CASE NO.

20
TRANS-PACIFIC INDUSTRIAL SUPPLIES V. CA G.R. NO. 109172, AUGUST 19, 1994

DOCTRINE: Art. 1271. The delivery of a private document evidencing a credit, made voluntarily by the creditor
to the debtor, implies the renunciation of the action which the former had against the latter. “The
presumption created by the Art. 1271 of the Civil Code is not conclusive but merely prima facie. If there be no
evidence to the contrary, the presumption stands. Conversely, the presumption loses its legal efficacy in the
face of proof or evidence to the contrary.”

FACTS
In 1979, petitioner Trans-Pacific applied for and was granted several financial accomodations amounting to
P1,300,000.00 from respondent Associated Bank. The loans were secured by four (4) promissory notes, a real
estate mortgage covering three parcels of land, and a chattel mortgage over petitioner’s stock and inventories.
Petitioner, apparently, cannot pay the obligation in full. Thereafter, petitioner was requested for and was
granted a restructuring of the remaining indebtedness amounting to P1,057,500.00. applying all the penalties
and interests. To secure the loan of P1,213,400.00, three (3) promissory notes1 were executed by petitioner
TransPacific. The mortgaged parcels of land were substituted by another mortgage covering two other parcels
of land and a chattel mortgage on petitioner's stock inventory. According to petitioner, the released parcels of
land were sold for P1,386,614.20, the proceeds of which were turned over to the respondent bank and
applied to the restructured loan of petitioner. Duplicate original copies of the promissory notes were returned
with the stamp: PAID.

1 First promissory note: P1,050,000.00 (working capital); Second: P121,166.00 (restructured interest) Third:
P42,234.00 (restructured interest)

Despite these payments, on December 12, 1985, respondent Associated Bank demanded payment of
P492,100.00 from petitioner, representing accrued interests. It was also argued that the promissory notes
were erroneously released.

Initially, petitioner Trans-Pacific expressed its willingness to pay the amount demanded by the bank. However,
it had a “change of heart” and initiated an action before the RTC of Makati for specific performance and
damages. The RTC ruled in favor of TransPacific but the CA reversed the decision.

ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner has indeed paid in full its obligation to respondent bank
RULING
Respondent court is of the view that being mere “duplicates”, the documents found in possession of Trans-Pacific
cannot be considered as basis for the full payment of the obligation. Accordingly, Article 1271 should be construed as
pertaining to the “original” copy of the document. This argument is groundless. The Supreme Court ruled that, it is
undisputed that the documents presented were duplicate originals. “A duplicate copy of the original may be admitted in
evidence when the original is in the possession of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to
produce it after reasonable notice, as in the case of respondent bank.” However, the petition should still fail. “The
presumption created by the Art. 1271 of the Civil Code is not conclusive but merely prima facie. If there be no evidence
to the contrary, the presumption stands. Conversely, the presumption loses its legal efficacy in the face of proof or
evidence to the contrary.” In the case at bar, despite the delivery of promissory notes, the presumption of full payment
of indebtedness is overcome by the evidence showing that there was still unpaid interests on the part of petitioner, as
seen in the crossexaminations and testimonies. “Article 1271 of the Civil Code raises a presumption, not of payment, but
of the renunciation of the credit where more convincing evidence would be required than what normally would be
called for to prove payment. The rationale for allowing the presumption of renunciation in the delivery of a private
instrument is that, unlike that of a public instrument, there could be just one copy of the evidence of credit. Where
several originals are made out of a private document, the intendment of the law would thus be to refer to the delivery
only of the original original rather than to the original duplicate of which the debtor would normally retain a copy.”
CASE NO. 21
L.M HANDICRAFT MANUFACTURING CORPORATION V. CA G.R. NO. 90047, JUNE18, 1990

FACTS
1. These two petitions originated from an action to collect sums of money with damages filed by Allied
Banking Corporation (Allied) against L.M. Handicraft Manufacturing Corp. (L.M.), Leovigildo Diapo, Jr., Virgilita
Diapo and Leonora Mabasa.
2. The complaint filed by Allied is based on 20 promissory notes executed by L.M and guaranteed by the
three above-named persons which were either not paid or not fully paid despite formal demands.
3. The lower court rendered a Decision favorable to the Allied. The appellate court rendered its Decision
which affirmed the Decision of the lower court with the modification that the stipulated service charge of 2%
per month and penalty charges of 1% per month should be deleted.
4. L.M. argued that the decision of the CA should be reversed on the ground that the CA did not declare
the transactions to be null and void for there was bad faith, fraud, undue influence and breach of trust on the
part of Allied. They also deny their liabilities on the personal guaranties found by the trial court.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE
W/N the promissory notes executed by the parties are valid and enforceable.

RULING
- YES
1. The guaranty agreements which secured the payment of the obligations were freely and intelligently
signed by Leovigildo M. Diapo, Jr., Virgilita M. Diapo and Leonora Q. Mabasa. The allegations of fraud and bad
faith on the part of the Allied Banking Corporation were not substantiated. Petitioners’ defense that the
promissory notes and bank documents that they signed were in blank is far from credible.
2. Leovigildo Diapo, himself, in his letter, offering a settlement of the accountabilities amounting to
P2,498,940.00 thereby effectively made an admission of their outstanding obligation to the Allied Banking
Corporation.
3. Clearly then, petitioners in G.R. No. 90047 have no valid ground to disavow their solidary liability on
the unpaid promissory notes and the continuing guaranty agreements.

DISPOSITION
Petition (GR # 90047) IS dismissed for lack of merit.
CASE NO. 22
PEOPLE VS. GODOY G.R. NOS. 115908-09 DECEMBER 6, 1995

FACTS
This is an automatic review of the decision of the RTC in view of the death sentence imposed upon Danny
Godoy, who was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of rape and kidnapping with serious
illegal detention.

Complainant Mia Taha alleged that Godoy, her Physics Teacher and a married man raped her first on Jan. 21,
1994 in her cousin’s boarding. As Godoy was about to rape her, a knife was pointed at her neck. As such, she
was not able to resist. The next day, Godoy came by their house and asked the permission of her parents if she
can join him in soliciting funds, since Mia was a candidate for Ms. Palawan National School (PNS). Mia’s
parents allowed her to go with Godoy and she was allegedly brought to the Sunset Garden Motel where she
was repeatedly raped again. After three days, they transferred to Edward’s subdivision where she was kept in
a lodging house and was again raped.

During this time, a police blotter had already been placed for the missing Mia. She was later released by Godoy
after a certain Naem interceded and only after her parents agreed to settle the case. It was after Mia’s return
that her parents accompanied her to a medico-legal which found lacerations in her vagina concluding that
“she just had sexual intercourse.” She and her mother Helen went to the police and executed sworn
statements stating that the accused Godoy had raped and abducted Mia.

Godoy denied that he raped Mia Taha. He admitted having had sex with her and that they indeed stayed in
Sunset Gardens and in Edward’s Subdivision, but it was because they were lovers and that Mia had consented
to their having sex. To support his claim that they were lovers, he presented two letters supposedly delivered
to him by Mia’s cousin, Lorna, in the provincial jail while he was detained. There Mia explained that it was her
parents who forced her to testify against him.

The delivery of the letters was denied by Lorna but the defense presented the provincial jail guard on duty on
the supposed dates of the delivery and testified that indeed Lorna had visited Godoy on said dates. Several
witnesses were also presented including two former teachers of Mia who knew the handwriting on the two
said letters as belonging to Mia. Other witnesses were presented by the defense attesting that they saw the
two together in a manner that was affectionate and cordial, prior to the said “kidnapping” and even during
such.

ISSUES
Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused?
Whether or not in rape cases, the complainant's claim of having been threatened can be taken as a matter of
judicial notice?

RULING
The basic rule remains that in all criminal prosecutions without regard to the nature of the defense which the
accused may raise, the burden of proof remains at all times upon the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. If the accused raises a sufficient doubt as to any material element, and the prosecution is
then unable to overcome this evidence, the prosecution has failed to carry its burden of proof of the guilt of
the accused beyond a reasonable doubt and the accused must be acquitted.
No, the prosecution failed to prove guilt of Godoy. The trial court made no serious effort to dispassionately or
impartially consider the totality of the evidence for the prosecution in spite of the teaching in various rulings
that in rape cases, the testimony of the offended party must not be accepted with precipitate credulity. In
finding that the crime of rape was committed, the lower court took into account only that portion of the
testimony of complainant regarding the incident and conveniently deleted the rest. Taken singly, there would
be reason to believe that she was indeed raped. But if we are to consider the other portions of her testimony
concerning the events which transpired thereafter, which unfortunately the court a quo wittingly or
unwittingly failed or declined to appreciate, the actual truth could have been readily exposed.

The Supreme Court acquitted Danny Godoy.

Three guiding principles in the appellate review of the evidence of the prosecution for the crime of rape,
namely: a) while rape is a most detestable crime, it must be borne in mind that it is an accusation easy to be
made, hard to be proved, but harder to be defended by the party accused, though innocent; b) the testimony
of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and c) that the evidence for the prosecution
must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
evidence for the defense.

Mia claimed that the appellant always carried a knife but it was never explained how she was threatened with
the same in such a manner that she was allegedly always cowed into giving in to his innumerable sexual
demands. In taking judicial notice, the Supreme Court said that it is not unaware that in rape cases, the claim
of the complainant of having been threatened appears to be a common testimonial expedient and face-saving
subterfuge. But it had not been duly corroborated by other evidence nor proved that the accused indeed
always carried a knife.

Likewise, complainant testified that appellant raped her through the use of force and intimidation (specifically
by holding a knife to her neck). However, the element of force was not sufficiently established. The physical
facts adverted to by the lower court as corroborative of the prosecution's theory on the use of force are
undoubtedly the medico-legal findings of Dr. Rogelio Divinagracia. Upon closer scrutiny, however, we find that
said findings neither support nor confirm the charge that rape was so committed through forcible means by
appellant against complainant on January 21, 1994. (Dr. Divinagracia further testified that he could not say
that there was force applied because there were no scratches or bruises, but only a week-old laceration).
While the "sweetheart theory" does not often gain favor with this Court, such is not always the case if the
hard fact is that the accused and the supposed victim are, in truth, intimately related except that, as is usual in
most cases, either the relationship is illicit or the victim's parents are against it. It is not improbable that in
some instances, when the relationship is uncovered, the alleged victim or her parents for that matter would
rather take the risk of instituting a criminal action in the hope that the court would take the cudgels for them
than for the woman to admit to her own acts of indiscretion. And this, as the records reveal, is precisely what
happened to appellant.
Appellant's claim that he and complainant were lovers is fortified by the highly credible testimonies of several
witnesses for the defense
The SC also takes judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas (such as in Palawan) young ladies are strictly
required to act with circumspection and prudence. Great caution is observed so that their reputations shall
remain untainted. Any breath of scandal which brings dishonor to their character humiliates their entire
families. It could precisely be that complainant’s mother wanted to save face in the community where
everybody knows everybody else, and in an effort to conceal her daughter’s indiscretion and escape wagging
tongues of their small rural community, she had to weave the scenario of this rape drama.