 Judicial review, it has been said, has developed "even as the Common Law itself, gradually, from

case to case, in response to the pressures of particular situations, the teachings of experience,
the guidance of ideal and general principles, and the influence of legis?lation". It has developed
in the hands of the Courts, which have the power of final interpretation of statutory laws, and a
concomitant power to provide judge-made remedies where the statutes are silent.
 The function of judicial review is to act as "a check against excess of power in derogation of
private right", yet judicial review cannot supervise all administrative adjudications, for it exists
to check, not to supplant them. Accordingly, if on a point of law, the administration has adopted
a construction, which is a possible one, the Court will support the action. On a point of
procedure, the essential duty is to secure fairness, for Court procedure is not the only fair
procedure, N but minimum standards are necessary. On a point of evidence, it is only when the
case proves to be one of "no evidence" that the Courts will be entitled to intervene, and as to
the conclusions reached by the administration, the Courts will respect them if all other
conditions are satisfied, just as they respect the judg?ments of the Courts subordinate to
themselves.
 The conditions of the exercise of judicial review ordinarily are that the petitioner should have
locus standi to pursue the 'hatter, that an adversary position should have developed, i.e., that
conflicting legal stand points have been taken so that justiciable issues are raised, that the
action within the administration should be final, and that the law itself must not indicate that
the public interest requires that it should be operated exclusively within the administrative
sphere. It may be stated here that all these conditions are satisfied in the present case. I am
indebted for the above propositions pertaining to judicial review to a United States Government
Paper, viz. the Report of the Attorney-General's Committee on Administrative Procedure in
Governmental Agencies 1951).
 Judicial review is not necessarily based upon the rule of "due process" as incorporated in the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. I am aware that in
the Jibendra Kishore's case (P L D 1957 S C (Pak.) 9 at p. 31) this Court has observed: "our
Constitution does not use and could not have used the due process of law clause in
guaranteeing primary rights in the sense in which that clause has been interpreted by the
Supreme Court of the United States ??..It is thus obvious that in determining the
constitutionality or otherwise of statutes in Pakistan, we cannot have that approach to the
question because there is no provision in our Constitution which is capable of such a flexible
meaning as the `due process of law' part of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments." I would
prefer to base such reliance as is required for the purposes of my argument, on the necessity of
"due process", upon the fact that it is an element of justice which forms an essential part of
British Common Law, deriving' from Royal Statutes of date as far back as 1351 A.D. The subject
has been dealt with in Willoughby's Commentary on the Constitution of the United States, 1929,
Volume III, page 1681, where it is shown that in those early statutes from which the Common
Law has developed the expression "due process of law" was deemed to be synonymous with the
expression "the law of the land". One of those statutes explained the expression "due process of
law" as meaning "by indictment or presentment of good and lawful men where such deeds be
done or by writ- - original of the common law", in other words by proper trial. In a Statute of
1355 it was said that : "No man of what state or condition soever he be, shall be put out of his
lands, or tenements, nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor indicted, nor put to death, without he be
brought into answer by due process of law." The emphasis of the words "brought into answer"
is impressive. In an earlier Statute of 1351, a similar expression was used to express the
condition under which the citizen might be arrested or deprived of his franchises, viz., "unless he
be fully brought in to answer and forejudged of the same by the Courts of the law". As I will
presently show, these principles are in active operation through the British Courts of Justice, but
here I continue with the statement of the discussion in Willoughby's book above cited. The
learned writer declares that wherever constitutional rights were involved, the United States
Supreme Court has always upheld the power of judicial review by fresh appraisement of
evidence as well as law, while at the same time giving due weight to administrative findings that
have been reached after hearing and receipt of evidence. But where no constitutional right was
involved, judicial review has been confined to the record of the hearing and evidence before the
agency and to determination whether there was excess of power.