Lansang vs garcia R. No. L-33964 and G.R. No. L-33965 and G.R. No.

L-33973

I. Nature

Petitions for writs of Habeas corpus

II. Parties

Lansang, et al, various individuals detained by virtue of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by Marcos,
petitioners

Garcia, Chief of Philippine Constabulary, along with Defense Secretary, et al, respondents

III. Disputed Matter

Constitutionality of proclamation No. 889 suspending the privilege of habeas corpus.

IV. Facts

On 9:00 PM of august 21, 1971, the Liberal Party of the Philippines held a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the
presentation of its candidates in the general elections scheduled for November 8, 1971. Two hand grenades were thrown in the
platform where the candidates and other persons were. 8 persons were killed on the incident, with several others seriously injured.

In relation to the Plaza Miranda Bombing incident, on noontime of August 23, then President Marcos issued Proclamation No.
889.

The Proclamation declared the presence of lawless elements in the country and thus the existence of the state of lawlessness
affecting public safety. Thus, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was suspended for current and subsequent detainees for the
crimes of insurrection or rebellion.

The petitioners were among those arrested and detained without warrant of arrest on reasonable belief that they had participated in
the crime of insurrection or rebellion.

asserting that the lawless elements are actually engaged in an armed insurrection and rebellion to accomplish their purpose.

Proclamation No. 889-A, then rendered the petitioners’ contentions moot and academic. Some of the petitioners’ cases were heard
and the suspension of the writ were lifted in some areas. The Court held a close-door meeting with the respondents’ and
petitioners’ attorneys, and other ranking AFP officials

V. Petitioners’ arguments

The petitioners are assailing the validity of said Proclamation for not being in compliance with Constitutional requirements insofar
as:

it did not declare the existence of actual invasion; insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof; and that

- the actuality so alleged refers to the existence, not of an uprising that constitutes the essence of a rebellion or insurrection, but of
the conspiracy and the intent to rise in arms.

The Constitutional bases of the contentions were:

— Paragraph (14) of section 1, Article III of the Constitution

The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, when the
public safety requires it, in any way of which events the same may be suspended wherever during such period the necessity for
such suspension shall exist.

— Paragraph (2), section 10, Article VII

The President shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, and, whenever it becomes necessary, he may
call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion. In case of invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof when the public safety requires it, he may suspend the privileges of the writ
of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.

VI. Issues and ruling

1. WAS THE DETERMINATION OF THE EXISTENCE OF EXIGENCIES (FACTUAL BASIS) THAT WARRANT THE
SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS BELONG EXCLUSIVELY TO THE
PRESIDENT?

HELD – NO.
Under Art. VII, Sec. 10, par. 2. Two conditions must concur for the valid exercise of the authority to suspend the privilege of the
writ:

— 1) there must be invasion, insurrection, or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, and

— 2) public safety must require the suspension of the privilege.

The grant of power to suspend the privilege is neither absolute nor unqualified. The authority conferred by the Constitution, both
under the Bill of Rights and under the Executive Department, is limited and conditional. The precept in the Bill of Rights
establishes a general rule, as well as an exception thereto. What is more, it postulates the former in the negative, evidently to stress
its importance, by providing that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended . . . .” It is only by way of
exception that it permits the suspension of the privilege in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion — or, under Art. VII of the
Constitution, imminent danger thereof — when the public safety requires it, in any of which events the same may be suspended
wherever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist.

While the Constitution guarantees the freedom of people, it should be exercised within the framework of social order established
by the Constitution. When individual freedom is used to destroy that social order, by means of force and violence — such as by
rising publicly and taking arms against the government to overthrow the same, thereby committing the crime of rebellion —
liberty may be withdraws, though limited, by suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, when public safety requires it.

The Court abandoned its ruling on Barcelon v. Baker and Montenegro v. Castaneda and declared that the Court had authority to
and should inquire into the existence of the factual bases required by the Constitution for the suspension of the privilege of the
writ after hearing the parties on the nature and extent of the inquiry to be undertaken.

Barcelon v. Baker as a precedent was diluted by the following factors (The ruling in Montenegro was based on Barcelon so
basically the same argument):

— 1) It depends on the case of Martin v. Mott which pertains to the President’s power to call to call out the militia to suppress
lawless violence. A power broader than the power to suspend the writ as it can be made despite the absence of invasion,
insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof.

— 2) The privilege was suspended by the Governor-general, a representative of the sovereign. Such is not equivalent with the
President’s exercise of his power, the latter dealing with the freedom of the Filipino people, in whom sovereignty resides, and
from whom all government authority emanates.

2. ARE THE CONDITIONS FOR THE VALID EXERCISE OF THE AUTHORITY TO SUSPEND THE PRIVILEGE OF
THE WRIT PRESENT? IS THERE AN INVASION, INSURRECTION, OR REBELLION OR IMMINENT DANGER
THEREOF?

HELD – YES.

The contention that the size of NPA is too small compared to AFP is irrelevant since from the Constitution’s perspective, the
existence of rebellion need not be widespread or of the magnitude of the civil war.

Jurisprudence attests abundantly to the Communist activities in the Philippines, especially in Manila.

— All Communists believes that their goals can be achieved only through violence;

— There exists a New People’s Army antagonistic to the AFP which is per se a proof of the existence of a rebellion, especially
considering that its establishment was announced publicly by the reorganized CPP.

3. ARE THE CONDITIONS FOR THE VALID EXERCISE OF THE AUTHORITY TO SUSPEND THE PRIVILEGE OF
THE WRIT PRESENT? DOES PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRE THE SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE?

HELD – YES

In case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, the President has, under the Constitution, three (3)
courses of action open to him, namely:

— 1) to call out the armed forces;

— 2) to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and

— 3) to place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.

He had, already, called out the armed forces, which measure, however, proved inadequate to attain the desired result. Of the other
alternatives, the suspension of the privilege is the least harsh.
 PETITIONERS’ CONTENTIONS – PUBLIC COURT’S OPINION
SECURITY DOES NOT REQUIRE THE
SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE BECAUSE
1) there is no rebellion The existence of a rebellion is obvious. See
substantive issue
2) prior to and at the time of the suspension of the The conditions were such that courts of justice no
privilege, the Government was functioning normally, longer functioned, a suspension of the privilege
as were the courts; would have been unnecessary, there being no courts
to issue the writ of habeas corpus. Petitioners’
reliance upon American cases is probably misplaced
as these cases pertain to conviction by military courts
of members of the civilian population charged with
common crimes. Which is manifestly illegal if civil
courts are properly functioning.
3) no untoward incident, confirmatory of an alleged It may have been due precisely to the
July-August Plan, has actually taken place after suspension of the privilege.
August 21, 1971;
4) the President’s alleged apprehension, because of In light of the demonstrations in 1970 and 1971, it
said plan, is non-existent and unjustified; and would have been highly imprudent for the President
to discard the possibility of a resort to terrorism, on a
much bigger scale, under the July-August Plan.
5) the Communist forces in the Philippines are too This is based on the assumption that the AFP has no
small and weak to jeopardize public safety to such other task than to fight the NPA, and that the latter is
extent as to require the suspension of the privilege of the only threat — and a minor one — to our security.
the writ of habeas corpus. Such assumption is manifestly erroneous
The narration of factual circumstances support the conclusion that public safety indeed requires the issuance of the writ. There are
also intels the NPA can make explosives from locally available materials. The President, in possession of these data and upon
proper consultation could not have acted arbitrarily. Granting that he should not have suspended the writ all over the country, the
justification is that he has to be given time to see how the rebellion work, and indeed, the suspension for some parts of the country
was gradually lifted. Further, the suspension is limited for crimes of insurrection or rebellion, not a general one, which the
President could as easily have issued.

4. WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE COURT’S FUNCTION IN PASSING UPON THE VALIDITY OF
PROCLAMATION NO. 889, AS AMENDED?

HELD – DETERMINATION IF THERE HAS BEEN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

The function of the Court is merely to check — not to supplant — the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone
beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act.
The Court determines only whether there is some evidentiary basis for the contested administrative finding; no quantitative
examination of the supporting evidence is undertaken.

The proper standard is not correctness, but arbitrariness.

5. DO PETITIONERS BELONG TO THE CLASS OF PERSONS AS TO WHOM PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS HAS BEEN SUSPENDED?

HELD – YES.

Some of the petitioners were already permanently or temporarily released rendering their petitions moot and academic. Of those
still detained, the Court found that their charges constitute rebellion and subversion both of which are covered by the proclamation
suspending the privilege of the writ. The crimes for which the detained petitioners are held and deprived of their liberty are among
those for which the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has been suspended. Thus their continued detention is justified.

Instead of the Supreme Court or its commissioner taking the evidence, it is best to let preliminary examination be completed, so
that petitioners’ release could be ordered by the CFI, should it find that there is no probable cause against them, or a warrant for
their arrest could be issued, should a probable cause be established against them.

VII. Dispositive position

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered

1. Declaring that the President did not act arbitrarily in issuing Proclamation No. 889, as amended, and that, accordingly, the same
is not unconstitutional;

2. Dismissing the petitions in L-33964, L-33965, L-33982, L-34004, L-34013, L-34039 and L-34265, insofar as petitioners
Teodosio Lansang, Bayani Alcala, Rogelio Arienda, Vicentellao, Juan Carandang, Nemesio E. Prudente, Gerardo Tomas,
Reynaldo Rimando, Filomeno M. de Castro, Barcelisa C. de Castro and Antolin Oreta, Jr. are concerned;

3. The Court of First Instance of Rizal is hereby directed to act with utmost dispatch in conducting the preliminary examination
and/or investigation of the charges for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act filed against herein petitioners Luzvimindo David,
Victor Felipe, Gary Olivar, Angelo de los Reyes, Rodolfo del Rosario and Teresito Sison, and to issue the corresponding warrants
of arrest, if probable cause is found to exist against them, or, otherwise, to order their release; and

4. Should there be undue delay, for any reason whatsoever, either in the completion of the aforementioned preliminary
examination and/or investigation, or in the issuance of the proper orders or resolution in connection therewith, the parties may by
motion seek in these proceedings the proper relief.

5. Without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.