that it implies the power of the Supreme Court to look into the sufficiency of such rules of
procedure insofar as they adequately protect and enforce constitutional rights.—Viewed in light of the broad
power of the Court to issue rules for the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, the power to
disapprove the rules of procedure of quasi-judicial bodies is significant in that it implies the power of the
Court to look into the sufficiency of such rules of procedure insofar as they adequately protect and enforce
constitutional rights. Moreover, the power to disapprove the aforesaid rules of procedure necessarily
includes or implies the power to approve or modify such rules or, on the one extreme, require that such rules
of procedure be issued when necessary to protect and enforce constitutional rights. In other words, within
and between the broader power to issue rules for the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights and
the narrower power to disapprove the rules of procedure of quasi-judicial bodies, there exist penumbras of
this power that the Court may exercise in order to protect and enforce constitutional rights.
Same; Same; View that the Supreme Court must step in by directing the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) to issue the proper rules of procedure in the determination of whether a drug or device is an abortifacient
under the Reproductive Health (RH) Law.—Within this framework of implementation, and given the unique
status of the unborn and the exceptional need to protect its right to life, the Court  must step in by directing
the FDA to issue the proper rules of procedure in the determination of whether a drug or device is an
abortifacient under the RH Law. Such rules must sufficiently safeguard the right to life of the unborn. As a
penumbra of its power to issue rules to protect and enforce constitutional rights and its power to disapprove
rules of procedure of quasi-judicial bodies, the Court has the power and competency to mandate the
minimum requirements of due process in order to sufficiently safeguard the right to life of the unborn in the
proceedings that will be conducted before
211
the FDA. This is in line with the declared policy and numerous provisions of the RH Law according
utmost respect and protection for the right to life of the unborn. In determining whether a drug or device is
an abortifacient, the FDA will necessarily engage in a quasi-judicial function. It will determine whether a set of
facts (active properties or mechanisms of a drug or device) comply with a legal standard (definition of non-
abortifacient) which will ultimately bear upon the right to life of the unborn. Considering that quasi-judicial
bodies involved in, say, rate-fixing follow the due process requirements of publication, notice and hearing,
where the lesser right to property is involved, then with far greater reason should the proceedings before the
FDA require publication, notice and hearing.
Same; Same; View that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) should be ordered to immediately inform
this Court whether its previously approved and the currently available contraceptive drugs and devices in our
jurisdiction were screened, evaluated and/or tested against the afore-discussed general and specific standards.
—The FDA should be ordered to immediately inform this Court whether its previously approved and the
currently available contraceptive drugs and devices in our jurisdiction werescreened, evaluated and/or tested
against the afore-discussed general and specific standards. It should be emphasized that the FDA is not being
asked to re-screen, re-evaluate or re-test the aforesaid contraceptive drugs and devices but only to inform
this Court if they were screened, evaluated and/or tested against the constitutional and statutory standards
that the Court upholds in this decision. Thus, this will not take an inordinate amount of time to do considering
that the files should be readily available with the FDA. This information will allow the Court to take
immediate remedial action in order to protect and defend the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization,
if the circumstances warrant. That is, if the contraceptive drugs or devices were not screened, evaluated
and/or tested against the constitutional and statutory standards that the Court upholds in this decision, then
it would be necessary to suspend their availability in the market, as a precautionary measure, in order to
protect the right to life of the unborn pending the proper screening, evaluation and/or testing through the
afore-discussed rules of procedure that the FDA is directed to issue.
 Same; Same; View that pursuant to the expanded jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and as a penumbra of
its power to issue rules
212
for the protection and enforcement of the right to life of the unborn as well as the exceptional need to
protect such life, the Court can require that, in the promulgation by the Department of Health (DOH) of the
subject rules and regulations or guidelines, certain minimum requirements of due process shall be followed.—
Pursuant to the expanded jurisdiction of this Court and as a penumbra of its power to issue rules for the
protection and enforcement of the right to life of the unborn as well as the exceptional need to protect such
life, the Court can require that, in the promulgation by the DOH of the subject rules and regulations or
guidelines, certain minimum requirements of due process shall be followed. I find that, under these premises,
publication, notice and hearing should precede the issuance of the rules and regulations or guidelines which
will govern the purchase and distribution of the subject products and supplies. In other words, there should
be public hearings and/or consultations. The Solicitor General should be mandated to represent the unborn
and the State’s interest in the protection of the life of the unborn in these proceedings before the DOH. And
interested parties should be allowed to intervene.
Same; Same; View that under the Reproductive Health (RH) Law, there is nothing to suggest that the
contraceptives will be made available without properly informing the target users of their possible harmful side
effects.—While indeed the RH Law will make available contraceptives that may have harmful side-effects, it is
necessary to remember that the law does not impose their use upon any person. Understandably, from
petitioners’ point of view, it would seem “irrational” for (1) a person to take contraceptives, which have
known harmful side effects and, in the long term, even lead to premature death, and (2) the government to
subsidize the same in order to prevent pregnancy or to properly space childbearing given that there are other
safer means and methods of family planning. But the weighing of which value is superior to the other is a
matter left to the individual’s sound judgment and conscience. It is his or her choice; an axiom of liberty; an
attribute of free will. Men and women are free to make choices that harm themselves, like cigarette-smoking
or excessive intake of alcohol, in order to attain a value that they perceive is more important than their own
health and well-being. For as long as these choices are made freely (and do not harm the unborn from
conception/fertilization insofar as this case is concerned), the State cannot intervene beyond ensuring that
the choices are well-informed absent a clear and unequivocal constitutional or
213
statutory command permitting it to do so. Under the RH Law, there is nothing to suggest that the
contraceptives will be made available without properly informing the target users of their possible harmful
side effects. The law itself mandates complete information-dissemination and severely penalizes deliberate
misinformation.
Same; Same; View that all persons, who are qualified to avail of the benefits provided by the law, shall be
given complete and correct information on the reproductive health programs and services of the government
under the Reproductive Health (RH) Law.—The duty to inform is embodied in the above-quoted Section 23(a)
(1), which penalizes a public or private health care service provider for: (1) knowingly withholding
information or restricting the dissemination of information, and/or (2) intentionally providing incorrect
information; where “information” pertains to the programs and services on reproductive health including the
right to informed choice and access to a full range of legal, medically-safe, non-abortifacient and effective
family planning methods. This provision, thus, seeks to ensure that all persons, who are qualified to avail of
the benefits provided by the law, shall be given complete and correct information on the reproductive health
programs and services of the government under the RH Law. It does not provide any exception to the duty to
inform. Thus, a conscientious objector is mandated to provide complete and correct information even if this
will include information on artificial contraceptives to which he or she objects to on religious grounds.
Otherwise, he or she shall suffer the penal liability under the law.
Same; Constitutional Law; Religious Freedom; View that Section 23(a)(3) of the Reproductive Health (RH)
Law respects the right of the conscientious objector by permitting him or her to refuse to perform or provide the
health care services to which he or she objects to on religious or ethical grounds provided that he or she
immediately refers the person seeking such care and services to another health care service provider within the
same facility or one which is conveniently accessible.—The duty to refer, on the other hand, is provided in the
proviso of Section 23(a)(3), which is likewise quoted above. This provision penalizes a public or private
health care service provider for refusing to extend quality health care services and information on account of
a person’s marital status, gender, age, religious convictions, personal circumstances, or nature of work.
However, it respects the right of the conscientious objector by permitting him or her to refuse to perform or
provide the health care services to which
214
he or she objects to on religious or ethical grounds provided that he or she immediately refers the
person seeking such care and services to another health care service provider within the same facility or one
which is conveniently accessible. As an exception to the exception, the conscientious objector cannot refuse to
perform or provide such health care services if it involves an emergency condition or serious case under
Republic Act No. 8344.
Same; Same; Same; View that the law does not command the health service provider to endorse a
particular family planning method but merely requires the presentation of complete and correct information so
that the person can make an informed choice.—The law does not command the health service provider to
endorse a particular family planning method but merely requires the presentation of complete and correct
information so that the person can make an informed choice. A conscientious objector, like a Catholic doctor,
is, thus, not compelled to endorse artificial contraceptives as the preferred family planning method. On its
face, therefore, there appears to be no burden imposed on the conscientious objector under the duty to
inform.
Same; Same; Same; View that the duty to refer imposed on the conscientious objector under Sections 7 and
23(a)(3) of the Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the Free Exercise of Religion
Clause.—I find that the duty to refer imposed on the conscientious objector under Sections 7 and 23(a)(3) of
the RH Law is unconstitutional for violating the Free Exercise of Religion Clause. Consequently, the phrase,
“Provided, further, That these hospitals shall immediately refer the person seeking such care and services to
another health facility which is conveniently accessible,” in Section 7 and the phrase, “however, the
conscientious objector shall immediately refer the person seeking such care and services to another health care
service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible,” in Section 23(a)(3) of the RH
Law should be declared void. Consequently, Sections 5.24(b) to (e) and 5.25 of the IRR, which implements the
aforesaid provisions of the RH Law, are void.
Same; Same; Equal Protection of the Laws; View that under Section 23(a)(3) of the Reproductive Health
(RH) Law, both public and private health service providers may invoke the right of a conscientious objector. The
last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) is, thus, void insofar as it
deprives
215
the skilled health professionals enumerated therein from the right to conscientious objection. I also agree
with the ponencia that the last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the IRR is unconstitutional for being violative of the
Equal Protection Clause although I find that the proper standard of review is the strict scrutiny test. —The
above-enumerated skilled health professionals fall within the definition of a “public health care service
provider’’ under Section 4(n) of the RH Law. Under Section 23(a)(3) of the RH Law, both public and private
health service providers may invoke the right of a conscientious objector. The last paragraph of Section 5.24
of the IRR is, thus, void insofar as it deprives the skilled health professionals enumerated therein from the
right to conscientious objection. I also agree with the ponencia that the last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the
IRR is unconstitutional for being violative of the Equal Protection Clause although I find that the proper
standard of review is the strict scrutiny test. The IRR effectively creates two classes with differential
treatment with respect to the capacity to invoke the right of a conscientious objector: (1) skilled health
professionals such as provincial, city, or municipal health officers, chiefs of hospital, head nurses, supervising
midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the
provisions of the RH Law and its IRR, and (2) skilled health professionals not belonging to (1). Those
belonging to the first class cannot invoke the right of a conscientious objector while those in the second class
are granted that right.
Same; Same; View that the decision-making process in this area is a delicate and private matter intimately
related to the founding of a family. The matter should, thus, be decided by both spouses under the assumption
that they will amicably settle their differences and forthwith act in the best interest of the marriage and family.
—Indeed, the decision-making process in this area is a delicate and private matter intimately related to the
founding of a family. The matter should, thus, be decided by both spouses under the assumption that they will
amicably settle their differences and forthwith act in the best interest of the marriage and family. But, as in all
relations between and among individuals, irreconcilable disagreements may arise. The law, therefore, steps in
to break the impasse. The law, however, settles the dispute by giving the spouse, who will undergo the
procedure, the absolute and final authority to decide the matter. The rationale seems to be that the spouse,
who will undergo the
216
procedure, should ultimately make the decision since it involves his or her body. Like the ponencia, I am
of the view that this provision in the RH Law clearly violates Article II, Section 12 in relation to Article XV,
Sections 1 and 3(1) of the Constitution.
Same; Same; View that the spouse, who will undergo the reproductive health procedure, cannot be given
the absolute and final authority to decide this matter because it will destroy the solidarity of the family, in
general, and do violence to the equal right of each spouse to found the family in accordance with their religious
convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood, in particular.—The provision speaks of this right as
properly belonging to both spouses. The right is, thus, conferred on both of them and they are to exercise this
right jointly. Implicit in this provision is that the spouses equally possess this right particularly when read in
light of Article II, Section 14 of the Constitution which enjoins the State to ensure the fundamental equality
before the law of women and men. Thus, the spouse, who will undergo the reproductive health procedure,
cannot be given the absolute and final authority to decide this matter because it will destroy the solidarity of
the family, in general, and do violence to the equal right of each spouse to found the family in accordance with
their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood, in particular.
Same; Same; View that while I agree that Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the Reproductive Health (RH) Law is
unconstitutional, the declaration of unconstitutionality should not be construed as giving the non-consenting
spouse the absolute and final authority in the decision-making process relative to undergoing a reproductive
health procedure by one spouse.—The key principle is that no spouse has the absolute and final authority to
decide this matter because it will run counter to the constitutional edict protecting the solidarity of the family
and equally conferring the right to found the family on both spouses. Consequently, while I agree that Section
23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law is unconstitutional, the declaration of unconstitutionality should not be construed
as giving the non-consenting spouse the absolute and final authority in the decision-making process relative
to undergoing a reproductive health procedure by one spouse. The proper state of the law and rules of
procedure on the matter is that the decision shall require the consent of both spouses, and, in case of
disagreement, the matter shall be brought before the courts for its just adjudication.
217
Same; Same; Parental Authority; View that as a natural right, parental authority is recognized as an
inherent right, not created by the State or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental
relationship.—The description of the family as a “basic” social institution is “an assertion that the family is
anterior to the state and is not a creature of the state” while the reference to the family as “ autonomous” is
“meant to protect the family against the instrumentalization by the state.” This provision is, thus, a guarantee
against unwarranted State intrusion on matters dealing with family life. The subject of parental authority and
responsibility is specifically dealt with in the last sentence of the above constitutional provision which reads:
The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. As a natural right, parental
authority is recognized as an inherent right, not created by the State or decisions of the courts, but derives
from the nature of the parental relationship. More important, as pertinent in this controversy, the present
Constitution refers to such right as “primary” which “imports the assertion that the right of parents is
superior to that of the state.”
Same; Same; Same; View that because parental authority is a constitutionally recognized natural and
primary right of the parents, with emphasis on “primary” as giving parents a superior right over the State, the
State cannot carve out an exception to such authority without showing or providing a sufficiently compelling
State interest to do so.—Because parental authority is a constitutionally recognized natural and primary right
of the parents, with emphasis on “primary” as giving parents a superior right over the State, the State cannot
carve out an exception to such authority without showing or providing a sufficiently compelling State interest
to do so. A limited but blanket exception from parental authority, such as that found in Section 7 of the RH
Law, will undoubtedly destroy the solidarity of the family as well as foster disrespect and disobedience on the
part of the minor. It disrupts the natural state of parent-child relationship and is wholly inconsistent with the
purpose and essence of parental authority granting the parents the natural and primary right in all matters
relating to the rearing and care of the minor in order to safeguard his or her well-being.
Same; Same; Same; View that the fundamental right involving the parental authority of parents over their
minor children is unduly
218
limited by the proviso in Section 7 of the Reproductive Health (RH) Law, thus, calling for the application of
the strict scrutiny test.—The fundamental right involving the parental authority of parents over their minor
children is unduly limited by the proviso in Section 7 of the RH Law, thus, calling for the application of the
strict scrutiny test. The government must show that a compelling State interest justifies the curtailment of
parental authority of parents whose minor children belong to the first group (i.e., minors who are already
parents or have had a miscarriage) vis-à-vis parents whose minor children belong to the second group (i.e.,
minors who are not parents or have not had a miscarriage). However, for reasons already discussed as to the
maturity level of such group of minors and the apparent purpose of the subject legal provision, the
government has failed to show such compelling State interest. Hence, the phrase “except when the minor is
already a parent or has had a miscarriage” in Section 7 of the RH Law is, likewise, unconstitutional on equal
protection grounds.
Same; Same; Same; View that the State or parents of the minor cannot prevent or restrict access to such
information considering that they will be readily available on various platforms of media, if they are not already
available at present. It is only when the minor decides to act on the information by seeking access to the family
planning services themselves that parental authority cannot be dispensed with.—I agree with the ponencia that
there is nothing unconstitutional about the capacity of a minor to access information on family planning
services under Section 7 of the RH Law for the reasons stated in the ponencia. In addition, for practical
reasons, the State or parents of the minor cannot prevent or restrict access to such information considering
that they will be readily available on various platforms of media, if they are not already available at present. It
is only when the minor decides to act on the information by seeking access to the family planning services
themselves that parental authority cannot be dispensed with.
Same; Same; Age- and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education; Police Power; View that
pursuant to its police power, the State may regulate the content of the matters taught to adolescents
particularly with respect to reproductive health education in order to, among others, propagate proper attitudes
and behavior relative to human sexuality and sexual relations as well as properly prepare the young for
marriage and family life.—I agree with the
219
ponencia that the constitutional challenge against Section 14 of the RH Law is unavailing insofar as it is
claimed to violate Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution on the natural and primary right and duty of
parents to rear their children. Indeed, the State has a substantial interest in the education of the youth.
Pursuant to its police power, the State may regulate the content of the matters taught to adolescents
particularly with respect to reproductive health education in order to, among others, propagate proper
attitudes and behavior relative to human sexuality and sexual relations as well as properly prepare the young
for marriage and family life. The topics to be covered by the curriculum include values formation; knowledge
and skills in self-protection against discrimination; sexual abuse and violence against women and children
and other forms of gender based violence and teen pregnancy; physical, social and emotional changes in
adolescents; women’s rights and children’s rights; responsible teenage behavior; gender and development;
and responsible parenthood. The curriculum is, thus, intended to achieve valid secular objectives. As
the ponencia aptly noted, the RH Law seeks to supplement, not supplant, the natural and primary right and
duty of parents to rear their children.
Same; Same; Same; Religious Freedom; View that the constitutional challenge against Section 14 relative to
the Free Exercise of Religion Clause is premature because, as noted by the ponencia, the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) has yet to formulate the curriculum on age- and development-appropriate
reproductive health education.—The constitutional challenge against Section 14 relative to the Free Exercise
of Religion Clause is premature because, as noted by the ponencia, the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (DECS) has yet to formulate the curriculum on age- and development-appropriate reproductive health
education. A Free Exercise of Religion Clause challenge would necessarily require the challenger to state what
specific religious belief of his or hers is burdened by the subject curriculum as well as the specific content of
the curriculum he or she objects to on religious grounds. Moreover, the proper party to mount such a
challenge would be the student and/or his or her parents upon learning of the specific content of the
curriculum and upon deciding what aspects of their religious beliefs are burdened. It would be inappropriate
for the Court to speculate on these aspects of a potential Free Exercise of Religion
220
Clause litigation involving a curriculum that has yet to be formulated by the DECS.
Same; Same; Same; Equal Protection of the Law; View that as to the equal protection challenge against
Section 14 of the Reproductive Health (RH) Law, I agree with the ponencia that there are substantial distinctions
between public and private educational institutions which justify the optional teaching of reproductive health
education in private educational institutions.—As to the equal protection challenge against Section 14, I agree
with the ponencia that there are substantial distinctions between public and private educational institutions
which justify the optional teaching of reproductive health education in private educational institutions. (By
giving private educational institutions the option to adopt the curriculum to be formulated by the DECS, the
RH Law effectively makes the teaching of reproductive health education in private educational institutions
optional because the aforesaid institutions may completely discard such curriculum).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Academic Freedom; View that only institutions of higher learning enjoy
academic freedom. Considering that the students who will be subjected to reproductive health education are
adolescents or “young people between the ages of ten (10) to nineteen (19) years who are in transition from
childhood to adulthood,” then this would presumably be taught in elementary and high schools which are not
covered by academic freedom.—I disagree that the academic freedom of private educational institutions
should be a basis of such justification. Article XIV, Section 5(2) of the Constitution provides that, “[a]cademic
freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.” Thus, only institutions of higher learning enjoy
academic freedom. Considering that the students who will be subjected to reproductive health education are
adolescents or “young people between the ages often (10) to nineteen (19) years who are in transition from
childhood to adulthood,” then this would presumably be taught in elementary and high schools which are not
covered by academic freedom. Nonetheless, I agree with the ponencia that, by effectively decreeing optional
teaching of reproductive health education in private educational institutions, the RH Law seeks to respect the
religious belief system of the aforesaid institutions. I find this to be a reasonable basis for the differential
treatment between public and private educational institutions.
221
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the Reproductive Health (RH) Law is replete with provisions
respecting the religious freedoms of individuals.—Noticeably, the RH Law is replete with provisions respecting
the religious freedoms of individuals. In fact, one of its central and guiding principles is free and informed
choice, thus, negating the imposition of any family planning method on an individual who objects on religious
grounds. The same principle appears to have been carried over relative to the teaching of reproductive health
education in private educational institutions. Congress may have legitimately concluded that the State
interests in societal peace, tolerance or benevolent-neutrality accommodation, as the case may be, vis-à-
vis the various religious belief systems of private educational institutions in our nation will be better served
by making the teaching of reproductive health education (which may touch on or impact delicate or sensitive
religious beliefs) as merely optional in such institutions. We can take judicial notice of the fact that majority of
the private educational institutions in our nation were established and are run by religious groups or sects.
Same; Same; View that the Reproductive Health (RH) Law enjoys the presumption of constitutionality and
should be given a construction which will avoid its nullity.—The RH Law enjoys the presumption of
constitutionality and should be given a construction which will avoid its nullity. The phrase “[k]nowingly
withhold information or restrict the dissemination thereof, and/or intentionally provide incorrect
information regarding programs and services” under Section 23(a)(1) of the RH Law should be reasonably
and narrowly construed as merely requiring the health care service provider to provide and explain to
persons the list of the government’s reproductive health programs and services under the RH Law. To
illustrate, if the government’s reproductive health programs and services under the RH Law consists of A, B, C
and D, then a health care service provider is required to transmit this information to a person qualified to
avail of the benefits under the law.
Same; Same; Religious Freedom; View that Section 17 of the Reproductive Health (RH) Law does not violate
the constitutional prohibition against involuntary servitude and that it is unconstitutional insofar as it imposes a
duty to conscientious objectors to render pro bono reproductive health care services to which the conscientious
objector objects to on religious or ethical grounds for reasons stated in the ponencia. —I am fully in accord with
the ruling of the ponencia
222
that Section 17 of the RH Law does not violate the constitutional prohibition against involuntary
servitude and that it is unconstitutional insofar as it imposes a duty to conscientious objectors to render pro
bono reproductive health care services to which the conscientious objector objects to on religious or ethical
grounds for reasons stated in the ponencia. Corrorarily, the conscientious objector can be required to
render pro bono reproductive health care services for as long as it involves services that he or she does not
object to on religious or ethical grounds.
Same; Natural Law; View that I agree with the ponencia that natural law may not, under the particular
circumstances of this case, be used to invalidate the Reproductive Health (RH) Law.—I agree with the ponencia
that natural law may not, under the particular circumstances of this case, be used to invalidate the RH Law.
However, I disagree with the following statements: While every law enacted by man emananted from what is
perceived as natural law, the Court is not obliged to see if a statute, executive issuance or ordinance is in
conformity to it. To begin with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body. Moreover, natural laws are
mere thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused by theorists, philosophers and theologists. The jurists
of the philosophical school are interested in the law as an abstraction, rather than in the actual law of the past
or present. These statements, I submit, are not necessary in the disposition of this case and appear to be an
inaccurate description of natural law. The Court need not foreclose the usefulness of natural law in resolving
future cases. I submit that the statement that natural law is not applicable in the resolution of this particular
case suffices.
Abad, J., Concurring Opinion:
Reproductive Health Law; Constitutional Law; View that Republic Act 10354 or the Responsible Parenthood
and Reproductive Health Act of 2012, the Reproductive Health (RH) Law for short, repeatedly extols the
principles of gender equality, sustainable human development, health, education, information, the sanctity of
human life and the family, improved quality of life, freedom of religious convictions, ethics, and cultural beliefs,
freedom from poverty, and other ennobled principles.—Remarkably, Republic Act 10354 or the Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012, the RH Law for short, repeatedly extols the principles of
gender equal-
223
ity, sustainable human development, health, education, information, the sanctity of human life and the family,
improved quality of life, freedom of religious convictions, ethics, and cultural beliefs, freedom from poverty,
and other ennobled principles. But these are already part of existing laws and no one can object to them.
What they do is apparently embellish what the RH Law seeks to accomplish.
Same; Same; Facial Challenges; View that a law claimed to threaten a child’s right to live sufficiently
justifies a constitutional facial challenge.—The ponencia is right that the procedural challenges to the petitions
are unmeritorious. In particular, respondents claim that the Court should dismiss these actions since they are
a mere facial challenge on the constitutionality of the RH Law as opposed to an actual breach of its provisions
and the filing of a case in court on account of such breach. The petitions should not be allowed, they add, since
this challenge is not about the exercise of the freedom of expression, an exception to such limitation. But the
right to life of the unborn child, which is at the center of these controversies, cannot be compared with rights
that are best examined in cases of actual violations. Obviously, the Court cannot wait for the actual
extermination of an unborn child before assessing the constitutional validity of the law that petitioners claim
to permit such action. A law claimed to threaten a child’s right to live sufficiently justifies a constitutional
facial challenge.
Same; Same; Same; View that there is no question of course that every couple planning their family and
every woman of ample, discernment has the right to use natural or artificial methods to avoid pregnancy. —
There is no question of course that every couple planning their family and every woman of ample
discernment has the right to use natural or artificial methods to avoid pregnancy. This much is clear. But, in
seeking to promote the exercise of this right, the RH Law must hurdle certain constitutional barriers: 1) the
right to life of the unborn child that outlaws abortion; 2) the right to health; 3) the free exercise of religion; 4)
the right to due process of law; and 4) the freedom of expression.
Same; Same; View that the 1987 Constitution is clear: the life of a child begins “from conception” and the
dictionary, which is the final arbiter of the common meaning of words, states that “ conception” is “the act of
being pregnant,” specifically, the “formation of a viable zygote.”—Some people believe that the conception of
the child begins
224
only from the moment the fleshed embryo implants itself on the mother’s uterine wall where it will draw the
food and nutrition it needs to survive and grow into a fetus. It is the termination of the embryo or the fetus at
this stage, painful, bloody, and depressing, that some are quick to condemn as abortion. Preventing
implantation by quietly slaying the zygote or the embryo with little or no blood before it reaches the uterine
wall is to them not abortion. But they are wrong. The 1987 Constitution is clear: the life of a child begins
“from conception’’ and the dictionary, which is the final arbiter of the common meaning of words, states that
“conception” is “the act of being pregnant,” specifically, the “formation of a viable zygote.” Science has proved
that a new individual comes into being from the moment the zygote is formed. Indeed, the zygote already has
a genome (DNA to others) that identifies it as a human being and determines its sex. The union of man and
woman in the fertilized ovum is the beginning of another person’s life.
Same; Same; Abortion; View that with the Constitution, the Filipino people have in effect covenanted that
the fertilized ovum or zygote is a person; Ambushing the fertilized ovum as it travels down the fallopian tube to
prevent its implantation on the uterine wall is abortion.—With the Constitution, the Filipino people have in
effect covenanted that the fertilized ovum or zygote is a person. And it is a covenant that binds. Indeed, the
RH Law accepts this inviolable principle and precisely prohibits the use of abortifacient that induces “the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb.” Ambushing the fertilized
ovum as it travels down the fallopian tube to prevent its implantation on the uterine wall is abortion.
Same; Same; Same; View that since the conception of a child begins from the fertilization of the ovum, it is
evident that merely preventing the woman from ovulating to produce ovum or preventing the sperm from
fertilizing it does not constitute abortion.—Since the conception of a child begins from the fertilization of the
ovum, it is evident that merely preventing the woman from ovulating to produce ovum or preventing the
sperm from fertilizing it does not constitute abortion. Contraception in this sense does not violate the
Constitutional right to life since the unborn has not as yet been conceived. The law may authorize or even
encourage this kind of contraception since it merely prevents conception. The life of an unborn child is not at
stake.
225
Same; Same; Contraceptives; Intrauterine Devices; View that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has
been routinely allowing public access to hormonal contraceptives and Intrauterine Devices (IUDs) even before
the passage of the Reproductive Health (RH) Law.—The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has been
routinely allowing public access to hormonal contraceptives and IUDs even before the passage of the RH Law.
The outcry for the law’s passage to make these things available to whoever wants them is the lament of the
unenlightened. In reality, the government senses a strong resistance to their use, borne of beliefs that they are
unsafe and abortifacient. The RH Law precisely aims to put an end to this resistance by imposing certain
sanctions against hospitals, physicians, nurses, midwives, and other health care providers who communicate
to others the view that contraceptives and IUDs are unsafe and abortifacient, refuse to prescribe them, or
decline to perform the required procedures for their use.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that in any event, I agree with the Court’s ruling that the second sentence of
Section 9 does not authorize the approval of family planning products and supplies that act as abortifacient.—
Congress fears that hormonal contraceptives and IUDs perform a third function — disabling the
endometrium of uterine lining — that enable them to serve as weapons of abortion, proof of this is that the
RH Law provides in the third sentence of Section 9 that these contraceptives and devices may, assuming that
they also function as abortifacients, pass FDA approval provided the latter issues a certification that they are
“not to be used as abortifacient..” Thus: Sec. 9. x x x Any product or supply included or to be included in the
EDL, must have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on the condition
that it is not to be used as an abortifacient. The above of course makes no sense since the two functions go
together and the user has no way, after taking the contraceptive, of stopping the second function from
running its course. The bad simply comes with the good. The certification requirement violates the RH Law’s
tenet that “reproductive health rights do not include...access to abortifacients.”It also contradicts the RH
Law’s stated policy of guaranteeing universal access to “non-abortifacient” contraceptives.” Above all, this
position is in breach of the provision of the Constitution that outlaws abortion. In any event, I agree with the
Court’s ruling that the second sentence of
226
Section 9 does not authorize the approval of family planning products and supplies that act as abortifacient.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Administrative Agencies; Food and Drug Administration; View that annulling
Section 9 of the Reproductive Health (RH) Law merely means that it is beyond the powers of Congress to
legislate the safe and non-abortifacient status of certain forms of artificial contraceptives. That function must
remain with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) which has the required scientific and technical skills for
evaluating, testing, and approving each contraceptive before it is publicly made available.—This is not to say
that all contraceptives and IUDs, present and future, double as abortifacients and are not to be allowed.
Annulling Section 9 merely means that it is beyond the powers of Congress to legislate the safe and non-
abortifacient status of certain forms of artificial contraceptives. That function must remain with the FDA
which has the required scientific and technical skills for evaluating, testing, and approving each contraceptive
before it is publicly made available. The manufacturers and distributors have their responsibilities, too. They
have to warrant that their products do not function as abortifacients.
Same; Same; Right to Health; Family Planning Programs; View that the government cannot promote family
planning programs that violate the women’s right to health.—Women have the right to be free from
government-sponsored sickness, government-sponsored pain, and government-sponsored defect. Since
healthy vital organs of the body form part of the right to health, women have the right to have normally
functioning vital organs. They have the right to walk in the park or in the malls free from debilitating illnesses
and free from worries and fears over contraceptives that the government assures them are safe. The
government cannot promote family planning programs that violate the women’s right to health. A law that
misleads women and states that hormonal contraceptives and IUDs are safe violates their constitutional right
to health.
Same; Same; Contraceptives; View that the Reproductive Health (RH) Law itself recognizes that the use of
contraceptives produces side effects or other harmful results.—Since the law does not define the meaning of the
term “safe,” it is to be understood according to its common meaning: “free from harm, injury, or risk.” The RH
Law itself recognizes that the use of contraceptives produces side
227
effects or other harmful results. Thus, it directs the FDA in Section 19 to issue strict guidelines with respect to
their use, acknowledging the need for abundant caution. Do warnings of side effects and possible lasting harm
make contraceptives and IUDs safe? The answer is of course no. For instance, a simple warning against pet
snakes would say, “Look at this snake. It is a safe pet to keep in the house. But just don’t keep it hungry. Don’t
forget to close the small door of the cage when you feed it. And watch those small kids.”
Same; Same; Same; View that the dangers of those side effects are more worrisome since the Reproductive
Health (RH) Law fails to provide standards of safe use of contraceptives.—The dangers of those side effects are
more worrisome since the RH Law fails to provide standards of safe use of contraceptives such as: (a) a
prescribed standard of tolerance for side effects; (b) the service of a qualified physician who can advice the
user, especially the poor, of the dangers of contraceptives, not just literature written in English so she can
make intelligent choice; (c) the service of a qualified physician who will, while she is under contraceptives,
monitor their effects on her, treat her for adverse side effects and complications, and provide her with the
right medicine; and (d) the contraceptives she takes do not act at the same time as abortifacients in case an
ovum is fertilized despite the use of such contraceptives. The fact is that contraceptives interfere with normal
body functions. Women have ovaries so these can produce ova or eggs that can be fertilized to ensure
procreation and the continuation of the human race. Contraceptives prevent healthy ovaries from ovulating,
which is the reason for their being ovaries. One cannot disable the woman’s ovaries or monkey with its
functions for long periods without affecting her health. Medical studies and reports show this to be the case.
Same; Same; Same; View that the determination of what medicine is safe and useful to a person is a
function of the science of medicine and pharmacy. It is not for the Supreme Court or the legislature to determine.
—The legislature’s attempt to elevate into law its arbitrary finding that hormonal contraceptives and IUDs
are safe and non-abortifacient is irrational. The determination of what medicine is safe and useful to a person
is a function of the science of medicine and pharmacy. It is not for the Court or the legislature to determine.
Raising present-day scientific or medical views regarding contraceptives to the level of law, when contested
by opposing scientific or medical views, is an arbitrary exercise of legislative power.
228
Same; Same; Religious Freedom; View that a health care service provider is not to be compelled to render
the services that would interfere with the natural human reproduction process if the same conflicts with his
conscience. This is consistent with Section 5, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides that no law shall
be made prohibiting a person’s free exercise of his religion.—The law provides, however, that the health care
service provider’s objection based on his or her ethical or religious beliefs is to be respected. Thus, he or she
is not to be compelled to render the services that would interfere with the natural human reproduction
process if the same conflicts with his conscience. This is consistent with Section 5, Article III of the 1987
Constitution which provides that no law shall be made prohibiting a person’s free exercise of his religion. But
the irony of it is that at the next breath the RH Law would require the conscientious objector to immediately
refer the person, whose wants he declines to serve, to the nearest health care service provider who will do
what he would not. The penalty for failing to do this is imprisonment for 1 to 6 months or payment of a fine of
P10,000 to P100,000 or both imprisonment and fine. If the offender is a juridical person, the penalty shall be
imposed on its president or responsible officer.
Same; Same; Same; View that the Supreme Court has correctly decided to annul Section 23(a)(3) and the
corresponding provision in the Reproductive Health (RH) Law-Implementing Rules and Regulations (RH-IRR),
particularly section 5.24, as unconstitutional insofar as they punish any health care provider who fails and/or
refuses to refer a patient not, in an emergency or life-threatening case, to another health care service provider
within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs.—
Unfortunately, the RH Law requires him to take steps to ensure that the woman is pointed to another place
where she could get the IUD implantation she wants. In effect, the law compels the doctor to do more than
just keep quiet and let alone. It compels him at the pains of going to jail to get involved and help in the
commission of what his religious belief regards as amounting to the murder of a child. And this is in order to
satisfy the need of the woman and her partner for sex without pregnancy. Remember, this is not the case of a
bleeding woman needing immediate medical attention. The Court has correctly decided to annul Section
23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly section 5.24, as unconstitutional insofar
as they punish any health care provider
229
who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not, in an emergency or life-threatening case, to another health
care service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her
religious beliefs.
Same; Same; Principle of Void for Vagueness; View that due process demands that the terms of a penal
statute must be sufficiently clear to inform those who may be subjected to it what conduct will render them
liable to its penalties.—Due process demands that the terms of a penal statute must be sufficiently clear to
inform those who may be subjected to it what conduct will render them liable to its penalties. A criminal
statute that “fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is
forbidden by statute,” or is so indefinite that “it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions,” is
void for vagueness. A vague or indefinite statute is unconstitutional because it places the accused on trial for
an offense, the nature of which he is given no fair warning.
Same; Same; View that the State guarantees under Section 2 of the Reproductive Health (RH) Law the right
of every woman to consider all available reproductive health options when making her decision.—The State
guarantees under Section 2 of the RH Law the right of every woman to consider all available reproductive
health options when making her decision. This implies that she has the right to seek advice from anyone she
trusts. Consequently, if a woman wanting to space her pregnancy seeks the advice of a Catholic physician she
trusts, the latter should not be sent to jail for expressing his belief that taking oral pills or using copper IUDs
can cause abortion that her faith prohibits. This is valid even if others do not share the faith. Religious
conscience is precisely a part of the consideration for free choice in family planning.
 Same; Same; View that for now I am satisfied that Section 23(a)(1) has been declared void and
unconstitutional insofar as it punishes any health care provider who fails or refuses to disseminate information
regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.—I concede,
however, that my above views on Section 23(a)(1) could be better appreciated in actual cases involving its
application rather than in the present case where I go by the are provisions of the law. For now I am satisfied
that Section 23(a)(1) has been declared void and unconstitutional
230
insofar as it punishes any health care provider who fails or refuses to disseminate information regarding
programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs. 
Reyes, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion: 
Reproductive Health Law; Parental Authority; View that the authority that is exercised by parents over
their unemancipated children includes the right and duty to enhance, protect, preserve, and maintain their
physical and mental health and to represent them in all matters affecting their interests. —The authority that is
exercised by parents over their unemancipated children includes the right and duty to enhance, protect,
preserve, and maintain their physical and mental health and to represent them in all matters affecting their
interests. The authority exercised by parents over their unemancipated children is terminated, inter alia,
upon emancipation of the child. Emancipation takes place upon attainment of the age of majority, which
commences at the age of eighteen years.
Same; Same; Parental Consent; View that the last proviso of Section 7 restricts the access of minors to
modern methods of family planning; It requires a written parental consent before a minor may be allowed
access thereto.—Section 7 seeks to make modern family planning methods more accessible to the public. The
provision mandates that no person shall be denied information and access to family planning services,
whether natural or artificial. However, the last proviso of Section 7 restricts the access of minors to modern
methods of family planning; it requires a written parental consent before a minor may be allowed access
thereto. This is but recognition of the parental authority that is exercised by parents over the persons of their
unemancipated children. That it is both a duty and a right of the parents to protect the physical health of their
unemancipated children. However, Section 7 provided an exception to the requirement of written parental
consent for minors. A minor who is already a parent or has had a miscarriage may be allowed access to
modern methods of family planning notwithstanding the absence of a written parental consent therefor. This
runs afoul of the natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of their children, which, under
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution, should receive the support of the government.
231
Same; Same; Same; View that there is no cogent reason to require a written parental consent for a minor
who seeks access to modern family planning methods and dispense with such requirement if the minor is already
a parent or has had a miscarriage. Under the Family Code, all minors, generally, regardless of his/her
circumstances, are still covered by the parental authority exercised by their parents. —There exists no
substantial distinction as between a minor who is already a parent or has had a miscarriage and a minor who
is not yet a parent or never had a miscarriage. There is no cogent reason to require a written parental consent
for a minor who seeks access to modern family planning methods and dispense with such requirement if the
minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Under the Family Code, all minors, generally, regardless of
his/her circumstances, are still covered by the parental authority exercised by their parents. That a minor is
already a parent or has had a miscarriage does not operate to divest his/her parents of their parental
authority; such circumstances do not emancipate a minor.
Same; Same; Constitutional Law; View that considering that the last proviso of Section 7 operates to divest
parents of their parental authority over the persons of their minor child who is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage, the same must be struck down for being contrary to the natural and primary right and duty of
parents under Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.—It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and
nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for
obligations the State can neither supply nor hinder. Most children, even in adolescence, simply are not able to
make sound judgments concerning many decisions, including their need for medical care or treatment.
Parents can and must make those judgments. Considering that the last proviso of Section 7 operates to divest
parents of their parental authority over the persons of their minor child who is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage, the same must be struck down for being contrary to the natural and primary right and duty of
parents under Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
Same; Constitutional Law; Age- and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education; Academic
Freedom; View that Section 5(2), Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher learning
academic freedom.—The petitioners claim that Section 14, by mandating the inclusion of age- and
development-
232
appropriate reproductive health education to adolescents, violates the academic freedom of educational
institutions since they will be compelled to include in their curriculum a subject, which, based on their
religious beliefs, should not be taught to students. The petitioners’ claim is utterly baseless. Section 5(2),
Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher learning academic freedom. The
institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide and adopt its aims and
objectives, and to determine how these objections can best be attained, free from outside coercion or
interference, save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. The essential
freedoms subsumed in the term “academic freedom” encompass the freedom of the school or college to
determine for itself: (1) who may teach; (2) what may be taught; (3) how lessons shall be taught; and (4) who
may be admitted to study. An analysis of the foregoing claim requires a dichotomy between public and
private educational institutions. The last sentence of Section 14 provides that the age- and development-
appropriate reproductive health curriculum that would be formulated by the DepEd “shall be used by public
schools and may be adopted by private schools.” The mandated reproductive health education would only be
compulsory for public schools. Thus, as regards private educational institutions, there being no compulsion,
their constitutional right to academic freedom is not thereby violated.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that as regards public educational institutions, though they are
mandatorily required to adopt an age- and development-appropriate reproductive health education curriculum,
the claimed curtailment of academic freedom is still untenable.—As regards public educational institutions,
though they are mandatorily required to adopt an age- and development-appropriate reproductive health
education curriculum, the claimed curtailment of academic freedom is still untenable. Section 4(1), Article XIV
of the Constitution provides that “[t]he State x x x shall exercise reasonable supervision and regulation of all
educational institutions.” The constitutional grant of academic freedom does not withdraw from the State the
power to supervise and regulate educational institutions, whether public or private. The only requirement
imposed by the Constitution on the State’s supervision and regulation of educational institutions is that the
exercise thereof must be reasonable.
233
Same; Same; Right to Privacy; View that although considered a fundamental right, the right to privacy may
nevertheless succumb to a narrowly drawn government regulation, which advances a legitimate and overriding
State interest.—When a government regulation is claimed to infringe on the right to privacy, courts are
required to weigh the State’s objective against the privacy rights of the people. Although considered a
fundamental right, the right to privacy may nevertheless succumb to a narrowly drawn government
regulation, which advances a legitimate and overriding State interest. As explained earlier, Section 14 aims to
address the increasing rate of teenage pregnancies in the country and the risks arising therefrom, which is
undeniably a legitimate and overriding State interest. The question that has to be asked then is whether
Section 14, in advancing such legitimate and overriding State interest, has employed means, which are
narrowly tailored so as not to intrude into the right to privacy of the people.
Same; Same; Religious Freedom; View that the Constitution guarantees that no law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; that the free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed.—
In order to properly assess the constitutionality of Sections 7 and 23(a)(3), the provisions thereof must be
considered in its entirety. Judicial scrutiny of the subject provisions cannot be delimited to a particular
provision thereof, i.e., the “duty to refer,” lest the Court lose sight of the objectives sought to be achieved by
Congress and the ramifications thereof with regard to the free exercise clause. The “duty to refer” must be
construed with due regard to the other provisions in Sections 7 and 23(a)(3) and the objectives sought to be
achieved by R.A. No. 10354 in its entirety. The Constitution guarantees that no law shall be made respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; that the free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. Religious
freedom forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship,
and conversely, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion.
 Same; Same; Same; Compelling State Interest Test; View that under the “compelling state interest test,” a
State regulation, which is challenged as being contrary to the free exercise clause, would only be
234
upheld upon showing that: (1) the regulation does not infringe on an individual’s constitutional right of free
exercise; or (2) any incidental burden on the free exercise of an individual’s religion maybe justified by a
compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State’s constitutional power to regulate by
means, which imposed the least burden on religious practices.—In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of
religious freedom, in cases where government regulations collide with the free exercise clause, the Court
further declared that, following the benevolent neutrality/accommodation standard, the “compelling state
interest” test should be applied. Under the “compelling state interest test,” a State regulation, which is
challenged as being contrary to the free exercise clause, would only be upheld upon showing that: (1) the
regulation does not infringe on an individual’s constitutional right of free exercise; or (2) any incidental
burden on the free exercise of an individual’s religion maybe justified by a compelling state interest in the
regulation of a subject within the State’s constitutional power to regulate by means, which imposed the least
burden on religious practices.
Same; Same; View that primarily, the objective of R.A. No. 10354 is to provide marginalized sectors of
society, particularly the women and the poor, access to reproductive health care services, and to health care in
general, of which they have been deprived for many decades due to discrimination and lack of access to
information.—Particularly, R.A. No. 10354 seeks to provide “effective and quality reproductive health care
services and supplies,” which would “ensure maternal and child health, the health of the unborn, safe delivery
and birth of healthy children, and sound replacement rate, in line with the State’s duty to promote the right to
health, responsible parenthood, social justice and full human development.” R.A. No. 10354, as a corollary
measure for the protection of the right to health of the people, likewise recognizes necessity to “promote and
provide information and access, without bias, to all methods of family planning.” Primarily, the objective of
R.A. No. 10354 is to provide marginalized sectors of society, particularly the women and the poor, access to
reproductive health care services, and to health care in general, of which they have been deprived for many
decades due to discrimination and lack of access to information.
Same; Same; Religious Freedom; Equal Protection of the Law; View that although Section 7 provides “that
family planning services shall likewise be extended by private health facilities to paying pa-
235
tients,” it nevertheless exempts “non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a
religious group” from providing full range of modern family planning methods. Instead, Section 7 imposes on
non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group the duty to
immediately refer patients seeking reproductive health care and services to another health facility that is
conveniently accessible.—Although Section 7 provides “that family planning services shall likewise be
extended by private health facilities to paying patients,” it nevertheless exempts “non-maternity specialty
hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group” from providing full range of modern family
planning methods. Instead, Section 7 imposes on non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and
operated by a religious group the duty to immediately refer patients seeking reproductive health care and
services to another health facility that is conveniently accessible. In the same manner, the prohibition
imposed under Section 23(a)(3) is not absolute; it recognizes that a health care service provider may validly
refuse to render reproductive health services and information if he/she conscientiously objects thereto
“based on his/her ethical or religious beliefs.” Nevertheless, Section 23(a)(3) likewise imposes a
corresponding duty on such conscientious objector to immediately refer the person seeking reproductive
health services to another health care service provider within the same facility or one, which is conveniently
accessible.
Same; Same; Same; Compelling Interest Test; View that the supposed burden on the religious freedom of
conscientious objectors in complying with the “duty to refer” would have to be weighed against the State’s
interest in promoting the right of the people to reproductive health.—The determination of whether there
exists a compelling state interest that would justify an incidental burden involves balancing the interest of the
State against religious liberty to determine which is more compelling under the particular set of facts. In
assessing the state interest, the court will have to determine the importance of the secular interest and the
extent to which that interest will be impaired by an exemption for the religious practice. Accordingly, the
supposed burden on the religious freedom of conscientious objectors in complying with the “duty to refer”
would have to be weighed against the State’s interest in promoting the right of the people to reproductive
health.
236
Same; View that Congress recognized that, in enacting regulations to further the reproductive health of the
people, including access to modern family planning methods, resistance thereto based on religious scruples
would abound.—Congress recognized that, in enacting regulations to further the reproductive health of the
people, including access to modern family planning methods, resistance thereto based on religious scruples
would abound. Notwithstanding the presence of a compelling state interest in the promotion and protection
of reproductive health, Congress deemed it proper to carve out exemptions that specifically take into account
the religious dissensions of conscientious objectors, which effectively exempts them from the requirements
imposed under Sections 7 and 23(a)(3). In this regard, it cannot thus be claimed that the said provisions
invidiously interfere with the free exercise of religion.
Same; Constitutional Law; Religious Freedom; View that a health care service provider who conscientiously
objects, based on his/her ethical or religious beliefs, to programs and services regarding reproductive health is
exempted from the effects of Section 23(a)(1) only insofar as it punishes a health care service provider who
knowingly withholds information on said programs and services.—Accordingly, a health care service provider
who conscientiously objects, based on his/her ethical or religious beliefs, to programs and services regarding
reproductive health is exempted from the effects of Section 23(a)(1) only insofar as it punishes a health care
service provider who knowingly withholds information on said programs and services. Section 23(a)(1), in
relation to Section 23(a)(3), recognizes that a conscientious objector cannot be compelled to provide
information on reproductive health if the same would go against his/her religious convictions. In such cases,
however, the conscientious objector, pursuant to Section 23(a)(3), has the correlative duty to immediately
refer the person seeking information on programs and services on reproductive health to another health care
service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible.
Same; Same; Equal Protection of the Law; View that the purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure
every person within a State’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned
by the express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities. —
Equal protection simply provides that all persons or things similarly
237
situated should be treated in a similar manner, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The
purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a State’s jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statute or by its
improper execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities. Persons or things ostensibly similarly
situated may, nonetheless, be treated differently if there is a basis for valid classification. The legislature is
allowed to classify the subjects of legislation; if the classification is reasonable, the law may operate only on
some and not all of the people without violating the equal protection clause. Classification, to be valid, must
(1) rest on substantial distinctions, (2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing
conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class.
Same; Same; Same; View that there is a substantial distinction as regards a conscientious objector under
Section 23(a)(3), who may be a public or private health care service provider, and a public officer specifically
charged with the duty to implement the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354 and its Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR).—There is a substantial distinction as regards a conscientious objector under Section
23(a)(3), who may be a public or private health care service provider, and a public officer specifically charged
with the duty to implement the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 and its IRR. The Constitution provides that a
public office is a public trust. An important characteristic of a public office is that its creation and conferment
involves a delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by
him for the benefit of the public; that some portion of the sovereignty of the country, either legislative,
executive, or judicial, attaches, for the time being, to be exercised for the public benefit.
Same; Spousal Consent; Parental Consent; View that Section 23(a)(2) does not penalize the refusal of a
health care service provider to perform reproductive health procedures per se. What is being penalized by the
provision is the refusal of a health care service provider to perform such procedures on the ground of lack of
spousal consent or parental consent in certain cases.—Section 23(a)(2) does not penalize the refusal of a
health care service provider to perform reproductive health procedures per se. What is being penalized by the
provision is the refusal of a health care service provider to perform such procedures  on the ground of lack of
spousal consent or paren-
 
238
tal consent in certain cases. Indeed, for reasons to be explained at length later, a health care service provider
cannot avoid the performance of reproductive health procedure, in case of married persons,  solely on the
ground of lack of spousal consent since there would be no justifiable reason for such refusal.
Same; Constitutional Law; Right to Privacy; View that intimate relations between husband and wife fall
within the right of privacy formed by emanations of the various guarantees in the Bill of Rights, to which State
intrusion is proscribed.—The ponencia declared Section 23(a)(2)(i) as being contrary to Section 3, Article XV
of the Constitution, which requires the State to defend the “right of the spouses to found a family,” thus
unduly infringing on the right to marital privacy. The ponencia explained that the said provision “refers to
reproductive health procedures like tubal ligation and vasectomy which, by their very nature, require mutual
consent and decision between the husband and wife as they affect issues intimately related to the founding of
the family.” The ponenciapointed out that decision-making concerning reproductive health procedure “falls
within the protected zone of marital privacy” from which State intrusion is proscribed. Thus, the ponencia
concluded, dispensing with the spousal consent is “disruptive of family unity” and “a marked departure from
the policy of the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution.” It is conceded that intimate
relations between husband and wife fall within the right of privacy formed by emanations of the various
guarantees in the Bill of Rights, to which State intrusion is proscribed. However, I do not agree that upholding
a married individual’s choice to submit to reproductive health procedure despite the absence of the consent
or authorization of his/her spouse would be disruptive of the family.
Same; View that the law, in case of disagreement, recognizes that the decision of the spouse undergoing the
reproductive health procedure should prevail.—It is indeed ideal that the decision whether to submit to
reproductive health procedure be a joint undertaking of the spouses, especially on such a vital and sensitive
matter. It is inevitable, however, for cases to abound wherein a husband/wife would object to the intended
procedure of his/her spouse. In such cases, the right to reproductive health of a spouse would be rendered
effectively inutile. I do not see how fostering such stalemate, which can hardly be considered as a harmonious
and blissful marital relationship, could “protect the marriage as an inviolable social institu-
239
tion.” Thus, the law, in case of disagreement, recognizes that the decision of the spouse undergoing the
reproductive health procedure should prevail. In so declaring, Section 23(a)(2)(i) does not invidiously
interfere with the privacy rights of the spouses. In dispensing with the spousal consent/authorization in case
of disagreement, the law is not declaring a substantive right for the first time; even in the absence of such
declaration, the decision of the spouse undergoing the reproductive health procedure would still prevail.
Section 23(a)(2)(i) is but a mere recognition and affirmation of a married individual’s constitutionally
guaranteed personal autonomy and his/her right to reproductive health.
Same; PhilHealth Accreditation; View that a health care service provider, his/her religious objections to
certain reproductive health care services aside, may still render pro bono reproductive health care service, as a
prerequisite for PhilHealth accreditation, by providing information or medical services.—That a health care
service provider has religious objections to certain reproductive health care services does not mean that
he/she is already exempted from the requirement under Section 17 for PhilHealth accreditation. The
requirement under Section 17 is stated in general terms and is religion-neutral; it merely states that health
care service providers, as a condition for PhilHealth accreditation, must render pro bono  reproductive health
service. The phrase “reproductive health care service” is quite expansive and is not limited only to those
services, which may be deemed objectionable based on religious beliefs. Reproductive health care includes:
(1) family planning information and services; (2) maternal, infant and child health and nutrition, including
breastfeeding; (3) proscription of abortion and management of abortion complications; (4) adolescent and
youth reproductive health guidance and counseling; (5) prevention, treatment, and management of
reproductive tract infections, HIV and AIDS, and other sexually transmittable infections; (6) elimination of
violence against women and children, and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence; (7) education
and counseling on sexuality and reproductive health; (8) treatment of breast and reproductive tract cancers,
and other gynecological conditions and disorders; (9) male responsibility and involvement, and men’s
reproductive health; (10) prevention, treatment, and management of infertility and sexual dysfunction; (11)
reproductive health education for adolescents; and (12) mental health aspect of reproductive health care.
Thus, a health care service
240
provider, his/her religious objections to certain reproductive health care services aside, may still render  pro
bono reproductive health care service, as a prerequisite for PhilHealth accreditation, by providing
information or medical services, for instance, on treatment of breast and reproductive tract cancers, and
other gynecological conditions and disorders or on maternal, infant and child health and nutrition.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion: 
Reproductive Health Law; Constitutional Law; Religious Freedom; Benevolent Neutrality; View that with
religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of religion
under certain circumstances.—Under the benevolent-neutrality theory utilized by the ponencia in support of
its position, religious freedom is seen as a substantive right and not merely a privilege against discriminatory
legislation. With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows
accommodation of religion under certain circumstances. As case law instructs, it is the strict scrutiny-
compelling state interest test which is most in line with the benevolent neutrality-accommodation approach.
This method of analysis operates under three (3) parameters, namely: (a) the sincerity of the religious belief
which is burdened by a statute or a government action; (b) the existence of a compelling state interest which
justifies such burden on the free exercise of religion; and (c) in the furtherance of its legitimate state
objective, the state has employed the least intrusive means to such exercise of religious beliefs.
Same; Same; Same; View that nothing in the law requires the conscientious objector to refer the patient to a
health care service provider capable and willing to perform the reproductive health procedure objected to. —
Neither do I find Section 23(a)(1) of the RH Law, as well as its RH-IRR provision counterpart, invidious of
religious freedom, particularly, of the Free Exercise Clause, for the reason that information dissemination on
health advice, including that on reproductive health, constitutes, as mentioned, an inherent professional
responsibility of health care service providers to their patients. Informing the patient of his or her health
options does not, in any way, preclude the conscientious objector from, as also earlier stated, sharing his or
her religious beliefs on the matter. After disseminating the information, and when the patient affirmatively
241
decides to take the reproductive health procedure, then the conscientious objector may opt not to perform
such procedure himself or herself and, instead, refer the patient to another health care service provider based
only on the qualification of accessibility; nothing in the law requires the conscientious objector to refer the
patient to a health care service provider capable and willing to perform the reproductive health procedure
objected to.
Same; Same; Same; View that Section 23(b) of the Reproductive Health (RH) Law must be construed in the
context of its surrounding provisions which afford the conscientious objector the ability to opt-out from
performing reproductive health practices on account of his or her religious beliefs.—As I see it, the problem lies
only with Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR going beyond what is provided for in the RH Law. Section 5.24 of the RH-
IRR is an erroneous construction of Section 23(b) of the RH Law which must stand as constitutional. As
earlier mentioned, the latter provision only states general prohibitions to public officers specifically charged
with the implementation of the RH Law; nothing in its text negates the availability of the conscientious
objector exception to them, or to “skilled health professionals such as provincial, city, or municipal health
officers, chiefs of hospital, head nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are
specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the [RH Law and the RH-IRR].” Section
23(b) of the RH Law must be construed in the context of its surrounding provisions which afford the
conscientious objector the ability to opt-out from performing reproductive health practices on account of his
or her religious beliefs. As the aforementioned RH-IRR provision would be stricken down as invalid on ultra
vires grounds, I believe that an equal protection analysis is unnecessary.
Same; Same; Same; Parental Consent; View that the Reproductive Health (RH) Law provision on parental
consent does not amount to a negation or even a dilution of the parent’s right to care for and rear their minor
child who is already a parent or has undergone an abortion towards the end of developing her physical
character and well-being.—The RH Law provision on parental consent does not amount to a negation or even
a dilution of the parent’s right to care for and rear their minor child who is already a parent or has undergone
an abortion towards the end of developing her physical character and well-being. Neither does the provision
inhibit the minor’s parents from preventing their child from acquiring detrimental
242
health habits. Recognizing that these minors have distinct reproductive health needs due to their existing
situation, the law simply does away with the necessity of presenting to reproductive health care service
providers prior parental consent before they are given information and access to modern day methods of
family planning. In a predominantly conservative culture like ours, wherein the thought that premarital sex is
taboo pervades, a minor who is already a parent or one who has undergone a previous miscarriage is, more
often than not, subject to some kind of social stigma. Said minor, given her predisposition when viewed
against social perception, may find it difficult, or rather uncomfortable, to approach her parents on the
sensitive subject of reproductive health, and, much more, to procure their consent. The RH Law does away
with this complication and makes modern methods of family planning easily accessible to the minor, all in the
interest of her health and physical well-being. On all accounts, nothing stops the minor’s parents to, in the
exercise of their parental authority, intervene, having in mind the best interest of their child insofar as her
health and physical well-being are concerned.
Same; View that ideally and as much as possible, spouses should, as the ponencia puts it, act as “one
cohesive unit” in the decision-making process in undergoing a reproductive health procedure. However, when
there is a complete disagreement between the spouses, the assailed Reproductive Health (RH) Law provision
provides, by way of exception, a deadlock-mechanism whereby the decision of the one undergoing the procedure
shall prevail if only to prevent any unsettling conflict between the married couple on the issue.—There is
nothing in the RH Law that would completely alienate the other spouse in the decision-making process nor
obviate any real dialogue between them. This is a purely private affair left for the spouses to experience for
themselves. Ideally and as much as possible, spouses should, as the ponencia puts it, act as “one cohesive unit”
in the decision-making process in undergoing a reproductive health procedure. However, when there is a
complete disagreement between the spouses, the assailed RH Law provision provides, by way of exception, a
deadlock-mechanism whereby the decision of the one undergoing the procedure shall prevail if only to
prevent any unsettling conflict between the married couple on the issue. To add, the assailed provision, in my
view, also provides a practical solution to situations of estrangement which complicates the process of
procuring the other spouse’s consent.
243
Same; PhilHealth Accreditation; View that as there is no form of compulsion, then the conscientious
objector remains free to choose whether to render pro bono reproductive health care services or not. In the
event, however, that he or she decides not to render such services, the State has the right to deny him or her
PhilHealth accreditation.—As there is no form of compulsion, then the conscientious objector remains free to
choose whether to render pro bono reproductive health care services or not. In the event, however, that he or
she decides not to render such services, the State has the right to deny him or her PhilHealth accreditation.
Being a mere privilege, the State, through its exercise of police power, is free to impose reasonable
concessions that would further its policies, i.e., dissemination of information and rendering of services on
reproductive health, in exchange for the grant of such accreditation.
Leonen, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Judicial Power; Actual Case or Controversy; View that there is a case or controversy
when there is a real conflict of rights or duties arising from actual facts.—An actual case or controversy is “one
which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution;
the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable
by a court of justice.” To be justiciable, the issues presented must be “‘definite and concrete, touching the legal
relations of parties having adverse legal interest;’ a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific
relief.” The term justiciability refers to the dual limitation of only considering in an adversarial context the
questions presented before courts, and in the process, the courts’ duty to respect its co-equal branches of
government’s powers and prerogatives under the doctrine of separation of powers. There is a case or
controversy when there is a real conflict of rights or duties arising from actual facts. These facts, properly
established in court through evidence or judicial notice, provide the natural limitations upon judicial
interpretation of the statute. When it is claimed that a statute is inconsistent with a provision of the
Constitution, the meaning of a constitutional provision will be narrowly drawn.
Same; Same; View that it is true that the present Constitution grants the Supreme Court with the exercise of
judicial review when the case involves the determination of “grave abuse of discretion
244
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.”—It is true that the present Constitution grants this court with the exercise of judicial review
when the case involves the determination of “grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.” This new feature of the 1987
Constitution affects our political question doctrine. It does not do away with the requirement of an actual
case. The requirement of an actual case is fundamental to the nature of the judiciary.
Same; Same; Facial Challenges; View that the only instance when a facial review of the law is not only
allowed but also essential is “when the provisions in question are so broad that there is a clear and imminent
threat that actually operates or it can be used as a prior restraint of speech.”—Unfortunately,
the ponencia failed to discuss how several provisions of the RH Law became vulnerable to a facial attack,
whereas other provisions must await an actual case or controversy to pass upon its constitutionality.
The ponencia explained that the: x x x foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human
right to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the
assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and determine if the
RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. I restate, for purposes of emphasis, parts of my disquisition
on facial challenges in my dissenting and concurring opinion in Disini v. Secretary of Justice, 716 SCRA 237
(2014). After all, the challenges to this present law and the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 are the
public’s reaction to the increasingly liberal but disturbing treatment that we have given on the issue of
rigorous analysis for the justiciability of controversies brought before us. The invalidation of the statute is
either “on its face” or “as applied.” The only instance when a facial review of the law is not only allowed but
also essential is “when the provisions in question are so broad that there is a clear and imminent threat that
actually operates or it can be used as a prior restraint of speech.”
Same; Same; Same; View that a facial challenge only applies to cases where the free speech and its cognates
are asserted before the court.—The prevailing doctrine today is that: a facial challenge only applies to cases
where the free speech and its cognates are asserted before the court. While as a general rule penal statutes
cannot be
245
 subjected to facial attacks, a provision in a statute can be struck down as unconstitutional when there is
a clear showing that there is an imminent possibility that its broad language will allow ordinary law
enforcement to cause prior restraints of speech and the value of that speech is such that its absence will be
socially irreparable. Broken down into its elements, a facial review should only be allowed when: First, the
ground for the challenge of the provision in the statute is that it violates freedom of expression or any of its
cognates; Second, the language in the statute is impermissibly vague; Third, the vagueness in the text of the
statute in question allows for an interpretation that will allow prior restraints; Fourth, the “chilling effect” is
not simply because the provision is found in a penal statute but because there can be a clear showing that
there are special circumstances which show the imminence that the provision will be invoked by law
enforcers; Fifth, the application of the provision in question will entail prior restraints; and  Sixth, the value of
the speech that will be restrained is such that its absence will be socially irreparable. This will necessarily
mean balancing between the state interests protected by the regulation and the value of the speech excluded
from society.
Same; Same; Same; View that facial challenges can only be raised on the basis of overbreadth and not on
vagueness.—Facial challenges can only be raised on the basis of overbreadth and not on vagueness. Southern
Hemisphere demonstrated how vagueness relates to violations of due process rights, whereas facial
challenges are raised on the basis of overbreadth and limited to the realm of freedom of expression. None of
these petitions justify a facial review of this social legislation. The free exercise of one’s religion may be a
cognate of the freedom of expression. However, the petitions have not properly alleged the religion, the
religious dogma, the actual application of the religious dogma where a repugnancy can be shown. They have
also failed to demonstrate that the violation of the amorphous religious dogmas that they imagine should
result in the invalidation of statutory text rather than simply an adjustment in its interpretation and in its
application.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Class Suits; Parties; View that a class suit is allowed under the rules if those
who instituted the action are found to be sufficiently numerous and representative of the interests of all those
they seek to represent.—A class suit is allowed under the rules if those who instituted the action are found to
be
246
sufficiently numerous and representative of the interests of all those they seek to represent. They must
be so numerous that it would be impractical to bring them all to court or join them as parties. Lastly, a
common interest in the controversy raised must be clearly established. These requirements afford protection
for all those represented in the class suit considering that this court’s ruling will be binding on all of them. We
should be especially cautious when the class represented by a few in an alleged class suit is the “entire
Filipino Nation” or all the adherents of a particular religion. This court must be convinced that the interest is
so common that there can be no difference in the positions and points of view of all that belong to that class.
Anything less than this standard will be an implied acceptance that in this important adjudication of alleged
constitutional rights, the views of a few can be imposed on the many.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that class suits require that there is a possibility that those represented can
affirm that their interests are properly raised in a class suit.—Class suits require that there is a possibility that
those represented can affirm that their interests are properly raised in a class suit. The general rule must be
that they be real and existing. In constitutional adjudication, this court must approach class suits with
caution; otherwise, future generations or an amorphous class will be bound by a ruling which they did not
participate in. Not all these elements for a proper class suit are present in the petitions filed in these cases.
Constitutional Law; Presidency; Immunity from Suit; View that a sitting president cannot be sued. This
immunity exists during the President’s incumbency only.—A sitting president cannot be sued. This immunity
exists during the President’s incumbency only. The purpose is to preserve the dignity of the office that is
necessary for its operations as well as to prevent any disruption in the conduct of official duties and functions.
Without this immunity, a proliferation of suits would derail the focus of the office from addressing the greater
needs of the country to attending each and every case filed against the sitting President, including the petty
and harassment suits. The doctrine of presidential immunity is not a surrender of the right to demand
accountability from those who hold public office such as the President. The Constitution enumerates the
grounds when a President may be impeached. This immunity is also no longer available to a non-sitting
President. After the end of his or
247
her tenure, he or she can be made criminally and civilly liable in the proper case.
Reproductive Health Law; Constitutional Law; Right to Life; View that a law that mandates informed
choice and proper access for reproductive health technologies should not be presumed to be a threat to the right
to life.—The constitutional right to life has many dimensions. Apart from the protection against harm to one’s
corporeal existence, it can also mean the “right to be left alone.” The right to life also congeals the autonomy
of an individual to provide meaning to his or her life. In a sense, it allows him or her sufficient space to
determine quality of life. A law that mandates informed choice and proper access for reproductive health
technologies should not be presumed to be a threat to the right to life. It is an affirmative guarantee to assure
the protection of human rights.
Same; View that the court cannot make a declaration of when life begins.—The court cannot make a
declaration of when life begins. Such declaration is not necessary and is a dictum that will unduly confuse
future issues. First, there is, as yet, no actual controversy that can support our deliberation on this specific issue.
Second, the court cannot rely on the discussion of a few commissioners during the drafting of the constitution by
the Constitutional Commission.
Same; View that the Constitutional Commission deliberations show that it is not true that the issue of when
life begins is already a settled matter.—The Constitutional Commission deliberations show that it is not true
that the issue of when life begins is already a settled matter. There are several other opinions on this
issue. The Constitutional Commissioners adopted the term “conception” rather than “fertilized ovum.” New
discoveries in reproductive science, particularly the possibility of cloning, provide basis for the possible
significance of viable implantation in the uterus as the “beginning of life and personhood.” It is at
implantation when a group of cells gain the potential of progressing into a human being without further
intervention.
Same; Administrative Agencies; Food and Drug Administration; View that the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) is mandated to examine each and every drug, contraceptive or technology vis- à-vis the
claims made for or against their inclusion.—The law specifically grants the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) with the
248
competence to determine the scientific validity of the allegations of the petitioners. The FDA is mandated
to examine each and every drug, contraceptive or technology vis-à -vis the claims made for or against their
inclusion. I agree with the ponencia in withholding any blanket pronouncement of any contraceptive absent
the exercise of the FDA of its functions under this provision. The FDA is mandated to ensure the safety and
quality of drugs released to the public.
Same; Contraceptives; View that the inclusion of contraceptives in the national drug formulary is not new.
—The inclusion of contraceptives in the national drug formulary is not new. The Philippine Drug Formulary:
Essential Medicines List, Volume 7, of 2008 already listed it under “Hormones and Hormone Antagonists.”
Contraceptives are included, following five pillars designed to make available affordable, safe, and effective
drugs to the public. These pillars are: (1) “the assurance of the safety, efficacy and usefulness of
pharmaceutical products through quality control”; (2) “the promotion of the rational use of drugs by both the
health professionals and the general public”; (3) “the development of self-reliance in the local pharmaceutical
industry”; (4) “[t]he tailored or targeted procurement of drugs by government with the objective of making
available to its own clientele, particularly the lower-income sectors of the society, the best drugs at the lowest
possible cost”; and (5) “people empowerment.”
Same; Constitutional Law; Religious Freedom; View that if a health care service provider’s religious belief
does not allow a certain method of family planning, then that provider may possibly withhold such information
from the patient.—If a health care service provider’s religious belief does not allow a certain method of family
planning, then that provider may possibly withhold such information from the patient. In doing so, the patient
is unable to give voluntary informed consent to all possible procedures that are necessary for her or his care.
The law, in sections 17 and 23 allow accommodation for full care of the patient by requiring referral. The
patient that seeks health care service from a provider should be able to put his or her trust on the provider
that he or she would be referred to the best possible option. There is nothing in the law which prevents the
referring health care provider from making known the basis of his or her conscientious objection to an
available procedure which is otherwise scientifically and medically safe and effective. Between the doctor or
health care provider on the one hand and the patient on the
249
other, it is the patient’s welfare and beliefs which should be primordial. It is the patient that needs the
care, and the doctor or health care provider should provide that care in a professional manner.
Same; Same; Same; View that it is clear that a conscientious objector provision whose coverage is too broad
will allow too many to raise exception and effectively undermine the purpose sought by the law.—There is a
difference between objections based on one’s conscience and those based on one’s religion. Conscience
appears to be the broader category. Objections based on conscience can be unique to the individual’s
determination of what is right or wrong based on ethics or religion. Objections based on religion, on the other
hand, imply a set of beliefs that are canonical to an institution or a movement considered as a religion. Others
share religious belief. Conscientious objection may also include those whose bases are unique only to the
person claiming the exception. One’s conscience may be shaped by cultural factors other than religion. It is
clear that a conscientious objector provision whose coverage is too broad will allow too many to raise
exception and effectively undermine the purpose sought by the law.
Same; Same; Same; View that it is not clear in the ponencia whether the provisions on referral by
conscientious objectors are declared unconstitutional for all religions or only for specific ones.—The petitions do
not show a specific instance when conscientious objection was availed of as a result of the exercise of a
religion. In this case, we are asked to evaluate whether the provision that accommodates conscientious
objectors would, in the future, with unspecified facts, violate the constitutional provision on religious
exercise. Thus, it is also not clear in the ponencia whether the provisions on referral by conscientious objectors
are declared unconstitutional for all religions or only for specific ones. This is the natural result for speculative
cases. This is dangerous constitutional precedent. If the declaration is for all religions, then this might just result
in a violation of the non-establishment clause. A dominant majoritarian religion is now aided in imposing its
beliefs not only on patients but also on all those who have different faiths. Conduct which purport to be religious
practice and its relationship to the fundamental tenets of that religion is a question of fact which cannot be part
of our judicial notice. Otherwise, we implicitly establish a religion or manifest a bias towards one in violation of
the clear and absolute separation between church and state.
250
Same; Same; Same; View that the Supreme Court cannot make any judicial determination to declare
the Catholic Church’s position on contraceptives and sex.—We cannot make any judicial determination
to declare the Catholic Church’s position on contraceptives and sex. This is not the forum to do so and
there is no present controversy — no contraceptive and no individual that has come concretely
affected by the law. This court must avoid entering into unnecessary entanglements with religion. We
are apt to do this when, without proof, we assume the beliefs of one sect or group within a church as
definitive of their religion. We must not assume at the outset that there might be homogeneity of
belief and practice; otherwise, we contribute to the State’s endorsement of various forms of
fundamentalism.
Same; View that the general rule encourages married persons to discuss and make a conjugal decision on
the matter; They are caught in a problem when they disagree.—Section 23(a)(2)(i) applies to a specific
situation: when there is a disagreement between married persons regarding the performance of a “legal and
medically-safe reproductive health procedure.” The general rule encourages married persons to discuss and
make a conjugal decision on the matter. They are caught in a problem when they disagree. This agreement
may fester and cause problems within their family. The disagreement will not be created by the RH Law. It
will exist factually regardless of the law. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the law becomes available to break this
deadlock and privilege the decision of the spouse undergoing the procedure. This is logical since the
reproductive health procedures involve the body, health and well being of the one undergoing the procedure.
The marriage may be a social contract but is certainly not a talisman that removes the possibility of power
relationships. Married persons, especially the woman/wife, can still suffer inequality. Married persons may
still experience spousal abuse. Generally, it will be the woman who will ask to undergo reproductive health
procedures. The interpretation of the majority therefore affects her control over her body. Rather than
enhance the zones of autonomy of a person even in a married state, the interpretation of the majority creates
the woman’s body as a zone of contestation that gives the upper hand to the husband.
251
Same; Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Law; View that the “equal protection” clause in this
provision ensures that individuals, even those that enter into a married state, do not coexist and suffer under
conditions of marital inequality.—This due process clause implies and congeals a person’s right to life. This
includes the individual’s right to existence as well as her or his right to a quality of life of her or his choosing.
The State is not to sanction a program or an act that deprives the individual of her or his control over her or
his life and body. The “equal protection” clause in this provision ensures that individuals, even those that
enter into a married state, do not coexist and suffer under conditions of marital inequality.
Same; Same; Same; View that the fundamental equality of women and men, the promotion of an improved
quality of life, and the full respect for human rights do not exist when a spouse is guaranteed control the other
spouse’s decisions respecting the latter’s body.—The fundamental equality of women and men, the promotion
of an improved quality of life, and the full respect for human rights do not exist when a spouse is guaranteed
control the other spouse’s decisions respecting the latter’s body. The autonomy and importance of family
should not be privileged over the privacy and autonomy of a person. Marriage is not bondage that
subordinates the humanity of each spouse. No person should be deemed to concede her or his privacy rights
and autonomy upon getting married. By declaring Section 23(a)(2)(i) as unconstitutional, the majority
interprets the privacy and autonomy of the family as also providing insulation of patriarchal or sexist practices
from state scrutiny. This is not what the Constitution intends.
Same; Parental Consent; View that the wisdom of all the members of the House of Representatives, the
Senate, and the President have determined that it would be best to give the minor who is already a parent or has
undergone a miscarriage all the leeway to be able to secure all the reproductive health technologies to prevent
her difficulties from happening again.—Those of us who have not and can never go through the actual
experience of miscarriage by a minor, those of us who cannot even imagine the pain and stresses of teenage
pregnancy, should not proceed to make blanket rules on what minors could do in relation to their parents.
None of us can say that in all cases, all parents can be understanding and extend sympathy for the minors that
are legally under their care. None of us can say that there are instances when parents would think that the
only
252
way to prevent teenage pregnancy is a tongue lashing or corporeal punishment. We cannot understand
reality only from the eyes of how we want it to be. Only when we are faced with an actual controversy and
when we see the complications of a real situation will we be able to understand and shape a narrowly tailored
exception to the current rule. In the meantime, the wisdom of all the members of the House of Representative,
the Senate, and the President have determined that it would be best to give the minor who is already a parent
or has undergone a miscarriage all the leeway to be able to secure all the reproductive health technologies to
prevent her difficulties from happening again. We must stay our hand for now.
Same; Administrative Agencies; Food and Drug Administration; View that insisting that we can impose,
modify or alter rules of the Food and Drug Administration is usurpation of the executive power of control over
administrative agencies. It is a violation of the principle of separation of powers.—The Constitution vests the
executive power upon the President. He or she, and not the judiciary, exercises the power of control over all
executive departments, bureaus and offices, including the Food and Drug Administration. The judiciary has no
administrative power of control or supervision over the Food and Drug Administration. Insisting that we can
impose, modify or alter rules of the Food and Drug Administration is usurpation of the executive power of
control over administrative agencies. It is a violation of the principle of separation of powers, which
recognizes that “[e]ach department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.” The system of checks and balances only allows us to
declare, in the exercise of our judicial powers, the Food and Drug Administration’s acts as violative of the law
or as committed with grave abuse of discretion. Such power is further limited by the requirement of actual
case or controversy.
Same; View that the law impliedly accepts that the choice of intimate relationships is better left to the
individual and the influences of their culture, their family, and their faiths.—Unwanted pregnancies may result
in clinical complications and deaths of women during childbirth, of the fetus while inside the womb and of
infants soon after they are born. Unwanted pregnancies may be the result of lack of knowledge of the
consequences of the sexual act, or it could be due to the lack of information and access to safe and effective
reproductive technologies. The law impliedly accepts that the choice of inti-
253
mate relationships is better left to the individual and the influences of their culture, their family, and
their faiths.
Same; Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Law; View that the law acknowledges the differential
impact of lack of knowledge and access to reproductive health technologies between the rich and the poor.—The
law acknowledges the differential impact of lack of knowledge and access to reproductive health technologies
between the rich and the poor. It, therefore, requires that proper information and access be made more
available to those who need it. It mandates the government to intervene at least in order to provide the right
information and, when requested and without coercion, provide access. 
 G.R. No. 198780. October 16, 2013.*
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, respondent.
Civil Law; Marriages; “Limited Purpose” Marriages; Words and Phrases; In the United States, marriages
where a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific benefits, have been referred to as
“limited purpose” marriages. A common limited purpose marriage is one entered into solely for the
legitimization of a child. Another is for immigration purposes.―The institution of marriage carries with it
concomitant benefits. This has led to the development of marriage fraud for the sole purpose of availing of
particular benefits. In the United States, marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a particular
purpose or acquire specific benefits, have been referred to as “limited purpose” marriages. A common limited
purpose marriage is one entered into solely for the legitimization of a child. Another, which is the subject of
the present case, is for immigration purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned with the intention of the
couple at the time of their marriage, and it attempts to filter out those who use marriage solely to achieve
immigration status.
Same; Same; Same; A “marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together
at the time they were married.”―In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,
established the principal test for determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled
that a “marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time they
were married.” This standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment
of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the marriage was not “entered
into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United States.” The focus, thus, shifted from
determining the intention to establish a life together, to determining the intention of evading immigration
laws. It must be noted, however, that this standard is used purely for
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
585
VOL. 707, OCTOBER 16, 2013

Republic vs. Albios

immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the legal validity or existence of a
marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given
and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer.―Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an
essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that the absence of any essential requisite
shall render a marriage void ab initio. Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given
and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A “freely given” consent requires that the contracting
parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not
vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code,
such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that
the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or
unfavorable consequences of their act. Their understanding should not be affected by insanity, intoxication,
drugs, or hypnotism.
Same; Same; Marriages in Jest; A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as
a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding that
the parties would not be bound; Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent
consent, but for a complete absence of consent.―In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the
CA characterized such as akin to a marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in
form but entered into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a
clear understanding that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct
indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation. It is a pretended marriage not intended to be real and with
no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in jest
are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent.
There is no genuine consent because the parties have absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or
for any purpose.
586
 586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Albios

Same; Same; A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by law;
There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution
or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship; Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal
requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall
be declared valid.―The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to
establish a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real intention
to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance with
law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage are governed by
law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the grounds
provided by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than
what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all
the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the
grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.
Same; Same; Marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience,
companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites, are equally
valid.―Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on
the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of
their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions. The right to marital privacy allows
married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to
have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other
purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that
they comply with all the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage
contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly
support a marriage.
587
VOL. 707, OCTOBER 16, 2013

Republic vs. Albios

Same; Same; No other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul
a marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not qualify under
any of the listed circumstances.―Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud
under Article 45 (3) of the Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may
constitute fraud, namely, (1) nondisclosure of a previous conviction involving moral turpitude; (2)
concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted disease;
and (4) concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or deceit
shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole
purpose of evading immigration laws does not qualify under any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore,
under Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent party. In the present
case, there is no injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.
Same; Same; No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State; The Supreme Court cannot leave the impression
that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when
no longer needed.―No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is
the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the
whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may
easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer
needed.

Our Ruling
First, we discuss the procedural issues.
President Duterte is dropped as
respondent in this case
As correctly pointed out by respondents, President Duterte must be
dropped as respondent in this case. The Court's pronouncement in
Professor David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo20 on the non-suability of an
incumbent President cannot be any clearer, viz.:
x x x Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of
office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case,
and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will
degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if
he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such.
Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment,
hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of
his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial
branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which
impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important
duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the
operation of the Government.2~
20 522 Phil. 705 (2006).
21 Id. at 763-764.
Decision 10 G.R. No. 238467
Accordingly, President Duterte is dropped as respondent in this case.
Propriety of Prohibition and
Mandamus
Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides for a petition for
prohibition as follows:
SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. - When the proceedings of any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter
specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.
xx xx
"Indeed, prohibition is a preventive remedy seeking that a judgment
be rendered directing the defendant to desist from continuing with the
commission of an act perceived to be illegal. As a rule, the proper function
of a writ of prohibition is to prevent the performance of an act which is
about to be done. It is not intended to provide a remedy for acts already
accomplished. "22
Mandamus,  on the other hand, is provided for by Section 3 of the
same Rule 65:
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus. - When any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust,
station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a
right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging
the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be
specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the
rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner
by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.~
22 Vivas v. The Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 716 Phil. 132, 145 (2013).
Decision 11 G.R. No. 238467
xx xx
"As the quoted provision instructs, mandamus will lie if the tribunal,
corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of
an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station."23
It is upon the above-discussed contexts of prohibition and mandamus
that respondents base their contention of improper recourse. Respondents
maintain that prohibition is not proper in this case because the closure of
Boracay is already a fait accompli. Neither is mandamus  appropriate since
there is no neglect of duty on their part as they were precisely performing
their duty to protect the environment when the closure was ordered.
Suffice it to state, however, that the use of prohibition and mandamus
is not merely confined to Rule 65. These extraordinary remedies may be
invoked when constitutional violations or issues are raised. As the Court
stated in Spouses Jmbong v. Hon. Ochoa, Jr. :24
As far back as Tanada v. Angara,  the Court has unequivocally
declared that certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are appropriate
remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or
prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive
officials, as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. This ruling was later on applied in Macalintal v.
COMELEC, Aldaba v. COMELEC, Magallona v. Ermita, and countless
others. In Tanada, the Court wrote:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate
on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the
petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an
action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but
in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. 'The
question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The
duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of
the Constitution is upheld.' Once a 'controversy as to the
application or interpretation of constitutional provision is
raised before this Court, as in the instant case, it becomes a
legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional
mandate to decide. x x x25 (Citations omitted; emphasis
supplied) /pq
23 Uy Kiao Eng v. Lee, 624 Phil. 200, 206-207 (20 I 0).
24 732 Phil. I (2014 ).
25 Id. at 121-122.
Decision 12 G.R. No. 238467
It must be stressed, though, that resort to prohibition and mandamus
on the basis of alleged constitutional violations is not without limitations.
After all, this Court does not have unrestrained authority to rule on just
about any and every claim of constitutional violation.26 The petition must be
subjected to the four exacting requisites for the exercise of the power of
judicial review, viz.: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the
petitioners must possess locus standi; ( c) the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and ( d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.27 Hence, it is not enough
that this petition mounts a constitutional challenge against Proclamation No.
4 7 5. It is likewise necessary that it meets the aforementioned requisites
before the Court sustains the propriety of the recourse.
Existence of Requisites for Judicial
Review
In La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Sec. Ramos,28 an actual
case or controversy was characterized as a "case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the
decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. The power does
not extend to hypothetical questions since any attempt at abstraction could
only lead to dialectics and barren legal question and to sterile conclusions
unrelated to actualities."29
The existence of an actual controversy in this case is evident.
President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 475 on April 26, 2018 and,
pursuant thereto, Boracay was temporarily closed the same day. Entry of
non-residents and tourists to the island was not allowed until October 25,
2018. Certainly, the implementation of the proclamation has rendered
legitimate the concern of petitioners that constitutional rights may have
possibly been breached by this governmental measure. It bears to state that
when coupled with sufficient facts, "reasonable certainty of the occurrence
of a perceived threat to any constitutional interest suffices to provide a basis
for mounting a constitutional challenge". 30 And while it may be argued that
the reopening of Boracay has seemingly rendered moot and academic
questions relating to the ban of tourists and non-residents into the island,
abstention from judicial review is precluded by such possibility of
constitutional violation and also by the exceptional character of the situation,
the paramount public interest involved, and the fact that the case is capable
of repetition.~
26 Id. at 122. /
27 Id.
28 465 Phil 860 (2004).
29 Id. at 889-890.
30 Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, 646 Phil. 452, 481 (2010).
31 Funa v. Acting Secretary Agra, 704 Phil. 205, 219-220(2013).
Decision 13 G.R. No. 238467
As to legal standing, petitioners assert that they were directly injured
since their right to travel and, their right to work and earn a living which
thrives solely on tourist arrivals, were affected by the closure. They likewise
want to convince the Court that the issues here are of transcendental
importance since according to them, the resolution of the same will have farreaching
consequences upon all persons living and working in Boracay;
upon the Province of Aklan which is heavily reliant on the island's tourism
industry; and upon the whole country considering that fundamental
constitutional rights were allegedly breached.
"Legal standing or locus standi is a party's personal and substantial
interest in a case such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the governmental act being challenged. It calls for more than just a
generalized grievance. The term 'interest' means a material interest, an
interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in
the question involved, or a mere incidental interest."32 There must be a
present substantial interest and not a mere expectancy or a future,
contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest. 33
In Galicto v. Aquino 111,34 the therein petitioner, Jelbert B. Galicto
(Galicto) questioned the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 7 (E07)
issued by President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, which ordered, among
others, a moratorium on the increases in the salaries and other forms of
compensation of all government-owned-and-controlled corporations
(GOCCs) and government financial institutions. The Court held that Galicto,
an employee of the GOCC Philhealth, has no legal standing to assail E07
for his failure to demonstrate that he has a personal stake or material interest
in the outcome of the case. His interest, if any, was speculative and based
on a mere expectancy. Future increases in his salaries and other benefits
were contingent events or expectancies to which he has no vested rights.
Hence, he possessed no locus standi to question the curtailment thereof.
Here, as mentioned, Zabal is a sandcastle maker and Jacosalem, a
driver. The nature of their livelihood is one wherein earnings are not
guaranteed. As correctly pointed out by respondents, their earnings are not
fixed and may vary depending on the business climate in that while they can
earn much on peak seasons, it is also possible for them not to earn anything
on lean seasons, especially when the rainy days set in. Zabal and Jacosalem
could not have been oblivious to this kind of situation, they having been in
the practice of their trade for a considerable length of time. Clearly,
therefore, what Zabal and Jacosalem could lose in this case are mere
projected earnings which are in no way guaranteed, and are sheer#{
/ 32 Jumamil v. Cafe, 507 Phil. 455, 465 (2005).
33 Galicto v. HE. President Aquino III, 683 Phil 141, 171 (2012).
34 Id.
Decision 14 G.R. No. 238467
expectancies characterized as contingent, subordinate, or consequential
interest, just like in Galicto. Concomitantly, an assertion of direct injury on
the basis of loss of income does not clothe Zabal and Jacosalem with legal
standing.
As to Bandiola, the petition is bereft of any allegation as to his
substantial interest in the case and as to how he sustained direct injury as a
result of the issuance of Proclamation No. 475. While the allegation that he
is a non-resident who occasionally goes to Boracay for business and pleasure
may suggest that he is claiming direct injury on the premise that his right to
travel was affected by the proclamation, the petition fails to expressly
provide specifics as to how. "It has been held that a party who assails the
constitutionality of a statute must have a direct and personal interest. [He]
must show not only that the law or any governmental act is invalid, but also
that [he] sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury
as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that [he] suffers thereby in
some indefinite way. [He] must show that [he] has been or is about to be
denied some right or privilege to which [he] is lawfully entitled or that [he]
is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute
or act complained of."35 Indeed, the petition utterly fails to demonstrate that
Bandiola possesses the requisite legal standing to sue.
Notwithstanding petitioners' lack of locus standi, this Court will allow
this petition to proceed to its ultimate conclusion due to its transcendental
importance. After all, the rule on locus standi is a mere procedural
technicality, which the Court, in a long line of cases involving subjects of
transcendental importance, has waived or relaxed, thus allowing nontraditional
plaintiffs such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters and
legislators to sue in cases of public interest, albeit they may not have been
personally injured by a government act.36 More importantly, the matters
raised in this case, involved on one hand, possible violations of the
Constitution and, on the other, the need to rehabilitate the country's prime
tourist destination. Undeniably, these matters affect public interests and
therefore are of transcendental importance to the people. In addition, the
situation calls for review because as stated, it is capable of repetition, the
Court taking judicial notice of the many other places in our country that are
suffering from similar environmental degradation.
As to the two other requirements, their existence is indubitable. It will
be recalled that even before a formal issuance on the closure of Boracay was
made by the government, petitioners already brought the question of the
constitutionality of the then intended closure to this Court. And, a day aft~~ ~
Proclamation No. 475 was issued, they filed a supplemental petitio/v-
35 Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. Executive Secretary Ermita, 558 Phil. 338,351 (2007).
36 Funa v. Chairman Villar, 686 Phil. 571, 585 (2012).
Decision 15 G.R. No. 238467
impugning its constitutionality. Clearly, the filing of the petition and the
supplemental petition signals the earliest opportunity that the
constitutionality of the subject government measure could be raised. There
can also be no denying that the very !is mota of this case is the
constitutionality of Proclamation No. 475.
Defense of SLAP P
Suffice it to state that while this case touches on the environmental
issues in Boracay, the ultimate issue for resolution is the constitutionality of
Proclamation No. 475. The procedure in the treatment of a defense of
SLAPP provided for under Rule 6 of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases should not, therefore, be made to apply.
Now as to the substantive issues.
We first quote in full Proclamation No. 475.
PROCLAMATION No. 475
DECLARING A STATE OF CALAMITY IN THE BARANGAYS OF
BALABAG, MANOC-MANOC AND Y APAK (ISLAND OF
BORACAY) IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY, AKLAN, AND
TEMPORARY CLOSURE OF THE ISLAND AS A TOURIST
DESTINATION
WHEREAS, Section 15, Article II of the 1987 Constitution states
that the State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people
and instill health consciousness among them;
WHEREAS, Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
provides that it is the policy of the State to protect and advance the right of
the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm
and harmony of nature;
WHEREAS, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
provides that the State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its
archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone;
WHEREAS, an Inter-Agency Task Force, composed of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), the [DILG]
and the Department of Tourism (DOT), was established to evaluate the
environmental state of the Island of Boracay, and investigate possible
violations of existing environmental and health laws, rules and
regulations; //ft
Decision 16 G.R. No. 238467
WHEREAS, the investigations and validation undertaken revealed
that:
a. There is a high concentration of fecal coliform in the Bolabog
beaches located in the eastern side of Boracay Island due to
insufficient sewer lines and illegal discharge of untreated waste
water into the beach, with daily tests conducted from 6 to 10
March 2018 revealing consistent failure in compliance with
acceptable water standards, with an average result of 18,000 most
probable number (MPN)/1 OOml, exceeding the standard level of
400 MPN/1 OOml;
b. Most commercial establishments and residences are not connected
to the sewerage infrastructure of Boracay Island, and waste
products are not being disposed through the proper sewerage
infrastructures in violation of environmental law, rules, and
regulations;
c. Only 14 out of 51 establishments near the shores of Boracay Island
are compliant with the provision of Republic Act (RA) No. 9275 or
the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004;
d. Dirty water results in the degradation of the coral reefs and coral
cover of Boracay Island, which declined by approximately 70.5%
from 1988 to 2011, with the highest decrease taking place between
2008 and 2011 during a period of increased tourist arrivals
(approximately 38.4%);
e. Solid waste within Boracay Island is at a generation rate of 90 to
115 tons per day, while the hauling capacity of the local
government is only 30 tons per day, hence, leaving approximately
85 tons of waste in the Island daily;
f. The natural habitats of Puka shells, nesting grounds of marine
turtles, and roosting grounds of flying foxes or fruit bats have been
damaged and/or destroyed; and
g. Only four (4) out of nine (9) wetlands in Boracay Island remain
due to illegal encroachment of structures, including 93 7 identified
illegal structures constructed on forestlands and wetlands, as well
as 102 illegal structures constructed on areas already classified as
easements, and the disappearance of the wetlands, which acts as
natural catchments, enhances flooding in the area;
WHEREAS, the findings of the Department of Science and
Technology (DOST) reveal that beach erosion is prevalent in Boracay
Island, particularly along the West Beach, where as much as 40 meters of
erosion has taken place in the past 20 years from 1993 to 2003, due to
storms, extraction of sand along the beach to construct properties and
structures along the foreshore, and discharge of waste water near the shore
causing degradation of coral reefs and seagrass meadows that supply the
beach with sediments and serve as buffer to wave action; R
/
Decision 17 G.R. No. 238467
WHEREAS, the DOST also reports that based on the 2010-2015
Coastal Ecosystem Conservation and Adaptive Management Study of the
Japan International Cooperation Agency, direct discharge of waste water
near the shore has resulted in the frequent algal bloom and coral
deterioration, which may reduce the source of sand and cause erosion;
WHEREAS, the data from the Region VI - Western Visayas
Regional Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council shows that
the number of tourists in the island in a day amounts to 18,082, and the
tourist arrival increased by more than 160% from 2012 to 2017;
WHEREAS, the continuous rise of tourist arrivals, the insufficient
sewer and waste management system, and environmental violations of
establishments aggravate the environmental degradation and destroy the
ecological balance of the Island of Boracay, resulting in major damage to
property and natural resources, as well as the disruption of the normal way
of life of the people therein;
WHEREAS, it is necessary to implement urgent measures to
address the abovementioned human-induced hazards, to protect and
promote the health and well-being of its residents, workers and tourists,
and to rehabilitate the Island in order to ensure the sustainability of the
area and prevent further degradation of its rich ecosystem;
WHEREAS, RA No. 9275 provides that the DENR shall
designate water bodies, or portions thereof, where specific pollutants from
either natural or man-made source have already exceeded water quality
guidelines as non-attainment areas for the exceeded pollutants and shall
prepare and implement a program that will not allow new sources of
exceeded water pollutant in non-attainment areas without a corresponding
reduction in discharges from existing sources;
WHEREAS, RA No. 9275 also mandates the DENR, in
coordination with other concerned agencies and the private sectors, to take
such measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such water in
non-attainment areas to meet the standards under which it has been
classified, and the local government units to prepare and implement
contingency plans and other measures including relocation, whenever
necessary, for the protection of health and welfare of the residents within
potentially affected areas;
WHEREAS, Proclamation No. 1064 (s. 2006) classified the Island
of Boracay into 3 77 .68 hectares of reserved forest land for protection
purposes and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land as alienable and
disposable land;
WHEREAS, pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, and as
emphasized in recent jurisprudence, whereby all lands not privately owned
belong to the State, the entire island of Boracay is state-owned, except for
lands already covered by existing valid titles;
WHEREAS, pursuant to RA No. 10121, or the Philippine Disaster
Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010, the National Disaster Risk
Reduction and Management Council has recommended the declaration of
a State of Calamity in the Island of Boracay and the temporary closure ~
Decision 18 G.R. No. 238467
the Island as a tourist destination to ensure public safety and public health, and to
assist the government in its expeditious rehabilitation, as well as in addressing the
evolving socio-economic needs of affected communities;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, RODRIGO ROA DUTERTE, President of
the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution and
existing laws, do hereby declare a State of Calamity in the barangays of Balabag,
Manoc-Manoc and Yapak (Island of Boracay) in the Municipality of Malay,
Aklan. In this regard, the temporary closure of the Island as a tourist destination
for six (6) months starting 26 April 2018, or until 25 October 2018, is hereby
ordered subject to applicable laws, rules, regulations and jurisprudence.
Concerned government agencies shall, as may be necessary or
appropriate, undertake the remedial measures during a State of Calamity as
provided in RA No. 10121 and other applicable laws, rules and regulations, such
as control of the prices of basic goods and commodities for the affected areas,
employment of negotiated procurement and utilization of appropriate funds,
including the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund, for relief
and rehabilitation efforts in the area. All departments and other concerned
government agencies are also hereby directed to coordinate with, and provide or
augment the basic services and facilities of affected local government units, if
necessary.
The State of Calamity in the Island of Boracay shall remain in force and
effect until lifted by the President, notwithstanding the lapse of the six-month
closure period.
All departments, agencies and offices, including government-owned or
controlled corporations and affected local government units are hereby directed
to implement and execute the abovementioned closure and the appropriate
rehabilitation works, in accordance with pertinent operational plans and
directives, including the Boracay Action Plan.
The Philippine National Police, Philippine Coast Guard and other law
enforcement agencies, with the support of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
are hereby directed to act with restraint and within the bounds of the law in the
strict implementation of the closure of the Island and ensuring peace and order in
the area.
The Municipality of Malay, Aklan is also hereby directed to ensure that
no tourist will be allowed entry to the island of Boracay until such time that the
closure has been lifted by the President.
All tourists, residents and establishment owners in the area are also urged
to act within the bounds of the law and to comply with the directives herein
provided for the rehabilitation and restoration of the ecological balance of the
Island which will be for the benefit of all concerned.
It must be noted at the outset that petitioners failed to present and establish
the factual bases of their arguments because they went directly to this Court. In
ruling on the substantive issues in this case, the Court is, thus, constrained to r~~~ h
on, and uphold the factual bases, which prompted the issuance of the challengr
Decision 19 G.R. No. 238467
proclamation, as asserted by respondents. Besides, executive determinations, such
as said factual bases, are generally final on this Court.37
The Court observes that the meat of petitioners' constitutional challenge on
Proclamation No. 475 is the right to travel.
Clearly then, the one crucial question that needs to be preliminarily
answered is - does Proclamation No. 47 5 constitute an impairment on the right to
travel?
The Court answers in the negative.
Proclamation No. 475 does not pose an
actual impairment on the right to travel
Petitioners claim that Proclamation No. 475 impairs the right to travel
based on the following provisions:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, RODRIGO ROA DUTERTE, President of
the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution and
existing laws, do hereby declare a State of Calamity in the barangays of Balabag,
Manoc-Manoc and Yapak (Island of Boracay) in the Municipality of Malay,
Aldan. In this regard, the temporary closure of the Island as a tourist
destination for six (6) months starting 26 April 2018, or until 25 October
2018, is hereby ordered subject to applicable laws, rules, regulations and
jurisprudence.
xx xx
The Municipality of Malay, Aldan is also hereby directed to ensure that
no tourist will be allowed entry to the island of Boracay until such time that
the closure has been lifted by the President.
xx xx
The activities proposed to be undertaken to rehabilitate Boracay involved
inspection, testing, demolition, relocation, and construction. These could not have
been implemented freely and smoothly with tourists coming in and out of the
island not only because of the possible disruption that they may cause to the works
being undertaken, but primarily because their safety and convenience might be
compromised. Also, the contaminated waters in the island were not just confined
to a small manageable area. The excessive water pollutants were all over Bolabog
beach and the numerous illegal drainpipes connected to and discharging
wastewater over it originate from different parts of the island. Indeed, the
activities occasioned by the necessary digging of these pipes and the isolation of
the contaminated beach waters to give way to treatment could not be done in thW
37 Philippine Association a/Service Exporters, Inc. v. Hon. Drilon, 246 Phil. 393, 401 (1988). / l/
Decision 20 G.R. No. 238467
presence of tourists. Aside from the dangers that these contaminated waters pose,
hotels, inns, and other accommodations may not be available as they would all be
inspected and checked to determine their compliance with environmental laws.
Moreover, it bears to state that a piece-meal closure of portions of the island would
not suffice since as mentioned, illegal drainpipes extend to the beach from various
parts of Boracay. Also, most areas in the island needed major structural
rectifications because of numerous resorts and tourism facilities which lie along
easement areas, illegally reclaimed wetlands, and of forested areas that were
illegally cleared for construction purposes. Hence, the need to close the island in
its entirety and ban tourists therefrom.
In fine, this case does not actually involve the right to travel in its essential
sense contrary to what petitioners want to portray. Any bearing that Proclamation
No. 475 may have on the right to travel is merely corollary to the closure of
Boracay and the ban of tourists and non-residents therefrom which were necessary
incidents of the island's rehabilitation. There is certainly no showing that
Proclamation No. 475 deliberately meant to impair the right to travel. Tue
questioned proclamation is clearly focused on its purpose of rehabilitating Boracay
and any intention to directly restrict the right cannot, in any manner, be deduced
from its import. This is contrary to the import of several laws recognized as
constituting an impairment on the right to travel which directly impose restriction
on the right, viz.:
[1] The Human Security Act of2010 or Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9372. The law
restricts the right travel of an individual charged with the crime of terrorism even
though such person is out on bail.
[2] The Philippine Passport Act of 1996 or R.A. No. 8239. Pursuant to said law,
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs or his authorized consular officer may refuse the
issuance of, restrict the use of, or withdraw, a passport of a Filipino citizen.
[3] The 'Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of2003' or RA 9208. Pursuant to the
provisions thereof, the Bureau of Immigration, in order to manage migration and
curb trafficking in persons, issued Memorandum Order Radjr No. 2011-011,
allowing its Travel Control and Enforcement Unit to 'offload passengers with
fraudulent travel documents, doubtful purpose of travel, including possible
victims of human trafficking' from our ports.
[4] The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 or R.A. No. 8042,
as amended by R.A. No. 10022. In enforcement of said law, the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) may refuse to issue deployment
permit[ s] to a specific country that effectively prevents our migrant workers to
enter such country.
[5] The Act on Violence Against Women and Children or R.A. No. 9262. The
law restricts movement of an individual against whom the protection order is
intended.
[6] Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995 or R.A. No. 8043. Pursuant thereto, the
Inter-Country Adoption Board may issue rules restrictive ofan adoptee's rig}J~
Decision 21 G.R. No. 238467
travel 'to protect the Filipino child from abuse, exploitation, trafficking and/or
sale or any other practice in connection with adoption which is harmful,
detrimental, or prejudicial to the child. '38
In Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Hon. Drilon, 39
the Court held that the consequence on the right to travel of the deployment
ban implemented by virtue of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1998 of the
Department of Labor and Employment does not impair the right.
Also significant to note is that the closure of Boracay was only
 temporary considering the categorical pronouncement that it was only for a
definite period of six months.
Hence, if at all, the impact of Proclamation No. 475 on the right to
travel is not direct but merely consequential; and, the same is only for a
reasonably short period of time or merely temporary.
In this light, a discussion on whether President Duterte exercised a
power legislative in nature loses its significance. Since Proclamation No.
4 7 5 does not actually impose a restriction on the right to travel, its issuance
did not result to any substantial alteration of the relationship between the
State and the people. The proclamation is therefore not a law and
conversely, the President did not usurp the law-making power of the
legislature.
For obvious reason, there is likewise no more need to determine the
existence in this case of the requirements for a valid impairment of the right
to travel.
Even if it is otherwise, Proclamation
No. 475 must be upheld for being in
the nature of a valid police power
measure
Police power, amongst the three fundamental and inherent powers of
the state, is the most pervasive and comprehensive.40 "It has been defined as
the 'state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty or property in order to promote general welfare."41 "As defined, it
consists of (1) imposition or restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to
foster the common good. It is not capable of exact definition but has bee~
38 Leave Division, Office of the Administrative Services (OAS)-Ofjice of the Court Administrator (OCA) v.
Heusdens, 678 Phil. 328, 339-340 (2011).
39 Supra note 37.
40 Gorospe, Rene, B., Constitutional Law, Notes and Readings on the Bill of Rights, Citizenship and
Suffrage,
Volume I (2006), p. 9.
41 Id., citing Edu v. Ericta,  146 Phil. 469 (1970).
Decision 22 G.R. No. 238467
purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive
embrace."42 The police power "finds no specific Constitutional grant for the
plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the Charter"43 since "it is
inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty."44 It is said to be the
"inherent and plenary power of the State which enables it to prohibit all
things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of the society."45 Thus,
police power constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights.46 After
all, "the Bill of Rights itself does not purport to be an absolute guaranty of
individual rights and liberties. 'Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is
not unrestricted license to act according to one's will.' It is subject to the far
more overriding demands and requirements of the greater number."47
"Expansive and extensive as its reach may be, police power is not a
force without limits."48 "It has to be exercised within bounds - lawful ends
through lawful means, i.e.,  that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from that of a particular class, require its exercise, and that the
means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose while not being unduly oppressive upon individuals."49
That the assailed governmental measure in this case is within the
scope of police power cannot be disputed. Verily, the statutes50 from which
the said measure draws authority and the constitutional provisions51 which
serve as its framework are primarily concerned with the environment and
health, safety, and well-being of the people, the promotion and securing of
which are clearly legitimate objectives of governmental efforts and
regulations. The motivating factor in the issuance of Proclamation No. 475
is without a doubt the interest of the public in general. The only question
now is whether the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
The pressing need to implement urgent measures to rehabilitate
Boracay is beyond cavil from the factual milieu that precipitated the
President's issuance of Proclamation No. 475. This necessity is even made
more critical and insistent by what the Court said in Oposa v. Hon.
Factoran, Jr.  52 in regard the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and
to health, which rights are likewise integral concerns in this case. Opos~
42 Id.
43 Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Hon. Drilon, supra note 37 at 398.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 399.
46 Id.
47 Id.
 48 Gorospe, Rene, 8., Constitutional law, Notes and Readings on the Bill of Rights, Citizenship and Sufji-
age,
Volume I (2006), p. 12.
49 Id.
50 RA I 0121 and RA 9275 or The Philippine Clean Water Act
51 CONSTITUTION, Article II, Sections 15 and 16 and Article XII, Section 2.
52 296 Phil. 694 (1993).
Decision 23 G.R. No. 238467
warned that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to
health are given continuing importance and the State assumes its solemn
obligation to preserve and protect them, the time will come that nothing will
be left not only for this generation but for the generations to come as well.53
It further taught that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries
with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. 54
Against the foregoing backdrop, we now pose this question: Was the
temporary closure of Boracay as a tourist destination for six months
reasonably necessary under the circumstances? The answer is in the
affirmative.
As earlier noted, one of the root causes of the problems that beset
Boracay was tourist influx. Tourist arrivals in the island were clearly far
more than Boracay could handle. As early as 2007, the DENR had already
determined this as the major cause of the catastrophic depletion of the
island's biodiversity. 55 Also part of the equation is the lack of commitment
to effectively enforce pertinent environmental laws. Unfortunately, direct
action on these matters has been so elusive that the situation reached a
critical level. Hence, by then, only bold and sweeping steps were required
by the situation.
Certainly, the closure of Boracay, albeit temporarily, gave the island
its much needed breather, and likewise afforded the government the
necessary leeway in its rehabilitation program. Note that apart from review,
evaluation and amendment of relevant policies, the bulk of the rehabilitation
activities involved inspection, testing, demolition, relocation, and
construction. These works could not have easily been done with tourists
present. The rehabilitation works in the first place were not simple,
superficial or mere cosmetic but rather quite complicated, major, and
permanent in character as they were intended to serve as long-term solutions
to the problem. 56 Also, time is of the essence. Every precious moment lost is
to the detriment of Boracay's environment and of the health and well-being
of the people thereat. Hence, any unnecessary distraction or disruption is
most unwelcome. Moreover, as part of the rehabilitation efforts, operations
of establishments in Boracay had to be halted in the course thereof since
majority, if not all of them, need to comply with environmental and
regulatory requirements in order to align themselves with the government's
goal to restore Boracay into normalcy and develop its sustainability.
Allowing tourists into the island while it was undergoing necessary
rehabilitation would therefore be pointless as no establishment would cater~
53 Id. at 713. /"" .
54 Id.
55 Rollo, p. 145.
56 See Executive Order No. 53, CREATING A BORACAY INTER-AGENCY TASK FORCE, PROVIDING FOR
ITS POWERS AND FUNCTIONS AND THOSE OF THE MEMBER-AGENCIES THEREOF, AND OTHER
MEASURES TO REVERSE THE DEGRADATION OF BORA CAY ISLAND, id. at 202-207.
Decision 24 G.R. No. 238467
to their accommodation and other needs. Besides, it could not be said that
Boracay, at the time of the issuance of the questioned proclamation, was in
such a physical state that would meet its purpose of being a tourist
destination. For one, its beach waters could not be said to be totally safe for
swimming. In any case, the closure, to emphasize, was only for a definite
period of six months, i.e., from April 26, 2018 to October 25, 2018. To the
mind of the Court, this period constitutes a reasonable time frame, if not to
complete, but to at least put in place the necessary rehabilitation works to be
done in the island. Indeed, the temporary closure of Boracay, although
unprecedented and radical as it may seem, was reasonably necessary and not
unduly oppressive under the circumstances. It was the most practical and
realistic means of ensuring that rehabilitation works in the island are started
and carried out in the most efficacious and expeditious way. Absent a clear
showing of grave abuse of discretion, unreasonableness, arbitrariness or
oppressiveness, the Court will not disturb the executive determination that
the closure of Boracay was necessitated by the foregoing circumstances. As
earlier noted, petitioners totally failed to counter the factual bases of, and
justification for the challenged executive action.
Undoubtedly, Proclamation No. 475 is a valid police power measure.
To repeat, police power constitutes an implied limitation to the Bill of
Rights, and that even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is subject to the
far more overriding demands and requirements of the greater number.
For the above reasons, petitioners' constitutional challenge on
Proclamation No. 475 anchored on their perceived impairment of the right to
travel must fail.
Petitioners have no vested rights on
their sources of income as to be
entitled to due process
Petitioners argue that Proclamation No. 475 impinges on their
constitutional right to due process since they were deprived of the corollary
right to work and earn a living by reason of the issuance thereof.
Concededly, "[a] profession, trade or calling is a property right within
the meaning of our constitutional guarantees. One cannot be deprived of the
right to work and the right to make a living because these rights are property
rights, the arbitrary and unwarranted deprivation of which normally
constitutes an actionable wrong."57 Under this premise, petitioners claim
that they were deprived of due process when their right to work and earn a
living was taken away from them when Boracay was ordered closed as a
tourist destination. It must be stressed, though, that "when the conditions so ,tf,t
57 JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 87, 99-100 (1996). /
Decision 25 G.R. No. 238467
demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the
primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due
process, must yield to general welfare."58 Otherwise, police power as an
attribute to promote the common good would be diluted considerably if on
the mere plea of petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital,
government measures implemented pursuant to the said state power would
be stymied or invalidated. 59
In any case, petitioners, particularly Zabal and Jacosalem, cannot be
said to have already acquired vested rights to their sources of income in
Boracay. As heretofore mentioned, they are part of the informal sector of
the economy where earnings are not guaranteed. In Southern Luzon Drug
Corporation v. Department of Social Welfare and Development,  60 the Court
elucidated on vested rights, as follows:
x x x Vested rights are 'fixed, unalterable, or irrevocable.' More
extensively, they are depicted as follows:
Rights which have so completely and definitely
accrued to or settled in a person that they are not subject to
be defeated or cancelled by the act of any other private
person, and which it is right and equitable that the
government should recognize and protect, as being lawful
in themselves, and settled according to the then current
rules of law, and of which the individual could not be
deprived arbitrarily without injustice, or of which he could
not justly be deprived otherwise than by the established
methods of procedure and for the public welfare. x x x A
right is not 'vested' unless it is more than a mere
expectancy based on the anticipated continuance of present
laws; it must be an established interest in property, not
open to doubt. x x x To be vested in its accurate legal
sense, a right must be complete and consummated, and one
of which the person to whom it belongs cannot be divested
without his consent. xx x 61
Here, Zabal and J acosalem 's asserted right to whatever they may earn
from tourist arrivals in Boracay is merely an inchoate right or one that has
not fully developed and therefore cannot be claimed as one's own. An
inchoate right is a mere expectation, which may or may not come into
fruition. "It is contingent as it only comes 'into existence on an event or
condition which may not happen or be performed until some other event
may prevent their vesting."'62 Clearly, said petitioners' earnings a~re
contingent in that, even assuming tourists are still allowed in the island, they
58 Carlos Superdrug Corporation v. Department of Social Welfare and Development, 553 Phil. 120, 2
(2007). .
59 Id.
60 G.R. No. 199669, April 25, 2017, 824 SCRA 164.
61 Id. at 211.
62 Id.at212.
Decision 26 G.R. No. 238467
will still earn nothing if no one avails of their services. Certainly, they do
not possess any vested right on their sources of income, and under this
context, their claim of lack of due process collapses. To stress, only rights
which have completely and definitely accrued and settled are entitled
protection under the due process clause.
Besides, Proclamation No. 475 does not strip Zabal and Jacosalem of
their right to work and earn a living. They are free to work and practice their
trade elsewhere. That they were not able to do so in Boracay, at least for the
duration of its closure, is a necessary consequence of the police power
measure to close and rehabilitate the island.
Also clearly untenable is petitioners' claim that they were being made
to suffer the consequences of the environmental transgressions of others. It
must be stressed that the temporary closure of Boracay as a tourist
destination and the consequent ban of tourists into the island were not meant
to serve as penalty to violators of environmental laws. The temporary
closure does not erase the environmental violations committed; hence, the
liabilities of the violators remain and only they alone shall suffer the same.
The temporary inconvenience that petitioners or other persons may have
experienced or are experiencing is but the consequence of the police
measure intended to attain a much higher purpose, that is, to protect the
environment, the health of the people, and the general welfare. Indeed, any
and all persons may be burdened by measures intended for the common
good or to serve some important governmental interest. 63
No intrusion into the autonomy of the
concerned LGUs
The alleged intrusion of the President into the autonomy of the LG Us
concerned is likewise too trivial to merit this Court's consideration.
Contrary to petitioners' argument, RA 10121 recognizes and even puts a
premium on the role of the LG Us in disaster risk reduction and management
as shown by the fact that a number of the legislative policies set out in the
subject statute recognize and aim to strengthen the powers decentralized to
LGUs.64 This role is echoed in the questioned proclamation. .{U
/
63 Manila Memorial Park, Inc. v. Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Development, 722 Phil.
538, 590 (2013).
64 Relevant legislative polices of RA 1012 I state, viz.:
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. - It shall be the policy of the State to:
xx xx
(e) Develop, promote, and implement a comprehensive National Disaster Risk Reduction and
Management Plan (NDRRMP) that aims to strengthen the capacity of the national government and
the local government units (LG Us), together with partner stakeholders, to build the disaster resilience
of communities, and to institutionalize arrangements and measures for reducing disaster risks, including
projected climate risks, and enhancing disaster preparedness and response capabilities at all levels;
xx xx
Decision 27 G.R. No. 238467
The fact that other government agencies are involved in the
rehabilitation works does not create the inference that the powers and
functions of the LGUs are being encroached upon. The respective roles of
each government agency are particularly defined and enumerated in
Executive Order No. 5365 and all are in accordance with their respective
mandates. Also, the situation in Boracay can in no wise be characterized or
labelled as a mere local issue as to leave its rehabilitation to local actors.
Boracay is a prime tourist destination which caters to both local and foreign
tourists. Any issue thereat has corresponding effects, direct or otherwise, at
a national level. This, for one, reasonably takes the issues therein from a
level that concerns only the local officials. At any rate, notice must be taken
of the fact that even if the concerned LGUs have long been fully aware of
the problems afflicting Boracay, they failed to effectively remedy it. Yet
still, in recognition of their mandated roles and involvement in the
rehabilitation ofBoracay, Proclamation No. 475 directed "[a]ll departments,
agencies and offices, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and affected local government units x x x to implement and
execute xx x the closure [of Boracay] and the appropriate rehabilitation
works, in accordance with pertinent operational plans and directives,
including the Boracay Action Plan.  "
As a final note, the Court in Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay,  66 called out the concerned
government agencies for their cavalier attitude towards solving
environmental destruction despite hard evidence and clear signs of climate
crisis. It equated the failure to put environmental protection on a plane of
high national priority to the then lacking level of bureaucratic efficiency and
commitment. Hence, the Court therein took it upon itself to put the heads of
concerned department-agencies and the bureaus and offices under them on
continuing notice and to enjoin them to perform their mandates and duties
towards the clean-up and/or restoration of Manila Bay, through a
 "continuing mandamus." It likewise took the occasion to state, viz.:
In the light of the ongoing environmental degradation, the Court
wishes to emphasize the extreme necessity for all concerned executive
departments and agencies to immediately act and discharge their
respective official duties and obligations. Indeed, time is of the essence;
hence, there is a need to set timetables for the performance and completion
of the tasks, some of them as defined for them by law and the nature of
their respective offices and mandates~
(k) Recognize the local risk patterns across the country and strengthen the capacity of LGUs for
disaster risk reduction and management through decentralized powers, responsibilities, and resources
at
the regional and local levels; [and]
(I) Recognize and strengthen the capacities of LGUs and communities in mitigating and
preparing for, responding to, and recovering from the impact of disasters;
xx xx
65 Supra note 56.
66 595 Phil. 305 (2008).
Decision 28 G.R. No. 238467
The importance of the Manila Bay as a sea resource, playground
and as a historical landmark cannot be over-emphasized. It is not yet too
late in the day to restore the Manila Bay to its former splendor and bring
back the plants and sea life that once thrived in its blue waters. But the
tasks ahead, daunting as they may be, could only be accomplished if those
mandated, with the help and cooperation of all civic-minded individuals,
would put their minds to these tasks and take responsibility. This means
that the State, through [the concerned department-agencies], has to take
the lead in the preservation and protection of the Manila Bay.
The era of delays, procrastination, and ad hoc measures is over.
[The concerned department-agencies] must transcend their limitations, real
or imaginary, and buckle down to work before the problem at hand
becomes unmanageable. Thus, we must reiterate that different
government agencies and instrumentalities cannot shirk from their
mandates; they must perform their basic functions in cleaning up and
rehabilitating the Manila Bay.xx x67
There is an obvious similarity in Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority and in the present case in that both involve the restoration of key
areas in the country which were once glowing with radiance and vitality but
are now in shambles due to abuses and exploitation. What sets these two
cases apart is that in the former, those mandated to act still needed to be
enjoined in order to act. In this case, the bold and urgent action demanded
by the Court in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority  is now in the
roll out. Still, the voice of cynicism, naysayers, and procrastinators heard
during times of inaction can still be heard during this time of full action -
demonstrating a classic case of "damn if you do, damn if you don't". Thus,
in order for the now staunch commitment to save the environment not to
fade, it behooves upon the courts to be extra cautious in invalidating
government measures meant towards addressing environmental degradation.
Absent any clear showing of constitutional infirmity, arbitrariness or grave
abuse of discretion, these measures must be upheld and even lauded and
promoted. After all, not much time is left for us to remedy the present
environmental situation. To borrow from Oposa, unless the State undertakes
its solemn obligation to preserve the rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology and advance the health of the people, "the day would not be too far
when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for
those to come - generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth
incapable of sustaining life."68
All told, the Court sustains the constitutionality and validity of
Proclamation No. 475.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus 1s
DISMISSED. 
280 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

City of Davao vs. RTC, Branch XII, Davao City

G.R. No. 127383. August 18, 2005.*

THE CITY OF DAVAO, CITY TREASURER AND THE CITY ASSESSOR OF DAVAO CITY, petitioners,  vs. THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH XII, DAVAO CITY AND THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
(GSIS), respondents.
Taxation; Exemptions; Local Government Units (LGUs); Local Government Code; The Court, in ruling
Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) non-exempt from realty taxes, considered that Section
133 of the Local Government Code qualified the exemption of the National Government, its agencies and
instrumentalities from local taxation with the phrase “unless otherwise provided herein.”—The Court, in ruling
MCIAA non-exempt from realty taxes, considered that Section 133 qualified the exemption of the National
Government, its agencies and instrumentalities from local taxation with the phrase “unless otherwise
provided herein.” The Court then considered the other relevant provisions of the Local Government Code.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 133 was not intended to be so absolute a prohibition on the power of
LGUs to tax the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities.—Section 133 was not intended to be
so absolute a prohibition on the power of LGUs to tax the National Government, its agencies and
instrumentalities, as evidenced by these cited provisions which “otherwise provided.” But what was the
extent of the limitation under Section 133? This is how the Court, in a discussion of far-reaching consequence,
defined the parameters in Mactan: The foregoing sections of the LGC speak of: (a) the limitations on the taxing
powers of local government units and the exceptions to such limitations; and (b) the rule on tax exemptions
and the exceptions thereto. The use of exceptions or provisos in these sections, as shown by the following
clauses: (1) “unless otherwise provided herein” in the opening paragraph of Section 133; (2) “Unless
otherwise provided in this Code” in Section 193; (3) “not hereafter specifically exempted” in Section 232; and
(4) “Except as provided herein” in the last paragraph of Section 234.
_______________

* SECOND DIVISION.
281
VOL. 467, AUGUST 18, 2005

City of Davao vs. RTC, Branch XII, Davao City

Same; Same; Same; Same; The exemptions from real property taxes are enumerated in Section 234,
which specifically states that only real properties owned “by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political
subdivisions” is exempted from payment of the tax. Clearly, instrumentalities or GOCCs do not fall within the
exceptions under Section 234.—This Court, in Mactan, acknowledged that under Section 133, instrumentalities
were generally exempt from all forms of local government taxation, unless otherwise provided in the Code.
On the other hand, Section 232 “otherwise provides” insofar as it allowed local government units to levy
an ad valorem real property tax, irrespective of who owned the property. At the same time, the imposition of
real property taxes under Section 232 is in turn qualified by the phrase “not hereinafter specifically
exempted.” The exemptions from real property taxes are enumerated in Section 234, which specifically states
that only real properties owned “by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions” are
exempted from the payment of the tax. Clearly, instrumentalities or GOCCs do not fall within the exceptions
under Section 234.
Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Statutes; Only the constitution may operate to preclude or place
restrictions on the amendment or repeal of laws—constitutional dicta are of higher order than legislative
statutes, and the latter should always yield to the former in cases of irreconcilable conflict .—The second
paragraph of Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146, as amended, effectively imposes restrictions on the competency of
the Congress to enact future legislation on the taxability of the GSIS. This places an undue restraint on the
plenary power of the legislature to amend or repeal laws, especially considering that it is a lawmaker’s act
that imposes such burden. Only the Constitution may operate to preclude or place restrictions on the
amendment or repeal of laws. Constitutional dicta is of higher order than legislative statutes, and the latter
should always yield to the former in cases of irreconcilable conflict.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is a basic precept that among the implied substantive limitations on the
legislative powers is the prohibition against the passage of irrepealable laws.—It is a basic precept that among
the implied substantive limitations on the legislative powers is the prohibition against the passage of
irrepealable laws. Irrepealable laws deprive succeeding legislatures of the fundamental best senses carte
blanche in crafting laws appropriate to the operative milieu. Their allowance promotes an unhealthy stasis in
the
282
 282 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

City of Davao vs. RTC, Branch XII, Davao City

legislative front and dissuades dynamic democratic impetus that may be responsive to the times. As
Senior Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno once observed, “[t]o be sure, there are no irrepealable laws just as
there are no irrepealable Constitutions. Change is the predicate of progress and we should not fear change.”
Same; Same; The express withdrawal of all tax exemptions accorded to all persons natural or juridical, as
stated in Section 193 of the Local Government Code applies, without impediment to the present case.—The two
conditionalities of Section 33 cannot bear relevance on whether the Local Government Code removed the tax-
exempt status of the GSIS. The express withdrawal of all tax exemptions accorded to all persons, natural or
juridical, as stated in Section 193 of the Local Government Code, applies without impediment to the present
case. Such position is bolstered by the other cited provisions of the Local Government Code, and by
the Mactanruling.
Same; Same; The State is mandated to ensure local autonomy of local governments, and local
governments are empowered to levy taxes, fees, and charges that accrue exclusively to them, subject to
congressional guidelines and limitations.—Also worthy of note is that the Constitution itself promotes the
principles of local autonomy as embodied in the Local Government Code. The State is mandated to ensure the
autonomy of local governments, and local governments are empowered to levy taxes, fees and charges that
accrue exclusively to them, subject to congressional guidelines and limitations. The principle of local
autonomy is no mere passing dalliance but a constitutionally enshrined precept that deserves respect and
appropriate enforcement by this Court.
 G.R. No. 186242.  December 23, 2009.*
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioner, vs. CITY TREASURER and CITY ASSESSOR of the
CITY OF MANILA, respondents.
Government Service Insurance System; Legal Research; In 1936, Commonwealth Act No. (CA) 186 was
enacted abolishing the then pension systems under Act No. 1638, as amended, and establishing the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) to manage the pension system, life and retirement insurance, and other benefits
of all government employees.—In 1936, Commonwealth Act No. (CA) 186 was enacted abolishing the then
pension systems under Act No. 1638, as amended, and establishing the GSIS to manage the pension system,
life and retirement insurance, and other benefits of all government employees. Under what may be
considered as its first charter, the GSIS was set up as a non-stock corporation managed by a board of trustees.
Notably, Section 26 of CA 186 provided exemption from any legal
_______________

* THIRD DIVISION.
331
VOL. 609, December 23, 2009

Government Service Insurance System vs. City Treasurer of the City of Manila

process and liens but only for insurance policies and their proceeds, thus: Section 26. Exemption from
legal process and liens.—No policy of life insurance issued under this Act, or the proceeds thereof, when paid
to any member thereunder, nor any other benefit granted under this Act, shall be liable to attachment,
garnishment, or other process, or to be seized, taken, appropriated, or applied by any legal or equitable
process or operation of law to pay any debt or liability of such member, or his beneficiary, or any other
person who may have a right thereunder, either before or after payment; nor shall the proceeds thereof,
when not made payable to a named beneficiary, constitute a part of the estate of the member for payment of
his debt. x x x
Same; Taxation; It is to be noted that prominently added in Government Service Insurance System’s (GSIS’s)
present charter is a paragraph precluding any implied repeal of the tax-exempt clause so as to protect the
solvency of GSIS funds; Restrictions in the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) Charter which for a
future express repeal do not make the proviso an irrepealable law, for such restrictions do not impinge or limit
the carte blanche legislative authority of the legislature to so amend it.—The foregoing exempting proviso,
couched as it were in an encompassing manner, brooks no other construction but that GSIS is exempt from all
forms of taxes. While not determinative of this case, it is to be noted that prominently added in GSIS’ present
charter is a paragraph precluding any implied repeal of the tax-exempt clause so as to protect the solvency of
GSIS funds. Moreover, an express repeal by a subsequent law would not suffice to affect the full exemption
benefits granted the GSIS, unless the following conditionalities are met: (1) The repealing clause
must expressly, specifically, and categorically revoke or repeal Sec. 39;and (2) a provision is enacted to
substitute or replace the exemption referred to herein as an essential factor to maintain or protect the
solvency of the fund. These restrictions for a future express repeal, notwithstanding, do not make the proviso
an irrepealable law, for such restrictions do not impinge or limit the carte blanche legislative authority of the
legislature to so amend it. The restrictions merely enhance other provisos in the law ensuring the solvency of
the GSIS fund.
332
332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Government Service Insurance System vs. City Treasurer of the City of Manila

Same; Same; While recognizing the exempt status of Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) owing to
the reenactment of the full tax exemption clause under Sec. 39 of Republic Act No. 8291 in 1997, the ponencia in
City of Davao v. RTC, Branch XII, Davao City, 467 SCRA 280 (2005), appeared to have  failed to take stock of and
fully appreciate the all-embracing condoning proviso in the very same Sec. 39 which, for all intents and purposes,
considered as paid “any assessment against the GSIS as of the approval of this Act.”—While recognizing the
exempt status of GSIS owing to the reenactment of the full tax exemption clause under Sec. 39 of RA 8291 in
1997, the ponencia in City of Davao appeared to have failed to take stock of and fully appreciate the all-
embracing condoning proviso in the very same Sec. 39 which, for all intents and purposes, considered as paid
“any assessment against the GSIS as of the approval of this Act.” If only to stress the point, we hereby
reproduce the pertinent portion of said Sec. 39: SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien.—x x x
Taxes imposed on the GSIS tend to impair the actuarial solvency of its funds and increase the contribution
rate necessary to sustain the benefits of this Act. Accordingly, notwithstanding, any laws to the contrary,
the GSIS, its assets, revenues including all accruals thereto, and benefits paid, shall be exempt from all taxes,
assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds. These exemptions shall continue unless expressly and
specifically revoked and any assessment against the GSIS as of the approval of this Act are hereby considered
paid. Consequently, all laws, ordinances, regulations, issuances, opinions or jurisprudence contrary to or in
derogation of this provision are hereby deemed repealed, superseded and rendered ineffective and without
legal force and effect.
Same; Same; The Court’s fairly recent ruling in Manila International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals,
495 SCRA 591 (2006), a case likewise involving real estate tax assessments by a Metro Manila city  on the real
properties administered by Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA), argues for the non-tax liability of
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for real estate taxes.—Apart from the foregoing consideration, the
Court’s
333
VOL. 609, December 23, 2009

Government Service Insurance System vs. City Treasurer of the City of Manila

fairly recent ruling in Manila International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals, 495 SCRA 591 (2006), a
case likewise involving real estate tax assessments by a Metro Manila city on the real properties administered
by MIAA, argues for the non-tax liability of GSIS for real estate taxes. There, the Court held that MIAA does not
qualify as a GOCC, not having been organized either as a stock corporation, its capital not being divided into
shares, or as a non-stock corporation because it has no members. MIAA is rather an instrumentality of the
National Government and, hence, outside the purview of local taxation by force of Sec. 133 of the LGC
providing in context that “unless otherwise provided,” local governments cannot tax national government
instrumentalities. And as the Court pronounced in Manila International Airport Authority, the airport lands
and buildings MIAA administers belong to the Republic of the Philippines, which makes MIAA a mere trustee
of such assets. No less than the Administrative Code of 1987 recognizes a scenario where a piece of land
owned by the Republic is titled in the name of a department, agency, or instrumentality.
Same; Same; Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), as a government instrumentality, is not a
taxable juridical person under Sec. 133(o) of the Local Government Code.—Thus read together, the provisions
allow the Republic to grant the beneficial use of its property to an agency or instrumentality of the national
government. Such grant does not necessarily result in the loss of the tax exemption. The tax exemption the
property of the Republic or its instrumentality carries ceases only if, as stated in Sec. 234(a) of the LGC of
1991, “beneficial use thereof has been granted, for a consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person.” GSIS, as
a government instrumentality, is not a taxable juridical person under Sec. 133(o) of the LGC. GSIS, however,
lost in a sense that status with respect to the Katigbak property when it contracted its beneficial use to MHC,
doubtless a taxable person. Thus, the real estate tax assessment of PhP 54,826,599.37 covering 1992 to 2002
over the subject Katigbak property is valid insofar as said tax delinquency is concerned as assessed over said
property.
334
334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Government Service Insurance System vs. City Treasurer of the City of Manila

Same; Same; The unpaid tax attaches to the property and is chargeable against the taxable person who had
actual or beneficial use and possession of it regardless of whether or not he is the owner. —The next query as to
which between GSIS, as the owner of the Katigbak property, or MHC, as the lessee thereof, is liable to pay the
accrued real estate tax, need not detain us long. MHC ought to pay. As we declared in Testate Estate of
Concordia T. Lim, “the unpaid tax attaches to the property and is chargeable against the taxable person who
had actual or beneficial use and possession of it regardless of whether or not he is the owner.” Of the same
tenor is the Court’s holding in the subsequent Manila Electric Company v. Barlis, 357 SCRA 832 (2001) and
later in Republic v. City of Kidapawan, 477 SCRA 324 (2005). Actual use refers to the purpose for which the
property is principally or predominantly utilized by the person in possession thereof. Being in possession and
having actual use of the Katigbak property since November 1991, MHC is liable for the realty taxes assessed
over the Katigbak property from 1992 to 2002.
Same; Same; A valid tax levy presupposes a corresponding tax liability; Even granting arguendo that
Government Service Insurance System’s (GSIS’s) liability for realty taxes attached from 1992, when Republic Act
No. 7160 effectively lifted its tax exemption under Presidential Decree Nos. 1146 to 1996, when Republic Act No.
8291 restored the tax incentive, the levy on the subject properties to answer for the assessed realty tax
delinquencies cannot still be sustained for the simple reason that the governing law, Republic Act No. 8291, in
force at the time of the levy prohibits it.—In light of the foregoing disquisition, the issue of the propriety of the
threatened levy of subject properties by the City of Manila to answer for the demanded realty tax deficiency is
now moot and academic. A valid tax levy presupposes a corresponding tax liability. Nonetheless, it will not be
remiss to note that it is without doubt that the subject GSIS properties are exempt from any attachment,
garnishment, execution, levy, or other legal processes. This is the clear import of the third paragraph of Sec.
39, RA 8291, which we quote anew for clarity: x x x The Court would not be indulging in pure speculative
exercise to say that the underlying legislative intent behind the above ex-
335
VOL. 609, December 23, 2009
 Government Service Insurance System vs. City Treasurer of the City of Manila

empting proviso cannot be other than to isolate GSIS funds and properties from legal processes that will
either impair the solvency of its fund or hamper its operation that would ultimately require an increase in the
contribution rate necessary to sustain the benefits of the system. Throughout GSIS’ life under three different
charters, the need to ensure the solvency of GSIS fund has always been a legislative concern, a concern
expressed in the tax-exempting provisions. Thus, even granting arguendo that GSIS’ liability for realty taxes
attached from 1992, when RA 7160 effectively lifted its tax exemption under PD 1146, to 1996, when RA
8291 restored the tax incentive, the levy on the subject properties to answer for the assessed realty tax
delinquencies cannot still be sustained. The simple reason: The governing law, RA 8291, in force at the time of
the levy prohibits it. And in the final analysis, the proscription against the levy extends to the leased Katigbak
property, the beneficial use doctrine, notwithstanding.

G.R. No. 157870. November 3, 2008.*

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), petitioner, vs. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG
ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA), respondents.
G.R. No. 158633. November 3, 2008.*
ATTY. MANUEL J. LASERNA, JR., petitioner, vs. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG
ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, respondents.
G.R. No. 161658. November 3, 2008.*
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
_______________

* EN BANC.

411
VOL. 570, NOVEMBER 3, 2008

Social Justice Society (SJS) vs. Dangerous Drugs Board

Remedial Law; Actions; Power of Judicial Review; Parties; Party-in-Interest; The power of judicial review
can only be exercised in connection with a bona fide controversy which involves the statute sought to be
reviewed; Even with the presence of an actual case or controversy, the court may refuse to exercise judicial
review unless the constitutional question is brought before it by a party having the requisite standing to
challenge it.—It is basic that the power of judicial review can only be exercised in connection with a  bona
fide controversy which involves the statute sought to be reviewed. But even with the presence of an actual
case or controversy, the Court may refuse to exercise judicial review unless the constitutional question is
brought before it by a party having the requisite standing to challenge it. To have standing, one must establish
that he or she has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable action.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The rule on standing is a matter of procedure; hence, it can be relaxed for non-
traditional plaintiffs, like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so requires, such
as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overarching significance to society, or of paramount
public interest.—The rule on standing, however, is a matter of procedure; hence, it can be relaxed for non-
traditional plaintiffs, like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires,
such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overarching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest. There is no doubt that Pimentel, as senator of the Philippines and candidate for
the May 10, 2004 elections, possesses the requisite standing since he has substantial interests in the subject
matter of the petition, among other preliminary considerations. Regarding SJS and Laserna, this Court is wont
to relax the rule on locus standi owing primarily to the transcendental importance and the paramount public
interest involved in the enforcement of Sec. 36 of RA 9165.
Constitutional Law; Statutes; It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the
Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect.—Pimentel’s contention is well-taken. Accordingly,
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an
adminis-
412
412 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Social Justice Society (SJS) vs. Dangerous Drugs Board

trative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The
Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the
Constitution. In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice
but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.
 Same; Same; Definition of the limits on legislative power in the abstract.—Congress’ inherent legislative
powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain limitations. As early as 1927, in Government v. Springer,
the Court has defined, in the abstract, the limits on legislative power in the following wise: Someone has said
that the powers of the legislative department of the Government, like the boundaries of the ocean, are
unlimited. In constitutional governments, however, as well as governments acting under delegated authority,
the powers of each of the departments x x x are limited and confined within the four walls of the constitution
or the charter, and each department can only exercise such powers as are necessarily implied from the given
powers. The Constitution is the shore of legislative authority against which the waves of legislative enactment
may dash, but over which it cannot leap.
Same; Same; The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by
unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.—In the same vein, the
COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules and
regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to
what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional
qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic
process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise
specified in the Constitution.
Same; Same; Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution,
effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution; Whether
or not the drug-free bar set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of
no moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot as-
413
VOL. 570, NOVEMBER 3, 2008

Social Justice Society (SJS) vs. Dangerous Drugs Board

sume office for non-compliance with the drug-testing requirement—Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be
implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification requirements
enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a
candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug clean, obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a
certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if
proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC resolution completes the chain with the proviso that
“[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone
mandatory drug test.” Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing
COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires
for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug-free bar set up under the challenged provision is to be
hurdled before or after election is really of no moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot
assume office for non-compliance with the drug-testing requirement.
Same; Same; Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random,
and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional.—Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the
Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational
institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations
and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable
requirements.
Same; Same; A random drug testing of students in secondary and tertiary schools is not only acceptable but
may even be necessary if the safety and interest of the student population, doubtless a legitimate concern of the
government, are to be promoted and protected.—The Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation of
prohibited drugs in the country that threatens the well-being of the people, particularly the youth and school
children who usually end up as victims. Accordingly, and until a more effective method is conceptualized and
put in motion, a random drug testing of students in secondary and tertiary schools is not only acceptable but
may even be
414
414 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Social Justice Society (SJS) vs. Dangerous Drugs Board

necessary if the safety and interest of the student population, doubtless a legitimate concern of the
government, are to be promoted and protected. To borrow from Vernonia, “[d]eterring drug use by our
Nation’s schoolchildren is as important as enhancing efficient enforcement of the Nation’s laws against the
importation of drugs”; the necessity for the State to act is magnified by the fact that the effects of a drug-
infested school are visited not just upon the users, but upon the entire student body and faculty. Needless to
stress, the random testing scheme provided under the law argues against the idea that the testing aims to
incriminate unsuspecting individual students.
Same; Same; The mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and
employees of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason. —Just as in the case
of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA
9165 for officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same
reason. The Court notes in this regard that petitioner SJS, other than saying that “subjecting almost everybody
to drug testing, without probable cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to
privacy,” has failed to show how the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing under Sec. 36(c) and
(d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy and constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search under Art.
III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution. Petitioner Laserna’s lament is just as simplistic, sweeping, and gratuitous
and does not merit serious consideration.
Same; Same; If RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it
should pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all
times to the people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.—Taking into account the
foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the employees, the compelling state
concern likely to be met by the search, and the well-defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide
authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under
the limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional. Like their counterparts in the private
sector, government officials and employees also
415
VOL. 570, NOVEMBER 3, 2008

Social Justice Society (SJS) vs. Dangerous Drugs Board

labor under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on
public officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service. And if RA 9165 passes
the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it should pass the test for civil
servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all times to the people and to
serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.
Same; Same; In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor’s office, a mandatory drug
testing can never be random or suspicionless; To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant
attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165.
—We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public prosecutor’s office
with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment. The operative concepts in
the mandatory drug testing are “randomness” and “suspicionless.” In the case of persons charged with a
crime before the prosecutor’s office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The
ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal
complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of
committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus
charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor’s office and peaceably submitting themselves to
drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to
privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a
tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would
violate a persons’ right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused
persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.
Same; Same; Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 declared unconstitutional. —
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and declares Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165
and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition in G.R.
Nos. 157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA
416
416 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Social Justice Society (SJS) vs. Dangerous Drugs Board

9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec. 36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All concerned agencies are,
accordingly, permanently enjoined from implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165.
RIZALITO Y. DAVID, petitioner, vs. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and MARY GRACE POE-
LLAMANZARES, respondents. 803 SCRA 435

Election Law; Electoral Tribunals; Jurisdiction; Exclusive, original jurisdiction over contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the elective officials falling within the scope of their powers is, thus,
vested in these electoral tribunals.—Exclusive, original jurisdiction over contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the elective officials falling within the scope of their powers is, thus, vested in
these electoral tribunals. It is only before them that post-election challenges against the election, returns, and
qualifications of Senators and Representatives (as well as of the President and the Vice President, in the case
of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal) may be initiated. The judgments of these tribunals are not beyond the
scope of any review. Article VI, Section 17’s stipulation of electoral tribunals’ being the “sole” judge must be
read in harmony with Article VIII, Section 1’s express statement that “[j]udicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice . . . to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; A petition for certiorari is allowed in Article VIII, Section 1 of
the Constitution and described in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as an independent civil action.—A party
aggrieved by the rulings of the Senate or House Electoral Tribunal invokes the jurisdiction of this Court
through the vehicle of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. An appeal is
a continuation of the proceedings in the tribunal from which the appeal is taken. A petition for certiorari is
allowed in Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution and described in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as an
independent civil action. The viability of such a petition is premised on an allegation of “grave abuse of
discretion.” The term “grave abuse of discretion” has been generally held to refer to such arbitrary,
capricious, or whimsical exercise of judgment as is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.

Same; Same; Same; Grave Abuse of Discretion; There is grave abuse of discretion when a constitutional organ
such as the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) or the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), makes manifestly
gross errors in its factual inferences such that critical pieces of evidence, which have been nevertheless
properly introduced by a party, or admitted, or which were the subject of stipulation, are ignored or not
accounted for.—There is grave abuse of discretion when a constitutional organ such as the Senate Electoral
Tribunal or the Commission on Elections, makes manifestly gross errors in its factual inferences such that
critical pieces of evidence, which have been nevertheless properly introduced by a party, or admitted, or
which were the subject of stipulation, are ignored or not accounted for. A glaring misinterpretation of the
constitutional text or of statutory provisions, as well as a misreading or misapplication of the current state of
jurisprudence, is also considered grave abuse of discretion. The arbitrariness consists in the disregard of the
current state of our law.

Same; Same; Same; Writs of certiorari have been issued: (a) where the tribunal’s approach to an issue is
premised on wrong considerations and its conclusions founded on a gross misreading, if not
misrepresentation, of the evidence; (b) where a tribunal’s assessment of a case is “far from reasonable[,]
[and] based solely on very personal and subjective assessment standards when the law is replete with
standards that can be used”; “(c) where the tribunal’s action on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence
oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable”; and (d) where the tribunal
invokes erroneous or irrelevant considerations in resolving an issue.—Writs of certiorari have, therefore,
been issued: (a) where the tribunal’s approach to an issue is premised on wrong considerations and its
conclusions founded on a gross misreading, if not misrepresentation, of the evidence; (b) where a tribunal’s
assessment of a case is “far from reasonable[,] [and] based solely on very personal and subjective assessment
standards when the law is replete with standards that can be used”; “(c) where the tribunal’s action on the
appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly
unreasonable”; and (d) where the tribunal invokes erroneous or irrelevant considerations in resolving an
issue.

Constitutional Law; Senators; Natural-born Citizens; Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution spells out
the requirement that “[n]o person shall be a Senator unless he [or she] is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines.”—Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution spells out the requirement that “[n]o person shall
be a Senator unless he [or she] is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.”

Same; Statutory Construction; Even when a reading of the plain text is already sufficient, contemporaneous
construction may still be resorted to as a means for verifying or validating the clear textual or contextual
meaning of the Constitution.—At the heart of this controversy is a constitutional ambiguity. Definitely,
foundlings have biological parents, either or both of whom can be Filipinos. Yet, by the nature of their being
foundlings, they may, at critical times, not know their parents. Thus, this controversy must consider
possibilities where parentage may be Filipino but, due to no fault of the foundling, remains unknown.
Resolving this controversy hinges on constitutional interpretation. Discerning constitutional meaning is an
exercise in discovering the sovereign’s purpose so as to identify which among competing interpretations of
the same text is the more contemporarily viable construction. Primarily, the actual words — text — and how
they are situated within the whole document — context — govern. Secondarily, when discerning meaning
from the plain text (i.e., verba legis) fails, contemporaneous construction may settle what is more viable.
Nevertheless, even when a reading of the plain text is already sufficient, contemporaneous construction may
still be resorted to as a means for verifying or validating the clear textual or contextual meaning of the
Constitution.
Same; Same; Verba Legis Doctrine; Words must be given their ordinary meaning; this is consistent with the
basic precept of verba legis.— To the extent possible, words must be given their ordinary meaning; this is
consistent with the basic precept of verba legis. The Constitution is truly a public document in that it was
ratified and approved by a direct act of the People: exercising their right of suffrage, they approved of it
through a plebiscite. The preeminent consideration in reading the Constitution, therefore, is the People’s
consciousness: that is, popular, rather than technical-legal, understanding. Thus: We look to the language of
the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is where we begin.
It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective
sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a
lawyer’s document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people’s
consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use.
What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power
of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus,
these are the cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.

Same; Same; The Constitution should be appreciated and read as a singular, whole unit — ut magis valeat
quam pereat.—Reading a constitutional provision requires awareness of its relation with the whole of the
Constitution. A constitutional provision is but a constituent of a greater whole. It is the framework of the
Constitution that animates each of its components through the dynamism of these components’
interrelations. What is called into operation is the entire document, not simply a peripheral item. The
Constitution should, therefore, be appreciated and read as a singular, whole unit — ut magis valeat quam
pereat. Each provision must be understood and effected in a way that gives life to all that the Constitution
contains, from its foundational principles to its finest fixings.

Same; Same; Our legal system is founded on the basic principle that “[j]udicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of [our] legal system.”—Reading a certain text
includes a consideration of jurisprudence that has previously considered that exact same text, if any. Our legal
system is founded on the basic principle that “judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form part of [our] legal system.” Jurisprudence is not an independent source of law.
Nevertheless, judicial interpretation is deemed part of or written into the text itself as of the date that it was
originally passed. This is because judicial construction articulates the contemporaneous intent that the text
brings to effect. Nevertheless, one must not fall into the temptation of considering prior interpretation as
immutable.

Same; Same; Contemporaneous construction and aids that are external to the text may be resorted to when
the text is capable of multiple, viable meanings.—Contemporaneous construction and aids that are external to
the text may be resorted to when the text is capable of multiple, viable meanings. It is only then that one can
go beyond the strict boundaries of the document. Nevertheless, even when meaning has already been
ascertained from a reading of the plain text, contemporaneous construction may serve to verify or validate
the meaning yielded by such reading.

Same; Same; On an initial level, a plain textual reading readily identifies the specific provision, which
principally governs: the Constitution’s actual definition, in Article IV , Section 2, of “natural-born citizens.”
This definition must be harmonized with Section 1’s enumeration, which includes a reference to parentage.
These provisions must then be appreciated in relation to the factual milieu of this case.—Though her parents
are unknown, private respondent is a Philippine citizen without the need for an express statement in the
Constitution making her so. Her status as such is but the logical consequence of a reasonable reading of the
Constitution within its plain text. The Constitution provides its own cues; there is not even a need to delve
into the deliberations of its framers and the implications of international legal instruments. This reading
proceeds from several levels. On an initial level, a plain textual reading readily identifies the specific
provision, which principally governs: the Constitution’s actual definition, in Article IV , Section 2, of “natural-
born citizens.” This definition must be harmonized with Section 1’s enumeration, which includes a reference
to parentage. These provisions must then be appreciated in relation to the factual milieu of this case. The
pieces of evidence before the Senate Electoral Tribunal, admitted facts, and uncontroverted circumstances
adequately justify the conclusion of private respondent’s Filipino parentage.

Same; Citizenship; The core of citizenship is the capacity to enjoy political rights, that is, the right to
participate in government principally through the right to vote, the right to hold public office[,] and the right
to petition the government for redress of grievance.—Citizenship is a legal device denoting political
affiliation. It is the “right to have rights.” It is one’s personal and . . . permanent membership in a political
community. . . The core of citizenship is the capacity to enjoy political rights, that is, the right to participate in
government principally through the right to vote, the right to hold public office[,] and the right to petition the
government for redress of grievance. Citizenship also entails obligations to the political community of which
one is part. Citizenship, therefore, is intimately tied with the notion that loyalty is owed to the state,
considering the benefits and protection provided by it. This is particularly so if these benefits and protection
have been enjoyed from the moment of the citizen’s birth.

Same; Same; Natural-born Citizens; A natural-born citizen is defined in Article IV , Section 2 as one who is a
citizen of the Philippines “from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect Philippine
citizenship.” By necessary implication, a naturalized citizen is one who is not natural-born.—A natural-born
citizen is defined in Article IV , Section 2 as one who is a citizen of the Philippines “from birth without having
to perform any act to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship.” By necessary implication, a naturalized citizen
is one who is not natural-born. Bengson III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 357 SCRA 545
(2001), articulates this definition by dichotomy: [O]nly naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born
citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are
only two classes of citizens: . . . A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the
process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Former
Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban further shed light on the concept of naturalized citizens in his
Concurring Opinion in Bengson: naturalized citizens, he stated, are “former aliens or foreigners who had to
undergo a rigid procedure, in which they had to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that they possessed all
the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law in order to become Filipino citizens.”

Remedial Law; Evidence; Circumstantial Evidence; Although the Revised Rules on Evidence’s sole mention of
circumstantial evidence is in reference to criminal proceedings, the Supreme Court (SC) has nevertheless
sustained the use of circumstantial evidence in other proceedings.— Although the Revised Rules on
Evidence’s sole mention of circumstantial evidence is in reference to criminal proceedings, this Court has
nevertheless sustained the use of circumstantial evidence in other proceedings. There is no rational basis for
making the use of circumstantial evidence exclusive to criminal proceedings and for not considering
circumstantial facts as valid means for proof in civil and/or administrative proceedings. In criminal
proceedings, circumstantial evidence suffices to sustain a conviction (which may result in deprivation of life,
liberty, and property) anchored on the highest standard or proof that our legal system would require, i.e.,
proof beyond reasonable doubt. If circumstantial evidence suffices for such a high standard, so too may it
suffice to satisfy the less stringent standard of proof in administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings such as
those before the Senate Electoral Tribunal, i.e., substantial evidence.

Same; Same; Burden of Proof; Words and Phrases; Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence
on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.
—“Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his
claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.” Burden of proof lies on the party making the
allegations; that is, the party who “alleges the affirmative of the issue” Burden of proof never shifts from one
party to another. What shifts is the burden of evidence. This shift happens when a party makes a prima facie
case in his or her favor. The other party then bears the “burden of going forward” with the evidence
considering that which has ostensibly been established against him or her. Constitutional Law; Citizenship;
Foundlings; The presumption that all foundlings found in the Philippines are born to at least either a Filipino
father or a Filipino mother (and are thus natural-born, unless there is substantial proof otherwise) arises
when one reads the Constitution as a whole, so as to “effectuate [its] whole purpose.”—The presumption that
all foundlings found in the Philippines are born to at least either a Filipino father or a Filipino mother (and are
thus natural-born, unless there is substantial proof otherwise) arises when one reads the Constitution as a
whole, so as to “effectuate [its] whole purpose.” As much as we have previously harmonized Article IV ,
Section 2 with Article IV , Section 1(2), constitutional provisions on citizenship must not be taken in isolation.
They must be read in light of the constitutional mandate to defend the well-being of children, to guarantee
equal protection of the law and equal access to opportunities for public service, and to respect human rights.
They must also be read in conjunction with the Constitution’s reasons for requiring naturalborn status for
select public offices. Further, this presumption is validated by contemporaneous construction that considers
related legislative enactments, executive and administrative actions, and international instruments.

Same; Same; Same; Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born Filipino citizens is tantamount to
permanently discriminating against our foundling citizens; Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born
citizens creates an inferior class of citizens who are made to suffer that inferiority through no fault of their
own.—Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born Filipino citizens is tantamount to permanently
discriminating against our foundling citizens. They can then never be of service to the country in the highest
possible capacities. It is also tantamount to excluding them from certain means such as professions and state
scholarships, which will enable the actualization of their aspirations. These consequences cannot be tolerated
by the Constitution, not least of all through the present politically charged proceedings, the direct objective of
which is merely to exclude a singular politician from office. Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born
citizens creates an inferior class of citizens who are made to suffer that inferiority through no fault of their
own.

Same; Equal Protection of the Laws; The equal protection clause serves as a guarantee that “persons under
like circumstances and falling within the same class are treated alike, in terms of ‘privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced.’”—The equal protection clause serves as a guarantee that “persons under like
circumstances and falling within the same class are treated alike, in terms of ‘privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced.’ It is a guarantee against ‘undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or oppression of inequality.’” Other than the anonymity of their biological parents, no
substantial distinction differentiates foundlings from children with known Filipino parents. They are both
entitled to the full extent of the state’s protection from the moment of their birth. Foundlings’ misfortune in
failing to identify the parents who abandoned them — an inability arising from no fault of their own —
cannot be the foundation of a rule that reduces them to statelessness or, at best, as inferior, second-class
citizens who are not entitled to as much benefits and protection from the state as those who know their
parents. Sustaining this classification is not only inequitable; it is dehumanizing. It condemns those who, from
the very beginning of their lives, were abandoned to a life of desolation and deprivation.

Same; Citizenship; Foundlings; Until this, as well as the proceedings in the related case of Poe-Llamanzares,
private respondent’s natural-born status has been affirmed and reaffirmed through various official public
acts. —Our statutes on adoption allow for the recognition of foundlings’ Filipino citizenship on account of
their birth. They benefit from this without having to do any act to perfect their citizenship or without having
to complete the naturalization process. Thus, by definition, they are natural-born citizens. Specifically
regarding private respondent, several acts of executive organs have recognized her natural-born status. This
status was never questioned throughout her life; that is, until circumstances made it appear that she was a
viable candidate for President of the Philippines. Until this, as well as the proceedings in the related case of
Poe-Llamanzares, private respondent’s natural-born status has been affirmed and reaffirmed through various
official public acts. First, private respondent was issued a foundling certificate and benefitted from the
domestic adoption process. Second, on July 18, 2006, she was granted an order of reacquisition of natural-
born citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 by the Bureau of Immigration. Third, on October 6, 2010, the
President of the Philippines appointed her as MTRCB Chairperson — an office that requires natural-born
citizenship.

Citizenship; Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003; Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 superseded
Commonwealth Act No. 63 and RA No. 8171 specifically “to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act
No. 63 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens
of other countries.”—“Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.”
Commonwealth Act No. 63, which was in effect when private respondent was naturalized an American citizen
on October 18, 2001, provided in Section 1(1) that “[a] Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship . . . [b]y
naturalization in a foreign country.” Thus, private respondent lost her Philippine citizenship when she was
naturalized an American citizen. However, on July 7, 2006, she took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225. Three (3) days later, July 10, 2006, she filed before
the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation a Petition for Reacquisition of her Philippine citizenship. Shortly
after, this Petition was granted. Republic Act No. 9225 superseded Commonwealth Act No. 63 and Republic
Act No. 8171 specifically “to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63 which takes away
Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries.”

Same; Same; Natural-born Citizens; Natural-born Philippine citizens who, after Republic Act (RA) No. 9225
took effect, are naturalized in foreign countries “retain,” that is, keep, their Philippine citizenship, although
the effectivity of this retention and the ability to exercise the rights and capacities attendant to this status are
subject to certain solemnities (i.e., oath of allegiance and other requirements for specific rights and/or acts, as
enumerated in Section 5). On the other hand, those who became citizens of another country before the
effectivity of RA No. 9225 “reacquire” their Philippine citizenship and may exercise attendant rights and
capacities, also upon compliance with certain solemnities.—Natural-born Philippine citizens who, after
Republic Act 9225 took effect, are naturalized in foreign countries “retain,” that is, keep, their Philippine
citizenship, although the effectivity of this retention and the ability to exercise the rights and capacities
attendant to this status are subject to certain solemnities (i.e., oath of allegiance and other requirements for
specific rights and/or acts, as enumerated in Section 5). On the other hand, those who became citizens of
another country before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9225 “reacquire” their Philippine citizenship and
may exercise attendant rights and capacities, also upon compliance with certain solemnities. Read in
conjunction with Section 2’s declaration of a policy of immutability, this reacquisition is not a mere
restoration that leaves a vacuum in the intervening period. Rather, this reacquisition works to restore
natural-born status as though it was never lost at all.

Same; Same; Same; Requisites which Natural-born Filipinos who Have Been Naturalized Elsewhere and Wish
to Run for Elective Public Office Must Comply.—Natural-born Filipinos who have been naturalized elsewhere
and wish to run for elective public office must comply with all of the following requirements: First, taking the
oath of allegiance to the Republic. This effects the retention or reacquisition of one’s status as a natural-born
Filipino. This also enables the enjoyment of full civil and political rights, subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities under existing laws, provided the solemnities recited in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9225
are satisfied. Second, compliance with Article V , Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189,
otherwise known as the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, and other existing laws. This is to facilitate the
exercise of the right of suffrage; that is, to allow for voting in elections. Third, “mak[ing] a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.”
This, along with satisfying the other qualification requirements under relevant laws, makes one eligible for
elective public office.

Same; Same; Same; It is incorrect to intimate that private respondent’s having had to comply with Republic
Act (RA) No. 9225 shows that she is a naturalized, rather than a natural-born, Filipino citizen.—It is incorrect
to intimate that private respondent’s having had to comply with Republic Act No. 9225 shows that she is a
naturalized, rather than a natural-born, Filipino citizen. It is wrong to postulate that compliance with
Republic Act No. 9225 signifies the performance of acts to perfect citizenship. To do so is to completely
disregard the unequivocal policy of permanence and immutability as articulated in Section 2 of Republic Act
No. 9225 and as illuminated in jurisprudence. It is to erroneously assume that a natural-born Filipino citizen’s
naturalization elsewhere is an irreversible termination of his or her natural-born status.

Same; Same; Same; Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 may involve extended processes not limited to taking the Oath
of Allegiance and requiring compliance with additional solemnities, but these are for facilitating the
enjoyment of other incidents to citizenship, not for effecting the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship
itself.—Although Bengson was decided while Commonwealth Act No. 63 was in force, its ruling is in keeping
with Republic Act No. 9225’s policy of permanence and immutability: “all Philippine citizens of another
country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship.” In Bengson’s words, the once
naturalized citizen is “restored” or brought back to his or her natural-born status. There may have been an
interruption in the recognition of this status, as, in the interim, he or she was naturalized elsewhere, but the
restoration of natural-born status expurgates this intervening fact. Thus, he or she does not become a
Philippine citizen only from the point of restoration and moving forward. He or she is recognized, de jure, as a
Philippine citizen from birth, although the intervening fact may have consequences de facto. Republic Act No.
9225 may involve extended processes not limited to taking the Oath of Allegiance and requiring compliance
with additional solemnities, but these are for facilitating the enjoyment of other incidents to citizenship, not
for effecting the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship itself. Therefore, it is markedly different from
naturalization as there is no singular, extended process with which the former natural-born citizen must
comply.

PERLAS-BERNABE, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Grave Abuse of Discretion; View that an act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as committed with
grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.—An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as committed with
grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility. In this relation, “grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal
patently violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.”

Citizenship; Jus Sanguinis Principle; View that in this case, respondent failed to present competent and
sufficient evidence to prove her blood relation to a Filipino parent which is necessary to determine natural-
born citizenship pursuant to the jus sanguinis principle.—In this case, respondent failed to present
competent and sufficient evidence to prove her blood relation to a Filipino parent which is necessary to
determine natural-born citizenship pursuant to the jus sanguinis principle. This notwithstanding, the
ponencia concludes that the following circumstances are substantial evidence justifying the inference that
respondent’s biological parents are Filipino.

Same; View that the Supreme Court (SC) cannot make a definitive pronouncement on a candidate’s
citizenship when there is a looming possibility that he/she is not Filipino.—Case law holds that “[m]atters
dealing with qualifications for public elective office must be strictly complied with.” The proof to hurdle a
substantial challenge against a candidate’s qualifications must therefore be solid. This Court cannot make a
definitive pronouncement on a candidate’s citizenship when there is a looming possibility that he/she is not
Filipino. The circumstances surrounding respondent’s abandonment (both as to the milieu of time and place),
as well as her physical characteristics, hardly assuage this possibility. By parity of reasoning, they do not
prove that she was born to a Filipino: her abandonment in the Philippines is just a restatement of her
foundling status, while her physical features only tend to prove that her parents likely had Filipino features
and yet it remains uncertain if their citizenship was Filipino. More so, the statistics cited — assuming the
same to be true — do not account for all births but only of those recorded. To my mind, it is uncertain how
“encompassing” was the Philippine’s civil registration system at that time — in 1968 — to be able to conclude
that those statistics logically reflect a credible and representative sample size. And even assuming it to be so,
1,595 were reflected as foreigners, rendering it factually possible that respondent belonged to this class.
Ultimately, the opposition against respondent’s natural-born citizenship claim is simple but striking: the fact
that her parents are unknown directly puts into question her Filipino citizenship because she has no prima
facie link to a Filipino parent from which she could have traced her Filipino citizenship.

Same; Jus Sanguinis Principle; View that while the predicament of foundlings of having their parents
unknown would seem to entail the difficult, if not impossible, task of proving their Filipino parentage, the
current state of the law which requires evidence of blood relation to a Filipino parent to establish natural-
born citizenship under the jus sanguinis principle must be respected at all costs.—While the predicament of
foundlings of having their parents unknown would seem to entail the difficult, if not impossible, task of
proving their Filipino parentage, the current state of the law which requires evidence of blood relation to a
Filipino parent to establish natural-born citizenship under the jus sanguinis principle must be respected at all
costs. This is not to say that the position of foundlings in relation to their endeavors for high public offices has
been overlooked in this discourse. Rather, the correction of this seeming “misfortune” — as the ponencia
would suppose — lies in legislative revision, not judicial supplication. For surely, it is not for this Court to step
in and supply additional meaning when clarity is evoked in the citizenship provisions of the Constitution.

Same; Same; Foundlings; View that the jus sanguinis principle of citizenship established in the 1935
Constitution was subsequently carried over and adopted in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus,
notwithstanding the existence of any treaty or generally accepted principle of international law which
purportedly evince that foundlings are accorded natural-born citizenship in the State in which they are found,
the same, nonetheless, could not be given effect as it would contravene the Constitution.—It bears stressing
that they jus sanguinis principle of citizenship established in the 1935 Constitution was subsequently carried
over and adopted in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus, notwithstanding the existence of any treaty or
generally accepted principle of international law which purportedly evince that foundlings are accorded
natural-born citizenship in the State in which they are found, the same, nonetheless, could not be given effect
as it would contravene the Constitution. To recall, should international law be adopted in this jurisdiction, it
would only form part of the sphere of domestic law. Being relegated to the same level as domestic laws, they
could not modify or alter, much less prevail, over the express mandate of the Constitution. In this relation, I
deem it fitting to echo the point made by Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, likewise in her
Separate Opinion before the SET: Citizenship is not automatically conferred under the international
conventions cited but will entail an affirmative action of the State, by a national law or legislative enactment,
so that the nature of citizenship, if ever acquired pursuant thereto, is citizenship by naturalization. There
must be a law by which citizenship can be acquired. By no means can this citizenship be considered that of a
natural-born character under the principle of jus sanguinis in the Philippine Constitution.

SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and MAYOR JESSE ROBREDO, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS represented by its Chairman JOSE A.R. MELO and its Commissioners, RENE V.
SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH AND
GREGORIO LARRAZABAL, respondents. 617 SCRA 623

Civil Procedure; Courts; Hierarchy of Courts; Supreme Court sanctioned momentary deviation from the
principle of the hierarchy of courts, and took original cognizance of cases raising issues of paramount public
importance.—In Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), 346 SCRA 485 (2000)
and Jaworski v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), 419 SCRA 317 (2004), this Court
sanctioned momentary deviation from the principle of the hierarchy of courts, and took original cognizance of
cases raising issues of paramount public importance.

Constitutional Law; Statutes; Before a law may be declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, there
must be a clear showing that a specific provision of the fundamental law has been violated or transgressed. —
Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it the presumption of constitutionality. Before a law may be
declared unconstitutional by this Court, there must be a clear showing that a specific provision of the
fundamental law has been violated or transgressed. When there is neither a violation of a specific provision of
the Constitution nor any proof showing that there is such a violation, the presumption of constitutionality will
prevail and the law must be upheld. To doubt is to sustain.

Same; Election Law; Legislative Districts; There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a
250,000 minimum population that must compose a legislative district.—There is no specific provision in the
Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must compose a legislative district. As already
mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
coupled with what they perceive to be the intent of the framers of the Constitution to adopt a minimum
population of 250,000 for each legislative district. The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the
Constitution, succinctly provides: “Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative.” The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between
the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other.

Same; Same; Same; While Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a minimum
population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not have to increase its population by another
250,000 to be entitled to an additional district.—The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000
minimum population requirement for cities only to its initial legislative district. In other words, while Section
5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a
representative, it does not have to increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional
district. There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the creation of an additional district within
a city, should not be applied to additional districts in provinces. Indeed, if an additional legislative district
created within a city is not required to represent a population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid, neither
should such be needed for an additional district in a province, considering moreover that a province is
entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its creation and regardless of its population.

CARPIO, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Constitutional Law; Election Law; Legislative Districts; View that the assailed Republic Act No. 9716 is
unconstitutional for being utterly repugnant to the clear and precise “standards” prescribed in Section 5,

Article VI of the 1987 Constitution for the creation of legislative districts.— The assailed Republic Act No.
9716 (RA 9716) is unconstitutional for being utterly repugnant to the clear and precise “standards”
prescribed in Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution for the creation of legislative districts. Section 5(4)
of Article VI mandates that “Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the
standards” fixed in Section 5. These constitutional standards, as far as population is concerned, are: (1)
proportional representation; (2) minimum population of 250,000 per legislative district; (3) progressive ratio
in the increase of legislative districts as the population base increases; and (4) uniformity in apportionment
of legislative districts “in provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area.” The assailed RA 9716 grossly
violates these constitutional standards.

Same; Same; Same; View that to now declare that apportionment in provinces can disregard the minimum
population requirement because the Constitution speaks of a minimum population only in cities is logically
flawed, constitutionally repulsive, and fatally corrosive of the bedrock notion that this country is a
“democratic and republican State.”—To now declare, as the majority opinion holds, that apportionment in
provinces can disregard the minimum population requirement because the Constitution speaks of a minimum
population only in cities is logically flawed, constitutionally repulsive, and fatally corrosive of the bedrock
notion that this country is a “democratic and republican State.” This ruling of the majority strikes a
debilitating blow at the heart of our democratic and republican system of government.

Same; Same; Same; View that on population, the standards of the 1987 Constitution have four elements.—On
population, the standards of the 1987 Constitution have four elements. First is the rule on proportional
representation, which is the universal standard in direct representation in legislatures. Second is the rule on a
minimum population of 250,000 per legislative district, which was not present in our previous Constitutions.
Third is the rule on progressive ratio, which means that the number of legislative districts shall increase as
the number of the population increases in accordance with the rule on proportional representation. Fourth is
the rule on uniformity, which requires that the first three rules shall apply uniformly in all apportionments in
provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area.

Same; Same; Same; View that the Constitution provides for four (4) standards in the apportionment of
legislative districts as far a population is concerned.—The constitutional “standards” in the apportionment of
legislative districts under Section 5 of Article VI, as far as population is concerned, are: (1) proportional
representation; (2) a minimum “population of at least two hundred fifty thousand” per legislative district; (3)
progressive ratio in the increase of legislative districts as the population base increases; and (4) uniformity in
the apportionment of legislative districts in “provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area.”

Same; Same; Same; View that Senator Aquino’s attempt to redraw districting lines to make all five proposed
districts compliant with the minimum population requirement was thwarted chiefly for political expediency.
—Significantly, petitioner Senator Aquino’s attempt to redraw districting lines to make all five proposed
districts compliant with the minimum population requirement (and thus lessen the wide variances in
population among the districts) was thwarted chiefly for political expediency: his colleagues in the Senate
deemed the existing districts in Camarines Sur “untouchable” because “[a Congressman] is king [in his
district].” This shows a stark absence of a good faith effort to achieve a more precise proportional
representation in the redistricting under the assailed RA 9716. Clearly, RA 9716 tinkers with vote valuation,
and consequently with the constitutional standard of proportional representation, based solely on the whims
of incumbent Congressmen, an invalid standard for redistricting under Section 5 of Article VI.

Same; Same; Same; View that the Constitution mandates that the creation of legislative districts in provinces,
cities and the Metropolitan Manila area must comply with proportional representation, on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio.—The directive in Section 5(3) of Article VI that “each province, shall have at
least one representative” means only that when a province is created, a legislative district must also be
created with it. Can this district have a population below 250,000? To answer in the affirmative is to ignore
the constitutional mandate that districts in provinces be apportioned “in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio.” That the Constitution never
meant to exclude provinces from the requirement of proportional representation is evident in the opening
provision of Section 5(1), which states: The House of Representatives shall be composed of x x x members, x x
x, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio x x x.” In short, the Constitution clearly mandates that the creation of
legislative districts in provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area must comply with proportional
representation, on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio.

Same; Same; Same; View that such a grant of privileged political status is the modern day equivalent of a
royalty or nobility title, which is banned under the 1987 Constitution.—To create a special class of legislative
districts represented by a new political elite exercising more legislative power than their votes command?
Such a grant of privileged political status is the modern day equivalent of a royalty or nobility title, which is
banned under the 1987 Constitution. History will not be kind to those who embark on a grotesquely
anomalous constitutional revision that is repulsive to our ideals of a “democratic and republican State.”

Same; Same; Same; View that the ruling of the majority today could sound the death knell for the principle of
“one person, one vote” that insures equality in voting power.—The ruling of the majority today could sound
the death knell for the principle of “one person, one vote” that insures equality in voting power. All votes are
equal, and there is no vote more equal than others. This equality in voting power is the essence of our
democracy. This Court is supposed to be the last bulwark of our democracy. Sadly, here the Court, in ruling
that there are some votes more equal than others, has failed in its primordial constitutional duty to protect
the essence of our democracy.

CARPIO-MORALES, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:

Taxpayer’s Suit; Civil Procedure; Parties; View that at the initiative of a taxpayer, a statute may be nullified, on
the supposition that expenditure of public funds for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act
constitutes a misapplication of such funds.—“Transcendental importance” doctrine aside, petitioners have
the requisite locus standi. Petitioners are suing not only as lawmakers but as taxpayers and citizens as well.
At the initiative of a taxpayer, a statute may be nullified, on the supposition that expenditure of public funds
for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. Republic
Act No. 9716 (R.A. 9716) mandates the creation of another legislative district and indubitably involves the
expenditure of public funds. Civil Procedure; Legislative Districts; Parties; View that nothing in Mariano vs.
Comelec, 242 SCRA 211 (1995) reflects that the Court disregarded the 250,000 population requirement as it
merely stated that Makati’s legislative district may still be increased as long as the minimum population
requirement is met.—Nothing in Mariano reflects that the Court disregarded the 250,000 population
requirement as it merely stated that Makati’s legislative district may still be increased as long as the
minimum population requirement is met. The permissive declaration at that time presupposes that Makati
must still meet the constitutional requirements before it can have another congressional district.

Same; Same; Same; View that there is no point in asserting that population is merely an alternative addition
to the income requirement.— The Local Government Code likewise is not in point since Section 461 thereof
tackles the creation of a province and not the reapportioning of a legislative district based on increasing
population. There is thus no point in asserting that population is merely an alternative addition to the income
requirement.

Same; Same; Same; View that using anything less than 250,000 is illogical, for it would operate to allow more
than 360 representatives of legislative districts alone on some capricious basis other than the variable of
population.—Following the constitutional mandate, the population requirement cannot fall below 250,000.
This is the average “uniform and progressive ratio” that should prevail. Thus, using the present population
figure, the benchmark should be anywhere between 250,000-450,000 persons per district. Using anything
less than 250,000 is illogical, for it would operate to allow more than 360 representatives of legislative
districts alone on some capricious basis other than the variable of population.

Same; Same; Same; View that the ponencia sweepingly declares that “population was explicitly removed as a
factor,” far from it—population remains the controlling factor.—The ponencia sweepingly declares that
“population was explicitly removed as a factor.” Far from it. Population remains the controlling factor. From
the discussions in the initial apportionment and districting of Puerto Princesa, Baguio, Cavite, Laguna,
Maguindanao and Cebu in 1986, it is clear that population and contiguity were the primary considerations,
and the extraneous factors considered were circumspectly subsumed thereto.

Same; Same; Same; View that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9716 created one legislative district by reconfiguring the
first and second districts; it did not, however, touch the third and fourth districts which, when properly
reapportioned, can easily form another district.—R.A. 9716 created one legislative district by reconfiguring
the first and second districts. It did not, however, touch the third and fourth districts which, when properly
reapportioned, can easily form another district. No reasons were offered except Senator Joker Arroyo’s
during the Senate Plenary Debates on H.B. No. 4264, viz.: “When it comes to their district, congressmen are
kings. We cannot touch them. He [referring to Rep. Villafuerte] does not also want it [referring to the district
of Rep. Villafuerte] touched... even if they have a pregnant populace or inhabitants, he does not want it
touched.”

Same; Same; Same; View that linguistic difference is a weak basis to segregate the municipalities in the
redistricting.—The extraneous factors cited by the ponencia do not suffice to justify the redistricting,
particularly the inclusion of the municipality of Libmanan in the second district. Linguistic difference is a
weak basis to segregate the municipalities in the redistricting. To sanction that as basis would see a wholesale
redistricting of the entire country, given the hundreds of dialects being spoken. Imagine Binondo being
segregated from the Tagalog-speaking district of Tondo or Sta. Cruz in Manila on the ground that Fookien is
largely spoken in Binondo.

Same; Same; Same; View that the ponencia effectively opens the floodgates to opportunistic lawmakers to
reconfigure their own principalia and bantam districts.—By pronouncing that “other factors,” aside from
population, should be considered in the composition of additional districts, thereby adding other requisites
despite the Constitution’s clear limitation to population and contiguity, the ponencia effectively opens the
floodgates to opportunistic lawmakers to reconfigure their own principalia and bantam districts. Leaving
open Section 5 of Article VI to arbitrary factors, such as economic, political, socio-cultural, racial and even
religious ones, is an invitation to a free-for-all.

VICTORINO B. ALDABA, CARLO JOLETTE S. FAJARDO, JULIO G. MORADA, and MINERVA ALDABA
MORADA, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. 611 SCRA 137

Election Law; Legislative Districts; The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district,
the city must have “a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand.”—The 1987 Constitution requires
that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must have “a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand.” The only issue here is whether the City of Malolos has a population of at least 250,000, whether
actual or projected, for the purpose of creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos in time for the 10
May 2010 elections. If not, then RA 9591 creating a legislative district in the City of Malolos is
unconstitutional.

Same; Same; A city whose population has increased to 250,000 is entitled to have a legislative district only in
the “immediately following election” after the attainment of the 250,000 population.—The Certification of
Regional Director Miranda, which is based on demographic projections, is without legal effect because
Regional Director Miranda has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification. The Certification is also
void on its face because based on its own growth rate assumption, the population of Malolos will be less than
250,000 in the year 2010. In addition, intercensal demographic projections cannot be made for the entire
year. In any event, a city whose population has increased to 250,000 is entitled to have a legislative district
only in the “immediately following election” after the attainment of the 250,000 population. Same; Same;
National Statistics Office; National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB); Certifications on demographic
projection can be issued only if such projections are declared official by the National Statistics Coordination
Board (NSCB).—First, certifications on demographic projections can be issued only if such projections are
declared official by the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB). Second, certifications based on
demographic projections can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer.
Third, intercensal population projections must be as of the middle of every year.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Any population projection forming the basis for the creation of a legislative district
must be based on an official and credible source. That is why the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) cited
Executive Order No. 135 (The Guidelines on the Issuance of Certification of Population Sizes), otherwise the
population projection would be unreliable or speculative.—Executive Order No. 135 cannot simply be
brushed aside. The OSG, representing respondent Commission on Elections, invoked Executive Order No. 135
in its Comment, thus: Here, based on the NSO projection, “the population of the Municipality of Malolos will be
254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78 between 19952000.” This projection
issued by the authority of the NSO Administrator is recognized under Executive Order No. 135 (The
Guidelines on the Issuance of Certification of Population Sizes), which states: x x x (d) Certification of
population size based on projections may specify the range within which the true count is deemed likely to
fall. The range will correspond to the official low and high population projections. x x x (f) Certifications of
population size based on published census results shall be issued by the Provincial Census Officers or by the
Regional Census Officers. Certifications based on projections or estimates, however, will be issued by the NSO
Administrator or his designated certifying officer.” (Emphasis supplied) Any population projection forming
the basis for the creation of a legislative district must be based on an official and credible source. That is why
the OSG cited Executive Order No. 135, otherwise the population projection would be unreliable or
speculative.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A city must first attain the 250,000 population, and thereafter, in the immediately
following election, such city shall have a district representative.—A city that has attained a population of
250,000 is entitled to a legislative district only in the “immediately following election.” In short, a city must
first attain the 250,000 population, and thereafter, in the immediately following election, such city shall have
a district representative. There is no showing in the present case that the City of Malolos has attained or will
attain a population of 250,000, whether actual or projected, before the 10 May 2010 elections.

ABAD, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Election Law; Legislative Districts; National Statistics Office; National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB);
View that for a city to merit one representative it should have a population of at least 250,000. A province
however, is entitled to one representative no matter what its population size.—For a city to merit one
representative it should have a population of at least 250,000. A province, however, is entitled to one
representative no matter what its population size. In this case, the basis of House Bill 3696 is the certification
of the NSO that the projected population of the City of Malolos by 2010, the coming election year, will be
254,030.

Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the constitutional check against “gerrymandering,” which means the
creation of representative districts out of separate points of territory in order to favour a candidate, is found
in Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution.—The constitutional check against “gerrymandering,” which
means the creation of representative districts out of separate points of territory in order to favor a candidate,
is found in Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution. It states that “each legislative district shall comprise, as
far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory.” It should be noted, however, that this rule is
qualified by the phrase “as far as practicable.” Hence, the fact that the creation of a legislative district for
Malolos would separate the town of Bulacan from the rest of the towns comprising the first district, would
not militate against the constitutionality of R.A. 9716. This is so because there is no showing that Congress
enacted R.A. 9591 to favor the interest of any candidate. A city can aspire to have one representative who will
represent its interest in Congress.

Same; Same; Same; Same; View that as the Court held in Bagabuyo v. Commission on Elections, 573 SCRA 290
(2008), the holding of a plebiscite is not a requirement in legislative apportionment or reapportionment; A
plebiscite is necessary only in the creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of local
government units.—Contrary to petitioners’ claim, R.A. 9591 is a reapportionment bill. It does not require the
conduct of a plebiscite for its validity. As the Court held in Bagabuyo v. Commission on Elections, 573 SCRA
290 (2008), the holding of a plebiscite is not a requirement in legislative apportionment or reapportionment.
A plebiscite is necessary only in the creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of local
government units, which is not the case here.
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O. MEDINA, petitioners, vs. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, representing the President of the Philippines; Senate of the
Philippines, represented by the SENATE PRESIDENT; House of Representatives, represented by the
HOUSE SPEAKER; GOVERNOR ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS, representing the mother province of Surigao
del Norte; GOVERNOR GERALDINE ECLEO VILLAROMAN, representing the new Province of Dinagat
Islands, respondents. 612 SCRA 131

Statutory Construction; If the language of the law is plain, clear and unambiguous, courts simply apply the law
according to its express terms. If a literal application of the law results in absurdity, impossibility or injustice,
then courts may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction like the legislative history of the law, or may
consider the implementing rules and regulations and pertinent executive issuances in the nature of executive
construction.—Courts determine the intent of the law from the literal language of the law within the law’s
four corners. If the language of the law is plain, clear and unambiguous, courts simply apply the law according
to its express terms. If a literal application of the law results in absurdity, impossibility or injustice, then
courts may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction like the legislative history of the law, or may
consider the implementing rules and regulations and pertinent executive issuances in the nature of executive
construction. Constitutional Law; Local Government Units; The Constitution clearly mandates that the
creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code. Any
derogation of or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Sec. 10, Art. X
of the Constitution.—The Constitution clearly mandates that the creation of local government units must
follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code. Any derogation of or deviation from the criteria
prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.

Same; Same; Gerrymandering; Gerrymandering is a term employed to describe an apportionment of

representative districts so contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the party in power. Fr. Joaquin G.
Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, defined ‘gerrymandering’ as the formation of one
legislative district out of separate territories for the purpose of favoring a candidate or a party.
—“Gerrymandering” is a term employed to describe an apportionment of representative districts so
contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the party in power. Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, defined “gerrymandering” as the formation of one legislative district out of
separate territories for the purpose of favoring a candidate or a party. The Constitution proscribes
gerrymandering, as it mandates each legislative district to comprise, as far as practicable, a contiguous,
compact and adjacent territory.

Same; Election Laws; Plebiscite; Certiorari; Allegations of fraud and irregularities in the conduct of a
plebiscite are actual in nature; hence, they cannot be the subject of this special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which is a remedy designed only for the correction of errors of jurisdiction,
including grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.—Allegations of fraud and
irregularities in the conduct of a plebiscite are factual in nature; hence, they cannot be the subject of this
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which is a remedy designed only for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction, including grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Petitioners should have filed the proper action with the Commission on Elections. However,
petitioners admittedly chose not to avail themselves of the correct remedy.

NACHURA, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Local Governments; Where the province to be created is composed of several islands said islands need not be
contigious and need not have a land area of at least 2,000 sq. km. following Sec. 461 of the Local Government
Code (LGC).—By rough analogy, the two components are like dicephalic conjoined twins—two heads are
attached to a single body. If one head is separated from the other, then the twins die. In the same manner, the
law, by providing in paragraph (b) of Section 461 that the territory need not be contiguous if the same is
comprised of islands, must be interpreted as intended to exempt such territory from the land area component
requirement of 2,000 sq km. Because the two component requirements are inseparable, the elimination of
contiguity from the territorial criterion has the effect of a coexistent eradication of the land area component.
The territory of the province of Dinagat Islands, therefore, comprising the major islands of Dinagat and
Hibuson, and approximately 47 islets, need not be contiguous and need not have an area of at least 2,000 sq
km following Section 461 of the LGC.

Same; Same.—This interpretation of Section 461 is further in line with the law’s thrust of enabling the
territorial and political subdivisions of the state to attain their fullest development in order to make them
more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. The Philippines is composed of 7,107 islands,
most of them are small and surrounded by vast bodies of water. The constitution of provinces is aimed at
administrative efficiency, effective governance, more equitable delivery of basic services, and economic
development. If this Court is to prevent a group of islands, with skyrocketing revenues, from organizing
themselves into a province on account alone of their small aggregate land mass, then it would be impeding
their advancement as self-reliant communities and, in the process, would hamper the growth of the national
economy—an eventuality obviously not envisioned by both the Constitution and the LGC.

Constitutional Law; A party attacking the constitutionality of a law has the burden of showing that the law
constitutes a clear breach of the Constitution.—Cawaling, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 268 SCRA 453
(2001) fittingly instructs that every statute enjoys the presumption of constitutionality, owing to the doctrine
of separation of powers which imposes upon the three coordinate departments of the Government a
becoming courtesy for each other’s acts. Every law, being the joint act of the Legislature and the Executive,
has passed careful scrutiny to ensure that it is in accord with the fundamental law. Of course, the Court may,
nevertheless, declare a law, or portions thereof, unconstitutional, where a petitioner has shown that there is a
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one. Here, as
revealed in the above discussion, petitioners have not shown that Dinagat Islands does not meet the criteria
laid down in Section 461 of the LGC for thecreation of a province; thus, they cannot assert that R.A. No. 9355
clearly and unequivocally breaches Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution.

Quo Warranto; Certiorari; An action focused on the creation of a body politic must be initiated by the State by
way of quo warranto, not certiorari. —Absent a genuine constitutional issue, the petition fails in substance.
The petition also breaches procedural standards because when the inquiry is focused on the legal existence of
a body politic, the action is reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo warranto, not through a petition for
certiorari.
ANGEL G. NAVAL, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and NELSON B. JULIA, respondents. 729
SCRA 299

Constitutional Law; Republicanism; The essence of republicanism is representation and renovation, the
selection by the citizenry of a corps of public functionaries who derive their mandate from the people and act
on their behalf, serving for a limited period only, after which they are replaced or retained, at the option of
their principal.—Then Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno explained the character of a republican state and a
public office, viz.: A republic is a representative government, a government run by and for the people. It is not
a pure democracy where the people govern themselves directly. The essence of republicanism is
representation and renovation, the selection by the citizenry of a corps of public functionaries who derive
their mandate from the people and act on their behalf, serving for a limited period only, after which they are
replaced or retained, at the option of their principal. Obviously, a republican government is a responsible
government whose officials hold and discharge their position as a public trust and shall, according to the
Constitution, ‘at all times be accountable to the people’ they are sworn to serve. The purpose of a republican
government it is almost needless to state, is the promotion of the common welfare according to the will of the
people themselves.

Same; Term Limit; Our Constitution and statutes are explicit anent the existence of term limits, the nature of
public office, and the guarantee from the State that citizens shall have equal access to public service.—While
it is settled that in elections, the first consideration of every democratic polity is to give effect to the
expressed will of the majority, there are limitations to being elected to a public office. Our Constitution and
statutes are explicit anent the existence of term limits, the nature of public office, and the guarantee from the
State that citizens shall have equal access to public service. Section 8, Article X of our Constitution, on term
limits, is significantly reiterated by Section 43(b) of the LGC. Moreover, the Court has time and again declared
that a public office is a public trust and not a vested property right.

Election Law; Three-Term Limit; The drafters of our Constitution are in agreement about the possible
attendant evils if there would be no limit to reelection.—The drafters of our Constitution are in agreement
about the possible attendant evils if there would be no limit to reelection. Notwithstanding their conflicting
preferences on whether the term limit would disqualify the elected official perpetually or temporarily, they
decided that only three consecutive elections to the same position would be allowed. Thereafter, the public
official can once again vie for the same post provided there be a gap of at least one term from his or her last
election. The rule answers the need to prevent the consolidation of political power in the hands of the few,
while at the same time giving to the people the freedom to call back to public service those who are worthy to
be called statesmen. The compromise agreed upon by the drafters of our Constitution was a result of
exhaustive deliberations. The required gap after three consecutive elections is significant. Thus, the rule
cannot be taken with a grain of salt. Nothing less than its strict application is called for.

Procedural Laws and Technicality; A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention
underlying the provision under consideration.—“A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the
intention underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a
Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any,
sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the
times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to
ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the
purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant
to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.” Constitutional Law; Reapportionment; Words Phrases;
Reapportionment is “the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes in
population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation.”—
Reapportionment is “the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes in
population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation.” The aim of
legislative apportionment is to equalize population and voting power among districts. The basis for
districting shall be the number of the inhabitants of a city or a province and not the number of registered
voters therein.

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Time and again, the Court has held that a petition for certiorari against
actions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) is confined only to instances of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to patent and substantial denial of due process, because the COMELEC is presumed to be most
competent in matters falling within its domain.”—“Time and again, the Court has held that a petition for
certiorari against actions of the COMELEC is confined only to instances of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to patent and substantial denial of due process, because the COMELEC is presumed to be most
competent in matters falling within its domain.” “In a special civil action for certiorari, the burden rests on the
petitioner to prove not merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent issuing the impugned order, decision or resolution.” “Grave
abuse of discretion arises when a court or tribunal violates the Constitution, the law or existing
jurisprudence.”
BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT), petitioner,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (sitting as the National Board of Canvassers), respondent. 586 SCRA
210

Constitutional Law; Party-List System Act; In computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued
operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second
clause of Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional.—We rule that, in computing the allocation of
additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional
seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that
the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available
party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two
percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling
that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.

Same; Same; The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.”—We therefore strike
down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the
second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle
to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.”

Same; Same; Procedure in determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11
of R.A. No. 7941.—In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A.
No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed: 1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be
ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections. 2. The
parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-
list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each. 3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes,
according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated. 4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be
entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

Same; Same; The remaining available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats
reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats.—In computing the additional seats, the
guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to
every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum
seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the
absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.

Same; Same; Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in
the party-list system.—Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from
participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the
major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings.

Same; Same; By a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political
parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.—By a vote of 8-7, the Court
decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-
list elections, directly or indirectly. Those who voted to continue disallowing major political parties from the
party-list elections joined Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in his separate opinion. On the formula to allocate
party-list seats, the Court is unanimous in concurring with this ponencia.

PUNO, C.J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:

Constitutional Law; Party List System; Same; Limiting the party-list system to the marginalized and excluding
the major political parties from participating in the election of their representatives is aligned with the
constitutional mandate to reduce social, economic and political inequalities and remove cultural inequalities
by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good etc.—The harmonization of Article VI,
Section 5 with related constitutional provisions will better reveal the intent of the people as regards the
party-list system. Thus, under Section 7 of the Transitory Provisions, the President was permitted to fill by
appointment the seats reserved for sectoral representation under the party-list system from a list of
nominees submitted by the respective sectors. This was the result of historical precedents that saw how the
elected Members of the interim Batasang Pambansa and the regular Batasang Pambansa tried to torpedo
sectoral representation and delay the seating of sectoral representatives on the ground that they could not
rise to the same levelled status of dignity as those elected by the people. To avoid this bias against sectoral
representatives, the President was given all the leeway to “break new ground and precisely plant the seeds
for sectoral representation so that the sectoral representatives will take roots and be part and parcel exactly
of the process of drafting the law which will stipulate and provide for the concept of sectoral representation.”
Similarly, limiting the party-list system to the marginalized and excluding the major political parties from
participating in the election of their representatives is aligned with the constitutional mandate to “reduce
social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequalities by equitably diffusing wealth and
political power for the common good”; the right of the people and their organizations to effective and
reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making; the right of women to
opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their full potential in the service of
the nation; the right of labor to participate in policy and decisionmaking processes affecting their rights and
benefits in keeping with its role as a primary social economic force; the right of teachers to professional
advancement; the rights of indigenous cultural communities to the consideration of their cultures, traditions
and institutions in the formulation of national plans and policies, and the indispensable role of the private
sector in the national economy.

Same; Same; If we allow major political parties to participate in the party-list system electoral process, we
will surely suffocate the voice of the marginalized, frustrate their sovereignty and betray the democratic spirit
of the Constitution.—The evils that faced our marginalized and underrepresented people at the time of the
framing of the 1987 Constitution still haunt them today. It is through the party-list system that the
Constitution sought to address this systemic dilemma. In ratifying the Constitution, our people recognized
how the interests of our poor and powerless sectoral groups can be frustrated by the traditional political
parties who have the machinery and chicanery to dominate our political institutions. If we allow major
political parties to participate in the party-list system electoral process, we will surely suffocate the voice of
the marginalized, frustrate their sovereignty and betray the democratic spirit of the Constitution. That
opinion will serve as the graveyard of the party-list system.

NACHURA, J., Separate Opinion:

Constitutional Law; Party List System; Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, is not mandatory, it merely
provides a ceiling for the number of party-list seats in Congress.—It is correct to say, and I completely agree
with Veterans Federation Party, that Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, is not mandatory, that it
merely provides a ceiling for the number of party-list seats in Congress. But when the enabling law, R.A. 7941,
enacted by Congress for the precise purpose of implementing the constitutional provision, contains a
condition that places the constitutional ceiling completely beyond reach, totally impossible of realization,
then we must strike down the offending condition as an affront to the fundamental law. This is not simply an
inquiry into the wisdom of the legislative measure; rather it involves the duty of this Court to ensure that
constitutional provisions remain effective at all times. No rule of statutory construction can save a particular
legislative enactment that renders a constitutional provision inoperative and ineffectual.
BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT), petitioner,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (sitting as the National Board of Canvassers), respondent. 592 SCRA
294

Election Law; Party-List System; The filling-up of all available partylist seats is not mandatory. Actual
occupancy of the party-list seats depends on the number of participants in the party-list election.—The
filling-up of all available party-list seats is not mandatory. Actual occupancy of the party-list seats depends on
the number of participants in the party-list election. If only ten parties participated in the 2007 party-list
election, then, despite the availability of 54 seats, the maximum possible number of occupied party-list seats
would only be 30 because of the three-seat cap. In such a case, the three-seat cap prevents the mandatory
allocation of all the 54 available seats.

Same; Same; In the second round allocation of additional seats, there is no minimum vote requirement to
obtain a party-list seat because the Court has struck down the application of the 2% threshold in the
allocation of additional seats.—In the second round allocation of additional seats, there is no minimum vote
requirement to obtain a party-list seat because the Court has struck down the application of the 2% threshold
in the allocation of additional seats. Specifically, the provision in Section 11(b) of the PartyList Act stating that
“those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in the
proportion to their total number of votes” can no longer be given any effect. Otherwise, the 20 percent party-
list seats in the total membership of the House of Representatives as provided in the 1987 Constitution will
mathematically be impossible to fill up. However, a party-list organization has to obtain a sufficient number
of votes to gain a seat in the second round of seat allocation. What is deemed a sufficient number of votes is
dependent upon the circumstances of each election, such as the number of participating parties, the number
of available party-list seats, and the number of parties with guaranteed seats received in the first round of
seat allocation. To continue the example above, if only ten parties participated in the 2007 party-list election
and each party received only one thousand votes, then each of the ten parties would receive 10% of the votes
cast. All are guaranteed one seat, and are further entitled to receive two more seats in the second round of
seat allocation.

Same; Same; In the absence of minimum vote requirement in the second round of party-list seat allocation,
there is no need to belabor the disparity between the votes obtained by the first and last ranked winning
parties in the 2007 party-list elections.—In the absence of a minimum vote requirement in the second round
of party-list seat allocation, there is no need to belabor the disparity between the votes obtained by the first
and last ranked winning parties in the 2007 party-list elections. In the same manner, no one belabors the
disparity between the votes obtained by the highest and lowest ranked winners in the senatorial elections.
However, for those interested in comparing the votes received by party-list representatives vis-a-vis the
votes received by district representatives, the 162,678 votes cast in favor of TUCP, the last party to obtain a
party-list seat, is significantly higher than the votes received by 214 of the 218 elected district
representatives.

Same; Same; The allocation of seats under the party-list system is governed by the last phrase of Section 5(1),
which states that the party-list representatives shall be “those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a party-list system,” giving the Legislature wide discretion in formulating the allocation of party-list
seats.—The phrase “legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio” in Section 5(1) of Article VI requires that legislative districts shall be apportioned
according to proportional representation. However, this principle of proportional representation applies only
to legislative districts, not to the party-list system. The allocation of seats under the party-list system is
governed by the last phrase of Section 5(1), which states that the party-list representatives shall be “those
who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system,” giving the Legislature wide discretion
in formulating the allocation of party-list seats. Clearly, there is no constitutional requirement for absolute
proportional representation in the allocation of party-list seats in the House of Representatives. Section 2, on
Declaration of Policy, of R.A. No. 7941 provides that the “State shall promote proportional representation in
the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof x x x.” However, this proportional
representation in Section 2 is qualified by Section 11(b) of the same law which mandates a three-seat cap,
which is intended to bar any single party-list organization from dominating the partylist system. Section
11(b) also qualifies this proportional representation by imposing a two percent cut-off for those entitled to
the guaranteed seats. These statutory qualifications are valid because they do not violate the Constitution,
which does not require absolute proportional representation for the party-list system.

NACHURA, J., Separate Opinion:

Election Laws; Party-List System; Until Congress shall have effected an acceptable amendment to Section 11,
Republic Act No. 7941, we should abide by the sensible standard of “proportional representation” and adopt a
gradually regressive threshold vote requirement, inversely proportional to the increase in the number of
party-list seats.—Thus, we proposed that, until Congress shall have effected an acceptable amendment to
Section 11, R.A. 7941, we should abide by the sensible standard of “proportional representation” and adopt a
gradually regressive threshold vote requirement, inversely proportional to the increase in the number of
party-list seats. Expressed differently, we do not propose that Section 11 or a paragraph thereof be scrapped
for being unconstitutional. It is only the ratio of 2% that we find as unconstitutional—the steady increase in
the party-list seat allotment as it keeps pace with the creation of additional legislative districts, and the
foreseeable growth of party-list groups, the fixed 2% vote requirement/ratio is no longer viable. It does not
adequately respond to the inevitable changes that come with time; and it is, in fact, inconsistent with the
Constitution, because it prevents the fundamental law from ever being fully operative.

Same; Same; The erroneous application by the ponencia of a threshold vote (2%) in the first round of
allocation of seats, and its disregard in the second round, might cause an unintended transgression of the
equal protection clause, which requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,
both as to the rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.—The formula will not be discriminatory as it
will not only apply in the first round of allocation of seats, but will also be applicable in the second round.
While I do not wish to belabor the point, the erroneous application by the ponencia of a threshold vote (2%)
in the first round of allocation of seats, and its disregard in the second round, might cause an unintended
transgression of the equal protection clause, which requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to the rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Thus, as I have
expressed before, with respect to the fixed threshold vote of 2% (only the ratio) in Section 11 of R.A. No.
7941, I join the Court in declaring it unconstitutional, since all enactments inconsistent with the Constitution
should be invalidated.

ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent. 694 SCRA 477
Election Law; Party-List System; The party-list system is intended to democratize political power by giving
political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the House of
Representatives.—The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the partylist system of representation. Simply
put, the party-list system is intended to democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot win
in legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. The voter elects two
representatives in the House of Representatives: one for his or her legislative district, and another for his or
her party-list group or organization of choice.

Same; Same; The framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the partylist system to include not only sectoral
parties but also non-sectoral parties. —Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-
list system to include not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the
sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system. As explained by
Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can participate in the party-list system “[F]or as long as
they field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this
Constitution.”

Same; Same; The common denominator between sectoral and nonsectoral parties is that they cannot expect
to win in legislative district elections but they can garner, in nationwide elections, at least the same number of
votes that winning candidates can garner in legislative district elections.—The common denominator
between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that they cannot expect to win in legislative district elections but
they can garner, in nationwide elections, at least the same number of votes that winning candidates can
garner in legislative district elections. The party-list system will be the entry point to membership in the
House of Representatives for both these non-traditional parties that could not compete in legislative district
elections.

Same; Same; The party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or
organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.—What the
framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section 5(1), could not be any clearer: the party-list
system is composed of three different groups, and the sectoral parties belong to only one of the three groups.
The text of Section 5(1) leaves no room for any doubt that national and regional parties are separate from
sectoral parties. Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or
organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. National and
regional parties or organizations are different from sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional
parties or organizations need not be organized along sectoral lines and need not represent any particular
sector.

Same; Same; “Political Party” and “Sectoral Party,” Distinguished.— Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a
“party” as “either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.” Clearly, a political party is
different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides that a “political party refers to
an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general
conduct of government.” On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a “sectoral party
refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose
principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.” R.A. No. 7941 provides
different definitions for a political and a sectoral party. Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each
other.

Same; Same; Republic Act No. 7941; R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or
organizations to represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” sectors.—R.A. No. 7941 does not
require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the “marginalized and underrepresented”
sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the party-list system to represent the
“marginalized and underrepresented” is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-
oriented parties from the party-list system. How will these ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who
cannot win in legislative district elections, participate in the electoral process if they are excluded from the
party-list system? To exclude them from the party-list system is to prevent them from joining the
parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-list

system is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent and express wording of
the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented
political party is clearly different from a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral
party and need not represent any particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national
or regional political party must represent a “marginalized and underrepresented” sector. It is sufficient that
the political party consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same governance
principles and policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens.

Same; Same; Same; The economically “marginalized and underrepresented” are those who fall in the low
income group as classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board.—The phrase “marginalized and
underrepresented” should refer only to the sectors in Section 5 that are, by their nature, economically
“marginalized and underrepresented.” These sectors are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other similar sectors. For these sectors,
a majority of the members of the sectoral party must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented.” The
nominees of the sectoral party either must belong to the sector, or must have a track record of advocacy for
the sector represented. Belonging to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector does not mean one
must “wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity.” It is sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is below the
middle class. More specifically, the economically “marginalized and underrepresented” are those who fall in
the low income group as classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board.

Same; Same; Same; Major political parties can participate in subsequent party-list elections since the
prohibition is expressly limited only to the 1988 party-list elections.—Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly
prohibited the “first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of
Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress” from participating in the May 1988 party-list elections.
Thus, major political parties can participate in subsequent party-list elections since the prohibition is
expressly limited only to the 1988 party-list elections. However, major political parties should participate in
party-list elections only through their sectoral wings. The participation of major political parties through
their sectoral wings, a majority of whose members are “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in
“well-defined political constituencies,” will facilitate the entry of the “marginalized and underrepresented”
and those who “lack well-defined political constituencies” as members of the House of Representatives.

Same; Same; Same; The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate in
party-list elections so as to encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the
“marginalized and underrepresented” and to those who “lack well-defined political constituencies.”—The
1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate in party-list elections so as to
encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the “marginalized and
underrepresented” and to those who “lack well-defined political constituencies.” The participation of major
political parties in party-list elections must be geared towards the entry, as members of the House of
Representatives, of the “marginalized and underrepresented” and those who “lack well-defined political
constituencies,” giving them a voice in lawmaking. Thus, to participate in party-list elections, a major political
party that fields candidates in the legislative district elections must organize a sectoral wing, like a labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, professional, women or youth wing, that can register under the party-list
system. Such sectoral wing of a major political party must have its own constitution, bylaws, platform or
program of government, officers and members, a majority of whom must belong to the sector represented.
The sectoral wing is in itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a major political party through a
coalition. This linkage is allowed by Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941, which provides that “component parties or
organizations of a coalition may participate independently (in party-list elections) provided the coalition of
which they form part does not participate in the party-list system.”

Same; Same; Same; A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he or
she seeks to represent. In the case of sectoral parties, to be a bona fide party-list nominee one must either
belong to the sector represented, or have a track record of advocacy for such sector.—Section 9 of R.A. No.
7941 prescribes the qualifications of party-list nominees. This provision prescribes a special qualification
only for the nominee from the youth sector. Section 9. Qualifications of PartyList Nominees.—No person shall
be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered
voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of
the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to
represent for atleast ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years
of age on the day of the election. In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25)
but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who
attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his
term. A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he or she seeks to
represent. In the case of sectoral parties, to be a bona fide party-list nominee one must either belong to the
sector represented, or have a track record of advocacy for such sector.

SERENO, C.J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:

Election Law; Party-List System; View that the place of the party-list system in the constitutional scheme was
that it provided for the realization of the ideals on social justice in the political arena.—The place of the
party-list system in the constitutional scheme was that it provided for the realization of the ideals on social
justice in the political arena. The concept is not new, as discussed by political theorist Terry MacDonald: First,
an idea that has received much attention among democratic theorists is that representatives should be
selected to ‘mirror’ the characteristics of those being represented—in terms of gender, ethnicity, and other
such characteristics judged to be socially relevant. This idea has been advocated most notably in some recent
democratic debates focused on the need for special representation of disadvantaged and underrepresented
social groups within democratic assemblies. The applicability of this idea of ‘mirror’ representation is not
confined to debates about representing marginalized minorities within nation-states; Iris Young further
applies this model of representation to global politics, arguing that global representation should be based on
representation of the various ‘peoples’ of the world, each of which embodies its own distinctive identity and
‘perspective’. In practice, special representation for certain social groups within a ‘mirror’ framework can be
combined with election mechanisms” in various ways—such as by according quotas of elected
representatives to designated social groups. But since the selection of these ‘social groups’ for special
representation would nonetheless remain a distinct element of the process of selecting legitimate
representatives, occurring prior to the electoral process, such ‘mirror’ representation is still recognizable as a
distinct mechanism for selecting representative agents.

Same; Same; Principle of Subordinate Legislation; View that the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the
laws, the rigidity of the theory of separation of governmental powers is largely responsible in empowering
the COMELEC to not only execute elections laws, but also promulgate certain rules and regulations calculated
to promote public interest.—Flexibility of our laws is a key factor in reinforcing the stability of our
Constitution, because the legislature is certain to find it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate
situations that may be met in carrying laws into effect. The growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the
laws, the rigidity of the theory of separation of governmental powers is largely responsible in empowering
the COMELEC to not only execute elections laws, but also promulgate certain rules and regulations calculated
to promote public interest. This is the principle of subordinate legislation discussed in People v. Rosenthal
and in Pangasinan Transportation vs. Public Service Commission.

Same; Same; View that the disqualification of a party-list group due to the disqualification of its nominee is
only reasonable if based on material misrepresentations regarding the nominee’s qualifications.—I propose
the view that the disqualification of a party-list group due to the disqualification of its nominee is only
reasonable if based on material misrepresentations regarding the nominee’s qualifications. Otherwise, the
disqualification of a nominee should not disqualify the party-list group provided that: (1) it meets Guideline
Nos. 1-5 of Ang Bagong Bayani (alternately, on the basis of the new parameters set in the ponencia, that they
validly qualify as national, regional or sectoral party-list group); and (2) one of its top three (3) nominees
remains qualified, for reasons explained below. The constitutional policy is to enable Filipinos belonging to
the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit them. Consistent
therewith, R.A. No. 7941 provides that the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party-list
system that would achieve proportional representation in the House of Representatives by enhancing party-
list groups’ “chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature.” Because of this policy, I believe that the
COMELEC cannot interpret Section 6 (5) of R.A. No. 7941 as a grant of purely administrative, quasi-legislative
or quasi-judicial power to ipso facto disqualify party-list groups based on the disqualification of a single
nominee.

Same; Same; View that any disqualification of a party-list group based on the disqualification of its nominee
must be based on a material misrepresentation regarding that nominee’s qualifications.—It should also be
pointed out that the law itself considers a violation of election laws as a disqualifying circumstance. However,
for an act or omission to be considered a violation of election laws, it must be demonstrative of gross and
willful disregard of the laws or public policy. The standard cannot be less for the rules and regulations issued
by the COMELEC. Thus, any disqualification of a party-list group based on the disqualification of its nominee
must be based on a material misrepresentation regarding that nominee’s qualifications. This also finds
support in Section 6 (6) of R.A. No. 7941 which considers declaring “untruthful statements in its petition” as a
ground for disqualification.

Same; Same; View that party-list groups should have at least one qualified nominee among its top three
nominees for it to be allowed to participate in the elections.—Party-list groups should have at least one
qualified nominee among its top three nominees for it to be allowed to participate in the elections. This is
because if all of its top three nominees are disqualified, even if its registration is not cancelled and is thus
allowed to participate in the elections, and should it obtain the required number-of votes to win a seat, it
would still have no one to represent it, because the law does not allow the group to replace its disqualified
nominee through substitution. This is a necessary consequence of applying Sections 13 in relation to Section
8 of R.A. No. 7941.

Same; Same; View that only in case of death, incapacity, or withdrawal does the law allow a party-list group to
change the ranking of its nominees in the list it initially submitted.—Only in case of death, incapacity, or
withdrawal does the law allow a party-list group to change the ranking of its nominees in the list it initially
submitted. The ranking of the nominees is changed through, substitution, which according to Section 8 is
done by placing the name of the substitute at the end of the list. In this case, all the names that come after the
now vacant slot will move up the list. After substitution takes effect, the new list with the new ranking will be
used by COMELEC to determine who among the nominees of the party-list group shall be proclaimed, from
the first to the last, in accordance with Section 13.

Same; Same; View that if any/some of the nominees is/are disqualified, no substitution will be allowed; This
means that if the first nominee is disqualified, and the party-list group is able to join the elections and
becomes entitled to one representative, the second cannot take the first nominee’s place and represent the
party-list group.—If any/some of the nominees is/are disqualified, no substitution will be allowed. Thus, their
ranking remains the same and should therefore be respected by the COMELEC in determining the one/s that
will represent the winning partylist group in Congress. This means that if the first nominee is disqualified,
and the party-list group is able to join the elections and becomes entitled to one representative, the second
cannot take the first nominee’s place and represent the party-list group. If, however, the party-list group gets
enough votes to be entitled to two seats, then the second nominee can represent it.

Same; Same; View that the primary purpose of an election case is the ascertainment of the real candidate
elected by the electorate.—In Panlilio v. Commission on Elections, 593 SCRA 139 (2009), it was also held that
the primary purpose of an election case is the ascertaimnent of the real candidate elected by the electorate.
Thus, there must first be an election before there can be an election case. Since the national and local
elections are still to be held on 13 May 2013, the conduct of automatic review and summary evidentiary
hearing under the Resolution No. 9513 cannot be an election case. For this reason, a prior motion for
reconsideration under Section 3, is not required.

BRION, J., Separate Concurring Opinion:

Election Law; Party-List System; View that the party-list system came into being, principally driven by the
constitutional framers’ intent to reform the then prevailing electoral system by giving marginal and
underrepresented parties.—The party-list system came into being, principally driven by the constitutional
framers’ intent to reform the then prevailing electoral system by giving marginal and underrepresented
parties (i.e. those who cannot win in the legislative district elections and in this sense are marginalized and
may lack the constituency to elect themselves there, but who—nationally—may generate votes equivalent to
what a winner in the legislative district election would garner) the chance to participate in the electoral
exercise and to elect themselves to the House of Representatives through a system other than the legislative
district elections.

Same; Same; View that major political parties, if they participate in the legislative district elections, cannot
participate in the party-list elections, nor can they form a coalition with party-list parties and run as a
coalition in the party-list elections.—Major political parties, if they participate in the legislative district
elections, cannot participate in the party-list elections, nor can they form a coalition with party-list parties
and run as a coalition in the party-list elections. A coalition is a formal party participant in the party-list
system; what the party-list system forbids directly (i.e., participation in both electoral arenas), the major
political parties cannot do indirectly through a coalition. No prohibition, however, exists against informal
alliances that they can form with party-list parties, organizations or groups running for the party-list
elections. The party-list component of these informal alliances is not prohibited from running in the party-list
elections.

Same; Same; View that a nominee who does not actually possess the marginalized and underrepresented
status represented by the party-list group but proves to be a genuine advocate of the interest and concern of
the marginalized and underrepresented sector represented is still qualified to be a nominee.—Considering
the Constitution’s solicitous concern for the marginalized and underrepresented sectors as understood in the
social justice context, and RA 7941’s requirement of mere bona fide membership of a nominee in the party-
list group, a nominee who does not actually possess the marginalized and underrepresented status
represented by the party-list group but proves to be a genuine advocate of the interest and concern of the
marginalized and underrepresented sector represented is still qualified to be a nominee. This classification of
nominees, however, is relevant only to sectoral parties and organizations which are marginalized and
underrepresented in the social justice sense or in terms of their special interests, concerns or characteristics.
To be consistent with the sectoral representation envisioned by the framers, a majority of the members of the
party must actually belong to the sector represented, while nominees must be a member of the sectoral party
or organization. Since political parties are identified by their ideology or platform of government, bona fide
membership, in accordance with the political party’s constitution and bylaws, would suffice.

Same; Same; View that as a basic constitutional point, the business and principal function of the Supreme
Court (and of the whole Judiciary) is not to create policy or to supplant what the Constitution and the law
expressly provide.—As a basic constitutional point, the business and principal function of this Court (and of
the whole Judiciary) is not to create policy or to supplant what the Constitution and the law expressly
provide. The framers of the Constitution and Congress (through RA No. 7941 in this case) provided the policy
expressed through the words of the Constitution and the law, and through the intents the framers; both were
considered and cited to ensure that the constitutional policy is properly read and understood. The whole
Judiciary, including this Court, can only apply these policies in the course of their assigned task of
adjudication without adding anything of our own; we can interpret the words only in case of ambiguity. This
Court and its Members cannot likewise act as advocates, even for social justice or for any ideology for that
matter, as advocacy is not the task assigned to us by the Constitution. To play the role of advocates, or to
formulate policies that fall within the role of the Legislative Branch of government, would be a violation of our
sworn duty.

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; View that for the writ of certiorari to issue, the Rules of Court
expressly require that the tribunal must have acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.—For the writ of certiorari to issue, the Rules
of Court expressly require that the tribunal must have acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The requisite grave abuse of discretion
is in keeping with the office of the writ of certiorari; its function is to keep the tribunal within the bounds of
its jurisdiction under the Constitution and law. The term grave abuse of discretion, while it defies exact
definition, generally refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction; the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or
a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.

Same; Civil Procedure; Courts; Supreme Court; View that in the adjudication of a case with constitutional
dimensions, it is the letter and the spirit of the Constitution itself that reign supreme.—It should be
considered, too, that in the adjudication of a case with constitutional dimensions, it is the letter and the spirit
of the Constitution itself that reign supreme. The Court’s previous ruling on a matter serves as a guide in the
resolution of a similar matter in the future, but this prior ruling cannot inflexibly bind the Court in its future
actions. As the highest Court in our judicial hierarchy, the Court cannot tie its hands through its past actions,
particularly when the Constitution is involved; it is invested with the innate authority to rule according to
what it sees best in its role as guardian of the Constitution.

Election Law; Party-List System; Prospectivity of Laws; View that by ordering the remand of all the petitions
to the COMELEC and for the latter to act in accordance with the new ruling laid down by the Court—i.e.,
allowing political parties to participate in the party-list elections without need of proving that they are
“marginalized and underrepresented” (as this term is understood in Ang Bagong Bayani), and in recognizing
that a genuine advocate of a sectoral party or organization may be validly included in the list of nominees—
the Court would not be violating the principle of prospectivity.—By ordering the remand of all the petitions to
the COMELEC and for the latter to act in accordance with the new ruling laid down by the Court—i.e.,
allowing political parties to participate in the party-list elections without need of proving that they are
“marginalized and underrepresented” (as this term is understood in Ang Bagong Bayani), and in recognizing
that a genuine advocate of a sectoral party or organization may be validly included in the list of nominees—
the Court would not be violating the principle of prospectivity. The rationale behind the principle of
prospectivity—both in the application of law and of judicial decisions enunciating new doctrines—is the
protection of vested rights and the obligation of contracts. When a new ruling overrules a prior ruling, the
prospective application of the new ruling is made in favor of parties who have relied in good faith on the prior
ruling under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non respicit.

Same; Same; View that in March 1995, Congress enacted RA No. 7941, the Party-List System Act, as the law
that would implement the party-list election scheduled for May 1998.—In March 1995, Congress enacted RA
No. 7941, the Party-List System Act, as the law that would implement the party-list election scheduled for
May 1998. The law at the same time fleshed out the mechanics for party-list elections, in accordance with the
terms of the Constitution. The law specifically provided for: a. a declaration of the policy behind the law; b. a
definition of terms, specifically defining the terms national, political, regional, and sectoral parties, and their
coalitions; c. the requisites and terms for registration; the grounds for refusal and cancellation of registration;
and the certified list of registered parties; d. the nomination and qualification for party-list representatives; e.
the manner of voting; f. the number and procedure for the allocation of party-list representatives; and g. the
proclamation of the winning party-list representatives, their term of office; the limitation on their change of
affiliation; their rights; and the provisions in case of vacancy.

Same; Same; View that the aim of the party-list provision, Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, is
principally to reform the then existing electoral system by adding a new system of electing the members of
the House of Representatives.—The aim of the party-list provision, Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, is
principally to reform the then existing electoral system by adding a new system of electing the members of
the House of Representatives. The innovation is a party-list system that would expand opportunities for
electoral participation to allow those who could not win in the legislative district elections a fair chance to
enter the House of Representatives other than through the district election system.

Same; Same; View that the members of the House of Representatives under the party-list system are those
who would be elected, as provided by law, thus, plainly leaving the mechanics of the system to future
legislation. —The members of the House of Representatives under the party-list system are those who would
be elected, as provided by law, thus, plainly leaving the mechanics of the system to future legislation. They are
likewise constitutionally identified as the registered national, regional, sectoral parties and organizations, and
are the party-list groupings to be voted under the party-list system under a free and open party system that
should be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people within the limits of the Constitution.
From the perspective of the law, this party structure and system would hopefully foster proportional
representation that would lead to the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens: (1) who
belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and (2) who lack well-
defined constituencies; but (3) who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. The key words in this policy are “proportional
representation,” “marginalized and underrepresented,” and “lack of well-defined constituencies.”

Same; Same; View that as the constitutional debates and voting show, what the framers envisioned was a
multiparty system that already includes sectoral representation.—As the constitutional debates and voting
show, what the framers envisioned was a multiparty system that already includes sectoral representation.
Both sectoral representation and multiparty-system under our party-list system are concepts that
comfortably fall within this vision of a Filipino-style party-list system. Thus, both the text and spirit of the
Constitution do not support an interpretation of exclusive sectoral representation under the party-list
system; what was provided was an avenue for the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to participate
in the electoral system—it is an invitation for these sectors to join and take a chance on what democracy and
republicanism can offer.

Same; Same; View that the nominee is supposed to carry out the ideals and concerns of the party-list group to
which he/she belongs; to the electorate, he/she embodies the causes and ideals of the party-list group.— The
nominee is supposed to carry out the ideals and concerns of the partylist group to which he/she belongs; to
the electorate, he/she embodies the causes and ideals of the party-list group. However, unlike the political
parties’ official candidates—who can, for whatever reason, disaffiliate from his party and run as an
independent candidate—the linkage between a nominee and his party-list group is actually a one-way mirror
relationship. The nominee can only see (and therefore run) through the party-list group but the party-list
group can see beyond the nominee-member.

Same; Same; View that what the 1987 constitutional framers simply wanted, by way of electoral reform, was
to “open up” the electoral system by giving more participation to those who could not otherwise participate
under the then existing system.—What the 1987 constitutional framers simply wanted, by way of electoral
reform, was to “open up” the electoral system by giving more participation to those who could not otherwise
participate under the then existing system—those who were marginalized in the legislative district elections
because they could not be elected in the past for lack of the required votes and specific constituency in the
winner-takeall legislative district contest, and who, by the number of votes they garnered as 3rd or 4th placer
in the district elections, showed that nationally, they had the equivalent of what the winner in the legislative
district would garner. This was the concept of “marginalized and underrepresented” and the “lack of political
constituency” that came out in the constitutional deliberations and led to the present wordings of the
Constitution. RA No. 7941 subsequently faithfully reflected these intents.

REYES, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:

Election Law; Commission on Elections (COMELEC); View that under the present Constitution, the COMELEC
is recognized as the sole authority in the enforcement and administration of election laws.—Under the
present Constitution, the COMELEC is recognized as the sole authority in the enforcement and administration
of election laws. This grant of power retraces its history in the 1935 Constitution. From then, the powers and
functions of the COMELEC had continuously been expounded to respond to the call of contemporary times.

Same; Same; View that essentially, the COMELEC has general and specific powers. Section 2(1) of Article IX-C
partakes of the general grant of the power to the COMELEC to “enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall.”—Essentially,
the COMELEC has general and specific powers. Section 2(1) of Article IX-C partakes of the general grant of the
power to the COMELEC to “enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall.” The authority given to the COMELEC under this
provision encapsulates all the other powers granted to it under the Constitution. The intention in providing
this general grant of power is to give the COMELEC a wide latitude in dealing with matters under its
jurisdiction so as not to unduly delimit the performance of its functions. Undoubtedly, the text and intent of
this constitutional provision is to give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the
objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. The rest of the enumeration in the
mentioned provision constitutes the COMELEC’s specific powers.
Same; Same; View that the COMELEC does not simply register every party, organization or coalition that
comes to its office and manifests its intent to participate in the elections. Registration entails the possession
of qualifications. The party seeking registration must first present its qualifications before registration will
follow as a matter of course.—The power to register political parties, however, is not a mere clerical exercise.
The COMELEC does not simply register every party, organization or coalition that comes to its office and
manifests its intent to participate in the elections. Registration entails the possession of qualifications. The
party seeking registration must first present its qualifications before registration will follow as a matter of
course. Similar with all the specific powers of the COMELEC, the power to register political parties,
organizations and coalitions must be understood as an implement by which its general power to enforce and
administer election laws is being realized. The exercise of this power must thus be construed in a manner that
will aid the COMELEC in fulfilling its duty of ensuring that the electoral exercise is held exclusive to those who
possess the qualifications set by the law.

Same; Party-List System; View that consistent with the principle that the right to hold public office is a
privilege, it is incumbent upon aspiring participants in the party-list system of representation to satisfactorily
show that they have the required qualifications stated in the law and prevailing jurisprudence.—Consistent
with the principle that the right to hold public office is a privilege, it is incumbent upon aspiring participants
in the partylist system of representation to satisfactorily show that they have the required qualifications
stated in the law and prevailing jurisprudence. Specifically, a party-list group or organization applying for
registration in the first instance must present sufficient evidence to establish its qualifications. It is only upon
proof of possession of qualifications that registration follows. The process, however, does not end with
registration. Party-list groups and organizations that are previously allowed registration and/or accreditation
are duty-bound to maintain their qualifications.

Same; Same; View that similar to individual candidates, registered party-list groups, organizations and
coalitions must also establish their continuing compliance with the requirements of the law which are specific
to those running under the party-list system of representation. Registration does not vest them the perpetual
right to participate in the election.—The fact that a candidate was previously allowed to run or hold public
office does not exempt him from establishing his qualifications once again in case he bids for reelection. He
must maintain and attest to his qualifications every time he is minded to join the electoral race. Thus, he is
required to file a certificate of candidacy even if he is an incumbent elective official or previously a candidate
in the immediately preceding elections. Similar to individual candidates, registered party-list groups,
organizations and coalitions must also establish their continuing compliance with the requirements of the law
which are specific to those running under the party-list system of representation. Registration does not vest
them the perpetual right to participate in the election. The basis of the right to participate in the elections
remains to be the possession of qualifications. Resolution No. 9513 is a formal recognition of the COMELEC’s
duty to ensure that only those who are qualified must be allowed to run as party-list representative. It cannot
be defeated by a claim of previous registration.

Same; Same; Commission on Elections (COMELEC); Res Judicata; View that the COMELEC cannot be
precluded from reviewing pending registration and existing registration and/or accreditation of party-list
groups, organizations and coalitions on the ground of res judicata. It has been repeatedly cited in a long line
of jurisprudence that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to
the exercise of administrative powers.—The COMELEC cannot be precluded from reviewing pending
registration and existing registration and/or accreditation of party-list groups, organizations and coalitions
on the ground of res judicata. It has been repeatedly cited in a long line of jurisprudence that the doctrine of
res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative powers.
Moreover, the application of the doctrine of res judicata requires the concurrence of four (4) elements, viz.:
(1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) it must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it
was rendered after aconsideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties during the trial of
the case; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter and
causes of action.

Same; Same; View that the party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to the
great masses of our people who have less in life, but also to enable them to become veritable lawmakers
themselves, empowered to participate directly in the enactment of laws designed to benefit them.—The
party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to the great masses of our people
who have less in life, but also to enable them to become veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to
participate directly in the enactment of laws designed to benefit them. It is not simply a mechanism for
electoral reform. To simply regard it as a mere procedure for reforming the already working and existing
electoral system is a superficial reading of RA 7941 and the Constitution, from which the law breathed life.
The idea is that by promoting the advancement of the underprivileged and allowing them an opportunity to
grow, they can rise to become partners of the State in pursuing greater causes.

Same; Same; View that considering that the provisions on party-list system of representation are not self-
executing, the Congress enacted RA 7941.—Considering that the provisions on party-list system of
representation are not self-executing, the Congress enacted RA 7941. The said law defined the parameters of
the party-list system, the procedural guidelines and the qualifications of those intending to participate in the
exercise. In enacting RA 7941, the legislature did not mean to depart from the impetus which impelled the
members of the Constitutional Commission to provide for this scheme of representation—social justice. The
underlying principle remains to be the reduction of political inequality by equitably diffusing wealth and
political power. Certainly, there could be no other intended beneficiaries for this provision than the
powerless and underprivileged. It could not have been intended for those who already have the power and
resources who may be lesser in number but are in command of the machinery of the government.

Same; Same; View that the intent of the Constitution to keep the partylist system exclusive to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors is then crystal clear. To hold otherwise is to frustrate the spirit of
the law and the sacred intention to hold inviolable the safeguards of social justice embedded in the
Constitution.—The intent of the Constitution to keep the party-list system exclusive to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors is then crystal clear. To hold otherwise is to frustrate the spirit of the law and the
sacred intention to hold inviolable the safeguards of social justice embedded in the Constitution. In the same
line, RA 7941 must not be interpreted as merely a mode for electoral reform. It could not have been that too
simplistic. Far from being merely an electoral reform, the party-list system is one concrete expression of the
primacy of social justice in the Constitution. It is well to remember that RA 7941 was only implementing the
specific mandate of the Constitution in Section 5, Article VI. It should not be disengaged from the purpose of
its enactment. The purpose of the mentioned provision was not simply to reform the electoral system but to
initiate the equitable distribution of political power. It aims to empower the larger portion of the populace
who sulk in poverty and injustice by giving them a chance to participate in legislation and advance their
causes.

Same; Same; View that a marginalized and underrepresented sector is a group of individuals who, by reason
of status or condition, are drawn towards the bottom of the social strata.—RA 7941 gives emphasis on the
requirement that the party, organization or coalition must represent a marginalized and underrepresented
sector. A marginalized and underrepresented sector is a group of individuals who, by reason of status or
condition, are drawn towards the bottom of the social strata. Remote from the core of institutional power,
their necessities are often neglected and relegated to the least of the government’s priorities. They endure
inadequacies in provisions and social services and are oftentimes victims of economic, social and political
inequalities.

Same; Same; View that while a party-list group is allowed to represent various sectors, it must prove,
however, that it is able to address the multifarious interests and concerns of all the sectors it represents.—It
is likewise imperative for the party-list group to show that it effectively represents the marginalized and
underrepresented. While a party-list group is allowed to represent various sectors, it must prove, however,
that it is able to address the multifarious interests and concerns of all the sectors it represents. That a multi-
sectoral party-list group undertakes projects and activities that only address the interests of some of the
sectors, neglecting the concerns of the other marginalized and underrepresented sectors it supposedly
represents, is nugatory to the objective of giving a meaningful and effective representation to the
marginalized and underrepresented.

Same; Same; View that the majority of the membership of the party-list group, organization or coalition
belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector. This means that a majority of the members of the
sector must actually possess the attribute which makes the sector marginalized.—Equally important is that
the majority of the membership of the party-list group, organization or coalition belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented sector. This means that a majority of the members of the sector must actually possess
the attribute which makes the sector marginalized. This is so because the primary reason why party-list
groups are even allowed to participate in the elections of the members of the House of Representatives, who
are normally elected by district, is to give a collective voice to the members of the sectors who are oftentimes
unheard or neglected. This intention is put to naught if at least the majority of the members of the party-list
do not belong to the same class or sector. Thus, it is incumbent upon the party-list applicant to present all the
evidence necessary to establish this fact. Without a convincing proof of legitimate membership of a majority
of the marginalized, the COMELEC has no reason to believe otherwise and may thus deny a petition for
registration or cancel an existing registration.

Same; Same; View that political parties shall only be allowed to participate in the party-list system if they do
not field candidates in the election of legislative district representatives.—I, however, agree with the view of
the majority that it is unjustified to absolutely disqualify from the party-list system the major political parties
solely by reason of their classification as such. Nonetheless, the privilege to be accorded to them shall not be
without reasonable restrictions. Political parties shall only be allowed to participate in the party-list system if
they do not field candidates in the election of legislative district representatives. The justification therefor is
reasonable. The party-list system was adopted by the state purposely to enable parties which, by their limited
resources and citizens base per district, find difficulty in placing representatives in Congress. Major political
parties that field candidates for district representatives can do so with ease, given that they satisfy the
standards set by Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, for their classification, to wit:
(a) the established record of the said parties, coalition of groups that now compose them, taking into account,
among other things, their showing in past elections; (b) the number of incumbent elective officials belonging
to them ninety (90) days before the election; (c) their identifiable political organizations and strengths as
evidenced by their organized chapters; (d) the ability to fill a complete slate of candidates from the municipal
level to the position of the President; and (e) other analogous circumstances that may determine their
relative organizations and strengths.

Same; Same; View that the move to open the party-list system free-forall will create a dangerous precedent as
it will open the doors even to illegitimate organizations.—The move to open the party-list system freefor-all
will create a dangerous precedent as it will open the doors even to illegitimate organizations. Organizations
aspiring to join the party-list election can simply skirt the law and organize themselves as a political party to
take advantage of the more lenient entrance. The organization need only to register as a political party to
dispense with the stringent requirement of representing a sector. It will automatically be off the hook from
the danger of being disqualified on the ground that it is not representing a marginalized and
underrepresented sector. Other organizations, even those organized as sectoral parties, may follow through
and may even disrobe themselves as sectoral parties and opt to become political parties instead because it is
the easier way to be allowed participation in the party-list elections. Thus, once again, the causes of the
marginalized and underrepresented are lagged behind.

Same; Same; View that owing to the peculiarity of the party-list system of representation, it is not required
that the nominee be a resident or a registered voter of a particular district since it is the party-list group that
is voted for and not the appointed nominees.—Except for a few, the basic qualifications of the nominee are
practically the same as those required of individual candidates for election to the House of Representatives.
He must be: (a) a natural-born citizen; (b) a registered voter; (c) a resident of the Philippines for a period of
not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; (d) able to read and write; (e) bona
fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days before the
day of election; (f) at least twenty five (25) years of age on the day of election; (g) in case of a nominee for the
youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of
election. Owing to the peculiarity of the party-list system of representation, it is not required that the
nominee be a resident or a registered voter of a particular district since it is the party-list group that is voted
for and not the appointed nominees. He must, however, be a bona fide member of the party-list group at least
ninety (90) days before the elections.

Same; Same; View that aside from the qualifications similarly required of candidates seeking to represent
their respective districts, the nominee is required to be a bona fide member of the party, a status he acquires
when he enters into the membership of the organization for at least ninety (90) days before the election.—To
be consistent with the letter of the law, it must be harmonized with Section 9 of RA 7941, the specific
provision dealing with the qualifications of the nominee. In the mentioned provision, aside from the
qualifications similarly required of candidates seeking to represent their respective districts, the nominee is
required to be a bona fide member of the party, a status he acquires when he enters into the membership of
the organization for at least ninety (90) days before the election. From the point in time when the person
acquires the status of being a bona fide member, he becomes one “belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector.” It is my view that the foregoing interpretation accommodates two (2) types of
nominees: 1. One who actually shares the attribute or characteristic which makes the sector marginalized or
underrepresented (the first type); 2. An advocate or one who is genuinely and actively promoting the causes
of the sector he wishes to represent (the second type).

Same; Same; View that there are instances when one or some of the nominees are disqualified to represent
the group but this should not automatically result to the disqualification of the latter. To hold otherwise is to
accord the nominees the same significance which the law holds for the party-list groups of the marginalized
and underrepresented.—Indeed, there are instances when one or some of the nominees are disqualified to
represent the group but this should not automatically result to the disqualification of the latter. To hold
otherwise is to accord the nominees the same significance which the law holds for the party-list groups of the
marginalized and underrepresented. It is worthy to emphasize that the formation of party-list groups
organized by the marginalized and underrepresented and their participation in the process of legislation is
the essence of the party-list system of representation. Consistent with the purpose of the law, it is still the fact
that the party-list group satisfied the qualifications of the law that is material to consider. That one or some of
its chosen agents failed to satisfy the qualifications for the position should not unreasonably upset the
existence of an otherwise legitimate party-list group. The disqualification of the nominees must simply be
regarded as failure to qualify for an office or position. It should not, in any way, blemish the qualifications of
the party-list group itself with defect.

Same; Same; View that the selection of nominees depends upon the choice of the members of the party-list
group. It is a matter which cannot be legislated and is solely dependent upon the will of the party.—It is
worth emphasizing that the selection of nominees depends upon the choice of the members of the party-list
group. It is a matter which cannot be legislated and is solely dependent upon the will of the party. More often
than not, the choice of nominees is grounded on trust and confidence, not on the vague or abstract concepts of
qualifications under the law. The method or process by which the members of the party-list group choose
their nominees is a matter internal to them. No set of rules or guidelines can be imposed upon them by the
Court or the COMELEC in selecting their representatives lest we be charged of unnecessarily disrupting a
democratic process.

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; View that for an extraordinary writ of certiorari to be
justified, the tribunal or administrative body must have issued the assailed decision, order or resolution with
grave abuse of discretion.—For an extraordinary writ of certiorari to be justified, the tribunal or
administrative body must have issued the assailed decision, order or resolution with grave abuse of
discretion. In Mitra v. Commission on Elections, 622 SCRA 744 (2010), the Court recognized that along with
the limited focus that attends petitions for certiorari is the condition, under Section 5, Rule 64 of the Rules of
Court, that findings of fact of the COMELEC, when supported by substantial evidence, shall be final and
nonreviewable. Substantial evidence is that degree of evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
sufficient to support a conclusion.

LEONEN, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:

Election Law; Party-List System; View that national political parties may participate in party list elections,
provided that they have no candidate for legislative districts.—National political parties may participate in
party list elections, provided that they have no candidate for legislative districts. The constitution disqualifies
political parties, which have candidates for legislative districts, from the party list system. I also agree that
they need not be organized sectorally and/or represent the “marginalized and underrepresented.”

Same; Same; View that there is no constitutional requirement that all those who participate in the party list
system “must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups” as mentioned in Republic Act No.
7941.—There is no constitutional requirement that all those who participate in the party list system “must
represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups” as mentioned in Republic Act No. 7941. This law is
unconstitutional in so far as it makes a requirement that is not supported by the plain text of the Constitution.
There is also a constitutional difference between the political parties that support those who are candidates
for legislative districts and those that participate in the party list system. It is inconsistent for national
political parties who have candidates for legislative districts to also run for party list. This, too, is the clear
implication from the text of article VI, section 5(1) of the Constitution.

Same; Same; View that the party list system is an attempt to introduce a new system of politics in our country,
one where voters choose platforms and principles primarily and candidate-nominees secondarily.—The
party list system is an attempt to introduce a new system of politics in our country, one where voters choose
platforms and principles primarily and candidate nominees secondarily. As provided in the Constitution, the
party list system’s intentions are broader than simply to “ensure that those who are marginalized and
represented become lawmakers themselves.”
Same; Same; View that it is the party or the organization that is elected. It is the party list group that
authorizes, hopefully through a democratic process, a priority list of its nominees. It is also the party list
group that can delist or remove their nominees, and hence replace him or her, should he or she act
inconsistently with the avowed principles and platforms of governance of their organization.—The party list
system was introduced to challenge the status quo. It could not have been intended to enhance and further
entrench the same system. It is the party or the organization that is elected. It is the party list group that
authorizes, hopefully through a democratic process, a priority list of its nominees. It is also the party list
group that can delist or remove their nominees, and hence replace him or her, should he or she act
inconsistently with the avowed principles and platforms of governance of their organization. In short, the
party list system assists genuine political parties to evolve. Genuine political parties enable true
representation, and hence, provide the potential for us to realize a “democratic and republican state.”

Same; Same; View that to require that all the seats for party list representatives remain sectoral in one form
or the other is clearly and patently unconstitutional.—Surely, it should be the electorate, not the COMELEC,
which should decide whether their groups should participate in our legislative deliberations. That these
groups could be excluded even before the vote is not what the party list system is all about. These two
instances arising from the consolidated petitions we are considering clearly show why the text of article VI,
section 5 (2) provides: “(2) The party-list representative shall constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list shall be filled, as provided by law,
by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth
and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sectors.” (emphasis provided) What is
plain from a reading of the text is that the qualification as to reserved seats is applicable only for the “three
consecutive terms after the ratification” of the Constitution. Only one-half of the seats within that period is
reserved to the “sectors” that were enumerated, clearly implying that there are other kinds of party list
groups other than those who are sectoral. To require that all the seats for party list representatives remain
sectoral in one form or the other is clearly and patently unconstitutional. It is not supported by the text. Its
rationale and its actual effect is not in accord with the spirit of these provisions.

Same; Same; View that to claim that the framers of the Constitution left it to Congress to complete the very
framework of the party list system is to question the fundamental character of our constitution.—The 1987
Constitution is a complete document. Every provision should be read in the context of all the other provisions
so that contours of constitutional policy are made clear. To claim that the framers of the Constitution left it to
Congress to complete the very framework of the party list system is to question the fundamental character of
our constitution. The phrases “in accordance with law” and “as may be provided by law” is not an invitation to
the members of Congress to continue the work of the constituent assembly that crafted the Constitution.
Constitutional policy is to be derived from the text of the constitution in the light of its context in the
document and considering the contemporary impact of relevant precedents.

Same; Same; View that with respect to existing registered party list groups, jurisdiction to disqualify is clearly
reposed on the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).—With respect to existing registered
party list groups, jurisdiction to disqualify is clearly reposed on the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET). The Constitution in article VI, section 17 clearly provides: “Sec. 17. The Senate and the
House of Representatives shall each have a Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members...” A more specific provision in
the Constitution with respect to disqualifying registered political party list groups should prevail over the
more general powers of the COMELEC to enforce and administer election laws. Besides, that the HRET is the
“sole judge” clearly shows that the constitutional intention is to exclude all the rest.
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY represented herein by its Chair, DANTON REMOTO, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. 618 SCAR 32

Constitutional Law; Election Law; Party-List System; The enumeration of marginalized and under-
represented sectors is not exclusive.—As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
Commission on Elections, 359 SCRA 698 (2001), “the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented
sectors is not exclusive.” The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a
particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.

Same; Same; Same; Aside from Commission on Elections’ (COMELEC’s) moral objection and the belated
allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is
not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under Republic Act No. 7941
or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani.—We find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its
compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELEC’s moral objection and
the belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang
Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or
the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang Ladlad’s morality, or lack
thereof.

Same; Same; Same; It was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.—Our Constitution
provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-establish ment clause calls for is “government
neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with
this policy of neutrality.” We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the
COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.

Same; Same; Same; Through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps homosexuals themselves, have
borne the brunt of societal disapproval.—We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual
conduct, and perhaps homosexuals themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is not difficult
to imagine the reasons behind this censure—religious beliefs, convictions about the preservation of marriage,
family, and procreation, even dislike or distrust of homosexuals themselves and their perceived lifestyle.
Nonetheless, we recall that the Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently,
therefore, these “generally accepted public morals” have not been convincingly transplanted into the realm of
law.

Election Law; Party-List System; Civil Law; “Nuisance,” Defined.— Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a
nuisance as “any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or
disregards decency or morality,” the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or
any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings.

Same; Same; Evidence; A mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or
criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.—A violation of Article 201 of the
Revised Penal Code, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs
to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of
public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of
liability or culpability.

Same; Same; Moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of
homosexuals from participation in the party-list system.—We hold that moral disapproval, without more, is
not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list
system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of
dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.
Respondent’s blanket justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets
homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of any particular morally reprehensible act. It is this selective
targeting that implicates our equal protection clause.

Constitutional Law; Election Law; Party-List System; Equal Protection Clause; Recent jurisprudence has
affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, the Supreme Court will
uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate government end.—
Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect
class, we will uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate
government end. In Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 446 SCRA 299
(2004), we declared that “[i]n our jurisdiction, the standard of analysis of equal protection challenges x x x
have followed the ‘rational basis’ test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative classifications and a
reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Law of general application should apply with equal force to Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual
and Transgender (LGBTs), and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other
marginalized and under-represented sectors.—From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and transgender have the same interest in participating in the party-list system on the same basis as
other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of
general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list
system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.

Same; Same; Freedom of Expression; Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a
democratic society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also to those
that offend, shock or disturb.—Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a
democratic society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also to those
that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate
aim pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its views
on the populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better
reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one. Same;

Same; Same; Freedom of Association; Only if a political party incites violence or puts forward policies that are
incompatible with democracy does it fall outside the protection of the freedom of association guarantee.—A
political group should not be hindered solely because it seeks to publicly debate controversial political issues
in order to find solutions capable of satisfying everyone concerned. Only if a political party incites violence or
puts forward policies that are incompatible with democracy does it fall outside the protection of the freedom
of association guarantee.

Same; Party-List System; Equal Protection Clause; The principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of
general application relating to elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation. —
The principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general application relating to elections be applied
equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation. Although sexual orientation is not specifically
enumerated as a status or ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights
Committee has opined that the reference to “sex” in Article 26 should be construed to include “sexual
orientation.” Additionally, a variety of United Nations bodies have declared discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation to be prohibited under various international agreements.

Same; Same; Same; Yogyakarta Principles; Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles,
consisting of a declaration formulated by various international law professors, are—at best—de lege ferenda
—and do not constitute binding obligations on the Philippines.— Using even the most liberal of lenses, these
Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a declaration formulated by various international law professors, are—at
best—de lege ferenda—and do not constitute binding obligations on the Philippines. Indeed, so much of
contemporary international law is characterized by the “soft law” nomenclature, i.e., international law is full
of principles that promote international cooperation, harmony, and respect for human rights, most of which
amount to no more than well-meaning desires, without the support of either State practice or opinio juris.

PUNO, C.J., Separate Concurring Opinion:

Constitutional Law; Election Law; Party-List System; View that the assailed Resolutions of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) run afoul of the non-establishment clause of the Constitution.—The assailed
Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) run afoul of the non-establishment clause of the
Constitution. There was cypher effort on the part of the COMELEC to couch its reasoning in legal—much less
constitutional—terms, as it denied Ang Ladlad’s petition for registration as a sectoral party principally on the
ground that it “tolerates immorality which offends religious (i.e., Christian and Muslim) beliefs.” To be sure,
the COMELEC’s ruling is completely antithetical to the fundamental rule that “[t]he public morality expressed
in the law is necessarily secular[,] for in our constitutional order, the religion clauses prohibit the state from
establishing a religion, including the morality it sanctions.”

Same; Same; Same; View that the assailed resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) are
violative of the constitutional directive that no religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or
political rights.—The assailed resolutions of the COMELEC are violative of the constitutional directive that no
religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. Ang Ladlad’s right of political
participation was unduly infringed when the COMELEC, swayed by the private biases and personal prejudices
of its constituent members, arrogated unto itself the role of a religious court or worse, a morality police.

Same; Same; Same; View that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) capitalized on Ang Ladlad’s definition
of the term “sexual orientation,” as well as its citation of the number of Filipino men who have sex with men,
as basis for the declaration that the party espouses and advocates sexual immorality; This position would
deny homosexual and bixesual individuals a fundamental element of personal identity and a legitimate
exercise of personal liberty.—The COMELEC capitalized on Ang Ladlad’s definition of the term “sexual
orientation,” as well as its citation of the number of Filipino men who have sex with men, as basis for the
declaration that the party espouses and advocates sexual immorality. This position, however, would deny
homosexual and bisexual individuals a fundamental element of personal identity and a legitimate exercise of
personal liberty. For, the “ability to [independently] define one’s identity that is central to any concept of
liberty” cannot truly be exercised in a vacuum; we all depend on the “emotional enrichment from close ties
with others.”

Same; Same; Same; View that at the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.—It has been said that freedom extends beyond
spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression,
and certain intimate conduct. These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by
the due process clause. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning,
of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes
of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.

Same; Same; Same; View that a classification based on gender or sexual orientation is a quasi-suspect
classification, as to trigger a heightened level of review.—The ponencia of Mr. Justice Del Castillo refused to
characterize homosexuals and bisexuals as a class in themselves for purposes of the equal protection clause.
Accordingly, it struck down the assailed Resolutions using the most liberal basis of judicial scrutiny, the
rational basis test, according to which government need only show that the challenged classification is
rationally related to serving a legitimate state interest. I humbly submit, however, that a classification based
on gender or sexual orientation is a quasi-suspect classification, as to trigger a heightened level of review.

Same; Same; Same; View that gay persons are entitled to heightened constitutional protection despite some
recent political progress.—It would not be difficult to conclude that gay persons are entitled to heightened
constitutional protection despite some recent political progress. The discrimination that they have suffered
has been so pervasive and severe— even though their sexual orientation has no bearing at all on their ability
to contribute to or perform in society—that it is highly unlikely that legislative enactments alone will suffice
to eliminate that discrimination. Same; Same; Same; View that any state action singling les bians, gays,
bisexuals and trans-genders out for disparate treatment is subject to heightened judicial scrutiny to ensure
that it is not the product of historical prejudice and stereotyping.—It is therefore respectfully submitted that
any state action singling lesbians, gays, bisexuals and trans-genders out for disparate treatment is subject to
heightened judicial scrutiny to ensure that it is not the product of historical prejudice and stereotyping.

Same; Same; Same; View that the position that the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT)
community cannot participate in the party-list system because it is not a “marginalized and underrepresented
sector” is belied by the Supreme Court ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. COMELEC, where
the Court held that the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive.—It has
been suggested that the LGBT community cannot participate in the party-list system because it is not a
“marginalized and underrepresented sector” enumerated either in the Constitution or Republic Act No. (RA)
7941. However, this position is belied by our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC, 359
SCRA 698 (2001), where we clearly held that the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors
in RA 7941 is not exclusive.

CORONA, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Constitutional Law; Election Law; Party-List System; View that the party-list system is essentially a tool for
the advancement of social justice with the fundamental purpose of affording opportunity to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors to participate in the shaping of public policy and the crafting of national laws.—The
party-list system is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. It is essentially a tool for the advancement of
social justice with the fundamental purpose of affording opportunity to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors to participate in the shaping of public policy and the crafting of national laws. It is premised on the
proposition that the advancement of the interests of the marginalized sectors contributes to the advancement
of the common good and of our nation’s democratic ideals.

Same; Same; Same; Congress; View that the Constitution left the matter of determining the groups or sectors
that may qualify as “marginalized” to the hands of Congress.—The Constitution left the matter of determining
the groups or sectors that may qualify as “marginalized” to the hands of Congress. Pursuant to this
constitutional mandate, RA 7941 or the Party-List System Act was enacted in 1995.

Same; Same; Same; View that the Supreme Court stressed that the party-list system is reserved only for those
sectors marginalized and underrepresented in the past.—In Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party, 359 SCRA
698 (2001), the Court stressed that the party-list system is reserved only for those sectors marginalized and
underrepresented in the past (e.g., labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, professionals and even those in the
underground movement who wish to come out and participate). They are those sectors traditionally and
historically marginalized and deprived of an opportunity to participate in the formulation of national policy
although their sectoral interests are also traditionally and historically regarded as vital to the national
interest.

Same; Same; Same; View that the concept of marginalized and underrepresented sectors under the party-list
scheme has been carefully refined by concrete examples involving sectors deemed to be significant in our
legal tradition.—The concept of marginalized and underrepresented sectors under the party-list scheme has
been carefully refined by concrete examples involving sectors deemed to be significant in our legal tradition.
They are essentially sectors with a constitutional bond, that is, specific sectors subject of specific provisions in
the Constitution, namely, labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth,
veterans, fisherfolk, elderly, handicapped, overseas workers and professionals.
Same; Same; Same; View that marginalized sectors should be given a say in governance through the party-list
system, not simply because they desire to say something constructive but because they deserve to be heard
on account of their traditionally and historically decisive role in Philippine society.—The long-muffled voices
of marginalized sectors must be heard because their respective interests are intimately and indispensably
woven into the fabric of the national democratic agenda. The social, economic and political aspects of
discrimination and marginalization should not be divorced from the role of a particular sector or group in the
advancement of the collective goals of Philippine society as a whole. In other words, marginalized sectors
should be given a say in governance through the party-list system, not simply because they desire to say
something constructive but because they deserve to be heard on account of their traditionally and historically
decisive role in Philippine society.

Same; Same; Same; View that the majority’s decision is cryptic and wanting when it makes short shrift of the
issue of whether petitioner is a marginalized and underrepresented sector.—The enumeration of sectors
considered as marginalized and underrepresented in the fundamental law and in the implementing law (RA
7941) cannot be without significance. To ignore them is to disregard the texts of the Constitution and of RA
7941. For, indeed, the very first of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party’s eight guidelines for screening
party-list participants is this: the parties, sectors or organizations “must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941.” For this reason, I submit the majority’s decision
is cryptic and wanting when it makes short shrift of the issue of whether petitioner is a marginalized and
underrepresented sector in the following manner.

Same; Same; Same; View that marginalized sectors qualified to participate in the party-list system but not
mentioned in Section 5(2), Article VI are “such other sectors as may be provided by law” duly enacted by
Congress.—Marginalized sectors qualified to participate in the party-list system but not mentioned in Section
5(2), Article VI are “such other sectors as may be provided by law” duly enacted by Congress. It is also
consistent with the basic canon of statutory construction, ejusdem generis, which requires that a general
word or phrase that follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class, the general
word or phrase should be construed to include, or to be restricted to persons, things or cases, akin to,
resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned.

Same; Same; Same; View that even assuming that petitioner was able to show that the community of lesbians,
gays, bisexuals and transsexuals (LGBT) is underrepresented, it cannot be properly considered as
marginalized under the party-list system.—Even assuming that petitioner was able to show that the
community of lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transsexuals (LGBT) is underrepresented, it cannot be properly
considered as marginalized under the party-list system. First, petitioner is not included in the sectors
mentioned in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 5 of RA 7941. Unless an overly strained
interpretation is resorted to, the LGBT sector cannot establish a close connection to any of the said sectors.
Indeed, petitioner does not even try to show its link to any of the said sectors. Rather, it represents itself as an
altogether distinct sector with its own peculiar interests and agenda.

Same; Same; Same; View that only sectors expressly or closely related to those sectors mentioned in Section 5
of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 are qualified to participate in the party-list system.—In this instance, Congress,
in the exercise of its authority under Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, enacted RA 7941. Sections 2,
3(d) and (5) of the said law instituted a policy when it enumerated certain sectors as qualified marginalized
and underrepresented sectors under the party-list system. Respect for that policy and fidelity to the Court’s
duty in our scheme of government require us to declare that only sectors expressly mentioned or closely
related to those sectors mentioned in Section 5 of RA 7941 are qualified to participate in the party-list system.
Same; Same; Same; View that until and unless Congress amends the law to include the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual
and Transgender (LGBTs) and other sectors in the party-list system, deference to Congress’ determination on
the matter is proper.—The Court is called upon to exercise judicial restraint in this case by strictly adhering
to, rather than expanding, legislative policy on the matter of marginalized sectors as expressed in the
enumeration in Section 5 of RA 7941. The Court has no power to amend and expand Sections 2, 3(d) and 5 of
RA 7941 in the guise of interpretation. The Constitution expressly and exclusively vests the authority to
determine “such other [marginalized] sectors” qualified to participate in the party-list system to Congress.
Thus, until and unless Congress amends the law to include the LGBT and other sectors in the party-list
system, deference to Congress’ determination on the matter is proper.

Same; Same; Same; View that the party-list system was not designed as a tool to advocate tolerance and
acceptance of any and all socially misunderstood sectors.—While bigotry, social stereotyping and other forms
of discrimination must be given no place in a truly just, democratic and libertarian society, the party-list
system has a well-defined purpose. The party-list system was not designed as a tool to advocate tolerance and
acceptance of any and all socially misunderstood sectors. Rather, it is a platform for the realization of the
aspirations of marginalized sectors whose interests are, by nature and history, also the nation’s but which
interests have not been sufficiently brought to public attention because of these sectors’ underrepresentation.

Same; Same; Same; View that Congress was given by the Constitution full discretion to determine what
sectors may qualify as marginalized and underrepresented, the Court’s task is to respect that legislative
determination by strictly adhering to it.—Congress was given by the Constitution full discretion to determine
what sectors may qualify as marginalized and underrepresented. The Court’s task is to respect that legislative
determination by strictly adhering to it. If we effectively and unduly expand such congressional
determination, we will be dabbling in policy-making, an act of political will and not of judicial judgment.

ABAD, J., Separate Opinion:

Constitutional Law; Election Law; Party-List System; View that the underlying policy of Republic Act No. 7941
or The Party-List System Act is to give the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society an
opportunity to take a direct part in enacting the laws of the land.—The underlying policy of R.A. 7941 or The
Party-List System Act is to give the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society an opportunity to
take a direct part in enacting the laws of the land. In Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), 359 SCRA 698 (2001), the Court laid down guidelines for accreditation, but these seem
to leave the COMELEC like everyone else even more perplexed and dumbfounded about what organizations,
clubs, or associations can pass for sectoral parties with a right to claim a seat in the House of Representatives.
The Court can, in adjudicating this case, unravel some of the difficulties.

Same; Same; Same; View that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) erred when it denied Ang Ladlad’s
petition for sectoral party accreditation on religious and moral grounds—the COMELEC has never applied
these tests on regular candidates for Congress.—Here, I fully agree that the COMELEC erred when it denied
Ang Ladlad’s petition for sectoral party accreditation on religious and moral grounds. The COMELEC has
never applied these tests on regular candidates for Congress. There is no reason for it to apply them on Ang
Ladlad. But the ponencia already amply and lucidly discussed this point.

Same; Same; Same; View that a reading of Ang Bagong Bayani will show that, based on the Court’s reading,
neither the Constitution nor Republic Act No. 7941 intends the excessively limited coverage that the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) now suggests.—The COMELEC’s proposition imposes an unwarranted
restriction which is inconsistent with the purpose and spirit of the Constitution and the law. A reading of Ang
Bagong Bayani will show that, based on the Court’s reading, neither the Constitution nor R.A. 7941 intends
the excessively limited coverage that the COMELEC now suggests. In fact, the Court said in that case that the
list in R.A. 7941 is not exclusive. Thus, while the party-list system is not meant for all sectors of society, it was
envisioned as a social justice tool for the marginalized and underrepresented in general. Same; Same; Same;
View that Congress did not provide a definition of the term “marginalized and underrepresented.”—Congress
did not provide a definition of the term “marginalized and underrepresented.” Nor did the Court dare provide
one in its decision in Ang Bagong Bayani. It is possible, however, to get a sense of what Congress intended in
adopting such term. No doubt, Congress crafted that term—marginalized and underrepresented —from its
reading of the concrete examples that the Constitution itself gives of groupings that are entitled to
accreditation. These examples are the labor, the peasant, the urban poor, the indigenous cultural minorities,
the women, and the youth sectors. Fortunately, quite often ideas are best described by examples of what they
are, which was what those who drafted the 1987 Constitution did, rather than by an abstract description of
them.

Same; Same; Same; View that an interpretation that will allow concretely or specifically defined groups to
seek election as a separate party-list sector by itself will result in riot and redundancy in the mix of sectoral
parties grabbing seats in the House of Representatives.—An interpretation that will allow concretely or
specifically defined groups to seek election as a separate party-list sector by itself will result in riot and
redundancy in the mix of sectoral parties grabbing seats in the House of Representatives. It will defeat
altogether the objectives of the party-list system. If they can muster enough votes, the country may have a
party-list of pedicab drivers and another of tricycle drivers. There will be an irrational apportionment of
party-list seats in the legislature.

Same; Same; Same; View that applying the universally accepted estimate that one out of every 10 persons is a
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBTs) of a certain kind, the Filipino LGBTs should now stand at
about 8.7 million.—In this case, Ang Ladlad represents men and women who identify themselves as lesbians,
gays, bisexuals, or transgendered persons (LGBTs). Applying the universally accepted estimate that one out of
every 10 persons is an LGBT of a certain kind, the Filipino LGBTs should now stand at about 8.7 million.
Despite this, however, they are by and large, subtly if not brutally, excluded from the mainstream,
discriminated against, and persecuted. That the COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad’s petition on religious and
moral grounds is proof of this discrimination.

Same; Same; Same; View that Ang Ladlad has amply proved that it meets the requirements for sectoral party
accreditation—their members are in the vulnerable class like the women and the youth.—Ang Ladlad has
amply proved that it meets the requirements for sectoral party accreditation. Their members are in the
vulnerable class like the women and the youth. Ang Ladlad represents a narrow definition of its class (LGBTs)
rather than a concrete and specific definition of a sub-group within the class (group of gay beauticians, for
example). The people that Ang Ladlad seeks to represent have a national presence.
MILAGROS E. AMORES, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and
EMMANUEL JOEL J. VILLANUEVA, respondents. 622 SCRA 593

Election Law; Party-List System; A candidate who is more than 30 on election day is not qualified to be a
youth sector nominee.—As the law states in unequivocal terms that a nominee of the youth sector must at
least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election, so it must be
that a candidate who is more than 30 on election day is not qualified to be a youth sector nominee. Since this
mandate is contained in RA No. 7941, the Party-List System Act, it covers ALL youth sector nominees vying
for party-list representative seats.

Same; Same; Changes of Political Party and Sectoral Affiliation; A nominee who changes his sectoral affiliation
within the same party will not only be eligible for nomination under the new sectoral affiliation of the change
has been effected at least six months before the elections.—What is clear is that the wording of Section 15
covers changes in both political party and sectoral affiliation. And the latter may occur within the same party
since multi-sectoral party-list organizations are qualified to participate in the Philippine party-list system.
Hence, a nominee who changes his sectoral affiliation within the same party will only be eligible for
nomination under the new sectoral affiliation if the change has been effected at least six months before the
elections. Again, since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation. This is the plain meaning rule or verba legis, as expressed in the
maxim index animi sermo or speech is the index of intention.

Same; Same; A party-list organization’s ranking of its nominees is a mere indication of preference, their
qualifications according to law are a different matter.—That private respondent is the first nominee of CIBAC,
whose victory was later upheld, is of no moment. A party-list organization’s ranking of its nominees is a mere
indication of preference, their qualifications according to law are a different matter.
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. [SENIOR CITIZENS
PARTY-LIST], represented herein by its Chairperson and First Nominee, FRANCISCO G. DATOL, Jr.,
petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. 701 SCRA 786

Election Law; Notice and Hearing; The twin requirements of due notice and hearing are indispensable before
the COMELEC may properly order the cancellation of the registration and accreditation of a party-list
organization.—Unquestionably, the twin requirements of due notice and hearing are indispensable before the
COMELEC may properly order the cancellation of the registration and accreditation of a party-list
organization. In connection with this, the Court lengthily discussed in Mendoza v. Commission on Elections
the concept of due process as applied to the COMELEC.

Same; Term-Sharing Agreements; When the term-sharing agreement was executed in 2010, the same was not
yet expressly proscribed by any law or resolution.—The Datol Group argues that the public policy prohibiting
term-sharing was provided for under Section 7, Rule 4 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9366, which was
promulgated only on February 21, 2012. Hence, the resolution should not be made to apply retroactively to
the case of SENIOR CITIZENS as nothing therein provides for its retroactive effect. When the term-sharing
agreement was executed in 2010, the same was not yet expressly proscribed by any law or resolution.

Civil Law; Prospectivity of Laws; Article 4 of the Civil Code states that laws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided.— Article 4 of the Civil Code states that “[l]aws shall have no retroactive
effect, unless the contrary is provided.” As held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Reyes, 480 SCRA 382
(2006), “[t]he general rule is that statutes are prospective. However, statutes that are remedial, or that do not
create new or take away vested rights, do not fall under the general rule against the retroactive operation of
statutes.” We also reiterated in Lintag and Arrastia v. National Power Corporation, 528 SCRA 287 (2007),
that: It is a wellentrenched principle that statutes, including administrative rules and regulations, operate
prospectively unless the legislative intent to the contrary is manifest by express terms or by necessary
implication because the retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become
vested. This is based on the Latin maxim: Lex prospicit non respicit (the law looks forward, not backward).

DARYL GRACE J. ABAYON, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL, PERFECTO C. LUCABAN, JR., RONYL S. DE LA CRUZ and AGUSTIN C. DOROGA, respondents.
612 SCRA 375

Election Law; Party-List Representatives; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); It is for the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification
of a nominee—the need for him or her to be a bona fide member or a representative of his party-list
organization in the context of the facts that characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparan’s relation to Aangat
Tayo and Bantay, respectively, and the marginalized and underrepresented interests that they presumably
embody. —It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a nominee—the need
for him or her to be a bona fide member or a representative of his party-list organization—in the context of
the facts that characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparan’s relation to Aangat Tayo and Bantay,
respectively, and the marginalized and underrepresented interests that they presumably embody.

Same; Same; Same; The right to examine the fitness of aspiring nominees and, eventually, to choose five from
among them after all belongs to the party or organization that nominates them. But where an allegation is
made that the party or organization had chosen and allowed a disqualified nominee to become its party-list
representative in the lower House and enjoy the secured tenure that goes with the position, the resolution of
the dispute is taken out of its hand.—Petitioners Abayon and Palparan of course point out that the authority
to determine the qualifications of a party-list nominee belongs to the party or organization that nominated
him. This is true, initially. The right to examine the fitness of aspiring nominees and, eventually, to choose five
from among them after all belongs to the party or organization that nominates them. But where an allegation
is made that the party or organization had chosen and allowed a disqualified nominee to become its party-list
representative in the lower House and enjoy the secured tenure that goes with the position, the resolution of
the dispute is taken out of its hand.

Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Commission on Elections; Once the party or organization of the party-list
nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the
House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications
ends and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s (HRET’s) own jurisdiction begins.—What is
inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives.
Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are “elected members” of the House of Representatives no
less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications.
By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee
has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the
HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.

15. Isidro Lico v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 205505, September 29, 2015)

Party-List System; A party-list nominee must have been, among others, a bona fide member of the party or
organization for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election.—In the present case, the Petition
for petitioner Lico’s expulsion from the House of Representatives is anchored on his expulsion from Ating
Koop, which necessarily affects his title as member of Congress. A party-list nominee must have been, among
others, a bona fide member of the party or organization for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the
election. Needless to say, bona fide membership in the party-list group is a continuing qualification. We have
ruled that qualifications for public office, whether elective or not, are continuing requirements. They must be
possessed not only at the time of appointment or election, or of assumption of office, but during the officer’s
entire tenure.

16. Abang Lingkod Party-List v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 206952, October 22, 2013)

Party-List System; Track Record; Under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, groups intending to register under the
party-list system are not required to submit evidence of their track record; they are merely required to attach
to their verified petitions their “constitution, by-laws, platform of government, list of officers, coalition
agreement, and other relevant information as may be required by the COMELEC.”—Track record is not the
same as the submission or presentation of “constitution, by-laws, platform of government, list of officers,
coalition agreement, and other relevant information as may be required by the COMELEC,” which are but mere
pieces of documentary evidence intended to establish that the group exists and is a going concern. The said
documentary evidence presents an abstract of the ideals that national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations seek to achieve. Under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, groups intending to register under the party-list
system are not required to submit evidence of their track record; they are merely required to attach to their
verified petitions their “constitution, by-laws, platform of government, list of officers, coalition agreement, and
other relevant information as may be required by the COMELEC.”

Evidence showing a track record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented sectors is only
required from nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and
underrepresented who do not factually belong to the sector represented by their party or organization.—
Contrary to the COMELEC’s claim, sectoral parties or organizations, such as ABANG LINGKOD, are no longer
required to adduce evidence showing their track record, i.e. proof of activities that they have undertaken to
further the cause of the sector they represent. Indeed, it is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to
the special interest and concerns of their sector. Otherwise stated, it is sufficient that the ideals represented
by the sectoral organizations are geared towards the cause of the sector/s, which they represent.
There is no logic in treating sectoral organizations differently from national and regional parties or
organizations as regards their bid for registration under the party-list system.— The “varying track record
requirement” suggested by the dissent would unnecessarily put a premium on groups intending to register as
national and regional parties or organizations as against those intending to register as sectoral organizations.
The imposition of an additional burden on sectoral organizations, i.e., submission of their track record, would
be unjust as it deters the marginalized and underrepresented sectors from organizing themselves under the
party-list system.

There exists no reason to further require groups seeking registration under the party-list system to submit
evidence showing their track record.—There exists no reason to further require groups seeking registration
under the party-list system to submit evidence showing their track record. Pursuant to Atong Paglaum, not all
groups are required to represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors and, accordingly, there is no
longer any incentive in merely feigning representation of the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. For
purposes of registration under the party-list system, it is enough that the principal advocacy of sectoral
organizations pertains to the sector/s they represent.

Considering that track record is no longer a requirement, a group’s misrepresentation as to its track record
cannot be used as a ground to deny or cancel its registration — it is no longer material to its qualification
under the party-list system.— In this case, ABANG LINGKOD’s submission of digitally altered photographs
cannot be considered material to its qualification as a party-list group. Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941, in part,
reads: Sec. 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration.—The COMELEC may, motu propio or upon verified
complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds: xxxx (6) It
declares untruthful statements in its petition.

Declaration of an untruthful statement in a petition for registration, or in any other document pertinent to the
registration and/or accreditation under the party-list system, as a ground for the refusal or cancellation of
registration under Section 6(6) of R.A. No. 7941, is akin to material misrepresentation in the certificate of
candidacy filed by an individual candidate under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.— Both provisions
disallow prospective candidates from participating in an election for declaring false statements in their
eligibility requirements. Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code reads: Sec. 78. A verified petition seeking to
deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground
that any material misrepresentation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false.

In order to justify the cancellation or refusal of registration of a group, there must be a deliberate attempt to
mislead, misinform, or hide a fact, which would otherwise render the group disqualified from participating in
the party-list elections.—A declaration of an untruthful statement in a petition for registration under Section
6(6) of R.A. No. 7941, in order to be a ground for the refusal and/or cancellation of registration under the
party-list system, must pertain to the qualification of the party, organization or coalition under the party-list
system. The digitally altered photographs of activities submitted by ABANG LINGKOD to prove its continuing
qualification under R.A. No. 7941 only pertain to its track record, which, as already discussed, is no longer a
requirement under the new parameters laid down in Atong Paglaum. Simply put, they do not affect the
qualification of ABANG LINGKOD as a party-list group and, hence, could not be used as a ground to cancel its
registration under the party-list system.

The party-list group must be treated as separate and distinct from its nominees such that qualifications of the
latter must not be considered part and parcel of the qualifications of the former.—The disqualification of one
or some of the nominees of a party-list group should not automatically result in the disqualification of the
group. Otherwise it would accord the nominees the same significance, which the law holds for the party-list
groups; it is still the fact that the party-list group satisfied the qualifications of the law that is material to
consider. The disqualification of the nominees must simply be regarded as failure to qualify for an office or
position. It should not, in any way, blemish the qualifications of the party-list group itself with defect.

17. Dr. Hans Señeres v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 178678, April 16, 2009)
Election Law; Election Contests; Electoral Tribunals; Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken
his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over
elections relating to the election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.—
The HRET’s sole and exclusive jurisdiction over contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications of
the members of the House of Representatives “begins only after a candidate has become a member of the
House of Representatives.”

Party-List System; Where the right of the nominees as party-list representatives had been recognized and
declared by a Resolution of the COMELEC and the nominees had taken their oath and already assumed their
offices in the House of Representatives, the proper recourse would have been to file a petition for quo
warranto before the HRET within ten (10) days from receipt of the Resolution and not a petition for certiorari
before the Supreme Court.—Without a doubt, at the time Señ eres filed this petition before this Court on July
23, 2007, the right of the nominees as party-list representatives had been recognized and declared in the July
19, 2007 Resolution and the nominees had taken their oath and already assumed their offices in the House of
Representatives. Since Señ eres failed to file a petition for quo warranto before the HRET declaring the validity
of Robles’ Certificate of Nomination, said Resolution of the COMELEC has already become final and executory.

It is irrelevant who among a party-list organization’s officials sign the Certificate of Nomination, as long as the
signatory was so authorized by said organization.—The nomination of Velarde, Coscolluela, Tieng, Monsod,
and Villarama to the 2007 party-list elections was, in the final analysis, an act of the National Council of
BUHAY. Robles’ role in the nominating process was limited to signing, on behalf of BUHAY, and submitting the
party’s Certificate of Nomination to the COMELEC. The act of nominating BUHAY’s representatives was
veritably a direct and official act of the National Council of BUHAY and not Robles.’ Be that as it may, it is
irrelevant who among BUHAY’s officials signs the Certificate of Nomination, as long as the signatory was so
authorized by BUHAY. The alleged disqualification of Robles as nominating officer is indeed a non-issue and
does not affect the act of the National Council of nominating Velarde and others. Hence, the Certificate of
Nomination, albeit signed by Robles, is still the product of a valid and legal act of the National Council of
BUHAY. Robles’ connection with LRTA could not really be considered as a factor invalidating the nomination
process.

Hold-Over Doctrine; As a general rule, officers and directors of a corporation hold over after the expiration of
their terms until such time as their successors are elected or appointed.— As a general rule, officers and
directors of a corporation hold over after the expiration of their terms until such time as their successors are
elected or appointed. Sec. 23 of the Corporation Code contains a provision to this effect, thus: Section 23. The
board of directors or trustees.—Unless otherwise provided in this Code, the corporate powers of all
corporations formed under this Code shall be exercised, all business conducted and all property of such
corporations controlled and held by the board of directors or trustees to be elected from among the holders
of stocks, or where there is no stock, from among the members of the corporation, who shall hold office for
one (1) year until their successors are elected and qualified. The holdover doctrine has, to be sure, a purpose
which is at once legal as it is practical. It accords validity to what would otherwise be deemed as dubious
corporate acts and gives continuity to a corporate enterprise in its relation to outsiders.

18.1. Regina Reyes v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013)

Election Law; House of Representative; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); Jurisdiction; As
held in Marcos v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300 (1995), the HRET does not have jurisdiction over a candidate who
is not a member of the House of Representatives.― As to the HRET’s supposed assumption of jurisdiction over
the issue of petitioner’s qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET’s jurisdiction
as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress
begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. Petitioner not being a
member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the
question.

To be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following
requisites:(1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office.―It is then clear that to be
considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following
requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office. Indeed, in some cases,
this Court has made the pronouncement that once a proclamation has been made, COMELEC’s jurisdiction is
already lost and, thus, its jurisdiction over contests relating to elections, returns, and qualifications ends, and
the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. However, it must be noted that in these cases, the doctrinal
pronouncement was made in the context of a proclaimed candidate who had not only taken an oath of office,
but who had also assumed office.

COMELEC; Jurisdiction; The petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the House of Representatives
because, primarily, she has not yet assumed office; The term of office of a Member of the House of
Representatives begins only “at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.” Thus, until
such time, the Commission on Elections retains jurisdiction. ― In her attempt to comply with the second
requirement, petitioner attached a purported Oath of Office taken before Hon. Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 5
June 2013. However, this is not the oath of office which confers membership to the House of Representatives.
Section 6, Rule II (Membership) of the Rules of the House of Representatives provides: Section 6. Oath or
Affirmation of Members. —Members shall take their oath or affirmation either collectively or individually
before the Speaker in open session. Consequently, before there is a valid or official taking of the oath it must be
made (1) before the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and (2) in open session. Here, although she made
the oath before Speaker Belmonte, there is no indication that it was made during plenary or in open session and,
thus, it remains unclear whether the required oath of office was indeed complied with. More importantly, we
cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy — that before the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May
2013, the COMELEC had already finally disposed of the issue of petitioner’s lack of Filipino citizenship and
residency. After 14 May 2013, there was, before the COMELEC, no longer any pending case on petitioner’s
qualifications to run for the position of Member of the House of Representative.

18.2. Regina Reyes v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 207264, October 22, 2013)

Certificates of Candidacy; Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy; The special action before the COMELEC
which was a Petition to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy was a summary proceeding or one “heard
summarily.”― The nature of the proceedings is best indicated by the COMELEC Rule on Special Actions, Rule
23, Section 4 of which states that the Commission may designate any of its officials who are members of the
Philippine Bar to hear the case and to receive evidence. COMELEC Rule 17 further provides in Section 3 that
when the proceedings are authorized to be summary, in lieu of oral testimonies, the parties may, after due
notice, be required to submit their position paper together with affidavits, counter-affidavits and other
documentary evidence; x x x and that “[t]his provision shall likewise apply to cases where the hearing and
reception of evidence are delegated by the Commission or the Division to any of its officials x x x.”

Election Law; Certificates of Candidacy; COMELEC; The COMELEC covers the matter of petitioner’s certificate
of candidacy, and its due course or its cancellation, which are the pivotal conclusions that determines who
can be legally proclaimed.―It may need pointing out that there is no conflict between the COMELEC and the
HRET insofar as the petitioner’s being a Representative of Marinduque is concerned. The COMELEC covers
the matter of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy, and its due course or its cancellation, which are the pivotal
conclusions that determines who can be legally proclaimed. The matter can go to the Supreme Court but not
as a continuation of the proceedings in the COMELEC, which has in fact ended, but on an original action before
the Court grounded on more than mere error of judgment but on error of jurisdiction for grave abuse of
discretion.

House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); The HRET jurisdiction over the qualification of the
Member of the House of Representatives is original and exclusive, and as such, proceeds de novo unhampered
by the proceedings in the COMELEC which, as just stated has been terminated. The HRET proceedings is a
regular, not summary, proceeding. ―The HRET’s constitutional authority opens, over the qualification of its
MEMBER, who becomes so only upon a duly and legally based proclamation, the first and unavoidable step
towards such membership. The HRET jurisdiction over the qualification of the Member of the House of
Representatives is original and exclusive, and as such, proceeds de novo unhampered by the proceedings in
the COMELEC which, as just stated has been terminated. The HRET proceedings is a regular, not summary,
proceeding. It will determine who should be the Member of the House. It must be made clear though, at the
risk of repetitiveness, that no hiatus occurs in the representation of Marinduque in the House because there is
such a representative who shall sit as the HRET proceedings are had till termination. Such representative is
the duly proclaimed winner resulting from the terminated case of cancellation of certificate of candidacy of
petitioner. The petitioner is not, cannot, be that representative. And this, all in all, is the crux of the dispute
between the parties: who shall sit in the House in representation of Marinduque, while there is yet no HRET
decision on the qualifications of the Member.

19. Lord Allan Velasco v. Speaker Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. (G.R. No. 211140, January 12, 2016)

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Quo Warranto; A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine
the right of a person to the use or exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if
his claim is not well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege.— Where the action is filed
by a private person, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted position; otherwise, respondent has
a right to the undisturbed possession of the office. In this case, (i) the final and executory resolutions of this
Court in G.R. No. 207264; (ii) the final and executory resolutions of the COMELEC in SPA No. 13-053 (DC)
cancelling Reyes’s Certificate of Candidacy; and (iii) the final and executory resolution of the COMELEC in SPC
No. 13-010 declaring null and void the proclamation of Reyes and proclaiming Velasco as the winning
candidate for the position of Representative for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque — it cannot
be claimed that the present petition is one for the determination of the right of Velasco to the claimed office.
To be sure, what is prayed for herein is merely the enforcement of clear legal duties and not to try disputed
title. That the respondents make it appear so will not convert this petition to one for quo warranto.

Mandamus; A petition for mandamus will prosper if it is shown that the subject thereof is a ministerial act or
duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has a
well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.—Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, provides that any person may file a verified petition for mandamus “when any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.” A petition for mandamus will prosper if it is shown that the subject
thereof is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person,
and that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.

“Ministerial Act” and “Discretionary Act,” Distinguished. —The difference between a ministerial and
discretionary act has long been established. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal
performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority,
without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If
the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be
performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of
the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.

20. Wigberto Tañada, Jr. v. HRET (G.R. No. 217012, March 1, 2016)

Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy; Nuisance Candidates; It is not enough for Wigberto to have Alvin
John’s Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) cancelled, because the effect of such cancellation only leads to stray
votes. Alvin John must also be declared a nuisance candidate, because only then will Alvin John’s votes be
credited to Wigberto.—The HRET did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in declaring that it has no
jurisdiction to determine whether Alvin John was a nuisance candidate. If Wigberto timely filed a petition
before this Court within the period allotted for special actions and questioned Alvin John’s nuisance
candidacy, then it is proper for this Court to assume jurisdiction and rule on the matter. As things stand, the
COMELEC En Banc’s ruling on Alvin John’s nuisance candidacy had long become final and executory.
Wigberto’s petition challenging Alvin John’s nuisance candidacy filed before the HRET, and now before this
Court, is a mere afterthought. It was only after Angelina was proclaimed a winner that Wigberto renewed his
zeal in pursuing Alvin John’s alleged nuisance candidacy. Alvin John must also be declared a nuisance
candidate, because only then will Alvin John’s votes be credited to Wigberto.

21. Harlin Abayon v. HRET (G.R. No. 222236 & 223032, May 3, 2016)

Election Law; Election Protests; An Election Protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is
strictly a contest between the defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds
or irregularities. It aims to determine who between them has actually obtained the majority of the legal votes
cast and, therefore, entitled to hold the office.

House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; Jurisdiction; The Constitution no less, grants the HRET with
exclusive jurisdiction to decide all election contests involving the members of the House of Representatives,
which necessarily includes those which raise the issue of fraud, terrorism or other irregularities committed
before, during or after the elections.—The Court agrees that the power of the HRET to annul elections differ
from the power granted to the COMELEC to declare failure of elections. To deprive the HRET the prerogative
to annul elections would undermine its constitutional fiat to decide election contests. The phrase “election,
returns and qualifications” should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters affecting the validity
of the contestee’s title. Consequently, the annulment of election results is but a power concomitant to the
HRET’s constitutional mandate to determine the validity of the contestee’s title.

The HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the House of Representatives, may annul election results if in its determination, fraud, terrorism or other
electoral irregularities existed to warrant the annulment.—The power granted to the HRET by the
Constitution is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature.
Because in doing so, it is merely exercising its constitutional duty to ascertain who among the candidates
received the majority of the valid votes cast.

The passage of RA No. 7166 cannot deprive the HRET of its incidental power to annul elections in the exercise
of its sole and exclusive authority conferred by no less than the Constitution. — It must be remembered that
the COMELEC exercises quasi-judicial, quasi-legislative and administrative functions. In Bedol v. COMELEC,
606 SCRA 554 (2009), the Court expounded, to wit: The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred
upon it by the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, may be classified into administrative, quasi-
legislative, and quasi-judicial. The quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC embraces the power to resolve
controversies arising from the enforcement of election laws, and to be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation
controversies; and of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications. Its quasi-legislative
power refers to the issuance of rules and regulations to implement the election laws and to exercise such
legislative functions as may expressly be delegated to it by Congress. Its administrative function refers to the
enforcement and administration of election laws. In the exercise of such power, the Constitution (Section 6,
Article IX-A) and the Omnibus Election Code (Section 52[c]) authorize the COMELEC to issue rules and
regulations to implement the provisions of the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code. The quasi-
judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which
the legislative policy is to apply, and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in
enforcing and administering the same law.

Commission on Elections; Jurisdiction; RA No. 7166 was enacted to empower the COMELEC to be most
effective in the performance of its sacred duty of ensuring the conduct of honest and free elections. —The
COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial function when it decides election contests not otherwise reserved to
other electoral tribunals by the Constitution. The COMELEC, however, does not exercise its quasi-judicial
functions when it declares a failure of elections pursuant to R.A. No. 7166. Further, a closer perusal of Section
6 of the Omnibus Election Code readily reveals that it is more in line with the COMELEC’s administrative
function of ensuring that elections are free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible, and not its quasi-judicial
function to adjudicate election contests. The said provision reads: Sec. 6. Failure of elections.—If, on account
of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not
been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting,
or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody
or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension
of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by
any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not
held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election
not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of
the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.

House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; Failure of Elections; Annulment of Elections; There is no overlap
of jurisdiction because when the COMELEC declares a failure of elections on the ground of violence,
intimidation, terrorism or other irregularities, it does so in its administrative capacity. In contrast, when
electoral tribunals annul elections under the same grounds, they do so in the performance of their quasi-
judicial functions. —The difference between the annulment of elections by electoral tribunals and the
declaration of failure of elections by the COMELEC cannot be gainsaid. First, the former is an incident of the
judicial function of electoral tribunals while the latter is in the exercise of the COMELEC’s administrative
function. Second, electoral tribunals only annul the election results connected with the election contest before
it whereas the declaration of failure of elections by the COMELEC relates to the entire election in the
concerned precinct or political unit. As such, in annulling elections, the HRET does so only to determine who
among the candidates garnered a majority of the legal votes cast. The COMELEC, on the other hand, declares a
failure of elections with the objective of holding or continuing the elections, which were not held or were
suspended, or if there was one, resulted in a failure to elect. When COMELEC declares a failure of elections,
special elections will have to be conducted.

22. Rep. Teddy Baguilat, Jr. v. Speaker Pantaleon Alvarez (G.R. No. 227757, July 25, 2017)

Political Law; Speaker of the House of Representatives; The Speaker of the House of Representatives shall be
elected by a majority vote of its entire membership. Said provision also states that the House of
Representatives may decide to have officers other than the Speaker, and that the method and manner as to
how these officers are chosen is something within its sole control. — In the case of Defensor-Santiago v.
Guingona, Jr., 298 SCRA 756 (1998), which involved a dispute on the rightful Senate Minority Leader during
the 11th Congress (1998-2001), this Court observed that “while the Constitution is explicit on the manner of
electing x x x [a Speaker of the House of Representative,] it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting
the other officers of the Lower House. All that the Charter says is that ‘each House shall choose such other
officers as it may deem necessary.’ As such, the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a
derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore,
such method must be prescribed by the House of Representatives itself, not by the Court.”

Same; Section 16(3), Article VI of the Constitution vests in the House of Representatives the sole authority to,
inter alia, “determine the rules of its proceedings.” These “legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have
the imprints of permanence and obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they ‘are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.’”— Being merely matters of procedure,
their observance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body at will, upon the concurrence of a majority of the House of Representatives.” Hence, as a
general rule, “this Court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm,
without running afoul of Constitutional principles that it is bound to protect and uphold x x x. Constitutional
respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents the Court from prying into
the internal workings of the House of Representatives.”

By and large, this case concerns an internal matter of a co-equal, political branch of government which, absent
any showing of grave abuse of discretion, cannot be judicially interfered with.— To rule otherwise would not
only embroil this Court in the realm of politics, but also lead to its own breach of the separation of powers
doctrine. Verily, “it would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a co-equal department for this
Court either to set aside a legislative action as void only because it thinks the House has disregarded its own
rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum
when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself.”
23. Antero Pobre v. Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago (A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009)

Administrative Law; Conduct Unbecoming a Public Official; Generally speaking, a lawyer holding a
government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct committed while in the
discharge of official duties, unless said misconduct also constitutes a violation of his/her oath as a lawyer.—
The lady senator belongs to the legal profession bound by the exacting injunction of a strict Code. Society has
entrusted that profession with the administration of the law and dispensation of justice.

Code of Professional Responsibility; Public Officers;  When the Code of Professional Responsibility or the
Rules of Court speaks of “conduct” or “misconduct,” the reference is not confined to one’s behavior exhibited
in connection with the performance of lawyer’s professional duties, but also covers any misconduct, which—
albeit unrelated to the actual practice of their profession—would show them to be unfit for the office and
unworthy of the privileges which their license and the law invest in them.—Lawyers may be disciplined even
for any conduct committed in their private capacity, as long as their misconduct reflects their want of probity
or good demeanor, a good character being an essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law
and for continuance of such privilege.

It is imperative on our part to re-instill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect courts of justice,
especially this Tribunal, and remind her anew that the parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to
members of Congress is not to protect them against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as
the people’s representatives, to perform the functions of their office without fear of being made responsible
before the courts or other forums outside the congressional hall.—We, however, would be remiss in our duty
if we let the Senator’s offensive and disrespectful language that definitely tended to denigrate the institution
pass by. It is intended to protect members of Congress against government pressure and intimidation aimed
at influencing the decision-making prerogatives of Congress and its members.

24. Antonio Trillanes v. Hon. Evangeline Castillo-Marigomen (G.R. No. 223451, March 14, 2018)

Petitioner's statements in media interviews are not covered by the parliamentary speech or debate" privilege.
Petitioner admits that he uttered the questioned statements, describing private respondent as former VP
Binay's "front" or "dummy" in connection with the so-called Hacienda Binay, in response to media interviews
during gaps and breaks in plenary and committee hearings in the Senate. With Jimenez as our guidepost, it is
evident that petitioner's remarks fall outside the privilege of speech or debate under Section 11, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution. The statements were clearly not part of any speech delivered in the Senate or any of its
committees. They were also not spoken in the course of any debate in said fora. It cannot likewise be
successfully contended that they were made in the official discharge or performance of petitioner's duties as a
Senator, as the remarks were not part of or integral to the legislative process

In Jimenez, a civil action for damages was filed against a member of the House of Representatives for the
publication, in several newspapers of general circulation, of an open letter to the President which spoke of
operational plans of some ambitious officers of the AFP involving a "massive political build-up" of then
Secretary of National Defense Jesus Vargas to prepare him to become a presidential candidate, a coup d'etat,
and a speech from General Arellano challenging Congress' authority and integrity to rally members of the AFP
behind him and to gain civilian support. The letter alluded to the plaintiffs, who were members of the AFP, to
be under the control of the unnamed "planners," "probably belonging to the Vargas-Arellano clique," and
possibly "unwitting tools" of the plans. Holding that the open letter did not fall under the privilege of speech
or debate under the Constitution, the Court declared: The publication involved in this case does not belong to
this category. According to the complaint, it was an open letter to the President when Congress presumably
was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general
circulation in the Philippines. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was
not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof.

Albeit rendered in reference to the 1935 constitutional grant of parliamentary immunity, the Jimenez
pronouncement on what constitutes privileged speech or debate in Congress still applies. The same privilege
of "speech or debate" was granted under the 1973 and 1987 Philippine Constitutions, with the latter Charters
specifying that the immunity extended to lawmakers' speeches or debates in any committee of the legislature.
This is clear from the "speech or debate" clauses in the parliamentary immunity provisions of the 1935, 1973
and 1987 Constitutions which respectively provide:

25.1. Dante Liban v. Richard Gordon (G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009)

Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC); Public Officers; Constitutional Law; The Philippine National Red Cross
(PNRC) Chairman is not an official or employee of the Executive branch since his appointment does not fall
under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution; Not being a government official or employee, the Philippine
National Red Cross (PNRC) Chairman, as such, does not hold a government office or employment.—The
President does not appoint the Chairman of the PNRC. Neither does the head of any department, agency,
commission or board appoint the PNRC Chairman. This leads us to the obvious conclusion that the PNRC
Chairman is not an official or employee of the Philippine Government. Not being a government official or
employee, the PNRC Chairman, as such, does not hold a government office or employment.

Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is not government-owned but privately owned.— The vast majority of
the thousands of PNRC members are private individuals, including students. Under the PNRC Charter, those
who contribute to the annual fund campaign of the PNRC are entitled to membership in the PNRC for one
year. Thus, any one between 6 and 65 years of age can be a PNRC member for one year upon contributing
P35, P100, P300, P500 or P1,000 for the year. Even foreigners, whether residents or not, can be members of
the PNRC.

25.2. Dante Liban v. Richard Gordon (G.R. No. 175352, January 18, 2011)

Corporation Law; Philippine National Red Cross; A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that
there is none like it not just in terms of structure, but also in terms of history, public service and official
status.—The passage of several laws relating to the PNRC’s corporate existence notwithstanding the
effectivity of the constitutional proscription on the creation of private corporations by law, is a recognition
that the PNRC is not strictly in the nature of a private corporation contemplated by the aforesaid
constitutional ban. There is merit in PNRC’s contention that its structure is sui generis.

The sui generis character of PNRC requires us to approach controversies involving the PNRC on a case-to-
case basis.—Although it is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the government, nor a
government-owned or controlled corporation or a subsidiary thereof, as succinctly explained in the Decision
of July 15, 2009, so much so that respondent, under the Decision, was correctly allowed to hold his position as
Chairman thereof concurrently while he served as a Senator, such a conclusion does not ipso facto imply that
the PNRC is a “private corporation” within the contemplation of the provision of the Constitution, that must
be organized under the Corporation Code.

CARPIO, J., Dissenting Opinion:

View that the PNRC cannot claim that it is sui generis just because it is a private organization performing
certain public or governmental functions.—All private charitable organizations are doing public service or
activities that also constitute governmental functions. Hence, the PNRC cannot claim that it is sui generis just
because it is a private organization performing certain public or governmental functions. That the PNRC is
rendering public service does not exempt it from the constitutional prohibition against the creation of a
private corporation through a special law since the PNRC is, admittedly, still a private organization. The
express prohibition against the creation of private corporations by special charter under Section 16, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disregarded just because a private corporation claims to be sui generis.
The constitutional prohibition admits of no exception.

View that the PNRC could either choose to remain unincorporated or it could incorporate under the
Corporation Code.—The PNRC could either choose to remain unincorporated or it could adopt its own
articles of incorporation and by-laws and incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the
Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation.
26.1. NERI v. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS,
549 SCRA 77 (2008)

Constitutional Law; Presidency; Congress; Separation of Powers; Checks and Balances; Power of Inquiry;
Executive Privilege; Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation, its aim is to elicit information that may be used for legislation while Section 22 pertains to the
power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’
oversight function.—Senate cautions that while the above provisions are closely related and complementary
to each other, they should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. Section 21 relates
to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, its aim is to elicit information that may be used for
legislation, while Section 22 pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to
obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function. Simply stated, while both powers allow
Congress or any of its committees to conduct inquiry, their objectives are different.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Unlike in Section 21, Congress cannot compel the appearance of
executive officials under Section 22.—This distinction gives birth to another distinction with regard to the use
of compulsory process. Unlike in Section 21, Congress cannot compel the appearance of executive officials
under Section 22. The Court’s pronouncement in Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006), is clear: When
Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has
issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive,
such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section
22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance.
Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is ‘in aid of legislation’ under
Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault. In fine, the oversight function
of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of
legislation. This is consistent with the intent discerned from the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
broad; To be valid, it is imperative that it is done in accordance with the Senate or House duly published rules
of procedure and that the rights of the persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected.—The
power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is broad. This is based on the proposition that a
legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions
which the legislation is intended to affect or change. Inevitably, adjunct thereto is the compulsory process to
enforce it. But, the power, broad as it is, has limitations. To be valid, it is imperative that it is done in
accordance with the Senate or House duly published rules of procedure and that the rights of the persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases
where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President such
as the area of military and foreign relations.—In Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government,
299 SCRA 744 (1998), this Court held that there is a “governmental privilege against public disclosure with
respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other security matters.” In Chavez v. Public Estates
Authority, 360 SCRA 132 (2001), there is also a recognition of the confidentiality of Presidential
conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings. In Senate v. Ermita, 488
SCRA 1 (2006), the concept of presidential communications privilege is fully discussed. As may be gleaned
from the above discussion, the claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of
inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of
military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-
chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers,
the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Elements of presidential communications privilege.—Nixon, In
Re Sealed Case and Judicial Watch, somehow provide the elements of presidential communications privilege,
to wit: 1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential
power.” 2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the
President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with
the President. 3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be
overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains important
evidence” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are
covered by the presidential communications privilege.—Using the above elements, we are convinced that,
indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential
communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of
the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the
President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally
been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of
the President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a
member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that
would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The right of Congress or any of its committees to obtain
information in aid of legislation cannot be equated with the people’s right to public information.—The right of
Congress or any of its Committees to obtain information in aid of legislation cannot be equated with the
people’s right to public information. The former cannot claim that every legislative inquiry is an exercise of
the people’s right to information.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The right to information must be balanced with and should give
way, in appropriate cases, to constitutional precepts.—The members of respondent Committees should not
invoke as justification in their exercise of power a right properly belonging to the people in general. This is
because when they discharge their power, they do so as public officials and members of Congress. Be that as it
may, the right to information must be balanced with and should give way, in appropriate cases, to
constitutional precepts particularly those pertaining to delicate interplay of executive-legislative powers and
privileges which is the subject of careful review by numerous decided cases.

Same; Same; Same; Executive Privilege; For the claim to be properly invoked, there must be a formal claim of
privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter.—We now proceed to the
issue—whether the claim is properly invoked by the President. Jurisprudence teaches that for the claim to be
properly invoked, there must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has
control over the matter.” A formal and proper claim of executive privilege requires a “precise and certain
reason” for preserving their confidentiality. The Letter dated November 17, 2007 of Executive Secretary
Ermita satisfies the requirement. It serves as the formal claim of privilege. There, he expressly states that
“this Office is constrained to invoke the settled doctrine of executive privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita,
and has advised Secretary Neri accordingly.” Obviously, he is referring to the Office of the President. That is
more than enough compliance. In Senate v. Ermita, a less categorical letter was even adjudged to be sufficient.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with
such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect.—With
regard to the existence of “precise and certain reason,” we find the grounds relied upon by Executive
Secretary Ermita specific enough so as not “to leave respondent Committees in the dark on how the requested
information could be classified as privileged.” The case of Senate v. Ermita only requires that an allegationbe
made “whether the information demanded involves military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet
meetings, etc.” The particular ground must only be specified. The enumeration is not even intended to be
comprehensive.” The following statement of grounds satisfies the requirement: The context in which
executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our
diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China. Given the confidential nature in
which these information were conveyed to the President, he cannot provide the Committee any further
details of these conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to protect. At any
rate, as held further in Senate v. Ermita, 481 SCRA 1 (2006), the Congress must not require the executive to
state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the
privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter of respect to a coordinate and co-equal department.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Respondent committees’ actions constitute grave abuse of discretion for being
arbitrary and for denying petitioner due process of law.—A fact worth highlighting is that petitioner is not an
unwilling witness. He manifested several times his readiness to testify before respondent Committees. He
refused to answer the three (3) questions because he was ordered by the President to claim executive
privilege. It behooves respondent Committees to first rule on the claim of executive privilege and inform
petitioner of their finding thereon, instead of peremptorily dismissing his explanation as “unsatisfactory.”
Undoubtedly, respondent Committees’ actions constitute grave abuse of discretion for being arbitrary and for
denying petitioner due process of law. The same quality afflicted their conduct when they (a) disregarded
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration alleging that he had filed the present petition before this Court and
(b) ignored petitioner’s repeated request for an advance list of questions, if there be any aside from the three
(3) questions as to which he claimed to be covered by executive privilege.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Courts; The Court’s mandate is to preserve the constitutional principles at all times
to keep the political branches of government within constitutional bounds.—In this present crusade to
“search for truth,” we should turn to the fundamental constitutional principles which underlie our tripartite
system of Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, government,
where the Legislature enacts the law, the Judiciary interprets it and the Executive implements it. They are
considered separate, co-equal, coordinate and supreme within their respective spheres but, imbued with a
system of checks and balances to prevent unwarranted exercise of power. The Court’s mandate is to preserve
these constitutional principles at all times to keep the political branches of government within constitutional
bounds in the exercise of their respective powers and prerogatives, even if it be in the search for truth. This is
the only way we can preserve the stability of our democratic institutions and uphold the Rule of Law.

26.2. NERI v. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS,

564 SCRA 152 (2008)

Presidency; Executive Privilege; Separation of Powers; Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation; There is a
recognized presumptive presidential communications privilege; The presidential communications privilege is
fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the
Constitu tion.—Respondent Committees argue as if this were the first time the presumption in favor of the
presidential communications privilege is mentioned and adopted in our legal system. That is far from the
truth. The Court, in the earlier case of Almonte v. Vasquez, 244 SCRA 286 (1995), affirmed that the
presidential communications privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted
in the separation of powers under the Constitution. Even Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006), the case relied
upon by respondent Committees, reiterated this concept. There, the Court enumerated the cases in which the
claim of executive privilege was recognized, among them Almonte v. Chavez, Chavez v. Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), 299 SCRA 744 (1998) and Chavez v. PEA, 384 SCRA 152 (2002).
The Court articulated in these cases that “there are certain types of information which the government may
withhold from the public,” that there is a “governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to
state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters;” and that “the right to
information does not extend to matters recognized as ‘privileged information’ under the separation of
powers, by which the Court meant Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-
door Cabinet meetings.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; When an executive official, who is one of those mentioned in the said Sec. 2(b) of
E.O. No. 464, claims to be exempt from disclosure, there can be no presumption of authorization to invoke
executive privilege given by the President to said executive official, such that the presumption in this
situation inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.—Respondent Committees’
observation that this Court’s Decision reversed the “presumption that inclines heavily against executive
secrecy and in favor of disclosure” arises from a piecemeal interpretation of the said Decision. The Court has
repeatedly held that in order to arrive at the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof
should be isolated and resorted to, but the decision must be considered in its entirety. Note that the aforesaid
presumption is made in the context of the circumstances obtaining in Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006),
which declared void Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 464, Series of 2005. The pertinent
portion of the decision in the said case reads: From the above discussion on the meaning and scope of
executive privilege, both in the United States and in this jurisprudence, a clear principle emerges. Executive
privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain
types of information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim
thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made.
Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information
by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates
that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied) Obviously, the last sentence of the above-quoted paragraph in Senate v. Ermita refers
to the “exemption” being claimed by the executive officials mentioned in Section 2(b) of E.O. No. 464, solely by
virtue of their positions in the Executive Branch. This means that when an executive official, who is one of
those mentioned in the said Sec. 2(b) of E.O. No. 464, claims to be exempt from disclosure, there can be no
presumption of authorization to invoke executive privilege given by the President to said executive official,
such that the presumption in this situation inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of
disclosure.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Quintessential” and “Non-Delegable,” Defined; The fact that a
power is subject to the concurrence of another entity does not make such power less executive;
“Quintessential” is defined as the most perfect embodiment of something, the concentrated essence of
substance; “Non-delegable” means that a power or duty cannot be delegated to another or, even if delegated,
the responsibility remains with the obligor; The fact that the President has to secure the prior concurrence of
the Monetary Board, which shall submit to Congress a complete report of its decision before contracting or
guaranteeing foreign loans, does not diminish the executive nature of the power.—The fact that a power is
subject to the concurrence of another entity does not make such power less executive. “Quintessential” is
defined as the most perfect embodiment of something, the concentrated essence of substance. On the other
hand, “non-delegable” means that a power or duty cannot be delegated to another or, even if delegated, the
responsibility remains with the obligor. The power to enter into an executive agreement is in essence an
executive power. This authority of the Presi Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Quintessential”
and “Non-Delegable,” Defined; The fact that a power is subject to the concurrence of another entity does not
make such power less executive; “Quintessential” is defined as the most perfect embodiment of something,
the concentrated essence of substance; “Non-delegable” means that a power or duty cannot be delegated to
another or, even if delegated, the responsibility remains with the obligor; The fact that the President has to
secure the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, which shall submit to Congress a complete report of its
decision before contracting or guaranteeing foreign loans, does not diminish the executive nature of the
power.—The fact that a power is subject to the concurrence of another entity does not make such power less
executive. “Quintessential” is defined as the most perfect embodiment of something, the concentrated essence
of substance. On the other hand, “non-delegable” means that a power or duty cannot be delegated to another
or, even if delegated, the responsibility remains with the obligor. The power to enter into an executive
agreement is in essence an executive power. This authority of the Presi dent to enter into executive
agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence. Now, the fact that the President has to secure the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board,
which shall submit to Congress a complete report of its decision before contracting or guaranteeing foreign
loans, does not diminish the executive nature of the power.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of “Operational Proximity”; The doctrine of “operational proximity”
was laid down precisely to limit the scope of the presidential communications privilege.—It must be stressed
that the doctrine of “operational proximity” was laid down in In re: Sealed Case, No. 96-3124, June 17, 1997,
121 F.3d 729, 326 U.S. App. D.C. 276, precisely to limit the scope of the presidential communications privilege.
The U.S. court was aware of the dangers that a limitless extension of the privilege risks and, therefore,
carefully cabined its reach by explicitly confining it to White House staff, and not to staffs of the agencies, and
then only to White House staff that has “operational proximity” to direct presidential decision-making.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; “Organizational Test”; In determining which test to use—whether the
Operational Proximity Test or the Organizational Test—the main consideration is to limit the availability of
executive privilege only to officials who stand proximate to the President, not only by reason of their function,
but also by reason of their positions in the Executive’s organizational structure.—In the case at bar, the
danger of expanding the privilege “to a large swath of the executive branch” (a fear apparently entertained by
respondents) is absent because the official involved here is a member of the Cabinet, thus, properly within the
term “advisor” of the President; in fact, her alter ego and a member of her official family. Nevertheless, in
circumstances in which the official involved is far too remote, this Court also mentioned in the Decision the
organizational test laid down in Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Department of Justice, 365 F 3d. 1108, 361 U.S. App.
D.C. 183, 64 Fed. R. Evid. Serv.141. This goes to show that the operational proximity test used in the Decision
is not considered conclusive in every case. In determining which test to use, the main consideration is to limit
the availability of executive privilege only to officials who stand proximate to the President, not only by
reason of their function, but also by reason of their positions in the Executive’s organizational structure. Thus,
respondent Committees’ fear that the scope of the privilege would be unnecessarily expanded with the use of
the operational proximity test is unfounded.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Congress must not require the Executive to state the reasons for the claim with
such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect.—It must
be stressed that the President’s claim of executive privilege is not merely founded on her generalized interest
in confidentiality. The Letter dated November 15, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita specified presidential
communications privilege in relation to diplomatic and economic relations with another sovereign nation as
the bases for the claim. Thus, the Letter stated: The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is
that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with
the People’s Republic of China. Given the confidential nature in which this information were conveyed to the
President, he cannot provide the Committee any further details of these conversations, without disclosing the
very thing the privilege is designed to protect. (emphasis supplied) Even in Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1
(2006), it was held that Congress must not require the Executive to state the reasons for the claim with such
particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect. This is a
matter of respect for a coordinate and co-equal department.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Considering that the information sought through the three (3) questions subject of
this Petition involves the President’s dealings with a foreign nation, with more reason, the Court is wary of
approving the view that Congress may peremptorily inquire into not only official, documented acts of the
President but even her confidential and informal discussions with her close advisors on the pretext that said
questions serve some vague legislative need.—Considering that the information sought through the three (3)
questions subject of this Petition involves the President’s dealings with a foreign nation, with more reason,
this Court is wary of approving the view that Congress may peremptorily inquire into not only official,
documented acts of the President but even her confidential and informal discussions with her close advisors
on the pretext that said questions serve some vague legislative need. Regardless of who is in office, this Court
can easily foresee unwanted consequences Same; Same; Same; Same; Considering that the information sought
through the three (3) questions subject of this Petition involves the President’s dealings with a foreign nation,
with more reason, the Court is wary of approving the view that Congress may peremptorily inquire into not
only official, documented acts of the President but even her confidential and informal discussions with her
close advisors on the pretext that said questions serve some vague legislative need.—Considering that the
information sought through the three (3) questions subject of this Petition involves the President’s dealings
with a foreign nation, with more reason, this Court is wary of approving the view that Congress may
peremptorily inquire into not only official, documented acts of the President but even her confidential and
informal discussions with her close advisors on the pretext that said questions serve some vague legislative
need. Regardless of who is in office, this Court can easily foresee unwanted consequences.

Same; Same; Same; Public Officers; Right to Information; Accountability and Transparency; The constitutional
right of the people to information and the constitutional policies on public accountability and transparency
are the twin postulates vital to the effective functioning of a democratic government.—There is no debate as
to the importance of the constitutional right of the people to information and the constitutional policies on
public accountability and transparency. These are the twin postulates vital to the effective functioning of a
democratic government. The citizenry can become prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the
power has been delegated if they are denied access to information. And the policies on public accountability
and democratic government would certainly be mere empty words if access to such information of public
concern is denied. In the case at bar, this Court, in upholding executive privilege with respect to three (3)
specific questions, did not in any way curb the public’s right to information or diminish the importance of
public accountability and transparency.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The right to information is not an absolute right—that there is a
recognized public interest in the confidentiality of such information covered by executive privilege is a
recognized principle in other democratic States.—This Court did not rule that the Senate has no power to
investigate the NBN Project in aid of legislation. There is nothing in the assailed Decision that prohibits
respondent Committees from inquiring into the NBN Project. They could continue the investigation and even
call petitioner Neri to testify again. He himself has repeatedly expressed his willingness to do so. Our Decision
merely excludes from the scope of respondents’ investigation the three (3) questions that elicit answers
covered by executive privilege and rules that petitioner cannot be compelled to appear before respondents to
answer the said questions. We have discussed the reasons why these answers are covered by executive
privilege. That there is a recognized public interest in the confidentiality of such information is a recognized
principle in other democratic States. To put it simply, the right to information is not an absolute right. Indeed,
the constitutional provisions cited by respondent Committees do not espouse an absolute right to
information. By their wording, the intention of the Framers to subject such right to the regulation of the law is
unmistakable.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to
his right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by
Congress and neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from
government officials.—The right primarily involved here is the right of respondent Committees to obtain
information allegedly in aid of legislation, not the people’s right to public information. This is the reason why
we stressed in the assailed Decision the distinction between these two rights. As laid down in Senate v.
Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006), “the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to
information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress” and
“neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials.”
As pointed out, these rights belong to Congress, not to the individual citizen. It is worth mentioning at this
juncture that the parties here are respondent Committees and petitioner Neri and that there was no prior
request for information on the part of any individual citizen. This Court will not be swayed by attempts to
blur the distinctions between the Legislature’s right to information in a legitimate legislative inquiry and the
public’s right to information.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court cannot uphold the view that when a constitutionally guaranteed
privilege or right is validly invoked by a witness in the course of a legislative investigation, the legislative
purpose of the Committees’ questions can be sufficiently supported by the expedient of mentioning statutes
and/or pending bills to which their inquiry as a whole may have relevance—the presumption of privilege can
only be overturned by a showing of compelling need for disclosure of the information covered by executive
privilege.—It must be clarified that the Decision did not pass upon the nature of respondent Committees’
inquiry into the NBN Project. To reiterate, this Court recognizes respondent Committees’ power to investigate
the NBN Project in aid of legislation. However, this Court cannot uphold the view that when a constitutionally
guaranteed privilege or right is validly invoked by a witness in the course of a legislative investigation, the
legislative purpose of respondent Committees’ questions can be sufficiently supported by the expedient of
mentioning statutes and/or pending bills to which their inquiry as a whole may have relevance. The
jurisprudential test laid down by this Court in past decisions on executive privilege is that the presumption of
privilege can only be overturned by a showing of compelling need for disclosure of the information covered
by executive privilege.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The need for hard facts in crafting legislation cannot be equated with the
compelling or demonstratively critical and specific need for facts which is so essential to the judicial power to
adjudicate actual controversies.—The need for hard facts in crafting legislation cannot be equated with the
compelling or demonstratively critical and specific need for facts which is so essential to the judicial power to
adjudicate actual controversies. Also, the bare standard of “pertinency” set in Arnault cannot be lightly
applied to the instant case, which unlike Arnault involves a conflict between two (2) separate, co-equal and
coordinate Branches of the Government.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Whatever test we may apply, the starting point in resolving the conflicting claims
between the Executive and the Legislative Branches is the recognized existence of the presumptive
presidential communications privilege.—Whatever test we may apply, the starting point in resolving the
conflicting claims between the Executive and the Legislative Branches is the recognized existence of the
presumptive presidential communications privilege. This is conceded even in the Dissenting Opinion of the
Honorable Chief Justice Puno, which states: A hard look at Senate v. Ermita ought to yield the conclusion that
it bestowed a qualified presumption in favor of the Presidential communications privilege. As shown in the
previous discussion, U.S. v. Nixon, as well as the other related Nixon cases Sirica and Senate Select Committee
on Presidential Campaign Activities, et al. v. Nixon in the D.C. Court of Appeals, as well as subsequent cases all
recognize that there is a presumptive privilege in favor of Presidential communications. The Almonte case
quoted U.S. v. Nixon and recognized a presumption in favor of confidentiality of Presidential communications.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The presumption in favor of Presidential communications puts the burden on the
respondent Senate Committees to overturn the presumption by demonstrating their specific need for the
information to be elicited by the answers to the three (3) questions subject of this case, to enable them to
craft legislation—for sure, a factual basis for situations covered by bills is not critically needed before
legislative bodies can come up with relevant legislation unlike in the adjudication of cases by courts of law.—
The presumption in favor of Presidential communications puts the burden on the respondent Senate
Committees to overturn the presumption by demonstrating their specific need for the information to be
elicited by the answers to the three (3) questions subject of this case, to enable them to craft legislation. Here,
there is simply a generalized assertion that the information is pertinent to the exercise of the power to
legislate and a broad and non-specific reference to pending Senate bills. It is not clear what matters relating to
these bills could not be determined without the said information sought by the three (3) questions. As
correctly pointed out by the Honorable Justice Dante O. Tinga in his Separate Concurring Opinion: …If
respondents are operating under the premise that the president and/or her executive officials have
committed wrongdoings that need to be corrected or prevented from recurring by remedial legislation, the
answer to those three questions will not necessarily bolster or inhibit respondents from proceeding with
such legislation. They could easily presume the worst of the president in enacting such legislation.  For sure, a
factual basis for situations covered by bills is not critically needed before legislatives bodies can come up with
relevant legislation unlike in the adjudication of cases by courts of law.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Oversight Function; Anent the function to curb graft and corruption, it must be
stressed that respondent Committees’ need for information in the exercise of this function is not as
compelling as in instances when the purpose of the inquiry is legislative in nature—curbing graft and
corruption is merely an oversight function of Congress.—Anent the function to curb graft and corruption, it
must be stressed that respondent Committees’ need for information in the exercise of this function is not as
compelling as in instances when the purpose of the inquiry is legislative in nature. This is because curbing
graft and corruption is merely an oversight function of Congress. And if this is the primary objective of
respondent Committees in asking the three (3) questions covered by privilege, it may even contradict their
claim that their purpose is legislative in nature and not oversight. In any event, whether or not investigating
graft and corruption is a legislative or oversight function of Congress, respondent Committees’ investigation
cannot transgress bounds set by the Constitution.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; While it may be a worthy endeavor to investigate the potential culpability of
high government officials, including the President, in a given government transaction, it is simply not a task
for the Senate to perform—the role of the Legislature is to make laws, not to determine anyone’s guilt of a
crime or wrongdoing.—The general thrust and the tenor of the three (3) questions is to trace the alleged
bribery to the Office of the President. While it may be a worthy endeavor to investigate the potential
culpability of high government officials, including the President, in a given government transaction, it is
simply not a task for the Senate to perform. The role of the Legislature is to make laws, not to determine
anyone’s guilt of a crime or wrongdoing. Our Constitution has not bestowed upon the Legislature the latter
role. Just as the Judiciary cannot legislate, neither can the Legislature adjudicate or prosecute.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Congress; There is no Congressional power to expose for the sake of
exposure.—No matter how noble the intentions of respondent Committees are, they cannot assume the
power reposed upon our prosecutorial bodies and courts. The determination of who is/are liable for a crime
or illegal activity, the investigation of the role played by each official, the determination of who should be
haled to court for prosecution and the task of coming up with conclusions and finding of facts regarding
anomalies, especially the determination of criminal guilt, are not functions of the Senate. Congress is neither a
law enforcement nor a trial agency. Moreover, it bears stressing that no inquiry is an end in itself; it must be
related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress, i.e. legislation. Investigations conducted
solely to gather incriminatory evidence and “punish” those investigated are indefensible. There is no
Congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Ombudsman; Courts; The Office of the Ombudsman is the body properly
equipped by the Constitution and our laws to preliminarily determine whether or not the allegations of
anomaly are true and who are liable therefor, and the same holds true for our courts upon which the
Constitution reposes the duty to determine criminal guilt with finality.—It is important to stress that
complaints relating to the NBN Project have already been filed against President Arroyo and other
personalities before the Office of the Ombudsman. Under our Constitution, it is the Ombudsman who has the
duty “to investigate any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.” The Office of the Ombudsman is the body
properly equipped by the Constitution and our laws to preliminarily determine whether or not the allegations
of anomaly are true and who are liable therefor. The same holds true for our courts upon which the
Constitution reposes the duty to determine criminal guilt with finality. Indeed, the rules of procedure in the
Office of the Ombudsman and the courts are well-defined and ensure that the constitutionally guaranteed
rights of all persons, parties and witnesses alike, are protected and safeguarded.

Same; Same; Congress; The Legislature’s need for information in an investigation of graft and corruption
cannot be deemed compelling enough to pierce the confidentiality of information validly covered by executive
privilege.—Should respondent Committees uncover information related to a possible crime in the course of
their investigation, they have the constitutional duty to refer the matter to the appropriate agency or branch
of government. Thus, the Legislature’s need for information in an investigation of graft and corruption cannot
be deemed compelling enough to pierce the confidentiality of information validly covered by executive
privilege. As discussed above, the Legislature can still legislate on graft and corruption even without the
information covered by the three (3) questions subject of the petition.

Same; Same; Same; Legislative inquiries, unlike court proceedings, are not subject to the exacting standards of
evidence essential to arrive at accurate factual findings to which to apply the law; Every person, from the
highest public official to the most ordinary citizen, has the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty
in proper proceedings by a competent court or body.—Legislative inquiries, unlike court proceedings, are not
subject to the exacting standards of evidence essential to arrive at accurate factual findings to which to apply
the law. Hence, Section 10 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provides
that “technical rules of evidence applicable to judicial proceedings which do not affect substantive rights need
not be observed by the Committee.” Court rules which prohibit leading, hypothetical, or repetitive questions
or questions calling for a hearsay answer, to name a few, do not apply to a legislative inquiry. Every person,
from the highest public official to the most ordinary citizen, has the right to be presumed innocent until
proven guilty in proper proceedings by a competent court or body.
Same; Congress; An unconstrained congressional investigative power, like an unchecked Executive, generates
its own abuses.—Respondent Committees’ second argument rests on the view that the ruling in Senate v.
Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006), requiring invitations or subpoenas to contain the “possible needed statute which
prompted the need for the inquiry” along with the “usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the
questions relative to and in furtherance thereof” is not provided for by the Constitution and is merely an
obiter dictum. On the contrary, the Court sees the rationale and necessity of compliance with these
requirements. An unconstrained congressional investigative power, like an unchecked Executive, generates
its own abuses. Consequently, claims that the investigative power of Congress has been abused (or has the
potential for abuse) have been raised many times. Constant exposure to congressional subpoena takes its toll
on the ability of the Executive to function effectively. The requirements set forth in Senate v. Ermita are
modest mechanisms that would not unduly limit Congress’ power. The legislative inquiry must be confined to
permissible areas and thus, prevent the “roving commissions” referred to in the U.S. case, Kilbourn v.
Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880). Likewise, witnesses have their constitutional right to due process. They
should be adequately informed what matters are to be covered by the inquiry. It will also allow them to
prepare the pertinent information and documents. To our mind, these requirements concede too little
political costs or burdens on the part of Congress when viewed vis-à -vis the immensity of its power of
inquiry.

Same; Courts; Judicial Review; While it is true that the Court must refrain from reviewing the internal
processes of Congress, as a co-equal branch of government, however, when a constitutional requirement
exists, the Court has the duty to look into Congress’ compliance therewith.—Anent the third argument,
respondent Committees contend that their Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation (the
“Rules”) are beyond the reach of this Court. While it is true that this Court must refrain from reviewing the
internal processes of Congress, as a co-equal branch of government, however, when a constitutional
requirement exists, the Court has the duty to look into Congress’ compliance therewith. We cannot turn a
blind eye to possible violations of the Constitution simply out of courtesy.

Same; Same; Contempt; The Court does not believe that respondent Committees have the discretion to set
aside their rules anytime they wish, and this is especially true where what is involved is the contempt power;
It must be stressed that the Rules are not promulgated to benefit legislative committees—more than anybody
else, it is the witness who has the highest stake in the proper observance of the Rules.—Obviously the
deliberation of the respondent Committees that led to the issuance of the contempt order is flawed. Instead of
being submitted to a full debate by all the members of the respondent Committees, the contempt order was
prepared and thereafter presented to the other members for signing. As a result, the contempt order which
was issued on January 30, 2008 was not a faithful representation of the proceedings that took place on said
date. Records clearly show that not all of those who signed the contempt order were present during the
January 30, 2008 deliberation when the matter was taken up. Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution states
that: The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of person appearing in
or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. (Emphasis supplied) All the limitations embodied in the
foregoing provision form part of the witness’ settled expectation. If the limitations are not observed, the
witness’ settled expectation is shattered. Here, how could there be a majority vote when the members in
attendance are not enough to arrive at such majority? Petitioner has the right to expect that he can be cited in
contempt only through a majority vote in a proceeding in which the matter has been fully deliberated upon.
There is a greater measure of protection for the witness when the concerns and objections of the members
are fully articulated in such proceeding. We do not believe that respondent Committees have the discretion to
set aside their rules anytime they wish. This is especially true here where what is involved is the contempt
power. It must be stressed that the Rules are not promulgated for their benefit. More than anybody else, it is
the witness who has the highest stake in the proper observance of the Rules.

Senate; Certainly, there is no debate that the Senate as an institution is “continuing,” as it is not dissolved as
an entity with each national election or change in the composition of its members, but in the conduct of its
day-to-day business the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate of the
Congress before it.—On the nature of the Senate as a “continuing body,” this Court sees fit to issue a
clarification. Certainly, there is no debate that the Senate as an institution is “continuing,” as it is not dissolved
as an entity with each national election or change in the composition of its members. However, in the conduct
of its day-to-day business the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate of the
Congress before it. The Rules of the Senate itself confirms this when it states: RULE XLIV UNFINISHED
BUSINESS SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall be taken up at the next session in the
same status. All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress,
but may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if present for the first time. (emphasis supplied) Undeniably
from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e. unpassed bills and even legislative
investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are considered terminated upon the expiration of that
Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished
matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the first time. The logic and practicality of such a rule is
readily apparent considering that the Senate of the succeeding Congress (which will typically have a different
composition as that of the previous Congress) should not be bound by the acts and deliberations of the Senate
of which they had no part. If the Senate is a continuing body even with respect to the conduct of its business,
then pending matters will not be deemed terminated with the expiration of one Congress but will, as a matter
of course, continue into the next Congress with the same status.

Same; Rules on Legislative Inquiries; It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules for its legislative
inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly state that the same shall be effective
in subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.—Section
136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into account the new composition of the Senate after an election
and the possibility of the amendment or revision of the Rules at the start of each session in which the newly
elected Senators shall begin their term. However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its main
rules are intended to be valid from the date of their adoption until they are amended or repealed. Such
language is conspicuously absent from the Rules. The Rules simply state “(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven
(7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.” The latter does not explicitly provide
for the continued effectivity of such rules until they are amended or repealed. In view of the difference in the
language of the two sets of Senate rules, it cannot be presumed that the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would
continue into the next Congress. The Senate of the next Congress may easily adopt different rules for its
legislative inquiries which come within the rule on unfinished business. The language of Section 21, Article VI
of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be conducted in accordance with the duly published rules of
procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in
each Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly state that the same shall be effective in
subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice. If it was the
intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative inquiries to be effective even in the next Congress, it
could have easily adopted the same language it had used in its main rules regarding effectivity.

Same; Same; Not all orders issued or proceedings conducted pursuant to the subject Rules are null and void—
only those that result in violation of the rights of witnesses should be considered null and void, considering
that the rationale for the publication is to protect the rights of witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI
of the Constitution.—Lest the Court be misconstrued, it should likewise be stressed that not all orders issued
or proceedings conducted pursuant to the subject Rules are null and void. Only those that result in violation
of the rights of witnesses should be considered null and void, considering that the rationale for the
publication is to protect the rights of witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. Sans
such violation, orders and proceedings are considered valid and effective.  

Separation of Powers; Checks and Balances; In a free and democratic society, the interests of these Executive
and Legislative branches inevitably clash, but each must treat the other with official courtesy and respect.—
On a concluding note, we are not unmindful of the fact that the Executive and the Legislature are political
branches of government. In a free and democratic society, the interests of these branches inevitably clash, but
each must treat the other with official courtesy and respect. This Court wholeheartedly concurs with the
proposition that it is imperative for the continued health of our democratic institutions that we preserve the
constitutionally mandated checks and balances among the different branches of government.

Same; Same; Accountability and Transparency; There is no question that any story of government
malfeasance deserves an inquiry into its veracity, but the best venue for this noble undertaking is not in the
political branches of government—the customary partisanship and the absence of generally accepted rules
on evidence are too great an obstacle in arriving at the truth or achieving justice that meets the test of the
constitutional guarantee of due process of law.—While this Court finds laudable the respondent Committees’
well-intentioned efforts to ferret out corruption, even in the highest echelons of government, such lofty
intentions do not validate or accord to Congress powers denied to it by the Constitution and granted instead
to the other branches of government. There is no question that any story of government malfeasance
deserves an inquiry into its veracity. As respondent Committees contend, this is founded on the constitutional
command of transparency and public accountability. The recent clamor for a “search for truth” by the general
public, the religious community and the academe is an indication of a concerned citizenry, a nation that
demands an accounting of an entrusted power. However, the best venue for this noble undertaking is not in
the political branches of government. The customary partisanship and the absence of generally accepted rules
on evidence are too great an obstacle in arriving at the truth or achieving justice that meets the test of the
constitutional guarantee of due process of law. We believe the people deserve a more exacting “search for
truth” than the process here in question, if that is its objective.

26.3. CARPIO, J., Dissenting and Concurring Opinion:

Constitutional Law; Presidency; Congress; Separation of Powers; Executive Privilege; The Constitution does
not expressly grant executive privilege power to the President but courts have long recognized implied
Presidential powers if “necessary and proper” in carrying out powers and functions expressly granted to the
Executive under the Constitution.—Executive privilege is the implied constitutional power of the President to
withhold information requested by other branches of the government. The Constitution does not expressly
grant this power to the President but courts have long recognized implied Presidential powers if “necessary
and proper” in carrying out powers and functions expressly granted to the Executive under the Constitution.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Executive privilege is not absolute; Interest of protecting military, national
security and diplomatic secrets as well as Presidential communications, must be weighed against other
constitutionally recognized interests.—Exe cutive privilege, however, is not absolute. The interest of
protecting military, national security and diplomatic secrets, as well as Presidential communications, must be
weighed against other constitutionally recognized interests. There is the declared state policy of full public
disclosure of all transactions involving public interest, the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern, the accountability of public officers, the power of legislative inquiry, and the judicial power to
secure testimonial and documentary evidence in deciding cases.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; In conflicts between the Executive and the Legislature involving executive
privilege, the Judiciary encourages negotiation between the Executive and Legislature as the preferred route
of conflict resolution.—The Judiciary, however, will consider executive privilege only if the issues cannot be
resolved on some other legal grounds. In conflicts between the Executive and the Legislature involving
executive privilege, the Judiciary encourages negotiation between the Executive and Legislature as the
preferred route of conflict resolution. Only if judicial resolution is unavoidable will courts resolve such
disputes between the Executive and Legislature.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Information covered by executive privilege remains confidential even after
the expiry of the terms of office of the President, Cabinet members and presidential advisers.—Information
covered by executive privilege remains confidential even after the expiry of the terms of office of the
President, Cabinet members and presidential advisers. Thus, a former President can assert executive
privilege. The character of executive privilege attaches to the information and not to the person. Executive
privilege is for the benefit of the State and not for the benefit of the office holder. Even death does not
extinguish the confidentiality of information covered by executive privilege.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Executive privilege cannot be invoked to hide a crime because the President
is neither empowered nor tasked to conceal a crime; It cannot also be used to hide private matters, like
private financial transactions of the President.—Executive privilege must be exercised by the President in
pursuance of official powers and functions. Executive privilege cannot be invoked to hide a crime because the
President is neither empowered nor tasked to conceal a crime. On the contrary, the President has the
constitutional duty to enforce criminal laws and cause the prosecution of crimes. Executive privilege cannot
also be used to hide private matters, like private financial transactions of the President. Private matters are
those not undertaken pursuant to the lawful powers and official functions of the Executive. However, like all
citizens, the President has a constitutional right to privacy. In conducting inquiries, the Legislature must
respect the right to privacy of citizens, including the President’s.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Executive privilege must be invoked with specificity sufficient to inform the
Legislature and the Judiciary that the matter claimed as privileged refers to military, national security or
diplomatic secrets or to confidential Presidential communications.—Executive privilege must be invoked
with specificity sufficient to inform the Legislature and the Judiciary that the matter claimed as privileged
refers to military, national security or diplomatic secrets, or to confidential Presidential communications. A
claim of executive privilege accompanied by sufficient specificity gives rise to a presumptive executive
privilege. A generalized assertion of executive privilege, without external evidence or circumstances
indicating that the matter refers to any of the recognized categories of executive privilege, will not give rise to
presumptive executive privilege.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Executive privilege must be invoked after the question is asked by the
legislative committee, not before.—Executive privilege must be invoked after the question is asked by the
legislative committee, not before. A witness cannot raise hypothetical questions that the committee may ask,
claim executive privilege on such questions, and on that basis refuse to appear before the legislative
committee. If the legislative committee furnished in advance the questions to the witness, the witness must
bring with him the letter of the President or Executive Secretary invoking executive privilege and stating the
reasons for such claim. If the legislative committee did not furnish in advance the questions, the witness must
first appear before the legislative committee, wait for the question to be asked, and then raise executive
privilege. The legislative committee must then give the witness sufficient time to consult the President or
Executive Secretary whether the President will claim executive privilege. At the next hearing, the witness can
bring with him the letter of the President or Executive Secretary, and if he fails to bring such letter, the
witness must answer the question.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Powers of Inquiry; The Legislature can conduct inquiries not specifically to enact
laws, but specifically to oversee the implementation of laws.—The Legislature can conduct inquiries not
specifically to enact laws, but specifically to oversee the implementation of laws. This is the mandate of
various legislative oversight committees which admittedly can conduct inquiries on the status of the
implementation of laws. In the exercise of the legislative oversight function, there is always the potential,
even if not expressed or predicted, that the oversight committees may discover the need to improve the laws
they oversee and thus recommend amendment of the laws. This is sufficient reason for the valid exercise of
the power of legislative inquiry. Indeed, the oversight function of the Legislature may at times be as
important as its law-making function.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Constitution imposes two other limitations on the power of legislative
inquiry.—Aside from the purpose of the inquiry, the Constitution imposes two other limitations on the power
of legislative inquiry. One, the rules of procedure for the inquiry must be duly published. Publication of the
rules of the inquiry is an essential requirement of due process. Two, the rights of persons appearing before
the investigating committees, or affected by such inquiries, must be respected. These rights include the right
against self-incrimination, as well as the right to privacy of communications and correspondence of a private
nature. The power of legislative inquiry does not reach into the private affairs of citizens.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Due Process; To avoid doubts on whether there is fair notice, the witness
must be given in advance the questions pertaining to the basic nature of the inquiry.—Also protected is the
right to due process, which means that a witness must be given “fair notice” of the subject of the legislative
inquiry. Fair notice is important because the witness may be cited in contempt, and even detained, if he
refuses or fails to answer. Moreover, false testimony before a legislative body is a crime. Thus, the witness
must be sufficiently informed of the nature of the inquiry so the witness can reasonably prepare for possible
questions of the legisla tive committee. To avoid doubts on whether there is fair notice, the witness must be
given in advance the questions pertaining to the basic nature of the inquiry. From these advance questions,
the witness can infer other follow-up or relevant questions that the legislative committee may ask in the
course of the inquiry.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The two principal means of enforcing the power of inquiry are for the
Legislature to order the arrest of a witness who refuses to appear, and to detain a witness who refuses to
answer.—The Legislature has the inherent power to enforce by compulsion its power of inquiry. The
Legislature can enforce its power of inquiry through its own sergeant-at-arms without the aid of law
enforcement officers of the Executive or resort to the courts. The two principal means of enforcing the power
of inquiry are for the Legislature to order the arrest of a witness who refuses to appear, and to detain a
witness who refuses to answer. A law that makes a crime the refusal to appear before the Legislature does not
divest the Legislature of its inherent power to arrest a recalcitrant witness.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Contempt; Legislature can cite in contempt and order the arrest of a witness who
fails to appear pursuant to a subpoena ad testificandum.—The Legislature can cite in contempt and order the
arrest of a witness who fails to appear pursuant to a subpoena ad testificandum. There is no distinction
between direct and indirect contempt of the Legislature because both can be punished motu proprio by the
Legislature upon failure of the witness to appear or answer. Contempt of the Legislature is different from
contempt of court.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Executive privilege applies only to protect official acts and functions of the
President, never to conceal illegal acts by anyone, not even those of the President.—Executive privilege can
never be used to hide a crime or wrongdoing, even if committed by high government officials. Executive
privilege applies only to protect official acts and functions of the President, never to conceal illegal acts by
anyone, not even those of the President. During the oral arguments on 4 March 2008, counsel for petitioner
admitted that executive privilege cannot be invoked to hide a crime. Counsel for petitioner also admitted that
petitioner and the President discussed a scandal, and that the “scandal was about bribery.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; The bare claim that disclosure “might impair” diplomatic relations with China,
without specification of external evidence and circumstances justifying such claim, is insufficient to give rise
to any presumptive executive privilege.—The Ermita Letter merely raises a generalized assertion of executive
privilege on diplomatic matters. The bare claim that disclosure “might impair” diplomatic relations with
China, without specification of external evidence and circumstances justifying such claim, is insufficent to give
rise to any presumptive executive privilege. A claim of executive privilege is presumptively valid if there is
specificity in the claim. The claim of impairment of economic relations with China is invalid because
impairment of economic relations, involving “foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines,” is not a
recognized ground for invoking executive privilege.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Impairment of economic relations is not a recognized ground.—The bases for the
claim of executive privilege are what the Ermita Letter states, namely, confidential Presidential conversations
and impairment of diplomatic and economic relations. However, impairment of economic relations is not
even a recognized ground. In short, this Court can only consider confidential Presidential conversations and
impairment of diplomatic relations as grounds for the invocation of executive privilege in this petition.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Senate under the 1987 Constitution is not a continuing body; Rules of Procedure
must be republished by the Senate after every expiry of the term of twelve Senators.—The present Senate
under the 1987 Constitution is no longer a continuing legislative body. The present Senate has twenty-four
members, twelve of whom are elected every three years for a term of six years each. Thus, the term of twelve
Senators expires every three years, leaving less than a majority of Senators to continue into the next
Congress. The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 Constitution, requires a majority of Senators to “constitute a
quorum to do business.” Applying the same reasoning in Arnault v. Nazareno, the Senate under the 1987
Constitution is not a continuing body because less than majority of the Senators continue into the next
Congress. The consequence is that the Rules of Procedure must be re-published by the Senate after every
expiry of the term of twelve Senators.

Same; Same; Same; Due Process; Failure of the Senate to publish its rules of Procedure as required in Section
22, Article VI of the Constitution renders the Rules of Procedure void.—Due process requires that “fair notice”
be given to citizens before rules that put their liberty at risk take effect. The failure of the Senate to publish its
Rules of Procedure as required in Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution renders the Rules of Procedure
void. Thus, the Senate cannot enforce its Rules of Procedure.

Same; Same; Same; Contempt; The Senate’s Order of 30 January 2008 citing petitioner in contempt and
ordering his arrest is void due to the non-publication of the Rules of Procedure.—The Senate and its
investigating committees have the implied power to cite in contempt and order the arrest of a witness who
refuses to appear despite the issuance of a subpoena. The Senate can enforce the power of arrest through its
own Sergeant-at-Arms. In the present case, based on the Minutes of Meetings and other documents submitted
by respondents, the majority of the regular members of each of the respondent Committees voted to cite
petitioner in contempt and order his arrest. However, the Senate’s Order of 30 January 2008 citing petitioner
in contempt and ordering his arrest is void due to the non-publication of the Rules of Procedure. The arrest of
a citizen is a deprivation of liberty. The Constitution prohibits deprivation of liberty without due process of
law. The Senate or its investigating committees can exercise the implied power to arrest only in accordance
with due process which requires publication of the Senate’s Rules of Procedure. This Court has required
judges to comply strictly with the due process requirements in exercising their express constitutional power
to issue warrants of arrest. This Court has voided warrants of arrest issued by judges who failed to comply
with due process. This Court can do no less for arrest orders issued by the Senate or its committees in
violation of due process.

27. ROMERO v. ESTRADA, 583 SCRA 396 (2009)

Remedial Law; Sub Judice Rule; The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to judicial
proceedings to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice.
—The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to judicial proceedings to avoid
prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice. A violation of the sub
judice rule may render one liable for indirect contempt under Sec. 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. The
rationale for the rule adverted to is set out in Nestlé Philippines v. Sanchez, 154 SCRA 542 (1987): [I]t is a
traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact
and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence
produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or
sympathies.

Same; Same; An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy, so that a determination of the issue would be without practical use and value.—The sub judice
issue has been rendered moot and academic by the supervening issuance of the en banc Resolution of July 1,
2008 in G.R. No. 164527. An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a
justiciable controversy, so that a determination of the issue would be without practical use and value. In such
cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which the petitioner would be entitled and which would be
negated by the dismissal of the petition. Courts decline jurisdiction over such cases or dismiss them on the
ground of mootness, save in certain exceptional instances, none of which, however, obtains under the
premises.

Same; Same; A legislative investigation in aid of legislation and court proceedings has different purposes; On-
going judicial proceedings do not preclude congressional hearings in aid of legislation.—A legislative
investigation in aid of legislation and court proceedings has different purposes. On one hand, courts conduct
hearings or like adjudicative procedures to settle, through the application of a law, actual controversies
arising between adverse litigants and involving demandable rights. On the other hand, inquiries in aid of
legislation are, inter alia, undertaken as tools to enable the legislative body to gather information and, thus,
legislate wisely and effectively; and to determine whether there is a need to improve existing laws or enact
new or remedial legislation, albeit the inquiry need not result in any potential legislation. On-going judicial
proceedings do not preclude congressional hearings in aid of legislation.

Same; Same; Court has no authority to prohibit a Senate Committee from requiring persons to appear and
testify before it in connection with an inquiry in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules
of procedure.—With the foregoing disquisition, the Court need not belabor the other issues raised in this
recourse.

Suffice it to state that when the Committee issued invitations and subpoenas to petitioners to appear before it
in connection with its investigation of the aforementioned investments, it did so pursuant to its authority to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. This is clearly provided in Art. VI, Sec. 21 of the Constitution, which was
quoted at the outset. And the Court has no authority to prohibit a Senate committee from requiring persons to
appear and testify before it in connection with an inquiry in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure. Sabio emphasizes the importance of the duty of those subpoenaed to appear
before the legislature, even if incidentally incriminating questions are expected to be asked.
28. BALAG v. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, – SCRA – (G.R. No. 234608, July 3, 2018)

The period of detention under the Senate's inherent power of contempt is not indefinite: The Court finds that
there is a genuine necessity to place a limitation on the period of imprisonment that may be imposed by the
Senate pursuant to its inherent power of contempt during inquiries in aid of legislation.  Section 21, Article
VI of the Constitution states that Congress, in conducting inquiries in aid of legislation, must respect
the rights of persons appearing in or affected therein.

The Court finds that the period of imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt by the Senate
during inquiries in aid of legislation should only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry
under which the said power is invoked

29. BELGICA v. OCHOA, JR., 710 SCRA 1 (2013)

The Legislative branch of government, much more any of its members, should not cross over the field of
implementing the national budget since, as earlier stated, the same is properly the domain of the Executive.
Again, in Guingona, Jr., the Court stated that “Congress enters the picture [when it] deliberates or acts on the
budget proposals of the President. Thereafter, Congress, “in the exercise of its own judgment and wisdom,
formulates an appropriation act precisely following the process established by the Constitution, which
specifies that no money may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with an appropriation made by
law.” Upon approval and passage of the GAA, Congress’ law-making role necessarily comes to an end and from
there the Executive’s role of implementing the national budget begins. So as not to blur the constitutional
boundaries between them, Congress must “not concern itself with details for implementation by the
Executive.” The foregoing cardinal postulates were definitively enunciated in Abakada where the Court held
that “[f]rom the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its
members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of
separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.” It must be clarified, however, that since the restriction
only pertains to “any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law,” Congress may still exercise its
oversight function which is a mechanism of checks and balances that the Constitution itself allows. But it must
be made clear that Congress’ role must be confined to mere oversight. Any post-enactment-measure allowing
legislator participation beyond oversight is bereft of any constitutional basis and hence, tantamount to
impermissible interference and/or assumption of executive functions.

Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and
fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to
intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. Indeed, by virtue of
the foregoing, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in — as Guingona, Jr.
puts it — “the various operational aspects of budgeting,” including “the evaluation of work and financial plans
for individual activities” and the “regulation and release of funds” in violation of the separation of powers
principle. The fundamental rule, as categorically articulated in Abakada, cannot be overstated — from the
moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to
play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers
and is thus unconstitutional. That the said authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not
alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition, to repeat, covers any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the Court must therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa which
sanctioned the conduct of legislator identification on the guise that the same is merely recommendatory and,
as such, respondents’ reliance on the same falters altogether.
The Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow
legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the
budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus
unconstitutional. Corollary thereto, informal practices, through which legislators have effectively intruded
into the proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same unconstitutional treatment. That such informal
practices do exist and have, in fact, been constantly observed throughout the years has not been substantially
disputed here.

As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle, legislative power shall be exclusively exercised by the
body to which the Constitution has conferred the same. In particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution states that such power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on
initiative and referendum. Based on this provision, it is clear that only Congress, acting as a bicameral body,
and the people, through the process of initiative and referendum, may constitutionally wield legislative power
and no other. This premise embodies the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, and the only
recognized exceptions thereto would be: (a) delegated legislative power to local governments which, by
immemorial practice, are allowed to legislate on purely local matters; and (b) constitutionally-grafted
exceptions such as the authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry
out a declared national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and
subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government.

In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment
identification authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said
legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which — as settled in
Philconsa — is lodged in Congress. That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation
is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: “No money shall be paid out
of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” To understand what constitutes an act
of appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor (Bengzon), held that the
power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a
specified purpose. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-
sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project
or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power
of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual
legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate
which the Constitution does not, however, allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of non-delegability of
legislative power, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of Congressional
Pork Barrel which contain the similar legislative identification feature as herein discussed, as
unconstitutional.

The Court agrees with petitioners that certain features embedded in some forms of Congressional Pork
Barrel, among others the 2013 PDAF Article, has an effect on congressional oversight. The fact that individual
legislators are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the budget makes it difficult for them to
become disinterested “observers” when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the implementation of the
appropriation law. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are
vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves
participate. Also, it must be pointed out that this very same concept of post-enactment authorization runs
afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that: Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of
the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the
Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly,
be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or
controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before
any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his
office. (Emphasis supplied) Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project
implementation — a matter before another office of government — renders them susceptible to taking undue
advantage of their own office.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The gauge of Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and Countrywide
Development Fund (CDF) allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking into account
the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. In this regard, the
allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic or
geographic indicators have been taken into consideration.―The Court, however, finds an inherent defect in
the system which actually belies the avowed intention of “making equal the unequal.” In particular, the Court
observes that the gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without
taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. In this
regard, the allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine parameters of equality, wherein
economic or geographic indicators have been taken into consideration. As a result, a district representative of
a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district representative of a far-flung rural
province which would be relatively “underdeveloped” compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver
scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List Representatives — and in some years, even the Vice-President
— who do not represent any locality, receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well. These
certainly are anathema to the Congressional Pork Barrel’s original intent which is “to make equal the
unequal.” Ultimately, the PDAF and CDF had become personal funds under the effective control of each
legislator and given unto them on the sole account of their office.

Same; “An appropriation made by law” under the contemplation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution exists when a provision of law (a) sets apart a determinate or determinable amount of money
and (b) allocates the same for a particular public purpose.―“An appropriation made by law” under the
contemplation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution exists when a provision of law (a) sets
apart a determinate or determinable amount of money and (b) allocates the same for a particular public
purpose. These two minimum designations of amount and purpose stem from the very definition of the word
“appropriation,” which means “to allot, assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or purpose,” and hence, if
written into the law, demonstrate that the legislative intent to appropriate exists. As the Constitution “does
not provide or prescribe any particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or
appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be “made by law,’” an appropriation law may —
according to Philconsa — be “detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be” for as long as the intent to
appropriate may be gleaned from the same.

Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); The 2013 Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF) Article cannot be properly deemed as a legal appropriation precisely because it contains post-
enactment measures which effectively create a system of intermediate appropriations.―It is apropos to note
that the 2013 PDAF Article cannot be properly deemed as a legal appropriation under the said constitutional
provision precisely because, as earlier stated, it contains post-enactment measures which effectively create a
system of intermediate appropriations. These intermediate appropriations are the actual appropriations
meant for enforcement and since they are made by individual legislators after the GAA is passed, they occur
outside the law. As such, the Court observes that the real appropriation made under the 2013 PDAF Article is
not the P24.79 Billion allocated for the entire PDAF, but rather the post-enactment determinations made by
the individual legislators which are, to repeat, occurrences outside of the law. Irrefragably, the 2013 PDAF
Article does not constitute an “appropriation made by law” since it, in its truest sense, only authorizes
individual legislators to appropriate in violation of the non-delegability principle as afore-discussed.

Same; Delegation of Powers; Malampaya Funds; The Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase “and for
such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of P.D. 910 constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately
determine the limits of the President’s authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds
may be used.―The Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the
President’s authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads,
the said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may
direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law. That
the subject phrase may be confined only to “energy resource development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government” under the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the general word or phrase
is to be construed to include — or be restricted to — things akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class
as those specifically mentioned, is belied by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase “energy resource development
and exploitation programs and projects of the government” states a singular and general class and hence,
cannot be treated as a statutory reference of specific things from which the general phrase “for such other
purposes” may be limited; second, the said phrase also exhausts the class it represents, namely energy
development programs of the government; and, third, the Executive department has, in fact, used the
Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes under the subject phrase, thereby contradicting
respondents’ own position that it is limited only to “energy resource development and exploitation programs
and projects of the government.” Thus, while Section 8 of PD 910 may have passed the completeness test
since the policy of energy development is clearly deducible from its text, the phrase “and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under the same provision of law should nonetheless
be stricken down as unconstitutional as it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the
delegating law. This notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for
the use of the Malampaya Funds “to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government,” remains legally effective and subsisting. Truth be told, the declared
unconstitutionality of the aforementioned phrase is but an assurance that the Malampaya Funds would be
used — as it should be used — only in accordance with the avowed purpose and intention of PD 910.

The operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares
the invalidity of a certain legislative or executive act, such act is presumed constitutional and thus, entitled to
obedience and respect and should be properly enforced and complied with.―It must be stressed that the
Court’s pronouncement anent the unconstitutionality of (a) the 2013 PDAF Article and its Special Provisions,
(b) all other Congressional Pork Barrel provisions similar thereto, and (c) the phrases (1) “and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD 910, and (2) “to finance the
priority infrastructure development projects” under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, must
only be treated as prospective in effect in view of the operative fact doctrine. To explain, the operative fact
doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares the invalidity of a
certain legislative or executive act, such act is presumed constitutional and thus, entitled to obedience and
respect and should be properly enforced and complied with. As explained in the recent case of Commissioner
of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation, 707 SCRA 66 (2013), the doctrine merely “reflect[s]
awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether
or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the
power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality
of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.” “In
the language of an American Supreme Court decision: ‘The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a
determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly
be ignored.’ ”

The Court renders this Decision to rectify an error which has persisted in the chronicles of our history. In the
final analysis, the Court must strike down the Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional in view of the inherent
defects in the rules within which it operates. To recount, insofar as it has allowed legislators to wield, in
varying gradations, non-oversight, post-enactment authority in vital areas of budget execution, the system
has violated the principle of separation of powers; insofar as it has conferred unto legislators the power of
appropriation by giving them personal, discretionary funds from which they are able to fund specific projects
which they themselves determine, it has similarly violated the principle of non-delegability of legislative
power; insofar as it has created a system of budgeting wherein items are not textualized into the
appropriations bill, it has flouted the prescribed procedure of presentment and, in the process, denied the
President the power to veto items; insofar as it has diluted the effectiveness of congressional oversight by
giving legislators a stake in the affairs of budget execution, an aspect of governance which they may be called
to monitor and scrutinize, the system has equally impaired public accountability; insofar as it has authorized
legislators, who are national officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local nature, despite the existence of
capable local institutions, it has likewise subverted genuine local autonomy; and again, insofar as it has
conferred to the President the power to appropriate funds intended by law for energy-related purposes only
to other purposes he may deem fit as well as other public funds under the broad classification of “priority
infrastructure development projects,” it has once more transgressed the principle of non-delegability.

30.1. ARAULLO v. AQUINO III, 728 SCRA 1 (2014)

For us to consider unreleased appropriations as savings, unless these met the statutory definition of savings,
would seriously undercut the congressional power of the purse, because such appropriations had not even
reached and been used by the agency concerned vis-à -vis the PAPs for which Congress had allocated them.
However, if an agency has unfilled positions in its plantilla and did not receive an allotment and NCA for such
vacancies, appropriations for such positions, although unreleased, may already constitute savings for that
agency under the second instance. Unobligated allotments, on the other hand, were encompassed by the first
part of the definition of “savings” in the GAA, that is, as “portions or balances of any programmed
appropriation in this Act free from any obligation or encumbrance.” But the first part of the definition was
further qualified by the three enumerated instances of when savings would be realized. As such, unobligated
allotments could not be indiscriminately declared as savings without first determining whether any of the
three instances existed. This signified that the DBM’s withdrawal of unobligated allotments had disregarded
the definition of savings under the GAAs.

According to Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 (1994): “Impoundment refers to
a refusal by the President, for whatever reason, to spend funds made available by Congress. It is the failure to
spend or obligate budget authority of any type.” Impoundment under the GAA is understood to mean the
retention or deduction of appropriations. The 2011 GAA authorized impoundment only in case of
unmanageable National Government budget deficit.

Congress acts as the guardian of the public treasury in faithful discharge of its power of the purse whenever it
deliberates and acts on the budget proposal submitted by the Executive. Its power of the purse is touted as
the very foundation of its institutional strength, and underpins “all other legislative decisions and regulating
the balance of influence between the legislative and executive branches of government.” Such enormous
power encompasses the capacity to generate money for the Government, to appropriate public funds, and to
spend the money. Pertinently, when it exercises its power of the purse, Congress wields control by specifying
the PAPs for which public money should be spent. It is the President who proposes the budget but it is
Congress that has the final say on matters of appropriations. For this purpose, appropriation involves two
governing principles, namely: (1) “a Principle of the Public Fisc, asserting that all monies received from
whatever source by any part of the government are public funds”; and (2) “a Principle of Appropriations
Control, prohibiting expenditure of any public money without legislative authorization.” To conform with the
governing principles, the Executive cannot circumvent the prohibition by Congress of an expenditure for a
PAP by resorting to either public or private funds. Nor could the Executive transfer appropriated funds
resulting in an increase in the budget for one PAP, for by so doing the appropriation for another PAP is
necessarily decreased. The terms of both appropriations will thereby be violated.

The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the law or executive act prior to the determination
of its unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced consequences that cannot always be erased,
ignored or disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void law or executive act but sustains its effects. It provides an
exception to the general rule that a void or unconstitutional law produces no effect. But its use must be
subjected to great scrutiny and circumspection, and it cannot be invoked to validate an unconstitutional law
or executive act, but is resorted to only as a matter of equity and fair play. It applies only to cases where
extraordinary circumstances exist, and only when the extraordinary circumstances have met the stringent
conditions that will permit its application. We find the doctrine of operative fact applicable to the adoption
and implementation of the DAP. Its application to the DAP proceeds from equity and fair play. The
consequences resulting from the DAP and its related issuances could not be ignored or could no longer be
undone. To be clear, the doctrine of operative fact extends to a void or unconstitutional executive act. The
term executive act is broad enough to include any and all acts of the Executive, including those that are quasi-
legislative and quasi-judicial in nature.

In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation, 707 SCRA 66 (2013), the Court
likewise declared that “for the operative fact doctrine to apply, there must be a ‘legislative or executive
measure,’ meaning a law or executive issuance.” Thus, the Court opined there that the operative fact doctrine
did not apply to a mere administrative practice of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, viz.: Under Section 246,
taxpayers may rely upon a rule or ruling issued by the Commissioner from the time the rule or ruling is issued
up to its reversal by the Commissioner or this Court. The reversal is not given retroactive effect. This, in
essence, is the doctrine of operative fact. There must, however, be a rule or ruling issued by the Commissioner
that is relied upon by the taxpayer in good faith. A mere administrative practice, not formalized into a rule or
ruling, will not suffice because such a mere administrative practice may not be uniformly and consistently
applied. An administrative practice, if not formalized as a rule or ruling, will not be known to the general
public and can be availed of only by those with informal contacts with the government agency. It is clear from
the foregoing that the adoption and the implementation of the DAP and its related issuances were executive
acts. The DAP itself, as a policy, transcended a merely administrative practice especially after the Executive,
through the DBM, implemented it by issuing various memoranda and circulars. The pooling of savings
pursuant to the DAP from the allotments made available to the different agencies and departments was
consistently applied throughout the entire Executive. With the Executive, through the DBM, being in charge of
the third phase of the budget cycle — the budget execution phase, the President could legitimately adopt a
policy like the DAP by virtue of his primary responsibility as the Chief Executive of directing the national
economy towards growth and development. This is simply because savings could and should be determined
only during the budget execution phase.

30.2. ARAULLO v. AQUINO III, 749 SCRA 283 (2015)

Necessarily, savings, their utilization and their management will also be strictly construed against expanding
the scope of the power to augment. Such a strict interpretation is essential in order to keep the Executive and
other budget implementors within the limits of their prerogatives during budget execution, and to prevent
them from unduly transgressing Congress’ power of the purse. Hence, regardless of the perceived beneficial
purposes of the DAP, and regardless of whether the DAP is viewed as an effective tool of stimulating the
national economy, the acts and practices under the DAP and the relevant provisions of NBC No. 541 cited in
the Decision should remain illegal and unconstitutional as long as the funds used to finance the projects
mentioned therein are sourced from savings that deviated from the relevant provisions of the GAA, as well as
the limitation on the power to augment under Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution. In a society
governed by laws, even the best intentions must come within the parameters defined and set by the
Constitution and the law. Laudable purposes must be carried out through legal methods.

In Nazareth v. Villar, 689 SCRA 385 (2013), we clarified that there must be an existing item, project or
activity, purpose or object of expenditure with an appropriation to which savings may be transferred for the
purpose of augmentation. Accordingly, so long as there is an item in the GAA for which Congress had set aside
a specified amount of public fund, savings may be transferred thereto for augmentation purposes. This
interpretation is consistent not only with the Constitution and the GAAs, but also with the degree of flexibility
allowed to the Executive during budget execution in responding to unforeseeable contingencies.

As a general rule, the nullification of an unconstitutional law or act carries with it the illegality of its effects.
However, in cases where nullification of the effects will result in inequity and injustice, the operative fact
doctrine may apply. In so ruling, the Court has essentially recognized the impact on the beneficiaries and the
country as a whole if its ruling would pave the way for the nullification of the P144.378 Billion worth of
infrastructure projects, social and economic services funded through the DAP. Bearing in mind the disastrous
impact of nullifying these projects by virtue alone of the invalidation of certain acts and practices under the
DAP, the Court has upheld the efficacy of such DAP-funded projects by applying the operative fact doctrine.
For this reason, we cannot sustain the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the petitioners in G.R. No.
209442.

31. TECHNICAL EDUCATION SKILLS DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (TESDA) v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT,

750 SCRA 247 (2015)

It bears reminding that pursuant to Article VI, Section 29(1) of the 1987 Constitution, no money shall be paid
out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. Hence, the GAA should be
purposeful, deliberate, and precise in its contents and stipulations. Also, the COA was correct when it held
that the provisions of the GAA were not self-executory. This meant that the execution of the GAA was still
subject to a program of expenditure to be approved by the President, and such approved program of
expenditure was the basis for the release of funds. For that matter, Section 34, Chapter 5, Book VI of the
Administrative Code (Executive Order No. 292) states that — Section 34. Program of Expenditure.—The
Secretary of Budget shall recommend to the President the year’s program of expenditure for each agency of
the government on the basis of authorized appropriations. The approved expenditure program shall
constitute the basis for fund release during the fiscal period, subject to such policies, rules and regulations as
may be approved by the President.

Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1597 (Further Rationalizing the System of Compensation and Position
Classification in the National Government) states that the authority to approve the grant of allowances,
honoraria, and other fringe benefits to government employees, regardless of whether such endowment is
payable by their respective offices or by other agencies of the Government, is vested in the President. As such,
the precipitous release and payment of the healthcare maintenance allowance benefits without any
authorization from the Office of the President is without basis and should be rightfully disallowed.

32. ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST v. PURISIMA, 562 SCRA 251 (2008)

Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the
sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or
limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate’s authority, announce the
legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.

RA 9335 in no way violates the security of tenure of officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC. The
guarantee of security of tenure only means that an employee cannot be dismissed from the service for causes
other than those provided by law and only after due process is accorded the employee. In the case of RA
9335, it lays down a reasonable yardstick for removal (when the revenue collection falls short of the target by
at least 7.5%) with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection. This standard is
analogous to inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties, a ground for disciplinary
action under civil service laws. The action for removal is also subject to civil service laws, rules and
regulations and compliance with substantive and procedural due process. At any rate, this Court has
recognized the following as sufficient standards: “public interest,” “justice and equity,” “public convenience
and welfare” and “simplicity, economy and welfare.” In this case, the declared policy of optimization of the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with public interest.

It is clear that congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily
constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional
separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of
government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of
power in the executive branch. However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment “beyond the
legislative sphere,” the Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on Congress. It may not vest
itself, any of its committees or its members with either executive or judicial power. And, when it exercises its
legislative power, it must follow the “single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures”
specified under the Constitution, including the procedure for enactment of laws and presentment. Thus, any
post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In
particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following: (1) scrutiny based primarily on
Congress’ power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask
heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their
departments and its power of confirmation and (2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of
laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Any action or step beyond
that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this
class.
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to present the
proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee
formed by it, retains a “right” or “power” to approve or disapprove such regulations before they take effect. As
such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning
delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and investigation) to an
agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers. It radically changes the design or
structure of the Constitution’s diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying
or implementing its own laws. Congress has two options when enacting legislation to define national policy
within the broad horizons of its legislative competence. It can itself formulate the details or it can assign to
the executive branch the responsibility for making necessary managerial decisions in conformity with those
standards. In the latter case, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves
the hands of the legislature. Thus, what is left for the executive branch or the concerned administrative
agency when it formulates rules and regulations implementing the law is to fill up details (supplementary
rule-making) or ascertain facts necessary to bring the law into actual operation (contingent rule-making).

Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and interpret the law which
they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to respect. Such rules and regulations
partake of the nature of a statute and are just as binding as if they have been written in the statute itself. As
such, they have the force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and legality until
they are set aside with finality in an appropriate case by a competent court. Congress, in the guise of assuming
the role of an overseer, may not pass upon their legality by subjecting them to its stamp of approval without
disturbing the calculated balance of powers established by the Constitution. In exercising discretion to
approve or disapprove the IRR based on a determination of whether or not they conformed with the
provisions of RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power exclusively vested in this Court
by the Constitution.

The requirement that the implementing rules of a law be subjected to approval by Congress as a condition for
their effectivity violates the cardinal constitutional principles of bicameralism and the rule on presentment.
x x x Legislative power (or the power to propose, enact, amend and repeal laws) is vested in Congress which
consists of two chambers, the Senate and the House of Representatives. A valid exercise of legislative power
requires the act of both chambers. Corrollarily, it can be exercised neither solely by one of the two chambers
nor by a committee of either or both chambers. Thus, assuming the validity of a legislative veto, both a single-
chamber legislative veto and a congressional committee legislative veto are invalid.

Every bill passed by Congress must be presented to the President for approval or veto. In the absence of
presentment to the President, no bill passed by Congress can become a law. In this sense, law-making under
the Constitution is a joint act of the Legislature and of the Executive. Assuming that legislative veto is a valid
legislative act with the force of law, it cannot take effect without such presentment even if approved by both
chambers of Congress.

Where Congress delegates the formulation of rules to implement the law it has enacted pursuant to sufficient
standards established in the said law, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when
it leaves the hands of the legislature. And it may be deemed to have left the hands of the legislature when it
becomes effective because it is only upon effectivity of the statute that legal rights and obligations become
available to those entitled by the language of the statute. Subject to the indispensable requisite of publication
under the due process clause, the determination as to when a law takes effect is wholly the prerogative of
Congress. As such, it is only upon its effectivity that a law may be executed and the executive branch acquires
the duties and powers to execute the said law. Before that point, the role of the executive branch, particularly
of the President, is limited to approving or vetoing the law.
From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its
members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of
separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that requires Congress or
its members to approve the implementing rules of a law after it has already taken effect shall be
unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows Congress or its members to overturn any directive or ruling
made by the members of the executive branch charged with the implementation of the law.

In Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, 282 SCRA 361 (1997), the Court laid down the following
rules: The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another
part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. The presence of a
separability clause in a statute creates the presumption that the legislature intended separability, rather than
complete nullity of the statute. To justify this result, the valid portion must be so far independent of the
invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the legislature would have enacted it by itself if it had supposed
that it could not constitutionally enact the other. Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible and
valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent. x x x The exception to the general rule is that when the
parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or
compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, the nullity
of one part will vitiate the rest. In making the parts of the statute dependent, conditional, or connected with
one another, the legislature intended the statute to be carried out as a whole and would not have enacted it if
one part is void, in which case if some parts are unconstitutional, all the other provisions thus dependent,
conditional, or connected must fall with them.

1. PIMENTEL, JR. v. JOINT COMMITTEE OF CONGRESS TO CANVASS THE VOTES CAST FOR PRESIDENT
AND VICE-PRESIDENT IN THE MAY 10, 2004 ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 163783, 22 June 2004
[http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/resolutions/enbanc/2004/jun/163783.htm}

The legislative functions of the Twelfth Congress may have come to a close upon the final adjournment of its
regular sessions on June 11, 2004, but this does not affect its non-legislative functions, such as that of being
the National Board of Canvassers. In fact, the joint public session of both Houses of Congress convened by
express directive of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to canvass the votes for and to proclaim the
newly elected President and Vice-President has not, and cannot, adjourn sine dieuntil it has accomplished its
constitutionally mandated tasks. For only when a board of canvassers has completed its functions is it
rendered functus officio. Its membership may change, but it retains its authority as a board until it has
accomplished its purposes.

Since the Twelfth Congress has not yet completed its non-legislative duty to canvass the votes and proclaim
the duly elected President and Vice-President, its existence as the National Board of Canvassers, as well as
that of the Joint Committee to which it referred the preliminary tasks of authenticating and canvassing the
certificates of canvass, has not become functus officio.

In sum, despite the adjournment sine die of Congress, there is no legal impediment to the Joint Committee
completing the tasks assigned to it and transmitting its report for the approval of the joint public session of
both Houses of Congress, which may reconvene without need of call by the President to a special session.

2. MACALINTAL v. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, 635 SCRA 783 (2010)

Unmistakable from the foregoing is that the exercise of our power to judge presidential and vice-presidenti al
election contests, as well as the rule-making power adjunct thereto, is plenary; it is not as restrictive as
petitioner would interpret it. In fact, former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., who proposed the insertion of
the phrase, intended the Supreme Court to exercise exclusive authority to promulgate its rules of procedure
for that purpose. To this, Justice Regalado forthwith assented and then emphasized that the sole power ought
to be without intervention by the legislative department. Evidently, even the legislature cannot limit the
judicial power to resolve presidential and vice-presidential election contests and our rule-making power
connected thereto.

The conferment of additional jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, with the duty characterized as an “awesome”
task, includes the means necessary to carry it into effect under the doctrine of necessary implication. We
cannot overemphasize that the abstraction of the PET from the explicit grant of power to the Supreme Court,
given our abundant experience, is not unwarranted. A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7,
readily reveals a grant of authority to the Supreme Court sitting en banc. In the same vein, although the
method by which the Supreme Court exercises this authority is not specified in the provision, the grant of
power does not contain any limitation on the Supreme Court’s exercise thereof. The Supreme Court’s method
of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, through the PET, is actually a derivative of the
exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Thus, the subsequent
directive in the provision for the Supreme Court to “promulgate its rules for the purpose.”

Particularly cogent are the discussions of the Constitutional Commission on the parallel provisions of the SET
and the HRET. The discussions point to the inevitable conclusion that the different electoral tribunals, with
the Supreme Court functioning as the PET, are constitutional bodies, independent of the three departments of
government—Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary—but not separate therefrom.

By the same token, the PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the Supreme Court, albeit it has
functions peculiar only to the Tribunal. It is obvious that the PET was constituted in implementation of
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, and it faithfully complies—not unlawfully defies—the constitutional
directive. The adoption of a separate seal, as well as the change in the nomenclature of the Chief Justice and
the Associate Justices into Chairman and Members of the Tribunal, respectively, was designed simply to
highlight the singularity and exclusivity of the Tribunal’s functions as a special electoral court.

With the explicit provision, the present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in conjunction with
latter’s exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the task of deciding presidential and vice-presidential
election contests, with full authority in the exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a derivative of the
plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution. On the whole, the
Constitution draws a thin, but, nevertheless, distinct line between the PET and the Supreme Court.

We have previously declared that the PET is not simply an agency to which Members of the Court were
designated. Once again, the PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution
independent, but not separate, from the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court. McCulloch v. State of
Maryland proclaimed that “[a] power without the means to use it, is a nullity.” The vehicle for the exercise of
this power, as intended by the Constitution and specifically mentioned by the Constitutional Commissioners
during the discussions on the grant of power to this Court, is the PET. Thus, a microscopic view, like the
petitioner’s, should not constrict an absolute and constitutional grant of judicial power.

3. CLINTON v. JONES, 520 U.S. 681, 137 L Ed 2d 945, 117 S Ct 1636 (1997)
In contrast to the scope of presidential immunity in the Philippines, the United States Supreme Court allowed
a suit for damages against a sitting president arising from his acts before he became such official. The Court
pointed out that “we have never suggested that the President, or any other official, has an immunity that
extends beyond the scope of any action taken in an official capacity”. It also held that “the doctrine of
separation of powers does not require federal courts to stay all private actions against the President until he
leaves office”.

4. RUBRICO v. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, 613 SCRA 233 (2010)

Petitioners first take issue on the President’s purported lack of immunity from suit during her term of office.
The 1987 Constitution, so they claim, has removed such immunity heretofore enjoyed by the chief executive
under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. Petitioners are mistaken. The presidential immunity from suit
remains preserved under our system of government, albeit not expressly reserved in the present constitution.
Addressing a concern of his co-members in the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the absence of an express
provision on the matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already understood in jurisprudence that
the President may not be sued during his or her tenure. The Court subsequently made it abundantly clear in
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160 (2006), a case likewise resolved under the umbrella of the 1987
Constitution, that indeed the President enjoys immunity during her incumbency, and why this must be so:
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in
any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the
dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while
serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or
distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the
legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his
usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution
necessarily impairs the operation of the Government.

While in a qualified sense tenable, the dismissal by the CA of the case as against Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen.
Razon is incorrect if viewed against the backdrop of the stated rationale underpinning the assailed decision
vis-à -vis the two generals, i.e., command responsibility. The Court assumes the latter stance owing to the fact
that command responsibility, as a concept defined, developed, and applied under international law, has little,
if at all, bearing in amparo proceedings. The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its
context in the development of laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, “command
responsibility,” in its simplest terms, means the “responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by
subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or
domestic conflict.” In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. The Hague
Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility, foreshadowing the present-day
precept of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be
remiss in his duty of control over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is “an omission mode of
individual criminal liability,” whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his
subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators (as opposed to crimes he ordered).

C.5. Rodriguez vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 191805. November 15, 2011.

Writ of Amparo; The writ of amparo is an extraordinary and independent remedy that provides rapid judicial
relief, as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate
interim and permanent reliefs available to the petitioner.—The writ of amparo is an extraordinary and
independent remedy that provides rapid judicial relief, as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires
only substantial evidence to make the appropriate interim and permanent reliefs available to the petitioner. It
is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages
requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will
require full and exhaustive proceedings. Rather, it serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the
problem of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the
expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses, and it is curative in that it facilitates the
subsequent punishment of perpetrators by inevitably leading to subsequent investigation and action.

Writ of Habeas Data; The writ of habeas data provides a judicial remedy to protect a person’s right to control
information regarding oneself, particularly in instances where such information is being collected through
unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.—The writ of habeas data provides a judicial remedy to
protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances where such
information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. As an independent
and summary remedy to protect the right to privacy—especially the right to informational privacy—the
proceedings for the issuance of the writ of habeas data does not entail any finding of criminal, civil or
administrative culpability. If the allegations in the petition are proven through substantial evidence, then the
Court may (a) grant access to the database or information; (b) enjoin the act complained of; or (c) in case the
database or information contains erroneous data or information, order its deletion, destruction or
rectification.

Writ of Amparo; Writ of Habeas Data; There is no determination of administrative, civil or criminal liability in
amparo and habeas data proceedings.—It bears stressing that since there is no determination of
administrative, civil or criminal liability in amparo and habeas data proceedings, courts can only go as far as
ascertaining responsibility or accountability for the enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing.

Same; Command Responsibility; Nothing precludes this Court from applying the doctrine of command
responsibility in amparo proceedings to ascertain responsibility and accountability in extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances.—The doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine whether
respondents are accountable for and have the duty to address the abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable
the courts to devise remedial measures to protect his rights. Clearly, nothing precludes this Court from
applying the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings to ascertain responsibility and
accountability in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.

Same; Same; Amparo proceedings determine investigation of the enforced disappearance.—Amparo

proceedings determine (a) responsibility, or the extent the actors have been established by substantial
evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, and (b)
accountability, or the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those (i) who exhibited involvement
in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility
defined above; or (ii) who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry
the burden of disclosure; or (iii) those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary
diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. Thus, although there is no determination of
criminal, civil or administrative liabilities, the doctrine of command responsibility may nevertheless be
applied to ascertain responsibility and accountability within these foregoing definitions.

Same; Same; The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses control over
the military that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the command responsibility doctrine.—Having
established the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings, it must now
be resolved whether the president, as commander-in-chief of the military, can be held responsible or
accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. We rule in the affirmative. To hold
someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following elements must obtain: a. the
existence of a superiorsubordinate relationship between the accused as superior and the perpetrator of the
crime as his subordinate; b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had
been committed; and c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the
criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof. The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed
forces, necessarily possesses control over the military that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of
the command responsibility doctrine.

Same; Same; The Rule on the Writ of Amparo explicitly states that the violation of or threat to the right to life,
liberty and security may be caused by either an act or an omission of a public official.—The Rule on the Writ of
Amparo explicitly states that the violation of or threat to the right to life, liberty and security may be caused
by either an act or an omission of a public official. Moreover, in the context of amparo proceedings,
responsibility may refer to the participation of the respondents, by action or omission, in enforced
disappearance.

C.6. Funa vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 184740. February 11, 2010.

Justiciable Controversy; Moot and Academic; A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a
justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical
use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness. —A moot
and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so
that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over
such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness. However, as we held in Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma, 494
SCRA 53 (2006) supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from
rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution. Even in cases where supervening events
had made the cases moot, this Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to
formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar, and public.

Administrative Law; Incompatible Office; While the designation was in the nature of an acting and temporary
capacity, the words “hold the office” were employed. Such holding of office pertains to both appointment and
designation because the appointee or designate performs the duties and functions of the office. The 1987
Constitution in prohibiting dual or multiple offices, as well as incompatible offices, refers to the holding of the
office, and not to the nature of the appointment or designation, words which were not even found in Section 13,
Article VII nor in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B. To “hold” an office means to “possess or occupy” the same,
or “to be in possession and administration,” which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions
and duties of the office.—Respondents’ reliance on the foregoing definitions is misplaced considering that the
above-cited case addressed the issue of whether petitioner therein acquired valid title to the disputed
position and so had the right to security of tenure. It must be stressed though that while the designation was
in the nature of an acting and temporary capacity, the words “hold the office” were employed. Such holding of
office pertains to both appointment and designation because the appointee or designate performs the duties
and functions of the office. The 1987 Constitution in prohibiting dual or multiple offices, as well as
incompatible offices, refers to the holding of the office, and not to the nature of the appointment or
designation, words which were not even found in Section 13, Article VII nor in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article
IX-B. To “hold” an office means to “possess or occupy” the same, or “to be in possession and administration,”
which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions and duties of the office.
Same; Presidency; Holding of Other Office; Evidently, from this move as well as in the different phraseologies of
the constitutional provisions in question, the intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter
prohibition of the President and his official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the
government or elsewhere is concerned.—Evidently, from this move as well as in the different phraseologies of
the constitutional provisions in question, the intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter
prohibition on the President and his official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the
government or elsewhere is concerned.

C.7. Funa vs. Agra, G.R. No. 191644. February 19, 2013.

Constitutional Law; Judicial Review; Limitations to the Power of Judicial Review.—The power of judicial review
is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to assail the validity of the subject
act or issuance, that is, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained,
or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised
at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Locus Standi; To have legal standing, therefore, a suitor must show that he has
sustained or will sustain a “direct injury” as a result of a government action, or have a “material interest” in the
issue affected by the challenged official act.—The OSG does not dispute the justiciability and ripeness for
consideration and resolution by the Court of the matter raised by the petitioner. Also, the locus standi of the
petitioner as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a lawyer to bring a suit of this nature has already been
settled in his favor in rulings by the Court on several other public law litigations he brought. In Funa v. Villar,
670 SCRA 579 (2012), for one, the Court has held: To have legal standing, therefore, a suitor must show that
he has sustained or will sustain a “direct injury” as a result of a government action, or have a “material
interest” in the issue affected by the challenged official act. However, the Court has time and again acted
liberally on the locus standi requirements and has accorded certain individuals, not otherwise directly
injured, or with material interest affected, by a Government act, standing to sue provided a constitutional
issue of critical significance is at stake. The rule on locus standi is after all a mere procedural technicality in
relation to which the Court, in a catena of cases involving a subject of transcendental import, has waived, or
relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to
sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any
other government act. In David, the Court laid out the bare minimum norm before the so-called
“nontraditional suitors” may be extended standing to sue, thusly: 1.) For taxpayers, there must be a claim of
illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; 2.) For voters, there must be
a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question; 3.) For concerned citizens, there
must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
4.) For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes their prerogatives as
legislators. This case before Us is of transcendental importance, since it obviously has “far-reaching
implications,” and there is a need to promulgate rules that will guide the bench, bar, and the public in future
analogous cases. We, thus, assume a liberal stance and allow petitioner to institute the instant petition.

Same; Same; Moot and Academic; Words and Phrases; A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a
justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical
use or value.—A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Although the
controversy could have ceased due to the intervening appointment of and assumption by Cadiz as the
Solicitor General during the pendency of this suit, and such cessation of the controversy seemingly rendered
moot and academic the resolution of the issue of the constitutionality of the concurrent holding of the two
positions by Agra, the Court should still go forward and resolve the issue and not abstain from exercising its
power of judicial review because this case comes under several of the wellrecognized exceptions established
in jurisprudence. Verily, the Court did not desist from resolving an issue that a supervening event meanwhile
rendered moot and academic if any of the following recognized exceptions obtained, namely: (1) there was a
grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the case involved a situation of exceptional character and was of
paramount public interest; (3) the constitutional issue raised required the formulation of controlling
principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the public; and (4) the case was capable of repetition, yet evading
review.

Administrative Law; To Hold an Office; Words and Phrases; To hold an office means to possess or to occupy the
office, or to be in possession and administration of the office, which implies nothing less than the actual
discharge of the functions and duties of the office.—It was of no moment that Agra’s designation was in an
acting or temporary capacity. The text of Section 13, 1987 Constitution, plainly indicates that the intent of the
Framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and the Members of his
Cabinet in so far as holding other offices or employments in the Government or in government-owned or
government controlled-corporations was concerned. In this regard, to hold an office means to possess or to
occupy the office, or to be in possession and administration of the office, which implies nothing less than the
actual discharge of the functions and duties of the office. Indeed, in the language of Section 13 itself, 1987
Constitution, the Constitution makes no reference to the nature of the appointment or designation. The
prohibition against dual or multiple offices being held by one official must be construed as to apply to all
appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary, for it is without question that the avowed
objective of Section 13, 1987 Constitution, is to prevent the concentration of powers in the Executive
Department officials, specifically the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet and their
deputies and assistants. To construe differently is to “open the veritable floodgates of circumvention of an
important constitutional disqualification of officials in the Executive Department and of limitations on the
President’s power of appointment in the guise of temporary designations of Cabinet Members,
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries as officers-in-charge of government agencies, instrumentalities, or
government-owned or controlled corporations.”

Same; Multiple Offices; The only two exceptions against the holding of multiple offices are: (1) those provided for
under the Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII, authorizing the Vice President to become a member of the
Cabinet; and (2) posts occupied by Executive officials specified in Section 13, Article VII without additional
compensation in ex officio capacities as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of the officials’
offices.—According to Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma, 494 SCRA 53 (2006), the only two exceptions
against the holding of multiple offices are: (1) those provided for under the Constitution, such as Section 3,
Article VII, authorizing the Vice President to become a member of the Cabinet; and (2) posts occupied by
Executive officials specified in Section 13, Article VII without additional compensation in ex officio capacities
as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of the officials’ offices. In this regard, the
decision in Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma, 494 SCRA 53 (2006), adverted to the resolution issued on
August 1, 1991 in Civil Liberties Union v. The Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991), whereby the Court
held that the phrase “the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants” found in Section 13, 1987
Constitution, referred only to the heads of the various executive departments, their undersecretaries and
assistant secretaries, and did not extend to other public officials given the rank of Secretary, Undersecretary
or Assistant Secretary. Hence, in Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma, 494 SCRA 53 (2006), the Court opined
that the prohibition under Section 13 did not cover Elma, a Presidential Assistant with the rank of
Undersecretary.
Same; Office of the Solicitor General; The powers and functions of the Office of the Solicitor General are neither
required by the primary functions nor included by the powers of the Department of Justice, and vice versa. —
Indeed, the powers and functions of the OSG are neither required by the primary functions nor included by
the powers of the DOJ, and vice versa. The OSG, while attached to the DOJ, is not a constituent unit of the
latter, as, in fact, the Administrative Code of 1987 decrees that the OSG is independent and autonomous. With
the enactment of Republic Act No. 9417, the Solicitor General is now vested with a cabinet rank, and has the
same qualifications for appointment, rank, prerogatives, salaries, allowances, benefits and privileges as those
of the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals. Moreover, the magnitude of the scope of work of the Solicitor
General, if added to the equally demanding tasks of the Secretary of Justice, is obviously too much for any one
official to bear. Apart from the sure peril of political pressure, the concurrent holding of the two positions,
even if they are not entirely incompatible, may affect sound government operations and the proper
performance of duties.

Same; Same; The primary functions of the Office of the Solicitor General are not related or necessary to the
primary functions of the Department of Justice.—Clearly, the primary functions of the Office of the Solicitor
General are not related or necessary to the primary functions of the Department of Justice. Considering that
the nature and duties of the two offices are such as to render it improper, from considerations of public
policy, for one person to retain both, an incompatibility between the offices exists, further warranting the
declaration of Agra’s designation as the Acting Secretary of Justice, concurrently with his designation as the
Acting Solicitor General, to be void for being in violation of the express provisions of the Constitution.

Same; Public Officers; De Facto Officers; Words and Phrases; A de facto officer is one who derives his
appointment from one having colorable authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose
appointment is valid on its face. He may also be one who is in possession of an office, and is discharging its duties
under color of authority, by which is meant authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or
informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer.—A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment
from one having colorable authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is
valid on its face. He may also be one who is in possession of an office, and is discharging its duties under color
of authority, by which is meant authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or informal, so that
the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. Consequently, the acts of the de facto officer are just as valid for all
purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third persons who are interested therein are
concerned.

Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court holds that all official actions of Agra as a de facto Acting Secretary of
Justice, assuming that was his later designation, were presumed valid, binding and effective as if he was the
officer legally appointed and qualified for the office.—In order to be clear, therefore, the Court holds that all
official actions of Agra as a de facto Acting Secretary of Justice, assuming that was his later designation, were
presumed valid, binding and effective as if he was the officer legally appointed and qualified for the office.
This clarification is necessary in order to protect the sanctity of the dealings by the public with persons whose
ostensible authority emanates from the State. Agra’s official actions covered by this clarification extend to but
are not limited to the promulgation of resolutions on petitions for review filed in the Department of Justice,
and the issuance of department orders, memoranda and circulars relative to the prosecution of criminal
cases.

C.8. Pimentel, Jr. vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 164978. October 13, 2005.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Prohibition; As a rule, the writ of prohibition will not lie to enjoin acts already
done.—As a rule, the writ of prohibition will not lie to enjoin acts already done. However, as an exception to
the rule on mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading
review. In the present case, the mootness of the petition does not bar its resolution. The question of the
constitutionality of the President’s appointment of department secretaries in an acting capacity while
Congress is in session will arise in every such appointment.

Constitutional Law; Appointments; Executive Department; Congress; The power to appoint is essentially
executive in nature, and the legislature may not interfere with the exercise of this executive power except in
those instances when the Constitution expressly allows it to interfere.—The power to appoint is essentially
executive in nature, and the legislature may not interfere with the exercise of this executive power except in
those instances when the Constitution expressly allows it to interfere. Limitations on the executive power to
appoint are construed strictly against the legislature. The scope of the legislature’s interference in the
executive’s power to appoint is limited to the power to prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office.
Congress cannot appoint a person to an office in the guise of prescribing qualifications to that office. Neither
may Congress impose on the President the duty to appoint any particular person to an office.

Same; Same; Commission on Appointments; Even if the Commission on Appointments is composed of

members of Congress, the exercise of its powers is executive and not legislative. —Even if the Commission on
Appointments is composed of members of Congress, the exercise of its powers is executive and not legislative.
The Commission on Appointments does not legislate when it exercises its power to give or withhold consent
to presidential appointments. Thus: x x x The Commission on Appointments is a creature of the Constitution.
Although its membership is confined to members of Congress, said Commission is independent of Congress.
The powers of the Commission do not come from Congress, but emanate directly from the Constitution.
Hence, it is not an agent of Congress. In fact, the functions of the Commissioner are purely executive in nature.
xxx

Same; Same; Same; Considering the independence of the Commission on Appointments from Congress, it is
error for petitioners to claim standing in the present case as members of Congress.—Considering the
independence of the Commission on Appointments from Congress, it is error for petitioners to claim standing
in the present case as members of Congress. President Arroyo’s issuance of acting appointments while
Congress is in session impairs no power of Congress. Among the petitioners, only the following are members
of the Commission on Appointments of the 13th Congress: Senator Enrile as Minority Floor Leader, Senator
Lacson as Assistant Minority Floor Leader, and Senator Angara, Senator Ejercito-Estrada, and Senator
Osmeñ a as members. Thus, on the impairment of the prerogatives of members of the Commission on
Appointments, only Senators Enrile, Lacson, Angara, Ejercito-Estrada, and Osmeñ a have standing in the
present petition. This is in contrast to Senators Pimentel, Estrada, Lim, and Madrigal, who, though vigilant in
protecting their perceived prerogatives as members of Congress, possess no standing in the present petition.

Same; Same; Same; Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint
automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego.—The essence of an appointment in an acting
capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the
appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of
the President, such as the office of a department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter
ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office.
Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the
undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a position
of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose
on the President who her alter ego should be.
Same; Same; Same; Statutes; Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that “[t]he President may
temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform
the functions of an office in the executive branch.”—The law expressly allows the President to make such
acting appointment. Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that “[t]he President may
temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform
the functions of an office in the executive branch.” Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity
a person not yet in the government service, as long as the President deems that person competent.

Same; Same; Same; Ad interim appointments are extended only during recess of Congress and are submitted
to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection, whereas appointments in an acting
capacity may be extended any time there is a vacancy and are not submitted to the Commission on
Appointments.—In distinguishing ad interim appointments from appointments in an acting capacity, a noted
textbook writer on constitutional law has observed: Ad interim appointments must be distinguished from
appointments in an acting capacity. Both of them are effective upon acceptance. But ad interim appointments
are extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there
is a vacancy. Moreover ad interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting
appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of
circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

C.9.1. Aguinaldo vs. Aquino III, G.R. No. 224302. November 29, 2016.

Quo Warranto; Rule 66 of the Revised Rules of Court particularly identifies who can file a special civil action of
Quo Warranto.— The Petition at bar is for (a) Quo Warranto under Rule 66 of the Revised Rules of Court; and
(b) Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the same Rules. Rule 66 of the Revised Rules of Court
particularly identifies who can file a special civil action of Quo Warranto.

Same; Petitioners, as nominees for the 16th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, did not have a clear right to said
position, and therefore not proper parties to a quo warranto proceeding. Being included in the list of nominees
had given them only the possibility, but not the certainty, of being appointed to the position, given the
discretionary power of the President in making judicial appointments.—Petitioners Aguinaldo, et al., as
nominees for the 16th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, did not have a clear right to said position, and
therefore not proper parties to a quo warranto proceeding. Being included in the list of nominees had given
them only the possibility, but not the certainty, of being appointed to the position, given the discretionary
power of the President in making judicial appointments. It is for this same reason that respondents Jorge-
Wagan, et al., nominees for the 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, may not be impleaded as respondents
or unwilling plaintiffs in a quo warranto proceeding. Neither can the IBP initiate a quo warranto proceeding
to oust respondents Musngi and Econg from their currents posts as Sandiganbayan Associate Justices for the
IBP does not qualify under Rule 66, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court as an individual claiming to be
entitled to the positions in question.

Presidential Immunity; The President is granted the privilege of immunity from suit “to assure the exercise of
Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief
Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holder’s time, also demands
undivided attention.”—The Court finds it proper to drop President Aquino as respondent taking into account
that when this Petition was filed on May 17, 2016, he was still then the incumbent President who enjoyed
immunity from suit. The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved in the system of government of
this country, even though not expressly reserved in the 1987 Constitution. The President is granted the
privilege of immunity from suit “to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any
hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside
from requiring all of the office-holder’s time, also demands undivided attention.”

Locus Standi; Words and Phrases; “Legal standing” means a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged; while “interest” refers to material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree or act
assailed, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. —The Court
will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal
standing to raise the constitutional or legal question. “Legal standing” means a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged; while “interest” refers to material interest, an interest in issue and
to be affected by the decree or act assailed, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a
mere incidental interest.

Certiorari; Exceptions to the strict observance of the sixty (60)day period for filing a petition for certiorari.—Just
like any rule, however, there are recognized exceptions to the strict observance of the 60-day period for filing
a petition for certiorari, viz.: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an
injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the
defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the
existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any
showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence without appellant’s fault; (10)
peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and
fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by
all the attendant circumstances.

Constitutional Law; Judicial and Bar Council; Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution provides that the
Members of the Supreme Court (SC) and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of
at least three (3) nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) for every vacancy.—Article VIII,
Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution provides that “[t]he Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower
courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and
Bar Council for every vacancy.”

Judicial and Bar Council; The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) is a body, representative of all the stakeholders in
the judicial appointment process, intended to rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary of the evils of
political pressure and partisan activities.—The JBC was created under the 1987 Constitution with the principal
function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary. It is a body, representative of all the stakeholders in
the judicial appointment process, intended to rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary of the evils of
political pressure and partisan activities.

Same; The power to recommend of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) cannot be used to restrict or limit the
President’s power to appoint as the latter’s prerogative to choose someone whom he/she considers worth
appointing to the vacancy in the Judiciary is still paramount.—It should be stressed that the power to
recommend of the JBC cannot be used to restrict or limit the President’s power to appoint as the latter’s
prerogative to choose someone whom he/she considers worth appointing to the vacancy in the Judiciary is
still paramount. As long as in the end, the President appoints someone nominated by the JBC, the
appointment is valid.

Same; Sandiganbayan; President Aquino was not obliged to appoint one new Sandiganbayan Associate Justice
from each of the six (6) shortlists submitted by the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). —The Court finds herein that
President Aquino was not obliged to appoint one new Sandiganbayan Associate Justice from each of the six
shortlists submitted by the JBC, especially when the clustering of nominees into the six shortlists encroached
on President Aquino’s power to appoint members of the Judiciary from all those whom the JBC had
considered to be qualified for the same positions of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.

Presidential Appointments; The President’s power to appoint members of a collegiate court, such as the
Sandiganbayan, is the power to determine the seniority or order of preference of such newly appointed members
by controlling the date and order of issuance of said members’ appointment or commission papers. —It bears to
point out that part of the President’s power to appoint members of a collegiate court, such as the
Sandiganbayan, is the power to determine the seniority or order of preference of such newly appointed
members by controlling the date and order of issuance of said members’ appointment or commission papers.

Same; Judicial and Bar Council; By designating the numerical order of the vacancies, the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC) would be establishing the seniority or order of preference of the new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices
even before their appointment by the President and, thus, unduly arrogating unto itself a vital part of the
President’s power of appointment.—By already designating the numerical order of the vacancies, the JBC
would be establishing the seniority or order of preference of the new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices even
before their appointment by the President and, thus, unduly arrogating unto itself a vital part of the
President’s power of appointment.

Same; Same; The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC), in sorting the qualified nominees into six (6) clusters, one (1) for
every vacancy, could influence the appointment process beyond its constitutional mandate of recommending
qualified nominees to the President.—Furthermore, the JBC, in sorting the qualified nominees into six clusters,
one for every vacancy, could influence the appointment process beyond its constitutional mandate of
recommending qualified nominees to the President.

Same; Same; Clustering impinges upon the President’s power of appointment, as well as restricts the chances for
appointment of the qualified nominees.—Clustering impinges upon the President’s power of appointment, as
well as restricts the chances for appointment of the qualified nominees, because (1) the President’s option for
every vacancy is limited to the five to seven nominees in the cluster; and (2) once the President has appointed
from one cluster, then he is proscribed from considering the other nominees in the same cluster for the other
vacancies.

Same; Same; The clustering by the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) of the qualified nominees for the six (6)
vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice appears to have been done arbitrarily, there being no clear basis,
standards, or guidelines for the same.—There is no explanation for the shift in practice by the JBC, which
impaired the power of the President to appoint under the 1987 Constitution and his statutory authority to
determine seniority in a collegiate court. The clustering by the JBC of the qualified nominees for the six
vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice appears to have been done arbitrarily, there being no clear
basis, standards, or guidelines for the same. The number of nominees was not even equally distributed among
the clusters.

Same; President Aquino validly exercised his discretionary power to appoint members of the Judiciary when he
disregarded the clustering of nominees into six (6) separate shortlists for the vacancies for the 16th, 17th, 18th,
19th, 20th and 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.—In view of the foregoing, President Aquino validly
exercised his discretionary power to appoint members of the Judiciary when he disregarded the clustering of
nominees into six separate shortlists for the vacancies for the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th and 21st
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. President Aquino merely maintained the well-established practice,
consistent with the paramount Presidential constitutional prerogative, to appoint the six new Sandiganbayan
Associate Justices from the 37 qualified nominees, as if embodied in one JBC list.

Same; Judicial and Bar Council; The President is not bound by the clustering of nominees by the Judicial and Bar
Council (JBC) and may consider as one the separate shortlists of nominees concurrently submitted by the JBC. —
The President is not bound by the clustering of nominees by the JBC and may consider as one the separate
shortlists of nominees concurrently submitted by the JBC. As the Court already ratiocinated herein, the
requirements and qualifications, as well as the power, duties, and responsibilities are the same for all the
vacant posts in a collegiate court; and if an individual is found to be qualified for one vacancy, then he/she is
also qualified for all the other vacancies. It is worthy of note that the JBC, in previous instances of closely
successive vacancies in collegiate courts, such as the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, faithfully
observed the practice of submitting only a single list of nominees for all the available vacancies, with at least
three nominees for every vacancy, from which the President made his appointments on the same occasion.

Intervention; The allowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the sound discretion of the
court after consideration of the appropriate circumstances. It is not an absolute right.—Intervening in a case is
not a matter of right but of sound discretion of the Court. The allowance or disallowance of a motion for
intervention rests on the sound discretion of the court after consideration of the appropriate circumstances.
It is not an absolute right. The statutory rules or conditions for the right of intervention must be shown.

LEONEN, J., Concurring Opinion:

Judicial Review; Judicial and Bar Council; View that the independent character of the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC) as a constitutional body does not remove it from the Court’s jurisdiction when the assailed acts involve
grave abuse of discretion.— Nonetheless, the independent character of the Judicial and Bar Council as a
constitutional body does not remove it from the Court’s jurisdiction when the assailed acts involve grave
abuse of discretion.

Same; Same; View that the expanded power of judicial review gives the court the authority to strike down acts of
all government instrumentalities that are contrary to the Constitution.—Judicial review is the mechanism
provided by the Constitution to settle actual controversies and to determine whether there has been grave
abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. The expanded power of
judicial review gives the court the authority to strike down acts of all government instrumentalities that are
contrary to the Constitution.

Same; Same; View that the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) may have acted in excess of its constitutional mandate
to recommend nominees to the President when it clustered the Sandiganbayan applicants, in six (6) separate
groups, purportedly to account for each newly created division.—The Judicial and Bar Council may have acted
in excess of its constitutional mandate to recommend nominees to the President when it clustered the
Sandiganbayan applicants, in six separate groups, purportedly to account for each newly created division.
There seems to be no rational basis in the positioning of the applicants in their respective clusters, with some
of the shortlists containing five names, while others having six, and two clusters even containing as many as
seven names.
Same; Same; Presidential Appointments; View that President Aquino did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
disregarding the shortlists submitted to him by the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) and treating all six (6)
shortlists as one (1) shortlist from which he can choose the new Sandiganbayan justices.—President Aquino did
not commit grave abuse of discretion in disregarding the shortlists submitted to him by the Judicial and Bar
Council and treating all six shortlists as one shortlist from which he can choose the new Sandiganbayan
justices.

Same; Same; Same; View that the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) is not mandated to submit its revised internal
rules to the Supreme Court (SC) for approval.—The Judicial and Bar Council is not mandated to submit its
revised internal rules to the Supreme Court for approval. The question as to whether the Judicial and Bar
Council must submit its existing rules to the Supreme Court was not raised as an issue in this case.

Same; Same; Same; View that exercise of the Supreme Court’s (SC’s) power of judicial review over the Judicial
and Bar Council (JBC) must always be balanced with the JBC’s independent nature.—The exercise of this Court’s
power of judicial review over the Judicial and Bar Council must always be balanced with the Judicial and Bar
Council’s independent nature. The Court’s authority over the Judicial and Bar Council should, thus, be
considered as primarily administrative, with the Chief Justice, as the ex officio Chair, exercising overall
administrative authority in the execution of the Judicial and Bar Council’s mandate.

Same; Same; Same; View that the Supreme Court (SC) cannot meddle in the Judicial and Bar Council’s (JBC’s)
internal rules and policies precisely because doing so would be an unconstitutional affront to the JBC's
independence.--The Constitution has provided the qualifications of the members of the judiciary, but has given
the Judicial and Bar Council the latitude to promulgate its own set of rules and procedures to effectively
ensure its mandate. This Court cannot meddle in the Judicial and Bar Council’s internal rules and policies
precisely because doing so would be an unconstitutional affront to the Judicial and Bar Council’s
independence.

Same; Same; Same; View that the vetting by the Supreme Court (SC) of the Judicial and Bar Council’s (JBC’s)
internal rules do not fall under the power of judicial review as there is no justiciable controversy in the absence
of clashing legal rights.— Thus, the vetting by this Court of the Judicial and Bar Council’s internal rules do not
fall under the power of judicial review as there is no justiciable controversy in the absence of clashing legal
rights.

C.9.2. Aguinaldo vs. Aquino III, G.R. No. 224302. February 21, 2017.

Judges; Disqualification and Inhibition of Judges; The present Motion for Inhibition has failed to comply with
Rule 8, Section 2 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (SC), which requires that “[a] motion for inhibition
must be in writing and under oath and shall state the grounds therefor.”—The present Motion for Inhibition
has failed to comply with Rule 8, Section 2 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, which requires that “[a]
motion for inhibition must be in writing and under oath and shall state the grounds therefor.” Yet, even if
technical rules are relaxed herein, there is still no valid ground for the inhibition of the ponente. There is no
ground for the mandatory inhibition of the ponente from the case at bar. The ponente has absolutely no
personal interest in this case. The ponente is not a counsel, partner, or member of a law firm that is or was the
counsel in the case; the ponente or her spouse, parent, or child has no pecuniary interest in the case; and the
ponente is not related to any of the parties in the case within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or
to an attorney or any member of a law firm who is counsel of record in the case within the fourth degree of
consanguinity or affinity. The ponente is also not privy to any proceeding in which the JBC discussed and
decided to adopt the unprecedented method of clustering the nominees for the six simultaneous vacancies for
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice into six separate short lists, one for every vacancy. The ponente does not
know when, how, and why the JBC adopted the clustering method of nomination for appellate courts and
even the Supreme Court.

Appointments; Judicial and Bar Council; Jurisdiction; The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) cannot impair the
President’s power to appoint members of the Judiciary and his statutory power to determine the seniority of the
newly-appointed Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.—The JBC invokes its independence, discretion, and
wisdom, and maintains that it deemed it wiser and more in accord with Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987
Constitution to cluster the nominees for the six simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice
into six separate short lists. The independence and discretion of the JBC, however, is not without limits. It
cannot impair the President’s power to appoint members of the Judiciary and his statutory power to
determine the seniority of the newly-appointed Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. The Court cannot sustain
the strained interpretation of Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution espoused by the JBC, which
ultimately curtailed the President’s appointing power.

Same; The requirements and qualifications, as well as the powers, duties, and responsibilities are the same for all
vacant posts in a collegiate court, such as the Sandiganbayan; and if an individual is found to be qualified for one
(1) vacancy, then he/she is found to be qualified for all the other vacancies — there are no distinctions among
the vacant posts.—The Court emphasizes that the requirements and qualifications, as well as the powers, duties,
and responsibilities are the same for all vacant posts in a collegiate court, such as the Sandiganbayan; and if an
individual is found to be qualified for one vacancy, then he/she is found to be qualified for all the other vacancies
— there are no distinctions among the vacant posts. It is improbable that the nominees expressed their desire
to be appointed to only a specific vacant position and not the other vacant positions in the same collegiate
court, when neither the Constitution nor the law provides a specific designation or distinctive description for
each vacant position in the collegiate court. The JBC did not cite any cogent reason in its Motion for
Reconsideration-in-Intervention for assigning a nominee to a particular cluster/vacancy. The Court highlights
that without objective criteria, standards, or guidelines in determining which nominees are to be included in
which cluster, the clustering of nominees for specific vacant posts seems to be at the very least, totally
arbitrary. The lack of such criteria, standards, or guidelines may open the clustering to manipulation to favor
or prejudice a qualified nominee.

Same; As long as in the end, the President appoints someone nominated by the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC), the
appointment is valid, and he, not the JBC, determines the seniority of appointees to a collegiate court. —It is also
not clear to the Court how, as the JBC avowed in its Motion for Reconsideration, the clustering of nominees for
simultaneous vacancies in collegiate courts into separate short lists can rid the appointment process to the
Judiciary of political pressure; or conversely, how the previous practice of submitting a single list of nominees
to the President for simultaneous vacancies in collegiate courts, requiring the same qualifications, made the
appointment process more susceptible to political pressure.

The 1987 Constitution itself, by creating the JBC and requiring that the President can only appoint judges and
Justices from the nominees submitted by the JBC, already sets in place the mechanism to protect the
appointment process from political pressure. By arbitrarily clustering the nominees for appointment to the
six simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice into separate short lists, the JBC influenced
the appointment process and encroached on the President’s power to appoint members of the Judiciary and
determine seniority in the said court, beyond its mandate under the 1987 Constitution. As the Court
pronounced in its Decision dated November 29, 2016, the power to recommend of the JBC cannot be used to
restrict or limit the President’s power to appoint as the latter’s prerogative to choose someone whom he/she
considers worth appointing to the vacancy in the Judiciary is still paramount. As long as in the end, the
President appoints someone nominated by the JBC, the appointment is valid, and he, not the JBC, determines
the seniority of appointees to a collegiate court.

Same; The declaration of the Supreme Court (SC) that the clustering of nominees by the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC) for the simultaneous vacancies that occurred by the creation of six (6) new positions of Associate Justice of
the Sandiganbayan is unconstitutional was only incidental to its ruling that President Aquino is not bound by
such clustering in making his appointments to the vacant Sandiganbayan Associate Justice posts.—The
declaration of the Court that the clustering of nominees by the JBC for the simultaneous vacancies that
occurred by the creation of six new positions of Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan is unconstitutional
was only incidental to its ruling that President Aquino is not bound by such clustering in making his
appointments to the vacant Sandiganbayan Associate Justice posts. Other than said declaration, the Court did
not require the JBC to do or to refrain from doing something insofar as the issue of clustering of the nominees
to the then six vacant posts of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice was concerned.

Velasco, Jr., J., Separate Opinion:

Appointments; Disqualification and Inhibition of Judges; View that there is no compelling reason for Associate
Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro (Justice Leonardo-De Castro) to inhibit in the case at bar. —I agree that
there is no compelling reason for Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro (Justice Leonardo-De
Castro) to inhibit in the case at bar. Justice Leonardo-De Castro explained at length the extent of her
participation, or nonparticipation, in the closed door meetings of the JBC when she was still a consultant
thereof. She is not privy to the decision of the JBC to approve the rule on the clustering of nominees, much less
to its implementation.

Leonen, J., Separate Opinion:

Advisory Opinions; View that the Supreme Court (SC) should rule on the issues as it does not render advisory
opinions.—I concur in the result insofar as the finding that respondents did not gravely abuse their discretion
in making appointments to the Sandiganbayan as all six vacancies were opened for the first time. I do not find
any reasonable basis to cluster nominees in this case, where the law created simultaneous new vacancies for
a collegial court. I agree with the ponencia that future vacancies for collegial appellate courts and this Court,
are not at issue in this case. Hence, this Court should rule on the issues as it does not render advisory
opinions.

Disqualification and Inhibition of Judges; View that the Supreme Court (SC), in its Internal Rules, provided the
grounds on which a member of the Court must inhibit himself or herself from participating in the resolution
of the case, and none of the cited reasons apply to the ponente.—I likewise concur in the ponencia’s denial of
the Motion for Inhibition filed by the Judicial and Bar Council. This Court, in its Internal Rules, provided the
grounds on which a member of the Court must inhibit himself or herself from participating in the resolution
of the case, and none of the cited reasons apply to the ponente. I am convinced that there is no reason for the
ponente to voluntarily inhibit herself from resolving or participating in this case. The ponente has adequately
explained that she was neither privy nor consulted by the Judicial and Bar Council on the move to cluster the
applicants to the newly created Sandiganbayan positions into six (6) separate shortlists. I see no reason to
doubt the ponente’s statement of impartiality. In the years that I have worked alongside the ponente, I have
personally witnessed her unblemished character and unwavering commitment to upholding the rule of law.
Historically, her moral compass has never waned. I have no reason to doubt her impartiality in this case.

Same; Judicial and Bar Council; View that without the participation of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC), the
doctrine in this case will only be about the discretion of the President when there are simultaneous vacancies in
newly created divisions of a collegial court.—The Judicial and Bar Council should be allowed to intervene in
the case. As the party who committed the act of clustering the Sandiganbayan applicants — an act that was
eventually declared unconstitutional — the Judicial and Bar Council clearly has a legal interest in the matter
under litigation. Without the participation of the Judicial and Bar Council, the doctrine in this case will only be
about the discretion of the President when there are simultaneous vacancies in newly created divisions of a
collegial court. This policy should not extend to other vacancies caused by retirements in the future.

Appointments; Judicial and Bar Council; Jurisdiction; View that more than a technical committee, the Judicial
and Bar Council (JBC) has the power to examine the judicial philosophies of the applicants and make selections,
which it submits to the President. The President may have the final discretion to choose, but he or she chooses
only from that list.—The Judicial and Bar Council is not merely a technical committee that evaluates the
fitness and integrity of applicants in the Judiciary. It is a constitutional organ participating in the process that
guides the direction of the Judiciary. Its composition represents a cross section of the legal profession, retired
judges and Justices, and the Chief Justice. More than a technical committee, it has the power to examine the
judicial philosophies of the applicants and make selections, which it submits to the President. The President
may have the final discretion to choose, but he or she chooses only from that list.

Courts; Sandiganbayan; View that as a collegial court, the Sandiganbayan seats members who equally share
power and sit in divisions of three (3) members each.—As a collegial court, the Sandiganbayan seats members
who equally share power and sit in divisions of three (3) members each. The numerical designation of each
division only pertains to the seniority or order of precedence based on the date of appointment. The Rule on
Precedence is in place primarily for the orderly functioning of the Sandiganbayan, as reflected in Rule II,
Section 1 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan.

Appointments; View that applicants in collegial courts apply only once even when there are simultaneous
vacancies because among divisions in a collegial court, there is no substantial difference to justify the creation of
separate shortlists or clusters for each vacancy.—In single courts such as the regional trial courts or municipal
trial courts, each branch carries its own station code and acts separately and independently from other
coequal branches. On the other hand, the Sandiganbayan divisions, as part of a collegial court, do not possess
similar station codes. This is because there is no discernible difference between the divisions, and decisions
are made not by one justice alone but by a majority or all of the members sitting in a division or En Banc. This
reinforces the collegial nature of the Sandiganbayan: one that is characterized by the equal sharing of
authority among the members. Additionally, in single courts, applicants may apply for each available vacancy;
thus, to find the same applicant in shortlists for vacancies in different single courts is common. On the other
hand, applicants in collegial courts apply only once even when there are simultaneous vacancies because
among divisions in a collegial court, there is no substantial difference to justify the creation of separate
shortlists or clusters for each vacancy.

Judicial and Bar Council; View that the Constitution may have provided the qualifications of the members of the
Judiciary, but it has given the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) the latitude to promulgate its own set of rules and
procedures to effectively ensure its mandate.—I reiterate that the Judicial and Bar Council is not mandated to
submit its revised internal rules to this Court for approval. Jardeleza v. Sereno, 733 SCRA 279 (2014),
emphasized that this Court’s power of judicial review is only to ensure that rules are followed. It has neither
the power to lay down these rules nor the discretion to modify or replace them. The Internal Rules of the
Judicial and Bar Council is necessary and incidental to the function conferred to it by the Constitution. The
Constitution may have provided the qualifications of the members of the Judiciary, but it has given the Judicial
and Bar Council the latitude to promulgate its own set of rules and procedures to effectively ensure its
mandate. This Court cannot meddle in the Judicial and Bar Council’s internal rules and policies. To do so
would be an unconstitutional affront to the Judicial and Bar Council’s independence.
Caguioa, J., Separate Opinion:

Appointments; View that so long as the grouping of at least three (3) nominees for every vacancy by the Judicial
and Bar Council (JBC) did not impinge on the President’s appointing power, there is, in my view, no violation of
the Constitution.—President Aquino was presented with six lists to fill up the six vacancies in the
Sandiganbayan. Each list has at least three nominees. An appointment coming from each of the six lists would
be in keeping with the Constitutional provision. I cannot see it otherwise. Thus, had President Aquino picked
one from each of the six lists prepared by the JBC, I would not have declared his action unconstitutional. My
basis is the plain language of the above Constitutional provision which mandates the JBC to recommend
nominees to any vacancy in the judiciary — to prepare a list of at least three nominees for every vacancy. So
long as the grouping of at least three nominees for every vacancy by the JBC did not impinge on the
President’s appointing power, there is, in my view, no violation of the Constitution. Thus, I cannot view as
grave abuse of discretion the act of the JBC in adopting the six lists it came up with following its “textualist
approach of constitutional interpretation.”

Same; View that President Aquino chose to disregard Judicial and Bar Council’s (JBC’s) clustering, and
considered all the thirty seven (37) nominees named in the six (6) lists, is likewise “textually compliant” with
Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution (i.e., because there are at least three [3] nominees for each of the six
Associate Justice positions).—That President Aquino chose to disregard JBC’s clustering, and considered all the
37 nominees named in the six lists, is likewise “textually compliant” with Section 9, Article VIII of the
Constitution (i.e., because there are at least three nominees for each of the six Associate Justice positions). For
this reason, I cannot find the act of President Aquino as constituting grave abuse of discretion. In fine, I find
nothing unconstitutional in the questioned action of the JBC — in the same manner that I find nothing
unconstitutional in the act of President Aquino in disregarding the clustering done by the JBC, and in choosing
Associate Justices for each of the vacancies “outside” of the “clustered” lists provided by the JBC.

C.9.3. Aguinaldo vs. Aquino III, G.R. No. 224302. August 8, 2017.

Judicial and Bar Council; Clustering of Nominees; MR Resolution and Supplement-MR-Resolution lack merit
given the admission of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) itself in its previous pleadings of lack of consensus
among its own members on the validity of the clustering of nominees for the six (6) simultaneous vacancies in
the Sandiganbayan, further bolstering the unanimous decision of the Supreme Court (SC) against the validity of
such clustering.—Presently for resolution of the Court are the following Motions of the JBC: (a) Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution dated 21 February 2017 (MRResolution), filed on March 17, 2017; and (b)
Motion to Admit Attached Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated 21 February
2017 and the Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated 21 February 2017
(Supplement-MR-Resolution) filed on March 24, 2017. The aforementioned MR-Resolution and Supplement-
MR-Resolution lack merit given the admission of the JBC itself in its previous pleadings of lack of consensus
among its own members on the validity of the clustering of nominees for the six simultaneous vacancies in
the Sandiganbayan, further bolstering the unanimous decision of the Court against the validity of such
clustering. The lack of consensus among JBC members on the validity of the clustering also shows that the
ponente’s decision in this case did not arise from personal hostility — or any other personal consideration —
but solely from her objective evaluation of the adverse constitutional implications of the clustering of the
nominees for the vacant posts of Sandigan bayan Associate Justice.

Judges; Disqualification and Inhibition of Judges; There is no factual or legal basis for the ponente to inhibit
herself from the present case.—It bears to stress that the Court also unanimously held in its Resolution dated
February 21, 2017 that there is no factual or legal basis for the ponente to inhibit herself from the present
case. Worth reiterating below is the ponente’s explanation in the Resolution dated February 21, 2017 that
there was no conflict of interest on her part in rendering judgment in this case, and even in her voting in
Jardeleza v. Sereno, 733 SCRA 279 (2014), considering that she had absolutely no participation in the
decisions made by the JBC that were challenged before this Court in both cases.

C.10. Rufino vs. Endriga, G.R. No. 139554. July 21, 2006.

Courts; Judicial Review; Moot and Academic Questions; For the Court to exercise its power of adjudication, there
must be an actual case or controversy—one that involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal
claims susceptible of judicial resolution, and one not moot or based on extra-legal or other similar
considerations not cognizable by courts of justice. —We first consider the Rufino group’s contention that the
Endriga group’s quo warranto suit should have been dismissed for being moot. The Rufino group argued that
when the Endriga group’s terms subsequently expired, there was no more actual controversy for the Court to
decide. For the Court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy—one
that involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution.
The case must not be moot or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by courts of
justice. A case becomes moot when its purpose has become stale.

Judicial Review; Moot and Academic Questions; There are times when the controversy is of such character that to
prevent its recurrence, and to assure respect for constitutional limitations, the Supreme Court must pass on the
merits of a case.—The purpose of the quo warranto petition was to oust the Rufino group from the CCP Board
and to declare the Endriga group as the rightful trustees of the CCP Board. It may appear that supervening
events have rendered this case moot with the resignation of the Rufino group as well as the expiration of the
terms of the Endriga group based on their appointments by then President Ramos. A “new” set of CCP
trustees had been appointed by President MacapagalArroyo and subsequently elected by the CCP Board.
However, there are times when the controversy is of such character that to prevent its recurrence, and to
assure respect for constitutional limitations, this Court must pass on the merits of a case. This is one such
case.

Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP); Presidential Decree No. 15 (PD 15); Constitutional Law; The Court
cannot refrain from passing upon the constitutionality of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 if only to prevent a repeat
of this regrettable controversy and to protect the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP) from being
periodically wracked by internecine politics.—The constitutional question that gave rise to these issues will
continue to spawn the same controversy in the future, unless the threshold constitutional question is
resolved—the validity of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 on the manner of filling vacancies in the CCP Board.
While the issues may be set aside in the meantime, they are certain to recur every four years, especially when
a new President assumes office, generating the same controversy all over again. Thus, the issues raised here
are capable of repetition, yet evading review if compromises are resorted every time the same controversy
erupts and the constitutionality of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is not resolved. The Court cannot refrain from
passing upon the constitutionality of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 if only to prevent a repeat of this
regrettable controversy and to protect the CCP from being periodically wracked by internecine politics. Every
President who assumes office naturally wants to appoint his or her own trustees to the CCP Board. A frontal
clash will thus periodically arise between the President’s constitutional power to appoint under Section 16,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and the CCP trustees’ power to elect their fellow trustees under Section
6(b) and (c) of PD 15.
Judicial Review; It is the Supreme Court’s duty to apply the 1987 Constitution in accordance with what it says
and not in accordance with how the Legislature or the Executive would want it interpreted—this Court has the
final word on what the law means.—This Court may, in the exercise of its sound discretion, brush aside
procedural barriers and take cognizance of constitutional issues due to their paramount importance. It is the
Court’s duty to apply the 1987 Constitution in accordance with what it says and not in accordance with how
the Legislature or the Executive would want it interpreted. This Court has the final word on what the law
means. The Court must assure respect for the constitutional limitations embodied in the 1987 Constitution.

Presidency; Power of Appointment; Separation of Powers; Usurpation of this fundamentally Executive power of
appointment by the Legislative and Judicial branches violates the system of separation of powers that inheres in
our democratic republican government; Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President
appoints three groups of officers—the first group refers to the heads of the Executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution, the
second group refers to those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint, and the third group
refers to all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law; Under
the same Section 16, there is a fourth group of lower-ranked officers whose appointments Congress may by
law vest in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.—The power to appoint is the
prerogative of the President, except in those instances when the Constitution provides otherwise. Usurpation
of this fundamentally Executive power by the Legislative and Judicial branches violates the ment. Under
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints three groups of officers. The first
group refers to the heads of the Executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments
are vested in the President by the Constitution. The second group refers to those whom the President may be
authorized by law to appoint. The third group refers to all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided by law. Under the same Section 16, there is a fourth group of lower-
ranked officers whose appointments Congress may by law vest in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards. The present case involves the interpretation of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution with respect to the appointment of this fourth group of officers. The President appoints the first
group of officers with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The President appoints the second
and third groups of officers without the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The President appoints
the third group of officers if the law is silent on who is the appointing power, or if the law authorizing the
head of a department, agency, commission, or board to appoint is declared unconstitutional. Thus, if Section
6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is found unconstitutional, the President shall appoint the trustees of the CCP Board
because the trustees fall under the third group of officers.

Power of Appointment; Constitutional Law; The express language of the Constitution and the clear intent of its
framers point to only one conclusion—the officers whom the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards may appoint must be of lower rank than those vested by law with the power to appoint.—The framers
of the 1987 Constitution clearly intended that Congress could by law vest the appointment of lower-ranked
officers in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Commission explain this intent beyond any doubt. The framers of the 1987 Constitution
changed the qualifying word “inferior” to the less disparaging phrase “lower in rank” purely for style.
However, the clear intent remained that these inferior or lower in rank officers are the subordinates of the
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards who are vested by law with the power to appoint.
The express language of the Constitution and the clear intent of its framers point to only one conclusion—the
officers whom the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards may appoint must be of lower
rank than those vested by law with the power to appoint.
Same; Congress may vest the authority to appoint only in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards.—Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution authorizes Congress to vest “in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards” the power to appoint lower-ranked officers. Section 16
provides: The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President
alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. (Emphasis supplied) In
a department in the Executive branch, the head is the Secretary. The law may not authorize the
Undersecretary, acting as such Undersecretary, to appoint lower ranked officers in the Executive department.
In an agency, the power is vested in the head of the agency for it would be preposterous to vest it in the
agency itself. In a commission, the head is the chairperson of the commission. In a board, the head is also the
chairperson of the board. In the last three situations, the law may not also authorize officers other than the
heads of the agency, commission, or board to appoint lower ranked officers.

Same; Presidency; The President’s power to appoint which is a self-executing power vested by the Constitution
itself and thus not subject to legislative limitations or conditions.—The grant of the power to appoint to the
heads of agencies, commissions, or boards is a matter of legislative grace. Congress has the discretion to grant
to, or withhold from, the heads of agencies, commissions, or boards the power to appoint lower-ranked
officers. If it so grants, Congress may impose certain conditions for the exercise of such legislative delegation,
like requiring the recommendation of subordinate officers or the concurrence of the other members of the
commission or board. This is in contrast to the President’s power to appoint which is a self-executing power
vested by the Constitution itself and thus not subject to legislative limitations or conditions. The power to
appoint conferred directly by the Constitution on the Supreme Court en banc and on the Constitutional
Commissions is also self-executing and not subject to legislative limitations or conditions.

Words and Phrases; The word “heads” refers to the chairpersons of the commissions or boards and not to
their members.—The Constitution authorizes Congress to vest the power to appoint lowerranked officers
specifically in the “heads” of the specified offices, and in no other person. The word “heads” refers to the
chairpersons of the commissions or boards and not to their members, for several reasons.

Power of Appointment; The Supreme Court en banc is the appointing power.—The 1987 Constitution speaks of
vesting the power to appoint “in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards.” This is consistent with Section 5(6), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which states that the
“Supreme Court shall x x x [a]ppoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil
Service Law,” making the Supreme Court en banc the appointing power. In sharp contrast, when the 1987
Constitution speaks of the power to appoint lower-ranked officers in the Executive branch, it vests the power
“in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.”

Constitutional Law; Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP); The Chairman of the Cultural Center of the
Philippines (CCP) board is the “head” of the CCP who may be vested by law, under Section 16, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution, with the power to appoint lower-ranked officers of the CCP; The CCP, being governed by a
board, is not an agency but a board for purposes of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.—The
Chairman of the CCP Board is the “head” of the CCP who may be vested by law, under Section 16, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution, with the power to appoint lower-ranked officers of the CCP. Under PD 15, the CCP is a
public corporation governed by a Board of Trustees. Section 6 of PD 15, as amended, states: Board of
Trustees.—The governing powers and authority of the corporation shall be vested in, and exercised by, a
Board of eleven (11) Trustees who shall serve without compensation. The CCP, being governed by a board, is
not an agency but a board for purposes of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

Same; Power of Appointment; Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution allows heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards to appoint only “officers lower in rank” than such “heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards”—this excludes a situation where the appointing officer appoints an officer
equal in rank as him; Insofar as it authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board to elect their co-trustees, Section 6(b)
and (c) of PD 15 is unconstitutional.—Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is thus irreconcilably inconsistent with
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 empowers the remaining
trustees of the CCP Board to fill vacancies in the CCP Board, allowing them to elect their fellow trustees. On
the other hand, Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution allows heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards to appoint only “officers lower in rank” than such “heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards.” This excludes a situation where the appointing officer appoints an officer equal in
rank as him. Thus, insofar as it authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board to elect their co-trustees, Section 6(b)
and (c) of PD 15 is unconstitutional because it violates Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

Power of Appointment; Words and Phrases; It does not matter that Section 6(b) of PD 15 empowers the
remaining trustees to “elect” and not “appoint” their fellow trustees for the effect is the same, which is to fill
vacancies in the CCP Board.—It does not matter that Section 6(b) of PD 15 empowers the remaining trustees
to “elect” and not “appoint” their fellow trustees for the effect is the same, which is to fill vacancies in the CCP
Board. A statute cannot circumvent the constitutional limitations on the power to appoint by filling vacancies
in a public office through election by the co-workers in that office. Such manner of filling vacancies in a public
office has no constitutional basis.

Same; The creation of an independent appointing power inherently conflicts with the President’s power to
appoint.—Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes the CCP trustees the independent appointing power of their
fellow trustees. The creation of an independent appointing power inherently conflicts with the President’s
power to appoint. This inherent conflict has spawned recurring controversies in the appointment of CCP
trustees every time a new President assumes office. In the present case, the incumbent President appointed
the Endriga group as trustees, while the remaining CCP trustees elected the same Endriga group to the same
positions. This has been the modus vivendi in filling vacancies in the CCP Board, allowing the President to
appoint and the CCP Board to elect the trustees. In effect, there are two appointing powers over the same set
of officers in the Executive branch. Each appointing power insists on exercising its own power, even if the two
powers are irreconcilable. The Court must put an end to this recurring anomaly.

Presidency; Power of Control; The presidential power of control over the Executive branch of government
extends to all executive employees from the Department Secretary to the lowliest clerk, a constitutional power
that is self-executing and which does not require any implementing law; Congress cannot limit or curtail the
President’s power of control over the Executive branch. —There is another constitutional impediment to the
implementation of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15. Under our system of government, all Executive departments,
bureaus, and offices are under the control of the President of the Philippines. Section 17, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution provides: The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied) The presidential power of
control over the Executive branch of government extends to all executive employees from the Department
Secretary to the lowliest clerk. This constitutional power of the President is self-executing and does not
require any implementing law. Congress cannot limit or curtail the President’s power of control over the
Executive branch.

Same; Same; Every government office, entity, or agency must fall under the Executive, Legislative, or Judicial
branches, or must belong to one of the independent constitutional bodies, or must be a quasi-judicial body or
local government unit; Since the CCP does not fall under the Legislative or Judicial branches of government, and
neither is it also one of the independent constitutional bodies, nor a quasi-judicial body or a local government
unit, the CCP must fall under the Executive branch; Since the President exercises control over “all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices,” the President necessarily exercises control over the CCP which is an office in
the Executive branch.—Every government office, entity, or agency must fall under the Executive, Legislative,
or Judicial branches, or must belong to one of the independent constitutional bodies, or must be a quasi-
judicial body or local government unit. Otherwise, such government office, entity, or agency has no legal and
constitutional basis for its existence. The CCP does not fall under the Legislative or Judicial branches of
government. The CCP is also not one of the independent constitutional bodies. Neither is the CCP a quasi-
judicial body nor a local government unit. Thus, the CCP must fall under the Executive branch. Under the
Revised Administrative Code of 1987, any agency “not placed by law or order creating them under any
specific department” falls “under the Office of the President.” Since the President exercises control over “all
the executive departments, bureaus, and offices,” the President necessarily exercises control over the CCP
which is an office in the Executive branch. In mandating that the President “shall have control of all executive
x x x offices,” Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not exempt any executive office—one
performing executive functions outside of the independent constitutional bodies—from the President’s
power of control. There is no dispute that the CCP performs executive, and not legislative, judicial, or quasi-
judicial functions.

Same; Same; There can be no instance under the Constitution where an officer of the Executive branch is outside
the control of the President—any office in the Executive branch that is not under the control of the President is a
lost command whose existence is without any legal or constitutional basis.—The President’s power of control
applies to the acts or decisions of all officers in the Executive branch. This is true whether such officers are
appointed by the President or by heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The power of
control means the power to revise or reverse the acts or decisions of a subordinate officer involving the
exercise of discretion. In short, the President sits at the apex of the Executive branch, and exercises “control of
all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices.” There can be no instance under the Constitution where
an officer of the Executive branch is outside the control of the President. The Executive branch is unitary
since there is only one President vested with executive power exercising control over the entire Executive
branch. Any office in the Executive branch that is not under the control of the President is a lost command
whose existence is without any legal or constitutional basis.

Power of Control; The Legislature cannot validly enact a law that puts a government office in the Executive
branch outside the control of the President in the guise of insulating that office from politics or making it
independent.—The Legislature cannot validly enact a law that puts a government office in the Executive
branch outside the control of the President in the guise of insulating that office from politics or making it
independent. If the office is part of the Executive branch, it must remain subject to the control of the
President. Otherwise, the Legislature can deprive the President of his constitutional power of control over “all
the executive x x x offices.” If the Legislature can do this with the Executive branch, then the Legislature can
also deal a similar blow to the Judicial branch by enacting a law putting decisions of certain lower courts
beyond the review power of the Supreme Court. This will destroy the system of checks and balances finely
structured in the 1987 Constitution among the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches. Of course, the
President’s power of control does not extend to quasi-judicial bodies whose proceedings and decisions are
judicial in nature and subject to judicial review, even as such quasi-judicial bodies may be under the
administrative supervision of the President. It also does not extend to local government units, which are
merely under the general supervision of the President.

Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP); Presidential Decree No. 15; Presidency; Power of Control; Section 6(b)
and (c) of PD 15 makes the CCP a self-perpetuating entity, virtually outside the control of the President —such a
public office or board cannot legally exist under the 1987 Constitution.—Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15, which
authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board to fill vacancies in the Board, runs afoul with the President’s power
of control under Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The intent of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is
to insulate the CCP from political influence and pressure, specifically from the President. Section 6(b) and (c)
of PD 15 makes the CCP a self-perpetuating entity, virtually outside the control of the President. Such a public
office or board cannot legally exist under the 1987 Constitution.

Same; Power of Control; Section 3 of PD 15 stating that the CCP “shall enjoy autonomy of policy and operation”
may give the CCP Board a free hand in initiating and formulating policies and undertaking activities, but
ultimately these policies and activities are all subject to the President’s power of control. —Section 3 of PD 15, as
amended, states that the CCP “shall enjoy autonomy of policy and operation x x x.” This provision does not
free the CCP from the President’s control, for if it does, then it would be unconstitutional. This provision may
give the CCP Board a free hand in initiating and formulating policies and undertaking activities, but ultimately
these policies and activities are all subject to the President’s power of control.

Same; Same; Constitutional Law; By stating that the “President shall have control of all the executive x x x
offices,” the 1987 Constitution empowers the President not only to influence but even to control all offices in the
Executive branch, including the CCP—control is far greater than, and subsumes, influence.—The CCP is part of
the Executive branch. No law can cut off the President’s control over the CCP in the guise of insulating the CCP
from the President’s influence. By stating that the “President shall have control of all the executive x x x
offices,” the 1987 Constitution empowers the President not only to influence but even to control all offices in
the Executive branch, including the CCP. Control is far greater than, and subsumes, influence.

Same; Appointments Clause; Constitutional authority to make appointments within the executive branch is
governed solely by the Appointments Clause of the Constitution, which is broad enough to cover all possible
appointment scenarios.—Constitutional authority to make appointments within the executive branch is
governed solely by the Appointments Clause of the Constitution, which is broad enough to cover all possible
appointment scenarios. The provision states: SECTION 16. The President shall nominate and, with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he
may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower
in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The first sentence of the Appointments Clause enumerates the officers whom only the President may appoint,
subject to the consent of the Commission of Appointments. There is no doubt that no official of the CCP, or
any GOCC for that matter, is included in this first category of appoint-ees. The second and third sentences
must be examined together. The second sentence authorizes the President to appoint all other officers whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, or those whom he may be authorized to appoint by law.
This authority must be appreciated with the third sentence, which authorizes Congress to vest the
appointment of other officers lower in rank to the President, the courts, or in the heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards.

Appointments Clause; Words and Phrases; “Boards,” as used in the Appointments Clause does not pertain to the
boards of directors of government or public corporations such as the CCP— such GOCCs are properly considered
as agencies which nonetheless fall within the same classification in the Appointments Clause; The term “board”
or “Board,” as utilized in the administrative bureaucracy, may pertain to different entities performing different
functions under different mandates.—I submit that “boards,” as used in the Appointments Clause, does not
pertain to the boards of directors of government or public corporations such as the CCP. Such GOCCs are
properly considered as agencies which nonetheless fall within the same classification in the Appointments
Clause. The term “board” or “Board,” as utilized in the administrative bureaucracy, may pertain to different
entities performing different functions under different mandates. There are several prominent government
agencies which use the nomenclature “Board,” such as the Monetary Board (MB), the Housing Land Use and
Regulatory Board (HLURB), the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), the Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB), and the former Energy Regulatory Board, among
others. Collegial bodies such as the Boards just mentioned have long formed part of the executive
superstructure, along with departments, agencies and commissions. Hence, it came as no surprise that all four
(4) entities were lumped together in the Appointments Clause.

Same; Same; The term “Board,” used in a general sense, has been defined as a representative body organized to
perform a trust or to execute official or representative functions, or a group of persons with managerial,
supervisory or investigatory functions.— The CCP itself may be considered as an agency since under the
Administrative Code, an agency includes a government-owned or controlled corporation. The term “Board,”
used in a general sense, has been defined as a representative body organized to perform a trust or to execute
official or representative functions, or a group of persons with managerial, supervisory or investigatory
functions. There is no doubt that sovereign executive functions can be delegated through duly constituted
Boards, such as the HLURB or MTRCB, and it is commonly understood that the Boards in those cases refer to a
group of individuals vested with the exercise of governmental functions. However, boards do not normally
have independent juridical personality, unlike corporations.

Power of Appointment; Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP); It is the CCP board itself that is the “head” of the
CCP or acts as such head.—Who then is the “head” of the CCP? The majority suggests that it is the Chairperson
of the CCP board. I respectfully differ but maintain that it is the CCP board itself that is the “head” of the CCP
or acts as such head. The majority’s conclusion is predicated on the premise that the CCP should be classified
as a board (Board) and not an agency. However, as I pointed out, the CCP as a GOCC should instead be
considered as an agency. Indeed, the CCP Board of Trustees cannot exercise any function or power outside
the context of its mandate as the governing authority of the CCP.

Same; Appointments Clause; The proper construction of “head” should be functional in approach, focusing on the
entity that exercises the actual governing authority rather than searching for a single individual who could be
deemed by reason of title as representative of the CCP; Pursuant to the Appointments Clause, Congress may vest
on the CCP board, as the head of the CCP, the power to appoint officers of the CCP.—I feel that the majority has
succumbed to the temptation in regarding the term “head” as exclusively referring to a singular personality.
Such a reading, I respectfully submit, is unduly formalistic. The proper construction of “head” should be
functional in approach, focusing on the entity that exercises the actual governing authority rather than
searching for a single individual who could be deemed by reason of title as representative of the CCP. For the
objective of the Appointments Clause is to allow the power to appoint to be exercised by the final governing
authority of a department, agency, commission or board (Board) over its junior officers. It would be patently
absurd to insist that the constitutional intent is to authorize the repose of such appointing power instead to
an individual officer whose acts are still subject to confirmation by a higher authority within that office.
Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper freinda est, ut eviatur inconveniens et absurdum. Thus, pursuant to the
Appointments Clause, Congress may vest on the CCP board, as the head of the CCP, the power to appoint
officers of the CCP. The controversy in this case lies though in the appointment of the members of the Board
of Trustees themselves, and not the particular officers of the CCP. Thus, the question is this: Can the Board of
Trustees be validly empowered by law to appoint its own members, as it is so under the CCP Charter?

Presidency; Power of Control; Congress; Evidently, there is a looming clash between the prerogative of the
President to exercise control over the executive branch, and the prerogative of Congress to dictate through
legislation the metes and bounds of a government corporation with original charter.—Our laws similarly
sustain the theoretical underpinning that a chartered GOCC is a creature of the legislative branch of
government, even as it falls within the executive branch. As noted earlier, Section 6 of the Corporation Code
states that “[c]orporations created by special laws or charters shall be governed primarily by the provisions
of the special law or charter creating them or applicable to them” Thus, it is Congress, and not the executive
branch, which determines a chartered GOCC’s corporate structure, purposes and functions. This basic point
should be beyond controversy. Yet, the majority implies that Congress cannot limit or curtail the President’s
power of control over the Executive branch, and from that context, declares that a law authorizing the CCP
Board of Trustees to appoint its own members runs afoul with the President’s power of control. Evidently,
there is a looming clash between the prerogative of the President to exercise control over the executive
branch, and the prerogative of Congress to dictate through legislation the metes and bounds of a government
corporation with original charter. The scope of the potential controversy could also extend not only to GOCCs
with original charters, but also to other public offices created by law. Outside of those offices specifically
created by the Constitution itself, the creation and definition of the bureaucracy that constitutes the executive
branch of government is an incident of the legislative power to make laws. The power to create public offices
is inherently legislative, and generally includes the power to modify or abolish it.

Power of Removal; Government-Owned or Controlled Corporations (GOCCs); Even as public offices or GOCCs may
fall within the control and supervision of the executive branch, Congress has the power, through legislation, to
enact whatever restrictions it may deem fit to prescribe for the public good.—I submit that as a means of
checking executive power, the legislature is empowered to impose reasonable statutory limitations in such
exercise, over such areas wherein the legislative jurisdiction to legislate is ceded. As stated earlier, among
such areas within the province of Congress is the creation of public offices or GOCCs. Even as such public
offices or GOCCs may fall within the control and supervision of the executive branch, Congress has the power,
through legislation, to enact whatever restrictions it may deem fit to prescribe for the public good.

Constitutional Law; Presidency; The Constitution is allergic to an omnipotent presidency, and thus, the law is the
limit.—The ruling of the Court today is boon for those quarters which wish to concede to the presidency as
much power as there can be. Sadly, it comes at the expense of the time-honored prerogative of Congress to
legislate laws. The power of Congress to enact legislative charters with any sort of restrictions that would be
enforced is now severely put in doubt. The power of Congress to fix the terms of the offices it creates is now
controvertible. The President has been given the green light to remove at will officials whose terms of offices
are set by law, without regard to the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure to these officials. All these
wrought simply because for the majority, the CCP Board of Trustees somehow transubstantiated itself into
the CCP itself. I have consistently advocated a generous interpretation of presidential authority, owing to my
firm belief in the potency of the inherent and residual powers implicit in the highest office of the land. Still,
the Constitution is allergic to an omnipotent presidency, and thus, the law is the limit. This is a live tiger that
the majority has set loose today, one utterly capable of inflicting great pain on the delicate balance that
safeguards the separation of powers.

C.11. De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar Council (JBC), G.R. No. 191002. March 17, 2010.

Judicial Review; Locus Standi; Requisites; Words and Phrases; In public or constitutional litigations, the Court is
often burdened with the determination of the locus standi of the petitioners due to the ever-present need to
regulate the invocation of the intervention of the Court to correct any official action or policy in order to avoid
obstructing the efficient functioning of public officials and offices involved in public service; Black defines locus
standi as “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.”—Black defines locus standi as “a right
of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” In public or constitutional litigations, the Court is
often burdened with the determination of the locus standi of the petitioners due to the ever-present need to
regulate the invocation of the intervention of the Court to correct any official action or policy in order to avoid
obstructing the efficient functioning of public officials and offices involved in public service. It is required,
therefore, that the petitioner must have a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, for, as indicated
in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc., 402 SCRA 612 (2003): The question on legal
standing is whether such parties have “alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.” Accordingly, it has been held that the interest
of a person assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show,
not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some
indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or
privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by
reason of the statute or act complained of.

Presidency; Appointments; Midnight Appointment Ban; The prohibition against presidential appointments under
Section 15, Article VII does not extend to appointments in the Judiciary.—In the consolidated petitions, the
petitioners, with the exception of Soriano, Tolentino and Inting, submit that the incumbent President can
appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement on May 17, 2010, on the ground that the
prohibition against presidential appointments under Section 15, Article VII does not extend to appointments
in the Judiciary. The Court agrees with the submission.

Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section
15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so—they
could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions.—As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the
Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The
presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article. Article VIII is
dedicated to the Judicial Department and defines the duties and qualifications of Members of the Supreme
Court, among others. Section 4(1) and Section 9 of this Article are the provisions specifically providing for the
appointment of Supreme Court Justices. In particular, Section 9 states that the appointment of Supreme Court
Justices can only be made by the President upon the submission of a list of at least three nominees by the JBC;
Section 4(1) of the Article mandates the President to fill the vacancy within 90 days from the occurrence of
the vacancy. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have
ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition
made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not
done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within
two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s
term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Same; Same; Same; Judgments; The reference to the records of the Constitutional Commission did not advance or
support the result in In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B.
Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City,
respectively (Valenzuela), 298 SCRA 408 (1998). —The reference to the records of the Constitutional
Commission did not advance or support the result in Valenzuela. Far to the contrary, the records disclosed
the express intent of the framers to enshrine in the Constitution, upon the initiative of Commissioner Eulogio
Lerum, “a command [to the President] to fill up any vacancy therein within 90 days from its occurrence,”
which even Valenzuela conceded. The exchanges during deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on
October 8, 1986 further show that the filling of a vacancy in the Supreme Court within the 90-day period was
a true mandate for the President.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution of the word shall—an
imperative, operating to impose a duty that may be enforced—should not be disregarded; Section 4(1) imposes
on the President the imperative duty to make an appointment of a Member of the Supreme Court within 90 days
from the occurrence of the vacancy—the failure by the President to do so will be a clear disobedience to the
Constitution; The 90-day limitation fixed in Section 4(1), Article VIII for the President to fill the vacancy in the
Supreme Court was undoubtedly a special provision to establish a definite mandate for the President as the
appointing power.—Moreover, the usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the word shall—an imperative,
operating to impose a duty that may be enforced—should not be disregarded. Thereby, Sections 4(1) imposes
on the President the imperative duty to make an appointment of a Member of the Supreme Court within 90
days from the occurrence of the vacancy. The failure by the President to do so will be a clear disobedience to
the Constitution. The 90-day limitation fixed in Section 4(1), Article VIII for the President to fill the vacancy in
the Supreme Court was undoubtedly a special provision to establish a definite mandate for the President as
the appointing power, and cannot be defeated by mere judicial interpretation in Valenzuela to the effect that
Section 15, Article VII prevailed because it was “couched in stronger negative language.” Such interpretation
even turned out to be conjectural, in light of the records of the Constitutional Commission’s deliberations on
Section 4 (1), Article VIII.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Valenzuela arbitrarily ignored the express intent of the Constitutional Commission to
have Section 4 (1), Article VIII stand independently of any other provision, least of all one found in Article VII—a
misinterpretation like Valenzuela should not be allowed to last after its false premises have been exposed;
Valenzuela now deserves to be quickly sent to the dustbin of the unworthy and forgettable. —In this connection,
PHILCONSA’s urging of a revisit and a review of Valenzuela is timely and appropriate. Valenzuela arbitrarily
ignored the express intent of the Constitutional Commission to have Section 4 (1), Article VIII stand
independently of any other provision, least of all one found in Article VII. It further ignored that the two
provisions had no irreconcilable conflict, regardless of Section 15, Article VII being couched in the negative.
As judges, we are not to unduly interpret, and should not accept an interpretation that defeats the intent of
the framers. Consequently, prohibiting the incumbent President from appointing a Chief Justice on the
premise that Section 15, Article VII extends to appointments in the Judiciary cannot be sustained. A
misinterpretation like Valenzuela should not be allowed to last after its false premises have been exposed. It
will not do to merely distinguish Valenzuela from these cases, for the result to be reached herein is entirely
incompatible with what Valenzuela decreed. Consequently, Valenzuela now deserves to be quickly sent to the
dustbin of the unworthy and forgettable. We reverse Valenzuela.

Same; Same; Same; Judicial and Bar Council; Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section
15, Article VII, the Court has no doubt that the Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to
appointments made in the Executive Department; If midnight appointments in the mold of Aytona v. Castillo, 4
SCRA 1 (1962), were made in haste and with irregularities, or made by an outgoing Chief Executive in the last
days of his administration out of a desire to subvert the policies of the incoming President or for partisanship,
the appointments to the Judiciary made after the establishment of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) would not
be suffering from such defects because of the JBC’s prior processing of candidates.—Given the background and
rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, we have no doubt that the Constitutional Commission
confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Department. The framers did not need to
extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because their establishment of the JBC and their
subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate
prior process of the JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary. If
midnight appointments in the mold of Aytona were made in haste and with irregularities, or made by an
outgoing Chief Executive in the last days of his administration out of a desire to subvert the policies of the
incoming President or for partisanship, the appointments to the Judiciary made after the establishment of the
JBC would not be suffering from such defects because of the JBC’s prior processing of candidates. Indeed, it is
axiomatic in statutory construction that the ascertainment of the purpose of the enactment is a step in the
process of ascertaining the intent or meaning of the enactment, because the reason for the enactment must
necessarily shed considerable light on “the law of the statute,” i.e., the intent; hence, the enactment should be
construed with reference to its intended scope and purpose, and the court should seek to carry out this
purpose rather than to defeat it.

Same; Presidency; Appointments; Judicial and Bar Council; The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) has no
discretion to submit the list of nominees to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court to the President after the
vacancy occurs, because that shortens the 90day period allowed by the Constitution for the President to make
the appointment.—Section 4(1) and Section 9, Article VIII, mandate the President to fill the vacancy in the
Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy, and within 90 days from the submission of
the list, in the case of the lower courts. The 90-day period is directed at the President, not at the JBC. Thus, the
JBC should start the process of selecting the candidates to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court before the
occurrence of the vacancy. Under the Constitution, it is mandatory for the JBC to submit to the President the
list of nominees to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court in order to enable the President to appoint one of them
within the 90-day period from the occurrence of the vacancy. The JBC has no discretion to submit the list to
the President after the vacancy occurs, because that shortens the 90-day period allowed by the Constitution
for the President to make the appointment. For the JBC to do so will be unconscionable on its part,
considering that it will thereby effectively and illegally deprive the President of the ample time granted under
the Constitution to reflect on the qualifications of the nominees named in the list of the JBC before making the
appointment.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The duty of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) to submit a list of nominees before the
start of the President’s mandatory 90-day period to appoint is ministerial, but its selection of the candidates
whose names will be in the list to be submitted to the President lies within the discretion of the JBC.— The duty
of the JBC to submit a list of nominees before the start of the President’s mandatory 90-day period to appoint
is ministerial, but its selection of the candidates whose names will be in the list to be submitted to the
President lies within the discretion of the JBC. The object of the petitions for mandamus herein should only
refer to the duty to submit to the President the list of nominees for every vacancy in the Judiciary, because in
order to constitute unlawful neglect of duty, there must be an unjustified delay in performing that duty. For
mandamus to lie against the JBC, therefore, there should be an unexplained delay on its part in
recommending nominees to the Judiciary, that is, in submitting the list to the President.

C.12. ATTY. CHELOY E. VELICARIA- GARAFIL, Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT AND HON.
SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, Respondents.

The appointment to a government post like that of provincial fiscal to be complete involves several steps.
First, comes the nomination by the President. Then to make that nomination valid and permanent, the
Commission on Appointments of the Legislature has to confirm said nomination. The last step is the
acceptance thereof by the appointee by his assumption of office. The first two steps, nomination and
confirmation, constitute a mere offer of a post. They are acts of the Executive and Legislative departments of
the Government. But the last necessary step to make the appointment complete and effective rests solely with
the appointee himself. He may or he may not accept the appointment or nomination. As held in the case of
Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil. 327, “there is no power in this country which can compel a man to accept an
office.” Consequently, since Lacson has declined to accept his appointment as provincial fiscal of Tarlac and
no one can compel him to do so, then he continues as provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental and no vacancy in
said office was created, unless Lacson had been lawfully removed as such fiscal of Negros Oriental.

C.13. Manalang-Demigillo vs. Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines
(TIDCORP), G.R. No. 168613. March 5, 2013.

Constitutional Law; Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency; The doctrine of qualified political agency, also known
as the alter ego doctrine, was introduced in the landmark case of Villena v. The Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451
(1939).—The doctrine of qualified political agency, also known as the alter ego doctrine, was introduced in
the landmark case of Villena v. The Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451 (1939). In said case, the Department of
Justice, upon the request of the Secretary of Interior, investigated Makati Mayor Jose D. Villena and found him
guilty of bribery, extortion, and abuse of authority. The Secretary of Interior then recommended to the
President the suspension from office of Mayor Villena. Upon approval by the President of the
recommendation, the Secretary of Interior suspended Mayor Villena. Unyielding, Mayor Villena challenged his
suspension, asserting that the Secretary of Interior had no authority to suspend him from office because there
was no specific law granting such power to the Secretary of Interior; and that it was the President alone who
was empowered to suspend local government officials. The Court disagreed with Mayor Villena and upheld
his suspension, holding that the doctrine of qualified political agency warranted the suspension by the
Secretary of Interior.

Same; Same; The doctrine of qualified political agency essentially postulates that the heads of the various
executive departments are the alter egos of the President, and, thus, the actions taken by such heads in the
performance of their official duties are deemed the acts of the President unless the President himself should
disapprove such acts.—The doctrine of qualified political agency essentially postulates that the heads of the
various executive departments are the alter egos of the President, and, thus, the actions taken by such heads
in the performance of their official duties are deemed the acts of the President unless the President himself
should disapprove such acts. This doctrine is in recognition of the fact that in our presidential form of
government, all executive organizations are adjuncts of a single Chief Executive; that the heads of the
Executive Departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive; and that the multiple executive
functions of the President as the Chief Executive are performed through the Executive Departments. The
doctrine has been adopted here out of practical necessity, considering that the President cannot be expected
to personally perform the multifarious functions of the executive office.

C.14. Vidallon-Magtolis vs. Salud, G.R. No. 168056. September 1, 2005.

Courts; Contempt; Separation of Powers; If it were true that former Finance Secretary Purisima felt that the
media misconstrued his actions, then he should have immediately rectified it and not waited until the Supreme
Court required him to explain before he denied having made such statements which impressed upon the public’s
mind that the issuance of the TRO was the product of the machinations on the Court by the executive branch. —
At the time the reports came out, Purisima did not controvert the truth or falsity of the statements attributed
to him. It was only after the Court issued the show-cause order that Purisima saw it fit to deny having uttered
these statements. By then, it was already impressed upon the public’s mind that the issuance of the TRO was
the product of machinations on the Court by the executive branch. If it were true that Purisima felt that the
media misconstrued his actions, then he should have immediately rectified it. He should not have waited until
the Court required him to explain before he denied having made such statements. And even then, his denials
were made as a result of the Court’s show-cause order and not by any voluntary act on his part that will show
utter regret for having been “misquoted.” Purisima should know that these press releases placed the Court
into dis-honor, disrespect, and public contempt, diminished public confidence, promoted distrust in the Court,
and assailed the integrity of its Members. The Court already took a beating before Purisima made any
disclaimer. The damage has been done, so to speak.

C.15. Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation vs. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, G.R. No. 198146. August 8, 2017.

Presidency; Courts; Jurisdiction; Power of Control; Under his constitutional power of control, the President
decides the dispute between the two (2) executive offices. The judiciary cannot substitute its decision over that of
the President. Only after the President has decided or settled the dispute can the courts’ jurisdiction be invoked.
—Clearly, the President’s constitutional power of control over all the executive departments, bureaus and
offices cannot be curtailed or diminished by law. “Since the Constitution has given the President the power of
control, with all its awesome implications, it is the Constitution alone which can curtail such power.” This
constitutional power of control of the President cannot be diminished by the CTA. Thus, if two executive
offices or agencies cannot agree, it is only proper and logical that the President, as the sole Executive who
under the Constitution has control over both offices or agencies in dispute, should resolve the dispute instead
of the courts. The judiciary should not intrude in this executive function of determining which is correct
between the opposing government offices or agencies, which are both under the sole control of the President.
Under his constitutional power of control, the President decides the dispute between the two executive
offices. The judiciary cannot substitute its decision over that of the President. Only after the President has
decided or settled the dispute can the courts’ jurisdiction be invoked. Until such time, the judiciary should not
interfere since the issue is not yet ripe for judicial adjudication. Otherwise, the judiciary would infringe on the
President’s exercise of his constitutional power of control over all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices.

28. VINUYA vs. ROMULO

The Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Department the conduct of foreign relations for the
Philippines. Whether or not to espouse petitioners’ claim against the Government of Japan is left to the
exclusive determination and judgment of the Executive Department. The Court cannot interfere with or
question the wisdom of the conduct of foreign relations by the Executive Department. Accordingly, we cannot
direct the Executive Department, either by writ of certiorari or injunction, to conduct our foreign relations
with Japan in a certain manner.

Political questions refer “to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom,
not legality of a particular measure.”
The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been used as a legal term
describing obligations owed by States towards the community of states as a whole. Essential distinction
should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole, and
those arising vis-à -vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are
the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal
interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.

The term “jus cogens” (literally, “compelling law”) refers to norms that command peremptory authority,
superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense that
they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified only by general international norms of
equivalent authority

29. SAGUISAG vs. OCHOA 779 SCRA 241

Distinguished from the general notion of judicial power, the power of judicial review specially refers to
both the authority and the duty of the Supreme Court (SC) to determine whether a branch or an instrumentality
of government has acted beyond the scope of the latter’s constitutional powers.

Even as we are left with no recourse but to bare our power to check an act of a coequal branch of
government — in this case the executive — we must abide by the stringent requirements for the exercise of
that power under the Constitution. Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208 (1987) and Francisco, Jr. v.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., 415 SCRA 44 (2003), cite the
“pillars” of the limitations on the power of judicial review as enunciated in the concurring opinion of U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288
(1936). Francisco redressed these “pillars” under the following categories: 1. That there be absolute
necessity of deciding a case; 2. That rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the
facts of the case; 3. That judgment may not be sustained on some other ground; 4. That there be actual
injury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of the statute; 5. That the parties are not
in estoppel; 6. That the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality. (Emphases supplied) These
are the specific safeguards laid down by the Court when it exercises its power of judicial review. Guided by
these pillars, it may invoke the power only when the following four stringent requirements are satisfied: (a)
there is an actual case or controversy; (b) petitioners possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality
is raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality is the lis mota of the case. Of these
four, the first two conditions will be the focus of our discussion.
 
The performance of an official act by the Executive Department that led to the entry into force of an executive
agreement was sufficient to satisfy the actual case or controversy requirement.

The question of locus standi or legal standing focuses on the determination of whether those assailing the
governmental act have the right of appearance to bring the matter to the court for adjudication. They must
show that they have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that they have sustained or are in
immediate danger of sustaining, some direct injury as a consequence of the enforcement of the challenged
governmental act.
SAGUISAG vs. OCHOA, Jr. 798 SCRA 292

The general rule is that foreign bases, troops, and facilities are not allowed in the Philippines. The exception to
this is authority granted to the foreign state in the form of a treaty duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate.

Article I of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) states that “[a]s used in this Agreement, “United States
personnel” means  United States (U.S.) military and civilian personnel temporarily in the Philippines in
connection with activities approved by the Philippine Government.”—Quite clearly, the VFA contemplated
activities beyond joint exercises, which this Court had already recognized and alluded to in Lim v. Executive
Secretary, 380 SCRA 739 (2002), even though the Court in that case was faced with a challenge to the Terms
of Reference of a specific type of joint exercise, the Balikatan Exercise. One source petitioners used to make
claims on the limitation of the VFA to joint exercises is the alleged Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)
Primer on the VFA, which they claim states that: Furthermore, the VFA does not involve access arrangements
for United States armed forces or the pre-positioning in the country of U.S. armaments and war materials. The
agreement is about personnel and not equipment or supplies. Unfortunately, the uniform resource locator
link cited by petitioners is inaccessible. However, even if we grant its veracity, the text of the VFA itself belies
such a claim. Article I of the VFA states that “[a]s used in this Agreement, ‘United States personnel’ means
United States military and civilian personnel temporarily in the Philippines in connection with activities
approved by the Philippine Government.” These “activities” were, as stated in Lim, left to further
implementing agreements. It is true that Article VII on Importation did not indicate pre-positioned materiel,
since it referred to “United States Government equipment, materials, supplies, and other property imported
into or acquired in the Philippines by or on behalf of the United States armed forces in connection with
activities to which this agreement applies[.]”

Diplomatic exchanges of notes are not treaties but rather formal communication tools on routine agreements,
akin to private law contracts, for the executive branch.—In disagreeing with the Court in respect of the MBA’s
jurisdictional provisions, petitioners cite an exchange of notes categorized as an “amendment” to the MBA, as
if to say it operated as a new treaty and should be read into the MBA. This misleadingly equates an exchange
of notes with an amendatory treaty. Diplomatic exchanges of notes are not treaties but rather formal
communication tools on routine agreements, akin to private law contracts, for the executive branch. This
cannot truly amend or change the terms of the treaty, but merely serve as private contracts between the
executive branches of government. They cannot ipso factoamend treaty obligations between States, but may
be treaty-authorized or treaty-implementing. Hence, it is correct to state that the MBA as the treaty did not
give the Philippines jurisdiction over the bases because its provisions on U.S. jurisdiction were explicit. What
the exchange of notes did provide was effectively a contractual waiver of the jurisdictional rights granted to
the U.S. under the MBA, but did not amend the treaty itself.

The Supreme Court’s (SC’s) only concern is the legality of Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) and
not its wisdom or folly.—Petitioners have littered their motion with alleged facts on U.S. practices, ineffective
provisions, or even absent provisions to bolster their position that EDCA is invalid. In this way, petitioners
essentially ask this Court to replace the prerogative of the political branches and rescind the EDCA because it
not a good deal for the Philippines. Unfortunately, the Court’s only concern is the legality of EDCA and not its
wisdom or folly. Their remedy clearly belongs to the executive or legislative branches of government.

30. OCAMPO vs. ENRIQUEZ 807 SCRA 223

It is well-settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be
heard and decided by the Court unless the following requisites for judicial inquiry are present: (a) there must be
an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must
have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must
be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
—It is well-settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act
may be heard and decided by the Court unless the following requisites for judicial inquiry are present: ( a)
there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person
challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; ( c) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality
must be the very lis mota of the case. In this case, the absence of the first two requisites, which are the most
essential, renders the discussion of the last two superfluous.

An “actual case or controversy” is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal
claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.—
An “actual case or controversy” is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal
claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or
dispute. There must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of
existing law and jurisprudence.

President Duterte’s decision to have the remains of Marcos interred at the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB)
involves a political question that is not a justiciable controversy.—The Court agrees with the OSG that President
Duterte’s decision to have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB involves a political question that is not
a justiciable controversy. In the exercise of his powers under the Constitution and the Executive Order (E.O.)
No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987) to allow the interment of Marcos at the LNMB,
which is a land of the public domain devoted for national military cemetery and military shrine purposes,
President Duterte decided a question of policy based on his wisdom that it shall promote national healing and
forgiveness.

Locus standi requires that a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions.—Defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question, locus standi requires that a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
Petitioners, who filed their respective petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, in their capacities as
citizens, human rights violations victims, legislators, members of the Bar and taxpayers, have no legal standing
to file such petitions because they failed to show that they have suffered or will suffer direct and personal injury
as a result of the interment of Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB).—Petitioners, who filed their
respective petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, in their capacities as citizens, human rights
violations victims, legislators, members of the Bar and taxpayers, have no legal standing to file such petitions
because they failed to show that they have suffered or will suffer direct and personal injury as a result of the
interment of Marcos at the LNMB.

Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative

remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, one should have availed first of all the
means of administrative processes available.—Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies,
before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, one should have availed first of all the means of
administrative processes available. If resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be
made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes
within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court’s judicial power can be
sought.

While the Constitution is a product of our collective history as a people, its entirety should not be interpreted as
providing guiding principles to just about anything remotely related to the Martial Law period such as the
proposed Marcos burial at the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB).—As the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
logically reasoned out, while the Constitution is a product of our collective history as a people, its entirety
should not be interpreted as providing guiding principles to just about anything remotely related to the
Martial Law period such as the proposed Marcos burial at the LNMB.

It cannot be conveniently claimed that Marcos’ ouster from the presidency during the EDSA Revolution is
tantamount to his dishonorable separation, reversion or discharge from the military service. The fact that the
President is the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP under the 1987 Constitution only enshrines the principle of
supremacy of civilian authority over the military.

Notwithstanding the call of human rights advocates, the Court must uphold what is legal and just. And that is
not to deny Marcos of his rightful place at the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB).

OCAMPO vs. ENRIQUEZ 835 SCRA 484

Judicial power is not only a power but also a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere invocation of the
political question doctrine.—From the records of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is
clear that judicial power is not only a power but also a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere
invocation of the political question doctrine. Nonetheless, Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion clarified that
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution was not intended to do away with “truly political questions,” which
are beyond judicial review due to the doctrine of separation of powers. In Francisco, Jr. v. The House of
Representatives, 415 SCRA 44 (2003), this Court conceded that Section 1 Article VIII does not define what are
“truly political questions” and “those which are not truly political,” and that identification of these two species
may be problematic since there has been no clear standard. In the end, however, We resolved that, “[i]n our
jurisdiction, the determination of whether an issue involves a truly political and nonjusticiable question lies
in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch
or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits.”

If the grant of presidential pardon to one who is totally undeserving cannot be set aside under the political
question doctrine, the same holds true with respect to the President’s power to faithfully execute a valid and
existing Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) regulation governing the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB) as a
national military cemetery and military shrine.—While the Bill of Rights stands primarily as a limitation not
only against legislative encroachments on individual liberties but also against presidential intrusions,
petitioners failed to show as well that President Duterte violated the due process and equal protection
clauses in issuing a verbal order to public respondents that authorized Marcos’ burial at the LNMB. To note, if
the grant of presidential pardon to one who is totally undeserving cannot be set aside under the political
question doctrine, the same holds true with respect to the President’s power to faithfully execute a valid and
existing AFP regulation governing the LNMB as a national military cemetery and military shrine. More so,
even if subject to review by the Court, President Duterte did not gravely abuse his discretion when he allowed
Marcos’ burial at the LNMB because it was already shown that the latter is qualified as a Medal of Valor
Awardee, a war veteran, and retired military personnel, and not disqualified due to dishonorable
separation/revertion/discharge from service or conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral
turpitude. If grave abuse is not established, the Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the official
concerned and decide a matter which by its nature or by law is for the latter alone to decide.

The issue of allowing Marcos’ burial at the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB) involves a truly political question
which is within the full discretionary authority and wisdom of President Duterte to decide. —There is also no
merit in petitioners’ contention that the issue of whether President Duterte and public respondents violated
the Constitution and the laws and/or committed grave abuse of discretion is purely a question of law that the
Court ultimately has to resolve. To reiterate, the issue of allowing Marcos’ burial at the LNMB involves a truly
political question which is within the full discretionary authority and wisdom of President Duterte to decide.
There is no constitutionally imposed limits on the powers or functions conferred upon him, much less grave
abuse of discretion in the exercise thereof. Similarly, public respondents cannot be faulted for issuing the
interment directive in their official capacities pursuant to the President’s verbal order and to a valid and
binding administrative regulation.
The Constitution is clear that judicial power, which includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government, is vested not just in the Supreme Court (SC) but also upon such lower
courts established by law.—It bears emphasis that the Constitution is clear that judicial power, which includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government, is vested not
just in the Supreme Court but also upon such lower courts established by law. The organic act vests in Us
appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the
constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance or regulation is in question. This means that the resolution of
such cases may be made in the first instance by said lower courts. Under the law, the proper Regional Trial
Court exercises concurrent jurisdiction over extraordinary remedies such as petitions
for certiorari,prohibition and/or mandamus and equally wields the power to grant provisional relief/s.

In the exercise of executive power, the President has inherent power to adopt rules and regulations — a power
which is different from a delegated legislative power that can be exercised only within the prescribed standards
set by law — and to delegate this power to subordinate executive officials; By granting the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff the power to administer a military reservation site then known as Fort Wm
Mckinley (now Fort Andres Bonifacio), part of which is now the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB), former
President Garcia and the presidents subsequent to him effectively delegated their rule-making power.

It is contended that our constitutional tradition has consistently followed the doctrine that the silence of the
Constitution does not mean the absence of constitutional principles and commands. Rosales, et
al. cite Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936), wherein the Court, following the doctrine of
necessary implication, appeared to have recognized the principle of separation of powers and Our power of
judicial review. Also, Ocampo, et al. refer to Egerton v. Earl of Brownlow, wherein an act based on public
policy considerations was allegedly struck down despite the fact that there was no law or jurisprudence
prohibiting it.

If the law is too narrow in scope or has shortcoming, it is for the Legislature alone to correct it by appropriate
enactment, amendment or even repeal.—Indeed, the Court cannot supply legislative omission. We cannot
engraft upon a law something that has been omitted but is believed as ought to have been embraced. This
Court cannot, under its power of interpretation, supply the omission even though the omission may have
resulted from inadvertence  or because the case in question was not foreseen or contemplated. If the law is too
narrow in scope or has shortcoming, it is for the Legislature alone to correct it by appropriate enactment,
amendment or even repeal.

Judicial power covers only the recognition, review or reversal of the policy crafted by the political departments if
and when a case is brought before it on the ground of illegality, unconstitutionality or grave abuse of
discretion (i.e., blatant abuse of power or capricious exercise thereof).—Judicial power covers only the
recognition, review or reversal of the policy crafted by the political departments if and when a case is brought
before it on the ground of illegality, unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion (i.e., blatant abuse of
power or capricious exercise thereof). The determination of the wisdom, fairness, soundness, justice,
equitableness or expediency of a statute or what “ought to be” as a matter of policy is within the realm of and
should be addressed to the legislature. If existing laws are inadequate, the policy-determining branches of the
government, specifically the duly elected representatives who carry the mandate of the popular will, may be
exhorted peacefully by the citizenry to effect positive changes. True to its constitutional mandate, the Court
cannot craft and tailor statutory provisions in order to accommodate all of situations no matter how ideal or
reasonable the proposal may sound. No matter how well-meaning, We can only air Our views in the hope that
Congress would take notice. x x x [The] Court should give Congress a chance to perform its primordial duty of
lawmaking. The Court should not preempt Congress and usurp its inherent powers of making and enacting
laws. While it may be the most expeditious approach, a short cut by judicial fiat is a dangerous proposition,
lest the Court dare trespass on prohibited judicial legislation.

D. JUDICIARY

1. CITY OF MANILA vs. CUERDO 715 SCRA 182

While it is clearly stated that the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over decisions,
orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them
in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction, there is no categorical statement under RA 1125 as well
as the amendatory RA 9282, which provides that the Court of Tax Appeals has jurisdiction over petitions for
certiorari assailing interlocutory orders issued by the Regional Trial Court in local tax cases filed before it; The
prevailing doctrine is that the authority to issue writs of certiorari involves the exercise of original jurisdiction
which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot be implied from the mere existence
of appellate jurisdiction.

While there is no express grant of the power to issue writ of certiorari, with respect to the Court of Tax Appeals
(CTA), Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides, nonetheless, that judicial power shall be vested in
one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law and that judicial power includes the
duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

It can be fairly interpreted that the power of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) includes that of determining
whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax
court.

The Supreme Court agrees with the ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA) that since appellate jurisdiction over
private respondents’ complaint for tax refund is vested in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), it follows that a
petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the said case should, likewise, be
filed with the same court.—If this Court were to sustain petitioners’ contention that jurisdiction over
their certiorari petition lies with the CA, this Court would be confirming the exercise by two judicial bodies,
the CA and the CTA, of jurisdiction over basically the same subject matter — precisely the split — jurisdiction
situation which is anathema to the orderly administration of justice. The Court cannot accept that such was
the legislative motive, especially considering that the law expressly confers on the CTA, the tribunal with the
specialized competence over tax and tariff matters, the role of judicial review over local tax cases without
mention of any other court that may exercise such power. Thus, the Court agrees with the ruling of the CA
that since appellate jurisdiction over private respondents’ complaint for tax refund is vested in the CTA, it
follows that a petition for certiorariseeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the said case
should, likewise, be filed with the same court. To rule otherwise would lead to an absurd situation where one
court decides an appeal in the main case while another court rules on an incident in the very same case.

The supervisory power or jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction should coexist with, and be a complement to, its appellate jurisdiction to review, by appeal,
the final orders and decisions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), in order to have complete supervision over the
acts of the latter.

A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the power necessary to exercise it effectively,
to make all orders that will preserve the subject of the action, and to give effect to the final determination of the
appeal.—A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the power necessary to exercise it
effectively, to make all orders that will preserve the subject of the action, and to give effect to the final
determination of the appeal. It carries with it the power to protect that jurisdiction and to make the decisions
of the court thereunder effective. The court, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, has authority to control all
auxiliary and incidental matters necessary to the efficient and proper exercise of that jurisdiction. For this
purpose, it may, when necessary, prohibit or restrain the performance of any act which might interfere with
the proper exercise of its rightful jurisdiction in cases pending before it.

The Supreme Court has held that “while a court may be expressly granted the incidental powers necessary to
effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive legislation, implies the necessary
and usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it, and, subject to existing laws and constitutional provisions,
every regularly constituted court has power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration
of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction and for the enforcement of its judgments and mandates.”

2. LOZANO vs. NOGRALES 589 SCRA 354

It is well-settled that it is the duty of the judiciary to say what the law is. The determination of the nature,
scope and extent of the powers of government is the exclusive province of the judiciary, such that any
mediation on the part of the latter for the allocation of constitutional boundaries would amount, not to its
supremacy, but to its mere fulfillment of its “solemn and sacred obligation” under the Constitution. This
Court’s power of review may be awesome, but it is limited to actual cases and controversies dealing with
parties having adversely legal claims, to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and
limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis motapresented. The “case-or-
controversy” requirement bans this court from deciding “abstract, hypothetical or contingent
questions,” lest the court give opinions in the nature of advice concerning  legislative or executive
action. In the illuminating words of the learned Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil.
139 (1936).

3. GALICTO vs. AQUINO III 667 SCRA 150

As a general rule, a party is allowed to “raise a constitutional question” when (1) he can show that he will
personally suffer some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government;
(2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable action. Jurisprudence defines interest as “material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by
the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. By real
interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future,
contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest.”
With the enactment of the GOCC Governance Act of 2011, the President is now authorized to fix the
compensation framework of GOCCs and GFIs. The pertinent provisions read: Section 5.  Creation of the
Governance Commission for Government-Owned or Controlled Corporations.—There is hereby created an
advisory, monitoring, and oversight body with authority to formulate, implement and coordinate policies to
be known as the Governance Commission for Government-Owned or-Controlled Corporations, hereinafter
referred to as the GCG, which shall be attached to the Office of the President. The GCG shall have the following
powers and functions: x x x x h) Conduct compensation studies, develop and recommend to the President a
competitive compensation and remuneration system which shall attract and retain talent, at the same time
allowing the GOCC to be financially sound and sustainable; x x x x Section 8. Coverage of the Compensation and
Position Classification System.—The GCG, after conducting a compensation study, shall develop a
Compensation and Position Classification System which shall apply to all officers and employees of the GOCCs
whether under the Salary Standardization Law or exempt therefrom and shall consist of classes of positions
grouped into such categories as the GCG may determine, subject to approval of the President. Section
9. Position Titles and Salary Grades.—All positions in the Positions Classification System, as determined by the
GCG and as approved by the President, shall be allocated to their proper position titles and salary grades in
accordance with an Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades of the Compensation
and Position Classification System, which shall be prepared by the GCG and approved by the President. x  x x x
[N]o GOCC shall be exempt from the coverage of the Compensation and Position Classification System
developed by the GCG under this Act. As may be gleaned from these provisions, the new law amended R.A. No.
7875 and other laws that enabled certain GOCCs and GFIs to fix their own compensation frameworks; the law
now authorizes the President to fix the compensation and position classification system for all GOCCs and
GFIs, as well as other entities covered by the law. This means that, the President can now reissue an EO
containing these same provisions without any legal constraints.

4. MOLDEX REALTY vs. HLURB 525 SCRA 198

When an administrative regulation is attacked for being unconstitutional or invalid, a party may raise its
unconstitutionality or invalidity on every occasion that the regulation is being enforced; The requisite for
judicial review that the party assailing the regulation must show that the question of constitutionality has been
raised at the earliest opportunity should not be taken to mean that the question of constitutionality must be
raised immediately after the execution of the state action complained of—a contrary rule would mean that a
law, otherwise unconstitutional, would lapse into constitutionality by the mere failure of the proper party to
promptly file a case to challenge the same.

The Supreme Court does not have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions assailing the constitutionality of a
law or an administrative regulation—the general rule is that this Court shall exercise only appellate jurisdiction
over cases involving the constitutionality of a statute, treaty or regulation, except in circumstances where the
Court believes that resolving the issue of constitutionality of a law or regulation at the first instance is of
paramount importance and immediately affects the social, economic and moral well being of the people . —It
must be emphasized that this Court does not have exclusiveoriginal jurisdiction over petitions assailing the
constitutionality of a law or an administrative regulation. In Drilon v. Lim, 235 SCRA 135 (1994), it was clearly
stated that the lower courts also have jurisdiction to resolve the constitu-tionality at the first instance, thus:
We stress at the outset that the lower court had jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Section 187,
this authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid
and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law. x x x Moreover, Article X,
Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and
orders of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question. The general rule is that this Court shall exercise only appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the
constitutionality of a statute, treaty or regulation, except in circumstances where the Court believes that
resolving the issue of constitutionality of a law or regulation at the first instance is of paramount importance
and immediately affects the social, economic and moral well being of the people. Thus, the Court of Appeals
erred in ruling that a question on the constitutionality of a regulation may be brought only to this Court.

It is also a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law,
or an administrative regulation as in the instant case, to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is
raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the
court may raise its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for
consideration until such question will be unavoidable. In other words, the Court will not touch the issue of
unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota of the case.

5. SERRANO vs. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES 582 SCRA 254

The non-impairment clause under Section 10, Article II of the Constitution is limited in application to laws about
to be enacted that would in any way derogate from existing acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any
manner changing the intention of the parties thereto.—The prohibition is aligned with the general principle
that laws newly enacted have only a prospective operation, and cannot affect acts or contracts already
perfected; however, as to laws already in existence, their provisions are read into contracts and deemed a
part thereof. Thus, the non-impairment clause under Section 10, Article II is limited in application to laws
about to be enacted that would in any way derogate from existing acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or
in any manner changing the intention of the parties thereto.

Police power legislations adopted by the State to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order,
safety, and general welfare of the people are generally applicable not only to the future contracts but even to
those already in existence, for all private contracts must yield to the superior and legitimate measures taken by
the State to promote public welfare. —But even if the Court were to disregard the timeline, the subject clause
may not be declared unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on the impairment clause, for the law
was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to regulate a business, profession or calling,
particularly the recruitment and deployment of OFWs, with the noble end in view of ensuring respect for the
dignity and well-being of OFWs wherever they may be employed. Police power legislations adopted by the
State to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people
are generally applicable not only to future contracts but even to those already in existence, for all private
contracts must yield to the superior and legitimate measures taken by the State to promote public welfare.
Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members of the labor sector, without distinction as
to place of deployment, full protection of their rights and welfare. To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed
under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate to economic security and parity: all monetary benefits
should be equally enjoyed by workers of similar category, while all monetary obligations should be borne by
them in equal degree; none should be denied the protection of the laws which is enjoyed by, or spared the
burden imposed on, others in like circumstances.

Republic Act No. 8042; Prior to Republic Act 8042, all Overseas Filipino workers (OFWs), regardless of contract
periods or the unexpired portions thereof, were treated alike in terms of the computation of their monetary
benefits in case of illegal dismissal. Their claims were subjected to a uniform rule of computation: their basic
salaries multiplied by the entire unexpired portion of their employment contracts.

While all the provisions of the 1987 Constitution are presumed self-executing, there are some which this Court
has declared not judicially enforceable, Article XIII, being one.—While all the provisions of the 1987
Constitution are presumed self-executing, there are some which this Court has declared not judicially
enforceable, Article XIII being one, particularly Section 3 thereof, the nature of which, this Court, in Agabon v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 442 SCRA 573 (2004), has described to be not self-actuating: Thus, the
constitutional mandates of protection to labor and security of tenure may be deemed as self-executing in the
sense that these are automatically acknowledged and observed without need for any enabling legislation.
However, to declare that the constitutional provisions are enough to guarantee the full exercise of the rights
embodied therein, and the realization of ideals therein expressed, would be impractical, if not unrealistic. The
espousal of such view presents the dangerous tendency of being overbroad and exaggerated. The guarantees
of “full protection to labor” and “security of tenure,” when examined in isolation, are facially unqualified, and
the broadest interpretation possible suggests a blanket shield in favor of labor against any form of removal
regardless of circumstance. This interpretation implies an unimpeachable right to continued employment—a
utopian notion, doubtless—but still hardly within the contemplation of the framers. Subsequent legislation is
still needed to define the parameters of these guaranteed rights to ensure the protection and promotion, not
only the rights of the labor sector, but of the employers’ as well. Without specific and pertinent legislation,
judicial bodies will be at a loss, formulating their own conclusion to approximate at least the aims of the
Constitution.

6. SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY v. CABILES 732 SCRA 22

Due process requires that the probationary employee be informed of such standards at the time of his or her
engagement so he or she can adjust his or her character or workmanship accordingly.—The predetermined
standards that the employer sets are the bases for determining the probationary employee’s fitness,
propriety, efficiency, and qualifications as a regular employee. Due process requires that the probationary
employee be informed of such standards at the time of his or her engagement so he or she can adjust his or
her character or workmanship accordingly. Proper adjustment to fit the standards upon which the
employee’s qualifications will be evaluated will increase one’s chances of being positively assessed for
regularization by his or her employer.

Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act
of 1995, states that overseas workers who were terminated without just, valid, or authorized cause “shall be
entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve (12%) per annum, plus his salaries
for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less.”

Section 15 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042 states that “repatriation of the worker and the transport of his [or
her] personal belongings shall be the primary responsibility of the agency which recruited or deployed the
worker overseas.”—Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042 states that “repatriation of the worker and the
transport of his [or her] personal belongings shall be the primary responsibility of the agency which recruited
or deployed the worker overseas.” The exception is when “termination of employment is due solely to the
fault of the worker,” which as we have established, is not the case. It reads: SEC. 15. REPATRIATION OF
WORKERS; EMERGENCY REPATRIATION FUND.—The repatriation of the worker and the transport of his
personal belongings shall be the primary responsibility of the agency which recruited or deployed the worker
overseas. All costs attendant to repatriation shall be borne by or charged to the agency concerned and/or its
principal. Likewise, the repatriation of remains and transport of the personal belongings of a deceased
worker and all costs attendant thereto shall be borne by the principal and/or local agency. However, in cases
where the termination of employment is due solely to the fault of the worker, the principal/employer or
agency shall not in any manner be responsible for the repatriation of the former and/or his belongings.

Equal Protection of the Laws; Due Process; In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation
Co., Inc., 582 SCRA 254 (2009), the Supreme Court (SC) ruled that the clause “or for three (3) months for every
year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause and
substantive due process.—In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., 582
SCRA 254 (2009), this court ruled that the clause “or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less” is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause and substantive due
process. A statute or provision which was declared unconstitutional is not a law. It “confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at
all.” We are aware that the clause “or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is
less” was reinstated in Republic Act No. 8042 upon promulgation of Republic Act No. 10022 in 2010.

Equal protection of the law is a guarantee that persons under like circumstances and falling within the same
class are treated alike, in terms of “privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.”

There is no violation of the equal protection clause if the law applies equally to persons within the same class
and if there are reasonable grounds for distinguishing between those falling within the class and those who do
not fall within the class.—In creating laws, the legislature has the power “to make distinctions and
classifications.” In exercising such power, it has a wide discretion. The equal protection clause does not
infringe on this legislative power. A law is void on this basis, only if classifications are made arbitrarily. There
is no violation of the equal protection clause if the law applies equally to persons within the same class and if
there are reasonable grounds for distinguishing between those falling within the class and those who do not
fall within the class. A law that does not violate the equal protection clause prescribes a reasonable
classification. A reasonable classification “(1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to
the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all
members of the same class.” The reinstated clause does not satisfy the requirement of reasonable
classification.

7. LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COMELEC 608 SCRA 636

The power to create political subdivisions or Local Government Units (LGUs) is essentially legislative in
character; Even without constitutional grant, Congress can by law, create, divide, merge or altogether abolish or
alter the boundaries of a province, city or municipality.—By constitutional design and as a matter of long-
established principle, the power to create political subdivisions or LGUs is essentially legislative in character.
But even without any constitutional grant, Congress can, by law, create, divide, merge, or altogether abolish
or alter the boundaries of a province, city, or municipality.

Legislative intent is part and parcel of the law, the controlling factor in interpreting a statute. In construing a
statute, the proper course is to start out and follow the true intent of the Legislature and to adopt the sense
that best harmonizes with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the policy and objects of the
legislature. In fact, any interpretation that runs counter to the legislative intent is unacceptable and invalid.

A law need not operate with equal force on all persons or things to be conformable with Sec. 1, Art. III of the
Constitution.

The equal protection guarantee is embraced in the broader and elastic concept of due process, every unfair
discrimination being an offense against the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless come as a
separate clause in Sec. 1, Art. III of the Constitution to provide for a more specific protection against any
undue discrimination or antagonism from government. Arbitrariness in general may be assailed on the basis
of the due process clause. But if a particular challenged act partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice,
the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause. This constitutional protection extends to all
persons, natural or artificial, within the territorial jurisdiction. Artificial persons, as the respondent LGUs
herein, are, however, entitled to protection only insofar as their property is concerned.

The equal protection clause does not preclude the state from recognizing and acting upon factual differences
between individuals and classes; Criteria for Classification to be Reasonable.—As a matter of settled legal
principle, the fundamental right of equal protection does not require absolute equality. It is enough that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights or privileges conferred and
responsibilities or obligations imposed. The equal protection clause does not preclude the state from
recognizing and acting upon factual differences between individuals and classes. It recognizes that inherent in
the right to legislate is the right to classify, necessarily implying that the equality guaranteed is not violated
by a legislation based on reasonable classification. Classification, to be reasonable, must (1) rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) not be limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class.

A law can be violative of the constitutional limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis.

8. RE: COA OPINION ON THE COMPUTATION OF THE APPRAISED VALUE OF THE PROPERTIES
PURCHASED BY THE RETIRED CHIEF/ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not   through express
provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.—In Angara v. Electoral
Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936), we explained the principle of separation of powers, as follows: The
separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express
provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow
from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to
be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate
system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the
other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and
legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
The powers of government must be divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any one branch; the
division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch from lording its power over the other branches or the
citizenry.—The concept of the independence of the three branches of government, on the other hand, extends
from the notion that the powers of government must be divided to avoid concentration of these powers in
any one branch; the division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch from lording its power over the other
branches or the citizenry. To achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-equal branches
of government that are equally capable of independent action in exercising their respective mandates; lack of
independence would result in the inability of one branch of government to check the arbitrary or self-interest
assertions of another or others.

Under the Judiciary’s unique circumstances, independence encompasses the idea that individual judges can
freely exercise their mandate to resolve justiciable disputes, while the judicial branch, as a whole, should work in
the discharge of its constitutional functions free of restraints and influence from the other branches, save only
for those imposed by the Constitution itself. —Under the Judiciary’s unique circumstances, independence
encompasses the idea that individualjudges can freely exercise their mandate to resolve justiciable disputes,
while the judicial branch, as a whole, should work in the discharge of its constitutional functions free of
restraints and influence from the other branches, save only for those imposed by the Constitution itself. Thus,
judicial independence can be “broken down into two distinct concepts: decisional
independence and institutional independence.” Decisional independence “refers to a judge’s ability to
render decisions free from political or popular influence based solely on the individual facts and applicable
law.” On the other hand, institutional independence “describes the separation of the judicial branch from
the executive and legislative branches of government.” Simply put, institutional independence refers to the
“collective independence of the judiciary as a body.”

One of the most important aspects of judicial independence is the constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy. Just
as the Executive may not prevent a judge from discharging his or her judicial duty (for example, by physically
preventing a court from holding its hearings) and just as the Legislature may not enact laws removing all
jurisdiction from courts, the courts may not be obstructed from their freedom to use or dispose of their funds
for purposes germane to judicial functions. While, as a general proposition, the authority of legislatures to
control the purse in the first instance is unquestioned, any form of interference by the Legislative or the
Executive on the Judiciary’s fiscal autonomy amounts to an improper check on a co-equal branch of
government. If the judicial branch is to perform its primary function of adjudication, it must be able to
command adequate resources for that purpose. This authority to exercise (or to compel the exercise of)
legislative power over the national purse (which at first blush appears to be a violation of concepts of
separateness and an invasion of legislative autonomy) is necessary to maintain judicial independence and is
expressly provided for by the Constitution through the grant of fiscal autonomy under Section 3, Article VIII.

By way of a long standing tradition, partly based on the intention to reward long and faithful service, the sale
to the retired Justices of specifically designated properties that they used during their incumbency has been
recognized both as a privilege and a benefit. This has become an established practice within the Judiciary that
even the COA has previously recognized. The En Banc Resolution also deems the grant of the privilege as a
form of additional retirement benefit that the Court can grant its officials and employees in the exercise of its
power of administrative supervision. Under this administrative authority, the Court has the power to
administer the Judiciary’s internal affairs, and this includes the authority to handle and manage the
retirement applications and entitlements of its personnel as provided by law and by its own grants.

Fiscal Autonomy; The Chief Justice and the Court En Banc determine and decide the who, what, where, when and
how of the privileges and benefits they extend to justices, judges, court officials and court personnel within the
parameters of the Court’s granted power.—Under the guarantees of the Judiciary’s fiscal autonomy and its
independence, the Chief Justice and the Court En Banc determine and decide the who, what, where,
when and how of the privileges and benefits they extend to justices, judges, court officials and court personnel
within the parameters of the Court’s granted power; they determine the terms, conditions and restrictions of
the grant as grantor.
9. RE: REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE/CLARIFICATION ON SECTION 7, RULE III OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10154
REQUIRING RETIRING GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES TO SECURE A CLEARANCE OF PENDENCY/NON-
PENDENCY OF CASE/S FROM THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION.

Supreme Court; Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel.—Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution (Constitution) exclusively vests in the Court administrative supervision over all courts and court
personnel. As such, it oversees the court personnel’s compliance with all laws and takes the proper
administrative action against them for any violation thereof. As an adjunct thereto, it keeps in its custody
records pertaining to the administrative cases of retiring court personnel.

The provision — which requires retiring government employees to secure a prior clearance of pendency/non-
pendency of administrative case/s from, among others, the Civil Service Commission — should not be made to
apply to employees of the Judiciary.—The Court rules that the subject provision — which requires retiring
government employees to secure a prior clearance of pendency/non-pendency of administrative case/s from,
among others, the CSC — should not be made to apply to employees of the Judiciary. To deem it otherwise
would disregard the Court’s constitutionally-enshrined power of administrative supervision over its
personnel. Besides, retiring court personnel are already required to secure a prior clearance of the
pendency/non-pendency of administrative case/s from the Court which makes the CSC clearance a
superfluous and non-expeditious requirement contrary to the declared state policy of RA 10154.

A prior clearance of pendency/non-pendency of administrative case/s from the Office of the President (albeit
some court personnel are presidential appointees, e.g., Supreme Court Justices) or the Office of the Ombudsman
should not equally apply to retiring court personnel.—To further clarify the matter, the same principles dictate
that a prior clearance of pendency/non-pendency of administrative case/s from the Office of the President
(albeit some court personnel are presidential appointees, e.g., Supreme Court Justices) or the Office of the
Ombudsman should not equally apply to retiring court personnel. Verily, the administrative supervision of
court personnel and all affairs related thereto fall within the exclusive province of the Judiciary.

 A clearance requirement which pertains to criminal cases may be imposed by the appropriate government
agency, i.e., the Office of the Ombudsman, on retiring court personnel as it is a matter beyond the ambit of the
Judiciary’s power of administrative supervision.—It must, however, be noted that since the Constitution only
accords the Judiciary administrative supervision over its personnel, a different treatment of the clearance
requirement obtains with respect to criminal cases. As such, a clearance requirement which pertains to
criminal cases may be imposed by the appropriate government agency, i.e., the Office of the Ombudsman, on
retiring court personnel as it is a matter beyond the ambit of the Judiciary’s power of administrative
supervision.

D. Judiciary

10. FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA vs.
CHIEF JUSTICE MARIA LOURDES
P. A. SERENO, THE JUDICIAL AND
BAR COUNCIL and EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA,
JR (G.R. No. 213181. August 19,
2014)
Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides for the creation of the JBC. The
Court was given supervisory authority over it. Section 8 reads: Section 8. A Judicial and
Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of
the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of
the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor
of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private
sector.
Supervision is the power of oversight, or the authority to see that subordinate officers
perform their duties. It ensures that the laws and the rules governing the conduct of a
government entity are observed and complied with. Supervising officials see to it that
rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have
the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order
the work done or redone
The purpose of the JBC’s existence is indubitably rooted in the categorical
constitutional declaration that “[a] member of the judiciary must be a person of proven
competence, integrity, probity, and independence.” To ensure the fulfillment of these
standards in every member of the Judiciary, the JBC has been tasked to screen aspiring
judges and justices, among others, making certain that the nominees submitted to the
President are all qualified and suitably best for appointment
When an integrity question arises, the voting requirement for his or her inclusion as a
nominee to a judicial post becomes “unanimous” instead of the “majority vote”.

The JBC, as a body, is not required by law to hold hearings on the qualifications of the
nominees. The process by which an objection is made based on Section 2, Rule 10 of
JBC-009 is not judicial, quasi-judicial, or fact-finding, for it does not aim to determine
guilt or innocence akin to a criminal or administrative offense but to ascertain the
fitness of an applicant vis-à -vis the requirements for the position.
Even the conduct of a hearing to determine the veracity of an opposition is
discretionary for there are ways, besides a hearing, to ascertain the truth or falsity of
allegations. Succinctly, this argument suggests that the JBC has the discretion to hold or
not to hold a hearing when an objection to an applicant’s integrity is raised and that it
may resort to other means to accomplish its objective.
As mandated by the Constitution, a Member of the Supreme Court must be a natural-
born Filipino, at least forty years of age, and must have been for fifteen years or more a
judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines. In addition
to these basic qualifications, all members of the Judiciary must be persons of proven
competence, integrity, probity, and independence. In order to ensure that a candidate
to a judicial position has the foregoing qualifications, the JBC set forth the evidence that
it may receive for each type of qualification. Rule 3 of JBC-009 deals with how the JBC
shall determine the competence of applicants in terms of education, experience and
performance. Rule 4 of JBC-009 involves guidelines on evaluating an applicant’s
integrity. Rule 5 and Rule 6 of JBC-009 provide for proof that may be considered for
demonstrating an applicant’s probity/inde pendence and his or her soundness of
physical, mental, and emotional condition.
Under Section 1, Rule 7 of JBC-009, the JBC En Banc or any panel of its members shall
conduct personal interviews of candidates for positions in the Judiciary and certain
positions in the Office of the Ombudsman. In the case of positions in the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, and the Ombudsman, the interviews
shall be conducted in public. In order to promote transparency and public awareness of
JBC proceedings in relation to its function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary
and to the positions of Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsman and pursuant to Section
1, Rule 7 of JBC-009, the JBC issued JBC-10 which contain the procedure for submission
and evaluation of complaints or oppositions against a candidate.
There is no legal or logical reason to exempt an oppositor who also happens to be a
member of the JBC from the requirement of setting forth his or her opposition to a
candidate in writing and under oath within the time limit given to the general public
and to give such candidate a fair period to respond to the opposition in writing or
during his public interview as provided for in JBC-10. A candidate for a judicial position
does not lose his constitutionally guaranteed right to due process simply because the
oppositor to his candidacy is the Chair or a member of the JBC.
An individual’s constitutional right to due process cannot be sacrificed in the name of
confidentiality. The JBC should still require a written complaint and allow the
candidate reasonable time to submit a written answer if he so wishes or allow him to
be heard orally at a hearing for which accurate records should be kept but all
submissions and records of the proceedings shall be treated with the utmost
 confidentiality
The Judiciary has no business passing judgment, however informally, on internal
developments within the Executive Department, a coordinate and coequal branch,
unless the developments are facts in issue in a case.
The present Constitution not only integrates the traditional definition of judicial
power, but introduces as well a completely new expanded power to the Judiciary under
the last phrase — “to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.” Under this expanded judicial power, justiciability
expressly and textually depends only on the presence or absence of grave abuse of
discretion, as distinguished from a situation where the issue of constitutional validity is
raised within a “traditionally” justiciable case which demands that the requirement of
actual controversy based on specific legal rights must exist. Notably, even if the
requirements under the traditional definition of judicial power are applied, these
requisites are complied with once grave abuse of discretion is prima facie shown to
have taken place.
The separation of powers inherent in our Constitution is a rational check against abuse
and the monopolization of all legal powers.

11. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs.

Notwithstanding the fact that only questions of law are raised in the petition, an action
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN.
for declaratory relief is not among those within the original jurisdiction of this Court as
FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO
provided in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution
and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR
The Courts’ power of judicial review, like almost all other powers conferred by the
Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) there must be an actual case
or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the
act must have “standing” to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest
in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of
the case.
Doubtless, the Framers of our Constitution intended to create a JBC as an innovative
solution in response to the public clamor in favor of eliminating politics in the
appointment of members of the Judiciary. To ensure judicial independence, they
adopted a holistic approach and hoped that, in creating a JBC, the private sector and the
three branches of government would have an active role and equal voice in the
selection of the members of the Judiciary. Therefore, to allow the Legislature to have
more quantitative influence in the JBC by having more than one voice speak, whether
with one full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote each, would, as one former congressman and
member of the JBC put it, “negate the principle of equality among the three branches of
government which is enshrined in the Constitution.”
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a
matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by
recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of
unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot
always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The
doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue
burden on those who have relied on the invalid law.
The lone representative of Congress is entitled to one full vote. This pronouncement
effectively disallows the scheme of splitting the said vote into half (1/2), between two
representatives of Congress. Not only can this unsanctioned practice cause disorder in

12. REP. REYNALDO V. UMALI, in
his capacity as Chairman of the
House of Representatives
Committee on Justice and Ex
Officio Member of the JBC vs. THE
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL,
chaired by THE HON. MARIA
LOURDES P.A. SERENO, Chief
Justice and Ex Officio Chairperson
13. FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA,
Presiding Judge, MCTC,
Compostela-New Bataan,
the voting process, it is clearly against the essence of what the Constitution authorized.
After all, basic and reasonable is the rule that what cannot be legally done directly
cannot be done indirectly. To permit or tolerate the splitting of one vote into two or
more is clearly a constitutional circumvention that cannot be countenanced by the
Court.
The Supreme Court cannot supply the legislative omission. According to the rule of
casus omissus “a case omitted is to be held as intentionally omitted.” “The principle
proceeds from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been
omitted from a legislative enumeration.” Pursuant to this, “the Court cannot under its
power of interpretation supply the omission even though the omission may have
resulted from inadvertence or because the case in question was not foreseen or
contemplated.” “The Court cannot supply what it thinks the legislature would have
supplied had its attention been called to the omission, as that would be judicial
legislation.”
Each member of Congress has a legal standing to sue even without an enabling
resolution for that purpose so long as the questioned acts invade the powers,
prerogatives and privileges of Congress. Otherwise stated, whenever the acts affect the
powers, prerogatives and privileges of Congress, anyone of its members may validly
bring an action to challenge the same to safeguard and maintain the sanctity thereof.
As a matter of policy, direct resort to the Supreme Court will not be entertained unless
the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate lower courts, and
exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as in cases involving national interest
and those of serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of
the writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.
JBC does not fall within the scope of a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions.
The JBC was created to support the executive power to appoint, and Congress, as one
whole body, was merely assigned a contributory nonlegislative function. No
parallelism can be drawn between the representative of Congress in the JBC and the
exercise by Congress of its legislative powers under Article VI and constituent powers
under Article XVII of the Constitution. Congress, in relation to the executive and judicial
branches of government, is constitutionally treated as another coequal branch in the
matter of its JBC representation.
While it is true that Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution did not explicitly
state that the JBC shall be composed of seven members, however, the same is implied
in the enumeration of who will be the members thereof. And though it is unnecessary
for the JBC composition to be an odd number as no tie-breaker is needed in the
preparation of a shortlist since judicial nominees are not decided by a “yes” or “no”
vote, still, JBC’s membership cannot be increased from seven to eight for it will be a
clear violation of the aforesaid constitutional provision. To add another member in the
JBC or to increase the representative of Congress to the JBC, the remedy is not judicial
but constitutional amendment.
In the process of selecting and screening applicants, the JBC neither acted in any
judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto itself any performance of judicial
or quasi-judicial prerogative.
Compostela Valley Province
vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL
The special civil action of declaratory relief falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
appropriate RTC pursuant to Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by
R.A. No. 7691. Therefore, by virtue of the Court’s supervisory duty over the JBC and in
the exercise of its expanded judicial power, the Court assumes jurisdiction over the
present petition.
The functions of searching, screening, and selecting are necessary and incidental to the
JBC’s principal function of choosing and recommending nominees for vacancies in the
judiciary for appointment by the President. However, the Constitution did not lay down
in precise terms the process that the JBC shall follow in determining applicants’
qualifications. In carrying out its main function, the JBC has the authority to set the
standards/criteria in choosing its nominees for every vacancy in the judiciary, subject
only to the minimum qualifications required by the Constitution and law for every
position.
The equal protection clause of the Constitution does not require the universal
application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction; what it requires is
simply equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Hence,
the Court has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a
suspect class, the classification stands as long as it bears a rational relationship to some
legitimate government end.
The JBC has the power to determine who shall be recommended to the judicial post. To
be included in the list of applicants is a privilege as one can only be chosen under
existing criteria imposed by the JBC itself. As such, prospective applicants, including
the petitioner, cannot claim any demandable right to take part in it if they fail to meet
these criteria.
The power of judicial review is part and parcel of the Court’s judicial power and is a
power inherent in all courts.
The five-year requirement imposed by the Judicial and Bar Council for first-level court
judges before they can be considered for another tier is reasonable. This same
requirement cannot be imposed on applicants from the public service, private practice,
or the academe simply because they are not from a judicial service. This does not mean,
however, that there is no requirement or any consideration made by the Judicial and
Bar Council that is equivalent or more stringent.

The payment of legal fees under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court is an integral part of the
14. RE: PETITION FOR
rules promulgated by this Court pursuant to its rulemaking power under Section 5(5),
RECOGNITION OF THE
Article VIII of the Constitution. In particular, it is part of the rules concerning pleading,
EXEMPTION OF THE
practice and procedure in courts. Indeed, payment of legal (or docket) fees is a
GOVERNMENT SERVICE
jurisdictional requirement. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate
INSURANCE SYSTEM FROM
initiatory pleading but the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court
PAYMENT OF LEGAL FEES
with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action
In proper cases, courts may waive the collection of legal fees. This, the Court has
allowed in Section 21, Rule 3 and Section 19, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court in
recognition of the right of access to justice by the poor under Section 11, Article III of
the Constitution.
The GSIS cannot successfully invoke the right to social security of government
employees in support of its petition. It is a corporate entity whose personality is
separate and distinct from that of its individual members. The rights of its members
are not its rights; its rights, powers and functions pertain to it solely and are not shared
by its members. Its capacity to sue and bring actions under Section 41(g) of RA 8291,
the specific power which involves the exemption that it claims in this case, pertains to

15. SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y
ASUELA vs. HON. FRANK E.
LOBRIGO, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 3,
Legazpi City, Albay, and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES
E. Constitutional Commissions
1. DENNIS A. B. FUNA vs. THE
CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, REYNALDO A. VILLAR
it and not to its members.
Fiscal autonomy recognizes the power and authority of the Court to levy, assess and
collect fees, including legal fees. Moreover, legal fees under Rule 141 have two basic
components, the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and the Special Allowance for the
Judiciary Fund (SAJF). The laws which established the JDF and the SAJF expressly
declare the identical purpose of these funds to “guarantee the independence of the
Judiciary as mandated by the Constitution and public policy.” Legal fees therefore do
not only constitute a vital source of the Court’s financial resources but also comprise an
essential element of the Court’s fiscal independence.
The Supreme Court’s sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal procedural rules is
limited to the preservation of substantive rights, i.e., the former should not diminish,
increase or modify the latter.
The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now Our
(Supreme Court) exclusive domain and no longer shared with the Executive and
Legislative departments.
The other branches (Legislative and Executive) trespass upon this prerogative if they
enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural
rules promulgated by the Court.
Where the Constitution or, for that matter, a statute, has fixed the term of office of a
public official, the appointing authority is without authority to specify in the
appointment a term shorter or longer than what the law provides.
The explicit command of the Constitution is that the “Chairman and the Commissioners
(of Audit) shall be appointed by the President x x x for a term of seven years [and]
appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the
predecessor.” To repeat, the President has two and only two options on term
appointments. Either he extends an appointment for a full 7-year term when the
vacancy results from the expiration of term, or for a shorter period corresponding to
the unexpired term of the predecessor when the vacancy occurs by reason of death,
physical disability, resignation or impeachment. If the vacancy calls for a full seven-
year appointment, the Chief Executive is barred from extending a promotional
appointment for less than seven years. Else, the President can trifle with terms of office
fixed by the Constitution.
A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years
is eligible for an appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of
the term of the departing chairman. Such appointment is not covered by the ban on
reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the length of service as
commissioner and the unexpired period of the term of the predecessor will not exceed
seven (7) years and provided further that the vacancy in the position of Chairman
resulted from death, resignation, disability or removal by impeachment.
There is no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly
intended to forbid reappointment of “any kind,” including specifically a situation
where, in the words of Commissioner Aquino, “a commissioner is upgraded to a
position of chairman.” To allow the “promotional” appointment of Villar from

2. DENNIS A. B. FUNA vs. THE
CHAIRMAN,
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III, and
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY LEANDRO
R. MENDOZA, OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT
Commissioner to Chairman is to put Villar in a far better, and uniquely privileged,
position compared to the first two Commissioners who were barred from being
promoted from Commissioners to Chairman.
A COA member, like members of the other independent constitutional commissions,
may no longer act with independence if he or she can be rewarded with a promotion or
reappointment, for he or she will likely do the bidding of the appointing power in the
expectation of being promoted or reappointed.
Section 1, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution expressly describes all the
Constitutional Commissions as “independent.” Although their respective functions are
essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the President of the
Philippines in the discharge of such functions. Each of the Constitutional Commissions
conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the
exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to
review on certiorari by the Court as provided by Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987
Constitution. To safeguard the independence of these Commissions, the 1987
Constitution, among others, imposes under Section 2, Article IX-A of the Constitution
certain inhibitions and disqualifications upon the Chairmen and members to
strengthen their integrity, to wit: (a) Holding any other office or employment during
their tenure; (b) Engaging in the practice of any profession; (c) Engaging in the active
management or control of any business which in any way may be affected by the
functions of his office; and (d) Being financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any
contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned or -
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries
The term ex officio means “from office; by virtue of office.” It refers to an “authority
derived from official character merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual
character, but rather annexed to the official position.” Ex officio likewise denotes an
“act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other
appointment or authority other than that conferred by the office. The ex officio
position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows
that the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his
services in the said position.
Section 3, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution describes the CSC as the central
personnel agency of the government and is principally mandated to establish a career
service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness,
progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service; to strengthen the merit and rewards
system; to integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and
ranks; and to institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability.
GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF and the members of their respective governing
Boards are under the control of the President. As such, the CSC Chairman cannot be a
member of a government entity that is under the control of the President without
impairing the independence vested in the CSC by the 1987 Constitution.
A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable
authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is
valid on its face. He may also be one who is in possession of an office, and is
discharging its duties under color of authority, by which is meant authority derived
from an appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a
mere volunteer.

3. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs.
NITA P. JAVIER
Under Executive Order No. 292, or the Administrative Code of 1987, civil service
positions are currently classified into either 1) career service and 2) non-career service
positions. Career positions are characterized by: (1) entrance based on merit and
fitness to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examinations, or based on
highly technical qualifications; (2) opportunity for advancement to higher career
positions; and (3) security of tenure. In addition, the Administrative Code, under its
Book V, subclassifies career positions according to “appointment status,” divided into:
1) permanent—which is issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the
positions to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility
prescribed, in accordance with the provisions of law, rules and standards promulgated
in pursuance thereof; and 2) temporary—which is issued, in the absence of
appropriate eligibles and when it becomes necessary in the public interest to fill a
vacancy, to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is
being appointed except the appropriate civil service eligibility; provided, that such
temporary appointment shall not exceed twelve months, and the appointee may be
replaced sooner if a qualified civil service eligible becomes available.
Positions that do not fall under the career service are considered non-career positions,
which are characterized by: (1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests of
merit and fitness utilized for the career service; and (2) tenure which is limited to a
period specified by law, or which is co-terminous with that of the appointing authority
or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a particular project for
which purpose employment was made.
A strict reading of the law reveals that primarily confidential positions fall under the
noncareer service. It is also clear that, unlike career positions, primarily confidential
and other non-career positions do not have security of tenure. The tenure of a
confidential employee is coterminous with that of the appointing authority, or is at the
latter’s pleasure.
There is no law enacted by the legislature that defines or sets definite criteria for
determining primarily confidential positions in the civil service. Neither is there a law
that gives an enumeration of positions classified as primarily confidential. What is
available is only petitioner’s own classification of civil service positions, as well as
jurisprudence which describe or give examples of confidential positions in
government. The Court is expected to make its own determination as to the nature of a
particular position, such as whether it is a primarily confidential position or not,
without being bound by prior classifications made by other bodies. The findings of the
other branches of government are merely considered initial and not conclusive to the
Court. Moreover, it is well-established that in case the findings of various agencies of
government, such as the petitioner and the CA in the instant case, are in conflict, the
Court must exercise its constitutional role as final arbiter of all justiciable
controversies and disputes.
Executive and legislative identification or classification of primarily confidential,
policy-determining or highly technical positions in government is no more than mere
declarations, and does not foreclose judicial review, especially in the event of conflict.
Far from what is merely declared by executive or legislative fiat, it is the nature of the
position which finally determines whether it is primarily confidential, policy
determining or highly technical, and no department in government is better qualified
to make such an ultimate finding than the judicial branch.
A primarily confidential position - (policy-determining, primarily confidential and
highly technical positions), involve the highest degree of confidence, or are closely
bound up with and dependent on other positions to which they are subordinate, or are
temporary in nature.
A primarily confidential position is characterized by the close proximity of the
positions of the appointer and appointee as well as the high degree of trust and
confidence inherent in their relationship. Ineluctably therefore, the position of

4. MARY LOU GETURBOS TORRES
vs. CORAZON ALMA G. DE LEON, in
her capacity as Secretary General
of the Philippine National Red
Cross and THE BOARD OF
GOVERNORS of the PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL RED CROSS, National
Headquarters
5. CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE
BOARD, et. al vs. CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION, et. al
Corporate Secretary of GSIS, or any GOCC, for that matter, is a primarily confidential
position. The position is clearly in close proximity and intimacy with the appointing
power. It also calls for the highest degree of confidence between the appointer and
appointee.
CSC has jurisdiction over the PNRC because the issue at hand is the enforcement of
labor laws and penal statutes, thus, in this particular matter, the PNRC can be treated
as a GOCC, and as such, it is within the ambit of Rule I, Section 1 of the Implementing
Rules of Republic Act 6713, stating that: Section 1. These Rules shall cover all officials
and employees in the government, elective and appointive, permanent or temporary,
whether in the career or noncareer service, including military and police personnel,
whether or not they receive compensation, regardless of amount.
Under the Administrative Code of 1987, as well as decisions of this Court, the CSC has
appellate jurisdiction on administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a
penalty of suspension for more than thirty (30) days, or fine in an amount exceeding
thirty (30) days salary.
Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution entrusts to the CSC the administration of the civil
service, which is comprised of “all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and
agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters.” In particular, Section 3 of Article IX-B provides for the mandate
of this independent constitutional commission: SECTION 3. The Civil Service
Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government, shall establish a
career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity,
responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen
the merit and rewards system, integrate all human resources development programs
for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management climate conducive to public
accountability.
The CES was created to “form a continuing pool of well-selected and development-
oriented career administrators who shall provide competent and faithful service.” The
CESB was likewise established to serve as the governing body of the CES with the
following functions: (a) to promulgate rules, standards and procedures for the
selection, classification, compensation and career development of members of the CES;
(b) to set up the organization and operation of the civil service in accordance with the
guidelines provided in the plan; (c) to prepare a program of training and career
development for members of the CES; (d) to investigate and adjudicate administrative
complaints against members of the CES. When the Administrative Code was enacted in
1987, the CESB was given the additional authority to (a) identify other officers
belonging to the CES in keeping with the conditions imposed by law; and (b) prescribe
requirements for entrance to the third level.
The rule on appeals to the Office of the President only covers disciplinary cases
involving members of the Career Executive Service (CES). It is evident that this special
rule was created for that particular type of case, because members of the CES are all
presidential appointees. Given that the power to appoint generally carries with it the
power to discipline
The authority to prescribe qualifications for positions in the government is lodged in
Congress as part of its plenary legislative power to create, abolish and modify public
offices to meet societal demands. From this authority emanates the right to change the
qualifications for existing statutory offices.
 Occupants of the subject PAO positions are only mandated to comply with
requirements as to age, citizenship, education, and experience. Since third-level
eligibility is not at all mentioned in the law, it would be improper for the CESB to
impose this additional qualification as a prerequisite to permanent appointments. To
do so would be to amend the law and to overrule Congress. While the CESB has been
granted the power to prescribe entrance requirements for the third level of the civil
service, this power cannot be construed as the authority to modify the qualifications
specifically set by law for certain positions.

6. HILARION F. DIMAGIBA, IRMA MENDOZA and ELLEN RASCO, petitioners, vs. JULITA ESPARTERO, MA.
BERNARDITA L. CARREON and MELINA SAN PEDRO, respondents.

Administrative Law; Double Compensation; The prohibition against additional or double compensation, except
when specifically authorized by law, is considered a “constitutional curb” on the spending power of the
government.―Clearly, the only exception for an employee to receive additional, double and indirect
compensation is where the law allows him to receive extra compensation for services rendered in another
position which is an extension or is connected with his basic work. The prohibition against additional or
double compensation, except when specifically authorized by law, is considered a “constitutional curb” on the
spending power of the government.

7. PHILIPPINE SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OFCRUELTY TO ANIMALS, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION
ON AUDIT, DIR. RODULFO J. ARIESGA (in his official capacity as Director of the Commission on Audit),
MS. MERLE M. VALENTIN and MS. SUSAN GUARDIAN (in their official capacities as Team Leader and
Team Member, respectively, of the audit Team of the Commission on Audit), respondents.

Corporation Law; Amendments introduced by C.A. No. 148 made it clear that the petitioner was a private
corporation and not an agency of the government.—The amendments introduced by C.A. No. 148 made it clear
that the petitioner was a private corporation and not an agency of the government. This was evident in
Executive Order No. 63, issued by then President of the Philippines Manuel L. Quezon, declaring that the
revocation of the powers of the petitioner to appoint agents with powers of arrest “corrected a serious defect”
in one of the laws existing in the statute books.

Same; A reading of petitioner’s charter shows that it is not subject to control or supervision by any agency of the
State, unlike government-owned and -controlled corporations.—A reading of petitioner’s charter shows that it
is not subject to control or supervision by any agency of the State, unlike government-owned and -controlled
corporations. No government representative sits on the board of trustees of the petitioner. Like all private
corporations, the successors of its members are determined voluntarily and solely by the petitioner in
accordance with its bylaws, and may exercise those powers generally accorded to private corporations, such
as the powers to hold property, to sue and be sued, to use a common seal, and so forth. It may adopt by-laws
for its internal operations: the petitioner shall be managed or operated by its officers “in accordance with its
by-laws in force.”

Same; Fact that employees of the petitioner are registered and covered by the Social Security System at the
latter’s initiative, and not through the Government Service Insurance System which should be the case if the
employees are considered government employees is another indication of petitioner’s nature as a private entity.
—The employees of the petitioner are registered and covered by the Social Security System at the latter’s
initiative, and not through the Government Service Insurance System, which should be the case if the
employees are considered government employees. This is another indication of petitioner’s nature as a
private entity.
Same; Fact that a certain juridical entity is impressed with public interest does not, by that circumstance alone,
make the entity a public corporation, inasmuch as a corporation may be private though its charter contains
provisions of a public character incorporated solely for the public good.—The respondents contend that the
petitioner is a “body politic” because its primary purpose is to secure the protection and welfare of animals
which, in turn, redounds to the public good. This argument, is, at best, specious. The fact that a certain
juridical entity is impressed with public interest does not, by that circumstance alone, make the entity a
public corporation, inasmuch as a corporation may be private although its charter contains provisions of a
public character, incorporated solely for the public good. This class of corporations may be considered quasi-
public corporations, which are private corporations that render public service, supply public wants, or pursue
other eleemosynary objectives. While purposely organized for the gain or benefit of its members, they are
required by law to discharge functions for the public benefit. Examples of these corporations are utility,
railroad, warehouse, telegraph, telephone, water supply corporations and transportation companies. It must
be stressed that a quasi-public corporation is a species of private corporations, but the qualifying factor is
the type of service the former renders to the public: if it performs a public service, then it becomes a quasi-
public corporation.

Same; The true criterion to determine whether a corporation is public or private is found in the totality of the
relation of the corporation to the State.—The true criterion, therefore, to determine whether a corporation is
public or private is found in the totality of the relation of the corporation to the State. If the corporation is
created by the State as the latter’s own agency or instrumentality to help it in carrying out its governmental
functions, then that corporation is considered public; otherwise, it is private. Applying the above test,
provinces, chartered cities, and barangays can best exemplify public corporations. They are created by the
State as its own device and agency for the accomplishment of parts of its own public works.
1. LA BUGAL-B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by its Chairman F’LONG MIGUEL M.
LUMAYONG et. al vs. VICTOR O. RAMOS, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES (DENR) et. al
G.R. No. 127882. January 27, 2004

Same; Same; As the case involves constitutional questions, this Court is not concerned with whether petitioners
are real parties in interest, but with whether they have legal standing.— The present action is not merely one
for annulment of contract but for prohibition and mandamus. Petitioners allege that public respondents acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the FTAA, which they submit is unconstitutional. As the
case involves constitutional questions, this Court is not concerned with whether petitioners are real parties in
interest, but with whether they have legal standing. As held in Kilosbayan v. Morato: x x x. “It is important to
note . . . that standing because of its constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very different from
questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity to sue. Although
all three requirements are directed towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action,
standing restrictions require a partial consideration of the merits, as well as broader policy concerns relating
to the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas.[”] (FRIEDENTHAL, KANE AND MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE
328 [1985]) Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are brought not by
parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but by
concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Hence, the question in
standing is whether such parties have “alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.” (Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 7 L.Ed.2d 633
[1962].)

Same; Same; The third requisite for judicial review should not be taken to mean that the question of
constitutionality must be raised immediately after the execution of the state action complained of—that the
question of constitutionality has not been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be raised
later.—Misconstruing the application of the third requisite for judicial review—that the exercise of the review
is pleaded at the earliest opportunity—WMCP points out that the petition was filed only almost two years
after the execution of the FTAA, hence, not raised at the earliest opportunity. The third requisite should not
be taken to mean that the question of constitutionality must be raised immediately after the execution of the
state action complained of. That the question of constitutionality has not been raised before is not a valid
reason for refusing to allow it to be raised later. A contrary rule would mean that a law, otherwise
unconstitutional, would lapse into constitutionality by the mere failure of the proper party to promptly file a
case to challenge the same.

Same; Prohibition; Words and Phrases; Prohibition is a preventive remedy; While the execution of the contract
itself may be fait accompli, its implementation is not.—Prohibition is a preventive remedy. It seeks a judgment
ordering the defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal. The
petition for prohibition at bar is thus an appropriate remedy. While the execution of the contract itself may be
fait accompli, its implementation is not. Public respondents, in behalf of the Government, have obligations to
fulfill under said contract. Petitioners seek to prevent them from fulfilling such obligations on the theory that
the contract is unconstitutional and, therefore, void.

Same; Hierarchy of Courts; The repercussions of the issues in this case on the Philippine mining industry, if not
the national economy, as well as the novelty thereof, constitute exceptional and compelling circumstances to
justify resort to the Supreme Court in the first instance.—The repercussions of the issues in this case on the
Philippine mining industry, if not the national economy, as well as the novelty thereof, constitute exceptional
and compelling circumstances to justify resort to this Court in the first instance. In all events, this Court has
the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirements of an actual case or legal
standing when paramount public interest is involved. When the issues raised are of paramount importance to
the public, this Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure.

National Economy and Patrimony; Regalian Doctrine; The first sentence of Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution, embodies the Regalian doctrine or jura regalia; Introduced by Spain into these Islands, this feudal
concept is based on the State’s power of dominium, which is the capacity of the State to own or acquire property.
—The first sentence of Section 2 embodies the Regalian doctrine or jura regalia. Introduced by Spain into
these Islands, this feudal concept is based on the State’s power of dominium, which is the capacity of the State
to own or acquire property. In its broad sense, the term “jura regalia” refers to royal rights, or those rights
which the King has by virtue of his prerogatives. In Spanish law, it refers to a right which the sovereign has
over anything in which a subject has a right of property or propriedad. These were rights enjoyed during
feudal times by the king as the sovereign. The theory of the feudal system was that title to all lands was
originally held by the King, and while the use of lands was granted out to others who were permitted to hold
them under certain conditions, the King theoretically retained the title. By fiction of law, the King was
regarded as the original proprietor of all lands, and the true and only source of title, and from him all lands
were held. The theory of jura regalia was therefore nothing more than a natural fruit of conquest.

Same; Same; The Regalian doctrine extends not only to land but also to “all natural wealth that may be found in
the bowels of the earth.”—The Philippines having passed to Spain by virtue of discovery and conquest, earlier
Spanish decrees declared that “all lands were held from the Crown.” The Regalian doctrine extends not only
to land but also to “all natural wealth that may be found in the bowels of the earth.” Spain, in particular,
recognized the unique value of natural resources, viewing them, especially minerals, as an abundant source of
revenue to finance its wars against other nations. Mining laws during the Spanish regime reflected this
perspective.

Same; Same; Unlike Spain, the United States considered natural resources as a source of wealth for its nationals
and saw fit to allow both Filipino and American citizens to explore and exploit minerals in public lands, and to
grant patents to private mineral lands; The Regalian doctrine and the American system, therefore, differ in one
essential respect—under the Regalian theory, mineral rights are not included in a grant of land by the state
while under the American doctrine, mineral rights are included in a grant of land by the government .—Unlike
Spain, the United States considered natural resources as a source of wealth for its nationals and saw fit to
allow both Filipino and American citizens to explore and exploit minerals in public lands, and to grant patents
to private mineral lands. A person who acquired ownership over a parcel of private mineral land pursuant to
the laws then prevailing could exclude other persons, even the State, from exploiting minerals within his
property. Thus, earlier jurisprudence held that: A valid and subsisting location of mineral land, made and kept
up in accordance with the provisions of the statutes of the United States, has the effect of a grant by the
United States of the present and exclusive possession of the lands located, and this exclusive right of
possession and enjoyment continues during the entire life of the location. x x x x x x. The discovery of
minerals in the ground by one who has a valid mineral location, perfect his claim and his location, not only
against third persons but also against the Government. x x x. [Italics in the original.] The Regalian doctrine and
the American system, therefore, differ in one essential respect. Under the Regalian theory, mineral rights are
not included in a grant of land by the state; under the American doctrine, mineral rights are included in a
grant of land by the government.

Same; Same; Concession System; Words and Phrases; Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a
direct equity investment for the purpose of exploiting a particular natural resource within a given area—the
concession amounts to complete control by the concessionaire over the country’s natural resource, for it is given
exclusive and plenary rights to exploit a particular resource at the point of extraction .—Section 21 also made
possible the concession (frequently styled “permit,” “license” or “lease”) system. This was the traditional
regime imposed by the colonial administrators for the exploitation of natural resources in the extractive
sector (petroleum, hard minerals, timber, etc.). Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a
direct equity investment for the purpose of exploiting a particular natural resource within a given area. Thus,
the concession amounts to complete control by the concessionaire over the country’s natural resource, for it
is given exclusive and plenary rights to exploit a particular resource at the point of extraction. In
consideration for the right to exploit a natural resource, the concessionaire either pays rent or royalty, which
is a fixed percentage of the gross proceeds.

Same; Same; Same; As adopted in a republican system, the medieval concept of jura regalia is stripped of royal
overtones and ownership of the land is vested in the State.—The 1935 Constitution adopted the Regalian
doctrine, declaring all natural resources of the Philippines, including mineral lands and minerals, to be
property belonging to the State. As adopted in a republican system, the medieval concept of jura regalia is
stripped of royal overtones and ownership of the land is vested in the State.

Same; Same; Same; Nationalization; Objectives of Nationalization; The nationalization and conservation of the
natural resources of the country was one of the fixed and dominating objectives of the 1935 Constitutional
Convention.— The nationalization and conservation of the natural resources of the country was one of the
fixed and dominating objectives of the 1935 Constitutional Convention. The nationalization of the natural
resources was intended (1) to insure their conservation for Filipino posterity; (2) to serve as an instrument of
national defense, helping prevent the extension to the country of foreign control through peaceful economic
penetration; and (3) to avoid making the Philippines a source of international conflicts with the consequent
danger to its internal security and independence.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Parity Amendments; The swell of nationalism that suffused the 1935 Constitution was
radically diluted when in November 1946, the Parity Amendment, which came in the form of an “Ordinance
Appended to the Constitution,” was ratified in a plebiscite.—The swell of nationalism that suffused the 1935
Constitution was radically diluted when on November l946, the Parity Amendment, which came in the form of
an “Ordinance Appended to the Constitution,” was ratified in a plebiscite. The Amendment extended, from
July 4, 1946 to July 3, 1974, the right to utilize and exploit our natural resources to citizens of the United
States and business enterprises owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by citizens of the United States.
The Parity Amendment was subsequently modified by the 1954 Revised Trade Agreement, also known as the
Laurel-Langley Agreement, embodied in Republic Act No. 1355.

Same; Same; Service Contracts; The Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972 (Presidential Decree No. 87);
Words and Phrases; The Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972 signaled a transformation from the
concession system to the exploration for and production of indigenous petroleum through “service contracts”;
“Service contracts” is a term that assumes varying meanings to different people, and it has carried many names
in different countries, like “work contracts” in Indonesia, “concession agreements” in Africa, “production-sharing
agreements” in the Middle East, and “participation agreements” in Latin America.—The promulgation on
December 31, 1972 of Presidential Decree No. 87, otherwise known as THE OIL EXPLORATION AND
DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1972 signaled such a transformation. P.D. No. 87 permitted the government to
explore for and produce indigenous petroleum through “service contracts.” “Service contracts” is a term that
assumes varying meanings to different people, and it has carried many names in different countries, like
“work contracts” in Indonesia, “concession agreements” in Africa, “production-sharing agreements” in the
Middle East, and “participation agreements” in Latin America. A functional definition of “service contracts” in
the Philippines is provided as follows: A service contract is a contractual arrangement for engaging in the
exploitation and development of petroleum, mineral, energy, land and other natural resources by which a
government or its agency, or a private person granted a right or privilege by the government authorizes the
other party (service contractor) to engage or participate in the exercise of such right or the enjoyment of the
privilege, in that the latter provides financial or technical resources, undertakes the exploitation or
production of a given resource, or directly manages the productive enterprise, operations of the exploration
and exploitation of the resources or the disposition of marketing or resources.

Same; Same; Same; It has been opined, though, that, in the Philippines, the concept of a service contract, at least
in the petroleum industry, was basically a concession regime with a production-sharing element .—Ostensibly,
the service contract system had certain advantages over the concession regime. It has been opined, though,
that, in the Philippines, our concept of a service contract, at least in the petroleum industry, was basically a
concession regime with a production-sharing element.

Same; Same; Same; While Section 9, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution maintained the Filipino-only policy in
the enjoyment of natural resources, it also allowed Filipinos, upon authority of the Batasang Pambansa, to enter
into service contracts with any person or entity for the exploration or utilization of natural resources.—On
January 17, 1973, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos proclaimed the ratification of a new Constitution.
Article XIV on the National Economy and Patrimony contained provisions similar to the 1935 Constitution
with regard to Filipino participation in the nation’s natural resources. Section 8, Article XIV thereof provides:
While Section 9 of the same Article maintained the Filipino-only policy in the enjoyment of natural resources,
it also allowed Filipinos, upon authority of the Batasang Pambansa, to enter into service contracts with any
person or entity for the exploration or utilization of natural resources.

Same; Same; Same; Conspicuously absent in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is the provision in the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions authorizing the State to grant licenses, concessions, or leases for the exploration,
exploitation, development, or utilization of natural resources—by such omission, the utilization of inalienable
lands of public domain through “license, concession or lease” is no longer allowed under the 1987 Constitution.—
The 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian doctrine. The first sentence of Section 2, Article XII states: “All
lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the
State.” Like the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions before it, the 1987 Constitution, in the second sentence of the
same provision, prohibits the alienation of natural resources, except agricultural lands. The third sentence of
the same paragraph is new: “The exploration, development and utilization of natural resources shall be under
the full control and supervision of the State.” The constitutional policy of the State’s “full control and
supervision” over natural resources proceeds from the concept of jura regalia, as well as the recognition of
the importance of the country’s natural resources, not only for national economic development, but also for
its security and national defense. Under this provision, the State assumes “a more dynamic role” in the
exploration, development and utilization of natural resources. Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the
provision in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions authorizing the State to grant licenses, concessions, or leases
for the exploration, exploitation, development, or utilization of natural resources. By such omission, the
utilization of inalienable lands of public domain through “license, concession or lease” is no longer allowed
under the 1987 Constitution.

Same; Same; Under the 1987 Constitution, the State itself may undertake the operation of a concession or enter
into joint ventures.—Having omitted the provision on the concession system, Section 2 proceeded to
introduce “unfamiliar language”: The State may directly undertake such activities or it may enter into co-
production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Consonant with the State’s
“full supervision and control” over natural resources, Section 2 offers the State two “options.” One, the State
may directly undertake these activities itself; or two, it may enter into coproduction, joint venture, or
productionsharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or entities at least 60% of whose capital is owned-by
such citizens.

Same; Same; Same; Limitations on Technical or Financial Assistance Agreements.—Although Section 2

sanctions the participation of foreign-owned corporations in the exploration, development, and utilization of
natural resources, it imposes certain limitations or conditions to agreements with such corporations. First,
the parties to FTAAs. Only the President, in behalf of the State, may enter into these agreements, and only with
corporations. By contrast, under the 1973 Constitution, a Filipino citizen, corporation or association may
enter into a service contract with a “foreign person or entity.” Second, the size of the activities: only large-
scale exploration, development, and utilization is allowed. The term “large-scale usually refers to very capital-
intensive activities.” Third, the natural resources subject of the activities is restricted to minerals, petroleum
and other mineral oils, the intent being to limit service contracts to those areas where Filipino capital may not
be sufficient. Fourth, consistency with the provisions of statute. The agreements must be in accordance with the
terms and conditions provided by law. Fifth, Section 2 prescribes certain standards for entering into such
agreements. The agreements must be based on real contributions to economic growth and general welfare of
the country. Sixth, the agreements must contain rudimentary stipulations for the promotion of the development
and use of local scientific and technical resources. Seventh, the notification requirement. The President shall
notify Congress of every financial or technical assistance agreement entered into within thirty days from its
execution. Finally, the scope of the agreements. While the 1973 Constitution referred to “service contracts for
financial, technical, management, or other forms of assistance” the 1987 Constitution provides for
“agreements . . . involving either financial or technical assistance.” It bears noting that the phrases “service
contracts” and “management or other forms of assistance” in the earlier constitution have been omitted.

Same; Same; Same; Modes by Which the State May Explore, Develop and Utilize Natural Resources.—The State,
being the owner of the natural resources, is accorded the primary power and responsibility in the
exploration, development and utilization thereof. As such, it may undertake these activities through four
modes: The State may directly undertake such activities. (2) The State may enter into co-production, joint
venture or productionsharing agreements with Filipino citizens or qualified corporations. (3) Congress may,
by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens. (4) For the large-scale
exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils, the President may
enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving technical or financial assistance. Except to
charge the Mines and Geosciences Bureau of the DENR with performing researches and surveys, and a
passing mention of government-owned or controlled corporations, R.A. No. 7942 does not specify how the
State should go about the first mode. The third mode, on the other hand, is governed by Republic Act No. 7076
(the People’s Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991) and other pertinent laws. R.A. No. 7942 primarily concerns itself
with the second and fourth modes.

Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Production Sharing Agreements,” “Co-Production Agreements,” and
“Joint Venture Agreements,” Explained.—Mineral production sharing, coproduction and joint venture
agreements are collectively classified by R.A. No. 7942 as “mineral agreements.” The Government participates
the least in a mineral production sharing agreement (MPSA). In an MPSA, the Government grants the
contractor the exclusive right to conduct mining operations within a contract area and shares in the gross
output. The MPSA contractor provides the financing, technology, management and personnel necessary for
the agreement’s implementation. The total government share in an MPSA is the excise tax on mineral
products under Republic Act No. 7729, amending Section 151 (a) of the National Internal Revenue Code, as
amended. In a coproduction agreement (CA), the Government provides inputs to the mining operations other
than the mineral resource, while in a joint venture agreement (JVA), where the Government enjoys the
greatest participation, the Government and the JVA contractor organize a company with both parties having
equity shares. Aside from earnings in equity, the Government in a JVA is also entitled to a share in the gross
output. The Government may enter into a CA or JVA with one or more contractors.

Same; Statutes; Statutory Construction; Executive Order (E.O.) No. 279; There is nothing in E.O. No. 200 that
prevents a law from taking effect on a date other than—even before—the 15- day period after its publication;
Where a law provides for its own date of effectivity, such date prevails over that prescribed by E.O. No. 200 .—It
bears noting that there is nothing in E.O. No. 200 that prevents a law from taking effect on a date other than—
even before—the 15-day period after its publication. Where a law provides for its own date of effectivity, such
date prevails over that prescribed by E.O. No. 200. Indeed, this is the very essence, of the phrase “unless it is
otherwise provided” in Section 1 thereof. Section 1, E.O. No. 200, therefore, applies only when a statute does
not provide for its own date of effectivity. What is mandatory under E.O. No. 200, and what due process
requires, as this Court held in Tañada v. Tuvera, is the publication of the law for without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim “ignorantia legis n[eminem] excusat.” It
would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of
which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

Same; Same; Same; From a reading then of Section 8 of E.O. No. 279, Section 1 of E.O. No. 200, and Tañada v.
Tuvera, this Court holds that E.O. No. 279 became effective immediately upon its publication in the Official
Gazette on 3 August 1987.—While the effectivity clause of E.O. No. 279 does not require its publication, it is
not a ground for its invalidation since the Constitution, being the fundamental, paramount and supreme law
of the nation,” is deemed written in the law. Hence, the due process clause, which, so Tañada held, mandates
the publication of statutes, is read into Section 8 of E.O. No. 279. Additionally, Section 1 of E.O. No. 200 which
provides for publication “either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines,” finds suppletory application. It is significant to note that E.O. No. 279 was actually published in
the Official Gazette on August 3, 1987. From a reading then of Section 8 of E.O. No. 279, Section 1 of E.O. No.
200, and Tañada v. Tuvera, this Court holds that E.O. No. 279 became effective immediately upon its
publication in the Official Gazette on August 3, 1987.

Same; Same; Same; The convening of the first Congress merely precluded the exercise of legislative powers by
President Aquino—it did not prevent the effectivity of laws she had previously enacted.—That such effectivity
took place after the convening of the first Congress is irrelevant. At the time President Aquino issued E.O. No.
279 on July 25, 1987, she was still validly exercising legislative powers under the Provisional Constitution.
Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution explicitly states: SEC. 6. The incumbent
President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until the first Congress is convened. The convening of
the first Congress merely precluded the exercise of legislative powers by President Aquino; it did not prevent
the effectivity of laws she had previously enacted. There can be no question, therefore, that E.O. No. 279 is an
effective, and a validly enacted, statute. Same; Same; It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation of constitutions
that the instrument must be so construed as to give effect to the intention of the people who adopted it;
Following the literal text of the Constitution, assistance accorded by foreignowned corporations in the large-
scale exploration, development, and utilization of petroleum, minerals and mineral oils should be limited to
“technical” or “financial” assistance only.—It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation of constitutions that the
instrument must be so construed as to give effect to the intention of the people who adopted it. This intention
is to be sought in the constitution itself, and the apparent meaning of the words is to be taken as expressing it,
except in cases where that assumption would lead to absurdity, ambiguity, or contradiction. What the
Constitution says according to the text of the provision, therefore, compels acceptance and negates the power
of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say.
Accordingly, following the literal text of the Constitution, assistance accorded by foreign-owned corporations
in the large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of petroleum, minerals and mineral oils should be
limited to “technical” or “financial” assistance only.

Same; Same; The management or operation of mining activities by foreign contractors, which is the primary
feature of service contracts, was precisely the evil that the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to eradicate .
—As priorly pointed out, the phrase “management or other forms of assistance” in the 1973 Constitution was
deleted in the 1987 Constitution, which allows only “technical or financial assistance.” Casus omisus pro
omisso habendus est. A person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been
omitted intentionally. As will be shown later, the management or operation of mining activities by foreign
contractors, which is the primary feature of service contracts, was precisely the evil that the drafters of the
1987 Constitution sought to eradicate.

Same; Same; Service Contracts; If the Constitutional Commission intended to retain the concept of service
contracts under the 1973 Constitution, it could have simply adopted the old terminology (“service contracts”)
instead of employing new and unfamiliar terms (“agreements . . . involving either technical or financial
assistance”).—As earlier noted, the phrase “service contracts” has been deleted in the 1987 Constitution’s
Article on National Economy and Patrimony. If the CONCOM intended to retain the concept of service
contracts under the 1973 Constitution, it could have simply adopted the old terminology (“service contracts”)
instead of employing new and unfamiliar terms (“agreements . . . involving either technical or financial
assistance”). Such a difference between the language of a provision in a revised constitution and that of a
similar provision in the preceding constitution is viewed as indicative of a difference in purpose. If, as
respondents suggest, the concept of “technical or financial assistance” agreements is identical to that of
“service contracts,” the CONCOM would not have bothered to fit the same dog with a new collar. To uphold
respondents’ theory would reduce the first to a mere euphemism for the second and render the change in
phraseology meaningless. An examination of the reason behind the change confirms that technical or
financial assistance agreements are not synonymous to service contracts. [T]he Court in construing a
Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any,
sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in light of the history of the times,
and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the
reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose
sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that
reason and calculated to effect that purpose.

Same; Same; Same; The insights of the proponents of the U.P. Law Draft are instructive in interpreting the
phrase “technical or financial assistance.”—It appears that Proposed Resolution No. 496, which was the draft
Article on National Economy and Patrimony, adopted the concept of “agreements . . . involving either
technical or financial assistance” contained in the “Draft of the 1986 U.P. Law Constitution Project” (U.P. Law
draft) which was taken into consideration during the deliberation of the CONCOM. The former, as well as
Article XII, as adopted, employed the same terminology, x x x The insights of the proponents of the U.P. Law
draft are, therefore, instructive in interpreting the phrase “technical or financial assistance.”

Same; Same; Same; The U.P. Law draft proponents viewed service contracts under the 1973 Constitution as
grants of beneficial ownership of the country’s natural resources to foreign owned corporations.—The U.P. Law
draft proponents viewed service contracts under the 1973 Constitution as grants of beneficial ownership of
the country’s natural resources to foreign owned corporations. While, in theory, the State owns these natural
resources—and Filipino citizens, their beneficiaries— service contracts actually vested foreigners with the
right to dispose, explore for, develop, exploit, and utilize the same. Foreigners, not Filipinos, became the
beneficiaries of Philippine natural resources. This arrangement is clearly incompatible with the constitutional
ideal of nationalization of natural resources, with the Regalian doctrine, and on a broader perspective, with
Philippine sovereignty.

Same; Same; Same; The replacement of “service contracts” with “agreements . . . involving either technical or
financial assistance,” as well as the deletion of the phrase “management or other forms of assistance,” assumes
greater significance when note is taken that the U.P. Law draft proposed other equally crucial changes that were
obviously heeded by the CONCOM; In light of the deliberations of the CONCOM, the text of the Constitution, and
the adoption of other proposed changes, there is no doubt that the framers considered and shared the intent of
the U.P. Law proponents in employing the phrase “agreements . . . involving either technical or financial
assistance.”—The proponents nevertheless acknowledged the need for capital and technical know-how in the
large-scale exploitation, development and utilization of natural resources—the second paragraph of the
proposed draft itself being an admission of such scarcity. Hence, they recommended a compromise to
reconcile the nationalistic provisions dating back to the 1935 Constitution, which reserved all natural
resources exclusively to Filipinos, and the more liberal 1973 Constitution, which allowed foreigners to
participate in these resources through service contracts. Such a compromise called for the adoption of a new
system in the exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources in the form of technical
agreements or financial agreements which, necessity, are distinct concepts from service contracts. The
replacement of “service contracts” with “agreements . . . involving either technical or financial assistance,” as
well as the deletion of the phrase “management or other forms of assistance,” assumes greater significance
when note is taken that the U.P. Law draft proposed other equally crucial changes that were obviously heeded
by the CONCOM. These include the abrogation of the concession system and the adoption of new “options” for
the State in the exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources. The proponents deemed these
changes to be more consistent with the State’s ownership of, and its “full control and supervision” (a phrase
also employed by the framers) over, such resources. In light of the deliberations of the CONCOM, the text of
the Constitution, and the adoption of other proposed changes, there is no doubt that the framers considered
and shared the intent of the U.P. Law proponents in employing the phrase “agreements . . . involving either
technical or financial assistance.”

Same; Same; Same; Loose statements of some of the Commissioners in the CONCOM do not necessarily translate
to the adoption of the 1973 Constitution provision allowing service contracts.—While certain commissioners
may have mentioned the term “service contracts” during the CONCOM deliberations, they may not have been
necessarily referring to the concept of service contracts under the 1973 Constitution. As noted earlier,
“service contracts” is a term that assumes different meanings to different people. The commissioners may
have been using the term loosely, and not in its technical and legal sense, to refer, in general, to agreements
concerning natural resources entered into by the Government with foreign corporations. These loose
statements do not necessarily translate to the adoption of the 1973 Constitution provision allowing service
contracts.

Same; Same; Same; Administrative Law; When an administrative or executive agency renders an opinion or
issues a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law; and the administrative interpretation of the
law is at best advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means .—WMCP cites Opinion No.
75, s. 1987, and Opinion No. 175, s. 1990 of the Secretary of Justice, expressing the view that a financial or
technical assistance agreement “is no different in concept” from the service contract allowed under the 1973
Constitution. This Court is not, however, bound by this interpretation. When an administrative or executive
agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it merely interprets a preexisting law; and the
administrative interpretation, of the law is at best advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the
law means. Same; Same; Same; The President may enter into FTAAs with foreign-owned corporation in the
exploitation of our natural resources.—In any case, the constitutional provision allowing the President to
enter into FTAAs with foreign-owned corporations is an exception to the rule that participation in the
nation’s natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly, such provision must be construed
strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. As Commissioner Villegas emphasized, the provision is
“very restrictive.” Commissioner Nolledo also remarked that “entering into service contracts is an exception
to the rule on protection of natural resources for the interest of the nation and, therefore, being an exception,
it should be subject, whenever possible, to stringent rules.” Indeed, exceptions should be strictly but
reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants and all doubts should be
resolved in favor of the general provision rather than the exception.

Same; Same; Same; Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (Republic Act No. 7942); With the foregoing discussion in
mind, this Court finds that R.A. No. 7942 is invalid insofar as said Act authorizes service contracts.—With the
foregoing discussion in mind, this Court finds that R.A. No. 7942 is invalid insofar as said Act authorizes
service contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase “financial and technical agreements” in
accordance with the 1987 Constitution, it actually treats these agreements as service contracts that grant
beneficial ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law. Same; Same; Same; Same; The
underlying assumption in all some of the provisions of R.A. No. 7942 is that the foreign contractor manages the
mineral resources, just like the foreign contractor in a service contract; By allowing foreign contractors to
manage or operate all the aspects of the mining operation, the above-cited provisions of R.A. No. 7942 have in
effect conveyed beneficial ownership over the nation’s mineral resources to these contractors, leaving the State
with nothing but bare title thereto.— The underlying assumption in all these provisions is that the foreign
contractor manages the mineral resources, just like the foreign contractor in a service contract. Furthermore,
Chapter XII of the Act grants foreign contractors in FTAAs the same auxiliary mining rights that it grants
contractors in mineral agreements (MPSA, CA and JV). Parenthetically, Sections 72 to 75 use the term
“contractor,” without distinguishing between FTAA and mineral agreement contractors. And so does “holders
of mining rights” in Section 76. A foreign contractor may even convert its FTAA into a mineral agreement if
the economic viability of the contract area is found to be inadequate to justify large-scale mining operations,
provided that it reduces its equity in the corporation, partnership, association or cooperative to forty percent
(40%). Finally, under the Act, an FTAA contractor warrants that it “has or has access to all the financing,
managerial, and technical expertise . . . .” This suggests that an FTAA contractor is bound to provide some
management assistance—a form of assistance that has been eliminated and, therefore, proscribed by the
present Charter. By allowing foreign contractors to manage or operate all the aspects of the mining operation,
the above-cited provisions of R.A. No. 7942 have in effect conveyed beneficial ownership over the nation’s
mineral resources to these contractors, leaving the State with nothing but bare title thereto.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Provisions of R.A. No. 7942 Violative of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution .—In
sum, the Court finds the following provisions of R.A. No. 7942 to be violative of Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution: (1) The proviso in Section 3 (aq), which defines “qualified person,” to wit: Provided, That a
legally organized foreign-owned corporation shall be deemed a qualified person for purposes of granting an
exploration permit, financial or technical assistance agreement or mineral processing permit. (2) Section 23,
which specifies the rights and obligations of an exploration permittee, insofar as said section applies to a
financial or technical assistance agreement; (3) Section 33, which prescribes the eligibility of a contractor in a
financial or technical assistance agreement; (4) Section 35, which enumerates the terms and conditions for
every financial or technical assistance agreement; (5) Section 39, which allows the contractor in a financial
and technical assistance agreement to convert the same into a mineral production-sharing agreement;
Section 37, which prescribes the procedure for filing and evaluation of financial or technical assistance
agreement proposals; Section 38, which limits the term of financial or technical assistance agreements;
Section 40, which allows the assignment or transfer of financial or technical assistance agreements; Section
41, which allows the withdrawal of the contractor in an FTAA; The second and third paragraphs of Section 81,
which provide for the Government’s share in a financial and technical assistance agreement; and Section 90,
which provides for incentives to contractors in FTAAs insofar as it applies to said contractors;

Same; Same; Same; Same; When the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions,
considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature
intended them as a whole, and that if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the
residue independently, then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent,
conditional, or connected, must fall with them.—When the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and
connected as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief
that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature
would not pass the residue independently, then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which
are thus dependent, conditional, or connected, must fall with them.

Same; International Law; Treaties; Equal Protection Clause; The annulment of the FTAA would not constitute a
breach of the Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments between the Philippine and Australian
Governments, for the decision herein invalidating the subject FTAA forms part of the legal system of the
Philippines, and the equal protection clause guarantees that such decision shall apply to all contracts belonging
to the same class, hence, upholding rather than violating, the “fair and equitable treatment” stipulation in said
treaty.—The invalidation of the subject FTAA, it is argued, would constitute a breach of said treaty which, in
turn, would amount to a violation of Section 3, Article II of the Constitution adopting the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land. One of these generally accepted principles is
pacta sunt servanda, which requires the performance in good faith of treaty obligations. Even assuming
arguendo that WMCP is correct in its interpretation of the treaty and its assertion that “the Philippines could
not . . . deprive an Australian investor (like [WMCP]) of fair and equitable treatment by invalidating [WMCP’s]
FTAA without likewise nullifying the service contracts entered into before the enactment of RA 7942 . . .,” the
annulment of the FTAA would not constitute a breach of the treaty invoked. For this decision herein
invalidating the subject FTAA forms part of the legal system of the Philippines. The equal protection clause
guarantees that such decision shall apply to all contracts belonging to the same class, hence, upholding rather
than violating, the “fair and equitable treatment” stipulation in said treaty.

Same; Statutory Construction; A constitution is not to be interpreted as demanding the impossible or the
impracticable— and unreasonable or absurd consequences, if possible, should be avoided—courts are not to
give words a meaning that would lead to absurd or unreasonable consequences and a literal interpretation is to
be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results.—One other matter requires clarification. Petitioners
contend that, consistent with the provisions of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, the President may
enter into agreements involving “either technical or financial assistance” only. The agreement in question,
however, is a technical and financial assistance agreement. Petitioners’ contention does not lie. To adhere to
the literal language of the Constitution would lead to absurd consequences. As WMCP correctly put it: x x x
such a theory of petitioners would compel the government (through the President) to enter into contract with
two (2) foreign-owned corporations, one for financial assistance agreement and with the other, for technical
assistance over one and the same mining area or land; or to execute two (2) contracts with only one
foreignowned corporation which has the capability to provide both financial and technical assistance, one for
financial assistance and another for technical assistance, over the same mining area. Such an absurd result is
definitely not sanctioned under the canons of constitutional construction. [Italics in the original.] Surely, the
framers of the 1987 Charter did not contemplate such an absurd result from their use of “either/or.” A
constitution is not to be interpreted as demanding the impossible or the impracticable; and unreasonable or
absurd consequences, if possible, should be avoided. Courts are not to give words a meaning that would lead
to absurd or unreasonable consequences and a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or
lead to absurd results. That is a strong argument against its adoption. Accordingly, petitioners’ interpretation
must be rejected.

2. WILSON P. GAMBOA vs. FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO B. TEVES, FINANCE UNDERSECRETARY

JOHN P. SEVILLA, et. al
G.R. No. 176579. June 28, 2011

Actions; Locus Standi; Petitioner being a stockholder of Philippine Long Distance Telephone (PLDT) has the
right to question the subject sale which he claims to violate the nationality requirement prescribed in Section 11,
Article XII of the Constitution; Court upheld the right of a citizen to bring a suit on matters of transcendental
importance to the public.—There is no dispute that petitioner is a stockholder of PLDT. As such, he has the
right to question the subject sale, which he claims to violate the nationality requirement prescribed in Section
11, Article XII of the Constitution. If the sale indeed violates the Constitution, then there is a possibility that
PLDT’s franchise could be revoked, a dire consequence directly affecting petitioner’s interest as a stockholder.
More importantly, there is no question that the instant petition raises matters of transcendental importance
to the public. The fundamental and threshold legal issue in this case, involving the national economy and the
economic welfare of the Filipino people, far outweighs any perceived impediment in the legal personality of
the petitioner to bring this action. In Chavez v. PCGG, 299 SCRA 744 (1998), the Court upheld the right of a
citizen to bring a suit on matters of transcendental importance to the public.

Corporation Law; Words and Phrases; “Capital”; The term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution
refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors, and thus in the present case only to
common shares, and not to the total outstanding capital stock comprising both common and non-voting
preferred shares.—We agree with petitioner and petitioners-inintervention. The term “capital” in Section 11,
Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors, and
thus in the present case only to common shares, and not to the total outstanding capital stock comprising
both common and non-voting preferred shares.

Same; Capital; Common shares cannot be deprived of the right to vote in any corporate meeting, and any
provision in the articles of incorporation restricting the right of common shareholders to vote is invalid. —
Indisputably, one of the rights of a stockholder is the right to participate in the control or management of the
corporation. This is exercised through his vote in the election of directors because it is the board of directors
that controls or manages the corporation. In the absence of provisions in the articles of incorporation denying
voting rights to preferred shares, preferred shares have the same voting rights as common shares. However,
preferred shareholders are often excluded from any control, that is, deprived of the right to vote in the
election of directors and on other matters, on the theory that the preferred shareholders are merely investors
in the corporation for income in the same manner as bondholders. In fact, under the Corporation Code only
preferred or redeemable shares can be deprived of the right to vote. Common shares cannot be deprived of
the right to vote in any corporate meeting, and any provision in the articles of incorporation restricting the
right of common shareholders to vote is invalid.
Same; Same; The term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock that
can vote in the election of directors.—Considering that common shares have voting rights which translate to
control, as opposed to preferred shares which usually have no voting rights, the term “capital” in Section 11,
Article XII of the Constitution refers only to common shares. However, if the preferred shares also have the
right to vote in the election of directors, then the term “capital” shall include such preferred shares because
the right to participate in the control or management of the corporation is exercised through the right to vote
in the election of directors. In short, the term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers
only to shares of stock that can vote in the election of directors.

Same; Same; The term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution to include both voting and non-
voting shares will result in the abject surrender of our telecommunications industry to foreigners, amounting to
a clear abdication of the State’s constitutional duty to limit control of public utilities to Filipino citizens; The
Court should never open to foreign control what the Constitution has expressly reserved to Filipinos for that
would be a betrayal of the Constitution and of the national interest.— Indisputably, construing the term
“capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution to include both voting and non-voting shares will result
in the abject surrender of our telecommunications industry to foreigners, amounting to a clear abdication of
the State’s constitutional duty to limit control of public utilities to Filipino citizens. Such an interpretation
certainly runs counter to the constitutional provision reserving certain areas of investment to Filipino
citizens, such as the exploitation of natural resources as well as the ownership of land, educational
institutions and advertising businesses. The Court should never open to foreign control what the Constitution
has expressly reserved to Filipinos for that would be a betrayal of the Constitution and of the national
interest. The Court must perform its solemn duty to defend and uphold the intent and letter of the
Constitution to ensure, in the words of the Constitution, “a selfreliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos.”

Same; Securities and Exchange Commission; The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is vested with the
power and function to suspend or revoke, after proper notice and hearing, the franchise or certificate of
registration of corporations, partnerships or associations, upon any of the grounds provided by law. —Under
Section 5(m) of the Securities Regulation Code, the SEC is vested with the “power and function” to “ suspend
or revoke, after proper notice and hearing, the franchise or certificate of registration of corporations,
partnerships or associations, upon any of the grounds provided by law.” The SEC is mandated under
Section 5(d) of the same Code with the “power and function” to “investigate x x x the activities of persons
to ensure compliance” with the laws and regulations that SEC administers or enforces. The GIS that all
corporations are required to submit to SEC annually should put the SEC on guard against violations of the
nationality requirement prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws. This Court can compel the SEC, in a
petition for declaratory relief that is treated as a petition for mandamus as in the present case, to hear and
decide a possible violation of Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution in view of the ownership structure of
PLDT’s voting shares, as admitted by respondents and as stated in PLDT’s 2010 GIS that PLDT submitted to
SEC.
3. Roy III vs. Herbosa
G.R. No. 207246. November 22, 2016.

Judiciary; Judicial Review; Requisites for the exercise of the Supreme Court’s (SC’s) power of judicial review.—
The Court may exercise its power of judicial review and take cognizance of a case when the following specific
requisites are met: (1) there is an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the
petitioner has standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance, i.e., he has a personal and
substantial interest in the case that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of the act or issuance; (3) the question of constitutionality is raised at the earliest opportunity;
and (4) the constitutional question is the very lis mota of the case.

Actual Controversy; An actual case or controversy is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract
difference or dispute.—The Court in Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., 710 SCRA 1 (2013), stressed anew that an actual case
or controversy is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims,
susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute since
the courts will decline to pass upon constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of
authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questions. Related to the requirement of an actual case or
controversy is the requirement of “ripeness,” and a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being
challenged has a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.

Same; As to injury, the party must show that (1) he will personally suffer some actual or threatened injury
because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.—As to injury, the party must show that
(1) he will personally suffer some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action. If the asserted injury is more imagined than real, or is merely superficial and
insubstantial, an excursion into constitutional adjudication by the courts is not warranted.

Same; The locus standi requisite is not met by the expedient invocation of one’s citizenship or membership in the
bar who has an interest in ensuring that laws and orders of the Philippine government are legally and validly
issued as these supposed interests are too general, which are shared by other groups and by the whole citizenry.
—The locus standi requisite is not met by the expedient invocation of one’s citizenship or membership in the
bar who has an interest in ensuring that laws and orders of the Philippine government are legally and validly
issued as these supposed interests are too general, which are shared by other groups and by the whole
citizenry. Per their allegations, the personal interest invoked by petitioners as citizens and members of the
bar in the validity or invalidity of SEC-MC No. 8 is at best equivocal, and totally insufficient.

Same; Taxpayer’s Suit; A taxpayer’s suit is allowed only when the petitioner has demonstrated the direct
correlation of the act complained of and the disbursement of public funds in contravention of law or the
Constitution, or has shown that the case involves the exercise of the spending or taxing power of Congress. —As
often reiterated by the Court, a taxpayer’s suit is allowed only when the petitioner has demonstrated the
direct correlation of the act complained of and the disbursement of public funds in contravention of law or
the Constitution, or has shown that the case involves the exercise of the spending or taxing power of
Congress. SEC-MC No. 8 does not involve an additional expenditure of public funds and the taxing or spending
power of Congress.

Corporation Law; Public Utility Corporation; As defined in the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
Securities Regulation Code (SRC-IRR), beneficial owner or beneficial ownership means any person who, directly
or indirectly, through any contract, arrangement, understanding, relationship or otherwise, has or shares voting
power and/or investment returns or power.—As defined in the SRC-IRR, “[b]eneficial owner or beneficial
ownership means any person who, directly or indirectly, through any contract, arrangement, understanding,
relationship or otherwise, has or shares voting power (which includes the power to vote or direct the voting
of such security) and/or investment returns or power (which includes the power to dispose of, or direct the
disposition of such security).”
Same; Same; The term “full beneficial ownership” found in the Foreign Investment Act-Implementing Rules and
Regulations (FIA defining the term “Philippine national.” Mere legal title is not enough to meet the required
Filipino equity, which means that it is not sufficient that a share is registered in the name of a Filipino citizen or
national, i.e., he should also have full beneficial ownership of the share.—The term “full beneficial ownership”
found in the FIA-IRR is to be understood in the context of the entire paragraph defining the term “Philippine
national.” Mere legal title is not enough to meet the required Filipino equity, which means that it is not
sufficient that a share is registered in the name of a Filipino citizen or national, i.e., he should also have full
beneficial ownership of the share. If the voting right of a share held in the name of a Filipino citizen or
national is assigned or transferred to an alien, that share is not to be counted in the determination of the
required Filipino equity. In the same vein, if the dividends and other fruits and accessions of the share do not
accrue to a Filipino citizen or national, then that share is also to be excluded or not counted.

Same; Same; If a “specific stock” is owned by a Filipino in the books of the corporation, but the stock’s voting
power or disposing power belongs to a foreigner, then that “specific stock” will not be deemed as “beneficially
owned” by a Filipino.—Given that beneficial ownership of the outstanding capital stock of the public utility
corporation has to be determined for purposes of compliance with the 60% Filipino ownership requirement,
the definition in the SRC-IRR can now be applied to resolve only the question of who is the beneficial owner
or who has beneficial ownership of each “specific stock” of the said corporation. Thus, if a “specific stock” is
owned by a Filipino in the books of the corporation, but the stock’s voting power or disposing power belongs
to a foreigner, then that “specific stock” will not be deemed as “beneficially owned” by a Filipino.

Same; Same; If the Filipino has the “specific stock’s” voting power, or the Filipino has the investment power over
the “specific stock,” or he has both, then such Filipino is the “beneficial owner” of that “specific stock” and that
“specific stock” is considered as part of the sixty percent (60%) Filipino ownership of the corporation.—If the
Filipino has the “specific stock’s” voting power (he can vote the stock or direct another to vote for him), or the
Filipino has the investment power over the “specific stock” (he can dispose of the stock or direct another to
dispose it for him), or he has both (he can vote and dis- pose of the “specific stock” or direct another to vote or
dispose it for him), then such Filipino is the “beneficial owner” of that “specific stock” — and that “specific
stock” is considered (or counted) as part of the 60% Filipino ownership of the corporation. In the end, all
those “specific stocks” that are determined to be Filipino (per definition of “beneficial owner” or “beneficial
ownership”) will be added together and their sum must be equivalent to at least 60% of the total outstanding
shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors and at least 60% of the total number of outstanding
shares of stock, whether or not entitled to vote in the election of directors.

Same; Same; The “beneficial owner or beneficial ownership” definition in the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Securities Regulation Code (SRC-IRR) is understood only in determining the respective
nationalities of the outstanding capital stock of a public utility corporation in order to determine its compliance
with the percentage of Filipino ownership required by the Constitution.—To reiterate, the “beneficial owner or
beneficial ownership” definition in the SRC-IRR is understood only in determining the respective nationalities
of the outstanding capital stock of a public utility corporation in order to determine its compliance with the
percentage of Filipino ownership required by the Constitution.

Same; Same; The application of the sixty-forty (60-40) Filipino-foreign ownership requirement separately to
each class of shares, whether common, preferred nonvoting, preferred voting or any other class of shares fails to
understand and appreciate the nature and features of stocks as financial instruments.—To be sure, the
application of the 60-40 Filipino-foreign ownership requirement separately to each class of shares, whether
common, preferred nonvoting, preferred voting or any other class of shares fails to understand and
appreciate the nature and features of stocks as financial instruments.

Same; Same; Stock Corporations; That stock corporations are allowed to create shares of different classes with
varying features is a flexibility that is granted, among others, for the corporation to attract and generate capital
(funds) from both local and foreign capital markets.—That stock corporations are allowed to create shares of
different classes with varying features is a flexibility that is granted, among others, for the corporation to
attract and generate capital (funds) from both local and foreign capital markets. This access to capital —
which a stock corporation may need for expansion, debt relief/repayment, working capital requirement and
other corporate pursuits — will be greatly eroded with further unwarranted limitations that are not
articulated in the Constitution.

Same; Same; Constitutional Law; As mandated by Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, all the executive and
managing officers of a public utility company must be Filipinos. Thus, the all-Filipino management team must
first be convinced that any of the eight (8) corporate actions in Section 6 of the Corporation Code will be to the
best interest of the company.—In this regard, it should be noted that the 8 corporate matters enumerated in
Section 6 of the Corporation Code require, at the outset, a favorable recommendation by the management to
the board. As mandated by Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, all the executive and managing officers
of a public utility company must be Filipinos. Thus, the all-Filipino management team must first be convinced
that any of the 8 corporate actions in Section 6 will be to the best interest of the company.
Same; Same; Allowing stockholders holding preferred shares without voting rights to vote in the eight (8)
corporate matters enumerated in Section 6 of the Corporation Code is an acknowledgment of their right of
ownership.—Allowing stockholders holding preferred shares without voting rights to vote in the 8 corporate
matters enumerated in Section 6 is an acknowledgment of their right of ownership. If the owners of preferred
shares without right to vote/elect directors are not allowed to vote in any of those 8 corporate actions, then
they will not be entitled to the appraisal right provided under Section 81 of the Corporation Code in the event
that they dissent in the corporate act.

Same; Same; A too restrictive definition of “capital” will surely have a dampening effect on the business milieu by
eroding the flexibility inherent in the issuance of preferred shares with varying terms and conditions.—As
acknowledged in the Gamboa v. Teves, 652 SCRA 690 (2011) (Gamboa Decision), preferred shareholders are
merely investors in the company for income in the same manner as bondholders. Without a lucrative package,
including an attractive return of investment, preferred shares will not be subscribed and the much-needed
additional capital will be elusive. A too restrictive definition of “capital,” one which was never contemplated
in the Gamboa Decision, will surely have a dampening effect on the business milieu by eroding the flexibility
inherent in the issuance of preferred shares with varying terms and conditions.

4. IDEALS, INC. vs. PSALM

GR No. 192088, Oct. 9, 2012

Electric Power Industry; Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA); The Electric Power Industry
Reform Act of 2001 mandated that “all assets of National Power Corporation (NPC) shall be sold in an open and
transparent manner through public bidding.”—The EPIRA was enacted to provide for “an orderly and
transparent privatization” of NPC’s assets and liabilities. Specifically, said law mandated that “[a]ll assets of
NPC shall be sold in an open and transparent manner through public bidding.”

Electric Power Industry; Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA); With the advent of Electric Power
Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA) in 2001, Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation
(PSALM) came into existence for the principal purpose of managing the orderly sale, privatization and
disposition of generation assets, real estate and other disposable assets of the NPC including IPP Contracts.—
With the advent of EPIRA in 2001, PSALM came into existence for the principal purpose of managing the
orderly sale, privatization and disposition of generation assets, real estate and other disposable assets of the
NPC including IPP Contracts. Accordingly, PSALM was authorized to take title to and possession of, those
assets transferred to it. EPIRA mandated that all such assets shall be sold through public bidding with the
exception of Agus and Pulangui complexes in Mindanao, the privatization of which was left to the discretion
of PSALM in consultation with Congress.

The Supreme Court finds that the operation and maintenance of a hydroelectric power plant is not among the
statutorily granted powers of Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS).—The Court finds that
the operation and maintenance of a hydroelectric power plant is not among the statutorily granted powers of
MWSS. Although MWSS was granted authority to construct and operate dams and reservoirs, such was for the
specific purpose of supplying water for domestic and other uses, and the treatment, regulation and control of
water usage, and not power generation. Moreover, since the sale of AHEPP by PSALM merely implements the
legislated reforms for the electric power industry through schemes that aim “[t]o enhance the inflow of
private capital and broaden the ownership base of the power generation, transmission and distribution
sectors,” the proposed transfer to MWSS which is another government entity contravenes that State policy.

Water Code of the Philippines (P.D. No. 1067); Presidential Decree No. 1067, otherwise known as “The Water
Code of the Philippines” is the basic law governing the ownership, appropriation utilization, exploitation,
development, conservation and protection of water resources and rights to land related thereto.—The State’s
policy on the management of water resources is implemented through the regulation of water rights.
Presidential Decree No. 1067, otherwise known as “The Water Code of the Philippines” is the basic law
governing the ownership, appropriation utilization, exploitation, development, conservation and protection
of water resources and rights to land related thereto. The National Water Resources Council (NWRC) was
created in 1974 under P.D. No. 424 and was subsequently renamed as National Water Resources Board
(NWRB) pursuant to Executive Order No. 124-A. The NWRB is the chief coordinating and regulating agency
for all water resources management development activities which is tasked with the formulation and
development of policies on water utilization and appropriation, the control and supervision of water utilities
and franchises, and the regulation and rationalization of water rates.

Electric Power Industry; Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA); Power generation shall not be
considered a public utility operation, and hence no franchise is necessary. Foreign investors are likewise allowed
entry into the electric power industry.—Under the EPIRA, the generation of electric power, a business affected
with public interest, was opened to private sector and any new generation company is required to secure a
certificate of compliance from the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC), as well as health, safety and
environmental clearances from the concerned government agencies. Power generation shall not be
considered a public utility operation, and hence no franchise is necessary. Foreign investors are likewise
allowed entry into the electric power industry. However, there is no mention of water rights in the
privatization of multi-purpose hydropower facilities.

Since only the power plant is to be sold and privatized, the operation of the non-power components such as the
dam and reservoir, including the maintenance of the surrounding watershed, should remain under the
jurisdiction and control of National Power Corporation (NPC) which continue to be a government corporation.
—Lease or transfer of water rights is allowed under the Water Code, subject to the approval of NWRB after
due notice and hearing. However, lessees or transferees of such water rights must comply with the citizenship
requirement imposed by the Water Code and its IRR. But regardless of such qualification of water permit
holders/transferees, it is to be noted that there is no provision in the EPIRA itself authorizing the NPC to
assign or transfer its water rights in case of transfer of operation and possession of multi-purpose
hydropower facilities. Since only the power plant is to be sold and privatized, the operation of the non-power
components such as the dam and reservoir, including the maintenance of the surrounding watershed, should
remain under the jurisdiction and control of NPC which continue to be a government corporation.
5. NARRA NICKEL MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., TESORO MINING AND DEVELOPMENT, INC., and
MCARTHUR MINING, INC., vs. REDMONT CONSOLIDATED MINES CORP.
G.R. No. 195580. April 21, 2014.

Mercantile Law; Corporations; Control Test; Grandfather Rule; Basically, there are two acknowledged tests in
determining the nationality of a corporation: the control test and the grandfather rule.—Basically, there are
two acknowledged tests in determining the nationality of a corporation: the control test and the grandfather
rule. Paragraph 7 of DOJ Opinion No. 020, Series of 2005, adopting the 1967 SEC Rules which implemented
the requirement of the Constitution and other laws pertaining to the controlling interests in enterprises
engaged in the exploitation of natural resources owned by Filipino citizens, provides: Shares belonging to
corporations or partnerships at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipino citizens shall be
considered as of Philippine nationality, but if the percentage of Filipino ownership in the corporation or
partnership is less than 60%, only the number of shares corresponding to such percentage shall be counted
as of Philippine nationality. Thus, if 100,000 shares are registered in the name of a corporation or partnership
at least 60% of the capital stock or capital, respectively, of which belong to Filipino citizens, all of the shares
shall be recorded as owned by Filipinos. But if less than 60%, or say, 50% of the capital stock or capital of the
corporation or partnership, respectively, belongs to Filipino citizens, only 50,000 shares shall be counted as
owned by Filipinos and the other 50,000 shall be recorded as belonging to aliens. The first part of paragraph
7, DOJ Opinion No. 020, stating “shares belonging to corporations or partnerships at least 60% of the capital
of which is owned by Filipino citizens shall be considered as of Philippine nationality,” pertains to the control
test or the liberal rule. On the other hand, the second part of the DOJ Opinion which provides, “if the
percentage of the Filipino ownership in the corporation or partnership is less than 60%, only the number of
shares corresponding to such percentage shall be counted as Philippine nationality,” pertains to the stricter,
more stringent grandfather rule.

Same; Same; Corporate Layering; “Corporate layering” is admittedly allowed by the Foreign Investments Act
(FIA); but if it is used to circumvent the Constitution and pertinent laws, then it becomes illegal. —“Corporate
layering” is admittedly allowed by the FIA; but if it is used to circumvent the Constitution and pertinent laws,
then it becomes illegal. Further, the pronouncement of petitioners that the grandfather rule has already been
abandoned must be discredited for lack of basis. Art. XII, Sec. 2 of the Constitution provides: Sec. 2. All lands of
the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With
the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration,
development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.
The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into coproduction, joint venture or
production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty
per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and
conditions as may be provided by law.

Constitutional Law; Statutory Construction; Elementary in statutory construction is when there is conflict
between the Constitution and a statute, the Constitution will prevail.— Elementary in statutory construction is
when there is conflict between the Constitution and a statute, the Constitution will prevail. In this instance,
specifically pertaining to the provisions under Art. XII of the Constitution on National Economy and
Patrimony, Sec. 3 of the FIA will have no place of application. As decreed by the honorable framers of our
Constitution, the grandfather rule prevails and must be applied.

Mercantile Law; Corporations; Pseudo-Partnerships; As a rule, corporations are prohibited from entering into
partnership agreements; consequently, corporations enter into joint venture agreements with other
corporations or partnerships for certain transactions in order to form “pseudo partnerships.” —Though some
claim that partnerships and joint ventures are totally different animals, there are very few rules that
differentiate one from the other; thus, joint ventures are deemed “akin” or similar to a partnership. In fact, in
joint venture agreements, rules and legal incidents governing partnerships are applied. Accordingly, culled
from the incidents and records of this case, it can be assumed that the relationships entered between and
among petitioners and MBMI are no simple “joint venture agreements.” As a rule, corporations are prohibited
from entering into partnership agreements; consequently, corporations enter into joint venture agreements
with other corporations or partnerships for certain transactions in order to form “pseudo partnerships.”
Obviously, as the intricate web of “ventures” entered into by and among petitioners and MBMI was executed
to circumvent the legal prohibition against corporations entering into partnerships, then the relationship
created should be deemed as “partnerships,” and the laws on partnership should be applied. Thus, a joint
venture agreement between and among corporations may be seen as similar to partnerships since the
elements of partnership are present. Considering that the relationships found between petitioners and MBMI
are considered to be partnerships, then the CA is justified in applying Sec. 29, Rule 130 of the Rules by stating
that “by entering into a joint venture, MBMI have a joint interest” with Narra, Tesoro and McArthur.

Mines and Mining; Panel of Arbitrators; Jurisdiction; The Panel of Arbitrators (POA) has jurisdiction to settle
disputes over rights to mining areas.—We affirm the ruling of the CA in declaring that the POA has jurisdiction
over the instant case. The POA has jurisdiction to settle disputes over rights to mining areas which definitely
involve the petitions filed by Redmont against petitioners Narra, McArthur and Tesoro. Redmont, by filing its
petition against petitioners, is asserting the right of Filipinos over mining areas in the Philippines against
alleged foreign-owned mining corporations. Such claim constitutes a “dispute” found in Sec. 77 of RA 7942:
Within thirty (30) days, after the submission of the case by the parties for the decision, the panel shall have
exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following: (a) Disputes involving rights to mining
areas (b) Disputes involving mineral agreements or permits.

Same; Same; Same; It is clear that the Panel of Arbitrators (POA) has exclusive and original jurisdiction over any
and all disputes involving rights to mining areas.—It is clear that POA has exclusive and original jurisdiction
over any and all disputes involving rights to mining areas. One such dispute is an MPSA application to which
an adverse claim, protest or opposition is filed by another interested applicant. In the case at bar, the dispute
arose or originated from MPSA applications where petitioners are asserting their rights to mining areas
subject of their respective MPSA applications. Since respondent filed 3 separate petitions for the denial of said
applications, then a controversy has developed between the parties and it is POA’s jurisdiction to resolve said
disputes. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the RTC involves civil actions while what petitioners filed with the
DENR Regional Office or any concerned DENRE or CENRO are MPSA applications. Thus POA has jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the POA has jurisdiction over the MPSA applications under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
Euro-med Laboratories v. Province of Batangas, 495 SCRA 301 (2006), elucidates: The doctrine of primary
jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized training and
knowledge of an administrative body, relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before
resort to the courts is had even if the matter may well be within their proper jurisdiction.

Mercantile Law; Corporations; Control Test; The “control test” is still the prevailing mode of determining
whether or not a corporation is a Filipino corporation, within the ambit of Sec. 2, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution,
entitled to undertake the exploration, development and utilization of the natural resources of the Philippines. —
The “control test” is still the prevailing mode of determining whether or not a corporation is a Filipino
corporation, within the ambit of Sec. 2, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, entitled to undertake the exploration,
development and utilization of the natural resources of the Philippines. When in the mind of the Court there
is doubt, based on the attendant facts and circumstances of the case, in the 60-40 Filipino-equity ownership in
the corporation, then it may apply the “grandfather rule.”
 6. RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAÑON STRAIT vs. SECRETARY
ANGELO REYES, in his capacity as Secretary
G.R. No. 180771. April 21, 2015.*

Service Contracts; In La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, 445 SCRA 1 (2004), the Supreme Court
(SC) held that the deletion of the words “service contracts” in the 1987 Constitution did not amount to a ban on
them per se.—This Court has previously settled the issue of whether service contracts are still allowed under
the 1987 Constitution. In La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, 445 SCRA 1 (2004), we held that
the deletion of the words “service contracts” in the 1987 Constitution did not amount to a ban on them per se.
In fact, in that decision, we quoted in length, portions of the deliberations of the members of the
Constitutional Commission (ConCom) to show that in deliberating on paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII, they
were actually referring to service contracts as understood in the 1973 Constitution, albeit with safety
measures to eliminate or minimize the abuses prevalent during the martial law regime.

Natural Resources; Oil Explorations; Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972; The disposition, exploration,
development, exploitation, and utilization of indigenous petroleum in the Philippines are governed by
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 87 or the Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972 .—The disposition,
exploration, development, exploitation, and utilization of indigenous petroleum in the Philippines are
governed by Presidential Decree No. 87 or the Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972. This was
enacted by then President Ferdinand Marcos to promote the discovery and production of indigenous
petroleum through the utilization of government and/or local or foreign private resources to yield the
maximum benefit to the Filipino people and the revenues to the Philippine Government. Contrary to the
petitioners’ argument, Presidential Decree No. 87, although enacted in 1972, before the adoption of the 1987
Constitution, remains to be a valid law unless otherwise repealed.

Statutory Construction; In cases where the statute seems to be in conflict with the Constitution, but a
construction that it is in harmony with the Constitution is also possible, that construction should be preferred .—
In cases where the statute seems to be in conflict with the Constitution, but a construction that it is in
harmony with the Constitution is also possible, that construction should be preferred. This Court, in
Pangandaman v. Commission on Elections, 319 SCRA 283 (1999), expounding on this point, pronounced: It is a
basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution
and that the spirit, rather than the letter of the law determines its construction; for that reason, a stat- ute
must be read according to its spirit and intent. x x x. (Citation omitted) Consequently, we find no merit in
petitioners’ contention that SC-46 is prohibited on the ground that there is no general law prescribing the
standard or uniform terms, conditions, and requirements for service contracts involving oil exploration and
extraction.

Constitutional Law; Presidency; Oil Explorations; Natural Resources; Paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution requires that the President himself enter into any service contract for the exploration of
petroleum.—Paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution requires that the President himself
enter into any service contract for the exploration of petroleum. SC-46 appeared to have been entered into
and signed only by the DOE through its then Secretary, Vicente S. Perez, Jr., contrary to the said constitutional
requirement. Moreover, public respondents have neither shown nor alleged that Congress was subsequently
notified of the execution of such contract. Public respondents’ implied argument that based on the “alter ego
principle,” their acts are also that of then President Macapagal-Arroyo’s, cannot apply in this case. In Joson v.
Torres, 290 SCRA 279 (1998), we explained the concept of the alter ego principle or the doctrine of qualified
political agency and its limit in this wise: Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single
executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads
of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases
where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of
the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the
Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of
such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
Same; Balanced and Healthful Ecology; National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992; Natural
Resources; True to the constitutional policy that the “State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature,” Congress enacted the
National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992 (NIPAS Act) to secure the perpetual existence of all
native plants and animals through the establishment of a comprehensive system of integrated protected areas.—
True to the constitutional policy that the “State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature,” Congress enacted the NIPAS Act to
secure the perpetual existence of all native plants and animals through the establishment of a comprehensive
system of integrated protected areas. These areas possess common ecological values that were incorporated
into a holistic plan representative of our natural heritage. The system encompasses outstandingly remarkable
areas and biologically important public lands that are habitats of rare and endangered species of plants and
animals, biogeographic zones and related ecosystems, whether terrestrial, wetland, or marine. It classifies
and administers all the designated protected areas to maintain essential ecological processes and life-support
systems, to preserve genetic diversity, to ensure sustainable use of resources found therein, and to maintain
their natural conditions to the greatest extent possible. The following categories of protected areas were
established under the NIPAS Act: a. Strict nature reserve; b. Natural park; c. Natural monument; d. Wildlife
sanctuary; e. Protected landscapes and seascapes; f. Resource reserve; g. Natural biotic areas; and h. Other
categories established by law, conventions or international agreements which the Philippine Government is a
signatory.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Under Section 4 of the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992
(NIPAS Act), a protected area refers to portions of land and water, set aside due to their unique physical and
biological significance, managed to enhance biological diversity and protected against human exploitation.—
Under Section 4 of the NIPAS Act, a protected area refers to portions of land and water, set aside due to their
unique physical and biological significance, managed to enhance biological diversity and protected against
human exploitation. The Tañ on Strait, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1234, was set aside and declared a
protected area under the category of Protected Seascape. The NIPAS Act defines a Protected Seascape to be an
area of national significance characterized by the harmonious interaction of man and land while providing
opportunities for public enjoyment through recreation and tourism within the normal lifestyle and economic
activity of this areas; thus a management plan for each area must be designed to protect and enhance the
permanent preservation of its natural conditions. Consistent with this endeavor is the requirement that an
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) be made prior to undertaking any activity outside the scope of the
management plan. Unless an ECC under the EIA system is obtained, no activity inconsistent with the goals of
the NIPAS Act shall be implemented.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Environmentally Critical Area; Environmental Impact Statement System; The
Environmental Impact Statement System (EISS) prohibits any person, partnership or corporation from
undertaking or operating any declared environmentally critical project or areas without first securing an
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) issued by the President or his duly authorized representative.—The
Environmental Impact Statement System (EISS) was established in 1978 under Presidential Decree No. 1586.
It prohibits any person, partnership or corporation from undertaking or operating any declared
environmentally critical project or areas without first securing an ECC issued by the President or his duly
authorized representative. Pursuant to the EISS, which called for the proper management of environmentally
critical areas, Proclamation No. 2146 was enacted, identifying the areas and types of projects to be considered
as environmentally critical and within the scope of the EISS, while DENR Administrative Order No. 2003-30
provided for its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR).

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) Administrative Order No. 2003-30 defines an environmentally critical area as “an area delineated as
environmentally sensitive such that significant environmental impacts are expected if certain types of proposed
projects or programs are located, developed, or implemented in it”; thus, before a project, which is “any activity,
regardless of scale or magnitude, which may have significant impact on the environment,” is undertaken in it,
such project must undergo an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) to evaluate and predict the likely impacts
of all its stages on the environment. —DENR Administrative Order No. 2003-30 defines an environmentally
critical area as “an area delineated as environmentally sensitive such that significant environmental impacts
are expected if certain types of proposed projects or programs are located, developed, or implemented in it”;
thus, before a project, which is “any activity, regardless of scale or magnitude, which may have significant
impact on the environment,” is undertaken in it, such project must undergo an EIA to evaluate and pre dict
the likely impacts of all its stages on the environment. An EIA is described in detail as follows: h.
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) — process that involves evaluating and predicting the likely impacts
of a project (including cumulative impacts) on the environment during construction, commissioning,
operation and abandonment. It also includes designing appropriate preventive, mitigating and enhancement
measures addressing these consequences to protect the environment and the community’s welfare. The
process is undertaken by, among others, the project proponent and/or EIA Consultant, EMB, a Review
Committee, affected communities and other stakeholders.

Same; Same; Same; Natural Resources; Service Contracts; Oil Explorations; While Presidential Decree (PD) No.
87 may serve as the general law upon which a service contract for petroleum exploration and extraction may be
authorized, the exploitation and utilization of this energy resource in the present case may be allowed only
through a law passed by Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a National Integrated Protected Areas System
(NIPAS) area.—SC-46 was not executed for the mere purpose of gathering information on the possible energy
resources in the Tañ on Strait as it also provides for the parties’ rights and obligations relating to extraction
and petroleum production should oil in commercial quantities be found to exist in the area. While
Presidential Decree No. 87 may serve as the general law upon which a service contract for petroleum
exploration and extraction may be authorized, the exploitation and utilization of this energy resource
in the present case may be allowed only through a law passed by Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a
NIPAS area. Since there is no such law specifically allowing oil exploration and/or extraction in the
Tañon Strait, no energy resource exploitation and utilization may be done in said protected seascape.

Summary:
The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, and utilization of indigenous petroleum in the
Philippines are governed by Presidential Decree No. 87 or the Oil Exploration and  Development Act of 1972.
This was enacted by then President Ferdinand Marcos to promote the discovery and production of
indigenous petroleum through the utilization of government and/or local or foreign private resources to yield
the maximum benefit to the Filipino people and the revenues to the Philippine Government. Contrary to the
petitioners’ argument, Presidential Decree No. 87, although enacted in 1972, before the adoption of the 1987
Constitution, remains to be a valid law unless otherwise repealed.
7. METROPOLITAN CEBU WATER DISTRICT (MCWD) vs. MARGARITA A. ADALA,
G.R. No. 168914. July 4, 2007.

Administrative Law; Public Utilities; Franchises; Words and Phrases; The term “franchise” has been construed
broadly so as to include, not only authorizations issuing directly from Congress in the form of statute, but also
those granted by administrative agencies to which the power to grant franchises has been delegated by
Congress; It has been held that privileges conferred by grant by local authorities as agents for the state
constitute as much a legislative franchise as though the grant had been made by an act of the Legislature.—This
Court, in Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 270 SCRA 538 (1997), has construed the term
“franchise” broadly so as to include, not only authorizations issuing directly from Congress in the form of
statute, but also those granted by administrative agencies to which the power to grant franchises has been
delegated by Congress, to wit: Congress has granted certain administrative agencies the power to grant
licenses for, or to authorize the operation of certain public utilities. With the growing complexity of
modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of
administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency towards the delegation of greater powers by
the legislature, and towards the approval of the practice by the courts. It is generally recognized that a
franchise may be derived indirectly from the state through a duly designated agency, and to this
extent, the power to grant franchises has frequently been delegated, even to agencies other than those
of a legislative nature. In pursuance of this, it has been held that privileges conferred by grant by local
authorities as agents for the state constitute as much a legislative franchise as though the grant had
been made by an act of the Legislature.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Water Districts; Presidential Decree No. 198 (P.D. 198); P.D. 198 itself gives the name
“franchise” to an authorization that does not proceed directly from the legislature.—It bears noting that once a
district is “duly formed and existing” after following the above procedure, it acquires the “exclusive franchise”
referred to in Section 47. Thus, P.D. 198 itself, in harmony with Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics
Board, 270 SCRA 538 (1997), gives the name “franchise” to an authorization that does not proceed directly
from the legislature. It would thus be incongruous to adopt in this instance the strict interpretation proffered
by respondent and exclude from the scope of the term “franchise” the CPCs issued by the NWRB.

Public Utilities; Water Districts; Waterworks; Statutes; Section 47 of P.D. 198 must be deemed void ab initio for
being irreconcilable with Article XIV, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution which was ratified on 17 January 1973
—the constitution in force when P.D. 198 was issued on 25 May 1973—which prohibits against exclusive
franchises.—While the prohibition in Section 47 of P.D. 198 applies to the issuance of CPCs for the
reasons discussed above, the same provision must be deemed void ab initio for being irreconcilable
with Article XIV, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution which was ratified on January 17, 1973—the
constitution in force when P.D. 198 was issued on May 25, 1973. Thus, Section 5 of Art. XIV of the 1973
Constitution reads: SECTION 5. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of
a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations
organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such
citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer
period than fifty years. Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except under the condition that
it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Batasang Pambansa when the public interest so
requires. The State shall encourage equity participation in public utilities by the general public. The
participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to
their proportionate share in the capital thereof. (Emphasis and italics supplied) This provision has been
substantially reproduced in Article XII Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution, including the prohibition against
exclusive franchises.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Water districts fall under the term “public utility”—a business or service
engaged in regularly supplying the public with some commodity or service of public consequence such as
electricity, gas, water, transportation, telephone or telegraph service.—In view of the purposes for which they
are established, water districts fall under the term “public utility” as defined in the case of National Power
Corporation v. Court of Appeals: 279 SCRA 506 (1997), A “public utility” is a business or service engaged in
regularly supplying the public with some commodity or service of public consequence such as electricity, gas,
water, transportation, telephone or telegraph service. x x x (Emphasis and italics supplied) It bears noting,
moreover, that as early as 1933, the Court held that a particular water district—the Metropolitan Water
District—is a public utility.
8. Manila International Airport Authority vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 155650; July 20, 2006

Manila International Airport Authority; Taxation; MIAA’s Airport Lands and Buildings are exempt from real
estate tax imposed by local governments.—We rule that MIAA’s Airport Lands and Buildings are exempt from
real estate tax imposed by local governments. First, MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled
corporation but an instrumentality of the National Government and thus exempt from local taxation. Second,
the real properties of MIAA are owned by the Republic of the Philippines and thus exempt from real estate
tax.

Same; Same; While there is no dispute that a governmentowned or controlled corporation is not exempt from
real estate tax, MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation; A government-owned or controlled
corporation must be “organized as a stock or non-stock corporation,” of which MIAA is neither; MIAA is not a
stock corporation because it has no capital stock divided into shares.—There is no dispute that a government-
owned or controlled corporation is not exempt from real estate tax. However, MIAA is not a government-
owned or controlled corporation. Section 2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of
1987 defines a government-owned or controlled corporation as follows: SEC. 2. General Terms Defined. —x x x
x (13) Government-owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature,
and owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as
in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock: x x x.
(Emphasis supplied) A government-owned or controlled corporation must be “organized as a stock or non-
stock corporation.” MIAA is not organized as a stock or non-stock corporation. MIAA is not a stock corporation
because it has no capital stock divided into shares.

Same; Same; Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) is not a non-stock corporation because it has no
members; Section 11 of the MIAA Charter which mandates MIAA to remit 20% of its annual gross operating
income to the National Treasury prevents it from qualifying as a non-stock corporation .—MIAA is also not a
non-stock corporation because it has no members. Section 87 of the Corporation Code defines a non-stock
corporation as “one where no part of its income is distributable as dividends to its members, trustees or
officers.” A non-stock corporation must have members. Even if we assume that the Government is considered
as the sole member of MIAA, this will not make MIAA a non-stock corporation. Non-stock corporations cannot
distribute any part of their income to their members. Section 11 of the MIAA Charter mandates MIAA to remit
20% of its annual gross operating income to the National Treasury. This prevents MIAA from qualifying as a
non-stock corporation.

Administrative Law; Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) is a government instrumentality vested with
corporate powers to perform efficiently its governmental functions.—Since MIAA is neither a stock nor a non-
stock corporation, MIAA does not qualify as a government-owned or controlled corporation. What then is the
legal status of MIAA within the National Government? MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with
corporate powers to perform efficiently its governmental functions. MIAA is like any other government
instrumentality, the only difference is that MIAA is vested with corporate powers. Section 2(10) of the
Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code defines a government “instrumentality” as follows: SEC. 2.
General Terms Defined.––x x x x (10) Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not
integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed
with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy,
usually through a charter. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Same; When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the instrumentality does not
become a corporation—unless the government instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-stock corporation,
it remains a government instrumentality exercising not only governmental but also corporate powers .—When
the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the instrumentality does not become a
corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, it
remains a government instrumentality exercising not only governmental but also corporate powers. Thus,
MIAA exercises the governmental powers of eminent domain, police authority and the levying of fees and
charges. At the same time, MIAA exercises “all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law,
insofar as these powers are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order.” Same; When the law
makes a government instrumentality operationally autonomous, the instrumentality remains part of the
National Government machinery although not integrated with the department framework.—Likewise, when
the law makes a government instrumentality operationally autonomous, the instrumentality remains part of
the National Government machinery although not integrated with the department framework. The MIAA
Charter expressly states that transforming MIAA into a “separate and autonomous body” will make its
operation more “financially viable.”

Same; Manila International Airport Authority; Taxation; Local Government Code; A government instrumentality
like MIAA falls under Section 133(o) of the Local Government Code, which provision recognizes the basic
principle that local governments cannot tax the national government.—A government instrumentality like
MIAA falls under Section 133(o) of the Local Government Code, which states: SEC. 133. Common Limitations
on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units.—Unless otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the
taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the levy of the
following: x x x x (o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and
instrumentalities and local government units. (Emphasis and italics supplied) Section 133(o) recognizes the
basic principle that local governments cannot tax the national government, which historically merely
delegated to local governments the power to tax. While the 1987 Constitution now includes taxation as one of
the powers of local governments, local governments may only exercise such power “subject to such guidelines
and limitations as the Congress may provide.”

Taxation; Local Government Code; Statutory Construction; When local governments invoke the power to tax on
national government instrumentalities, such power is construed strictly against local governments, and when
Congress grants an exemption to a national government instrumentality from local taxation, such exemption is
construed liberally in favor of the national government instrumentality.—Section 133(o) recognizes the basic
principle that local governments cannot tax the national government, which historically merely delegated to
local governments the power to tax. While the 1987 Constitution now includes taxation as one of the powers
of local governments, local governments may only exercise such power “subject to such guidelines and
limitations as the Congress may provide.” When local governments in- voke the power to tax on national
government instrumentalities, such power is construed strictly against local governments. The rule is that a
tax is never presumed and there must be clear language in the law imposing the tax. Any doubt whether a
person, article or activity is taxable is resolved against taxation. This rule applies with greater force when
local governments seek to tax national government instrumentalities. Another rule is that a tax exemption is
strictly construed against the taxpayer claiming the exemption. However, when Congress grants an
exemption to a national government instrumentality from local taxation, such exemption is construed
liberally in favor of the national government instrumentality. As this Court declared in Maceda v. Macaraig, Jr.:
The reason for the rule does not apply in the case of exemptions running to the benefit of the government
itself or its agencies. In such case the practical effect of an exemption is merely to reduce the amount of
money that has to be handled by government in the course of its operations. For these reasons, provisions
granting exemptions to government agencies may be construed liberally, in favor of non tax-liability of such
agencies. There is, moreover, no point in national and local governments taxing each other, unless a sound
and compelling policy requires such transfer of public funds from one government pocket to another.

Same; Same; Taxation; Local Government Code; There is also no reason for local governments to tax national
government instrumentalities for rendering essential public services to inhabitants of local governments, the
only exception being when the legislature clearly intended to tax government instrumentalities for the delivery
of essential services for sound and compelling policy considerations.—There is also no reason for local
governments to tax national government instrumentalities for rendering essential public services to
inhabitants of local governments. The only exception is when the legislature clearly intended to tax government
instrumentalities for the delivery of essential public services for sound and compelling policy considerations.
There must be express language in the law empowering local governments to tax national government
instrumentalities. Any doubt whether such power exists is resolved against local governments.

Manila International Airport Authority; The Airport Lands and Buildings of the MIAA are property of public
dominion and therefore owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines.— The Airport Lands and
Buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion and therefore owned by the State or the Republic of
the Philippines. The Civil Code provides: ARTICLE 419. Property is either of public dominion or of private
ownership. ARTICLE 420. The following things are property of public dominion: (1) Those intended for
public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks,
shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; (2) Those which belong to the State, without being for
public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. (Emphasis
supplied) ARTICLE 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding
article, is patrimonial property. ARTICLE 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for
public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State.

Same; Words and Phrases; The term “ports” in Article 420 (1) of the Civil Code includes seaports and airports—
the MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings constitute a “port” constructed by the State .—No one can dispute that
properties of public dominion mentioned in Article 420 of the Civil Code, like “roads, canals, rivers,
torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,” are owned by the State. The term “ports” includes
seaports and airports. The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings constitute a “port” constructed by the State.
Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings are properties of public dominion
and thus owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines.

Same; Same; The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use because they are used by the public for
international and domestic travel and transportation; The charging of fees to the public does not determine the
character of the property whether it is of public dominion or not.—The Airport Lands and Buildings are
devoted to public use because they are used by the public for international and domestic travel and
transportation. The fact that the MIAA collects terminal fees and other charges from the public does not
remove the character of the Airport Lands and Buildings as properties for public use. The operation by the
government of a tollway does not change the character of the road as one for public use. Someone must pay
for the maintenance of the road, either the public indirectly through the taxes they pay the government, or
only those among the public who actually use the road through the toll fees they pay upon using the road. The
tollway system is even a more efficient and equitable manner of taxing the public for the maintenance of
public roads. The charging of fees to the public does not determine the character of the property whether it is
of public dominion or not. Article 420 of the Civil Code defines property of public dominion as one “intended
for public use.” Even if the government collects toll fees, the road is still “intended for public use” if anyone
can use the road under the same terms and conditions as the rest of the public. The charging of fees, the
limitation on the kind of vehicles that can use the road, the speed restrictions and other conditions for the use
of the road do not affect the public character of the road.

Same; Taxation; User’s Tax; Words and Phrases; The terminal fees MIAA charges passengers, as well as the
landing fees MIAA charges airlines, are often termed user’s tax; A user’s tax is more equitable—a principle of
taxation mandated by the 1987 Constitution.—The terminal fees MIAA charges to passengers, as well as the
landing fees MIAA charges to airlines, constitute the bulk of the income that maintains the operations of
MIAA. The collection of such fees does not change the character of MIAA as an airport for public use. Such fees
are often termed user’s tax. This means taxing those among the public who actually use a public facility
instead of taxing all the public including those who never use the particular public facility. A user’s tax is more
equitable—a principle of taxation mandated in the 1987 Constitution.

Same; The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA, as properties of public dominion, are outside the commerce of
man.— The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are devoted to public use and thus are properties of public
dominion. As properties of public dominion, the Airport Lands and Buildings are outside the
commerce of man. The Court has ruled repeatedly that properties of public dominion are outside the
commerce of man. As early as 1915, this Court already ruled in Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas that properties
devoted to public use are outside the commerce of man, thus: According to article 344 of the Civil Code:
“Property for public use in provinces and in towns comprises the provincial and town roads, the squares,
streets, fountains, and public waters, the promenades, and public works of general service supported by said
towns or provinces.”

Same; Public Auctions; Property of public dominion, being outside the commerce of man, cannot be the subject of
an auction sale; Any encumbrance, levy on execution or auction sale of any property of public dominion is void
for being contrary to public policy.—Again in Espiritu v. Municipal Council, the Court declared that properties
of public dominion are outside the commerce of man: x x x Town plazas are properties of public dominion,
to be devoted to public use and to be made available to the public in general. They are outside the
commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or even leased by the municipality to private parties. While in
case of war or during an emergency, town plazas may be occupied temporarily by private individuals, as was
done and as was tolerated by the Municipality of Pozorrubio, when the emergency has ceased, said temporary
occupation or use must also cease, and the town officials should see to it that the town plazas should ever be
kept open to the public and free from encumbrances or illegal private constructions. (Emphasis supplied) The
Court has also ruled that property of public dominion, being outside the commerce of man, cannot be the
subject of an auction sale. Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to levy,
encumbrance or disposition through public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on execution or auction
sale of any property of public dominion is void for being contrary to public policy. Essential public services
will stop if properties of public dominion are subject to encumbrances, foreclosures and auction sale. This
will happen if the City of Parañ aque can foreclose and compel the auction sale of the 600-hectare runway of
the MIAA for nonpayment of real estate tax.

Same; Unless the President issues a proclamation withdrawing the Airport Lands and Buildings from public use,
these properties remain properties of public dominion and are inalienable.—Before MIAA can encumber the
Airport Lands and Buildings, the President must first withdraw from public use the Airport Lands and
Buildings. Sections 83 and 88 of the Public Land Law or Commonwealth Act No. 141, which “remains to this
day the existing general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other
than timber and mineral lands,” provide: x x x Thus, unless the President issues a proclamation withdrawing
the Airport Lands and Buildings from public use, these properties remain properties of public dominion and
are inalienable. Since the Airport Lands and Buildings are inalienable in their present status as properties of
public dominion, they are not subject to levy on execution or foreclosure sale. As long as the Airport Lands
and Buildings are reserved for public use, their ownership remains with the State or the Republic of the
Philippines.

Same; Trusts; MIAA is merely holding title to the Airport Lands and Buildings in trust for the Republic .—MIAA is
merely holding title to the Airport Lands and Buildings in trust for the Republic. Section 48, Chapter 12, Book
I of the Administrative Code allows instrumentalities like MIAA to hold title to real properties owned by the
Republic. Same; The transfer of the Airport Lands and Buildings from the Bureau of Air Transportation to MIAA
was not meant to transfer beneficial ownership of these assets from the Republic to MIAA—the Republic remains
the beneficial owner of the Airport Lands and Buildings.—The transfer of the Airport Lands and Buildings from
the Bureau of Air Transportation to MIAA was not meant to transfer beneficial ownership of these assets from
the Republic to MIAA. The purpose was merely to reorganize a division in the Bureau of Air Transportation
into a separate and autonomous body. The Republic remains the beneficial owner of the Airport Lands and
Buildings. MIAA itself is owned solely by the Republic. No party claims any ownership rights over MIAA’s
assets adverse to the Republic. The MIAA Charter expressly provides that the Airport Lands and Buildings
“shall not be disposed through sale or through any other mode unless specifically approved by the President of
the Philippines.” This only means that the Republic retained the beneficial ownership of the Airport Lands and
Buildings because under Article 428 of the Civil Code, only the “owner has the right to x x x dispose of a
thing.” Since MIAA cannot dispose of the Airport Lands and Buildings, MIAA does not own the Airport Lands
and Buildings. At any time, the President can transfer back to the Republic title to the Airport Lands and
Buildings without the Republic paying MIAA any consideration. Under Section 3 of the MIAA Charter, the
President is the only one who can authorize the sale or disposition of the Airport Lands and Buildings. This
only confirms that the Airport Lands and Buildings belong to the Republic.

Taxation; Local Government Code; Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code exempts from real estate tax
any “real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines.”—Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code
exempts from real estate tax any “[r]eal property owned by the Republic of the Philippines.” Section 234(a)
provides: SEC. 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax.—The following are exempted from payment of the
real property tax: (a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political
subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise,
to a taxable person; x x x. (Emphasis supplied) This exemption should be read in relation with Section
133(o) of the same Code, which prohibits local governments from imposing “[t]axes, fees or charges of any
kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities x x x.” The real properties owned by the
Republic are titled either in the name of the Republic itself or in the name of agencies or instrumentalities of
the National Government. The Administrative Code allows real property owned by the Republic to be titled in
the name of agencies or instrumentalities of the national government. Such real properties remain owned by
the Republic and continue to be exempt from real estate tax.

Manila International Airport Authority; Local Government Code; The Republic may grant the beneficial use of its
real property to an agency or instrumentality of the national government, an arrangement which does not result
in the loss of the tax exemption; MIAA, as a government instrumental- ity, is not a taxable person under Section
133(o) of the Local Government Code.—The Republic may grant the beneficial use of its real property to an
agency or instrumentality of the national government. This happens when title of the real property is
transferred to an agency or instrumentality even as the Republic remains the owner of the real property. Such
arrangement does not result in the loss of the tax exemption. Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code
states that real property owned by the Republic loses its tax exemption only if the “beneficial use thereof has
been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person.” MIAA, as a government instrumentality, is
not a taxable person under Section 133(o) of the Local Government Code. Thus, even if we assume that the
Republic has granted to MIAA the beneficial use of the Airport Lands and Buildings, such fact does not make
these real properties subject to real estate tax.

Same; Same; Taxation; Portions of the Airport Lands and Buildings that MIAA leases to private entities are not
exempt from real estate tax.—Portions of the Airport Lands and Buildings that MIAA leases to private entities
are not exempt from real estate tax. For example, the land area occupied by hangars that MIAA leases to
private corporations is subject to real estate tax. In such a case, MIAA has granted the beneficial use of such
land area for a consideration to a taxable person and therefore such land area is subject to real estate tax. In
Lung Center of the Philippines v. Quezon City, 433 SCRA 119, 138 (2004), the Court ruled: Accordingly, we
hold that the portions of the land leased to private entities as well as those parts of the hospital leased to
private individuals are not exempt from such taxes. On the other hand, the portions of the land occupied by
the hospital and portions of the hospital used for its patients, whether paying or non-paying, are exempt from
real property taxes.

Same; Taxation; By express mandate of the Local Government Code, local governments cannot impose any kind
of tax on national government instrumentalities like the MIAA.—By express mandate of the Local Government
Code, local governments cannot impose any kind of tax on national government instrumentalities like the
MIAA. Local governments are devoid of power to tax the national government, its agencies and
instrumentalities. The taxing powers of local governments do not extend to the national government, its
agencies and instrumentalities, “[u]nless otherwise provided in this Code” as stated in the saving clause of
Section 133. The saving clause refers to Section 234(a) on the exception to the exemption from real estate tax
of real property owned by the Republic.

Same; Same; The determinative test whether MIAA is exempt from local taxation is not whether MIAA is a
juridical person, but whether it is a national government instrumentality under Section 133(o) of the Local
Government Code.—The minority’s theory violates Section 133(o) of the Local Government Code which
expressly prohibits local governments from imposing any kind of tax on national government
instrumentalities. Section 133(o) does not distinguish between national government instrumentalities with or
without juridical personalities. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Thus,
Section 133(o) applies to all national government instrumentalities, with or without juridical personalities.
The determinative test whether MIAA is exempt from local taxation is not whether MIAA is a juridical person,
but whether it is a national government instrumentality under Section 133(o) of the Local Government Code.
Section 133(o) is the specific provision of law prohibiting local governments from imposing any kind of tax on
the national government, its agencies and instrumentalities.

Taxation; The saving clause in Section 133 of the Local Government Code refers to the exception to the
exemption in Section 234(a) of the Code, which makes the national government subject to real estate tax when it
gives the beneficial use of its real properties to a taxable entity; The exception to the exemption in Section 234(a)
is the only instance when the national government, its agencies and instrumentalities are subject to any kind of
tax by local governments.—The saving clause in Section 133 refers to the exception to the exemption in
Section 234(a) of the Code, which makes the national government subject to real estate tax when it gives the
beneficial use of its real properties to a taxable entity. Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code
provides: SEC. 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax.—The following are exempted from payment of the
real property tax: (a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political
subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise,
to a taxable person. x x x. (Emphasis supplied) Under Section 234(a), real property owned by the Republic is
exempt from real estate tax. The exception to this exemption is when the government gives the beneficial use
of the real property to a taxable entity. The exception to the exemption in Section 234(a) is the only instance
when the national government, its agencies and instrumentalities are subject to any kind of tax by local
governments. The exception to the exemption applies only to real estate tax and not to any other tax. The
justification for the exception to the exemption is that the real property, although owned by the Republic, is
not devoted to public use or public service but devoted to the private gain of a taxable person.

Same; Statutory Construction; When a provision of law grants a power but withholds such power on certain
matters, there is no conflict between the grant of power and the withholding of power. —There is no conflict
whatsoever between Sections 133 and 193 because Section 193 expressly admits its subordination to other
provisions of the Code when Section 193 states “[u]nless otherwise provided in this Code.” By its own words,
Section 193 admits the superiority of other provisions of the Local Government Code that limit the exercise of
the taxing power in Section 193. When a provision of law grants a power but withholds such power on certain
matters, there is no conflict between the grant of power and the withholding of power. The grantee of the
power simply cannot exercise the power on matters withheld from its power.

Same; Words and Phrases; By their very meaning and purpose, the “common limitations” on the taxing power
prevail over the grant or exercise of the taxing power.—Since Section 133 prescribes the “common limitations”
on the taxing powers of local governments, Section 133 logically prevails over Section 193 which grants local
governments such taxing powers. By their very meaning and purpose, the “common limitations” on the taxing
power prevail over the grant or exercise of the taxing power. If the taxing power of local governments in
Section 193 prevails over the limitations on such taxing power in Section 133, then local governments can
impose any kind of tax on the national government, its agencies and instrumentalities—a gross absurdity.

Administrative Law; The Administrative Law is the governing law defining the status and relationship of
government departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities.— The third whereas clause of the
Administrative Code states that the Code “incorporates in a unified document the major structural, functional
and procedural principles and rules of governance.” Thus, the Administrative Code is the governing law
defining the status and relationship of government departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and
instrumentalities. Unless a statute expressly provides for a different status and relationship for a specific
government unit or entity, the provisions of the Administrative Code prevail.

Same; The government-owned or controlled corporations created through special charters are those that meet
the two conditions prescribed in Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution, regarding their creation in the
interest of common good and their being subject to the test of economic viability.—The governmentowned or
controlled corporations created through special charters are those that meet the two conditions prescribed in
Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution. The first condition is that the government-owned or controlled
corporation must be established for the common good. The second condition is that the government-owned or
controlled corporation must meet the test of economic viability. Section 16, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
provides: SEC. 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or
regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or
established by special charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic
viability.

Same; The test of economic viability applies only to government-owned or controlled corporations that perform
economic or commercial activities and need to compete in the market place—government instrumentalities
vested with corporate powers and performing governmental or public functions need not meet the test of
economic viability.—The Constitution expressly authorizes the legislature to create “government-owned or
controlled corporations” through special charters only if these entities are required to meet the twin
conditions of common good and economic viability. In other words, Congress has no power to create
government-owned or controlled corporations with special charters unless they are made to comply with the
two conditions of common good and economic viability. The test of economic viability applies only to
government-owned or controlled corporations that perform economic or commercial activities and need to
compete in the market place. Being essentially economic vehicles of the State for the common good—meaning
for economic development purposes—these government-owned or controlled corporations with special
charters are usually organized as stock corporations just like ordinary private corporations. In contrast,
government instrumentalities vested with corporate powers and performing governmental or public
functions need not meet the test of economic viability. These instrumentalities perform essential public
services for the common good, services that every modern State must provide its citizens. These
instrumentalities need not be economically viable since the government may even subsidize their entire
operations. These instrumentalities are not the “government-owned or controlled corporations” referred to
in Section 16, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

Manila International Airport Authority; Administrative Law; The MIAA need not meet the test of economic
viability because the legislature did not create MIAA to compete in the market place.— The MIAA need not meet
the test of economic viability because the legislature did not create MIAA to compete in the market place.
MIAA does not compete in the market place because there is no competing international airport operated by
the private sector. MIAA performs an essential public service as the primary domestic and international
airport of the Philippines.

Same; Words and Phrases; The terminal fees that MIAA charges every passenger are regulatory or
administrative fees and not income from commercial transactions.—MIAA performs an essential public service
that every modern State must provide its citizens. MIAA derives its revenues principally from the mandatory
fees and charges MIAA imposes on passengers and airlines. The terminal fees that MIAA charges every
passenger are regulatory or administrative fees and not income from commercial transactions.
 9. Dante V. Liban, Reynaldo M. Bernardo And Salvador M. Viari Vs. Richard J. Gordon; Philippine
National Red Cross (Intervenor)
G.R. No. 175352; January 18, 2011

Corporation Law; Philippine National Red Cross; A closer look at the nature of the Philippine National Red Cross
(PNRC) would show that there is none like it not just in terms of structure, but also in terms of history, public
service and official status.—The passage of several laws relating to the PNRC’s corporate existence
notwithstanding the effectivity of the constitutional proscription on the creation of private corporations by
law, is a recognition that the PNRC is not strictly in the nature of a private corporation contemplated by the
aforesaid constitutional ban. A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like it not
just in terms of structure, but also in terms of history, public service and official status accorded to it by the
State and the international community. There is merit in PNRC’s contention that its structure is sui generis.

Same; Same; The sui generis character of Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) requires us to approach
controversies involving the PNRC on a case-to-case basis.—Although it is neither a subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality of the government, nor a government-owned or controlled corporation or a subsidiary
thereof, as succinctly explained in the Decision of July 15, 2009, so much so that respondent, under the
Decision, was correctly allowed to hold his position as Chairman thereof concurrently while he served as a
Senator, such a conclusion does not ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a “private corporation” within the
contemplation of the provision of the Constitution, that must be organized under the Corporation Code. As
correctly mentioned by Justice Roberto A. Abad, the sui generis character of PNRC requires us to approach
controversies involving the PNRC on a case-to-case basis.

Same; Same; The Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) has responded to almost all national disasters since
1947, and is widely known to provide a substantial portion of the country’s blood requirements.—It bears
emphasizing that the PNRC has responded to almost all national disasters since 1947, and is widely known to
provide a substantial portion of the country’s blood requirements. Its humanitarian work is unparalleled. The
Court should not shake its existence to the core in an untimely and drastic manner that would not only have
negative consequences to those who depend on it in times of disaster and armed hostilities but also have
adverse effects on the image of the Philippines in the international community. The sections of the PNRC
Charter that were declared void must therefore stay.
10. Boy Scouts of the Philippines vs Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 177131; June 7, 2011

Corporation Law; Commission on Audit; Boy Scouts of the Philippines; The Boy Scouts of the Philippines (BSP) is
a public corporation and its funds are subject to the Commission on Audit’s (COA’s) audit jurisdiction.—After
looking at the legislative history of its amended charter and carefully studying the applicable laws and the
arguments of both parties, we find that the BSP is a public corporation and its funds are subject to the COA’s
audit jurisdiction.

Same; Same; Same; Boy Scouts of the Philippines (BSP) as presently constituted under Republic Act No. 7278,
falls under the second classification of juridical persons under Article 44 of the Civil Code.—There are three
classes of juridical persons under Article 44 of the Civil Code and the BSP, as presently constituted under
Republic Act No. 7278, falls under the second classification. Article 44 reads: Art. 44. The following are
juridical persons: (1) The State and its political subdivisions; (2) Other corporations, institutions and
entities for public interest or purpose created by law; their personality begins as soon as they have
been constituted according to law; (3) Corporations, partnerships and asso- ciations for private interest
or purpose to which the law grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each
shareholder, partner or member.

Same; Same; Same; The Boy Scouts of the Philippines (BSP) which was created by a special law to serve a public
purpose in pursuit of a constitutional mandate, comes within the class of “public corporations” defined by
paragraph 2, Article 44 of the Civil Code.—Evidently, the BSP, which was created by a special law to serve a
public purpose in pursuit of a constitutional mandate, comes within the class of “public corporations” defined
by paragraph 2, Article 44 of the Civil Code and governed by the law which creates it, pursuant to Article 45 of
the same Code.

Same; Same; Same; The Boy Scouts of the Philippines (BSP) is a public corporation or a government agency or
instrumentality with judicial personality, which does not fall within the constitutional prohibition in Article XII,
Section 16, notwithstanding the amendments to its charter; Not all corporations, which are not government
owned or controlled, are ipso facto to be considered private corporations, as there exists another distinct class of
corporations or chartered institutions which are otherwise known as “public corporations.”—The BSP is a
public corporation or a government agency or instrumentality with juridical personality, which does not fall
within the constitutional prohibition in Article XII, Section 16, notwithstanding the amendments to its
charter. Not all corporations, which are not government owned or controlled, are ipso facto to be considered
private corporations as there exists another distinct class of corporations or chartered institutions which are
otherwise known as “public corporations.” These corporations are treated by law as agencies or
instrumentalities of the government which are not subject to the tests of ownership or control and economic
viability but to different criteria relating to their public purposes/interests or constitutional policies and
objectives and their administrative relationship to the government or any of its Departments or Offices.

Same; Same; Same; The ownership and control test is likewise irrelevant for a public corporation like the Boy
Scouts of the Philippines (BSP).—The ownership and control test is likewise irrelevant for a public corporation
like the BSP. To reiterate, the relationship of the BSP, an attached agency, to the government, through the
DECS, is defined in the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. The BSP meets the minimum statutory
requirement of an attached government agency as the DECS Secretary sits at the BSP Board ex officio, thus
facilitating the policy and program coordination between the BSP and the DECS.
Same; Same; Same; Boy Scouts of the Philippines (BSP) is subject to the exercise by the Commission on Audit
(COA) of its audit jurisdiction in the manner consistent with the provisions of the BSP charter.—Since the BSP,
under its amended charter, continues to be a public corporation or a government instrumentality, we come to
the inevitable conclusion that it is subject to the exercise by the COA of its audit jurisdiction in the manner
consistent with the provisions of the BSP Charter.