Untitled

China’s Economic and Political Presence in
the Middle East and South Asia
This book explores a range of key issues connected to China’s relations with
countries in the Middle East and South Asia. It discusses economic and political
connections, and projects that have arisen as part of China’s Belt and Road
Initiative. It covers both important countries in the Middle East, and also
Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan. It examines current contentious
issues including Iranian sanctions and the war in Syria, and assesses the roles
of other powers such as Russia, Turkey and Israel insofar as they affect
China’s relationships. Overall, the book presents many new perspectives on
the subject, with most representing the view from the countries of the Middle
East and South Asia.
Mehran Haghirian is a PhD Candidate at the Gulf Studies Program in Qatar

University and Director of Regional Initiatives at the Bourse & Bazaar
Foundation.
Luciano Zaccara is a Research Associate Professor at the Gulf Studies Center

in Qatar University.
Durham Modern Middle East and Islamic World Series
Series Editor: Anoushiravan Ehteshami, University of Durham
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By Alexey Vasiliev
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Relations with Azerbaijan and Armenia
By Marzieh Kouhi-Esfahani
How China’s Rise is Changing the Middle East

By Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Niv Horesh
Iran’s Regional Relations

A History from Antiquity to the Islamic Republic
Seyed Mohammad Houshisadat
Limited Statehood and Informal Governance in the Middle East and Africa
Edited by Ruth Hanau Santini, Abel Polese and Rob Kevlihan
Constituting the Political Economy of the Kurds

Social Embeddedness, Hegemony, and Identity
Omer Tekdemir
Reimagining Arab Political Identity

Justice, Women’s Rights, and the Arab State
Salam Hawa
China’s Economic and Political Presence in the Middle East and South Asia
Edited by Mehran Haghirian and Luciano Zaccara
For a full list of available titles please visit: https://www.routledge.com/Durham

Modern-Middle-East-and-Islamic-World-Series/book-series/SE0526
China’s Economic and Political
Presence in the Middle East and
South Asia
Edited by
Mehran Haghirian and Luciano Zaccara
First published 2023
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DOI: 10.4324/9781003269175
Typeset in Times New Roman

by Taylor & Francis Books
Contents
List of illustrations vii

List of contributors ix
1 Introduction 1
LUCIANO ZACCARA AND MEHRAN HAGHIRIAN
2 China in the Middle East and North Africa: An Empirical

Inquiry on China’s Expansion towards the West 5
AMIN MOHSENI-CHERAGHLOU AND HAMED VAFAEI
3 The Sino–Iranian Relationship: A Role Theory Approach to a

Non-Western Great Power-Middle Power Partnership 35
JACOPO SCITA
4 Iran’s ‘Eastward Turn’ in a Turning World: Reassessing Sanctions

as a Driver of China-Iran Trade 57
ESFANDYAR BATMANGHELIDJ
5 China’s Foreign Policy in the Middle East and the Position of the
GCC States 74
VORACHAI ISRASENA-PICHITKANJANAKUL
6 Strategic Transformations of China’s Relations with GCC States:

From a Unidimensional Relationship to a Multilayered
Partnership 98
ÜMIT ALPEREN
7 The Emerging Security Role of Turkey and China in the Middle

East: Avoiding a Possible Clash in the Future 120
ALI BAKIR
vi Contents
8 China’s Role in Post-War Syria: Does it Strengthen or Undermine
the Sino–Russian Cooperation? 145
LUKACS KRAJCSIR
9 The Israel Factor in the Dynamic Relations between China and

the Islamic World 168
ZHIQUN ZHU
10 China’s Security Cooperation with Bangladesh and Pakistan in

the Context of ‘Belt and Road Initiative’: Implications for Indian
Ocean Geopolitics 188
NOOR MOHAMMAD SARKER
11 China’s Changing Posture towards Afghanistan: A New Classical

Realist Explanation 216
SEHAR SABIR
Index 238
Illustrations
Figures
2.1 Chinese Oil Imports from Top 15 Country, 2018 (%) 7
2.2 Bilateral Trade between China and the U.S. with Individual
MENA Economies, 2018 (Billions USD) 8
2.3 MENA Trade Flows with China and the U.S., 1992–2018
(Billions USD) 9
2.4 Chinese Investment by Region and Different Periods of Time
(Millions USD) 14
2.5 Chinese Investment Around the Globe, 2005-2018 (Millions
USD) 15
2.6 Growth Rate of Chinese Investment (%) 15
2.7 Chinese Investment in the MENA Countries between 2005–
2018 (Millions USD) 17
2.8 Share of Chinese Investment in Each Sector between 2005–
2018 (% Total 2005–2018) 18
2.9 China’s GDP Growth Rate, 1983–2019 (%) 18
2.10 Chinese Investment in MENA by Sector between 2005–2018
(%) 19
2.11 Share of Top Three Sectors in Chinese MENA Investments,
2005–2018 (%) 20
2.12 Number of MENA Countries with Chinese Investment in the
Sector 21
2.13 BRI Related Investment around the World, 2005–2018
(Millions USD) 22
10.1 China–Bangladesh and China–Pakistan Win-Win Strategic
Cooperation in the Indian Ocean, with a Focus on BRI 200
viii List of illustrations

Tables
2.1 Chinese Investment by Region and Year, 2005–2018 (Millions
USD) 29
2.2 Chinese Investment in the MENA Countries, 2005–2018
(Millions USD) 30
2.3 Chinese Investment by Region and Sector (Millions USD) 31
2.4 Chinese Investment in the Energy Sector by Region and Year,
2005–2018 (Millions USD) 32
2.5 Chinese Investments in MENA Countries Between 2005–2018
by Country and Sector (Millions USD) 33
2.6 T-test Comparison between BRI-Related vs. Non-BRI Related
Investments, 2014–2018 34
2.7 T-test Comparison between BRI-Related vs. Non-BRI Related
Investments, 2014–2018 34
2.8 Regional Distribution of the Number of Non-BRI and BRI
related Investments, 2014–2018 34
4.1 Chinese trade with Iran under sanctions (USD thousands) 59
4.2 Proportion of SITC7 exports to sum of three partners (China,
USA, EU28) 61
4.3 Ratio of Chinese to EU28 SITC7 exports 63
Contributors
Ali Bakir is a Research Assistant Professor at the Ibn Khaldon Center for
Humanities and Social Sciences in Qatar University, Qatar.
Esfandyar Batmanghelidj is the Founder and CEO of the Bourse & Bazaar
Foundation, United Kingdom.
Mehran Haghirian is a PhD Candidate at the Gulf Studies Program in Qatar
University, Qatar, and Director of Regional Initiatives at the Bourse &
Bazaar Foundation, United Kingdom. Previously, he was a researcher in
and Assistant Director at the Ibn Khaldon Center for Humanities and
Social Sciences in Qatar University.
Lukács Krajcsír is a Research Fellow at Historical Archives of the Hungarian
State Security, Hungary.
Amin Mohseni-Cheraghlou is an Assistant Professor at American University,
Washington, D.C.
Vorachai Israsena-Pichitkanjanakul is a PhD Student at the Gulf Studies
Program in Qatar University, Qatar.
Sehar Sabir is an Assistant Professor at the Department of International Rela
tions in the Islamia University of Bahawalpur Pakistan.
Noor Mohammad Sarker is a Research Fellow at Bangladesh Institute of Law
and International Affairs, Bangladesh.
Jacopo Scita is H.H. Sheikh Nasser al-Mohammad al-Sabah Doctoral Fellow
at the School of Government and International Affairs (SGIA) in Durham
University, United Kingdom.
Hamed Vafaei is an Assistant Professor of Chinese Language and Literature
at the University of Tehran, Iran.
Luciano Zaccara is a Research Associate Professor at the Gulf Studies Center
in Qatar University, Qatar.
x List of contributors
Zhiqun Zhu is Professor of Political Science and International Relations at
Bucknell University, Pennsylvania.
Ümit Alperen is an Assistant Professor at the Süleyman Demirel University,
Turkey.
1 Introduction
Luciano Zaccara and Mehran Haghirian
Introduction
‘China’s Economic and Political Presence in the Middle East and South
Asia’ is a project that was established by the Ibn Khaldon Center for
Humanities and Social Sciences at Qatar University to assess the trajectory
of China’s presence in these regions considering various regional and inter
national challenges. This edited volume is the result of widely circulated call
for abstracts that was released in the Fall of 2019. The abstracts were
assessed and selected by blind peer reviewers, and the chosen ones, among
the 40 submitted, were carefully edited and reviewed before their inclusion
in the final manuscript submitted to Routledge for publication in the
Durham Modern Middle East series. The resulting volume has brought
together a selection of case studies and quality contributions submitted by
renown scholars and experts.
This book assesses China’s economic and political presence in the Middle
East and South Asia with a particular focus on Beijing’s relations with the
member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates – Iran, Turkey, Syria,
Bangladesh, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Israel. At the heart of all of China’s
interactions with these countries lies the ever-important aspect of economic
relations. Understanding China’s investments in and trade relations with these
countries are topics that are assessed in each chapter of this book. While the
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is mentioned as an important factor in China’s
bilateral relations in all the chapters included in this volume, this book did
not focus on this initiative as the spinal cord of China’s relations with these
countries. Instead, this volume focuses on the different aspects that con
tributed to consolidating and expanding relations between China and the
countries under consideration in this book. In other words, while the BRI is
considered as a major factor in the expansion of ties with Beijing, every
chapter tracks back to the origins of relations that predate the establishment
of the BRI. Moreover, every contribution was written by experts in the field
of International Relations, either from the political or economic perspective,
with a special emphasis on Middle East studies or Chinese foreign policy. The
DOI: 10.4324/9781003269175-1
2 Luciano Zaccara and Mehran Haghirian
end result is a combination of ten scholarly approaches to the topic that
enrich the ongoing debate and discussions on the future of China’s presence
in the Middle East and South Asia.
The second chapter of the book is by Amin Mohseni-Cheraghlou and
Hamed Vafaei under the title: “China in the Middle East and North Africa:
An Empirical Inquiry on China’s Expansion Towards the West.” The authors
use various sources of empirical data to examine China’s evolving relations
with countries in the Middle East and North Africa region, with a particular
focus on the period between 2005 and 2018. Mohseni-Cheraghlou and Vafaei
shed light on the myriad of Chinese investments around the region and spell
out the growing challenges Beijing will likely face in the coming decade. To
continue benefitting from the increased economic engagements, this chapter
argues that China will be forced to take a more active role on the geopolitical
dynamic of the region. Mohseni-Cheraghlou is an Assistant Professor at
American University in Washington, D.C., and Vafaei is an Assistant Professor
of Chinese Language and Literature at the University of Tehran in Iran.
Chapter 3, “The Sino–Iranian Relationship: A Role Theory Approach to a
non-Western Great Power-Middle Power Partnership,” is by Jacopo Scita, a
Doctoral Fellow at Durham University’s School of Government and Interna
tional Affairs in the United Kingdom. As the first chapter that looks at China’s
bilateral relationships, Scita discusses the limits of strictly structuralist theore
tical frameworks in explaining Sino–Iranian relations. He uses Role Theory to
identify the non-Western identity of both China and Iran as the driver for their
‘Great Power-Middle Power’ partnership. The following chapter by Esfandyar
Batmanghelidj also looks at China’s relations with Iran. Under the title, “Iran’s
‘Eastward Turn’ in a Turning World: Reassessing Sanctions as a Driver of
China–Iran Trade,” Batmanghelidj argues that while economic activity between
Iran and China increased in the period in which Iran was under sanctions, par
ticularly 2008–2016, this seeming expansion of bilateral relations with Iran was
in line with China’s growing share of global high-tech manufacturing and
industrial exports. Batmanghelidj is the Founder and CEO of the Bourse &
Bazaar Foundation in the United Kingdom.
In his chapter, “China’s Foreign Policy in the Middle East and the Position
of the GCC States,” Vorachai Israsena Pichitkanjanakul looks at China’s
relations with the six GCC states. While China has largely remained unin
volved in the geopolitical conflicts in the Persian Gulf region, he argues that
China will most likely find herself struggling to maintain its good relations
without deeper engagements as the political and security dynamics of the
region shift. Moreover, the fifth chapter attempts to identify the extent of the
importance of the GCC states to Chinese foreign policy in the region, how
significant is the import of oil as a driver of Chinese foreign policy in the
region, and the way economic interest lies at the heart of China’s approach to
international relations. Pichitkanjanakul is a PhD. Student at Qatar Uni
versity’s Gulf Studies Program in Qatar. Chapter 6 is also dedicated to asses
sing China’s relations with the GCC states. Ümit Alperen’s chapter on the
Introduction 3
“Strategic Transformations of China’s Relations with GCC States: From A
Unidimensional Relationship to A Multilayered Partnership,” assesses the
importance of the Persian Gulf region in China’s foreign policy. He argues that
with the US decreasing its presence in the region, China appears as an ideal
candidate to tame some of the GCC states’ security woes. Alperen is an Assistant
Professor at the Süleyman Demirel University in Turkey.
The next three chapters look at the China’s engagement with external
players in the region. Particularly, Chapter 7 looks at the Chinese–Turkish
political, security and economic dynamics in the Middle East, Chapter 8 is on
Chinese–Russian cooperation and competition in post-war Syria, and Chap
ter 9 looks at the consequences of Chinese–Israeli relations on Beijing’s
Middle East policy. Ali Bakir’s chapter on “The Emerging Security Role of
Turkey and China in the Middle East: Avoiding a Possible Clash in the
Future,” presents an argument that China’s security-related engagements in
the region have negatively impacted Turkey and has the potential to lead to a
conflict between the two countries. In addition, this chapter underlines the
importance of Turkey’s “Middle Corridor” project to China’s BRI and
reflects on how Beijing’s economic rise can affect Ankara. Bakir is a Research
Assistant Professor at Qatar University’s Ibn Khaldon Center for Humanities
and Social Sciences, Qatar.
Chapter 8 is by Lukács Krajcsír under the title, “China and Russia in
Post-War Syria: Cooperation or Competition?” He argues that “unlike
Moscow, Beijing’s most important goal in its Middle East policy is not
the survival of local ally regimes”. Rather, the stability of the region as a
whole is paramount for China’s regional trade and investment under the
BRI. As such, while the two countries are politically aligned, particularly
at the United Nations Security Council, the two countries are competing
for economic gains around Syria. Krajcsír is a Research Fellow at His
torical Archives of the Hungarian State Security in Hungary. The ninth
chapter analyses “The Israel Factor in the Dynamic Relations between
China and the Islamic World.” Zhiqun Zhu, who is a Professor of Political
Science and International Relations at Bucknell University in Pennsylva
nia, argues that China’s relations with both the Islamic world and Israel
are “strong but are based on different historical contexts and geopolitical
considerations” (p. 170). In his chapter, Zhu writes that China’s expanding
relations with Israel have not overshadowed its relations with countries in
the Islamic world and provides the rationale and strategies of Beijing’s
expanding engagements with, and growing investments in, Israel.
To delve into understanding China’s relations with countries elsewhere in
Asia, Chapter 10 analyzes China’s relations with Bangladesh and Pakistan
comparatively and Chapter 11 looks at Beijing’s approach towards Afghani
stan. Noor Mohammad Sarker’s chapter is under the title, “China–Bangla
desh and China–Pakistan Security Cooperation in the Context of the ‘Belt
and Road Initiative’ and its Implications to the Contemporary Indian Ocean
Geopolitics.” Since Pakistan and Bangladesh are actively involved in China’s
4 Luciano Zaccara and Mehran Haghirian
BRI, he explains the linkages between China–Bangladesh and China–Paki
stan security cooperations and shows how these security arrangements work
in tandem to “ensure an effective balance of power in the Indian Ocean.”
Sarker is a Research Fellow at Bangladesh Institute of Law and International
Affairs in Bangladesh. The final chapter of the book is by Sehar Sabir, an
Assistant Professor at the Islamia University of Bahawalpur’s Department of
International Relations in Pakistan. Chapter 11 looks at “China’s Changing
posture towards Afghanistan: An insight from Neo Classical Realism.” She
argues that with the US withdrawal and the rise of Taliban, China has an
opportunity to fill the power vacuum. Nevertheless, its security considerations
collide with its economic interests and Beijing will be forced to manage the
threats emanating from the Taliban before deepening its engagements in
Afghanistan.
These 10 chapters enhance our understanding of the nature of China’s
presence in the Middle East and South Asia and help us navigate the drivers
behind its political and economic engagements with the six GCC states, Iran,
Turkey, Syria, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Israel. Moreover, the
objective of this edited volume is to provide in-depth analyses and assess
ments that complement the existing literature on China’s foreign policy, as
well as on the foreign policies of the countries under consideration.
2 China in the Middle East and North
Africa
An Empirical Inquiry on China’s Expansion
towards the West
Amin Mohseni-Cheraghlou and Hamed Vafaei
Introduction
Writing in 1993 Lillian Craig Harris observed that “for China, economic power,
not armed conflict, had become the most important factor in the struggle to gain
national independence, power, and status” (Harris 1993, 177). Fast-forwarding
more than a quarter of a century, one can only attest to the accuracy of this
claim. In the past three decades, not only China has not been directly or indir
ectly involved in any armed conflict, but it has also managed to play the role of
an intermediator and power broker alongside other major global powers while at
the same time successfully expanding its economic reach and influence. Harris
was not, however, oblivious to the fact the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) region is important to China beyond the attractive markets for Chinese
goods and services and the massive energy resources:
The age-old primary reason for Chinese interest in the Middle East [is
that] the region is a buffer between China and the West The Middle East,
although not as a next-door neighbor of Communist China, is sig
nificantly related to it because of its unique geographical position. The
political trends of the countries in the Persian Gulf in particular have
much to do with the security of the Chinese mainland in its south and
southwestern border.
(Ibid.)
According to Harris, for China to achieve its “rightful international place,” it

must acquire wealth and power through strengthening its ties, mainly eco
nomic ties, with as many developing countries as possible, and the countries
in the MENA region have always been a high priority in that respect.1 As a
result, Beijing is ever more eager to pursue the “xiang xi kai fang” approach
or, rather, the “development and expansion toward the West” strategy.
Moreover, China has been careful to approach the countries in the region in a
delicate balance of not favoring one over the other.
While the literature on the relationship of China and MENA is quite rich
and developed, empirical studies are scarce. It is the purpose of this study to
DOI: 10.4324/9781003269175-2
6 Amin Mohseni-Cheraghlou and Hamed Vafaei
address the weakness in the existing literature and provide an empirical ana
lysis on the relationship of China and the MENA region as a whole and some
of its main economic considerations. The first part of the chapter suggests an
analytical framework within which the China–MENA relationship is exam
ined. In the second part, the chapter presents an empirical discussion on the
investment activities of Chinese entities (private or public) in the MENA
region, covering the period from 2005 through 2018. The third section
examines the challenges facing China–MENA relations and offers some
insights on what the future might hold. It is important to note that in this
chapter, Israel is excluded from references to MENA and relevant analyses.
China–MENA Relations: An Analytical Framework

From the middle ages, the MENA region has remained a strategic region for
sovereign states in pursuit of global reach and dominance. Zbigniew Brze
zinski’s The Grand Chessboard drives this point home that access to and
control of the MENA region alongside Central Asia is a necessary ingredient
to ensure American primacy in the global political-economic dynamics. The
same is true for China, a rising economic, political, and military power in
today’s transitioning international order. One can safely argue that MENA is
important for China far more than it is for the U.S. for four main reasons:
MENA’s massive energy reserves, its strategic geographical location, its large,
young, and untapped markets, as well as its religious influence on the large
Chinese Muslim minority community in Western China, toward which Beij
ing has serious concerns of possible radicalization and separatists’ inclina
tions. Therefore, while the relationship between the U.S. and the MENA can
be analyzed from economic, political, and security dimensions, Sino–MENA
relations have added cultural, ethnic, and religious dimensions. Moreover, the
declining role of the U.S. as the sole provider of security in the MENA region
and the rapidly rising role of Russia in this capacity, has prompted China to
reconsider its once low-profile influence in the region in political and security
domains.
Economics
The MENA region is important to China’s economy for two main reasons:
first, MENA is home to the largest known energy reserves in the world. In
terms of crude oil, by end of 2018, 52% of world’s proven oil reserves are in
this region with Saudi Arabia leading at 17% of global reserves followed by
Iran and Iraq at 9% and 8.5% respectively (BP 2019, 14). In terms of natural
gas, again as of end of 2018, 42% of world’s proven natural gas reserves are
located in this region with Iran at 16.2% of global reserves followed by Qatar
at 12.5% (BP 2019, 30). Put differently, the world’s second largest oil reserves
(Saudi Arabia following Venezuela very closely) and the world’s second and
third largest gas reserves (Iran and Qatar following Russia) are in the MENA
China in the Middle East and North Africa 7
region and specifically in the Persian Gulf region. As a result, the MENA
region plays a crucial role in global energy markets and in the economies of
most countries around the world, including that of China. In fact, in 2018,
more than 45% of Chinese crude oil imports were sourced from the MENA
region (Figure 2.1). In term of natural gas imports, although most of the
Chinese import of this commodity is sourced through pipelines from Turk
menistan and Uzbekistan and LNG from Australia, the MENA region is still
responsible for around 19% of Chinese LNG imports or 11.3% of total Chi
nese natural gas imports (BP 2019, 40–41). It will be shown in the next part
of this chapter that China’s investment in the MENA region has mainly been
directed towards its energy sector, accounting for about half of all Chinese
investment in this region between 2005–2018.
The second reason behind MENA’s economic importance to China is its
large untapped markets and young population. MENA is home to around
400 million people with about one-third aged between 15 and 29. By 2050,
MENA’s population is expected to double that of the year 2000. Therefore,
for the next few decades, MENA’s population is expected to continue to grow
and get younger. This constitutes a large market for Chinese goods and ser
vices now and in the foreseeable future as the young population in MENA
establish their own families and households in the next few decades. In 2017
alone, China exported $124.6 billion worth of goods to MENA, more than
45% of which were in consumer goods.
It is very important to note here that while the U.S. was far ahead of China
in its trade with the MENA region (in energy and other sectors), the global
financial crisis of 2007–2009 significantly changed the story and reversed this
trend. As seen in Figure 2.2, the difference between U.S.–MENA trade with
that of China–MENA grew continuously from $37.5 billion in 1992 to $62.3
18%
15.8%
16%
14%
12.4%
12%
10.4%
10%
9.4%
8%
7.2% 6.8%
6.3%
6%
5.0%
4% 2.9% 2.8% 2.8% 2.7%
2.1% 2.0% 2.0%
2%
0%
Figure 2.1 Chinese Oil Imports from Top 15 Country, 2018 (%)
Source: IMF’s Direction of Trade database and Authors’ Calculation
$70
$60
$50
$40
$30
$20
$10
$0
2018 Bilateral Trade with China (Billions USD)

2018 Bilateral Trade with the U.S. (Billions USD)
Figure 2.2 Bilateral Trade between China and the U.S. with Individual MENA
Economies, 2018 (Billions USD)
Source: World Bank’s World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) Database and
Authors’ Calculation
billion in 2006. In other words, while trade of both countries with MENA
increased between 1992 to 2006, this growth was higher in the case of the U.S.
in absolute terms. With the onset of the global financial crisis of 2007–2009,
this difference started to decline for three consecutive years. Eventually in
2010, China–MENA trade overtook that of the U.S.–MENA, and the gap
between China and U.S. trade with MENA grew rapidly to a peak of $110.2
billion in 2014. As of 2018, this difference was $132 billion. To look at this
data differently, total trade between China and MENA grew by 214% after
the global financial crisis, while the total U.S.–MENA trade only increased by
5%. This points to the fact that China was able to take great advantage of the
weakening U.S. economy at home and abroad during the recession and
immediately filled the gap in trade with the MENA region that was created
by the shocks to the U.S. economy. Finally, as of 2018, China has been ahead
of the U.S. in bilateral trades with all individual MENA economies, except
that of Bahrain and Jordan. This lead ranges from $319 million in the case of
Morocco to as much as $37, $17, $14, and $12 billion in the cases of Iran,
UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Oman, respectively (Figure 2.3).
The region’s geography and transport network are also important to the
Chinese economy. For example, roughly 40% of China’s oil and gas imports
has to go through the Strait of Hormuz. Moreover, China’s exports to Europe
relies heavily on the Suez Canal. It is estimated that around “60% of Chinese
exports travel through the Suez Canal” (Dorsey 2017, 7). Hence, China’s
investments in Suez ports have been significant. In 2008, COSCO Pacific,
China’s largest shipping state owned enterprise, invested $185.6 million in a
joint venture to operate and manage the Suez Canal Container Terminal
(SCCT) in Port Said East Port, located in the western Sinai Peninsula at the
$350
$300
$250
$200
$150
$100
$50
$0
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
China-MENA Trade (Billions USD) U.S.-MENA Trade (Billions USD)
Figure 2.3 MENA Trade Flows with China and the U.S., 1992–2018 (Billions USD)
Source: World Bank’s World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) Database and
Authors’ Calculation
northern end of the Canal (Scott 2014, 1). For this port’s second development
phase, operating since 2012, state-owned China Harbor Engineering Com
pany (CHEC) invested $219 million to construct a 1,200-meter quay. CHEC
also completed a contract valued at US$ 1 billion to construct a quay in Al-
Adabiya port at the southern entrance to the Canal (Scott 2014, 1). The
importance of the Suez Canal and other transport routes is shown in the next
part of this chapter where we explain that about 20% of all Chinese invest
ment in the MENA region has been directed towards the transport sector.
Moreover, China’s rapid economic growth over the past two decades, while still
maintaining its autocratic political structure, has enhanced China’s soft power
among the rulers in the region who are searching for governance and economic
models that would provide them with more legitimacy amongst their people.
One Belt, One Road Initiative or in short Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is
the most recent and ambitious example of China’s active efforts to promote
its unique model for economic development and management at the global
level. BRI, or the 21st century Silk Road as it is also called, is an interna
tional development project at a massive scale of more than 1,700 infra
structure projects and investment worth more than $1 trillion in 70 countries
in Asia, Europe, and Africa. With a targeted completion date of 2049, BRI
was first announced by Xi Jinping in 2013, when visiting Indonesia and
Kazakhstan. While the Chinese government views the initiative as a win-win
scenario for all entities involved and as “a bid to enhance regional con
nectivity and embrace a brighter future” (The State Council 2015), many
critics see the project as a push for Beijing to increase its dominance in global
affairs through enhancing Chinese-centric international economic relations.
Through BRI, China is striving to achieve three objectives. First, it hopes
to contribute to the growth of the economies of trading partners, which will
in turn boost demand for its exports. Second, “by establishing a land route for
its wares, it would also seek to rebalance its economy from the port cities on
its east coast, towards its more deprived Western and Southern provinces”
(Dusek and Kairouz 2017, 1). China’s interest in the development of its
Western provinces might have to do with checking the rising religious and
ethnic tensions with Uighur and Turkic Muslim populations who mainly
reside in Western China. Third, a land trade route would reduce Beijing’s
total dependence on the Strait of Malacca for its trade, through which an
estimated 80% of China’s oil imports flow. Rising tensions in the South China
sea has increased the risk of maritime blockade, which if happened, would be
devastating to China’s economy. “At the heart of three continents, the
MENA region would therefore constitute an indispensable element of that
strategy” (Dusek and Kairouz 2017, 1).
It is important to realize here that from a purely economic perspective,
there would have been no need for BRI. China could have easily entered
bilateral agreements with each individual country included in the BRI to
develop the necessary infrastructure envisioned in the BRI. In other words,
China could have achieved the same economic objectives without introducing
an overarching BRI and the associated Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
(AIIB). Therefore, in addition to being a grand economic and international
investment endeavor, BRI is also a marketing strategy through which Beijing
is promoting the image of China as a global leader who can bring together
more than 100 countries in East Asia, South Asia, Middle East, Europe, and
Africa around a common economic and trade project devised and led by
China. While BRI is an ambitious and forward-looking economic project,
Ehteshami (2018) argues, it comes with immense reputational consequences
for China. Arguably, BRI can either make or break China for decades to
come. If successful, BRI will be an indisputable evidence for China’s capacity
as a global leader. An unsuccessful BRI, on the other hand, will provide
strong support for the case of the Washington against Beijing in that China is
not yet ready to lead the global economy and lacks the capacity, trust
worthiness, the management and leadership skills to address the everyday
challenges facing the world.
The cornerstone of the Chinese approach to economic investment and
development is the notion that improving living standards will increase stabi
lity and security in a given region or country which will ultimately benefit
China (Niblock 2014). Therefore, Beijing views policies that promote eco
nomic inclusion and prosperity as the key for reducing the frequency of costly
conflicts in the MENA region. This, by extension, will contribute to Chinese
economy, prosperity, and stability, as it will safeguard Chinese investment in
the region, reduce the cost of energy, and make the transport of Chinese
goods through the region cheaper and more secure. In contrast to the West,
“which sees terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and
other great powers seeking political and military dominance in the Middle
East as national security threats, China prioritizes protection of its economic,
trade, and energy interests” (Dorsey 2017, 8) in MENA and elsewhere.
Politics and Security

The most important consideration for China in its MENA relationships is
powers external to the region, namely the U.S. and, in recent years, Russia.
As Dorsey argues, “China’s formulation of a policy towards the region is
complicated by the fact that it occurs at a time that the US and China are
adjusting to one another in a world in which China is on the rise” (Dorsey
2017, 2). Beijing’s political and security involvement in the MENA region has
been lagging far behind rapid expansion of its economic ties to the region. In
the past two decades, there have been many opportunities for China to get
directly involved in MENA’s turbulent political and security landscape.
However, Beijing has been intentionally avoiding a direct involvement and
has instead preferred for the U.S. and Russia, to be the external players in the
political and security dynamics of the MENA region. This does not mean
that China has been absent from such issue in MENA, rather, it has not taken
strong unilateral stances and has often made it known “what it is against, but
rarely what it is for” (Shambaugh 2013, 7).
This strategy of China to remain somewhat passive to the political and
security developments in the MENA region is clearly visible in the way it has
approached the two main political and security challenges of the MENA
region in the past decade: the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program as well
as the conflict in Syria. In both cases, China has exercised its influence on the
multinational stage, for example, in the form of using its veto power in the
United Nations Security Council, however, it has largely avoided to take
unilateral stances and actions.
The important question is how China–U.S. and also China–Russia rela
tionships in the MENA region will evolve. Without any doubt, as a rising
power, China is in pursuit of more global influence. However, Chinese leaders
are well aware of their limited capacity in delivering satisfactory outcomes in
the political and security fronts in MENA and elsewhere in the world. As a
result, China has not seriously challenged the U.S. presence and involvement
in the security dynamics of the region. This is mainly because, as a rising
global power, China’s long-term interest lies in avoiding any form of explicit
or implicit security and armed conflicts. This, in turn, requires China not to
align itself with one power in the region against another. In his 2015 lecture
titled “One Belt and One Road, Asia’s Stability and Prosperity” Ambassador
Wu explains that “if China aligned with others there would be a new cold
war. It would create enemies. China today does not need enemies, but we need
partners…China benefits a lot from the current world order…China will
never rock the boat” (Wu 2015). To extrapolate from Wu’s observation, con
sidering the highly unstable and turbulent political and security environment
of MENA, attempting to replace the U.S. in the region would be a grave
mistake for China and the Chinese leaders are, as stated earlier, very well
aware of the immense costs of such a mistake.
The Chinese strategy has been to strategically cooperate with all countries
in the MENA region as well as work with traditional and rising external
powers in the region. This means that while China is not creating any direct
challenge to the dominance of the U.S. and a rising Russian influence in the
region, Beijing is actively looking for small, but strategic opportunities, to fill
in the gap or become more present if and when the U.S. and Russia are
absent or idle. It was shown above that China was able to quickly and
strongly fill in the trade gap with MENA which was created by the weakening
of the U.S. economy during the 2007–2009 recession in the U.S. This waiting
strategy has also been driven by the fact that in recent years Beijing has
sensed a slowly declining interest and capacity on the part of Washington
with regard to the security and political dynamics in the MENA region.
One can expect that China’s involvement in the politics and security of the
MENA region will gradually evolve, driven by the rising demands from the
region, instead of China attempting to explicitly challenge the current U.S.
dominated hegemony in the region. “While realizing that they are likely to
remain dependent on the U.S. regional defense umbrella,” the Persian Gulf
States have begun to look “towards Asia, and China specifically, as a power
that can at least partially compensate for growing doubts about U.S. relia
bility” (Dorsey 2017, 3).
Historical, Ethnic, and Cultural

For Beijing, MENA is more than a strategic region in international political
and economic considerations.
A further driver of Chinese policy towards the MENA is mounting concern

that jihadist groups like IS could fuel unrest among Uighurs, a Turkic-
speaking people that has long felt culturally more akin to the region’s Turkic
trading partners than to the majority Han Chinese and Hui Muslims.
(Dorsey 2017, 11)
This is one reason Zhu Weilie argues that in its relationship with countries
in MENA or the wider Muslim world, Beijing might want to consider
including religious diplomacy on its agenda. While many experts of interna
tional relations might argue that religion should not be a factor in the making
of foreign policy, Zhu’s suggestion is crucial in promoting and strengthening
China–MENA relations if one considers that “China’s heavy-handed policies
towards its predominantly Muslim Uighur population in Xinjiang could hurt
its relations with the Middle East” (Chen 2011, 5). For example, Beijing’s
handling of the Xinjiang riots in July of 2009, while largely ignored by Arab
rulers of the region, outraged Turkey’s Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan who
labeled the crackdown ‘a kind of genocide’ and raised criticisms from senior
clerics in Iran. More recently, while the reports of the Chinese suppression of
its minority Muslim communities in Western China and the existence of
concentration and forced labor camps housing thousands of Uighurs2 have
drawn sharp criticisms from some scholars and the general public in the
MENA region, government officials in the region have largely remained
oblivious to and ignored these reports in their relations with China.
China in its cultural and ethnic ties with the MENA region is attempting to
address the threats of “three evils of terrorism, separatism, and extremism”
(Scobell 2018, 17) in its own territories. Therefore, through strengthening
ethnic and cultural ties with the MENA region, Beijing is hoping to improve
its relations with China’s Muslim population while at the same time gain the
implicit or explicit approval of Muslim rulers towards the treatment Chinese
Muslims receive from Beijing.
The Analytical Framework of China–MENA Relations

The relations between China and countries in the MENA region is one of stra
tegic mutual dependence. For its continued rapid economic growth, China needs
a secure access to MENA’s energy resources. MENA’s strategic location in Wes
tern Asia also proves to be essential to China’s economic growth and stability. In
addition, the presence of large Muslim communities in Western China and the
increasing tensions between these populations and Beijing, has put ethnic, cul
tural, and religious diplomacy with the MENA region a priority in Beijing’s
foreign policy agenda. On the other hand, MENA enjoys being the region that
provides most of China’s energy needs and attracting significant sums of Chinese
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in its energy, transport, and real estate sectors.
MENA rulers are keen to benefit from the U.S.–China rivalry in the region,
however, China is not yet at the point at which it is willing or able to clearly
articulate its strategic interests or intentions in the MENA beyond its drive to
secure resources, investments and to expand its influence through economic
cooperation and its “One Belt, One Road Initiative” (Dorsey 2017, 4). To this
date, China’s non-interference strategy in MENA’s security and political
dynamics, as well as its preference to allow the U.S. and Russia to be the
main players in those domains, have benefited China significantly. China has
used its non-interference position to enhance its economics relationship with
all MENA economies in parallel to each other.
The next section will provide novel data and statistics on the nature of
China’s economic involvement in the MENA region as a whole and with
individual MENA economies. Nonetheless, sensing a declining U.S. interest
and capacity in recent years in MENA’s security and political fronts, both the
Chinese leadership and the rulers in the MENA region are envisioning a
slowly growing role for China in the security and political fronts in the region.
Data and Analysis
Economics, trade, and energy are the most important aspects of China–MENA
relations, especially so in the past three decades during which China’s economy
has been experiencing rapid growth rates. Chinese FDI in the MENA region is
an important dimension of China’s economic strategy in this region. Hence, this
section of the chapter will provide a detailed evidence-based discussion of
China–MENA relations based on novel data gathered from the American
Enterprise Institute’s China Global Investment Tracker project.
Chinese FDI: A Global and MENA Overview

Chinese investments have been on a continuous rise over the past two dec
ades, growing from $19 billion in 2005 to $197 billion in 2018 – a whopping
10-fold increase (Table A2.1 and Figure 2.4). All regions of the world have
been hosts to such investments, with varying degrees. (Table A2.1 and Figure
2.5). For example, even countries in MENA ranked as only the fifth region in
total Chinese investments between 2005–2018 (Table A2.1),3 they have been
the most attractive destination for Chinese investments in the 2015–2018
period (Figure 2.6). During this time, overall global Chinese investments
declined by 4%, with some region such as Central Asia experiencing a decline
of as much as 52%. However, Chinese investments in Europe (+25%), Latin
America and the Caribbean region (+44%), and especially the MENA region
(+137%) recorded positive growth (Figure 2.6). Writing on this issue, Afshin
Molavi observes that the MENA region
50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
0
Central EAP Europe LAC MENA North South Asia SSA
Asia America
2007 2012 2018
Figure 2.4 Chinese Investment by Region and Different Periods of Time

Note: EAP is the East Asia and the Pacific region, MENA is the Middle East and
North Africa region, LAC is Latin America and the Caribbean region, SSA is the
Sub-Saharan Africa region.
Source: AEI’s China Global Investment Tracker and Authors’ Calculations
$3,00,000
$2,50,000
$2,00,000
$1,50,000
$1,00,000
$50,000
$0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Figure 2.5 Chinese Investment Around the Globe, 2005–2018 (Millions USD)
800%
700%
600%
500%
400%
300%
200% 137%
100% 44%
25%
-52% -40% -17% -9% -27% -4%
0%
Central EAP Europe MENA North LAC South SSA World
-100%
Asia America Asia
-200%
Growth 2007-2012
Growth 2012-2015 Growth 2015-2018
Figure 2.6 Growth Rate of Chinese Investment (%)
still lags behind both East Asia and sub-Saharan Africa regions as a
whole since the launch of BRI in 2013 and dating back to 2005, but the
three-year surge has brought it in closer proximity to the top of the table.
(Molavi 2019, 2)
That could mean, according to Molavi, “a windfall for Chinese state-owned
construction companies as the majority of MENA projects involve construction,
rather than foreign direct investment” (Molavi 2019, 2).
Some might immediately think that the increase of Chinese investments in
the MENA region is mainly due to increased Chinese economic activities in
Iran after the JCPOA. Iran is only part of the increase. Table A2.2 shows that
as Chinese investments and construction projects in Iran shifted into a high
gear in the post-JCPOA era, Beijing also increased its economic activities in
other countries who are also considered Iran’s main rivals in the region,
nominally, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt. “Despite a recent setback,
Chinese state-owned enterprises will likely play a prominent role in Egypt’s
ambitious infrastructure program, including the building of a new, gleaming
capital city just outside Cairo,” as Molavi observes (Molavi 2019, 3). He fur
ther writes that, “Chinese enterprises announced a new $3.4 billion investment
to build a trade hub for Chinese goods in Dubai’s Jebel Ali Port, as well as a
manufacturing and processing hub for animal and agricultural products for the
food industry” (Molavi 2019, 3).
This simultaneous increase in Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt
could be because of two principal reasons. First, it could point to Beijing’s
efforts in keeping its relationships with strategic MENA economies in a
balance to avoid sending signals that they prefer one country over another.
As a result, with the opportunity of increasing their economic ties with Iran,
China also found it necessary to ramp up their economic activities with
other countries in the region. This is in line with the idea presented earlier
that China, today, is eager to have as many partners and as few enemies as
possible (Wu 2015). Second, from the Chinese perspective, the JCPOA
increased hopes for, and shifted the odds towards, a more stable and peace
ful MENA. In other words, during its short-lived implementation between
2016 and 2018, the JCPOA reduced the odds of conflict between Iran and
the U.S. over Iran’s nuclear activities, therefore reducing the risks and
increasing the returns of economic activities in the region as a whole. This,
in turn, provided the motivation for Beijing to increase its economic pre
sence in the region by 137% between 2015 and 2018, which was mainly
driven by new massive Chinese investments in the UAE (974% increase),
Egypt (384% increase), Iran (316% increase), Iraq (173% increase), and
Saudi Arabia (134% increase).
Also, it is important to note that keeping a balance between large and strategic
economies in MENA has been a long-standing policy of China and, impor
tantly, it is not only limited to the post-JCPOA era. As shown in Figure 2.7,
amongst the MENA countries, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iran, Egypt, Algeria, and
Iraq are the top six destination of Chinese investment in the MENA region
which attracted a comparable level of Chinese investments in the 2005–2018
period (i.e. 16%, 14%, 13%, 12%, 11%, and 10% of all Chinese investment in the
MENA region, respectively).
40,000
35,000
30,000
25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
Figure 2.7 Chinese Investment in the MENA Countries between 2005–2018 (Millions
USD)
Sectoral Breakdown of Chinese Investments Globally

Table A2.3 provides some initial insights on the sectors in which China has been
most eager to invest in the past decades. As seen in Table A2.3 and Figure 2.8,
the energy sector has attracted more than 36% of all Chinese investments
between 2005 and 2018, and it is by far the leading sector for Chinese invest
ments abroad. The transport, real estate, and metals sectors follow the energy
sector by a large gap, each attracting 18.4%, 9.5%, and 9.1% share of total
worldwide Chinese investments in 2005–2018. This clearly shows that the energy
sector is of immense strategic importance for Beijing. Understandably so, due to
the fact that having secure and dependable access to energy (mainly oil and gas,
as well as coal) is the cornerstone of any developing economy, let alone China’s
economy which has been registering double digits or high single digit growth
rates for most of the period in the past three decades (Figure 2.9).
When it comes to the energy sector, Beijing has diversified its investment
across all regions of the world. As seen in Table A2.4, Chinese investment in the
energy sector is highly linked to East Asia and the Pacific regions (20.3%) with
MENA, Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as Latin America and the Caribbean fol
lowing with shares of 14.7%, 14.2%, and 13.6%, respectively. However, it is
important to note that while MENA’s share in Chinese energy investment
declined significantly during the pre-JCPOA era (with the exception of 2013),
this region has attracted an increasing share of Beijing’s worldwide investment in
this sector after the JCPOA where investments grew from a low share of 5.8% in
2015 to a whopping share of 27.5% in 2018 (Table A2.4). This finding is in line
with those presented in Figure 2.6 and Table A2.2, where it was shown that
40%
36.1%
35%
30%
25%
20% 18.4%
15%
9.5% 9.1%
10%
4.9% 4.1% 4.0%
5% 2.9% 2.6% 2.3% 2.0%
1.5% 1.4% 1.2%
0%
Figure 2.8 Share of Chinese Investment in Each Sector between 2005–2018 (% Total
2005–2018)
16%
14%
12%
10%
8%
6%
4%
2%
0%
Figure 2.9 China’s GDP Growth Rate, 1983–2019 (%)
Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators and Authors’ Calculation
Chinese investments in the MENA region and especially in Iran, Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, and UAE have increased since 2015.
It is also interesting, but not surprising, at all to see that the energy sector,
attracting about half of all 2005–2018 Chinese investments in the MENA region,
is by far the most attractive sector in this region for Chinese firms (Figure 10).
These investments have been mainly in the form of exploration and production
projects, which is not the case for the U.S. As Chen argues, “the United States
and China, as the world’s first- and second-largest consumers of energy, share a
vital interest in stable and secure energy sources in the Middle East” (Chen 2011,
6). However, “they hold different approaches toward achieving their goal of
energy security: The United States has sought to bolster the reliability of the
international energy market, while China prefers acquiring equity stakes in
energy exploration and production projects” (Ibid.).
Clearly, such an approach is increasing China’s stakes in the region, as
Chinese technology, capital, and personnel are moving into MENA for oil
exploration and production purposes.
As stated earlier, energy is not the only sector that has attracted Chinese
investment in the region. MENA’s transport and real estate sectors have also
been targets of significant Chinese investments (Figure 2.10). These two sec
tors, alongside the energy sector, have been attracting more than 80% of all
Chinese investment in the MENA region during most years between 2005
and 2018, with the share of the energy sector growing significantly since 2015,
going from 34% to 54% in 2018 (Figure 2.11). While, the importance of
MENA’s energy sector is clear, it is important to note that MENA’s transport
industry is crucial to Chinese economy due to MENA’s geographic link
between East Asia and European markets. For example, 60% of Chinese
exports are transported through the Suez Canal alone and more than 40% of
all of China’s energy imports go through the Strait of Hormuz. As a result, it
is not surprising to see Chinese interest in MENA’s transport industry, which
is mainly maritime-related for now. The recent blockage of the Suez Canal for
several days in March 2021 and its serious ripple effects on the global econ
omy, provides strong support for more investments in the development and
50% 47%
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
19%
20%
15%
15%
10%
6% 4%
5% 3% 2% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
0%
Figure 2.10 Chinese Investment in MENA by Sector between 2005–2018 (%)

80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Share of Energy (%) Share of Real Estate (%) Share of Transport (%)
Figure 2.11 Share of Top Three Sectors in Chinese MENA Investments, 2005–2018
(%)
expansion of this crucial maritime global trade bottleneck, further justifying

Chinese investment in the Suez Canal.
China’s interest in MENA’s real estate sector stems from the fact that an
estimate of four million new housing units are needed in the next two dec
ades to address MENA’s growing demand. This strong housing demand is
fueled by three reinforcing dynamics. First, MENA’s population is growing
rapidly and, as a result, it is getting younger. Second, culturally, marriage is
still the only venue to establish long-term relationships and families in all
MENA countries. Third, more and more young couples want to be inde
pendent from their parents and frown upon living with parents after mar
riage. This in turn is driven by the modern family culture and also rapid
urbanization rates in the past half-a-century and smaller size of dwelling
units in the urban areas.4
Table A2.5 shows the distribution of Chinese investment across different
sectors in various countries in the MENA region. Table A2.5 and Figure 2.12
support the argument made earlier that Chinese investment has a particular
focus on Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Algeria, as China has
invested in many sectors in these countries. Moreover, energy, real estate, and
transport are the most attractive sectors for Chinese investment in the MENA
region. Finance, tourism, and technology have been the least popular sectors
in the MENA region with respect to attracting Chinese investment.
In return for Chinese massive investments in MENA’s energy, transport and
real estate sectors, especially in the past four years, China has been increasing its
reach and securing its access to oil and gas resources. Furthermore, China has
become a major player in the region’s energy industry, forcing the traditional
16
14 14
14
12
12
10
8 7 7
6 5 5
4
4 3 3
2 2 2
2 1
Figure 2.12 Number of MENA Countries with Chinese Investment in the Sector
American and Western European firms to share their presence in this region with
China. For Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iran, and Kuwait, the top destination for oil
exports is China. According to the statistics from IMF’s Direction of Trade
database, the UAE exports three times more oil to China than to the United
States. For Kuwait and Qatar, the gap is even larger, with nearly eight times and
nine times more exported to China than to the United States, respectively. This is
because while China’s appetite for imported oil and natural gas is continuously
on the rise, the U.S. reliance on MENA’s energy resources has been decreasing as
the U.S. is becoming more energy independent over the past decades. Given that
its energy and economic lifeline are heavily dependent on its relationship with
individual MENA countries, China is acting judiciously in keeping a fine bal
ance between rivaling powers in the region.
MENA and the BRI

Since the inception of the BRI in 2013, China has been channeling many of its
international investments through the BRI initiative. For example, Chinese BRI-
related investments have totaled $613 billion between 2014 and 2018, while the
non-BRI related investments summed to about $492 billion in the same period.
Namely, in the two years after the announcement of the BRI (i.e. in 2014 and
2015) BRI-related investments valued 113% and 76% more than non-BRI rela
ted investments, respectively (Figure 2.13). The main reason behind this shift is
to strengthen the BRI initiative and ensure its success as a Chinese model for
international development and cooperation. However, it must be noted, in
the post-BRI era (i.e. 2014–2018), while BRI-related investments were in
larger quantity (1,097 BRI vs. 709 non-BRI), each BRI-related project was
$1,60,000
$1,40,000
$1,20,000
$1,00,000
$80,000
$60,000
$40,000
$20,000
$0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Non-BRI Related Investments BRI Related Investments
Figure 2.13 BRI Related Investment around the World, 2005–2018 (Millions USD)
on average $134 million smaller in value than non-BRI projects and this dif
ference was statistically significant at less than 5% level (Table A2.6). This
finding, however, is not true for all regions and seems to be driven by mainly
by Europe where Chinese non-BRI investment are significantly larger than
other investments (Table A2.7). While, in Europe, the BRI-related investment
are on average 60% smaller in value than non-BRI ones, for the MENA and
South Asia the reverse is true (Table A2.7). This shows the centrality of these
two regions in the success of broader BRI initiative, especially South Asia
where BRI-related investments are more than twice the non-BRI ones.
Finally, there is certainly a geographic bias regarding BRI vs. non-BRI
investments, with Central Asia, East Asia and the Pacific, MENA, South
Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa having a significantly larger number of BRI-
related investments than non-BRI related (Table A2.8).
The Future of China–MENA Relationship

While economic, trade, and energy have been the cornerstone of China’s
relations with countries in the MENA region, in recent years, political,
security as well as ethnic and cultural dimensions of this relationship have
also gained considerable importance. “West Asia has become an extension of
China’s neighborhood,” writes Chen and continues
China’s major strategic target is to maintain sub-regional peace, partici

pate in the process to solve hotspot issues there, ensure energy security,
enhance economic and trade links, and develop its relations with relevant
states and organizations in a balanced and all-round way.
(Chen 2012, 2)
However, both China and MENA countries are aware of the fact that
strengthening of their economic, political, and cultural ties might alarm and
in fact upset the U.S. with regard to the decline of its hegemony and the rise
of China in the MENA region. Therefore, as Dorsey puts it,
they are careful not to provoke the U.S. to a point at which it would
consider playing games with the flow of oil from the region, something
both believe has entered the realm of the possible as a result of America’s
sharply reduced dependence on Gulf production.
(Dorsey 2017, 4–5)
In addition to various ways of disrupting the flow of oil from MENA to

China, one can imagine the U.S. employing legal actions and economic
sanctions as other tactics to increase the cost of interactions between China
and countries in the MENA region. The recent U.S. legal activities against
Chinese tech companies and high-profile individuals, because of Huawei’s
involvement with Iran for example, are part of the actions taken by the U.S.
to create hurdles in the path of Chinese activities in Iran. Another example is
the recent sanctions of China’s Shipping Tankers (Dalian Co.) by Washing
ton, because of, again, U.S. unilateral sanctions against Iran.5 One can ana
lyze these events as examples of increasing U.S. tensions with China in the
MENA region, which is fueled by China’s increasingly important role in the
region. It must be noted here that such measure by the U.S. against increasing
China–Iran ties can easily be replicated for other MENA countries if and
when Washington decides to unilaterally sanction China or any of the MENA
countries on the basis of human rights violations, sponsoring terrorism, mis
sile or proliferation-related matters, or any other reason.
Moving forward, as China’s economic interests in the region deepens, one
can expect for the U.S. to grow more hostile towards China. As such, Dorsey
argues that “remaining aloof may however be easier said than done as China’s
economic stake in the region increases and conflicts in the Middle East and
North Africa escalate and potentially spill out of the region and closer to
home” (Dorsey 2017, 3). As a result, China’s military role in the region has
been increasing, but very slowly and only in the form of exporting military
equipment (less than 5% of the total imports by the region)6 and security con
tractors for the time being. This is because China is careful not to upset the
security dynamics of the region and not take sides in political conflicts.
However, this position may not be sustainable as Chinese involvement and

influence in the Middle East grows…. Middle Eastern governments may wish
to start using this, among other things, as a bargaining chip to gain Chinese
support for certain political issues. Amr Musa alluded to such a possibility
when he stated, “If you protect my interests, I will protect yours. If you take a
position that does not reflect that will, I will take a similar position”.
(Chen 2011, 5–6)
As Liu (2014) warns, China needs to play a more active role regarding the
MENA region’s political and security dynamics.
The deep political changes in the Middle East, the restructuring of the
regional system and the strategy adjustment of the U.S., Europe and
other Great Powers…suggests that it is urgent for China to work out a
mid-term and long-term diplomatic strategy toward the Middle East and
corresponding mechanism and measures.
(Liu 2014, 115)
Increasing aid to the region and increasing Beijing’s active role in mediating
disputes in the region, Liu argues, should be the component of such a strategy
(Liu 2014). China’s 2020 proposal for peace and security in the Persian Gulf
region is the most recent attempt of Beijing to take a more active role in this front.
Another challenge facing China is that while MENA’s oil industries have bene
fited much from Chinese investments and trade, other non-technical businesses in
the region (such as textile, consumer goods, and crafts) have suffered significantly
because of massive imports from China. As a result, while China is being wel
comed in the region’s oil, transport, and construction sectors, there is a growing
resistance against Chinese imports in consumer goods which constitutes 45% of all
Chinese exports to the region. For example, one can sense the increasing negative
sentiments against Chinese goods in Iran. The import of inexpensive Chinese con
sumer and capital goods have created serious challenges for domestic manufactur
ing in Iran, exacerbating high unemployment rates in the country. As a result,
China needs to find a new balance in its economic relationship with countries in the
MENA region and be considerate toward their domestic manufacturing sectors.
Moreover, considering high unemployment rates in most of the MENA
economies, there is a growing resentments toward the Chinese workers among
the people of the region because, instead of using local labor, Chinese firms
often bring their own labor from China to work on projects in the MENA
countries. Facing the growing resentment in the regions towards Chinese
workers in MENA, in recent years China has realized
that populating its investments in the region with Chinese workers rather
than helping to create jobs by employing local labor was fueling resent
ment. If one makes money in a country, one has to give some of it back.
We learnt that in Libya…. German companies only had a German head.
There were more jobs for locals. We paid attention and are doing better.
(Guang 2015)
In the next few decades, it is expected that China’s demand for oil will not
increase as fast as its demand for natural gas. This is mainly because around 80%
of oil is used in the transportation and electricity generation industries. However,
as the automotive industry is moving toward electric and battery powered cars
and power plants are shifting rapidly toward cleaner natural gas, the demand for
oil will sooner or later start to decline. The declining demand for oil will be
substituted for increasing demand for natural gas, as the cleaner source for gen
erating electricity that will power the future of transportation around the world.
In the past three decades, the share of natural gas in China’s energy mix has
increased from 2% in 1990 to over 10% in 2016 (mainly replacing coal), while the
share of oil has remained more or less constant around 20%. As coal-powered
plants in China are phased out and replaced by the much cleaner, natural, gas-
powered plants, the share of natural gas in China’s energy mix is only expected
to rise. At the same time, with China, E.U., and the U.S. being the largest pro
ducers of electric vehicles in the world, the demand for oil will certainly plateau.
By the end of 2020 there were around 11 million electric vehicles (EVs) on the
roads in the world, with China accounting for 46% of them, followed by the E.U.
at 30% of world’s total, and the U.S. at about 16%. The global number of EVs
grew by more than 129% between 2019 and 2020 and an astonishing rate of
54,900% between 2010 and 2020.7 Therefore, one can expect a relative decline in
the strategic importance of Saudi Arabia and other oil exporting countries in the
MENA region’s political and economic dynamics, and conversely expect a rela
tive rise in the strategic importance of gas exporting countries, such as Qatar.
This will certainly create political challenges in the MENA region as the world’s
largest economic units such as China, the E.U., and Japan, because of their
growing need for natural gas, would find themselves forced to realign their stra
tegic alliances in the region.
An issue that can create potential bumps in the future of China–MENA rela
tions is China’s treatment of its minority Muslim population, especially the
Turkic Uighur community. However, governments in the MENA region have
largely remained silent to Beijing’s mistreatment and suppression of its minority
Muslim communities in its Western Provinces. This silence was expected as the
economies in the MENA region rely heavily on China for their energy exports as
well as imports of Chinese goods, services and technology. As shown above,
China imports around 50% of its crude oil (Figure 2.1) and 11% of natural gas
from the MENA region and has dominated trade with MENA, overtaking the
U.S. in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2007–2009 (Figure 2.2). The
importance of China to the countries in the MENA region, and vice-versa, is
only going to increase as China takes on a more active role in the region’s
security, military, and political dynamics, particularly in the face of a declining
American role in the region. As a result, moving into the future, Beijing’s treat
ment of its Muslim minority groups will become an even lesser important issue
for MENA governments, especially if China is able to present these minority
groups as extremists and separatists with a potential link to international terror
ist organizations such as the so-called Islamic State and Al-Qaeda.
Conclusion
In the face of increasing dependence on the MENA region’s energy resources
and the military dominance of the U.S. in this region, China has taken the
route of economic interdependence and has not been militarily involved.
China has used this strategy to benefit from its ties with MENA economies.
As a result, while China has reduced its investments in other regions, its
investments in the MENA region have been on the rise, particularly since
2015. The empirical discussion above points to the fact that China’s economic
dominance in the region as well as its dependence on the region will define
China’s relationship with MENA countries in the foreseeable future. Specifi
cally, this chapter highlighted the Chinese growing interest for investment in
the MENA region since 2015 and its relatively declining interest elsewhere in
the world. Moreover, the chapter argues that the attractiveness of MENA’s
energy, transport, and real estate sectors along with efforts of Beijing to keep
a balance between major economies of the region when it comes to investing
in these economies are major aspects of what shapes the relations between
China and most of the countries in the MENA region. In addition, an
increase in the number of BRI-related investments in the region as well as the
success of China in overtaking the U.S. in trade with the MENA region in the
aftermath of the 2007–2009 financial crisis are factors that have further
facilitated China’s presence in this region.
These findings are in line with Xi Jinping’s lecture on June of 2014
wherein he defines Beijing’s relationship with MENA economies based on a
“1+2+3” model. In this model “1” refers to the foundation of the relation
ships between China and MENA which is energy. Number “2” refers to the
“two arms” through which this strategic relationship can be expanded. One
wing is infrastructural development in the MENA and the other is increas
ing trade ties. Number “3” in the model refers to “three new frontiers of
cooperation” between countries in the MENA region and China which are
renewable energies, aerospace, and exploration for and development of new
oil and gas fields in the region. In the same speech, Xi Jinping reiterated
that trade flows between China and the MENA region should be strength
ened and increased by two folds (from around $300 billion now to $600
billion) in the next decade.
At the end, while economic and energy considerations are the main drivers
in China–MENA relations, China can find itself pulled into MENA’s security
and political dynamics in the face of a growing decline of U.S. interests and
hegemony in the region.
Notes
1 Harris (1993, 183).
2 For example, “Rights experts concerned about alleged detention, forced labour of
Uyghurs in China.” United Nations. March 29, 2021: https://news.un.org/en/story/
2021/03/1088612.
3 According to Table A2.1, total Chinese investment regional rankings are as follows:
1. EAP (19.6%), 2. Europe (19.5%), 3. SSA (15.8%), 4. North America (12.3%), 5.
MENA (11.3%), 6. LAC (9.3%), 7. South Asia (6.8%), and 8. Central Asia (5.4%).
4 See Hassler (2011) for more on the housing dynamics of the MENA region.
5 See Cheong, Chakraborty, and Cho (2019).
6 See Degang (2018).
7 See IEA (2020).
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Table A2.1 Chinese Investment by Region and Year, 2005–2018 (Millions USD)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Total % of
Appendix: Tables
(2005– Total
2018) (2005–
2018)
Central Asia 4,500 8,020 2,660 1,060 8,530 5,550 5,940 10,850 12,010 14,100 10,430 3,940 11,460 5,040 104,090 5.4%
EAP 2,500 6,490 6,700 28,650 20,800 22,640 27,090 25,660 23,720 30,240 52,560 41,890 55,540 31,700 376,180 19.6%
Europe 100 1,380 7,500 14,150 10,440 7,980 23,310 16,750 15,550 30,610 39,210 55,480 104,270 48,910 375,640 19.5%
LAC 4,700 2,060 1,640 2,690 3,230 36,690 15,790 9,360 9,890 18,310 14,950 22,910 14,670 21,500 178,390 9.3%
MENA 4,410 11,920 12,150 12,090 21,050 10,240 13,770 12,680 18,390 12,720 12,230 25,550 21,400 29,030 217,630 11.3%
North America 1,990 110 8,400 4,970 12,190 15,900 7,710 30,650 16,580 22,050 17,470 57,720 26,280 14,540 236,560 12.3%
South Asia 490 3,000 9,170 3,680 3,910 6,910 4,610 2,700 8,960 16,030 22,120 17,060 11,650 20,120 130,410 6.8%
Sub-Saharan 480 8,650 10,840 17,970 12,900 13,210 25,130 29,100 34,770 28,450 37,070 35,360 23,300 26,890 304,120 15.8%
Africa
Total 19,170 41,630 59,060 85,260 93,050 119,120 123,350 137,750 139,870 172,510 206,040 259,910 268,570 197,730 1,923,020 100.0%
Source: AEI’s China Global Investment Tracker and Authors’ Calculations.
Note: EAP is East Asia & Pacific, MENA is Middle East & North Africa, LAC is Latin America & Caribbean
China in the Middle East and North Africa

29
30
Table A2.2 Chinese Investment in the MENA Countries, 2005–2018 (Millions USD)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Total Growth
(2005–2018) (2015–2018)
Algeria 600 6,510 160 3,010 1,650 2,870 2,350 2,130 410 3,350 130 23,170 -68.3%
Egypt 940 520 380 280 1,990 440 550 3,600 370 1,780 1,970 3,630 8,610 25,060 383.7%
Iran 900 3,150 2,330 200 1,760 1,790 1,900 1,940 710 1,010 500 5,260 4,120 2,080 27,650 316.0%
Iraq 1,080 8,580 360 2,260 130 2,300 1,590 670 1,800 450 1,830 21,050 173.1%
Jordan 100 140 1,970 1,600 350 1,300 380 500 6,340 42.9%
Kuwait 840 510 570 260 510 240 2,480 1,620 1,330 2,070 10,430 -16.5%
Libya 2,600 2,600
Morocco 260 420 360 870 1,910
Oman 150 160 720 300 2,870 320 4,520 6.7%
Qatar 100 540 140 740 1,850 600 560 1,400 1,110 230 7,270 -83.6%
Saudi Arabia 1,100 5,770 1,170 4,230 2,060 4,320 1,830 1,080 4,260 2,020 1,250 1,910 4,800 35,800 137.6%
Syria 290 1,990 1,780 4,060
Tunisia 110 110
Turkey 1,270 610 870 440 1,140 640 1,700 4,180 320 1,560 870 1,090 300 14,990 -80.8%
UAE 300 650 3,550 670 130 450 3,150 730 640 760 4,150 7,620 8,160 30,960 973.7%
Yemen 480 250 470 510 1,710
Total 4,410 11,920 12,150 12,090 21,050 10,240 13,770 12,680 18,390 12,720 12,230 25,550 21,400 29,030 217,630 137.4%

Table A2.3 Chinese Investment by Region and Sector (Millions USD)
Agri- Che- Energy Enter- Finance Health Logis- Metals Other Real Tech- Tour- Trans- Utilities Total
culture micals tainment tics Estate nology ism port
Central Asia 3,170 4,830 65,450 1,410 10,310 2,360 6,770 880 200 8,610 100 104,090
EAP 8,460 3,330 141,340 2,690 6,720 7,290 12,920 61,360 11,880 40,540 7,170 7,460 60,890 4,130 376,180
Europe 54,330 5,050 64,650 24,050 38,450 5,800 18,620 5,520 13,390 27,550 31,050 15,810 67,440 3,930 375,640
LAC 7,300 3,250 94,690 100 3,170 450 940 36,810 460 5,670 1,590 1,660 21,240 1,060 178,390
MENA 1,440 5,950 102,410 780 430 990 500 12,090 5,300 33,450 200 2,840 41,960 9,290 217,630
North America 8,340 2,580 58,590 15,640 23,420 5,650 1,010 7,050 14,640 31,920 21,860 21,080 24,780 236,560
South Asia 3,370 400 68,990 100 340 1,280 1,490 8,210 2,050 4,910 6,210 950 30,500 1,610 130,410
Sub-Saharan Africa 6,940 2,970 98,460 1,450 5,850 710 2,450 33,910 4,790 31,920 7,020 660 99,290 7,700 304,120
Total 93,350 28,360 694,580 44,810 79,790 22,170 37,930 175,260 54,870 182,730 75,980 50,660 354,710 27,820 1,923,020
% of Total 2005– 4.9% 1.5% 36.1% 2.3% 4.1% 1.2% 2.0% 9.1% 2.9% 9.5% 4.0% 2.6% 18.4% 1.4% 100.0%
2018 Chinese
Investment
Note: EAP is East Asia & Pacific, MENA is Middle East & North Africa, LAC is Latin America & Caribbean.

31
32
Table A2.4 Chinese Investment in the Energy Sector by Region and Year, 2005–2018 (Millions USD)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Total % of Total
2005–2018 energy
Investments
Central Asia 4,200 6,300 2,550 250 6,970 1,260 3,530 8,230 8,460 9,260 3,020 3,140 6,360 1,920 65,450 9.4%
EAP 1,310 2,170 4,620 8,990 12,260 12,460 15,250 6,900 9,150 12,440 23,150 13,960 12,120 6,560 141,340 20.3%
Europe 7,630 8,180 2,230 11,870 4,720 1,570 9,600 3,050 4,900 6,160 4,740 64,650 9.3%
LAC 1,850 1,720 320 25,010 7,020 6,540 7,530 3,290 12,500 17,020 7,230 4,660 94,690 13.6%
MENA 680 2,840 3,910 6,650 13,320 7,050 6,860 2,250 10,820 4,860 4,130 11,160 12,150 15,730 102,410 14.7%
North America 250 100 3,420 10,370 4,600 24,170 3,570 3,900 3,020 1,250 800 3,140 58,590 8.4%
South Asia 490 1,960 4,700 1,470 2,300 5,530 1,960 780 5,540 10,960 9,840 13,270 4,050 6,140 68,990 9.9%
Sub-Saharan 3,120 1,650 6,070 7,140 4,160 3,980 10,680 16,850 4,990 12,140 6,810 6,560 14,310 98,460 14.2%
Africa
Share of 7.7% 15.7% 22.3% 21.4% 24.7% 10.4% 12.5% 3.5% 17.0% 8.2% 5.8% 15.6% 21.9% 27.5% 14.7%
MENA (%)

Table A2.5 Chinese Investments in MENA Countries Between 2005–2018 by Country and Sector (Millions USD)
Agri- Chemi- Energy Enter- Finance Health Logis- Metals Other Real Technol- Tourism Trans- Utilities Total
culture cals tainment tics estate ogy port
Algeria 210 1,410 340 110 560 170 4,180 1,470 14,560 160 23,170
Egypt 400 12,880 100 270 940 1,270 5,700 2,510 990 25,060
Iran 1,530 11,830 4,960 160 6,920 2,250 27,650
Iraq 19,080 1,240 730 21,050
Jordan 850 4,770 620 100 6,340
Kuwait 4,370 530 1,420 2,580 1,530 10,430
Libya 2,600 2,600
Morocco 590 390 930 1,910
Oman 300 3,670 240 160 150 4,520
Qatar 210 340 2,380 1,750 2,590 7,270
Saudi 400 2,470 13,110 230 5,190 1,140 4,900 5,940 2,420 35,800
Arabia
Syria 3,760 300 4,060
Tunisia 110 110
Turkey 1,100 9,460 430 440 1,150 100 2,310 14,990
UAE 130 16,800 350 440 9,470 100 1,370 2,300 30,960
Yemen 470 730 510 1,710
Total 1,440 5,950 102,410 780 430 990 500 12,090 5,300 33,450 200 2,840 41,960 9,290 217,630

33
Table A2.6 T-test Comparison between BRI-Related vs. Non-BRI Related Invest
ments, 2014–2018
Group # of Observations Average Value of an
Investment (Millions USD)
Non-BRI Related Investments 709 $693.39
BRI Related Investments 1,097 $558.92
Difference (Non-BRI minus BRI) $134.47**
Source: AEI’s China Global Investment Tracker and Authors’ Calculations. **: p-value < 0.05
Table A2.7 T-test Comparison between BRI-Related vs. Non-BRI Related Invest
ments, 2014–2018
Average Value of Average Value of Is Difference Sta-
a BRI Related a Non-BRI Rela- tistically
Investment (Mil- ted Investment Significant?
lions USD) (Millions USD)
East Asia & Pacific $507.7 $442.4 NO
Europe $592.6 $993.6 Yes: At less than
10% level
Latin America & $654.4 $736.0 NO
Caribbean
MENA $576.1 $414.0 Yes: At less than
10% level
South Asia $638.5 $296.0 Yes: At less than
2% level
Sub-Saharan Africa $526.5 $398.2 NO
Table A2.8 Regional Distribution of the Number of Non-BRI and BRI related
Investments, 2014–2018
Region Non-BRI Related BRI Related Total
Investment (2014–2018) Investment (2014–2018)
Central Asia 0 76 76
East Asia & Pacific 121 312 433
Europe 226 91 317
Latin America & 65 68 133
Caribbean
MENA 10 168 178
North America 219 0 219
South Asia 35 120 155
Sub-Saharan Africa 33 262 295
Total 709 1,097 1806
3 The Sino–Iranian Relationship
A Role Theory Approach to a Non-Western
Great Power-Middle Power Partnership
Jacopo Scita
Introduction
The relationship between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Islamic
Republic of Iran (IRI) is characterized by two fundamental features. The first is
being a typical Great Power-Middle Power partnership.1 The second is the non-
Western identity of both countries. An identity that does not simply reflect the
geographical location of China and Iran but acknowledges how they project
themselves inside and outside their relationship. These two characteristics, however,
relate to different dimensions and understandings of international relations. The
Great Power-Middle Power partnership refers to the distribution of power among
international actors and how it shapes interstate relations. The non-Western iden
tity of both countries, in contrast, implies that the particular identity of a state
defines how it projects itself towards other actors and the international system itself.
The Realist School of International Relations, in its various declinations, has
cantered its analysis of interstate interactions around the concept of power and
its distribution within the international system. Otherwise, Constructivism
emphasizes the role of ideational factors in shaping the international system
and its dynamics. While other attempts to reconcile these two scholarships have
emerged, the theoretical framework proposed in this chapter builds upon the
so-called Role Theory of International Relations, arguing that China’s role-
taking process vis-à-vis Iran is shaped by both material and non-material fac
tors.2 The organized context in which this process occurs is that of a typical
Great Power-Middle Power relationship. Therefore, the non-Western nature of
the China–Iran partnership intervenes at the level of the role-taking process,
shaping the ego and alter expectations. Rather than defining the contextual
boundaries, the non-Western character of Sino–Iranian relations acts as an
intervening variable. The objective of this chapter, therefore, is to present a
theoretical framework that reconciles the non-Western character of the China–
Iran relationship and the influence this feature has on the PRC’s role-taking
and role-enactment process vis-à-vis the IRI with the structural boundaries set
by the dynamic of Great Power-Middle Power relations.
As the first step, the present work identifies the features that define Great
Powers and Middle Powers, introducing a model of interaction between these
DOI: 10.4324/9781003269175-3
36 Jacopo Scita
categories of states. China and Iran are, respectively, a Great Power and a
Middle Power: the perimeter within which their relations exist is set by this
power asymmetry. Then, the chapter will introduce the so-called Role Theory
of International Relations. By focusing on the non-Western character of Sino–
Iranian relations, this chapter explores how this feature plays a key role in the
definition of the ego and alter expectations in China’s role-taking process vis-à
vis Iran. In this case, the ego-alter dialectic happens in the organized context
defined not by an international organization or an informal group of states but
within the semi-rigid perimeter of a Great Power-Middle Power relationship.
Great Powers, Middle Powers, and their Asymmetrical Encounter

The possession of material resources and capabilities distinguishes Great
Powers and Middle Powers. According to the fundamental assumption of
Realism, those are distributed within a system dominated by anarchy. How
ever, the possession of resources and capabilities – the distribution of power –
is asymmetrical. Yet asymmetry is what generates hierarchy: power is not
equally distributed horizontally among states but vertically. Therefore,
because the distinction between Great Powers and Middle Powers is the result
of power asymmetry, it is fundamentally hierarchical. Hierarchy and power
asymmetry define the framework of Sino–Iranian relations, modelling the
perimeter within which China’s role-taking process vis-à-vis Iran takes shape.
Defining Great Powers

In a celebrated 1993 article, Kenneth Waltz stated that the rank of power
depends on the combination of a precise set of characteristics. Those are
the “size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic cap
ability, military strength, political stability, and competence”.3 Among
Waltz’s features, prominent Realists have put much stress on the military
capability, adding that, in the nuclear age, the possession of a nuclear
deterrent is a necessary feature of Great Powers.4 The compresence of
these features determines the apical positioning of a state in the power
hierarchy of the international system.5
According to the Realist tradition, a state’s capacity of having a major
impact on the other actors acting within the international system is what
ultimately defines the Great Power status.6 In other words, the Great Powers
“determine the structure, major processes, and general evolution of the
system”.7 However, moving from a strictly structuralist interpretation, the
possession of relevant material resources (e.g. military, economic, etc.) is not
sufficient when it comes to the notion of power as a relation.8 Arguably, being
a Great Power in the Waltzian sense is not automatically translated into the
will, nor into the capacity of producing policies that impact the system pro
foundly. Therefore, a certain degree of flexibility exists despite the structural
rigidness derived from the notion of power as possession.
The Sino–Iranian Relationship 37
For the purpose of this chapter, Mearsheimer’s definition of great power is
sufficient to consider China as part of this category. According to him,
to qualify as a great power, a state must have sufficient military assets to

up a serious fight in an all-out conventional war against the most pow
erful state in the world. The candidate need not to have the capability to
defeat the leading state, but it must have some reasonable prospect of
turning the conflict into a war of attrition that leaves the dominant state
seriously weakened, even if that dominant state ultimately wins the war.
In the nuclear age great powers must have a nuclear deterrent.9
The PRC is a military nuclear power since 1964 and it is estimated to have
the second highest military budget in the world.10
Defining Middle Powers

If the fundamental feature of Great Powers is that of being global actors –
possessing enough material resources to influence the international system –
Middle Powers, otherwise, are eminently regional actors. However, since
Middle Powers are the key actors in their regions, their behaviour within their
system of reference mimics that of Great Powers vis-à-vis the international
system.11
The IRI can be considered a Middle Power. Indeed, Iran has a “compara
tively large population, economy and conventional army” that allow the
country to exercise regional influence and, within the Middle East, to affect
the policy of external Great Powers.12 Furthermore, Iran appears to be pow
erful enough to credibly claim a role of prominence within the Middle East,
as well as “to resist a coalition of other regional states against [it]”.13 Tehran’s
enduring confrontation with the United States, its network of regional allies
and unconventional proxies, and its competition with Saudi Arabia further
prove that Iran has reached the status of a regional Middle Power. The IRI’s
military, economic, and even ideological projection outside the Middle East is
minimum in comparison with its influence within the region. Yet, as Zaccara
notes, Iran has shown “great power” aspiration, showing the “predisposition
to surpass its sphere of [regional] influence”.14
Power Asymmetry in Great Power-Middle Power Relations

The fundamental feature of the encounter between Great Powers and Middle
Powers is power asymmetry. Great Powers have a global projection, are
powerful and resourceful enough to compete and challenge their equivalents
and can create systems of alliances or partnerships that reflect their own
interests. Vice versa, the range of action of a Middle Power is more limited,
their material capabilities are almost only relevant at the regional level, and
their relationship with Great Powers is ambiguous. Indeed, the former may
38 Jacopo Scita
find in the latter a way to avoid diplomatic isolation and increase their
security vis-à-vis another hostile Great Power. At the same time, though,
“regional [M]iddle [P]owers typically see [G]reat [P]owers’ penetration and
regulation as threatening to their sovereignty”.15
From a Great Powers’ point of view, establishing partnership with Middle
Powers appear to be particularly appealing because the asymmetry in mate
rial capabilities and resources limits the potential of a direct threat from the
weaker partner.16 Furthermore, the regional influence and prominence held
by Middle Powers offer to Great Powers a range of benefits. Firstly, Middle
Powers may work as a bulwark against the regional penetration of other
Great Powers. Secondly, creating links and security arrangements that involve
the leading regional actors is a necessary step for Great Powers’ regional
strategies. Thirdly, “client states” may be crucial to a Great Power’s own
security, even if the former is not geographically located in the proximity of
the latter. Lastly, Middle Powers are first-tier, regional pivots of Great Powers
global projection.17
As shown, interests in cooperating, establishing partnerships, and forming
alliances exist for both Great Powers and Middle Powers. However, the existence
of mutual interests does not fully compensate for power asymmetry. Great
Power-Middle Power relations are inherently unbalanced. As Conduit and
Akbarzadeh rightly state, “[i]t is important, however, to not overestimate the
extent to which [G]reat [P]owers can shape the behaviour of their partners”.18 In
fact, rather than directly affecting the conduct of the weaker party, power
imbalance defines the expectations, limits, and objectives of the partnership
itself. Arguably, those constraints are structural and can only be nuanced but not
overtook by the formalization of partnership agreements such as the Compre
hensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) signed by China and Iran in 2021.19
The IRI’s agency within Sino–Iranian relations is limited. Especially from
the beginning of the 21st century, Iran’s growing international isolation has
increasingly pushed the country towards China. The PRC, indeed, has proved
to be the only major international actor willing to keep buying Iran’s oil in
defiance of international sanctions. This has come at a price. Chinese goods
have massively saturated the Iranian domestic market, while the “Siniciza
tion” of the country’s economy and energy industry has allowed China to
“dictate ‘the rules of the game”.20
A further sign of imbalance is, again, related to energy relations. Although
Beijing is Iran’s largest oil buyer, China has based its energy security strategy
on the diversification of suppliers. This has resulted in Tehran not being
among the PRC’s top three suppliers since 2012. While Beijing offers Iran an
economic lifeline, the former does not occupy a dominant place in the latter’s
energy security.
Even from a more political perspective, the Sino–Iranian partnership is
informed by a strong power asymmetry. Evidence emerges from the historical
analysis of the US–China–Iran triangle. Indeed, while Beijing’s support for
Tehran reflects the strategy of keeping Iran strong enough to act as a bulwark
against Washington’s attempt to acquire a position of full hegemony in the
Persian Gulf, developments such as the 1997 Chinese disengagement from
Iran’s nuclear program show a more complex picture. According to Garver,
“China’s 1996–97 decisions to suspend […] cooperation with Iran were a
function of calculations about China’s relations with the United States”.21
Thus, the 1997 episode illustrates that despite the importance that Iran has
for China it does not match that of the United States. The reasons are clear,
Beijing and Washington are engaged in an enduring competition and their
economic relations outmatch that with Tehran. When they come to collide,
relations between the two Great Powers prevail over those between the Great
Power and the Middle Power. For Iran, the relationship with China is a first-
tier partnership, especially in the confrontation with Washington. For China,
Sino–Iranian relations are a second-tier partnership that can eventually be
sacrificed in favour of that with the United States.
Great Power-Middle Power Dynamics: China in the Persian Gulf

The PRC’s strategy in the Persian Gulf sets contextual constraints to Sino–
Iranian relations, which reinforce the dynamics of Great Power-Middle
Power relations previously described. Beijing, indeed, has developed a mul
tilateral approach to the Persian Gulf based on the establishment of a hier
archy of partnerships that has at its top the Comprehensive Strategic
Partnerships (CSP).22 In the Persian Gulf, three countries enjoy CSP with
China: The United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and Iran. This
strategy has two main reflections on Sino–Iranian relations.
Saudi Arabia broadly fits into the definition of Middle Power.23 Therefore,
China has comparable partnerships with the two Middle Powers in the Per
sian Gulf region. Nonetheless, the relationship between Iran and Saudi
Arabia is historically turbulent. The two countries are engaged in a political
and ideological competition that has been crystalized and exacerbated by the
end of Washington’s Twin Pillars Policy after the 1979 Revolution. This con
text appears to affect the degree through which China can effectively cultivate
its relationship with one of the two without putting in jeopardy that with the
other. Arguably, Beijing has been able to navigate in this reality successfully
so far, increasing its footprint in the Persian Gulf. However, especially in the
case of Iran, Beijing’s peculiar approach has added further constraints to
Tehran’s opportunities and expectations in its relationship with China.
Beyond the China–Iran–Saudi Arabia intersection, the PRC’s equidistant
approach to the Persian Gulf rivalries further limits Iran’s agency towards
China. Although the narrative that sustains Sino–Iranian relations is solid
and ambitious, Beijing is involved in a complex game of balancing that
entails developing its relationship with Tehran without alienating the other
regional partners, competing with the United States without escalating into a
confrontation, and limiting the possibility of a regional conflict that would
jeopardize China’s energy security.24 Therefore, the spectrum of actions and
40 Jacopo Scita
expectations within Sino–Iranian relations is not only limited by the typical
dynamics of Great Power-Middle Power partnerships, but it is further
impacted by a problematic regional context.
The Perimeter of China’s Role-Taking vis-à-vis Iran

As defined in the previous sections, Sino–Iranian relations reflect the power
dynamics of a classic Great Power-Middle Power partnership. Those dynam
ics are internally defined by the existing power asymmetry and externally
heightened by a turbulent regional system. Therefore, the framework that
emerges from the analysis of the distribution of power within and around
Sino–Iranian relations is semi-rigid. The distribution of power and regional
configuration may be subject to small adjustments that could have a (limited)
impact on the predictability of Great Power-Middle Power dynamics.25 Still,
this framework will keep setting the boundaries of Sino–Iranian relations.
Nevertheless, the Great Power-Middle Power framework tells little about
how China directly interacts with Iran. Policy decisions and narratives are
located within the perimeter defined by those power dynamics and are, at
least in part, impacted by that context. However, a certain degree of agency
exists and defines the mode in which the PRC pursues its interest vis-à-vis the
IRI. This chapter argues that this mode responds to a role-taking and role-
enactment process that is affected by both material and non-material factors.
Role Theory
Role Theory lays its roots in the work of K.J. Holsti who, in his pioneering
study entitled “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy”,
analysed how psychological aspects and the social milieu shapes the way a
“nation views itself and its role in the international arena”.26 Arguably, Hol
sti’s work has given a remarkable imprinting to the study of culture as an
independent variable in foreign policy making. Since then, Role Theory has
developed as a theory located at the intersection between Foreign Policy
Analysis and International Relations Theory. This theoretical location is par
ticularly interesting as it gives Role Theory the analytical ability to explain
and understand the interactions between agents and structure.27 In the case of
Sino–Iranian relations, where the structure is defined by the semi-rigid peri
meter set by the Great Power-Middle Power dynamics, this aspect is crucial.
Defining International Roles

The concept of international roles has been widely explored. Walker has
defined roles as “repertoires of behaviour, inferred from others’ expectations
and one’s own conceptions, selected at least partly in response to cues and
demands”.28 According to Walker, international roles encapsulate the opera
tional code of a leader or a group. According to Hudson, on the other hand,
“defining an operational code involves identifying the core beliefs of a leader
or a group [or a nation], as well as the preferred means and style of pursuing
goals”.29 Therefore, I argue that the operational code adopted by a polity
cannot be separated from the milieu (cultural, historical, geographical, poli
tical, etc.) that informs the polity itself.
It can also be argued that the definition of the operational code of a nation
is a complex task, especially given the number of actors that are involved in
modern foreign policymaking. Is it really possible, therefore, to refer to a
single, unified operational code that intervenes in the foreign policymaking of a
modern state? This question is not only pertinent but has been addressed by
Role Theory and FPA scholars who largely agree that international roles
emerge from a process of domestic contestation that partly reflects the exis
tence of different operational codes.30 However, what the milieu provides to
policymakers, before any phase of domestic contestation is
a repertoire or palette of adaptive responses from which members build of-

the-shelf strategies of action. What matters [are] ‘chunk’ of prefabricated
cultural response. We may not be able to predict choice, […] but we can
begin to identify what is on the shelf, ready and available to be used or not.31
As will be clarified later in this chapter, a relevant part of what is on the cul
tural and ideational shelf of Sino–Iranian relations is sufficiently clear.
Other definitions have pointed out what fundamentally distinguishes roles
from national identities. While the latter refers to self-representation of an
actor, the former are the result of a dialectic between ego and alter expecta
tions, as Harnisch writes:
roles expectations may vary considerably. On the one hand, they regularly
comprise ego expectations –that is, domestic and/or individual expectations
as to what the appropriate role is and what it implies– and alter expectations
–that is, implicit or explicit demands by others (counter-roles or com
plementary roles, audience cues). […] Roles, and even more role sets, entail a
potential conflict within a role (intra-role conflicts, e.g., between ego and
alter expectations) and between roles (inter-roles conflicts).32
What emerges from Harnisch’s definition is the social nature of roles. Indeed,
international roles exist within social groups formed by states or other orga
nizations and are the product of social interaction between the ego of an
actor – its self-representation and self-projection – and the alter expectations.
Therefore, the social relationship that involves international roles is bivalent.
Roles and role-taking processes are the results of social interactions as much
as they affect and shape the socialization mechanisms within the international
community. Hence roles are taken and performed within organized groups.33
In summary, Role Theory addresses the process of role-taking, which
depends upon material and ideational factors. The ego-alter dialectic
42 Jacopo Scita
aggregates those factors and defines the role taken by an actor within a spe
cific organized group. However, roles and role-enactment are always contested
because they do not exist in a vacuum, but they are part of an environment
where other actors perform roles as well.34
The Non-Western Character of Sino–Iranian Relations

Arguably, in the 41 years of relations between the PRC and the IRI, China
has taken and acted more than one role. However, the purpose of this chapter
is to present the role performed by Beijing vis-à-vis Iran, which emerged as a
synthesis between the ego and alter ideational and identity-related expecta
tions. Although roles are shaped by both material and non-material factors,
the focus here is pointed to the ideational milieu that constitute the non-
Western character of Sino–Iranian relations. Therefore, the following sections
explore how this character is expressed within Iran’s and China’s self-concep
tion and self-projection towards the international system. As a result, the
encounter between the two countries’ self-perceptions generates a synthesis
that is one of the key variables in China’s role-taking process vis-à-vis Iran.
A Revolution against an Unjust World: Iran’s Non-Western Otherness

The Islamic Republic of Iran is the product of a successful Revolution that not
only overthrew the existing regime but radically changed Iran’s position within
the international system. Mohamed Reza Pahlavi, the last Shah of Iran, centred
his reign around a vertically imposed process of modernization and Westerniza
tion, making Iran the cornerstone of Washington’s Middle East policy and
importing the zeitgeist of Euro-American modernity to the country. Under the
Shah, Iran became integrated into the international capitalist system and
reframed its self-perception as an “Aryan, Indo-European country”.35
The 1979 Revolution rejected the political and ideational alignment with
the West, ultimately embodied by the United States. At the same time, the
Revolution was “an act of resistance to a particular type of globalisation”.36
In other words, the different actors that animated the revolutionary zeal of
1978–79 rejected a normative system – the one produced by the Cold War –
that was considered other in respect of Iran. One of the chants of the revolu
tionaries, “down with the East, down with the West, long live to the Islamic
Republic”,37 best reflects this rejection, signalling one of the fundamental
features of the IRI. According to Furtig, indeed, the Islamic Republic of Iran
was built upon a “universalist counter projection”38 that appealed to the
unification of the Umma and the empowerment of the dispossessed masses of
the Third World.39
Undoubtedly, the 1979 Revolution has been a complex event that brought
together different, often divergent, actors, claims, and objectives. The claim
for an Iranian otherness and independence was transversal among the revo
lutionary actors. Arguably, the events that followed the Revolution and the
reactions to them polarized the external projection of the IRI around the
opposition to the United States and its main regional ally, Israel. The Iraq–
Iran war and the end of the Cold War increased Iran’s international isolation.
However, as noted by Adib-Moghaddam, “the more international society
turned against Iran, the more it confirmed the self-perception of the Iranian
state as the leader of an oppressed nation”.40
In the IRI’s narrative, the West, therefore, is not a geographical entity but an
expression of power and dominance, a specific configuration of the international
system that, before the 1979 Revolution, embedded Iran and after the establish
ment of the Islamic Republic isolated the country. Consequently, post-Revolu
tionary Iran has a non-Western character that reflects its self-projected otherness
in respect of the dominant configuration of power within the international
community. Therefore, those revolutionary ideals shape the ideational frame
work of the IRI’s external projection. According to Firooz-Abadi, Iran’s foreign
policy discourse is based on three cardinal principles: Islamism, Third-Worldism,
and the quest for justice.41 Ultimately, these principles reflect Iran’s revisionist
attitude towards the international system.42 Although this romantic attitude is
tempered by the pragmatism that became dominant after the death of the Aya
tollah Khomeini, Iran’s self-projected otherness remains crucial.43 Arguably, the
IRI’s preferred international partners are those who manifest the same dis
satisfaction towards the actual configuration of the international system.
China’s Quest for Empathy: National Humiliation and Alterative Worldviews

A substantial part of the ideational framework that sustains the PRC’s external
projection and foreign policy is based upon the concept of the “Century of
Humiliation”.44 The expression recalls the 110 years between the First Opium
War (1839–1842) and the establishment of the People’s Republic of China by
Mao Zedong in 1949. According to Kaufman, the First Opium War “marked
China’s first sustained exposure to the West and highlighted Imperial China’s
military and diplomatic weakness in the face of Western power”.45 Kissinger has
gone as far as defining the Opium War as the clash of two World orders.46
Indeed, the encounter between China and the West in the 19th century was
more than violent engagement. China had a rich imperial history that has
granted to it a position of substantial political and cultural dominance in East
Asia. Connections with neighbouring peoples and the other kingdoms in the
far West have been lengthily framed as tributary relations under the idea that
the Chinese Emperor “received the commission from Heaven to rule the uni
verse”.47 Losing a war against the British and being forced to concede ports
and commercial privileges to Western power profoundly challenged this self-
perception. The independence movements emerged at the beginning of the
20th century, the collapse of the millenary imperial system in 1911, the con
flict with Japan during the World War II, and the civil war between the
Nationalist Parties and the Red Army completed a period of unprecedented
chaos which began with the trauma of the First Opium War.48
44 Jacopo Scita
Although some Chinese scholars have challenged the dominance of this
“victim mentality” in the contemporary PRC’s foreign policy, it still is one
of the rhetorical and ideational tools used by the Chinese authorities to
frame the relationships between China and the Third World.49 According to
Brady, a typical Chinese diplomatic tool is to seek “common points” with
the foreign interlocutor to establish a good relationship and installing in the
partner a “positive sentiment” towards China. That first step precedes and
sustains the actual policymaking.50 The narrative of the national humilia
tion suffered after the encounter with the West is powerful because it allows
China to create a sentiment of empathy with those countries and regions
that have been the victims of Western imperialism. The empathy generated
by this “common point” is sustained by two related features of China’s
approach towards the developing countries.
The first one is the constant reference to history as the foundation of
inter-states relationships. In the case of Africa, Beijing has put great effort
into defining the historical roots of its engagement with the African con
tinent.51 Through this constant reference to history, China shows respect
for and acknowledges the historical roots of the foreign partner, defines a
relational framework deeper than practical interests, and reinforces empa
thy. Arguably, the case of the Sino–Iranian partnership is very much
comparable to that of Sino–African relations.
The other source of empathy that informs Chinese narratives towards the
developing world comes from the promotion of an alternative vision of the
world order. Having experienced the bitterness of humiliation perpetrated
by the West, Beijing projects itself as the bearer of an alternative vision of
international affairs. This vision is sustained by the rhetoric of a “national
culture that [is] non-competitive, non-striving and defensive” – in direct
contrast with the Western history of subjugation, imperialism, and dom
inance.52 Such rhetoric appears to be particularly appealing within those
countries that directly experience colonialism or other forms of Western
domination. Interestingly, China connects this self-perception with that of
being itself a developing country. As a developing country, the PRC is
experiencing a peaceful rise that “will neither jeopardise poor countries’
interests nor destabilize the international system”.53
Therefore, China’s self-projected otherness in respect of the West is built
upon the millenary history of the Chinese empire – a unique entity able to
guarantee the order in Asia under the heaven – the humiliating encounter with
the Western powers, and the ability of the People’s Republic of slowly, but
steadily, recovering the nation from the Century of Humiliation. This vision is
translated in a worldview that is based on peaceful coexistence, order, and non
interference. However, as Kaufman notes, “this position, despite its seemingly
revolutionary views of interstate relations, in fact retains many of the principles
of the current system”.54 Nevertheless, China’s otherness remains a powerful
ideational tool.
Civilizational Friendship and National Humiliations along Sino–Iranian
Relations
In what remains the most important work on the China–Iran relationship,
John Garver identifies in the civilizational solidarity the spirit of Sino–Iranian
relations, defining it as the “worldview and state of mind used to frame rela
tionships”.55 What Garver acknowledges, therefore, is the existence of a nar
rative that sustains Sino–Iranian relations besides material interests. However,
Garver himself clarifies that this shared narrative is not what drives policy
making.56 Otherwise, civilizational solidarity sets the vocabulary that
empowers policymaking, providing Chinese and Iranian policymakers a
basket of symbols, memories, ideas and common sentiments used to sustain
their partnership. Arguably, the PRC benefits the most from this narrative.
Indeed, it serves as a powerful and flexible tool to justify Beijing’s backlashes
in its relationship with Tehran. In other words, civilizational solidarity
appears to elevate Sino–Iranian relations to a higher level – a level in which
practical interests are not at the centre of the partnership. The fact that this
often collides with reality confirms the importance of the narrative itself,
which has survived forty years of seesawing Sino–Iranian relations.
Civilization solidarity is based on two, interconnected sub-narratives. The
first one is that of the rich, millenary history of both China and Iran. The
other builds upon the two countries’ national humiliation and their non-
Western nature. China and Iran share an incredibly rich past, of which the
apex was reached, according to the dominant narrative, when the Persian and
Chinese empires got in contact through the ancient Silk Road. Notably, “the
two countries have no history of war and conflict”, a quasi-unicum that is per
se sufficient to portray Sino–Iranian relations as an ancient friendship.57 A
clear reference to this legendary past was at the core of Xi Jinping’s signed
article published on an Iranian newspaper ahead of his first visit to Iran in
January 2016. Talking about Iran, Xi declared that, “like many other Chinese,
[he does] not feel like a stranger in your ancient and beautiful country, thanks
to the Silk Road that links out two great nations for centuries”.58 The pom
pous tone adopted by the Chinese president reached its climax when the
article declared that China and Iran made historical contributions to the
connectivity between Western and Eastern civilizations.
Two aspects should be noted. Firstly, Xi Jinping’s trip to Iran coincided
with the signature of the Sino–Iranian Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.
The article, therefore, proves China’s interest in sustaining its practical inter
ests in cooperating with Iran through a constant reference to civilizational
solidarity. Secondly, the exaltation of a past in which China and Iran were
both glorious empires appears to be in direct contrast with a present in which
a clear imbalance of power exists between the two countries.59
The establishment of diplomatic relations between Beijing and Tehran
dates back to 1971. Interestingly, this first modern diplomatic encounter
between the two countries happened amid the US–China rapprochement. On
46 Jacopo Scita
the occasion of the visit of Princess Ashraf, the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai
welcomed the Iranian delegation remarking “the ancient ties between the two
countries and the bringing low of both great countries by ‘foreign aggres
sion’”.60 Except the fact that this first encounter happened between the PRC
and Imperial Iran, it already set the tone and narrative that dominated the
PRC–IRI relations since 1979.
Unsurprisingly, the relationship between Beijing and Tehran grew in quality
and intensity after the 1979 Revolution when Iran’s regional and global isola
tion became particularly attractive to China. At the same time, the Revolution
brought into Iran’s national narrative those concepts of otherness and rejection
of foreign domination that perfectly fit with the PRC’s historical narrative.
According to Garver, “both Mao and Khomeini envisioned their nations as
providing the model, correct guidance, and support for a revolution against the
unjust, Western-dominated, and Western-created international order”.61 The
West, therefore, became the negative other through which China and Iran
identified themselves and their relationship. The narrative has its own flow. As
ancient, rich civilizations, China and Iran used to play a central role in pre
modern global history, connecting the West and the East along the Silk Road.
However, for both nations, the 20th century has been a century of national
humiliation perpetrated by Western powers, which aggressed China and Iran
excluding them from the definition of the current international order. There
fore, Iran fits within China’s national humiliation narrative, while the revolu
tionary momentum brought into the international community by the two
countries is idealized as a chance to overthrow Western dominance.62
The conceptualization of the non-Western character of Sino–Iranian relations
is sufficiently wide and encompassing to overcome the clear ideological differ
ence that exists between the Iranian and Chinese vanguards. Indeed, while Mao
Zedong’s Revolution established a Communist Republic, the outcome of the
1979 Revolution was the success of the Khomeinist faction, which radically took
possession of the composite revolutionary impetus, ultimately establishing a
theocratic regime. Only the definition of a common target, vague enough to
overcome the differences, but, at the same time, clear enough to appeal to the
revolutionary zeitgeist of both countries, could create a solid narrative. Arguably,
before being Communist-Maoist and Islamic-Khomeinist, the PRC and the IRI
are built upon the rejection of domestic foreign domination and a revisionist
attitude towards the Western-led international order. The common ground,
therefore, is that of being united in being other in respect of the West.
China’s Role(s) vis-à-vis Iran

International roles are not static but change and evolve over time. Therefore,
defining a single role bore by China vis-à-vis Iran since the 1979 Revolution
risks being analytically unproductive if not wrong. However, the non-Western
character of Sino–Iranian relations represents a social, political, and historical
milieu sufficiently defined and powerful to constitute a “prefabricated cultural
63
response that China exploits in the enactment of its role(s)”. Furthermore,
even within a bilateral context such as Sino–Iranian relations, an actor can
take multiple roles. This is a potential source of inter-role conflicts.
The present section of the paper explores how the non-Western nature of
Sino–Iranian relations shapes the ego and alter expectations in the PRC’s
role-taking and role-enactment vis-à-vis Iran. Then, the chapter will suggest a
preliminary association between the ego and alter expectations generated by
the non-Western character of the Beijing–Tehran partnership and Holsti’s
taxonomy. As mentioned above, international roles exist within an organized
context. This chapter argues that the Great Power-Middle Power dimension
and its related dynamics constitute the context of China’s role(s) enactment
vis-à-vis Iran. The tension between the role’s expectations and the structural
limits imposed by the Great Power-Middle Power framework reflects the
promising, but often unsatisfactory, reality of Sino–Iranian relations.
Ego and Alter Expectations within Sino–Iranian Relations

As shown in the previous sections of the chapter, China identifies Iran as part of
its “struggle to blot out and overcome its putative national humiliation”.64 This
position is reinforced by the reference to the glorious past of both countries – two
former empires whose primacy has been material but also intellectual and cul
tural. The ancient Silk Road, through which Iran and China connected the West
to the East, has been indicated by Xi Jinping himself as the historical bulwark of
the Sino–Iranian friendship. Ultimately, the domination and humiliation suffered
by the two countries is a source of empathy and shared victimization, which con
tributes to defining the shared otherness of China and Iran in respect of the West.
This vision of Iran as a country with a similar historical experience and com
parable dissatisfaction towards the power configuration of the Western-led
international order informs China’s narrative towards the IRI. As Garver notes,
Chinese analysts and politicians have repeatedly acknowledged Iran’s power and
importance. Announcing the formation of the Islamic Republic in 1979, a Beij
ing radio broadcast defined the country as a shield against the expansionism of
the USSR and the strategic dominator of the “[b]ottleneck of the Strait of
Hormuz… thus controlling the West’s major petroleum giveaways”.65
Beijing’s support for Tehran’s nuclear program is a further indication that the
PRC supports Iran’s claim of not being treated as a pariah state by the Wes
tern-led international community. Although this attitude, which has resulted in
multiple Chinese vetoes at the IAEA, is certainly part of Beijing’s broader
strategic calculus and self-projection towards international institutions, it also
reflects a position of remarkable empathy towards the Iranian demands –
almost a unicum after the 1979 Revolution.66 It is also interesting to note that,
according to a survey conducted by the International Crisis Group, Chinese
analysts do not perceive Iran’s potential possession of nuclear weapons as a
menace to the PRC.67 Obviously, this marks a substantial difference from the
Western perception of the issue.
48 Jacopo Scita
China has also shown an attitude to project itself as the actor that, rather
than pointing to Iran as the sole culprit of the growing tensions in the Persian
Gulf, vociferously calls for the responsibility of the United States.68 For
instance, the PRC’s standpoint vis-à-vis the current situation in the Gulf has
reiterated the necessity of diplomatic solutions, regional dialogue, and non
interference of foreign powers in the domestic affairs of the IRI. The sum of
these positions shapes Iran’s alter expectations.
Despite the existence of two discrete positions about China and the Chinese
involvement in the Iranian economy,69 the IRI’s attitude towards the PRC
seems overall complex, but responsive, to the civilizational solidarity narrative
adopted by Beijing. For instance, Iranian reformists – critical towards China’s
reluctance to establish long-term strategic links with Tehran – acknowledge
that the PRC views Iran as “a powerful political and strategic actor in the
hearth of the Middle East”.70 Iran’s conservatives, vice versa, have put much
stress on the civilizational links and, generally, have shown higher trust in the
possibility of deepening Sino–Iranian relations.71
Recently, both the Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and his Foreign Minis
ter Mohammad Javad Zarif have expressed interesting declarations that mirror
and directly appeal to China’s narrative. During a meeting with Xi Jinping
ahead of the 2019 summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Council (SCO), Rou
hani noted that “the U.S. administration’s pressure against Iran and China
aimed at dominating the world”.72 Two months later, in the occurrence of his
visit to China, Zarif published an op-ed on a Chinese newspaper – a practice that
is traditionally associated with Xi Jinping.73 The Iranian FM declared that when
he travels to the PRC he is “participating in a millennia’s old ritual between two
great civilizations”. Zarif went on saying that:
I would posit here that while our glorious past inspires us to look to one
another and our present relationship sets the framework for our coop
eration, it is indeed our futures that bind us. China and Iran share a
vision of sovereign states with independent foreign policies across the
Asian continent being connected, prospering together and realizing their
potential and their true place in the world.
Reiterating the role of the Belt and Road initiative as the foundation of
China–Iran mutual trust, Zarif said that “Iran strongly supports China’s
position in the so-called ‘trade war’”. The PRC and the IRI, therefore, are
deeply committed to a “connected and prosperous Asia” since the 21st cen
tury will be an Asian century.
Zarif ’s words came in a time in which Sino–Iranian cooperation represents
the lifeline for Iran’s suffering economy. The request for a long-term
improvement of economic and strategic ties between the two countries was
supported by exactly the same set of historical references and narratives that
Xi Jinping used in the open letter that inaugurated the Sino–Iranian com
prehensive strategic partnership. Arguably, this clarifies that part of Iran’s
expectations are built upon the milieu that constitutes China’s self-representation
in the role-taking process. Therefore, Zarif’s op-ed appears to clarify that Iran
has accepted Beijing’s role and, consequently, it is modelling its expectations
upon it. As further confirmation of the otherness of being non-Western as the
common ground of Sino–Iranian relations, Zarif’s reference to the emergence of
an Asian 21st century in which China and Iran can be the protagonist synthe
sizes the idea that this relationship lays ground on a strong spirit of change and
fundamental otherness.
Beijing: A Modern Anti-imperialist Agent

In his 1970 paramount study, Kal Holsti defines the role of the anti-imperi
alist agent as follows: “[w]here imperialism is perceived as a serious threat,
many governments – by no means limited to communist party states – see
themselves as agent of ‘struggle’ against this evil”.74 It is evident that Holsti’s
taxonomy reflects the political zeitgeist of the Cold War. However, once
depurated from that time-specific connotation, the role of the anti-imperialist
agent reflects China’s self-projection towards Iran. Indeed, the otherness
embodied by Sino–Iranian relations is built upon the trauma, rejection, and
recovery from the domination of the Western powers. Western powers that
keep acting as modern imperialists in their attempt to subjugate China and
Iran’s independence.
Within the PRC’s role-taking and role-enactment vis-à-vis Iran, Beijing is
the agent because it brings Tehran into its own quest for justice and attempt
to recover from its national humiliation. The IRI, otherwise, accepts this role
since it corresponds to its similar request for an alternative power configura
tion of the international system that does not reflect the dominance of the
Western powers. As stated, framing the role(s) bore by China in forty years of
relationship with the Islamic Republic of Iran with a single category may
result in an oversimplification. However, this is deemed to be the starting
point of a broader study of China’s role(s) within Sino–Iranian relations.
The Organized Context of China’s Role vis-à-vis Great Power-Middle

Power Dynamics
As said earlier, the non-Western character constitutes the ideational bulwark
of Sino–Iranian relations, informing the ego and alter expectations of China’s
role-taking process and enactment vis-à-vis Iran. Using Holsti’s taxonomy,
the related role enacted by the PRC resembles that of a modern anti-imperi
alist agent. However, it is evident that a relationship exclusively based on
civilizational solidarity, the desire to create an alternative to the Western-led
international order, and the recollection of a shared past cannot be pursued in
the contemporary world. As Garver acknowledges, the PRC articulates its
policies vis-à-vis Iran on the base of practical interests.75 But, in the case of
Sino–Iranian relations, what binds both the enactment of civilizational
50 Jacopo Scita
solidarity, and the pursuit of certain policies is the very nature of Great
Power-Middle Power dynamics.
Iran’s expectations related to the acceptance of China’s role as a modern
anti-imperialist agent are limited by the power asymmetry that informs Sino–
Iranian relations. In other words, the extent to which China performs this role
and translates the related expectations into policies is affected by the power
configuration of its relationship with the IRI. Clearly, such a tension between
an idealistic, romantic projection and a reality on the ground informed by
unavoidable structural limitations is problematic. When the Iranian Foreign
Minister relaunched the rhetoric of civilizational solidarity to appeal directly
to the foundation of China’s self-representation, the Chinese ambassador to
Iran replied that, despite that fact that he has “the feeling that China has the
best relations with Iran in comparison to the other Middle East countries”,
strategic patience is necessary.76 This conflict, therefore, is unavoidably pre
sent within Sino–Iranian relations.
Conclusion
The semi-rigid structure, defined by the Great Power-Middle Power framework,
within which Sino-Iranian relations exist defines a perimeter of predictable
actions and policymaking. In the case of China, Iran is an important partner
who is part of a turbulent region. For this reason, the relationship with Tehran is,
and will remain, a second-tier partnership, especially when it comes to challenge
that with Washington. In the case of Iran, otherwise, China is a necessary part
ner, whose economic and political support is unmatched. The contradiction
generated by these differences is self-evident. What exists within the perimeter of
the Great Power-Middle Power relations, whether it can be reconducted to
material interests or socio-political narratives, often functions as a response to
the inherent contradiction of a partnership between two subjects that have
opposite views and expectations from it. Role-taking and role-enactment are
part of the reality that exists within that perimeter.
The aim of this chapter was to highlight the non-Western identity as the
fundamental feature of Sino–Iranian relations. Role Theory is particularly effi
cacious to acknowledging this characteristic because it implies the coexistence
of material and ideational variables as intervening variables. It has also the
merit to understand the enactment of international roles as the result of ego
and alter interaction. In other words, it is wrong to understand Sino–Iranian
relations as a romantic partnership motivated and shaped by an opposition to
the Western-led international system. But it is also misleading thinking that the
power imbalance existing between Beijing and Tehran is sufficient to make Iran
passively accepting China’s role ambitions.
The study of international roles occupies an important, but still under
developed, niche of international studies. Being located at the intersection
between Foreign Policy Analysis and International Relations Theory, Role
Theory offers a modern approach able to reconcile structural elements with a
strong emphasis on the agency of actors. Interestingly, the number of works
applying Role Theory to the study of China’s global rise is growing quickly.
Little attention, however, has been given to the benefits that this theoretical
framework can have on the understanding of Iran’s interactions with the
international community.77 Sino–Iranian relations are an interesting case
study that suggests a broader application of Role Theory that goes extensively
beyond the introductory study here presented.
Among the unspoken objectives of this chapter, there was that of
acknowledging the complexity of a relationship – that between the People’s
Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Iran – that is informed by a
quite unique set of beliefs, narratives, and ideas. China is a Great Power and
possibly the only real challenger of US global primacy. Iran is a Middle
Power whose enormous potential is limited by domestic and external pres
sures. Therefore, Sino–Iranian relations should be observed and studied with
great curiosity, interest, and attention.
Notes
1 Conduit and Akbarzadeh, “Great Power-Middle Power Dynamics: The Case of
China and Iran”, Journal of Contemporary China, 28 (2019). p. 468.
2 Neoclassical Realism, for instance, has focused on the interaction between the
configuration of the international system and the domestic dynamics of the states
[see Lobell et al. Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, 2009]. Samuel
J. Barkin, on his side, has attempted to demonstrate the compatibility between
Constructivist epistemology and classical Realism [Barkin, “Realist Con
structivism”, International Studies Review, 5(3) (2003)].
3 Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics”, International Security,
18(2) (1993), p.50.
4 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 2001, p.5.
5 Levy, War in the Modern Great Power System 1495–1975, 1983, p.8.
6 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy, p.5.
7 Levy, War, p.8.
8 Zartman, Imbalance of Power: US Hegemony and International Order, 2009, p.17.
9 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy, p.5.
10 Lanteigne, Chinese Foreign Policy. An Introduction, 2016, p.105.
Tian et al., “Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2017”, Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute (2018).
11 Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran. Middle Powers in a Penetrated
Regional System, 1997, p.7.
12 Conduit and Akbarzadeh, “Great Power-Middle Power Dynamics”, p.469.
13 Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran, p.7.
14 Zaccara, “Iran’s Permanent Quest for Regional Power Status”, p.183.
15 Ibid., p.7.
16 Fels, Shifting Power in Asia Pacific?, 2016, p. 216.
17 Khan, “Unbalanced alliances: Why China hasn’t Reined in North Korea”, Foreign
Affairs (18 February 2016).
18 Conduit and Akbarzadeh, “Great Power-Middle Power Dynamics”, p.471.
19 IRNA, 27 March 2021.
20 Ehteshami et al., “Chinese-Iranian Mutual Strategic Perceptions”, The China
Journal, 79 (2018), pp.6–7.
52 Jacopo Scita
21 Garver, China & Iran. Ancient Partners in a Post-Imperial World, 2006, p.233.
22 Fulton, “China’s Changing Role in the Middle East”, Atlantic Council, 2019, p.3.
23 Ehteshami, “Middle East Middle Powers: Regional Role, International Impact”,
Uluslararasi Iliskiler, 11(42) (2014). In 2018, Saudi Arabia’s military expenditure
counted for $67.6bln, an amount that makes Riyadh the largest military spender in
the Persian Gulf and the broader MENA region [SIPRI, 2019].
24 Fulton, “China’s Changing Role”, p.9.
25 For instance, it can be argued that major advancements in the Belt and Road
Projects, such as the full operationalisation of the China-Central Asia-Western
Asia Economic Corridor – of which Iran is pivotal node – could increase the IRI’s
leverage vis-à-vis China.
26 Hudson, “Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of
International Relations”, Foreign Policy Analysis, 1 (2005), p.12.
27 Thies and Breuning, “Integrating Foreign Policy Analysis and International Rela
tions through Role Theory”, Foreign Policy Analysis, 8 (2012), p.1.
28 Walker, Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis, 1987.
29 Hudson, “Cultural Expectations of One’s Own and Other Nations’ Foreign Policy
Action Templates”, Political Psychology, 20(4) (1999), p.768.
30 Harnisch et al. China’s International Roles: Challenging or Supporting Interna
tional Order?, 2015, p.3.
31 Hudson, “Cultural Expectations”, p.786.
32 Harnisch, “Role Theory. Operationalization of key concepts” in Role Theory in
International Relations. Approaches and Analyses, ed. Harnisch et al., 2011, p.8.
33 Thies, “Role Theory and Foreign Policy” in The International Studies Encyclo
paedia, ed. Denemark and Marlin-Bennett, 2010, p.6336.
34 Harnisch, “Role Theory”, p.8.
35 Halliday, “Iranian Foreign Policy since 1979: Internationalism and Nationalism in
the Islamic Revolution”, in Shi’ism and Social Protest, ed. Cole and Keddie, 1986,
p.90. Adib-Moghaddam, “Discourse and violence: the friend enemy conjunction in
contemporary Iranian-American relations”, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 2(3)
(2009), p.517.
36 Ansari, “Cultural Transmutation: The Dialectics of Globalisation in Con
temporary Iran” in Politics of Modern Iran, vol. 4, ed. Ansari, 2006, p.96.
37 Gheytanci, “A Revolutionary Tradition: Shoars in Iranian Street Politics” Words
without Borders, 2009.
38 Fürtig, “Universalist Counter-projection: Iranian Post-revolutionary Foreign
Policy and Globalisation”, in Politics of Modern Iran, vol. 4, ed. Ansari, 2006.
39 Seeberg, “The Iranian Revolution, 1977–79: Interaction and Transformation”,
British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 41(4) (2014).
40 Adib-Moghaddam, The International Politics of the Persian Gulf: A Cultural Gen
ealogy, 2006, p.26.
41 Firooz-Abadi, “The Islamic Republic of Iran and the Ideal International System”
in Iran and the International System, ed. Ehteshami and Molavi, 2011, p.56.
42 Ibid., p.55.
43 Seeberg, “The Iranian Revolution”.
44 See Kaufman, “The ‘Century of Humiliation’ and China’s National Narratives”,
Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 10
March 2011 and Zheng, Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in
Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations, 2014.
45 Kaufman, “The Century of Humiliation”, p.2.
46 Kissinger, On China, 2012, p.45.
47 Ibid., p.11.
49 Lanteigne, Chinese Foreign Policy, p.43.

50 Brady, Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing Foreigners in the People’s
Republic of China, 2003. Reported in Garver, China-Iran, pp.5–6.
51 Alden and Alves, “History and Identity in the Construction of China’s Africa
Policy”, Review of African Political Economy, 35(115) (2008).
53 Alden and Alves “History and Identity”, p.43.
55 Garver, China-Iran, pp.3–4.
56 Ibid., p.5.
57 Dorraj and Currier, “Lubricated with Oil: Iran-China Relations in a Changing
World”, Middle East Policy, 15(2) (2008), p.66.
58 Xi, “Work Together for a Bright Future of China-Iran Relations”, China Daily, 21
January 2016.
59 Scita, “Has the Pomegranate finally Blossomed? Sino-Iranian Relations Three
Years after Xi visit to Tehran”, Global Policy, 23 January 2019.
60 Garver, China-Iran, p.9.
61 Ibid., p. 13.
62 Ibid., p. 5.
63 Hudson, “Cultural Expectations”, p. 786.
64 Garver, China & Iran, p.5.
65 Ibid., p.18.
66 Garver, “China-Iran Relations: Cautious Friendship with America’s Nemesis”,
China Report 49(1) (2013), p.75.
67 “The Iranian Nuclear Issue: The View from Beijing”, International Crisis Group
Asia Briefing n.100, 17 February 2010.
68 “US Desire to Strangle Iran could Easily Ignite War”, Global Times, 24 June 2019.
69 In their paper, Ehteshami and Horesh analyse the position of the two major camps
within Iranian politics, the conservatives and the reformists, towards China.
According to the authors, the former appears to be more prone to consider Beijing
a reliable and consistent partner, while the latter acknowledge China’s pragmatic,
often unsatisfactory cooperation with Iran [Ehteshami et al., “Chinese-Iranian”].
70 Ehteshami et al., “Chinese-Iranian”, p.3.
71 Ibid., pp.4–5.
72 “Rouhani says Iran, China’s resistance against U.S. unilateralism benefits the
world”, Tehran Times, 14 June 2019.
73 IRNA, “FM Zarif says shared vision binds Iran-China”, IRNA, 25 August 2019.
74 Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy”, International
Studies Quarterly, 14(3) (1970), p.264.
75 Garver, China-Iran, p.5.
76 “Envoy Urges Strategic Patience to Shield China-Iran Ties from US Sanctions”,
Tasnim News Agency, 13 September 2019.
77 A relevant exception is the study by Akan Malici and Stephen Walker [Malici and
Walker, Role Theory and the Role Conflict in US-Iran Relations: Enemies of Our
Own Making, 2016].
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4 Iran’s ‘Eastward Turn’ in a Turning
World
Reassessing Sanctions as a Driver of China-
Iran Trade
Esfandyar Batmanghelidj
China–Iran Relations Under Sanctions

In June 2012, then Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad traveled to
Beijing to attend a security meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organiza
tion (SCO). Just a few weeks earlier, the United States had imposed sweeping
financial sanctions on Iran, further tightening the campaign of multilateral
sanctions levied since 2008 as the United States and its European allies
sought to isolate Iran over its nuclear program.1 Increasingly isolated by the
West during his two tumultuous terms in office, Ahmadinejad capitalized on
China’s newly assertive position on the world stage to argue that Iran should
look to the East for the political and economic support that was being denied
by the West.2 The argument that Iran should make an “eastward turn” had
been made by a wide range of political stakeholders, including Iran’s Supreme
Leader, Ali Khamenei.3 The SCO summit was yet another opportunity for
photo-ops and public statements—Ahmadinejad met with both Chinese pre
sident Hu Jintao and Russian president Vladimir Putin—but as in previous
years, Iran’s president returned to Tehran with little in the way of concrete
support.
Unbeknownst to the world, backchannel talks would soon begin between
the United States and Iran to discuss the basic parameters of a deal that
would introduce restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanc
tions relief.4 Less than one year later, Iran’s newly elected president, Hassan
Rouhani, ushered in a short-lived era of diplomacy with the West. After two
years of arduous negotiations, in July 2015, Iran and the P5+1 group of
countries (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States, plus Ger
many) agreed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a deal that
placed limits on Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for broad sanctions relief.
In some respects, the JCPOA should have ended Iran’s eastward turn.
Sanctions relief was expected to see a return of European investment in the
Iranian economy and there were even hopes that the deal could form the
foundation of normalized relations between Iran and the United States.5 But
China’s newfound dominance, not just in the Iranian market, but also on the
global stage, gave new life to the idea that Iran had decidedly turned towards
DOI: 10.4324/9781003269175-4
58 Esfandyar Batmanghelidj
the East.6 Certainly, the Rouhani administration continued its outreach to
China, with regular delegations intended to boost economic cooperation.
China was perceived to be courting Iran, newly freed from U.S. secondary
sanctions that had stymied infrastructure investments, into taking a more
central role in the ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).7 Meanwhile,
Iranian politicians, many of whom were wary of the Rouhani administration’s
warming ties with the West, continued to push for an eastward orientation in
Iran’s foreign policy, arguing that China was the more reliable partner given
its support for Iran during the sanctions period. In a meeting with Chinese
President Xi Jinping in January 2016, Khamenei declared, “the Islamic
Republic of Iran will never forget China’s cooperation during the time of
sanctions.”8
It appeared that sanctions, particularly in the period between 2008 and
2016, had pushed Iran into China’s arms. But the reality was more complex.
The economic partnership between the two countries is typically understood
to hinge primarily on Iran’s role as a major exporter of crude oil to China,
and secondarily on the increased presence of Chinese enterprises, many of
them state owned, in the Iranian market, particularly in the area of infra
structure development. But China is still not a major investor in Iran—sanc
tions were an effective impediment to direct Chinese investment.9
Additionally, Iran’s crude oil exports to China matter only in so far as they
provide the financial resources for Iran to purchase the intermediate goods on
which the manufacturing sector depends. China is Iran’s most important oil
customer, but Iran is not an oil economy—oil has rarely accounted for more
than 20% of the country’s GDP.10
The eastward turn is largely substantiated through photo-ops, public state
ments, and political agreements. When economic data is brought to bear in
the discussion of increased Iranian dependence on China, it tends to exclude
both the significant role of non-oil trade in the bilateral relations of the two
countries, as well as the absence of state financing extended to Iran by China,
a key means by which China has sought to bring countries into its orbit.11 To
better inform the discussion of China–Iran relations, this study takes a closer
look at role of Chinese exports of parts, machinery, and transport equipment
to Iran. One of the few areas where Chinese firms did demonstrably expand
their activities in Iran in the period between 2008 and 2016 was in the export
of intermediate goods, which proved increasingly difficult to source from
Europe in the face of multilateral sanctions. This shift was particularly visible
in Iran’s automotive sector, a strategic sector which includes several of the
country’s largest employers.12 In 2011, Chinese cars accounted for just 1% of
the Iranian market. Four years later, that proportion had risen to 9% as more
Chinese automakers entered the Iranian market under complete knock-down
(CKD) manufacturing agreements while European automakers such as Peu
geot and Renault scaled back operations.13
A look to China–Iran bilateral trade (Figure 4.1) makes clear that Chinese
imports of Iranian oil grew considerably in the period during which Iran was
Iran’s ‘Eastward Turn’ in a Turning World 59
Table 4.1 Chinese trade with Iran under sanctions (USD thousands)
Year Exports Imports Oil Imports
2000 713440.6 1773059 1590563
2001 888580 2423971 2162742
2002 1393303 2346269 2079413
2003 2315162 3307360 2965087
2004 2554761 4490694 3983293
2005 3296585 6786678 6064961
2006 4488952 9958456 9028442
2007 7363292 13301528 11642791
2008 8163428 19594195 16799168
2009 7918687 13286547 10567447
2010 11092188 18300891 13085977
2011 14761999 30332973 23058523
2012 11598799 24869408 18431274
2013 14036645 25389864 18161541
2014 24338486 27503850 21187400
2015 17770107 16057447 11050418
2016 16417273 14827192 9601069
2017 18584815 18553693 12271202
2018 14008984 21098883 15090454
2019 9608726 13401559 7155074
2020 8510124 6401928 1339974
Source: UN Comtrade data prepared by author.
subject to multilateral sanctions, with purchases buoyed in value terms by the

historic high oil prices experienced in 2008 to 2014. However, it is the marked
increase in Chinese exports to Iran and, to a lesser extent, Chinese imports of
non-oil goods from Iran, which suggest an evolution in the economic relation
ship. Iran used the proceeds from its burgeoning oil sales to China to buy Chi
nese goods. Chinese exports to Iran peaked in 2014 at $23.3 billion. But as the
comparative analysis of this study shows, while Iran’s economy became far more
linked with that of China while under sanctions, similar shifts can be observed in
China’s trade relationships with many peer countries in the same period.
Methodology
The countries selected for the comparative analysis in this study include
Australia, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Phi
lippines, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand, and Turkey. This
cohort allows for a comparison between Iran and a range of upper-middle
income countries drawn from diverse geographies and with diverse political
alignments. For example, the inclusion of Australia, which is politically
aligned with the West yet proximal to China, can be contrasted with the
inclusion of Russia, which is proximal to Europe, though not politically
aligned with the West. For Iran, which sits between Europe and China and
which maintains political relationships with both, comparisons to countries
like Australia and Russia can help elucidate the degree to which any eastward
turn was politically conditioned, namely by sanctions.
This study focuses on Chinese exports of parts, machinery, and transport
equipment for two reasons. First, focusing on a single category of goods helps
account for variation in the trade composition of the countries included in this
study. Second, as described above, the increased presence of Chinese industrial
partners and suppliers was among the most pronounced examples of deeper
China–Iran economic relations in the sanctions period—it is the uniqueness of
this development that ought to be examined. To capture trade in parts,
machinery, and transport equipment, this study examines Chinese SITC Sec
tion 7 (SITC7) exports to a cohort of countries in the period from 1995 to 2018
using annual export data available from the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The SITC7 category covers intermediate
goods for manufacturing activity, including machinery for food processing,
textile production, power generation, and other forms of industrial activity, but
also includes vehicles and transport equipment such as road vehicles, railway
vehicles, and farming equipment, among other similar goods.
In order to measure the degree to which any changes in trade between China
and Iran might reflect a turn away from the West and towards the East, the
SITC7 export data is collected for China, the European Union, and the United
States. By analyzing the relative proportion of SITC7 exports from these three
major economies to the countries included in the cohort, it is possible to measure
the extent to which China emerged as a greater supplier of parts, machinery, and
transport equipment relative to the two leading Western economies over the last
23 years. The fundamental question addressed by this study is whether the shift
observed in Iran in the period from 1995 to 2018 differs in kind or magnitude
from any shifts observed in the trade patterns of the other countries in the cohort.
Analysis
The collected data tells a compelling story of China’s rise as a global supplier
of industrial goods. In 1995, China’s relative proportion of SITC7 exports
equaled or exceeded 10% in only two countries, Japan (10%) and Pakistan
(17%). China’s proportion averaged 4% across the cohort, compared to 36%
for the United States and 60% for Europe. By 2017, China’s relative propor
tion of SITC7 exports exceeded 50% in 9 of the countries in the cohort.
China’s average relative proportion rose to 46%, as American and European
relative proportions shrank by 20 points and 21 points respectively. What is
clear is that most industrializing economies around the world saw a sig
nificant increase in their reliance on Chinese parts, machinery, and transport
equipment since 1995. China’s share of SITC7 exports to Iran has remained
above the cohort average throughout the period of this study—in 1995, that
proportion was 7%, rising to 53% in 2017.
The snapshots for 1995 and 2017 make clear that Iran’s increased reliance
on Chinese parts, machinery, and transport equipment was not a unique
phenomenon. But these snapshots do not tell the full story. During this two-
decade period, Iran was subjected to an increasingly strict regime of interna
tional sanctions, which placed considerable pressure on Iran’s trade relation
ships in the period from 2008 to 2016. Focusing the analysis of SITC7 exports
to this period, sanctions-related impacts can be observed that appear con
sistent with the narrative of Iran’s eastward turn. The United States has not
been a major supplier of parts, machinery, or equipment to Iran’s industries
over the last four decades, owing to the initial imposition of primary sanc
tions in the aftermath of the 1979 revolution, which were subsequently tigh
tened in 1997 with the Iran Libya Sanctions Act. On that basis, U.S. exports
can be excluded from this analysis of the shift from West to East in the origin
of Iran’s SITC7 imports. In order to examine this shift, it is possible to look
at the ratio of the total value of Chinese SITC7 exports to Iran to those of the
Table 4.2 Proportion of SITC7 exports to sum of three partners (China, USA, EU28)
1995 2018
China USA EU28 China USA EU28
Australia 2.3% 45.8% 51.9% 36.0% 22.7% 41.3%
Brazil 1.7% 41.1% 57.2% 35.6% 23.1% 41.4%
India 1.8% 22.4% 75.8% 55.7% 7.8% 36.6%
Indonesia 6.5% 22.0% 71.6% 70.3% 5.3% 24.4%
Iran 7.1% 2.7% 90.3% 52.9% 0.2% 46.9%
Japan 9.8% 53.7% 36.6% 58.1% 14.6% 27.3%
Malaysia 2.5% 46.4% 51.1% 51.9% 19.1% 29.0%
Mexico 0.4% 87.6% 12.1% 14.0% 70.8% 15.2%
Pakistan 16.6% 11.5% 71.9% 69.5% 4.4% 26.1%
Philippines 3.7% 63.9% 32.3% 54.7% 19.5% 25.7%
Russia 1.0% 11.1% 87.9% 27.6% 3.9% 68.5%
S. Africa 3.3% 20.7% 76.0% 27.3% 10.1% 62.5%
South Korea 3.3% 60.0% 36.7% 53.9% 16.7% 29.4%
Thailand 4.6% 32.2% 63.2% 58.8% 14.2% 27.0%
Turkey 0.7% 11.4% 87.9% 18.0% 3.9% 78.1%
AVERAGE 4.3% 35.5% 60.2% 45.6% 15.8% 38.6%

European Union on an annual basis. For the first decade of this period, the
growth in this ratio was marginal. The ratio of Chinese SITC7 exports to
EU28 SITC7 exports doubled in value terms from 8% in 1995 to 16% in
2005. But in the period from 2005 to 2015, the ratio grew in China’s favor at
a much greater pace, rising to a peak of 258% in 2015. In 2015, with the
announcement of the JCPOA, Iran’s economy began to emerge from sanc
tions conditions. By the following year, after the implementation of sanctions
relief in January of 2016, the ratio fell to 187% as EU28 SITC7 exports
rebounded. Two years later, the ratio had fallen to 113%.
Iran’s 2015 peak ratio put it among countries like Japan, Thailand, and the
Philippines. In a sense, Iran did turn eastward—the relative dominance of
Chinese SITC7 exports over European SITC7 exports was characteristic of an
Asian economy. In this period, the composition of Iran’s trade relationships
notably diverged with that of Russia and Turkey, which might be considered
markets that are similar to Iran in terms of geopolitical orientation. In these
markets, Europe has remained the primary supplier of parts, machinery, and
transport equipment. However, the quick rebound of EU28 exports following
the lifting of both E.U. and U.S. sanctions in 2016 also suggests that this east
ward turn was more circumstantial than strategic. Iran’s trade relationships are
governed by path dependencies. Iran’s economy was primarily developed with
European technology as part of modernization efforts that began around 100
years ago. But more importantly, the most significant phase of Iranian indus
trialization, which took place from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s, was
enabled by European technology transfer and foreign direct investment. The
legacies of this early industrial cooperation remain strong. Iranian state auto
makers Iran Khodro and SAIPA continue to manufacture cars based on
French designs. Iranian state power and rail company MAPNA continues to
draw on technologies transferred to it by Germany’s Siemens.14 Many of the
country’s food and pharmaceutical manufacturers use processes and technolo
gies adopted from Italian and Swiss partners. At a consumer level, Iranians
report negative perceptions of goods that are “Made in China.”15
Stepping back, China’s share of SITC7 exports grew for each country in
the cohort in the period from 1995 to 2018. The sanctions pressures placed on
Iran between 2008 and 2016 exaggerated the underlying shift towards Chinese
SITC7 exports, which can be observed in all the economies in the cohort in
this period. But even if economically speaking, Iran did turn east as the world
turned east, the political significance of those economic shifts should not be
overstated. Notably, in the aftermath of JCPOA sanctions relief, granted to
Iran in 2016, the ratio of Chinese to EU28 exports declined quickly. This
suggests that Iran’s economy remained oriented towards European suppliers.
Second, though China greatly increased its economic engagement with Iran
during the period in which Iran was under multilateral sanctions, the bilateral
trade relationship suffered significantly when the Trump administration deci
ded to unilaterally withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal in May 2018, re
imposing secondary sanctions in full in November of that year. Later, in May
Table 4.3 Ratio of Chinese to EU28 SITC7 exports
Year Australia Brazil India Indonesia Iran Japan Malaysia Mexico Pakistan Philippines Russia South South Thailand Turkey
Africa Korea
1995 0.045 0.03 0.024 0.078 0.267 0.049 0.029 0.231 0.115 0.011 0.089 0.073 0.008
1996 0.044 0.025 0.019 0.116 0.296 0.08 0.023 0.205 0.079 0.011 0.138 0.05 0.011
1997 0.059 0.034 0.041 0.078 0.384 0.11 0.041 0.308 0.089 0.009 0.197 0.088 0.011
1998 0.081 0.036 0.044 0.141 0.492 0.179 0.064 0.262 0.248 0.008 0.321 0.132 0.018
1999 0.094 0.045 0.053 0.192 0.528 0.142 0.06 0.312 0.356 0.016 0.4 0.284 0.023
2000 0.127 0.065 0.094 0.151 0.609 0.221 0.078 0.335 0.22 0.022 0.043 0.428 0.372 0.029
2001 0.138 0.066 0.118 0.124 0.776 0.313 0.102 0.344 0.213 0.025 0.047 0.575 0.353 0.03
2002 0.183 0.073 0.199 0.131 1.034 0.571 0.159 0.443 0.43 0.039 0.064 0.61 0.535 0.043
2003 0.228 0.137 0.195 0.8 0.155 1.29 0.601 0.157 0.577 0.586 0.055 0.069 0.739 0.636 0.061
2004 0.291 0.175 0.318 0.842 0.12 1.435 0.66 0.234 0.56 0.747 0.057 0.075 1.004 0.679 0.055
2005 0.346 0.23 0.398 1 0.158 1.645 0.802 0.264 0.502 0.833 0.08 0.092 1.137 0.72 0.076
2006 0.442 0.331 0.523 1.11 0.262 1.812 0.832 0.409 0.541 0.772 0.106 0.131 1.22 1.153 0.091
2007 0.531 0.357 0.667 1.255 0.394 1.847 0.907 0.498 0.716 0.949 0.145 0.18 1.242 1.129 0.115
2008 0.481 0.438 0.791 1.772 0.446 2.112 0.933 0.543 0.841 1.194 0.152 0.218 1.589 1.185 0.136
2009 0.627 0.503 1.02 1.797 0.49 2.548 1.146 0.77 0.824 1.751 0.152 0.242 1.778 1.253 0.165
2010 0.711 0.587 1.093 2.164 0.601 2.773 1.181 0.798 1.098 1.721 0.21 0.294 1.653 1.321 0.152
2011 0.678 0.624 1.112 2.289 0.928 2.501 1.111 0.806 1.486 1.617 0.207 0.262 1.557 1.479 0.157
2012 0.695 0.693 1.194 1.952 1.265 2.502 1.133 0.801 1.997 1.554 0.227 0.303 1.861 1.468 0.184
2013 0.718 0.667 1.208 2.138 1.827 2.489 1.382 0.891 2.085 1.304 0.237 0.361 1.76 1.495 0.19
2014 0.823 0.691 1.32 2.042 2.613 2.472 1.386 0.925 2.378 1.346 0.29 0.367 1.654 1.875 0.206
2015 0.939 0.638 1.525 2.165 2.584 2.628 1.821 0.915 3.111 2.304 0.337 0.432 1.839 2.436 0.209
Iran’s ‘Eastward Turn’ in a Turning World
2016 0.821 0.656 1.762 2.09 1.868 2.404 1.635 0.859 3.025 2.478 0.439 0.372 1.835 2.19 0.204
2017 0.869 0.877 1.763 2.371 1.499 2.32 1.724 0.853 3.171 2.704 0.411 0.402 1.718 1.943 0.215
63
2018 0.871 0.867 1.527 2.879 1.129 2.116 1.776 0.923 2.667 2.124 0.403 0.443 1.779 2.18 0.231

2019, the revocation of waivers permitting the sale of Iranian oil to eight
customers has seen a marked decrease in Chinese purchases of Iranian oil,
though exports later rose as China began to source Iranian oil indirectly
through third countries such as the UAE and Malaysia.16 Between 2018 and
2020, overall bilateral trade fell from $35 billion to just $15 billion (Figure
4.1). These figures do not include China’s intermediated purchases of Iranian
oil, but they do reflect the significant decline in Chinese exports to Iran,
which totaled just $8.5 billion, a level last seen a decade ago.
In the era of unilateral sanctions, which have been maintained by the Biden
administration, China’s economic aims in Iran are narrow and strategic. As
Julia Gurol and Jacopo Scita have observed, China’s continued purchases of
Iranian oil reflect an “attempt to appease Iran and avoid a full-scale conflict
in the Persian Gulf.”17 As China has reduced overall import volumes from
Iran, it has increased purchases from Iran’s great energy rival, Saudi Arabia.
It would be relatively easy for China to replace Iranian supply outright with
imports from other countries, but incidents such as the attack on the Aramco
facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais in September 2019 have made clear the risks
to Chinese energy security of such a move. Iran has threatened—and now
credibly signaled—that is has the means to prevent reliable energy exports
from the Middle East, at least in the short-term.18 At the same time, China’s
overwhelming dependence on energy exports from the Middle East makes it
important to maintain diverse energy supplies. From this standpoint, the
diminishment of Iran as a supplier introduces vulnerabilities with respect to
those suppliers that have picked-up the slack—a phenomenon astutely noted
in a policy brief by the European Council on Foreign Relations:
The country has long maintained a somewhat balanced approach to its

Gulf energy imports. Given the Gulf monarchies’ close ties to the United
States, Beijing is concerned that Washington could put pressure on them
to disrupt the flow of oil into China. This concern increases the perceived
importance of Iran, which China sees as more resistant to US policy. At
the same time, the current round of US sanctions on Iran underscores
China’s reliance on the Arab side of the Gulf. Chinese oil imports from
Saudi Arabia rose from 921,811 barrels per day in August 2018 to
1,802,788 in July 2019. Beijing is likely concerned about this level of
dependence upon one energy source.19
In this way, the need to maintain energy security establishes a theoretical floor
for China–Iran trade ties, particularly in respect to imports of Iranian oil.
However, the atrophying of China–Iran trade under unilateral sanctions
challenges the notion that Iran had successfully consolidated a strategic rela
tionship with China following its eastward turn. Unlike in the previous sanc
tions period, Chinese firms are not aggressively moving in to fill the vacuum
left by the retreat of European firms.20 It is unlikely that China has decided to
sever a once-strong strategic partnership with Iran—the more likely
explanation is that analysts who had heralded Iran’s eastward turn had over
estimated the depth of the strategic relationship, in no small part because of
their misconception of the underlying logic of China–Iran economic ties.
Discussion
With regards to the imports of parts, machinery, and transport equipment, Iran
did undergo an eastward turn in the period of multilateral sanctions, which ran
from 2008 to the beginning of 2016. Iran’s industry sector proved resilient in the
face of sanctions in large part because of the ability to “reflect” imports of key
intermediate goods away from jurisdictions encumbered by sanctions, such as the
European Union, and towards those jurisdictions where trade could flow more
freely, such as China.21 The assessment of the efficacy of multilateral sanctions in
squeezing Iran’s economy typically focuses on metrics such as the impact on oil
sales and key macroeconomic indicators such as foreign exchange prices, infla
tion, and unemployment. However, in many respects, the resiliency of the Iranian
economy is reflective of a sustained industrial capacity—the expansion of Chinese
SITC7 exports, which largely offset the loss of European SITC7 exports, helps
illustrate how Iran was able to weather the sanctions, experiencing just one year
of significant contraction—in 2012, when Iran’s economy shrank by 7.4%.22 The
economy rebounded to flat growth the following year.
But while sanctions led to a greater reliance on Chinese SITC7 exports in
Iran, similar growth in Chinese SITC7 exports relative to European exports can
be observed in every country included in the cohort. It is clear that sanctions
were not the fundamental driver of the eastward turn. Here, the counterfactual
is instructive. Had broad sanctions not been placed on Iran in the period
between 2008 and 2016, Iran would have still experienced a significant increase
in Chinese SITC7 exports and the related industrial cooperation. As John
Garver observes in his study of China–Iran relations from 2006:
The lower technological level of China’s capital goods also held certain
advantages for Iran. They were easier for Iranian personnel to master,
thereby lessening the large numbers of expensive Western specialists
associated with the import of more advanced Western technology. Chi
nese experts, who often accompanied equipment to assist in set-up, also
cost a lot less than Western specialists. According to a top manager at
Iran’s Petro Pars oil company, a European petroleum engineer could cost
the company $30,000 a month, while a Chinese engineer with the same
level of skill cost $500 a month. China was also quite willing to transfer
to Iran advanced Western technology only recently acquired by China
itself. This assisted Iran’s efforts at indigenous industrialization.23
Garver’s analysis makes clear that the early drivers of increased Chinese
SITC7 exports to Iran were commercial in nature and not related to larger
geopolitical considerations.
The trade data assembled here also shows the contingent nature of this
eastward turn. The sanctions effect clearly exaggerated Iran’s reliance on
Chinese SITC7 exports, such that the composition of Iran’s trade with China
began to resemble that of an Asian economy. But while the presence of Chi
nese entrepreneurs and traders in Iran was highlighted as evidence of a dee
pening strategic alliance, in reality, the presence or absence of Chinese entities
within the Iranian economy is clearly governed not by some overarching
geopolitical alignment, but by the ebbs and flows of international commerce.
Neither Chinese nor Iranian officials are as convinced of their strategic
partnership as many Western observers have assumed. As Arianne Tabatabai
and Dina Esfandiary argue in their study of Iran’s relations with Russia and
China, the two powers “will not hesitate to walk away from Iran should eco
nomic, political, and/or military ties no longer be useful to them.”24 This is
perhaps best illustrated by the fact that China’s trade with Iran has fallen
dramatically following the imposition of unilateral sanctions by the United
States.25 Given the, at times, fractious experience dealing with Iranian coun
terparts in the sanctions period, many Chinese companies opted not to
expand their operations when sanctions were lifted and wind down operations
when sanctions were re-imposed. There was a sense among some Chinese
executives that Iranian firms had not shown enough gratitude for Chinese
support in the sanctions period, particularly considering the speed with which
Iranian firms turned back towards European partners as the nuclear deal
came to fruition.26 In October 2018, when Bank of Kunlun, the bank at the
center of China–Iran trade, halted Iran transactions in advance of the re-
imposition of U.S. secondary sanctions.27 Eventually, the bank announced
that it would resume Iran–related transactions, but only for trade activity
exempt from U.S. secondary sanctions, limiting its role mostly to the facilita
tion of humanitarian trade. Iranian firms were left scrambling to find alter
native financial channels through which to sustain imports of key goods from
China, including parts, machinery, and transport equipment.
The experience with Bank of Kunlun shattered any sense among Iranian
enterprises that China’s defiance of U.S. sanctions pressure would be resolute.
Iranian stakeholders have been frustrated by the minimal support offered by
China to counteract the threat to the nuclear deal posed by President Trump and
to help Iran weather the re-imposed sanctions. In a statement issued following a
February 2019 meeting between Iran’s parliament speaker Ali Larijani and Xi
Jinping, the Chinese president was reported to have declared that “No matter how
the international and regional situation changes, China’s resolve to develop a
comprehensive strategic partnership with Iran will remain unchanged.”28 Iranian
stakeholders remained unconvinced, not least because China–Iran trade had
fallen dramatically in the immediate aftermath of the Trump administration’s re
imposition of secondary sanctions in November of 2018. Speaking during a poli
tical gathering in Tehran that same month, Iranian foreign minister Mohammad
Javad Zarif criticized Iranian officials who were once again arguing for Iran to
shift its strategic focus to the East as a response to the renewed sanctions
pressures, telling the audience “At the time being, looking to East is as mean
ingless as looking to West.”29 Zarif’s comments pointed to an increased awareness
among Iranian policymakers that Iran must find its way in a multipolar world and
that no single power can be a guarantor of Iran’s security nor economic prosperity.
Notably, Zarif’s comments came only several weeks after Iran’s Supreme Leader,
Ali Khamenei, told an audience of scholars that the country must “look East”
given that pinning hopes of “the West” would “belittle” Iran.30
In an August 2019 op-ed in China Daily, published in advance of an official
visit to Beijing, Zarif called for China and Iran to achieve a “strategic part
nership,” and heralded a “guideline for future cooperation, which is a mani
festation of the fact that the two countries’ cooperation is now entering a new
phase.”31 In many respects, Zarif ’s op-ed is unremarkable. It uses language
that would be familiar to anyone who had read the communiqués issued fol
lowed Ahmadinejad’s many visits to Beijing a decade ago. However, while
Zarif acknowledges that “China has become an indispensable economic
partner of Iran and the two countries are strategic partners on many fronts,”
he emphasizes that “in order to overcome the emerging challenges which have
impeded the ability of many nations to achieve sustainable development, it is
imperative for both China and Iran to strengthen their ties more than the
past.” In this way, Zarif describes a still nascent strategic partnership with
China, particularly with regard to economic cooperation.
Zarif ’s 2019 op-ed provides an interesting update to the earlier op-ed
authored by Chinese President Xi Jinping ahead of his first official visit to
Tehran in January 2016. In his op-ed, Xi points to the legacy of the Silk Road
while noting that the “development strategies” of China and Iran “are highly
compatible, which creates huge potential for cooperation.”32 Xi declares that
China and Iran “will establish a comprehensive strategic partnership and
increase exchanges between political parties, legislatures and at the sub
national levels.”33 Reading Xi’s and Zarif ’s letters together, it is clear that
while China and Iran maintain a strong relationship based on economic and
political cooperation, the strategic partnership envisioned by Xi in 2016 had
yet to materialize by the time of Zarif ’s letter in 2019.
Two years later, one of Zarif ’s final acts as foreign minister was to oversee
the signing of the long-awaited Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with
China. Zarif welcomed Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi to Tehran in March
2021 to sign the agreement. But the agreement, which lacked specific targets
or commitments, did not represent a significant maturation of the China–Iran
partnership.34 Later in the year, Iran’s newly elected President Ebrahim Raisi
traveled to Dushanbe for the SCO summit—his first overseas trip, just as it
had been for Rouhani in 2003. During the summit, SCO members finally
voted to enable Iran to begin accession to the body—a process that may take
two years.35 By the end of 2021, Iran finally had its long-desired political
agreements in hand; a bilateral Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with
China and pending accession to the multilateral SCO. But economically
speaking, little had changed and bilateral trade continued to languish.
Conclusion
Paying greater attention to Iran’s economic relations can help refine our
understanding of Iranian foreign policy and strategic imperatives. The notion
that Iran made an eastward turn is often used to argue the strategic stakes of
Western sanctions. For sanctions opponents, the eastward turn is indicative of
the strategic folly of maximum pressure. For example, analysts wondered
whether Trump’s maximum pressure sanctions pushed Iran into China’s
hands.36 For sanctions proponents, China’s involvement in Iran is used to
justify maximalist approaches intended to deter even non-Western investment
activity. But both sides treat the China–Iran strategic partnership as a mature
phenomenon without recognizing that the partnership remains in a nascent
stage and continues to be shaped by internal factors, such as the political tides
in Beijing and Tehran, as well as external factors, such as the impact of U.S.
sanctions on the feasibility of trade and investment.
The proactive role the U.S. can play in determining the parameters of the
China–Iran relationship poses a dilemma for Iranian policymakers. Henry
Farrell and Abraham Newman define “weaponized interdependence” as the
phenomenon in which “some states are able to leverage interdependent
relations to coerce others.” Farrell and Newman offer a theoretical frame
work to understand the power of secondary sanctions and how U.S. eco
nomic coercion may impact the trajectory of China–Iran trade ties. They
write:
States with political authority over the central nodes in the international
networked structures through which money, goods and information travel
are uniquely positioned to impose costs on others. If they have appropriate
domestic institutions, they can activate networks to gather information or
choke off economic and information flows, discover and exploit vulner
abilities, compel policy change, and deter unwanted actions.37
The decline of China–Iran trade under U.S. secondary sanctions sub

stantiates that weaponized interdependence that the forces of globalization
helped drive increased Chinese trade and investment in the Iranian econ
omy may now be a source of vulnerability. As Farrell and Newman write,
“economic globalization may fundamentally transform the international
structure and thus generate new forms of state power.”38 The simple fact
that Chinese economic development was itself “interdependent” with the
period of frenetic globalization captured in the period of this study has led
to a point where China’s economic linkages can be weaponized against it,
particularly through direct exposure to what Farrell and Newman call
“chokepoints,” such as the primacy of the U.S. financial system, but also
indirectly through the ability of a country like the United States to create
linkages between the issue of Chinese economic support for Iran and per
ceived unfairness in China–U.S. trade given the multinational footprint of
Chinese state enterprises. Iran can no longer rely on the commercial
attractiveness of its large and diversified economy and strategic geographic
location to furnish a sufficient basis for trade with key suppliers like
China.
The second dilemma facing Iranian policymakers pertains to their lack of
options regarding these new and emergent dynamics. The analysis of Iran’s
strategic alignment to either the West or East tends to misunderstand the
ways in which that alignment matters to the economy. A superficial assess
ment of Iran’s economic ties to Europe and China not only leads to an
overestimation of the eastward turn, but it also leads to an underestimation
of the importance for Iran to find some new strategic alignment between
both East and West—something Iranian policymakers have also been guilty
of, as reflected in Zarif ’s frustrated pleas quoted above. Rather than simply
seeing oil sales or trade flows as indicative of some political alignment,
much greater attention ought to be placed on the ways in which Iran is
pursuing its strategic relations with specific regard to economic develop
ment. As the analysis of this study shows, something as seemingly mechan
ical as the availability of SITC7 goods is actually fundamentally important
to the prospects of Iranian economic development. If Iran is to achieve
sustained economic growth, delivering prosperity for its people, it must find
some way to sustain economic relations with both East and West—neither
offers an alternative for the other.
Further studies should also examine increased complementarity in Wes
tern and Eastern industrial supply chains. Cross-border investments and
technology transfer between Europe and China will mean that many Eur
opean multinationals may supply their Iran operations from supply chains
based in China, while Chinese multinationals may do the same from supply
chains based in Europe. When European automakers return to Iran, they
may supply their Iranian assembly lines with parts sourced from their
China-based supply chains. Likewise, Chinese ownership of European
industrial firms, such as German robotics leader Kuka, could see Iran-rela
ted sales or investment decisions require buy-in from management in both
Europe and China. The necessity of a more robust China–Iran partnership
is only enhanced by China’s increased role as a financial and industrial
player in Europe. In this regard, Iran may actually need to consolidate its
eastward turn to more effectively engage with the West.39
The possibility that Iran may integrate its trade relationships with Europe
and China into a single cohesive system points to the potential for a new
“Eurasian” strategic alignment that casts aside the obsolete binary between
East and West.40 In this regard, the fluid, non-ideological, if still culturally
determined, relationships that govern international business may be the best
early indicator for the direction of Iranian foreign policy. As the analysis of
trade relationships makes clear, Iran must remain ready to recalibrate in a
rapidly turning world.
Notes
1 Wee, “Iran’s Ahmadinejad to Visit as China Slams New Sanctions,” Reuters, May
23, 2012.
2 Scita, “To Understand the China-Iran Deal, Forget the Hype and Look at the
Context,” Responsible Statecraft, July 15, 2020.
3 Mahsa Rouhi and Clement Therme, “Could Iran’s Eastern Ambitions Pave the
Way for Future Prosperity?,” IISS, March 28, 2019.
4 In March 2013, secret talks between US and Iranian officials took place in Oman
in parallel to Iran’s negotiations with the P5+1. See: “A Timeline of Key Events in
US-Iran Negotiations,” Associated Press, 25 November 2013.
5 Power, “Iran: Western Companies Hope For a Business Bonanza,” Time, October
30, 2014.
6 Erdbrink, “For China’s Global Ambitions, ‘Iran Is at the Center of Everything’,”
New York Times, July 25, 2017.
7 Vatanka, “China Courts Iran,” Foreign Affairs, August 14, 2019.
8 “Iran will never forget China’s cooperation during the time of sanctions,” Khamenei.
ir, January 23, 2016.
9 Scita, “China-Iran: A Complex, Seesaw Relationship,” ISPI, February 8, 2019.
10 Detsch, “US Sanctions Fail to Bend Iran’s Economy, Expert Says,” Al Monitor,
June 20, 2019.
11 Cox, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Southeast Asia” (LSE Ideas and
CIMB ASEAN Research Institute, October 2018).
12 Baker, “China’s Chery to Open Auto Factory in Iran.” MSNBC, August 13, 2007.
13 Hosseinifar, Ebrahimzadeh, and Jünemann, “Sanction Effects on the Iranian
Automotive Market” (ILIA Corporation).
14 “Siemens and MAPNA Sign Iranian Locomotive Contract,” Railway Gazette,
October 4, 2016.
15 Karami, Siahpoush, and Olfati, “How Consumers Perceive the Products Made in
China: A Case Study of Iran’s Apparel Market,” International Journal of China
Marketing 3, no. 2 (2013).
16 Batmanghelidj, “UAE Earns Big as Iran Sells Oil to China.” Bourse & Bazaar
Foundation, 27 Oct. 2021.
17 Gurol and Scita, “China’s Persian Gulf Strategy: Keep Tehran and Riyadh Con
tent,” Iran Source, January 24, 2020.
18 Jaffe, “How Iran Can Hold the World Oil Market Hostage,” Council on Foreign
Relations, October 29, 2019.
19 Lons, Fulton, Sun, Al-Tamimi. “China’s Great Game in the Middle East,” Eur
opean Council on Foreign Relations, October 2019.
20 Batmanghelidj, “Why China Isn’t Standing By Iran,” Bloomberg, March 27, 2019.
21 Batmanghelidj. “The Ins and Outs of Iranian Industrial Resilience under Sanc
tions.” The Muslim World, vol. 111, Feb. 2021, pp. 96–112.
22 “IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) - Transitions and Tensions” (IMF, Octo
ber 2013).
23 Garver, China and Iran: Ancient Partners in a Post-Imperial World, 2011. (241).
24 Tabatabai and Esfandiary, Triple-Axis: Iran’s Relations with Russia and China.
25 Batmanghelidj, “New Dynamics in China-Iran Trade Under Sanctions” (Bourse &
Bazaar, January 2019).
26 Bozorgmehr, “China Ties Lose Lustre as Iran Refocuses on Trade with West,”
Financial Times, September 23, 2015.
27 Motamedi, “Policy Change at China’s Bank of Kunlun Cuts Iran Sanctions Life
line,” Bourse & Bazaar, January 2, 2019.
28 “Chinese president meets Iran’s parliament speaker,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the People’s Republic of China, February 21, 2019.
29 “Zarif Calls Khamenei’s ‘Look To East’ Policy ‘Meaningless,’” RFE/RL, Decem
ber 15, 2018.
30 Ibid.
31 Zarif, “Shared Vision Binds Iran-China Relations,” Global Times, August 26, 2019.
32 Xi, “Work Together for a Bright Future of China-Iran Relations,” China Daily,
January 21, 2016.
33 Ibid.
34 Greer and Batmanghelidj. “China and Iran Announced a New Economic and
Security Partnership. That’s Not as Alarming as It Sounds.” Washington Post,
April 1, 2021,
35 Grajewski. Iranian Membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Motiva
tions and Implications. Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 15, 2021.
36 Gordon. “Has Trump Driven China and Iran Together?” War on the Rocks, July
21, 2020.
37 Farrell and Newman. “Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic
Networks Shape State Coercion.” International Security 44, no. 1 (2019): 42–79.
38 Farrell and Newman. “Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic
Networks Shape State Coercion.”
39 Batmanghelidj, “To Work With Europe, Iran May Need to Deal with China,”
Bourse & Bazaar, October 25, 2016.
40 Rouhi and Batmanghelidj, “A New Narrative for Iranian Foreign Policy,” Survival
IISS (blog), February 28, 2019.
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5 China’s Foreign Policy in the Middle
East and the Position of the GCC
States
Vorachai Israsena-Pichitkanjanakul
Introduction
In modern times, foreign policy is closely intertwined with economic integration,
cultural trends and exchanges, and military cooperation. The interstate diplo
macy between China and the GCC states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) has grown tremendously in the last five
decades.1 These diplomatic relations have been shaped and influenced by the
prevailing international as well as regional power-play efforts, in addition to
China’s own strategic policies.2 When China initiated its radical, capitalistic
economic reforms in 1978, the subsequent economic growth that followed
necessitated the consumption of large amounts of energy, particularly crude oil.
The GCC states were able to facilitate China’s rising energy demand, marking
the start of strategic, multilateral, and economic relations.3 At present, China’s
foreign policy toward the Middle East is forged on strong economic interests that
are bound to grow even further. This is in spite of oil-related infrastructural
programs and non-oil investments in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and
other nascent sectors of the Middle East’s overall economy.
This chapter analyses China’s foreign policy goals with a specific view on
the diplomatic cooperation it has with the GCC states. Thereafter, an eva
luation of the energy and non-energy factor, the position of the GCC states
and Iran, the use of soft power and cultural interactions, the Sino–American
rivalry and influence, and the cooperation on the non-oil investments. More
over, this chapter also examines Chinese foreign policy from a holistic per
spective, which offers the advantage of evaluating the policy details from
existing literature and other secondary data sources which provide the foun
dation of this study. Using this approach made it possible to obtain vital
guidance in determining how China views its relationship with the GCC
states. This approach also made it easy to see the differences in the Chinese
policy when considering the causes and effects of those policy decisions when
compared to the actions of other countries who have interests in the Middle
East, such as Russia or the US. The holistic approach also allowed the fol
lowing questions to be considered: the extent of the importance of the GCC
states to Chinese foreign policy in the region, the extent to which oil drives
DOI: 10.4324/9781003269175-5
The GCC States in China’s Foreign Policy 75
the foreign policy of China in the region, and the way economic interest lies
at the heart of China’s approach to international relations.
China’s Foreign Policy Goals

1978 was a profound year in China’s history, as it marked the implementation of
the so-called “Socialism with Chinese Characteristic” that launched China into
the international limelight,4 which is the term Deng Xiaoping,5 the country’s
leader at the time, instituted economic reforms that aimed to replace the dom
ineering communist ideologies with capitalistic policies required to drive eco
nomic growth.6 Prior to the Deng Xiaoping era (1978–1990), Chinese foreign
policy sought primarily to defend the independence of the countries in which
China had its own interests. It was important to China that these countries were
able to maintain their independence since this promoted good relations with
China and, thus, encouraged those countries to welcome Chinese activities
within their territory.7 Today, China’s strategy and objectives remain broadly
similar. The act of building strong relationships with those countries in which it
had economic interests was clearly perceived as a means for China to expand its
global influence. In the context of the Middle East, for example, Chinese rela
tionships with several countries were initially based on the pursuit of the mutual
political interests. In, almost, the two-decade period that preceded Deng Xiaop
ing’s (1978–1990) ascent to power, Chinese foreign policy underwent significant
adjustments to eventually reflect the country’s political objectives to later achieve
and enhance its economic goal afterwards.8
In 1955, the comprehensive outcomes of the Bandung Conference9 in
Indonesia informally marked the start of the Sino–Arab relations. The mutual
political objective of the time involved support for all the liberation move
ments in various countries in the Middle East. This outcome undoubtedly
went well with the “Five principles of Chinese foreign policy”,10 which were
initially conceptualized by Chinese First Prime Minister Zhou Enlai11 in
1954, and has become a significant pillar within the foreign policy of China
continuously today.12 Accordingly, these principles are still being used to
assure that Beijing will not meddle or interfere in the domestic affairs of any
nation and will continue to maintain friendly relations that strengthen coop
eration and unity with other countries and its trading partners.
The economic reforms engineered by Deng Xiaoping also opened a new front
in China’s foreign policy, where political objectives were relegated behind multi
lateral economic engagements.13 As a result, the Chinese economy grew rapidly,
and, consequently, it became a net importer of energy resources. With the Per
sian Gulf being a key strategic region forthwith, China became increasingly
dependent upon the GCC states to supply its demands. In return, the GCC states
and Iran also became increasingly reliant upon this vital customer. There was an
establishment of comprehensive economic cooperation between the GCC states
and China in what was an insurance energy security pillar, or a key to sustaining
and to safeguarding Chinese economic growth.
76 Vorachai Israsena-Pichitkanjanakul
China’s Middle East Foreign Policy
Many strategic changes have been made to China’s Middle East foreign
policy ever since the start of informal relations after the Bandung Conference
in 1955. China’s establishment of formal diplomatic relations in the region
started in 1971 with Iran and Kuwait and continued with Oman in 1981, the
United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 1984, followed by Qatar in 1988, Bahrain in
1989, and finally with Saudi Arabia in 1990.14
China has exercised caution and avoided expressing support for either Iran
or Saudi Arabia in the decades-long tensions in the Gulf region. Instead,
China has sought to play the role of a neutral intermediary capable of
standing outside the geo-sectarian conflicts. More importantly, China has
pursued this policy with the objective of economic prosperity for all sides,
seeking peaceful coexistence by non-interfering to domestic issues of any
GCC states and Iran.15 It is clear that China is well aware that the tensions
between the two regional rivals presents a threat to oil security and ship lanes
stability and, thus, to Chinese interests. However, Beijing does not ignore the
existence of the significant opportunities in pursuing closer ties with both
Tehran and Riyadh at the same time. With the US severing diplomatic rela
tions with Iran, China understands that there exists the potential to forge
closer ties with the Iranian economy, noting Iran’s natural resources, highly
educated workforce, and important geographic position in the Persian Gulf.16
China is also seeking closer economic cooperation with Saudi Arabia.
China has significantly deeper ties with the GCC states as a bloc in the
Middle East. This was evidenced by the 2004 commencement of negotiations
of the China-GCC Free Trade Agreement, which sought to provide a much-
needed framework for trade and investment between the two partners. Even
without a comprehensive trade deal in place, transactions between China and
the GCC has accounted for close to 70% of the trade volume between China
and all member states of the Arab League.17 Putting this value in context, the
significance of the China-GCC trade has rapidly grown from under $10 billion
in 2000 to around $115 billion in 2016,18 and hit $160 billion in 2020.19 Beijing
has undoubtedly become the GCC’s topmost trading partner.20 Further, both
parties are in the progress of economic cooperation and transformation.
Undoubtedly, the Middle East provides a very important market for many
Chinese products as well as services. There is a considerable middle-class in
the region and a construction sector boom that many Chinese companies
have profited from in the recent past. Accordingly, the most important aspect
of China’s economic interest and cooperation in the Middle East is the
potential for growth and expansion that this region holds.21 It is therefore
worthy that China is aiming to gain a greater market share for its goods and
services within the region. Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that China’s
Middle East policy is based around getting value for the oil trade and its
demands, which, therefore, the safeguard of regional ship lanes and stability
would support Chinese economic growth. China is already one of the top and
the most significant export markets for the GCC, indicating the strategic
importance of relations. Upon further scrutiny, the growth in exports to the
GCC is encouraged by a marked increase in exports to Saudi Arabia.22 At
present, China’s three main trading partners in the Persian Gulf region
include Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran.23 As such, the growth in exports to
this region will offset part of the capital used to purchase oil from the region;
accruing double economic benefits to China.
Other than the GCC states, China’s economic relations with Iran are very
well-established. Beijing remains the topmost trading partner and oil importer
of Tehran.24 Accordingly, China has invested in Iranian infrastructure and
transferred its technological knowledge related to energy and infrastructural
sectors, which have helped Tehran from the global sanctions. It means that
Iran is a key partner and market that China cannot ignore. In perspective,
China–Iran trade exceeded $31 billion in 2016, in what was a double-digit
year-on-year growth.25 In 2019, Beijing was ranked 1st on imports from
Tehran, worth $12.1 billion, and the top product was crude oil petroleum.26
Thus, there are strategic benefits in having good relations and deepening the
ties with both the GCC and Iran.
The latest in this foreign policy is a 2016 framework called the Arab
Policy Paper. It outlines China’s engagement with the Middle East 11 in a
“1+2+3” cooperation framework.27 The “1” represents the most significant
area of cooperation, which is energy while the “2” represents the infra
structure construction, trade as well as finance sectors. Finally, the “3”
represents cooperation on science and advanced technology areas, for
instance, space satellites and nuclear energy. This policy framework is built
upon the realization of China’s reliance on the Middle East’s energy supply,
and the technology transfer that the Middle East countries are seeking in a
bid to diversify their national economies.
The Energy Factor

Crude oil forms the key component in the relationship between China and the
countries surrounding the Persian Gulf and, accordingly, the energy sector
can be characterized as the cornerstone of Chinese foreign policy in the
region. China is the world’s leading importer of oil and requires assurance
that the oil from the Middle East, particularly from the Gulf region, will
continue to flow Eastward. For this reason, China has diversified its interests
within the region, so that the GCC states, Iran, and Iraq combine to provide
around 60% or more of the country’s total oil imports.28 In 2016, the figures
for bilateral trade, predominantly crude oil, had the KSA accounting for $60
billion, $46.3 billion with the UAE, and $31 billion with Iran.29 However, the
last three years exports (2016–2019) to China report 156% growth from the
KSA, 13.5% growth from the UAE, and 129% growth from Iran. The crude
oil trade value in 2019 alone exported $45.8 billion (77.5%) from the KSA,
$12.1 billion (52.1%) from Iran, and $3.92 billion (26.7%) from the UAE.30 In
the case of Qatar, the trade value was $7.8 billion31 or 75.6% in 2019, which
primarily accounts for the exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG). The growth
on the petroleum gas exports from Qatar to China over last three years
(2016–2019) was $4.21 billion or increased by 117%.32
Saudi Arabia and Iran are both major oil exporters to China, and both
occupy strategic geographical positions in the global oil supply chain,
regardless of the periodic sanctions on Iran’s oil exports. Their animosity
and frigid relations present an overbearing risk to the Chinese energy supply
chain. Furthermore, China’s huge investments in the region would be
thrown into a state of chaos if any confrontation ensued between Tehran
and Riyadh. As such, China’s foreign policy has identified these risks, and
attempted to compartmentalize its interests and approach toward the two.
This has been done through the enactment of long-term crude oil supply
contracts that assure the countries of a reliable source of oil revenue from
China in return.33
One of the significant risks for China’s energy demands in the Persian Gulf
was the trade embargo that was imposed to Qatar by three GCC states of the
Quartet, namely the KSA, the UAE, and Bahrain. The Qatar blockade was
enforced on the grounds that the country was supporting terrorist groups that
had caused major disorder in the Middle East for years. As such, the ban had
made negotiations of a trade deal virtually impossible under that climate.34
Consequently, it requires a flexible geo-strategic response that is adaptive to
the current version of events. The signing of the Al-Ula declaration on 5
January 2021, to end the blockade has finally reunited and brought all GCC
member states to re-strengthen their cooperation and solidarity to promote
peace and stability in the region, including economic development, to which
Beijing is more than welcome to play parts in it.35
Non-energy Sectors
In terms of the export of services to the Middle East, China now plays a
prominent role in the construction, finance, and telecommunication sectors of
various countries in the region. As highlighted by Cheng (2016), the value of
the collaboration between construction companies in the Middle East and
their Chinese partners stood at $21 billion in 2011.36 Furthermore, Molavi
(2019) points out that the entirety of the North African and Middle Eastern
infrastructure partnerships with China amounted to a value of $123.12 billion
for the period from 2013 to 2018.37 These sectors are vital aspects of the non-
energy-related trade. By country, the figures for the same period were $14.91
billion for Saudi Arabia, $13.68 billion for Iran, $21.95 billion for the UAE,
and $8.64 billion for Iraq.38 As part of these investments, there are ongoing
infrastructural developments being carried out under a long-term vision that
has been entrenched in China’s current Middle East policy.39 The vision out
lines three key pillars that include:
� Conceptual framework that involves construction of transportation cor
ridors to link the Afro-Eurasian landmass.
� Comprehensive coordination with each country under the BRI grand plan
to enhance financial integration and remove barriers that hinder trade.
� Cooperation through the BRI linked projects and institutions, such as the
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.
Accordingly, the development of the BRI marks a major increase of China-

led infrastructural expansion in the Middle East. The role of the AIIB in the
BRI is structured upon multilateral ties that hinge on the economic benefits
accrued. As such, these non-oil investments will progressively play a key role
in safeguarding China’s relations with most GCC states.40 Therefore, it is
necessary to examine these investments holistically.
The BRI, in sum, is a strategic infrastructural vision that was launched by
Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013. The vision seeks to connect China to the
Eurasian geographical areas through extensive transportation corridors, tele
communication networks, and energy pipelines. In perspective, the BRI covers
65 countries, 4.4 billion people, and 30% of the global GDP, and is primarily
composed of two infrastructural routes: the Silk Road Economic Belt and the
Maritime Silk Road.41 The Silk Road Economic Belt refers to the land routes
linking China to Europe, the Middle East, Russia, and Central Asia, while the
sea routes are altogether grouped into the Maritime Silk Road. As of now
(2021), Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, by signing BRI-related documents
with the 19 States of the Middle East, China has already implemented dis
tinctive partnership and cooperation with them.42 As of now, according to Yi
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2021) the BRI is
unquestionably the most significant programme of economic diplomacy since
the US-led Marshall Plan of the late 1940s.43 For the GCC, both the Silk Road
Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road are earmarked for construction in
what China sees as an offensive through which it can gain further strategic
interests in the region.44 The BRI has grown in significance to China’s global
foreign policy. Karasik (2016) states that the GCC sees this as an opportunity
through which it can reshape the global economic market supply chains to
adapt to a new world order, and serve a larger more prominent role.45 Further
to the BRI initiative, Lin also indicates that the GCC countries view this for
eign investment as an avenue through which they can stimulate their national
economies and as a way of receiving more favourable and preferential financing
terms for loans and concessional funds.46 In maintaining its strategic foreign
policy balance and building ties with both Saudi Arabia and Iran, by virtue of
their position, both countries play a very critical geo-strategic role in the BRI’s
Middle East framework, and are key energy suppliers to China.
China has recently become more engaged and has been taking a more
prominent role in the Middle East’s security apparatus through arms sales
and naval presence. China has also taken part in the monitoring of critical
strategic points along the Persian Gulf where shipping might potentially be
choked, such as the Strait of Hormuz.47 The reason for this oversight lies in
the importance of protecting the supply of oil to China. To this end, the
Chinese navy has visited numerous ports throughout the Gulf region as one
component of the Chinese foreign policy in the Middle East. For example, in
2019, a joint Iran–Russia–China naval operation training sprang in the Gulf
of Oman in what was said to be an attempt to protect the regional shipping
lanes.48 Another similar joint naval exercise training in the Persian Gulf is
slated for late 2021 or early 2020.49
Further to supply chain surveillance, China has become an increasingly
important player in the Middle East’s arms market. In what is another com
ponent of the non-oil trade, Kliman and Grace (2018) describe that China
has always expressed willingness to supply military grade equipment to the
GCC countries and Iran; equipment that would face strict controls, if bought
from Western countries.50 Chinese manufactured military equipment is also
finding a ready market because of its relatively low cost and high grade.
China’s foreign policy supports this arms trade as a way of activating
domestic research and development of its arms industry. A good example of
this is the sale of military grade unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to the
UAE.51 On a related note, there was an agreement to open a manufacturing
plant for military drones in Saudi Arabia, following King Salman’s visit to
Beijing.52 At the same time, concerns have been raised regarding China’s
arms trade with Iran.53 The GCC has expressed alarm at the trade because of
its provisions, which include, among other things, the long-term supply of
advanced military munitions. It is this provision that the Chinese have used to
aid Iran’s production and capabilities surrounding the ballistic and cruise
missile programs.54
Position of the GCC States and Iran in China’s Foreign Policy

It is clear that the meaningful partnership between China and the GCC states
is strengthening, especially in non-oil trade. This durability of the relationship
has its basis in the longstanding Chinese tradition of avoiding interference in
the domestic affairs of sovereign states.55 The current foreign policy of China
toward the Middle East continues to advocate for respect for the sovereignty
of other states and opposing interference in the internal affairs. Based on this
framework, the GCC states are willing to reach closer ties with Beijing in
terms of security as well as forging closer political and economic links.56 It is
therefore justified to hypothesize that the GCC states’ position in China’s
current Middle East foreign policy is not just crucial, but also significantly
paramount. The basis upon which the relationship is formed, the oil trade,
provides a mutual benefit for both parties. Beijing forges close relations with
nations that fulfil its oil needs necessitated to intensify its economic growth
securely. Nevertheless, in the different circumstances, the GCC states perceive
a meaningful partner that supports their economic development and nation
visions. As a result, both constituent parties can enjoy commercial ties
without interfering in the complexities of domestic issues of one another.
Looking forward, as the GCC-China economic ties deepen and grow in value,
China will be accorded an even more prioritized position within the GCC
states and, vice versa, the position of GCC states in China’s overall global
foreign policy will become even more pronounced.57 It is through these con
ditions that the parties involved can increase their influence in one another’s
diplomatic sphere.
The position of GCC states in China’s foreign policy toward the Middle
East is also shown by the significance that China lays to its economic coop
eration with this bloc, as compared to its engagements with Iran. Karasik
(2016) demonstrates that China’s trade with the GCC is more than four times
the trade it conducts with Iran.58 Knowing that China’s foreign policy is built
upon strong economic cooperation, the GCC has become a very strategic
partner. Putting matters into perspective, the GCC–China trade is expected to
hit $350 billion in the next decade; a figure that is strategically important by
all accounts.59 Accordingly, China needs to use a balancing strategy to cal
culate the complexity of its relations with all the actors in the Persian Gulf by
being economically amicable with both Iran and the GCC states but not
overly friendly with one another. Beijing continues to engage Tehran though
similar economic partnerships and political ties, but not to the level and
intensity that it currently does with the GCC states.60 This balancing strategic
approach, which Beijing concentrates on economic development, will avoid
conflict and hope to maintain the peaceful coexistence of the Persian Gulf.
However, it should also consider not evoking a strong response from
Washington or be seen as countering American policy initiatives.61
There are various points to gaze through when considering the GCC states’
position in Chinese foreign policy approaching the region, centrally based on
energy security, the use of soft power and cultural interaction, the Sino–
American rivalry and influence, and the non-oil investments currently being
undertaken.
Energy Security
China’s oil demand has almost tripled over the past two decades, accounting for
one-third of global oil demand growth every year. In the pre-Deng Xiaoping era,
China consumed less than 5% of the world’s energy.62 Deng’s economic reforms
gradually catapulted China to the top of the world economic order, and with it
came a resoundingly strong demand for energy. By 1995, China was consuming
11% of the world’s energy.63 This figure is representative of China’s demand for
oil for which it became a net importer in 1993. By 2005, according to Saddolin
(2015), China’s dependence on crude oil imports was 45% to meet domestic
consumption.64 The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies reveals that China’s
petroleum consumption had risen by over 9 million barrels per day (mb/d) from
4.7 mb/d in 2000 to 14.1 mb/d in 2019, which is estimated to rise by 3–4 mb/d,
reaching 17–18 mb/d in 2040.65 Even though several indicators report that the
Chinese economy was profoundly negative in 2020 because of the Covid-19
pandemic, it continues to recover. As of today (2021), the estimated return of
Chinese energy demand expects to reach its 2019 level and rebound even more
robust by 2022.66
These oil import dependency figures, therefore, indicate the need for China
to have a comprehensive foreign policy that prioritizes energy security. Beijing
has identified this issue as a key incentive to ensure the supply of adequate
amounts of oil and gas at prices that are stable.67 Correspondingly, it is the
primary reason why the stability of the GCC in China’s oil supply chain makes
its position matter, significantly, as with considerations to the overall Middle
East foreign policy. As the world’s largest oil importer, China sources more
than 40% of total imports from the region.68 Having a relatively reasonable,
reliable, and secure oil supply reduces uncertainty and supports the demands
for overall economic growth.
The Use of Chinese Soft Power and Cultural Interactions

The common cultural framework linking China and the countries in the
Middle East, particularly, those surrounding the Persian Gulf includes ele
ments of a shared battle against imperialism. China still adheres to the
Westphalian concept of sovereignty with Chinese characteristics, called the
“Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” in Chinese Foreign Policy, which
holds that every state has exclusive sovereignty over their own territories
under international law and non-inference in the domestic affairs of other
states highlight the importance of these values to Chinese leaders from Zhou
Enlai to Deng Xiaoping, and today to Xi Jinping. It is this concept that lies
at the core of the relationships between China and the countries of the Per
sian Gulf and wider Middle East. The importance of the GCC states within
the Middle East is understood and respected by China, which seeks to main
tain the status quo through diplomacy on multiple levels. It is important for
China to maintain strong ties with the GCC states because of China’s reliance
upon their energy sector.69 Closer links between China and the GCC states
have established a framework that can support the transfer of technology and
models of governance allowing each side to learn from the other. One parti
cular example is the Chinese idea of giving local governments key roles in
shaping the plans for overall economic development, which is a cultural
notion from China that the GCC states can adopt. Legrenzi and Lawson
(2015) explain that the sharing of heritage in this manner is a key component
in bringing the GCC states and Iran to the core of Chinese policy in the
Middle East.70
The interaction and a shared purpose between China and the Middle East,
which most of them are today’s Global South countries, is to promote
peaceful coexistence as the cornerstone for respect and sovereignty. The First
Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai (1949–1976) prominently uttered this aspect of
cooperation, peace and friendship in cultural interactions in the 1955
Bandung Conference. Back then, Zhou highlighted the importance of indepen
dence and integrity, together with the non-intervention or non-interference in the
domestic affairs of other countries.71 This method has created the groundwork
for Chinese soft power diplomacy, which defines its interactions with other
states. Today, this soft power is developed upon trade agreements, technological
and educational and cultural exchange, for example, the Confucius Institutes in
many global higher education institutions, which are interplays that China uses
to involve global communities and familiarize them with Chinese culture.72
Another example is the establishment of the State of Qatar Chair in Middle
Eastern Studies at Peking University during the state visit of Emir Sheikh
Tamim Al Thani to China in 2014 to exchange support with Qatar University.73
It can also be seen as a cultural interaction to commemorate goodwill partner
ship and provide exchange support to Middle Eastern, particularly Arabian
Peninsula and Persian Gulf studies.
Furthermore, China has also strived its culture overseas. Chinese media, for
instance, China Daily, China Radio International (CRI), and Central China
Television (CCTV) are significant Chinese soft power tools with substantial
attempts to project China’s influence globally.74 Beijing produces various
versions of newspapers and channels both written and broadcasting in Arabic
for Middle Eastern audiences. Additionally, economic initiatives or infra
structural projects also denote one of China’s critical channels for soft power
projection. China utilizes soft power as a mechanism to expand its economic
growth and power and its position worldwide by either inviting or supporting
the development, for instance, of those countries along the lines of its mega-
projects like BRI. Chinese President Xi Jinping also emphasizes that the
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Silk Road Fund would
economically promote the development and bring together countries to get
involved economically.75 Accordingly, China’s interaction with the region is
shifting increasingly closer, and the implications of Chinese economic oppor
tunities are being expanded continuously through soft power.
In 2016, Xi Jinping once and stressing “to jointly create a bright future for
development of China-Arab relations”.76 In terms of cultural interaction, to
enhance cordial relations, both China and the region should come together to
promote interactive cultural learning. The civilization of both China and Arab
pursuits accumulated in the development of humanity, which partakes prevail
ing thoughts. Beijing will continuously remain to support the region unswerv
ingly and to exchange both cultural traditions. Accordingly, a mutual learning
channel or dialogue should be conducted. Beijing has planned to implement
the cultural projects along the BRI, such as the “Hundred, Thousand, and Ten
Thousand Talents” Project77 to prosper the social connections with the Middle
East. Xi Jingping emphasized that “the practical cooperation shows vitality
and people-to-people and cultural exchanges are rich and colourful”.78
Undoubtedly, this has relatively paid off well during the Covid-19 pan
demic, Chinese soft power and interaction with the Gulf region have become
indispensable. At the beginning of the pandemic, the GCC states were helpful
and provided donations to Beijing when needed in the form of medical sup
port and supplies. Later, the GCC states were the recipients. Therefore, both
parties have impressively enjoyed their so-called win-win cooperation. Chinese
soft power and public diplomacy have consistently connected with the region
and its people; its assistance with medical supplies and sharing of professional
knowledge of Covid-19 has been noted by all GCC states.79
All the aforementioned is part of the Chinese soft power instruments, includ
ing its strategy to become the world’s leader in technology. It is interesting;
however, it has drawn greater scrutiny as Western powers grow concerned about
China’s increasing global influence and foreign policy projects such as the Belt
and Road Initiative. As a result, in 2019, Washington declared the project a
threat to American interests.80
Sino–American Rivalry
It is an indisputable fact that China and the US have vast socio-economic
interests all over the world, and in the Middle East is no different. It is the
existence of oil in the region, which has driven both China and the United
States to exceedingly seek more influence in the region through the develop
ment of foreign policies that best serve their own interests. China has taken a
more persuasive approach or soft power, using its cultural and economic
leverage to form closer ties with the GCC countries and, thus, gain a stronger
political presence in the wider region.81 The non-military strategic approach
distinguishes China from the US, and is primarily focused on developing
relations with the ultimate goal of pushing forward the mutual economic
interests with the GCC states.
However, China’s policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other
countries has caused it to ignore certain issues, which the US would be less
likely to tolerate. For example, human rights violations would not be con
doned by China under the policy of non-interference (vice versa), while the
American foreign policy would bring such matters to greater prominence. The
issues of good governance and human rights in the GCC states, or even in the
Middle East, are consistently overlooked by China.82 It can be seen that this
lack of concern on the part of China is appreciated by the nations in this
region, who are free to work with China in the absence of scrutiny.
When it comes to dealing with Iran, not a GCC member but one of the
Persian GCC states, it is clear that the Chinese and American policies are
vastly different. While Washington regards Tehran as an enemy and a villain,
Beijing practices a calculated approach that is majorly aimed at forging even
friendlier energy and economic relations underpinned by Tehran’s significant
crude oil trade. Moreover, this approach provides a platform for China to
engage one regional entity without aggrieving the other, particularly the other
key energy suppliers. Thus, the Chinese approach to dealing with Iran vastly
differs from the American aggressive and confrontational stance. Legrenzi
and Lawson (2015) explain that this is a scenario that has been observed in
international engagements, where whenever Iran becomes more defiant,
especially with regards to its nuclear research programme, the US puts more
pressure on China to support robust sanctions against the Islamic Republic.83
Nevertheless, the nature of relations between Beijing and Tehran is built from
wrongful judgments by the West, particularly Washington, for being unde
mocratic regimes.84 Thus, both states consider each other as potential allies
that would hinder American influence in the region. China’s foreign policy in
the Middle East has largely been crafted on the basis of countering the
“hegemonic” effect of American militarism and dominance in the region.
The GCC has also attempted to balance its interests in the face of two
world powers that have affairs in its region. There are comparative advan
tages to having fruitful engagements with both the U.S. and China, with a
long-term interest that are best served by both.85 Some of these interests are
based on the geographical advantages of the Gulf region. The region provides
access and connections to three continents: Asia, Africa, and Europe; five seas:
the Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea, the Caspian Sea and the
Black Sea, and four straits: the Bosphorus, Dardanelles, Bab el-Mandab and
Hormuz.86 Hence, it is evident that this area represents a key transit hub, not
just for oil and other cargo, but also air transport. Therefore, the GCC is very
strategic in the overall Middle East policy of China and the U.S., as well as
many other states, including Russia. Furthermore, China keeps its options open
by engaging other members that are outside the purview of the region as a way
of expanding its overall influence.87
Chinese foreign policy has to consider the daily occurrences in the Persian
Gulf, or even in the Middle East, to subdue the systemic risks that would
otherwise affect its economy if the regional issues were to exacerbate again, for
example, the Qatar blockade. It can be seen that the GCC member states’ fatigue
of the blockade and economic diversification plans resulted in the reconciliation
of the crisis.88 However, China might have several uncertainties regarding its
regional roles with other external powers, especially the U.S. For instance, the
recent summit went well with the Biden Administration’s policy, which was
positively welcomed by Western countries, including the EU.89 This end of the
blockade could increase Washington influence in the region, which for example,
the KSA yearned to re-image itself with the Biden administration.
Non-oil Investments
China and the GCC states have shifted forward on a transformational course
that attempts to define the composition of their prospective economies.
However, China has concentrated on a consumer and service-based economy
while the GCC states implement more resilient measures to move beyond oil.
One key policy of the GCC states is to diversify their economies to reduce
their dependence on oil and to secure their future prosperity through a wider
range of industrial activity.90 China can be of vital assistance in providing the
kind of foreign direct investment, which can help the GCC states achieve their
aims. Moreover, China’s strategy involves engaging with the Middle East as part
of its “Belt and Road Initiative” policy, under which China has created a coop
erative framework known as the 1 + 2 + 3 strategy. “One” refers to the need for
enhanced cooperation in the sphere of energy, encompassing oil and natural gas
supplies, and ensuring the safe transit of those resources as part of a mutually
beneficial relationship over the long term. “Two” describes the infrastructural
components of construction and investment, while “Three” refers to the need for
ground-breaking innovations and technological advances in the energy, aero
space, and nuclear sectors through improved cooperation between China and
countries in the Middle East. While China explores to intensify advanced man
ufacturing further, there is an ever-widening possibility for technology transfer
and knowledge when conducting projects with the GCC states. Further note
worthy is that the GCC states seek economic diversification and upgrade their
position in the global value chain. Thus, there is leeway for further high-skill
cooperation and investments in technologically intensive sectors.91 For example,
it was reported by Cheng (2016) that Chinese non-financial investment in the
Arab world is set to rise from the 2013 level of $10 billion to more than $600
billion in the coming decades.92 The Persian Gulf has geo-strategically displayed
a global hub connecting the world. Therefore, the GCC states and China
manage to profit reciprocally from their non-oil investment and trade in the
manufacturing products imported from China and re-export from the region. In
2018, for example, Beijing was Dubai’s largest non-oil trading partner, with a
$37.8 billion value of total trade.93 Accordingly, under a roadmap of the UAE–
China century of prosperity, there are advanced drawing methods comprising
the plan for the Chinese warehouse of a 5.7 million square meters ensemble with
Jebel Ali being a re-export hub for the trans-shipments and the billion-dollar
programme for the UAE on the project of Vegetable Basket is designated on the
new Silk Road initiatives.94 The projects will be a centre pith for importing,
processing from China to the Persian Gulf and exporting, distributing various
goods, including marine, agricultural, and animal products from the region to
the world. Moreover, as part of the Digital Silk Road, the development of 5G or
other telecommunication networks and Chinese expertise in logistical value
chains can be seen as attractive opportunities for partnership. Most of the blue
prints for National Visions of the GCC states classify the importance of 5G
technology advancement as a robust digital economy, which the famous Chinese
brand, Huawei, has developed.95 By the antagonism between Beijing and
Washington surrounding Huawei’s advancement of the 5G network globally, the
GCC states will have to navigate this complicated situation without hampering
their relations with both regional powers.
Conclusion
China has a longstanding interest in the Middle East, which started infor
mally since the Bandung conference in 1955, where there were anti-imperialist
cultural interactions that underlined the Sino–Arab relations. China’s need for
energy makes the Middle East a potential partner due to its substantial oil
and gas reserves. To achieve economic growth, China relies heavily on having
good relations with the Middle East. Chinese foreign policy towards the Per
sian Gulf is designed primarily to strengthen the economic relationship
between both parties, as well as with Iran. By utilizing the non-interfering
approach, China acts respectfully towards those countries and seeks to exert
little influence on their domestic affairs. As a result, this is why the economic
cooperation in energy and non-energy sectors, together with the diplomatic
ties, continues to grow between China and the GCC states. Nevertheless,
safeguarding regional maritime trade routes and ensuring regional stability
would also support Chinese economic growth. In the past years, Beijing has
been well aware of regional instability, tensions, and rivals, consequently,
threaten and affect Chinese interests. Therefore, adhering to the five principles
of its foreign policy for peaceful coexistence and non-interference, Beijing
encourages enhancing dialogue, and strengthening development are solutions
to tackling thorny regional issues.
As China is the world’s largest oil importer, the use of Chinese soft power, such
as economic activities and cooperation, ensures good connections with its leading
suppliers. Energy security is an essential component of China’s economic growth
prospects. This fact has led to the formulation of a comprehensive foreign policy,
which encompasses amongst other vital issues, partnerships in the broader
Middle East, and geostrategic multilateral cooperation. To further the aim of
becoming a significant regional power in the Middle East, China has focused on
infrastructural investment with the goal of supporting Middle Eastern countries
in moving away from their economic reliance solely on energy products. These
considerable investment projects in the region are designed to promote other
economic sectors. The relationship between China and the GCC states also
involves the Chinese “Belt and Road Initiative” project, while Chinese coopera
tion is also provided through the 1 + 2 + 3 strategy. It is through these policies
that China is increasing its importance in shaping the future of the Middle East.
For the GCC states, their importance will depend on their ability to coordi
nate their activities and formulate a common policy to develop a free trade deal
with China. Economic interaction is a reciprocal co-dependency and economic
interdependence between the GCC states and China in areas determining to
grow. Thus, for example, Beijing provides the fundamental technology transfer,
training, safety cooperation, infrastructural development which the GCC states
need, and the latter renders China a stable trading atmosphere that guarantees a
steady oil supply. Some of the countries of the Middle East have created and
sought to implement a “Look East Policy” to strengthen their relationship with
China. For instance, the official visit to China by Crown Prince Mohammad Bin
Salman in 2019 marks a significant move towards developing energy and non-oil
trade with China in the future. The use of the Yuan as the main petrocurrency to
support oil trade with China is another move that emphasizes the growing
importance of these relationships. Since most of the GCC states find trading
with China and Chinese individuals attractive as a way to diversify the
economy to move beyond oil, it can be expected that they will be influ
enced to begin using the Chinese Yuan to further facilitate Chinese invol
vement in the oil trade and local investments in the future. Accordingly,
economic relations between China and the GCC states, especially BRI
have offered a perfect opportunity for the GCC states to move forward
and diversify the economy. The symbiotic relations will continue to dom
inate the economic diversification of the GCC states to move beyond oil;
all of the aforementioned appear more like trustworthy economic partners.
However, development is still wanting in various sectors, which China can
fulfil, such as renewable energy, infrastructure, intelligent megacities pro
jects, 5G telecommunication, educational exchange.
With the aforementioned complexity in mind, the goals of Chinese foreign
policy can be materialized by engaging with mutual respect, being co-equal, be
conscious of the regional issues, and non-inference with respect to the sovereignty
of all parties. To tread carefully with the Persian Gulf, Beijing needs to specifically
acknowledge the antagonism between critical regional rivalries, for instance,
Tehran and Riyadh or among the GCC members themselves. Chinese policy
towards the Middle East formulates dissimilarly from the American policy. Non
interference strategy allows China to navigate through Middle Eastern complexity
without confrontation. However, this can be seen as countering the hegemonic
effect of American interventionism and dominance in the region. American mili
tary presence in the region is not cooperation and does not seem co-equal. For
China, with its economic-centric thought, the country believes in collective and
peaceful cooperation. BRI is meaningful for Beijing and plays its parts in facil
itating industrialization, promoting economic development and, last but not least,
supporting regional stability. On the contrary to the US, China uses military
cooperation, namely joint maritime training with the local naval forces to mitigate
the problem from maritime chokepoints along the trade routes. While this may
appear as the military exercise, but it is a part of the BRI plan for safeguard and
to lessen the economic risks. Geopolitical rivalries also make it challenging to
combat more significant issues such as the Covid-19 pandemic. Accordingly, there
is a need that China can collaborate by deepening the development, given that the
region also needs to economically shift away from the Covid-19 consequences, of
which collective cooperation to strengthen tie their trading partnership is a key.
Thus, with all the thorny regional issues, if all the complexity mentioned ear
lier has never been mitigated, it would affect Chinese economic interest such as
BRI, which is “a small part in a greater plan for China”. By all means, the
instability of the Persian Gulf and broader Middle East would affect the stability
of Chinese economic interests. This seems to suggest that the region is important
because BRI is also important. If one would take this into account, it remains to
be seen if Beijing would apply a different approach to do whatever it takes to
secure Chinese economic interests like Washington, which would reverse the
tradition of Chinese Foreign Policy that all Chinese leaders have been used since
its informal diplomatic ties with the region. However, with the current economic
trends in the Persian Gulf, seeking economic diversifications to move beyond has
beforehand suggested that their Nation Visions fit well with Chinese foreign
policy, which will allow plenty of opportunities for cooperation and develop
ment. Accordingly, the diversification will enhance Chinese soft power and
cooperation with the GCC states, strengthening their close relations.
Notes
1 In this chapter, the Gulf region (or the Persian Gulf) comprises the Gulf Coop
eration Council or the GCC states, which are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Iran.
2 Liu, “Historical Evolution of Relationship between China and the Gulf Region”.
Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (In Asia), 10(1), (2016) p. 1.
3 Saddodin, “China and the Persian Gulf Policy: Growing Ties”. Iranian Review of
Foreign Affairs, 5(4), (2015) pp. 151.
4 Wilson, “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics: China and the Theory of the
Initial Stage of Socialism, Politics, 24:1 (1989) pp. 77–84. DOI: 10.1080/
00323268908402079.
5 Deng Xiaoping was one of the most powerful leaders of China and the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) since the beginning of 1980s, who came to start a new era of
China by “reforming and opening up” (改革开放 – gǎigé ka-ifàng). He is considered
the man who made modern China with “the Four Modernisations” (agriculture,
defense, industry, and science and technology) and Socialism with Chinese Char
acteristics. Deng Xiaoping once said “It doesn’t matter whether the cat is black or
white, as long as it catches mice” (黑猫白猫能捉到老鼠就是好猫. – He-i ma-o
- néng zhuo- dào lǎoshǔ jiùshì hǎo ma- o), which technically means that
bái mao,
regardless the regime either communism or democracy as long as they are able to
protect Chinese interests (Li, 1977; Liao 2009).
6 Hsü. China without Mao: The Search for a New Order. (2011); Saddodin, “China
and the Persian Gulf Policy: Growing Ties”. Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs, 5
(4), (2015) p. 151.
7 Bagwandeen, “Navigating the Gulf: China’s Balancing Strategy”, Stellenbosch
(2014) p. 7.
Foreign Affairs, 5(4), (2015) p. 155.
9 China, together with the leaders of other 28 states from Asia-Africa, most of which
were newly independent, participated in the Bandung Conference. It was the first
large-scale Asian-African Summit, which created stepping stone and had a sig
nificant legacy for the cooperation among the developing countries today.
(Timossi, 2015; CVCE, 2017).
10 The long-standing five principles of Chinese foreign policy, which represent peaceful
coexistence, are as follows (1) mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity,
(2) mutual non-aggression, (3) non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, (4)
equality and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful coexistence. (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2014; Chinese Consulate General in
Karachi, 2014; Asia for Educators, Columbia University, 2021).
11 Zhou Enlai (1949–1976) prominently uttered this aspect of cooperation, peace and
friendship in cultural interactions in the 1955 Bandung Conference. Back then,
Zhou highlighted the importance of independence and integrity, together with the
non-intervention or non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries.
12 Panda. “Reflecting on China’s Five Principles, 60 Years Later”. The Diplomat.
(2014). Available online at https://thediplomat.com/2014/06/reflecting-on-china
s-five-principles-60-years-later/.
Foreign Affairs, 5(4), (2015) p. 156.
14 Karasik, “The GCC’s New Affair with China”. Middle East Institute Policy Focus
Series, MEI Policy Focus 6 (2016), p. 2.
15 Karasik., pp. 1–2.
16 Bagwandeen, “Navigating the Gulf: China’s Balancing Strategy”. Stellenbosch,
(2014) p. 16.
Foreign Affairs, 5(4), (2015) p. 164.
18 Lin, “The Belt and Road and China’s Long-term Visions in the Middle East”,
(2017) p. 5.
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6 Strategic Transformations of China’s
Relations with GCC States
From a Unidimensional Relationship to a
Multilayered Partnership
Ümit Alperen
Introduction
The acceleration of the shift in the balance of power in the international
system following the 2008 global financial crisis has led to a reassessment in
China’s global interests and foreign policy strategy. Similarly, the change in
the balance of power between major actors in the global system has brought
about the need to revise the definitions of threat and areas of interest for the
member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – Bahrain, Kuwait,
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates. While the development
of relations between China and the GCC countries is conditioned by the
international system and regional dynamics, it cannot be separated from the
parties’ diplomatic strategies. Besides the shifts in the global system, a trans
formation in the common areas of interest of both China and all GCC states,
particularly Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Oman has taken place. After the Cold
War, the relations of the parties shifted from a unidimensional relationship
with an energy-centered economic basis into a multilayered partnership at the
strategic level.
Before Beijing initiated economic reforms in 1978, China’s policy toward the
Persian Gulf region was shaped by ideological and geopolitical concerns
because of the threat it perceived from the Soviet Union. With the 1979 eco
nomic reforms, Chinese foreign policy took a new shape economically, its
ideological and geopolitical approach in the previous period had faded, and its
national interests focused on economic progress and energy security.1 Develop
ments in the Iranian nuclear issue in 2002, followed by the invasion of Iraq in
2003, made strategic shifts in the regional balance in the Gulf. While the crisis
of mutual trust between the US and its partners in the Middle East after 2001
opened a space for Chinese diplomacy in the Gulf region, the Gulf states such
as Saudi Arabia, Iran, UAE also embarked on an exploratory process to
diversify their foreign policy. In this context, Iran and Saudi Arabia became the
center of China’s policy toward the region. China started free trade zone and
strategic dialogue negotiations with the GCC states as well.
With the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China–GCC
relations entered a new era.2 Especially after the implementation of the BRI in
DOI: 10.4324/9781003269175-6
Strategic Transformations of China-GCC Relations 99
2013, China–GCC relations have been revolving over BRI, and China’s influence
in the Gulf has been advancing through economic diplomacy. From the end of
the Cold War till the advent of the Xi Jinping administration in 2012, the internal
pressure created by China’s economic development played a critical role in the
development of China–GCC relations. Meanwhile Xi Jinping has positioned his
role as a transformational leadership and shifted China’s foreign policy from tao
guang yang hui (bide our time and build up our capabilities) to fen fa you wei
(striving for achievement).3 However, since 2012, international pressures and Xi’s
FFYW policy have been forcing China to adopt a strategic approach towards the
Gulf. Moreover, with the trade wars between China and the US compounded by
the global pandemic in 2020, the intensification of China–US competition has
had significant effects on relations with the GCC states.
While China’s policy towards the Persian Gulf is seen as a part of its
Middle East policy, changes in Chinese foreign policy, particularly with the
augmentation of the BRI, are reshaping China’s policy in the Gulf. In exam
ining Chinese foreign policy strategy, the Gulf region needs to be evaluated
not only within the framework of China’s Middle East policy but also in
terms of the importance of the Gulf of Aden, the Indian Ocean, the Arab
Sea, the China–Pakistan economic corridor, and protecting shipping lanes in
Chinese strategic thinking. This line, which stretches from China to the
Middle East over the sea, is also the line through which the geo economic
“21st Century Maritime Silk Road” that constitutes the BRI passes.
China is progressively becoming the primary extra-regional power in terms
of economic impact in the Gulf region while China remains a secondary
power in terms of its political and military influence. In the foreseeable future,
hard balancing against the US in the Gulf is not seen as a rational choice by
the Chinese policy makers.4 China’s involvement in the Gulf and expansion of
its sphere of influence in the region take place in a long-term perspective and
through sophisticated ways, capitalizing on filling the power gap created by
changes in intra-regional balance without challenging the global hegemon
under the current status quo in the region. In the Gulf, Chinese leadership
prefers utilizing economic and soft power tools rather than the political and
military tools. China is cautiously trying to balance the US with soft balan
cing instruments such as investment, develop cultural relations in the region.5
In the framework shaped by the aforesaid dynamics, this chapter analyzes
the motivations and mechanisms of the transformation in the relations
between China and the GCC states from an economic-based unidimensional
relationship to a multilayered partnership, especially in the post-2013 period.
Moreover, the strategic relations framework between China and the GCC
states – Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Oman – are analyzed.
Strategic Cooperation Framework between China and the GCC States

China’s fundamental strategic interest in the Gulf is to meet its demand for oil
and gas from the region without interruption. Politically, China considers it
100 Ümit Alperen
important for its national interests that the Gulf states do not follow an anti-
China policy and do not take an oppositional stance, particularly toward Tai
wan’s independence and the Uyghur issue.6 In this context, in parallel with the
increasing influence of China in the region, Chinese leadership does not want a
single hegemonic power to control the Gulf. In a similar vein, with the increasing
economic and political power of China at the global level, the GCC countries
aspire to improve their political and economic relations with China. In this geo
political setting, Xi Jinping’s tour of the Middle East in 2016 and his 2014 pro
posal on the “1 + 2 + 3” framework are significant.
Xi Jinping paid a visit to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Iran in January 2016 to
officially promote the BRI in the Middle East. In these visits Chinese President
Xi discussed with the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Iran in the fields of
energy, infrastructure and industrial capacity cooperation projects within the
framework of the BRI. Also, at the Sixth Ministerial Conference of the Sino-
Arab Cooperation Forum held in June 2014, Xi Jinping proposed a “1 + 2 + 3”
framework to “jointly build, shared benefit and develop cooperation” between
China and Arab states within the framework of the BRI. According to this pro
posal, energy cooperation constitutes the first pillar of relations. Infrastructure
construction is the second category of commercial and financial relations, and
high-tech, space satellite, and nuclear energy constitute the third pillar of coop
eration.7 This classification shows the priorities of China’s strategy in the Middle
East. This proposal also demonstrates that in accordance with the transforma
tions in the redefinition of national interests in the international system as well as
in the foreign policies of China and the Gulf states, relations between the parties
were to be strategized and transferred to an advanced level.
Within the context of the “1 + 2 + 3” framework proposed by Xi Jinping
for China’s relations with the Arab world, partnership agreements have been
signed between China and all six GCC states. China’s strategic partnership
diplomacy could be defined under five categories according to the intensity
and importance of bilateral relations. China’s five levels of strategic partner
ship categories are from highest to lowest comprehensive strategic partner
ship, strategic partnership, comprehensive cooperative partnership,
cooperative partnership, and friendly cooperative partnership.8 Saudi Arabia
and the UAE are China’s comprehensive strategic partners. The visit of King
Abdullah of Saudi Arabia to China in 2006 and the visit of Hu Jintao to
Saudi Arabia in 2009 constituted a turning point in the expansion of relations
between the two countries to a comprehensive strategic partnership.9 During
Xi Jinping’s visit to Saudi Arabia in 2016, the parties signed a comprehensive
strategic partnership and thereby, promoted it to the highest level of partner
ship in Chinese foreign policy.10 Likewise, the strategic partnership that was
established between China and the UAE in 2012 was promoted to the com
prehensive strategic partnership level in July 2018 during the visit of Xi
Jinping to the UAE. During the first visit of Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al
Thani to China in November 2014, a strategic partnership agreement was
signed between China and Qatar.11 On the 40th anniversary of China–Oman
diplomatic relations, a strategic partnership agreement was signed between the
parties in May 2018.12 China–Kuwait strategic partnership was established
during the visit of Emir Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah to China in
July 2018.13 During the visit of Sheikh Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa of Bahrain to
Beijing in September 2013, friendly cooperative partnership relations were
established.14 Especially with Xi Jinping’s ascension to power, the roadmap for
the development of relations between China and GCC states has been drawn
and an attempt has been made to place it within a multidimensional framework.
The development of relations between China and the GCC states have been
ongoing in parallel with China’s increasing relative power in the international
system and they have had concrete political outcomes. At this point, the approach
of the GCC states as Muslim countries towards China’s Uyghur policy is striking.
It is essential for China to promote its international image and its relations with
the Islamic world in order to successfully implement the BRI, which passes
through many Muslim-majority countries. In addition, if Turkey, Saudi Arabia,
and the other GCC states do not remain silent on China’s concentration camps, it
could find an echo in the Muslim world and reflect negatively on other areas
including the BRI. The silence of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and other dominant
Islamic countries like Pakistan plays a role in the legitimization of China’s train
ing/concentration camps policy in Xinjiang before the Islamic world. In addition,
37 countries including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar praised China’s success
in human rights in a letter circulated at the United Nations in 2019.15 In parti
cular, the statement by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman during his
visit to Beijing in February 2019 eased some pressure on China when he said that
the camps in Xinjiang were China’s domestic issue, and that Saudi Arabia sup
ported China’s policy on combating terrorism and radicalism.16 While bin
Salman was relatively and temporarily isolated from the West in the aftermath of
the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, that this issue did not even
come to the agenda during his visit to Beijing was a win-win situation for both
parties. The Crown Prince’s visit to China just a few months after Khashoggi’s
murder was viewed as an advantage in Saudi Arabia’s relations with the United
States and Europe. Similarly, in a joint statement during his visit to China in July
2019, the president of the UAE also expressed his appreciation for China’s efforts
to engage with Muslims in China, especially Muslims in Xinjiang and Urumqi,
and to promote national unity, stability and security.17 In addition, the GCC
countries preferred to remain silent about the events in Xinjiang on July 5, 2009,
and this silence was also considered a clear support of the Chinese government’s
stance on social stability by the Chinese leadership.18
The Shifting Salience of Power in the Gulf and the Strategic

Evolution of China’s Relations with the GCC states
Besides the changes in the overall Chinese foreign policy approach, the shifts
in the balance of power within the Persian Gulf have opened up space for
China to strengthen its influence in the region.19 One of the most critical
102 Ümit Alperen
dynamics that played a role in the establishment of the GCC in 1981 was the
concern of ensuring the security of monarchies against systemic pressures.20
The inability of the United States and the European Union to prevent
Ukraine and Georgia, which have long desired to develop close relations with
the West, from being assaulted by Russia is a lesson for the GCC states. As a
hypothetical question, if any GCC state is attacked by a regional power, how
much of this threat can be averted by the U.S.? China, which enjoys inde
pendent relations with all countries in the region, including Iran and the GCC
states, can play an active mediator role. The GCC states are prone to diversify
their strategic partnerships due to the decreasing influence of the US in the
region and the changes in regional geopolitics, as such, China stands out as a
potential equalizer candidate for the GCC states.
Alterman and Garver previously stated that China’s Middle East policy is
shaped in the framework of its energy demand, and that energy plays a con
stitutive role in other diplomatic, commercials, and military interests.21 None
theless, this situation has evolved. In addition, fluctuations in the global energy
market, destabilization in regional geopolitics, and inconsistency in the US
policy towards the Gulf have led the GCC states to pursue a more active foreign
policy and deepen their relations with other major powers, including with China.
Although the United States is still the dominant hegemonic power in the Gulf,
relative devitalizing of its power, shifting its foreign policy priority to Asia-Paci
fic, and the asymmetrical nature of the relations between the U.S. and the GCC
states in favor of Washington have opened up economic and political space for
China in the Gulf. In particular, the Arab uprisings, which broke out in 2011,
have been a motivating factor for Arab monarchies to develop alternative rela
tionships with major non-Western actors. Particularly, President Obama’s sup
port for pro-democracy and anti-government demonstrations in Egypt, one of
Washington’s closest allies in the Middle East, also disturbed the Gulf mon
archies. At the same time, the Arab uprisings raised the question of how auto
cratic governments in the regions would deal with Iran and Islamist movements
without a regional security guarantor.22
Especially after 2011, GCC states have been observed to accelerate coopera
tion with multiple actors as a necessity for their security as well as the sustain
ability of their economic development. Failure to develop a codependent
relationship between the U.S. and the GCC states indirectly creates space for
diplomatic activism for China. The Chinese leadership has strived to carry its
relations with the US allies in the region from economy to politics in a multi
dimensional perspective.23 In this way, it aspires to embed itself in a strategic
area with soft power tools, such as economic incentives, against its main global
rival. Furthermore, the foreign policy approach of not interfering with the
domestic affairs of regional states has facilitated the rapid development of
China’s relations with the GCC states.
Given the circumstances, Iran’s asymmetric dependency on China, per
ceived by the GCC as a regional threat, provides an advantage to China in its
relations with the Arab states. The fact that the economies of the GCC states
are based on oil and natural gas heightens their vulnerability against such
threats, and they opt for balancing a regional power with another external
power. Although the US guarantees the security of energy production and
transportation in the region as well as safe passage through the Strait of
Hormuz, Iran has the capability to create threats and block the strait, as
observed during the Iran–Iraq War. It should also be noted that Iran not only
poses a threat with its military capabilities but also with its ability to control
proxy forces, for example, in Yemen and Iraq. In other words, it is rather
problematic for the GCC states that the US does not possess the capacity to
completely prevent the Iranian threat in the region.
Iran’s nuclear program is also creating great discomfort amongst the GCC
states. In case Iran produces nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia will in all like
lihood seek nuclear weapons to balance against Iran, leading to a possible
nuclear arms race in the region.24 At this point, the two likely countries that
can assist Saudi Arabia with nuclear technology are China and Pakistan.
According to a report, China is helping Saudi Arabia’s nuclear program
within the framework of the bilateral agreement signed in 2017.25 In another
case, restoring the nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1 continues to
worry some GCC states, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE.26 In their
view, the revitalization of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)
would pave the way for Iran to act more aggressively in its regional engage
ments.27 In addition, the “pivot to Asia” policy of the United States and the
perceived softening of the security umbrella in the region is another funda
mental concern.
China focuses not merely on the GCC in the Gulf but pays due attention to
intra-regional balance and follows a balanced foreign policy with particular
influence instruments. Besides improving economic relations, China has rea
lized comprehensive strategic partnerships with Saudi Arabia and the UAE,
partners of the US, and with Iran, the regional rival of the US, which con
stitutes as a delicate balancing act in the geopolitics of the region. This
situation renders China an attractive partner by the states of the region for
the maintenance of regional stability and order. Unlike the US, China retains
a stable and quite cordial relationship with countries on both sides of the
Persian Gulf, and favors a balanced approach that is also more attractive by
the regional parties. China needs this balanced involvement to achieve its
comprehensive national goals, especially through economic diplomacy.
On the other hand, there is an indirect relationship between China and the
US in the region. The US continues to provide energy security in the Gulf
with its military capacity. China also needs and benefits from the energy
security provided by the US in the region without assuming the security costs.
Therefore, China is dependent on the US’ Gulf policy to an extent. Although
China is in a political and economic rivalry with the US in the region, it is
not in competition with the US in the security field, at least not yet. Because
of the strategic relationship between the US and the GCC states, China’s
military engagements with the GCC states have remained limited. Also, from
104 Ümit Alperen
the current perspective of the GCC states, only the US can provide a security
umbrella against international threats, especially threats from Iran.28 While
the US and Saudi Arabia view Iran as their archenemy, China is trying to
improve its relations with Iran. Therefore, the relationship of the GCC states
with China are not at a strategic level and do not constitute an alternative
partnership to the US. Nonetheless, it can be expected that the relations
between China and the GCC states will continue to develop unless the US
considers China’s increasing presence in the region as a serious threat to its
position and interests and pressures the Gulf countries to choose a side. It is
also likely that the GCC states will reassess their relations with China if the
Chinese balancing role in the Gulf shifts favorably towards Iran.
In contrast to the US, China seeks to achieve its goals with economic means
instead of applying military and political power to enhance its influence in the
Persian Gulf. Therefore, in the short and medium-term, unless there is a serious
break in China–US relations at the global level, China’s Gulf policy is expected
to continue with politically motivated economic diplomacy. With the strategy
China follows in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia is trying to strengthen its economic
interests in a balanced manner without clashing with the US while excluding
Iran, with a particular focus on bolstering its energy security.29 In this context,
Beijing realizes its interests in the region with minimum risk and minimum cost
under the security umbrella created and sustained by Washington without
taking the place of the US in the Gulf. Even though the current status quo in
the region is shifting in favor of China, the risks and costs for China may
increase in the short and medium-term. To sum, without disturbing the hege
monic stability created by the US security umbrella in the Gulf, China has
expanded its presence in the region at a low cost.
Limited Security Relations

During the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988), China was one of the major arms
suppliers for both states.30 However, the lower quality and technological lim
itations of Chinese weapons resulted in a significant loss in the market after
the war.31 There are limited security relations and arms trade between China
and the GCC states, which have been the main purchasers of American made
weaponry and military equipment. However, China’s security relations with
the GCC states are developing, albeit with small steps. In particular, the
Sino–Saudi military relations go back to 1985. In that year, Saudi Arabia
purchased 36 CSS-2 (East Wind) medium-range ballistic missiles and nine
launchers from China.32 Riyadh bought 50 DF-3S missiles in 1988, as part of
a secret military agreement with Beijing, as the US did not supply Saudi
Arabia with sophisticated military equipment because of Israeli pressure.33
Saudi Arabia received the Dongfeng ballistic missile from China in 2007 as
well as self-propelled howitzers in 2008 to balance Iranian military power.34
Besides weapons transfers, Chinese and Saudi Arabian Special Forces held
a two-week anti-terrorism training and military exercise for the first time in
October 2016, demonstrating the level of military cooperation between the two
countries.35 In addition, it is reported that Saudi Arabia is interested in Paki
stan–China made JF-17 Thunder fighter jets.36 Still, both China and Saudi
Arabia prudently avoid stronger military relations to not cause major concerns
for the US.37 Qatar, on the other hand, paraded the SY-400 short-range ballistic
missile systems purchased from China at the national day celebrations in
December 2017, months after the imposition of the blockade on Qatar by its
GCC partners – Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain – as well as Egypt.38
As seen in the case in 1988, as long as the GCC states can purchase
weapon systems from the US or European states, they prefer not to look for
alternative suppliers. However, when the level of threat perceptions of these
countries increase and they cannot access the weapon systems they want from
the US, they can recourse to alternative suppliers such as China.39 Therefore,
when the GCC countries are in need of military equipment that would give
them strategic superiority and yet cannot obtain these weapon systems from
Western suppliers, which are expected to provide an unwavering security
umbrella for the GCC states, they are not hesitant to turn to alternative sup
pliers. The UAE and Saudi Arabia, for example, after the US rejection of
selling military drones to them, have purchased these effective weapon sys
tems from China as an alternative channel, which are subsequently employed
in the civil wars of Libya and Yemen.40
Another country with a critical geopolitical position that has developing
military relations with China is Oman. The Sultanate is an important actor in
the Arabian Sea geopolitics, and possesses a critical position for the Chinese
navy and their strategic maneuverings in the region.41 In 2009, China’s
Zhousan missile frigate anchored in Oman’s Port of Salalah for refueling
which marked the first time that the Chinese navy officially entered the shores
of the GCC.42 In December 2011, two Chinese warships anchored in Mus
cat’s Sultan Qaboos Port within the framework of a five-day goodwill visit.43
In January 2013, the Commander of the Royal Navy of Oman, Admiral
Abdullah Al-Raisi, paid a visit to Beijing. Al Raisi met with Chinese officials,
including Defense Minister Liang Guanglie and Chinese navy commander
Admiral Wu Shenli.44
In terms of China–GCC security relations, Oman also has a significant
place in China’s geostrategic outlook. Oman is a critical partner for China in
its Maritime Silk Road that is the sea route corridor branch of the BRI,
which promotes port investments in Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and
Pakistan for various purposes.45 At the same time, warships from the Chinese
navy frequently visit Oman’s port of Salalah for anti-piracy activities in the
waters off the Somalia coast, refueling, and goodwill visit.46 In December
2008, in order to prevent Somalian pirates from attacking merchant ships,
China dispatched naval vessels to patrol the region upon the UN’s call. This is
noteworthy as it is the first overseas navy mission in China’s modern history,
after the voyages of Chinese Admiral Zheng He in the 15th century.47 Chinese
navy used the Salalah port to fulfill its duty.
106 Ümit Alperen
In addition, while the US highlights its Indo–Pacific strategy with its “pivot to
Asia” approach, it is inevitable for the Gulf states to strengthen their orientation
towards Asia on the security front because of the high level of regional threat
perceptions.48 By the same token, the geostrategic and geo-economic importance
of the Gulf states for China is increasing daily due to the US’ Indo–Pacific
strategy. The Persian Gulf, thanks to its favorable location, connects China to
the markets in the Middle East, Africa, and Europe by sea. While the GCC
states and Iran are significant for the BRI sea-routes, they are also critical for
Beijing in terms of gaining a strategic position against the Indo–Pacific strategy
led by the US. To that end, Oman is of geostrategic importance for China due to
the location of the ports extending to the Indian Ocean. Similarly, Jebel Ali free
zone in Dubai is a stable regional hub for Chinese goods.49
Mutual Economic Interests

The GCC states, which hold 30.8 percent of the world’s total crude oil
reserves, have intensified their economic relations with China in the early
1990s based on energy exports, which now extend over a broad field from
trade to finance and strategic investments.50 In 2020, the GCC–China total
trade volume with $180 billion exceeded the volume of the GCC’s trade with
the EU, and China has become the largest trade partner of the GCC.51 In
1980, the GCC’s 85 percent of total trade was with North American and
Western European countries, but in 2012, the GCC’s 57 percent of the trade
was with Asian states.52 In 1992, China’s share of the GCC’s total trade was
only 2 percent, while the trade volume with Europe was 24 percent.53 But, in
2012, China’s share of the GCC’s total trade increased to 11 percent, while
the level of trade with Europe decreased to 13 percent.54 In addition, China
procures 32 percent of its imported crude oil from the GCC.55 In order to
assess the significance of the Persian Gulf in Chinese energy security, not only
the energy resources imported from the GCC countries but also those
imported from Iran and Iraq should be taken into account as a whole. The 25
percent share of the GCC states in China’s total imports in petrochemicals is
also important to reveal the economic interdependence between them.56
Especially after 2013, China–GCC economic relations has assumed a strate
gic dimension with the transformations in the global system and overall Chi
nese foreign policy.
China–GCC economic relations have a noticeable financial dimension
besides trade. The fact that the financial asset size of banks of GCC countries
exceed $2.5 trillion in 2020 is also significant to ensure the internationaliza
tion of the Chinese currency (RMB) and creating a financial balance against
the challenges that originate in the US-based financial systems.57 In terms of
resilience against systemic financial shocks, Chinese economic engagements
with the Gulf are assigned considerable value, especially considering the
dominant position of the US in the global financial system. China could
require international financial support and cooperation, particularly against
the financial pressures as observed in the trade war between the parties
implemented by the US to limit China’s comprehensive global influence.
The UAE and Qatar have begun keeping RMB in reserves considering the
extent of mutual trade and investments, with the swap agreements they made
with China.58 The swap deal between the UAE and China came into effect with
the launch of the Renminbi Clearing Center in May 2017.59 Between January
and November 2018, 7 trillion dollars’ worth of transactions were made between
China and the UAE.60 In this respect, it is deemed necessary for the Gulf coun
tries to become members of financial institutions under the leadership of China,
such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which are alternatives
to Western-based financial institutions established and aim to limit the financial
pressures against China, particularly from the US.61 While Saudi Arabia, the
UAE, Oman, and Qatar were founding members of the AIIB, Kuwait signed the
Articles of Agreement of the AIIB on December 2015 and was granted pro
spective founder membership.62 Bahrain was granted prospective membership in
May 2017, and membership in August 2018.63
Investments and construction are also developing between China and the
GCC states. China’s investments in the GCC as a whole were 106 billion
dollars between 2005 and 2021.64 China’s investments in GCC states between
2005 and 2021 are respectively 42.8 billion dollars in Saudi Arabia, 36.16
billion dollars in the UAE, and 11.11 billion dollars in Kuwait, 7.8 billion
dollars in Qatar, 6.62 billion dollars in Oman, and 1.42 billion dollars in
Bahrain. The GCC states view China’s BRI as complementary to their eco
nomic visions. They announced, respectively, Saudi Vision 2030, UAE 2030,
New Kuwait 2035, Qatar National Vision 2030, Oman Vision 2040, Bahrain’s
Economic Vision 2030. The common feature of these goal-oriented policies is
that the GCC countries aim to diversify their economies, decreasing their
excessive reliance on natural gas and oil. To that end, the GCC states con
sider BRI a noteworthy initiative that assists and complements their economic
vision. The GCC countries are not expected to ignore China, the world’s lar
gest investor, to create more diverse economies.
As an example of Chinese investments, Mecca light metro was built by
China Railway Construction Company according to the agreement signed in
2009. In 2015, the same company completed the $1.8 billion Mashaer railway
project in Mecca.65 It is considerable prestige for China that the Mecca light
metro, which carries pilgrims from all over the world in the holiest city of
Muslims, was constructed by a Chinese company. Also in 2011, Saudi Arabia
announced that it planned to build 16 civilian nuclear power reactors in 20–
25 years.66 This project is expected to cost about 80 billion dollars.67 Saudi
Arabia utilizes approximately one-third of its oil production for domestic
consumption, including electricity and water treatment. The signing of a $10
billion refinery and petrochemical complex agreement in China during the
visit by the Saudi Crown Prince to Beijing in 2019 reveals the extent of
mutual interest in infrastructure investments.68 AIIB funds important projects
to strengthen energy and commercial ties in the Gulf as well.
108 Ümit Alperen
The Chinese government not only invests in the energy sector in the GCC
countries but also makes substantial port investments within the framework
of the BRI as well. In an agreement between AIIB and Oman, $265 million
worth of credit was approved for the construction of the Duqm Port Com
mercial Terminal and Operational Zone Development Project.69 Also, in
2018, China’s COSCO Shipping Ports (CSP) signed an agreement with Abu
Dhabi Ports to invest $300 million in the construction of a new terminal at
Khalifa Port.70 Additionally, China Harbor Engineering Company won a $91
million tender for the construction of a commercial port in Jazan Economic
City, on the Red Sea coast of Saudi Arabia.71 Chinese investments in the
strategic ports in the Persian Gulf region, the Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea,
and the Red Sea show the significance attached to the region in China’s geo
economic approach represented by BRI.
Strategic economic cooperation between China and the GCC states has
developed within a framework of mutual dependency. The GCC states in parti
cular approach these infrastructure investments and collaborations positively
from the perspective of diversifying their oil-based economies. For this reason,
they seek technological and financial support from China to diversify their
economies. China and India are foremost alternative partners with their eco
nomic size and potential for the diversification of their economic engagements
other than the US and Western countries, on which the GCC countries have
been asymmetrically dependent, both economically and politically, in the past
four decades, particularly since 1990.72 At the same time, the biggest destinations
for the oil exports of the GCC states are no longer Western countries, but Asian
powers, mainly China, India, Japan, and South Korea. The GCC countries are
investing in their domestic economies, especially in the petrochemical sector, to
develop their economic as well as political relations with the rising powers of
Asia. For the GCC states, the purpose of these investments is not only to main
tain and increase its market share in global trade and finance, but also to con
strain Iran’s political and economic power and to balance it with interdependent
economic relations among members of the GCC.73
The conventional structure of the economic relations between the GCC
states and the United States and the inability to revise and rehabilitate the
framework of the relationships has opened up a convenient space for China in
the region. Unlike the West, the Chinese leadership refrains from applying
pressure on the GCC states in areas such as domestic reforms and democra
tization. Western sensitivity on and appeals for political reforms encourages
the GCC states to cooperate more with Asian countries, such as China and
India. In return, Chinese investments in the region cause misgivings on the
US side. For instance, Huawei’s investments in the GCC, has angered the US
government, which has strengthened the perception in Washington and else
where in the West that China is attempting to enter the critical sectors in the
region.74 Huawei’s construction of the telecommunications infrastructure of
the region where the US Navy’s 5th Fleet and the largest American military
base in the Gulf are located is perceived as a threat by the US government.75
This situation negatively affects the relations between the GCC states and the
United States as developments in China–GCC relations are mainly evaluated
in a security perspective by the US government. Thus, China’s security chal
lenges are perceived by the Washington within the evolving multilayered
partnership between China and the GCC states.
Conclusion
After the Cold War, China’s relations with the GCC states initially gained
momentum in the energy realm. They are now developing into a multilayered
partnership expanding from economy to politics and security. Changes in the
regional dynamics of the Gulf as well as changes in China’s foreign policy
strategy and conceptions of national interests have led to an expansion of
bilateral and multilateral relations beyond energy. Particularly after the
implementation of the BRI in 2013, China’s involvement in the Persian Gulf
region has rapidly improved and China’s relations with the GCC states have
assumed a strategic dimension. Chinese strategic objectives in the region are
being able to access oil and gas from the region without interruption, keeping
sea lanes from China to the Gulf safe for BRI’s success, preventing the
countries of the region from pursuing an anti-China policy, and preventing
the region from being dominated by the US. On the other hand, the fact that
China is a veto-yielding member of the United Nations Security Council, the
declining global and regional influence of the US, and the progression of
China–Iran relations require the GCC members to develop their own ties with
China in a comprehensive strategic framework.
While China used to view its Persian Gulf policy as a part of its Middle
East policy, China’s approach towards the Gulf has increasingly become
independent from its broad Middle East policy with the power transitions in
the international system, the transformation of Chinese foreign policy strat
egy, and the redefinition of China’s national interest areas in the Gulf. Chi
nese ambition and determination have been the driving force of the
developments in China’s relations with GCC states. In the wake of the Arab
uprisings, the repercussions of China’s deepening economic influence in the
region on the political field have necessitated the transformation of the rela
tions into a complex, multilayered partnership.
Even though the US is still the dominant hegemonic power in the Persian
Gulf, the declining power of the US in the region, the asymmetry of the US–
GCC relations in favor of the US, and the inability to develop a balanced
relationship has created a space for strategic maneuvering for China. As the
security umbrella provided by the US in the Gulf is not absolute and budget
deficits appear in national economies, the Chinese government penetrates the
region, step by step, within the scope of the BRI. Moreover, Chinese foreign
policy strategy in regions outside of its immediate vicinity is mainly based on
economic concerns. However, when the interdependence between China and
the GCC states assumes a more sophisticated nature, the relationships have
110 Ümit Alperen
inevitably risen to a more comprehensive strategic level. This process ensures
that China takes enough measures to protect its security and economic inter
ests against global actors in the region. The GCC states also aspire to diver
sify their strategic partners with the decrease of the US influence in the
region, and China has stood out as a potential candidate with which they can
develop a mutually beneficial codependent relationship from economy to
politics and, eventually, security realms.
Beyond economic relations, Beijing’s capability to develop comprehensive
strategic partnerships with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, both partners of the US,
and with Iran, the regional rival of the US, is important in terms of regional
geopolitics. This balancing act induces the GCC states to worry about losing
China to Iran. However, China seems to pursue a prudent policy based on stra
tegic cooperation that pays attention to intra-regional dynamics in the Gulf. It is
observed that this strategic cooperation is shaped by economic instruments in a
way that does not disrupt regional security balances. The transformation of
China’s relations with the GCC states to a multilayered partnership and the
increase of Chinese influence in the Persian Gulf will not lead to a Chinese
challenge against the United States. Unless China becomes a security-providing
actor in the region, it will not attempt to take the place of the US by way of
challenging Washington with conventional military instruments. This is con
sidered a costly and perilous undertaking by the Chinese leadership beyond its
current capabilities. The GCC states are also prone to view China as a com
plementary actor in the region, not a substitute for the U.S. As a matter of fact,
China’s energy security in the Gulf depends on the stability of the US–GCC
relations to a great extent. Nevertheless, insofar as China–US relations are get
ting more strained on a global scale, the reliance of China’s energy security on
US policies and discretion in the region, the importance of the GCC for China
increases even more. Therefore, the future of the recently formed multilayered
partnership raises serious questions for China.
Notes
1 Zhang Baijia. 2007. Gaibian ziji yingxiang shijie. Niu Jun (Zhubian). Zhongguo
xuezhe kan shijie: Zhongguo waijiao juan. [Change Yourself, Influence the World.
In Niu Jun (ed.) World Politics: Views From China - China’s Foreign Policy]
Beijing: New World Press, pp. 19–23.
2 Xi Jinping zai Zhaerbayefu Daxue de yanjiang (quanwen). Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Waijiaobu. [Xi Jinping’s speech at Nazarbayev University (full text).
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China] 08 September
2013. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/zt_674979/dnzt_674981/qtzt/
ydyl_675049/zyxw_675051/t1074151.shtml.
3 Liu Zhongmin. March 2016. Zhongguo yu haiguojia guanxi de lishi bianqian.
[Historical Evolution of the Relations between China and the Gulf Region] Arab
World Studies. No. 2. p. 30. Ye Zicheng. 2003. Zhongguo Dazhanlüe. [The Grand
Strategy of China] Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, pp. 126–130.
4 J. Garlick and R. Havlová, 2020. China’s “Belt and Road” Economic Diplomacy
in the Persian Gulf: Strategic Hedging amidst Saudi–Iranian Regional Rivalry.
Journal of Current Chinese Affairs. 2020;49(1). p. 85; Steve A. Yetiv and Katerina
Oskarsson. 2018. Challenged Hegemony: the United States, China, and Russia in
the Persian Gulf. California: Stanford University Press, p. 171.
5 Yetiv and Oskarsson. ibid. p. 171.
6 Wu, Bingbing. 2011. Cong zhongguo yu haiwan baguo guanxi de fazhan kan
“zhonga hezuo luntan”.[Reflections on China-Arab Cooperation Forum: Based on
China-Gulf Relations.] Arab World Studies. No 1. p. 11.
7 Xi Jinping: Zuohao dinging sheji, guojian “1+2+3” Zhong a hezuo geju. [Xi
Jinping: Do a good job in top-level design and build a “1+2+3” China-Arab
cooperation pattern] 2014. Xinhuanet. June 5, 2016. http://www.xinhuanet.com//p
olitics/2014-06/05/c_1111000667.htm
8 Quick guide to China’s diplomatic levels. 2016. South China Morning Post. January 20,
2016. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1903455/quick-gui
de-chinas-diplomatic-levels
For more details see Georg Strüver. Spring 2017. China’s Partnership Diplomacy:
International Alignment Based on Interests or Ideology. The Chinese Journal of
International Politics. Vol. 10. Issue 1, pp. 31–65.
9 His Majesty King Abdullah to Visit China. 2006. Embassy of the PRC in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 19 January 2006. http://www.chinaembassy.org.sa/eng/
xwdt/t231866.htm
10 China, Saudi Arabia form comprehensive strategic partnership. 2016. People’s
Daily. January 20, 2016. http://en.people.cn/n3/2016/0120/c98389-9006770.html
11 Xi Jinping Holds Talks with Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani of Qatar and Two
Heads of State Together Announce to Establish China-Qatar Strategic Partnership.
2014. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. November 3,
2015. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1207490.shtml
12 China, Oman issue joint statement on establishment of strategic partnership. 2018.
Xinhuanet. May 26, 2018. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-05/26/c_137206872.
htm
13 Mordechai Chaziza. 2020. China’s Strategic Partnership with Kuwait: New
Opportunities for the Belt and Road Initiative. Contemporary Review of the Middle
East. 7(4), pp. 501–519.
14 Xi Jinping Holds Talks with King of Bahrain Sheikh Hamad bin Isa Al-khalifa
Stressing to Build China-Bahrain Friendly Cooperative Relations of Long-term
Stability. 2013. Consulate-General of the People’s Republic of China in San Fran
cisco. September 16, 2013. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cgsf/eng/zgxw/t1078070.htm
15 Muslim countries’ silence on China’s repression of Uighurs. 2019. France24.
November 27, 2019.
https://www.france24.com/en/20191127-china-communist-uighurs-xinjiang-muslim
-silence-camps-repression
16 Chinese president meets Saudi crown prince. 2019. Xinhuanet. February 22, 2019.
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-02/22/c_137843268.htm
17 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo he Alabo lianhe qiu zhangguo guanyu jia qiang
quanmian zhanlue huoban guanxi de liane shengming. [Joint statement of the
People’s Republic of China and the United Arab Emirates on strengthening the
comprehensive strategic partnership (full text)] (2019). Xinhuanet. July 23, 2019.
http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2019-07/23/c_1124789629.htm
18 Sike Wu. (2015). Constructing “One Belt and One Road” and Enhancing the China-
GCC Cooperation. Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia). 9(2), p. 8.
19 See Eyüp Ersoy.
. (2012). Çin Dış Politikasında Ortadoğu: Temkin Diplomasisi
Üzerine Bir Inceleme. [Chinese Foreign Policy Toward the Middle East: A Study
on the Diplomacy of Caution]. Review of International Law and Politics. 8(31).
20 Jonathan Fulton. 2017. China’s Relations with the Arab Gulf Monarchies: Three
Case Studies. University of Leicester. Thesis. p. 97.
112 Ümit Alperen
21 Jon Alterman and John W. Garver. 2008. The Vital Triangle: China, the United
States, and the Middle East. Washington: Center for Strategic and International
Studies. p. 3.
22 Lars Erslev Andersen and Yang Jiang. 2014. Is China challenging the US in the
Persian Gulf, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS Report
2014:29, pp. 19–21.
23 Camille Lons and Jonathon Fulton. 2019. China’s great game in the Middle East.
European Council on Foreign Relations. Policy Brief. October 2019.
24 Robert Einhorn and Richard Nephew. May 2016. The Iran Nuclear Deal: Prelude
to Proliferation in the Middle East?. The Brookings Institution. Arms Control and
Non-Proliferation Series Paper 11, p. vii; Chain Reaction: Avoiding a Nuclear
Arms Race in the Middle East. Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate. February 2008. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/
CPRT-110SPRT39674/html/CPRT-110SPRT39674.htm.
25 Saudi Arabia, With China’s Help, Expands Its Nuclear Program. 2020. Wall Street
Journal. 4 August 2020. https://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-arabia-with-chinas-help
-expands-its-nuclear-program-11596575671
26 Lons and Fulton, ibid, p. 25.
27 Ibid.
28 Naser Al‐Tamimi. 2013. Asia-GCC Relations: Growing Interdependence. ISPI.
Analysis No. 179. June 2013. p. 8.
29 Liu Li and Zesheng Wang. 2017. Belt and Road Initiative in the Gulf region:
progress and challenges. China International Studies. 66, pp. 110–131.
Garlick and Havlová, ibid, p. 83.
30 According to the SIPRI databases, during the Iran–Iraq war, While China was the
largest arms supplier to Iran with arms sales of 1958 million dollars, it was Iraq’s
third largest arms supplier after France and the Soviets with 4238 million dollars
of arms sales. https://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/html/export_values.php
David B. Ottaway. 1988. Israelis aided China on missiles. The Washington Post.
May 23, 1988. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1988/05/23/isra
elis-aided-china-on-missiles/ac476260-1cc5-4879-9de3-b3993dfec57b/
31 See John W. Garver. 2006. China and Iran: Ancient Partners in a Post-Imperial
World. Seattle: The University of Washington Press. p. 168.
32 Joseph A. Kéchichian. 2016. Saudi Arabia and China: The Security Dimension.
Middle East Institute. February 9, 2016. https://www.mei.edu/publications/saudi-a
rabia-and-china-security-dimension
Bruce Riedel. 2020. Saudi Arabia’s relations with China: Functional, but not
strategic. Brookings. July 20, 2020. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/saudi-arabia
s-relations-with-china-functional-but-not-strategic/
33 Yitzhak Shichor. 2000. Mountains Out of Molehills: Arms Transfers in Sino-
Middle Eastern Relations. Middle East Review of International Affairs. 4(3), pp.
71–72. Ottoway. Ibid.
34 Garlick and Havlová, ibid, p. 93.
35 China holds first anti-terror drills with Saudi Arabia. 2016. Reuters. October 27,
2016. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-saudi-security/china-holds-first-anti
terror-drills-with-saudi-arabia-idUSKCN12R0FD
36 Zachary Keck. 2014. Saudi Arabia May Buy Pakistani-Chinese Fighter Jets. The
Diplomat. January 24, 2014. https://thediplomat.com/2014/01/saudi-arabia-ma
y-buy-pakistani-chinese-fighter-jets/
37 For China-Saudi Arabia military relations see Naser M. Al-Tamimi. 2014.
China-Saudi Arabia Relations, 1990–2012: Marriage of Convenience or Strategic
Alliance. Routledge, pp. 166–180.
38 Ankit Panda. 2017. Qatar Parades New Chinese Short-Range Ballistic Missile
System. The Diplomat. 19 December 2017. https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/qata
r-parades-new-chinese-short-range-ballistic-missile-system/. For China–Qatar mili
tary relations see: Brahim Saidy. 2017. Qatar and Rising China: An Evolving
Partnership. China Report. 53(4), pp. 458–461.
39 Shimon Arad. 2020. The United States Shouldn’t Sell the F-35 to Saudi Arabia.
War on the Rocks. January 17, 2020. https://warontherocks.com/2020/01/the-uni
ted-states-shouldnt-sell-the-f-35-to-saudi-arabia/
40 UAE gets American drones as China ramps up sales. 2020. Al Jazeera. September
19, 2020.
https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2020/9/19/uae-gets-american-drones-as-china
-ramps-up-sales; Dominic Dudley. 2018. How China Is Fueling The Arms Race In
Drones In The Middle East. Forbes. 17 December 2018. https://www.forbes.com/
sites/dominicdudley/2018/12/17/china-fueling-drones-arms-race-middle-east/?sh=62
f4703f4bb4
41 See Matteo Legrenzi and Fred H. Lawson. 2019. China-Oman relations and the
Indian Ocean security dilemma. Global Change, Peace & Security. 31(3), pp. 361–366.
42 Christopher Davidson. 2010. The Persian Gulf and Pacific Asia: From Indifference
from Interdependence. London: Hurst and Company, p. 75.
43 Chinese warships begin goodwill visit to Oman. 2011. Sina. December 4, 2011.
http://english.sina.com/china/p/2011/1204/420310.html
44 Liang Guanglie meets with Omani navy commander. 2013. People Daily. January
23, 2013.
http://en.people.cn/90786/8103515.html
45 Jonathan Fulton. 2020. Domestic Politics as Fuel for China’s Maritime Silk Road
Initiative: The Case of the Gulf Monarchies. Journal of Contemporary China. 29
(122), pp. 184–186.
46 Robert Kaplan. 2009. Center Stage for the Twenty-First Century: Power Plays in
the Indian Ocean. Foreign Affairs, 88(2), p. 22.
47 Li Xinfeng. 2013. Zhongguo haijun zai yading hai he Suomalihai yu de huhang
xingdong. Zai. Zhongdong huangpishu: Zhongdong fazhan baogao. [The Chinese
Navy’s Convoy Operations in the Gulf of Aden and the Waters off the Somali
Coast. In Yellow Book of the Middle East: Annual Report on Development in the
Middle East] No. 15 (2012–2013). Yang Guang (ed.). Beijing: Social Sciences
Academic Press, pp. 56–73.
48 David Rothkopf. 2015. The Middle East’s Pivot to Asia. Foreign Policy. April 24,
2015. https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/24/the-middle-easts-pivot-to-asia-china/.
49 Cinzia Bianco and Corrado Čok. 2020. Emirati DPlomacy and Chinese BRInk
manship. Middle East Institute. 28 July 2020. https://www.mei.edu/publications/em
irati-dplomacy-and-chinese-brinkmanship
50 Tingting Zhang. 2021. Energy Cooperation Between China and the GCC Coun
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51 Abdel Aziz Aluwaisheg. 2020. How to expand the China-GCC strategic partner
ship. Arab News. December 30, 2020. https://www.arabnews.com/node/1785041.
GCC Foreign Trade Amounts to $1.1 Trillion. 2019. Asharq Al-Awsat. October
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52 Yetiv and Oskarsson, ibid, p. 86.
53 Aluwaisheg, ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Zhang, p. 50.
56 Abdel Aziz Aluwaisheg, 2020.
57 Malhar Nabar and Camilo E. Tovar. 2016. Renminbi Internationalization, pp. 249–276.
In Modernizing China: Investing in Soft Infrastructure. Ed. W. Raphael Lam, Markus
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Rodlauer. Washington D.C.: IMF Publications. GCC listed banks’ results. KPMG.
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58 China’s ICBC Doha clears more than $86 bln in yuan transactions. 2017. Reuters.
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59 UAE, Chinese banks to enhance RMB clearing. 2018. China Daily. 13 December
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61 Mark Beeson. 2018. Geoeconomics with Chinese characteristics: the BRI and
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62 Managing Director of Kuwait Investment Authority signed the Articles of Agree
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63 Members and Prospective Members of the Bank. AIIB. https://www.aiib.org/en/a
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64 China Global Investment Tracker. The American Enterprise Institute. http://www.
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65 Chinese-built Mecca Light Railway praised by Hajj pilgrims. 2018. CGTN. August
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66 Julia Masterson and Shannon Bugos. 2020. Saudi Arabia May Be Building Ura
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67 Chen Kane. (2019). Why proposals to sell nuclear reactors to Saudi Arabia raise
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68 Saudi Aramco agrees to $10 billion joint venture deal in China. 2019. Arab News.
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69 Oman: Duqm Port Commercial Terminal and Operational Zone Development.
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70 China’s CSP, UAE’s Abu Dhabi Ports launch new terminal. 2018. Xinhuanet.
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71 Chinese contractor wins Jizan port deal. 2017. MEED. March 6, 2017.
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72 Near East Meets Far East: The Rise of Gulf Investment in Asia. 2007. The Econ
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73 Tamimi, ibid, p. 9.
74 Gulf states should consider U.S. ties when dealing with China - official. 2020.
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75 Meiguo shiya haiwan mengyou: Yu Zhongguo dajiaodao xu guji yu Meiguo
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7 The Emerging Security Role of Turkey
and China in the Middle East
Avoiding a Possible Clash in the Future
Ali Bakir
Introduction
Since the fall of the Chinese and Ottoman empires at the beginning of the
twentieth century, Turkey–China relations have evolved significantly. As
China’s rise in the international system became more evident in the early
2000s, decision makers in Turkey attached more importance to Ankara’s
relations with Beijing. During the first decade of the twenty-first century, both
China and Turkey achieved remarkable economic progress with an average
annual GDP growth of around 11% and 5%, respectively, compared to about
3% of the world average over the same period.1 Despite the global financial
crisis that shook the world in the period between 2007 and 2008, China
managed to surpass Japan as the second biggest economy in the world, while
Turkey succeeded in asserting itself as a rising economic power with the lar
gest economy in the Middle East. On the regional and international levels, the
two countries displayed a shared literature of “peaceful rise” and “regional
stability.”2 The shared traits and foreign policy visions of the two emerging
powers, China on the global scene, and Turkey on the regional one, allowed
them to briefly overcome some differences over the Chinese Uyghur Muslim
minority of Turkish roots, and upgrade their relations to a new level starting
from the economic aspect.
In 2006, China signed its first foreign, high-speed rail contract with Turkey.
The deal included building a 533km line connecting Ankara to Istanbul.3 In
2010, Beijing held its first ever military exercise with a NATO member when
Turkey extended an invitation for a joint military drill, the 2010 Anatolian
Eagle exercise.4 These developments among others signaled their mutual
desire and interest to carry their bilateral relations to the next level. In 2010,
bilateral relations elevated to the status of “strategic cooperation.”5 Two years
later, Turkey secured a dialogue partner status in the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO).6 At the same time, Ankara and Beijing aimed to
increase the volume of bilateral trade to $100 billion, and China supported
Turkey’s space ambitions by offering its Gansu facility to launch the SkyTurk
2 satellite.7 These developments along with the establishment of projects
related to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), raised the question of whether
DOI: 10.4324/9781003269175-7
The Emerging Security Role of Turkey and China 121
Turkey and China can develop a cooperative relation that surpasses the mere
bilateral context and serve the interests of both countries at the same time.
The BRI, in particular, boosted China’s engagement with geographical
spheres beyond its immediate neighborhood, some of those spheres are of
great importance to Ankara as well when it comes to Turkey’s neighborhood.
In the last two decades, the Middle East emerged as an important arena for
realizing the rising potentials of both Turkey and China as emerging middle
and great powers. While the middle power is obviously less powerful eco
nomically and militarily than the great power, is not central to world politics,
and has limited influence on deciding the distribution of power in a given
regional system, the middle power has the capability to change the position of
great powers and defend its own position on matters related to national or
regional security that directly affect it.8
The Middle East is one important region where China’s increased engage
ment is expected to have negative implications for Turkey in the future.
Acknowledging the asymmetric nature of relations between Turkey and
China, which usually limits the possibility and scale of competition between
the two countries, the realist paradigm, however, asserts that Turkey and
China’s interests in the Middle East will inevitably clash.9
This chapter aims to highlight the rising interaction and engagement of
Turkey and China in the Middle East, explore the arenas of possible conflict
in the future, and provide assessments on the foreign policy option of both
countries. It argues that there are three areas of divergence which can lead to
a potential conflict between Ankara and Beijing in the Middle East; the first
is political, the second is economic, and the third relates to security. These
three areas are usually interconnected. Taking into consideration the increas
ing engagement of Turkey and China in the Middle East, avoiding a possible
clash in the future is not going to be easy.
The first part of the chapter underlines the importance of Turkey’s “Middle
Corridor” project to China’s BRI and reflects on how Beijing’s economic rise
is affecting Ankara. It builds on that to identify three primary economic sec
tors – Energy, trade, and construction and contracting, as an arena for eco
nomic competition between Turkey and China in the Middle East. The
second part of the chapter maps the emerging security-related involvement of
both Turkey and China in the Middle East, focusing on their growing capa
city to project power abroad – in different forms and shapes – to protect their
interests. The third part evaluates the impact of China’s involvement in the
security environment of the Middle East – particularly in the Gulf region, the
Levant–Iraq region, and the North African region, on Turkey, and how a
growing security-related engagement for Beijing in the Middle East can have
a profound impact on Turkey’s national security as well as on its regional role
and interests. The last part explores ways of avoiding a possible clash between
Turkey and China in the Middle East in the future and how they can turn the
challenge into an opportunity by promoting a constructive agenda and
building on their shared interests in the region.
122 Ali Bakir
The Economic Competition between Turkey and China in the
Middle East
In 2013, China announced the BRI for the first time.10 Four years later, it
officially launched the “One Belt, One Road” summit.11 The initiative aims to
revive the ancient Silk Road, a major corridor for global trade from several
centuries ago, which also features a parallel sea-route. In this sense, the BRI
depends on advanced land and sea transport networks linking Asia with
Europe and Africa to promote its goals for mutual trade and economic
development, making it the largest geo-economic project of the twenty-first
century. Since the BRI addresses the economic factor for China, it also
increases the geo-economic and geopolitical importance for Turkey as well.
Turkey considers the BRI compatible to its “Middle Corridor” (MC) project
which in turn represents a transport network linking Turkey to China and
East Asia via the Caucasus and Central Asia.12 The MC is the short name for
the Trans-Caspian East-West-Middle Corridor Initiative, one of the most
important components of the efforts to revive the ancient Silk Road.13 It
comprises of a set of roads and rails from Turkey to Georgia and Azerbaijan
before it crosses the Caspian Sea towards China via the Caspian transit cor
ridor by taking the Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan route or the
Kazakhstan route.14 The project has a maritime leg that makes full use of
ports of Baku and Alat in Azerbaijan, Aktau and Kuryk in Kazakhstan, and
Turkmenbashi in Turkmenistan as main points of multimodal transport.15
Furthermore, the corridor is of great importance for land-locked countries in
Central Asia and has the potential to further extend to South Asia via
Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The MC is 2000km shorter than the Northern Corridor of the Trans-Siberian
Railway and will cut the travel time by a third compared to the sea route which
takes around 45 days.16 As such, it will significantly boost connectivity between
China and Europe, support the regional development and critical infrastructure
in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and turn Turkey into a vital hub for invest
ment and trade. In November 2015, Turkey and China signed a Memorandum
of Understanding to align the MC with the BRI.17 Given the economic and
trade nature of the initiative, these facts are expected to assist the Turkish econ
omy following the interruption of Ankara’s economic expansion in the Middle
East after 2011 and the fact that there is no space to increase its trade with
Europe significantly after reaching a point of saturation. In this sense, China and
the BRI can offer many economic opportunities to Turkey, however, not all
Turks agree on that.
For many business circles in Turkey, China’s economic rise and regional
expansion carry risks for Ankara and might constitute a threat rather than an
opportunity. A 2014 report on Turkish perceptions of China’s rise explored
the different opinions and trends of this matter. The section dealing with the
Turkish Businessmen’s perceptions of China emphasizes this point.18 This
concern among some Turkish officials, businesses, and financial circles come
from two main points. First, the imbalanced economic relations and big trade
deficit with Beijing is a serious concern for Ankara. China is Turkey’s third
top economic partner, and number one partner in East Asia.19 During five
years period from 2014 to 2019, Turkey’s accumulated trade deficit with
China exceeded $100 billion.20 Judging by the trend in Turkish exports to
Beijing which did not reach the $3 billion threshold at any given year over a
decade period from 2009 to 2019,21 closing the gap seems impossible. For the
business circles in Turkey, the huge imbalance in the bilateral trade is a
financial threat to Ankara.
Second, the invasion of China’s cheap products to the domestic market is
causing many problems to several economic sectors and businesses in Turkey.
This has had a profound impact on Turkish companies as it means profit losses
for the businesses and job losses for the Turkish workers. The competition is not
strictly applicable to Turkey’s domestic market. Companies of both China and
Turkey are competing in the international market especially in Africa, Central
Asia, and all around the Middle East. The Middle East is already a critical
region for Turkey and China mainly for being a primary source of energy, a big
lucrative market, and a major source for infrastructure and construction con
tracts. As Turkey and China are stepping up their economic involvement in the
region, there is always a possibility of competition in the energy, trade, and
infrastructure fields in the countries the Arab world and Iran.
Energy is the first factor to consider. Turkey and China depend on the
Middle East region to import oil and gas. Around 86% of Turkey’s oil
imports came from the Middle East in 2018, with almost 75% coming from
Iran, Iraq and Saudi.22 In contrast, 44% of China’s oil imports came from the
Middle East in 2019.23 As both Turkey and China are set to consume more
energy in the future and import more oil and gas from the region, the Middle
East is expected to become an even more important strategic factor for both
countries. In order to secure its energy supplies from the Middle East, China
has been continuously signing agreements, increasing investments, and secur
ing shares in energy companies of the region,24 with particular focus on Iraq
where Chinese companies are gaining ground in the energy sector.25
Turkey is also actively involved in efforts to secure its own energy supplies
from the region by using different tools. For example, as one of the largest
investors in Iraq, Turkey is involved in many energy projects there. In 2012,
Ankara announced that it signed a deal on drilling 40 oil wells in the Basra
province and is in talks with Baghdad on drilling 7,000 wells across Iraq.26
Two years later, Turkey’s energy minister uncovered that the state-run oil
company TPAO has invested $6 billion in Iraq’s oil and gas sector,27 which
continued to receive Turkish investments.28 Additionally, Turkey sought to
increase the imports of gas from friendly nations such as Qatar.29
One problematic issue for both China and Turkey is the special relationship
between the GCC states and the United States amid the deterioration of
relations between the U.S. and China on one hand, and the U.S. and Turkey
on the other. Given the heavy dependence of China on the oil coming from
124 Ali Bakir
the GCC states and Iran, Beijing’s primary concern is Washington’s ability to
pressure the GCC states – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and
the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – to disrupt the flow of oil to China at any
point in the future.30 Turkey, however, is concerned that it will be forced to
depend on more expensive oil coming from Saudi Arabia and the UAE
compared to that coming from Iraq and Iran.31 The problematic relations
Ankara has with Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman
(MBS) and UAE’s de facto ruler Muhammad bin Zayed (MBZ) adds another
layer of complexity to the issue.
In such a situation, Iran gains more importance as an energy-rich country
for both Turkey and China, however, because of U.S. sanctions, they have
been forced to look elsewhere for oil. These circumstances can create compe
tition between Turkey and China on certain energy sources in the Middle
East. One example is in Iraq where both Turkey and China already have large
stakes. Moreover, Turkey’s ambitions to turn into an energy hub that connects
energy producers in its east (Russia-Azerbaijan) and south (Iran, Iraq – the
GCC states) to consumers in its West (European countries) may run against
China’s interests and priorities.
The second factor, trade, is as important to consider. Both Turkish and
Chinese economies view the Middle East as an important export market.
From 2004 to 2013, the share of the Middle East in Turkey’s total exports
volume almost doubled from 16% to 30%. From 2009 to 2019, the volume of
trade between Turkey and countries of the Middle East grew over 25% to
almost $50 billion, around 75% of which occurred mainly with Iraq, the
UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar.32 Likewise, the trade between China and the
Middle Eastern countries grew fast in the last few years in a way that allowed
China to become the region’s largest trade partner. The total volume of trade
between China and the region reached around $220 billion, about $197 bil
lion of them with the GCC states alone.33 Although bigger in volume, the
share of the Middle East region as a percentage of China’s global trade is less
than what the Middle East represents for Turkey. As such, competition with
Beijing in the Middle East region is an additional concern for Ankara.
The low cost of production offers competitive advantage for Turkey and
China in the Middle East market. While Turkish products enjoy low trans
portation costs, Chinese ones enjoy low labor, low energy, low material, and
other input costs. Turkey is trying to leverage its geographic proximity, cul
tural advantages, and historic ties with the countries of the region to con
solidate its gains in the market and increase its share, however, it is becoming
more difficult to compete with the Chinese products due to Beijing’s economic
might and low costs of production. The manufactured goods make up the
majority of Turkey’s exports. Competing with China in the Middle East
would put pressure on some manufactured goods and industries in a way that
would limit the reach of Turkey’s exports beyond their existing markets.
Third, the infrastructure factor. The contracting and construction industry
is not to be excluded from the most affected sectors in any competition
between Turkey and China in the Middle East. Beijing and Ankara have the
largest contracting companies in the world. For more than a decade, China
and Turkey remained the biggest global contractors in terms of number of
projects across the world. According to 2017 figures, China had 65 companies
while Turkey had 46 companies in the world’s top 250 contractors.34 Since the
first overseas project took place in Libya in 1972 till 2020, Turkish firms have
been awarded around 10,525 contracts in 128 countries, generating a total of
$418.7 billion.35 At their peak, Turkish companies won around $30 billion
worth of international contracts a year in 2012 and 2013.36However, business
declined later mainly as a result of conflicts in Libya and Iraq, strained ties
with Moscow, and deteriorating of relations with Saudi Arabia in the after
math of the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Istanbul. In 2018,
Turkish contracting and construction firms registered $19.4 billion of con
tracts taking place abroad, with Russia and Saudi Arabia accounting toge
ther around 44% of those projects.37 In contrast, China’s share is expected
to rise due to BRI infrastructure-related projects in the Middle East. As
Beijing is capable of offering large finances in form of development aid and
loans, it is becoming more difficult for the Turkish companies to compete
with state-owned or supported contractors from China especially with
depleting financial resources in the Turkish case.
Turkey and China’s Emerging Security-related Engagements in the

Middle East
As both China and Turkey are deepening their engagement in the Middle
East on several levels, the two countries are increasingly forced to take mea
sures to secure their interests, energy imports, and critical trade routes. The
erosion of the role of the United States as a security guarantor for many
countries in the Middle East, especially in the Gulf region, has prompted
several regional players to diversify their security relations and defense coop
eration with other powers to secure an extra layer of protection.38 This
situation has raised many questions about the volume and scope of the
security responsibilities that some regional or international players can
assume in order to fill the emerging power vacuum in the region. Besides
Russia and its emerging role in the Middle East, China and Turkey were
among the very few names on the table. While neither of these countries is
willing or capable of replacing the United States in the Middle East, both
Turkey and China have been increasing their security involvement capacity in
the region in different ways and forms.
Since 2014, Turkey has been relying more on its hard power in the Middle
East to counter the mounting regional threats posed to its national security.39
This has been enabled mainly through three factors. First, the home-grown
defense industry is central to Turkey’s military deterrence. The rising defense
industry boosted Turkey’s regional role as an independent and capable regio
nal power. During a relatively short period of time, Ankara added more
126 Ali Bakir
domestic defense systems and weapons to its inventory than ever before,
decreasing its dependence on imports and increasing the percentage of local
content in its defense procurement from 24% in 2002 to 70% in 2019.40 The
country aims to produce its own fighter-jet, and is in the process of manu
facturing its first national tank (ALTAY).41It successfully managed to manu
facture drones, helicopters, ships – including light air craft carriers – missile
systems, armored vehicles, and other indigenous defense products.42 Adding to
the fact that the Turkish army is the second largest army in the North Atlantic
Alliance (NATO) after the U.S. army, and one of the strongest in the Middle
East, the indigenous defense industry is boosting Turkey’s hard power capacity
in a way that entitles it to increase its security involvement in the region.
Second, the establishment of military bases and military deployments
abroad reflect Ankara’s aspiration to become a rising power in the region. By
increasing its security involvement and expanding its military footprints from
the Eastern Mediterranean to the Horn of Africa, Turkey has been stretching
its sphere of strategic influence in the Middle East.43 At the end of 2014,
Turkey and Qatar signed a defense pact that allowed Ankara to deploy its
troops in a military base in the heart of the Gulf region. The deployment to
Qatar play a crucial security role during the 2017 Gulf crisis – when Saudi
Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt imposed a blockade on Qatar.44
Additionally, Turkey signed an agreement with Somalia in 2015 that laid the
groundwork for establishing the biggest Turkish military base overseas and
securing a foothold for Ankara in the Horn of Africa.45 In 2017, Turkey also
signed an agreement with Sudan to rebuild the Suakin Island on the Red Sea
while eyeing a naval base in it.46 The possible militarization of the strategic
Island gives Ankara a geopolitical advantage in that region. Turkey’s military
bases abroad offer several advantages to Ankara including enhancing its cap
abilities to respond to contingencies, strengthening the security cooperation with
regional countries, defense capacity-building partnerships, geostrategic posturing
and effective political messaging, and self-promoting of high professionalism,
domestic defense capabilities, and alliance credibility.47
The third factor relates to Turkey’s military engagements abroad. The mili
tary operations beyond its borders proves that Ankara is capable of and willing
to use its hard power decisively in ongoing regional crisis, whether indepen
dently or with the collaboration of other players. Syria and Iraq are clear
examples of Ankara’s resolve in protecting its interests against the emerging
security threats.48 Turkey lunched several military operations across the borders
with the two countries, deployed troops, and established military posts.49
Moreover, Turkey’s ambition to boost its naval power by adding valuable assets
such as the light aircraft carrier (LHD) – TCG Anadolu – will considerably
enhance Ankara’s maritime influence, especially in the Mediterranean, and
provide it with extended power projection capacity.
In comparison, China’s security involvement in the Middle East was almost
non-existent in the past, however, there have been some interesting develop
ments in the last decade and China has been steadily building its footprint in
50
the region. These security-related developments coincided with two major
realities. First, the constant rise of China’s economic interests in the Middle
East, especially in the Gulf region. China’s trade with the region is largely
focused on three countries, Saudi Arabia with $47.4 billion in 2017, UAE with
$40 billion and Iran with $35.3 billion in the same year.51 The second reality
relates to the fast development of China’s military capabilities and power pro
jection. According to the 2019 US Department of Defense Intelligence Agency
report, “Chinese leaders characterize China’s long-term military modernization
program as essential to achieving great power status.”52 The report further
asserts that China is increasingly willing to project its military power, grow its
armed forces and develop military technology.53 Taking this into consideration,
it will be safe to assume that as China’s trade with the Middle East region
grows, and its military capabilities advance, Beijing will – at certain point in the
future, have the power to protect its vital trade routes, strategic chokepoints,
and sea lanes by itself.
Recently, Beijing openly stressed the importance of maritime security to
China’s national interests. The 2015 White Paper on China’s Military Strategy
indicated that China needs to protect the security of its “overseas interests
concerning energy and resources, strategic sea lines of communication
(SLOCs), as well as institutions, personnel and assets abroad.”54 It called for
the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to engage in a combination of
“offshore waters defense” with “open seas protection.”55 Moreover, the con
cept of “frontier defense”56 in Beijing’s strategic thinking means the PLAN
should be ready to carry out military operations and combat missions around
the world. This doctrine builds on two facts. First, China’s economic might
and sustainable growth is dependent on an uninterrupted and sustainable
access to foreign markets and primary resources via maritime trade routes,
especially through the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean, which links
Beijing to major energy producers in the Middle East and Africa. Second, the
fact that 95% of China’s exports to the Middle East, Africa, and Europe flow
through the Indian Ocean is another factor to consider.57
In 2008, China deployed an “anti-piracy task force” in the Gulf of Aden, the
Arabian Sea and off the Horn of Africa, marking Beijing’s return to the Indian
Ocean for the first time since the maritime expeditions of Admiral Zheng He
around 600 years ago.58 With over a decade of experience in this region and
until April 2019, the PLAN successfully carried out 32 escort missions to over
6,600 Chinese and foreign flagged ships.59 Beijing also carried out large-scale
operations to rescue its citizens from crisis such as in Libya and Yemen amid
the Arab Uprisings in 2011 and 2015.60 It significantly increased its military
diplomacy and soft power capabilities especially in the Indian Ocean by
increasing the joint military exercises in the period from 2013–2016 from three
to 47,61including with countries such as Russia and Iran. The most significant
security involvement for China in the region, however, occurred in August
2017, when Beijing opened its first overseas military facility in Djibouti.62 As a
country located in the Horn of Africa near the strategic Bab al Mandab strait,
128 Ali Bakir
around 10% of the world’s sea-borne oil trade passes through Djibouti
annually.63 A declassified document from the Center for Navy Analysis
(CNA)64 indicates that China’s naval facility in Djibouti will support four
other key missions: intelligence collection, non-combat evacuation operations,
peacekeeping operation support, and counterterrorism.65
The port of Gwadar on Pakistan’s coastline near the Strait of Hormuz is
another example of China’s reach and aspiration of a blue navy power. The
port is owned and operated by a Chinese firm.66 Its geographic position as a
gateway between western China and the Indian Ocean suggests that it is likely
to be the PLA’s next overseas naval base.67 The Djibouti base as well as the
Pakistani port of Gwadar, are indications of China’s growing presence near
strategic straits and sensitive sea routes. Gwadar is only 107 miles from Cha
bahar across the border with Iran which is being developed by India.68 China
has been utilizing its strong relations with Pakistan also to conduct joint
military exercises in the Arabian Sea to increase the PLAN’s familiarity and
understanding of the operational conditions in this very critical and sensitive
region for several regional and international players.69
China’s aircraft carrier program which aims to help Beijing project power
beyond its region is developing fast. In September 2012, China’s first aircraft
carrier, Liaoning, was handed over to the PLAN.70 Almost five years later,
the country’s first domestically built aircraft carrier – Type 001A – was laun
ched, only to be commissioned in December 2019 under the Type 002.71
Satellite images and intelligence reports suggest that China is already working
on building a new advanced aircraft carrier.72 This development will help
China to gradually transform its soft military presence73 in the Middle East
into a hard military power once the time comes.
The Security Interests of Turkey and China in the Middle East

China’s increasing involvement in the security environment of the Middle
East can have a profound impact on Turkey’s national security as well as on
its regional role and interests. There are three main areas that Turkey and
China might face off in the upcoming years: the Gulf region, the Levant–Iraq
region, and the North African region. In the Gulf region, the 2017 crisis and
the 2019 escalation between the United States and Iran shed light on the
security-oriented role of both Turkey and China in this Middle East. During
the 2017 Gulf crisis, Turkey played a crucial role in preventing the military
escalation of the crisis.74 This event demonstrated that Turkey is now involved
in the security of the Gulf region through its alliance with Qatar and its for
ward military base in the small gas-rich state. Emphasizing the importance
Turkey attaches to peace, security and stability in the region, President
Erdogan stressed during his visit to Doha in November 2019, that peace in
the Gulf region is key to stability in the Middle East.75 He went further to
connect the security of Qatar and the Gulf to that of Turkey by asserting that
“We do not deem Qatar’s security separate from that of our country.”76
A very dangerous escalation between the U.S. and Iran was bound to further
escalate tensions in the region. Tehran shot down a $130 million worth Amer
ican UAV,77 seized a British-flagged ship in the Gulf78 and was accused of tar
geting six foreign tankers – outside the Strait of Hormuz – in the Gulf of Oman,
four of them in UAE’s territorial water,79 and targeting critical oil facilities of
Saudi Arabia’s oil company Aramco by using drones and cruise missiles. The
Aramco attack resulted in decreasing Riyadh’s output of oil by 5.7 million bar
rels per day or around 5% of the global oil supply.80 These developments shed
light on the systematic erosion of the U.S. role as security guarantor for the GCC
states, thus raising questions on who has the capacity and the will to fill the void
in the future. Ironically, while announcing plans to mobilize an international
maritime force to share burden and protect vital shipping routes in the Gulf
through which roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil passes,81 the U.S. President at
the time, Trump implied that China should play a role in Gulf security and bear
the brunt.82
While China has the military capacity to maintain a sizable force in the
Middle East, particularly in the Gulf region, to carry out a relative power
projection or freedom of navigation operations, it does not seem to have nei
ther the will nor the capacity to play a role similar to that was played by the
US in the Gulf since 1991 at the current moment.83 Surprisingly, however,
China has been considering a middle way that can be significantly less costly
and more efficient when it comes to deepening its security involvement in the
Gulf without making burdensome commitments.
On August 6, 2019, Ni Jian, China’s Ambassador to the UAE confirmed
that his country is looking at the U.S. proposal for Gulf escorts.84 He con
firmed his country was considering having its navy escort its commercial ships
in the region. Yet, he cautiously indicated that China would only move in this
direction in the event of a “very unsafe situation” in the Gulf.85 If the Chinese
approve this option in the near future, it will indicate a change in China’s
military calculations regarding the region. Moreover, it might also signal the
age of the internationalization of the Gulf security and thus the diversification
of the security guarantors with a probable increasing role for other states such
as Russia and India. In this sense, China’s defense ties and possible security
arrangements with Iran and the GCC states can further complicate Turkey’s
interests and role in the region.
Unlike the Gulf region, both Syria and Iraq are direct neighbors of Turkey.
This makes Ankara more sensitive and reactive towards the internal and
regional situation of these countries, especially since both have been the
source of security-threats to Turkey in the past decade or more. On the other
hand, Iraq and Syria have also extensive relations with China and are
important to Beijing’s BRI agenda. During the last decade, however, China’s
position on the Syrian and Iraqi crisis seemed to harbor political calculations
rather being stemmed from pure economic interests. Regarding Syria, China
defended Assad’s government at the UN since the early days of the 2011
uprising.86 While it did not play a significant role in the military dimension of
130 Ali Bakir
the crisis, it has been accused of providing Assad with chlorine gas.87 China
used its veto power at the Security Council ten times between 2011 and 2020
to defend the Syrian government, including on the use of chemical weap
ons.88 This is 66.6% of the Chinese vetoes used since the People’s Republic
of China became a permanent member of the Security Council in 1971.89
The Chinese position has undoubtedly led to empowering Assad. The
situation had direct negative social, economic, and hard security implica
tions on Turkey but not much attention is given to China in comparison to
the reporting about Russia’s role in the Syrian conflict which primarily rests
on a blunt hard power.
In Iraq, China was one of the countries that expressed support for the
Prime Minister – at the time – Nouri al-Maliki who made the problem of
ISIS worse.90 China’s vast economic and energy interests in Iraq are mostly
located in the southern part of the country, in the predominantly Shiite areas
near the Iranian borders, far away from the danger of ISIS.91 Unlike China,
most of the Turkish interests in Iraq were located in the northern part, which
was directly threatened by ISIS.92
Energy, energy politics, and energy security can be another dimension of
possible encountering between the two countries. The increasing activism of
Ankara and Beijing in the regional energy theatre suggests that competition
between the two states over supplies cannot be ruled out in the future,
especially in countries like Iraq where they already have large stakes.
Moreover, plans to turn Turkey into a transit state connecting producers in
the east with consumers in the west may run against China’s interests and
priorities in the long run.
In North Africa, Libya is an example of another arena where Turkey and
China might indirectly or unintentionally clash. While Ankara supported
the UN-recognized Libyan government – the Government of National
Accord (GNA) – China seemed to work with the GNA and the self-styled
Libyan National Army (LNA) led by Khalifa Haftar at the same time.93 In
fact, the flow of advanced Chinese weapons94 to Haftar, undermined the
GNA. Although those weapons were not transferred to Haftar directly from
China95 and were given by third parties – UAE and Egypt96 – the back-
channel agreements with China have further enabled Haftar to sustain his
military campaign against the capital, Tripoli for more than a year from
April 2019 till June 2020. The Chinese armed drones in particular97 have
empowered Haftar and given him an extended military capacity to target
areas far away from his headquarters in Eastern Libya. This is a case where
a Chinese security factor had an impact on Turkey interests in a third
country. The Chinese drones along with other advanced weapons provided
by several countries to Haftar, prompted Turkey to provide military assis
tance to the (GNA), including Turkish armed drones, in order to bring a
balance to the imbalanced conflict.98 As a result, Turkish and Chinese
military equipment have ended up being used by opposing parties in
Libya.99
Avoiding a Possible Turkey–China Clash in the Middle East
The perception that China is a threat to Turkey can be weathered by
strengthening the economic interdependency between the two states and by
searching for new ways that would compensate the imbalanced bilateral trade.
In this sense, three factors can help close the gap and boost the trust and the
bilateral relations. First, increasing the Chinese investments in Turkey.
Second, increasing the number of Chinese tourists to Turkey. Third, integrat
ing Ankara in China’s BRI-related projects. Achieving progress on these three
fronts will probably make Turkey less sensitive towards China’s increasing
economic ties with the Middle East. It would also create new opportunities
for Ankara and Beijing not only on the bilateral level, but also on the regio
nal level where both would have a chance to cooperate in joint projects based
on mutual interests.
According to Turkey’s trade minister, Ruhsar Pekcan, Chinese companies
invested $1.56 billion in Turkey in 2018 out of $129 billion, the total invest
ments of Chinese companies’ across the globe.100 Although the Chinese
investments in Turkey cover sectors such as energy, infrastructure, logistic,
finance, automobile, telecommunication, and livestock,101 the investments are
still small, compared to China’s financial capacity and the volume of Beijing’s
global foreign direct investments. Increasing these investments in Ankara and
further integrating Turkey in the BRI would create great opportunities for both
countries on a win-win bases. On the one hand, it would transform Turkey into
a kind of a regional hub for China, not only to export goods to Europe but
also to Middle East and North Africa region. On the other hand, it would
promote Chinese enterprises’ going abroad, and help easing the negative
impact of the imbalance in bilateral trade on the bilateral relations.102
Historically, the Turkish people living now in Anatolia were once a neighbor
of the Chinese people.103 Importantly, tourism has the potential to impact the
mutual perceptions and strengthen people-to-people bonds. In 2017, around
250,000 Chinese tourists visited Turkey.104 The following year, China
announced the year 2018 as Turkey’s Year which boosted the number of Chi
nese tourists visiting Turkey to 400,000.105 Although this seems to be a huge
increase on a yearly basis, the number of Chinese tourists visiting Turkey is
incredibly low, especially when compared to the number of Chinese tourists
travelling abroad, and the number of foreign tourists visiting Turkey. For
example, the number of Russian tourists visiting Turkey exceeded seven million
in 2019.106 Taking into consideration that China has the world’s largest popu
lation of just over 1.4 billion people, and the massive growth of Chinese people
wishing to travel abroad, there is a great potential to increase the number of
Chinese visiting Turkey for tourism. This would help compensate the great
deficit with China and would also bring more balance to the imbalanced
Turkey–China economic relationship.
China’s BRI is about a trade-generating effect by increasing connectivity.
The BRI is a possible source of diversification for Turkey. It would answer its
132 Ali Bakir
needs in terms of boosting trade and investments, localization of high technol
ogy, better and more sustainable infrastructure, and self-sufficiency in energy.
The strategic geographic position of Turkey as a country that is located partly in
Asia and partly in Europe, and within the reach of central Asia, the Middle East,
and Africa, makes it an integral part of BRI. Although China already chose the
UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Iran as its primary partners in the BRI in the Middle
East region, Turkey can be a strategic partner to Beijing not only vis-à-vis
Europe – as it is right now – but also in other regional dimensions such as the
Middle East. In other words, Turkey can help China execute the BRI’s goals in
the Middle East. Unlike Abu Dhabi, Riyadh, and Tehran, which suffer several
disadvantages concerning the high dependency of the economy on the oil, the
quality of the skilled working power or the lack of it in some cases, the manu
facturing infrastructure, the geographic position and the Land-Sea connectivity
to MENA region, the weak nature of institutionalism and rule of law, etc.,
Ankara is qualified to compensate for those constraints through several advan
tages it can offer. According to HSBC China:
Turkey has a resilient economy which has grown more than three times over
the past 15 years. and is widely expected to further grow in the years to
come. Despite the setback in 2018, Turkey is anticipated to be one of the
fastest growing economies among OECD members during 2015–2025, with
an annual average growth rate of 4.9 percent.107 Turkey is also the second
biggest reformer among OECD countries with the most business-friendly
investment climate. Over the last decade, Turkey has invested $90 billion in
infrastructure projects, including bridges, highways, tunnels, railways and
airports, and a further $64 billion of investments are to be made through the
3,400 infrastructure projects in the pipeline.108
These facts reflect the huge potentials of the Turkish economy in comparison
to other regional countries as well as the capacity to develop and grow on a
large scale. Additionally, the mega investments on new infrastructure in a
country with unique geography completely suits the Chinese setting regarding
the connectivity and the BRI project and create valuable, economic opportu
nities for Beijing. However, despite signing a Memorandum of Understanding
to align China’s BRI with the “Middle Corridor” Project of Turkey, there
have been no tangible outcomes from the agreement. Progress on this front
seems much slower than it is supposed to be, which suggest more work need
to be done on this front. The level of integration of the MC in the BRI is
crucial for Turkey–China relations. Expanding the current fields of coopera
tion, and exploring more cooperative opportunities would create sustainable
partnership in several domains including the manufacturing, transportation,
high technology, telecommunications, energy, science, finance, etc.
In the infrastructure sector, for example, Chinese and Turkish companies
can avoid a lose-lose situation by looking for cooperation opportunities and
partnership agreements. The Chinese, in particular, face some disadvantages
that can hinder their work in the Middle East in the future, especially in
terms of cultural adaptation and the vast dependence on Chinese workers in
their projects at the expense of the local workers. A common vision for the
post-conflicts reconstruction of the Middle East can benefit both.
Additionally, in the energy domain, the two countries do not necessarily
need to compete in the Middle East as there’s no deep-rooted conflict. In fact,
historic experience in this regard shows that Ankara and Beijing can have a
fruitful cooperation in this field. Turkey and China have an interest in carry
ing out joint development projects along the BRI including projects related to
pipelines in the Middle East.109
Security-wise, coordinating on emerging crisis in the Middle East between
China and Turkey would help them avoid current or potential disagreements
in the future, provide them with a clearer understanding of each other’s
motives, and help them avoid being trapped in an unfavorable position that
might harm either of them. More security engagement would boost trust and
help avoid misjudgment in times of increased tension as Turkey and China
are set to play a bigger and more active role in the security of the Gulf region
in the future. Both countries have an interest in keeping the stability in the
region but given that China and Turkey are neither prepared, willing, nor
capable of substituting the United States in the Gulf at the moment, both
would prefer a cooperative role with the current dominant power, the US. The
maritime security in the Gulf can constitute a common ground for a joint
work. Moreover, defense relations are integral part of comprehensive relations
between any two states. In the case of Turkey and China, these relations have
been developing slowly, but steadily, during the last decade or so. There is a
unique chance for Beijing to bring content and depth to the 2010 “strategic
partnership” that bonds it with Ankara, given that some Turkish analysts
suggest that the Turkish government is open to Eurasian inclinations in the
aftermath of the failed 2016 coup, and the worsening of relations between
Turkey and the United States.110 Thus, Turkey and China can also enhance
their cooperation in the defense industry. Ankara considers China as a
potential source of defense technology and showed interest in China’s short-
range missile and space technology, while for Beijing, Ankara can be a
potential market for investments in its rising defense industry.
Finally, it is important for China to realize that its presumed neutrality is
increasingly involving taking sides in a way that leaves serious security impli
cations on the concerned state or other states – in this case Turkey – parti
cularly in conflict areas such as Syria, Iraq, and Libya. For example, in Syria,
China’s several vetoes against Security Council action led, in part, to the
continuation of the Syrian conflict. As a result, the conflict in Syria has con
tinued to raise security concerns for Ankara. The same can be said in Iraq
and Libya. In some cases, Chinese political support as well as military
equipment pose real threats to Turkey’s security and interests in conflicts
taking place around the region. The fact that the Middle East will remain a
higher priority for Turkey compared to China, mainly for security and
134 Ali Bakir
geographical reasons, means that Ankara will become more sensitive regard
ing the role of the foreign powers in the Middle East and thus needs to be
assured in a way that can guarantee a win-win situation for both.
Conclusion
Both China and Turkey are emerging powers with growing involvement and
interests in the Middle East. As their roles in the region are set to increase in
the future, they will find their paths cross more often on a host of political,
economic, and security issues. While the economic aspect of China’s presence
in the Middle East might prove challenging for Turkey, Beijing increasing
security-related engagement in the region can be of great concern for Ankara
and has the potential of putting the two countries on a collision course.
Nevertheless, despite their contrasting positions and interests on several issues
in the Middle East, the clash between Turkey and China is not inevitable.
Mapping the capacity of the two states in the region shows a divergence of
interests in more than one topic on several levels. As the Middle East will remain
a higher priority for Turkey than China, mainly for security and geographical
reasons, it would be in Beijing’s interest to build on the two countries’ common
interests to avoid possible conflicting positions or contentions between the two
players in the future. Rather than focusing on differences, better cooperation and
coordination between the two states should be sought out when dealing with
problems at different levels whether it be security or economy.
In this sense, to avoid being caught in an unfavorable position where their
interests might clash, Turkey and China can better navigate their relations in
the Middle East and create new opportunities for themselves by realizing their
“Strategic partnership,” creating platforms for discussions, and promoting
common perspectives and agendas on matters of vital interest. The level of
integration of the Middle Corridor in the BRI would be a litmus paper and a
critical indication of where things can go in the future between Ankara and
Beijing or in which way.
When it comes to the Middle East, China and Turkey have a unique
opportunity to unite their powers in specific sectors such as construction and
contracting, textile, energy etc., to achieve a win-win situation. Security-wise,
China, in particular, needs to take Turkey’s interests and concerns into con
sideration in matters that might have implications on their bilateral relations
or their regional standing.
Notes
1 World Bank national accounts data and OECD national accounts data files.
Database of the World Bank.
2 Ali Bakir (2011). Turkey and China: The foundations of strategic cooperation,
Strategic Dimensions Journal, Issue 7–8, April 2011, p. 192. [In Arabic]
3 Jeremy Luedi (2015). Turkey’s global competition with China. Global Risk
Insights, August 23, 2015.
4 Ibid.
5 Relations between Turkey and China (2019). Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
6 China ready to discuss Turkey’s membership into Shanghai pact, says ambassador.
(2017). Daily Sabah, May 12, 2017.
7 Jeremy Luedi. Op. cit.
8 Dong-min Shin (2015). A Critical Review of the Concept of Middle Power. E-
International Relations, December 4, 2015.
9 Altay Atli (2016). Turkey’s Foreign Policy Towards China: Analysis and
Recommendations. Global relations Forum, policy paper series, no.3, June 2016,
p. 11.
10 For more details: How Will the Belt and Road Initiative Advance China’s
Interests? (2020). China Power, May 8, 2017, Updated August 26, 2020.
11 Full text of President Xi’s speech at opening of Belt and Road forum. (2017).
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, May 15, 2017.
12 Altay Atli. Op. cit., p. 11.
13 Turkey’s Multilateral Transportation Policy (2020). Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Turkey builds massive high-speed railway to mark centennial anniversary (2017).
Xinhua, May 14, 2017.
18 Selcuk Colakoglu (2014). Turkish Perceptions of China’s Rise. International Stra
tegic Research Organization (USAK), Report No. 39, March 2014, pp. 19–23.
19 Turkey Profile (2019). World Integrated Trade Solutions Database.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Turkey 2021 Energy Policy Review. (2021). International Energy Agency (IEA),
2021, p.117.
23 China Profile (2020). Energy Information Administration (EIA), 20 September
2020.
24 James Murray (2019). China leads investment for Middle East oil and gas pro
jects worth $75bn. NS Energy, November 21, 2019.
25 Sophie Zinser (2020). A Quantum Leap Forward: Chinese Influence Grows in
Iraq’s Oil Market. The Diplomat, December 23, 2020.
26 Turkey signs $350 mln Iraq oil drilling deal (2012). Reuters, November 2, 2012.
27 Turkish Petroleum Corporation invests $6 billion in Iraq (2014). Hurriyet Daily
News, November 11, 2014.
28 Turkey’s state-run energy company plans to invest $2.3 bln abroad in 2016
(2016). Hurriyet Daily News, November 23, 2015.
29 Turkey, Qatar sign liquefied natural gas agreement (2015). Daily Sabah,
December 2, 2015.
QATARGAS and BOTAŞ (TURKEY) sign new LNG agreement. (2017).
Qatargas, September 20, 2017. Turkey to Sign Deal with Qatar to Reduce
Energy Supply Costs (2018). Reuters, September 3, 2018.
30 Camille Lons, Jonathan Fulton, Degang Sun, Naser Al-Tamimi (2019). China’s
great game in the Middle East. European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR),
October 21, 2019.
31 Selcan Hacaoglu (2019). Trump’s Gulf Backups to Iran Aren’t Good Enough for
Turkey. Bloomberg, April 24, 2019.
32 Turkey’s Trade with Middle East Surpasses $40 Billion (2019). Hurriyet Daily
News, April 15, 2019.
33 James Sorene (2019). Is China the real force behind Iran?. Times of Israel,
November 7, 2019.
136 Ali Bakir
34 Turkish contractors rank second in world for foreign projects for 10th straight
year (2017). Hurriyet Daily News. August 18, 2017.
35 Contractors Carry Out $14 bln Worth Projects (2021). Hurriyet Daily News,
January 20, 2021.
36 Ceyda Caglayan, Ezgi Erkoyun (2019). Chinese firms seek Turkish partners in
Africa: Turkish contractors’ chief. Reuters, May 16, 2019.
37 Ibid.
38 See Ali Bakir (2017). Kuwait moving up again on Turkey’s BFF list. Al-Monitor,
November 16, 2017.
39 Ali Bakir (2021). Mapping The Rise of Turkey’s Hard Power. New Lines Insti
tute for Strategy and Policy, August 24, 2021.
40 Ali Bakir (2021). Mapping The Rise of Turkey’s Hard Power: Domestic Industry.
New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy, August 26, 2021.
41 BMC Lays Foundations for the Next 50 Years at Sakarya Karasu (2019). Mili
tary Science and Intelligence magazine (MSI), March 18, 2019.
42 Paul Iddon (2019). Turkey’s Ever-growing Indigenous Arms Industry. The New
Arab, October 18, 2019.
43 Antoine Vagneur-Jones, Can Kasapoglu (2017). Bridging the Gulf: Turkey’s for
ward base in Qatar. Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Note de la FRS n°
16/2017, August 11, 2017, p. 3.
44 Ali Bakir (2019) The Evolution of Turkey—Qatar Relations Amid a Growing
Gulf Divide. In: Krieg A. (eds) Divided Gulf. Contemporary Gulf Studies. Palgrave
Macmillan, Singapore, pp. 212–213.
45 Bakir (2021). Mapping The Rise of Turkey’s Hard Power. Op. Cit.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Timeline: Turkey’s military operations in Iraq and Syria (2019). Reuters, October
11, 2019.
49 Ibid.
50 What Would a Larger Chinese Presence Mean for the Middle East? (2019).
China File, August 20, 2019.
51 Nicholas Lyal (2019). Can China Remake Its Image in the Middle East?, The
Diplomat. March 4, 2019.
52 China Military Power 2019 (2019). US’ Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA),
January 2019, p. v.
53 Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
2019 (2019). US’ Department of Defense (DoD), Annual report to Congress,
May 2019, p. 58.
54 China’s Military Strategy (full text). (2015). The State Council of the People’s
Republic of China, May 27, 2015.
55 Ibid.
56 You Ji (2016). China’s Emerging Indo-Pacific Naval Strategy. Asia Policy, vol.
22, 2016, p. 11.
57 Andrew S. Erickson, and others (2012). Beijing’s “Starter Carrier” and Future
Steps. US Naval War College Review, vol. 65, Number 1, Winter 2012, p. 25.
58 Explaining China’s Participation in Anti-Piracy Operations in the Gulf of Aden
(2013). Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Political Science,
May 2009, p. 2.
59 Chinese naval fleets escort over 6,600 vessels in Gulf of Aden, Somalia over past
10 years. (2019). China Daily, April 19, 2019.
60 Ibid.
61 Christopher K. Colley (2019). Why China’s PLA Will Not Replace the Amer
icans in the Middle East. The Diplomat, November 1, 2019.
62 China formally opens first overseas military base in Djibouti (2017). Reuters,
August 1, 2017.
63 Lily Kuo (2017). China has officially opened its first military base in Africa.
Quartz, August 1, 2019.
64 A federally funded center for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps.
65 Erica Downs and others (2017). China’s Military Support Facility in Djibouti:
The Economic and Security Dimensions of China’s First Overseas Base. Center
for Naval Analysis (CNA), July 2017, pp. 30–31.
66 Isaac Kardon (2020). China’s Geopolitical Gambit in Gwadar. Wilson Center,
October 20, 2020.
67 H. I. Sutton (2020). China’s New High-Security Compound In Pakistan May
Indicate Naval Plans. Forbes, June 2, 2020.
68 Pakistan’s Gwadar Port: A New Naval Base in China’s String of Pearls in the
Indo-Pacific (2018). CSIS, April 2, 2018.
69 Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan (2020). China-Pakistan naval drills: More than just
symbolism. ORF, January 11, 2020.
70 What do we know (so far) about China’s second aircraft carrier? (2017). China
Power, April 22, 2017. Updated June 15, 2021.
71 Ibid.
72 Tracking China’s third aircraft carrier (2019). China Power, May 6, 2019.
Updated October 17, 2019.
73 Degang Sun (2015). China’s Soft Military Presence in the Middle East. Middle
East Institute (MEI), Washington, March 11, 2015.
74 Bakir (2019) The Evolution of Turkey—Qatar Relations Amid a Growing Gulf
Divide. Op. cit., pp. 212–213.
75 Speech for the Turkish President Erdogan (2019). “We don’t deem Qatar’s
security separate from that of our country”. Presidency of the Republic of
Turkey, November 25, 2019.
76 Ibid.
77 Strikes on Iran Approved by Trump, Then Abruptly Pulled Back (2019). The
New York Times, June 20, 2019.
78 Iran’s seizure of UK tanker in Gulf seen as escalation. (2019). AP, July 20, 2019.
79 Tankers Are Attacked in Mideast, and U.S. Says Video Shows Iran Was
Involved (2019). The New York Times, June 13, 2019.
80 Attacks on Saudi Oil Facilities Knock Out Half the Kingdom’s Supply (2019).
Reuters, September 14, 2019.
81 U.S. Mobilizes Maritime Coalition in Persian Gulf (2019). The Iranian Primer.
September 23, 2019.
82 Geoffrey Aronson (2019). The end of an era: Trump invites China to police the
Gulf. Middle East Institute, September 9, 2019.
83 Christopher K. Colley (2019). Why China’s PLA Will Not Replace the Amer
icans in the Middle East. The Diplomat, November 1, 2019.
84 China May Set Its Navy on Course for the Persian Gulf (2019). Stratfor, August
9, 2019.
85 Ibid.
86 Guy Burton (2020). China and the Middle East Conflicts. Routledge, New York,
2020, pp. 167–168.
87 Syria: Strong Evidence Government Used Chemicals as a Weapon (2014).
Human Rights Watch (HRW), May 13, 2014.
88 Security Council Veto List. UN Documents.
89 Ali Bakir (2020). What an Iran-China pact means for Turkey, TRT World,
August 18, 2020.
90 Iraq’s former prime minister made the ISIS problem worse (2015). Vox,
November 17, 2015.
138 Ali Bakir
91 Peter Ford (2014). Why China Stays Quiet on Iraq, Despite Being No. 1 Oil
Investor. The Christian Science Monitor, June 27, 2014.
92 Ali Hussein Bakeer (2019). Turkey in Iraq: The fixed and the variable in role and
influence. Aljazeera Centre for Studies, June 18, 2019. [In Arabic]
93 Check: Adrea Ghiseli and Maria Grazia Giuffrida (2020). China as an Offshore
Balancer in the Middle East and North Africa. RUSI Journal, Volume 165, Issue 7,
November 2020, p. 15. Frederic Wehrey and Sandy Alkoutami (2020). China’s Bal
ancing Act in Libya. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 10, 2020.
94 Libyan fighters seize U.S. and Chinese missiles from Haftar’s forces (2019).
Reuters, June 29, 2019.
95 Lee Jeong-ho (2019). Chinese-made missiles and drones used in Libya conflict,
UN experts find. South China Morning Post (SCMP), May 7, 2019.
96 Point Blank: Egypt, Russia and UAE sent arms to Libya’s Haftar (2019). Al
Jazeera, November 13, 2019.
97 Ali Bakir (2019). Drone Arms Race: The Great Sky Game in the Middle East.
Inside Arabia, December 5, 2019.
98 Ali Bakir (2019). Turkish-Libyan alliance in eastern Mediterranean: A game
changer?. The New Arab, December 10, 2019.
99 Chinese Drones Hunt Turkish Drones in Libya Air War. (2019). South China Morn
ing Post, September 29, 2019. Turkey uses laser weapon technology to shoot down
Chinese UAV Wing Loong II in Libya (2019). Army Recognition, August 12, 2019.
100 Turkey Seeks ‘More Balanced Trade’ with China (2019). Hurriyet Daily News,
September 6, 2019.
101 Turkey-People’s Republic of China Economic and Trade Relations (2019). Tur
key’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
102 Zhiqiang Zou (2015). Sino-Turkish Strategic Economic Relationship in New
Era. Alternatives, vol. 14, no. 3, Fall 2015, p. 20.
103 Tao Zan (2015). Sino-Turkish Relationship: Centering on Turkey’s Perception
about the Rise of China. In: Sino-Turkey Relations: Concept, Policies, and Pro
spects. Istanbul Gelisim University Press, Istanbul, 2015, p.83.
104 China to become ‘important’ tourism partner for Turkey (2018). Anadolu Agency
(AA), April 17, 2018.
105 Number of visitors to Turkey from China to increase Exponentially (2019). Belt
and Road News, April 2, 2019.
106 In 2019 the flow of tourists from Russia to Turkey for the first time exceeded 7
million (2020). Russia Travel Digest, February 3, 2020.
107 The Big Bridge Between Turkey and China (2019), HSBC, June 24, 2019.
108 Ibid.
109 Zou. Op. cit., p. 21.
110 Metin Gürcan (2016). After Massive Purge, What’s Next for Turkish Armed
Forces?. Al-Monitor, August 1, 2016.
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8 China’s Role in Post-War Syria
Does it Strengthen or Undermine the
Sino–Russian Cooperation?
Lukacs Krajcsir
Introduction
“We have started talking to a number of Chinese companies on finding ways
to evade sanctions and have access to the Syrian market”—Bashar Al Assad
made this statement during an interview with Hong Kong-based Phoenix
Television in December 2019.1 The Syrian president mentioned that around
six projects were being proposed to Beijing in line with the Chinese Belt and
Road project with the objective of creating jobs for thousands of Syrians. In
addition, he admitted that China is a superpower and Syria wants to strengthen
relations with the East Asian country. “There are mutual interests: it is beneficial
to China, Syria and all the countries on this road,” he said, describing the Belt
and Road initiative as a significant departure from a history of “Western
attempts at domination.”2
Since 2011, China together with Russia voted against United Nations
Security Council resolutions against the Syrian government on 19 December
2019 (S/2019/961).3 Beijing supports Damascus not only by its veto-yielding
vote and political statements in support of the Assad regime, but gives finan
cial and humanitarian help for the reconstruction of Syria. For the Syrian
leadership, Chinese assistance is an alternative to the Western states (for
example France, Germany, Great Britany, United States) and their Middle
Eastern allies, like Jordan, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. These
countries have imposed sanctions against the regime and declared on numer
ous occasions that they will not provide economic assistance until Assad is in
office. In December 2019, Donald Trump signed the so-called “Caesar Act”:
since 17 June 2020, this law targets the Syrian businessmen and industries
who are supporting the Assad regime. According to the law even the Iranian
and Russian companies might face sanctions.4
But what about the Chinese companies? Could they risk harder sanctions?
Or could this lead to the situation in which Beijing will supersede the other
foreign investors in Syria, even the most important foreign partners of
Damascus, like Moscow or Tehran?
This chapter explores the scope of Chinese—and partly the Russian—
cooperation with the Syrian government. First, it was important to devote the
DOI: 10.4324/9781003269175-8
146 Lukacs Krajcsir
entire first two sections to the history of the Sino–Syrian relations since the
Cold War. This was necessary because it is only through the more compre
hensive and descriptive account of historical precedents that we may under
stand why China’s role in the Syrian conflict counts as special. The third
section will present the Chinese leadership’s stance to Russian military invol
vements in Syria in 2015. Also in this section, the author examines one of the
most uncertain questions in the war: are there “Chinese boots” on the ground
in Syria? The next two sections detail Chinese political, humanitarian and
economical support to the Syrian regime. The final section is intended to give
an answer to the main hypothesis: in the long term, who could be the “real
winner” among Syria’s international partners?
The Sino–Syrian Relations before 2011

Syria was the second country in the Middle Eastern and North African region
that, in the summer of 1956, recognized and established diplomatic relations
with the People’s Republic of China.5 Also from the beginning, Damascus was
a vocal supporter of Beijing’s “One China” principle, which defines Taiwan as
part of China’s sovereign territory.6 The first Chinese ambassador was appoin
ted only a year later, and Syria sent only a chargé d’affaires to Beijing. In 1957,
the China–Syria Friendship Association was established in Damascus. Its main
goal was strengthening the economic ties between the two states, but, despite
all efforts, the relations stood on a very low level for years. For example, China
and Syria signed their first bilateral economic agreement in 1963, which in and
by itself did not yield any visible outcomes.7
One of the reasons behind was the growing conflict between the Soviet
Union and China from the second half of the 1950s. Amongst the first geo
political disagreements between the two communist powers appeared during
the Syrian crisis in 1957: the Chinese press and the Communist Party of
China sharply criticized Nikita Khrushchev’s stance and “low response”
against “Western conspiracy”.8 Beijing wanted an armed solution, which
could have led to a full-scale war not just in the region but even between
member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the
Warsaw Pact.9
The second main reason was Syria’s vulnerability in the first half of the
Cold War. Coups, revolutions, wars with other states (Israel) and the power
games of the local Arab countries (like Egypt, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia) to
ensure political dominance over Damascus—all these factors made the East
Mediterranean country poor, unpredictable and unstable. After the collapse
of the United Arab Republic10 in 1961, Beijing again recognized the newly
formed Syrian Republic and hoped for a new era in the two countries’ bilat
eral relationship. Although Zhou Enlai, Premier of the People’s Republic of
China, stopped in Damascus during his Africa and Asia trip in 1965 and met
with the most important leaders of the Syrian Arab Socialist Ba‘at Party, the
visit did not have any positive outcomes. The many coups, security problems,
China’s Role in Post-War Syria 147
domestic disturbances, and the growing Soviet influence in Syria did not
make the country an attractive partner for the Communist Party of China.
Even Beijing was unable to implement its $16.3 million loan, which it offered
to Syria in 1963.11
In 1969, there were some attempts to improve the Sino–Syrian relations.
Hafez Al Assad, back then the Syrian Defense Minister, wanted to counter
balance its rivals in the Ba‘at Party and the Syrian army, mostly the country’s
leader, General Salah Jadid.12 That is why he sent his Chief of Staff and First
Deputy Minister of Defense to Beijing to secure an arms deal—they wanted
to buy not just small arms, but tanks, aircraft and artillery units. After the
signing of the agreement, Mustafa Tlass—perhaps on Assad’s instructions as
the historian Robert O. Freedman suggested—allowed himself to be photo
graphed with Mao Zedong’s Little Red Book.13 That was a huge insult for
Moscow, because this happened only a few weeks after the bloody border
conflict between the Chinese and Soviet armies for the Damansky [In Chinese
Zhenbao] Island on the Ussuri River. In June, immediately after Tlass’s visit,
the Chinese dispatched an ambassador to Syria—the first to the Arab region
since the Cultural Revolution.14 As an answer, the Soviet Union suspended its
own weapons export and started to withdraw the Eastern Bloc’s military and
civilian experts from Syria. However, when Assad came to power with a
bloodless coup at the end of 1970, the Kremlin implicitly gave a green light to
the new arms delivery to Syria.15
Damascus fully neglected the development of the Sino–Syrian relations until
the end of the Cold War. Beijing supported the Syrian government in just few
international cases, such as the fourth Arab–Israeli war in 1973 or some terri
torial disputes (Golan highlight), but mostly criticized Damascus, as it hap
pened during the Syrian intervention in the Lebanese civil war. Ḥafeẓ Al Assad
approached China again after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. When Chinese
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen visited Syria in 1990—along with other Arab
states such as Iraq and Saudi Arabia—the Syrians asked for weapons. In the
first half of the 1990s, Syria’s arms import from the former socialist states (the
Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Hungary) had fallen dramatically and
Damascus looked for another potential weapons suppliers—according to
Stockholm peace research institute (SIPRI) only tanks (T-72M1), light artillery
(mortars) and few helicopters were delivered from the former Eastern Bloc to
the Arab country.16
One of them was China, but thanks to the Western embargos imposed after
the fights on the Tiananmen Square, it was quite difficult to buy heavy
weapons from the East Asian country. That is why back then Beijing started
to equip a strong military and technological cooperation with other non-
Western states nor their allies in the “Third World”. For example, with Syria:
1993–6 dozens of Syrian military experts and rocket scientists were trained in
China. Chinese and North Korean firms built Syrian missile facilities. Also in
June 1996, the China Precision Machinery Company shipped missile-related
components to Syria’s Scientific Studies and Research Center.17
148 Lukacs Krajcsir
H. afez. Al Assad’s death in 2000 meant no setback in the Sino–Syrian relations.
However, they had not developed as fast as the new leader, Bashar Al Assad, the
former president’s second son, had hoped. In 2001, Chinese President Hu Jintao
met with the new Syrian president, and they discussed the possibilities of stron
ger economic ties, but otherwise no significant results were achieved during the
meeting. Two years later, Assad was the first Syrian leader who made an official
visit to Beijing. The main topic of the talks was not the relations between the two
countries, but the fall of Saddam Hussein and the United States’ military pre
sence in Iraq.18 Therefore, in 2005 Damascus decided to speed up its “look East”
policy, which included Russia too.19
First, the Syrian diplomacy renewed their relations with Russia: when in 2005,
Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Assad, he released three-quarters off
a $10.4 billion debt of Syria which was accumulated during the Cold War.20 In
addition, they agreed to reopen and renew the former Soviet military port in
Tartus and increase the size of Russian investments. Also in 2005, the Sino–Syria
Trade Council was established and Sino–Syrian trade evolved rapidly. In 2000,
their trade volume was only $174 million, in 2007 $1.87 billion and, before the
so-called “Arab spring”, it reached circa $2 billion.21 It should not be forgotten
that Chinese exports (textiles, machines, telecommunication, electronic devices
and even minerals) were dominant in the bilateral trade. The East Asian country
imported only fruit and a negligible amount of oil from Syria. In 2005, the China
National Petroleum Corporation and the Syrian Petroleum Company signed a
billion-dollar agreement, in which they agreed to exploit the Arab country’s oil.
Another Chinese energy company promised to modernize the Syrian oil pro
duction infrastructure, but Damascus gave this right primarily to Russian, Ira
nian, and Turkish firms.22 Chinese businessmen turned toward investing greater
amounts and more frequently into the Syrian tourism sector, the textile industry,
infrastructure, telecommunications and agriculture. However, by 2006 China
became the second biggest investor among non-Middle Eastern countries in
Syria—the value of China’s investment was approximately $16.6 million—yet,
they still lagged behind Iran, Turkey and even the Gulf monarchies.23 In the first
decade of the twenty-first century, China focused more on other states in the
Middle East, mostly on Iran, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. Unlike Syria, these
countries offered a bigger market for Chinese goods, better and more profitable
investments, and much more of energy resources (oil and gas) for the East Asian
economy. Moreover, 800 or 900 Chinese experts worked in Syria, much less than
in Libya or in the states of the Persian Gulf.24
Beijing’s and Moscow’s Stance in the Syrian Crisis until 2015
Initial Support (From the Beginning until April 2012)

Since the beginning of the Syrian uprisings in March 2011, the Chinese and
Russian leadership were very careful about how to approach the events in the
Arab country. They kept distance from the Syrian opposition and rejected the
calls for regime change. In the first months, they supported Assad diplo
matically and in the media. Though, they admitted that Damascus is using
unnecessary force against the opposition, but in their opinion, the radical
Islamist groups and terrorist organizations who are fighting under the Syrian
Free Army’s flag are responsible for the chaos and bloodshed. So, if Beijing
and Moscow implicitly agreed with the calls for regime change in Syria—as in
Libya, Egypt, Tunisia—then the country could fall into anarchy and it will
even affect the neighbouring states.
On 5 October 2011, both countries voted against the European Union’s
resolution draft on implementing “targeted actions against Assad regime”.25
On 4 February 2012, there was a vote on a new draft resolution in the United
Nation Security Council which was drawn up by European Union and sup
ported by the Arab League. Nothing was mentioned about a foreign military
action, yet the Russians and Chinese rejected it, because it called for Assad to
step down. On 16 February 2012, China and Russia, along with ten other
states, refused to adopt another Syria-condemning resolution in the United
Nations General Assembly.26 Two weeks later, Beijing and Moscow vetoed a
draft resolution of the United States in the Human Rights Council, which
accused the Assad regime with war crimes. Again, on 19 July 2012, China
and Russian together voted against the resolution in the General on Syria.27
Meanwhile, both countries supported their own plans to solve the crisis. On 7
March, a Chinese special envoy arrived in Damascus, who brought a six-
point peace plan with him and presented it to the Syrian Foreign Minister
and the leading members of the Syrian opposition. China suggested:28
a.) Ceasefire between the government and the opposition

b.) A dialogue to be initiated and a negotiated solution to be reached to end
the conflict
c.) More Chinese economical and humanitarian assistance to Syria
d.) The respect of Syrian sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity by the
international community
e.) A United Nations–Arab League joint special envoy to Syria
f.) Members of the Security Council to abide by principles of the United
Nations Charter
Intermediation (From April 2012 to Mid-2013)

In the first half of 2012, there was a lot of criticism about China’s Syria-
policy. These voices came not only from the West but even from Muslim
countries. The Chinese leadership feared of their possible strong criticism,
because, since the beginning of the twenty-first century, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
and United Arab Emirates became the most important partners of China in
the Middle East. For example, 41% of the total Chinese liquid natural gas
import came from the region, mostly from Qatar (34%), and 35% of China’s
crude oil import from the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council.
150 Lukacs Krajcsir
The Arab monarchies in the Persian Gulf region were the main targets of
Chinese direct investment: from 2003 to 2011, the level of investments
increased from $10 million to $2.23 billion in 2011.29 In parallel, the Chinese
investment did not reach $20 million in Syria, approximately thirty (mostly
small and medium-sized) companies and less than 1,000 Chinese citizens
worked in the country.
As such, in 2012 and 2013, Beijing slightly distanced itself from Damascus
and rejected any arguments, which suggested that China took part in the
escalation of the crisis. Moreover, Chinese foreign policy showed a more
flexible approach in the Syrian conflict. On 14 April 2012, the Chinese
diplomacy voted in favour of the United Nations Security Council Resolution
2042, which urged the Syrian government not to use artillery and airstrikes
against the opposition forces and Beijing offered a $2 million humanitarian
aid to Syria.30 China also agreed with Resolution 2043, which was adopted
on 21 April.31 The resolution brought about the setting up of the United
Nations Supervision Mission in Syria: 300 observers would be sent to monitor
the ceasefire agreement and implementation of the Kofi Annan peace plan.32
On 3 October 2012, an artillery strike from Syria hit the Turkish town of
Akçakale, which caused the death of four civilians. Two days later, China
agreed with the statement in which the United Nation Security Council con
demned Damascus for the attack.33 In addition, Beijing accepted the
appointment of Lakhdar Brahimi, who became the first Special Envoy to
Syria.34 The Algerian diplomat met with Yang Jiechi, then Chinese Foreign
Minister in Beijing, and urged China to play an active role in solving the
Syrian crisis. The Chinese government supported Brahimi’s plan, under one
condition: to remove the point which was urging Assad to leave.35 In
November 2012, the Chinese Foreign Ministry worked out their own proposal
to resolve the Syrian crisis. They recommended a general ceasefire, a United
Nations humanitarian mission, and a resolution to the refugee question.36
Prevention of Military Intervention (From 21 August 2013 to End of October)

One of the biggest chemical attacks in human history was carried out on 21
August 2013. In Ghouta, the outskirts of Damascus, hundreds—there are esti
mates from 300 to more than 13,001,700—of civilians died by sarin.37 In the
following days, there was a dispute among experts, news agencies and politicians
about who could have had access to nerve gas in such large amounts, as both
sides, the Syrian Armed Forces and Free Syrian Army, had chemical weapons in
their possession. The Western countries and their Arab allies were convinced that
Damascus was behind the attacks.38 In 2012, Barack Obama declared that the
use of the weapons of mass destruction in the Syrian crisis is a “red line”: if
somebody crossed it, it would lead to an armed retaliation.39
China and Russia were not convinced that Assad was behind the Ghouta
attack. Moscow called on the international community “to show prudence
over the Syrian crisis” and observe international law. The Russian leadership
rejected any military action against Damascus and warned the Western states
that the use of force will have “catastrophic consequences” for the whole
region. Similar, but less aggressive voices came from China too. In the Chinese
press, there were articles about the “geopolitical and secret motivations” of a
Washington-led attack against Syria. “The rumor that the Syrian government
had used chemical weapons against the rebels was a perfect excuse for America
to launch an attack on Syria”—wrote the Chinese People’s Daily. 40 Later,
when the United Nations investigation confirmed the chemical attack, Beijing
urged a political solution and called for all parties to exercise restraint.
President Obama requested permission from the U.S. Congress to execute
an air strike against bases of the Syrian army. Meanwhile, Moscow sent a
significant part of his naval forces to the region to protect Damascus from
any type of attack. In addition, there were reports about the Chinese Jing
gangshan (China’s Type 071 amphibious transport dock), being in the East
Mediterranean “as a precursor to overt intervention”.41 Finally, the Amer
ican–Russian tension brought about an agreement on 14 September, which
called on the Assad regime to destroy all its chemical weapons. On 26 Sep
tember 2013, Moscow and Beijing issued a common statement, which wel
comed the decision of Damascus to join the Chemical Weapons Convention
and to accept experts from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons, who would monitor the destruction of the chemical weapons in
Syria. One day later, the members of the United Nations Security Council
unanimously voted in favour of Resolution 2118, which demanded the Syrian
government to destroy all of its remaining chemical weapons.42 After the vote,
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said that “This is the first time that the
Security Council has taken a joint major action on the Syrian issue in more
than one year”.43
Peace and Disarmament (From November 2013 to the Second Half of 2015)
When the clouds of a Western military intervention cleared away, Beijing
concentrated on two things: the disarmament of chemical weapons and the
peace process. China took a significant role in the destruction of weapons,
although the Chinese government criticized the short timeline that was given
to the Assad regime. The day after the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons submitted a plan for Syrian chemical weapons, the Chi
nese foreign minister announced that China would send its own naval fleet to
escort the weapons from the Syrian port of Latakia to Italy. On 7 January
2014, the Yancheng (a Type-054 frigate) along with Danish, Norwegian and
Russian frigates guarded the cargo ship, which delivered 16 tons of chemical
weapons of mass destruction.44
Meanwhile, Chinese diplomacy was preparing for the next round of the
peace talks. In September 2013, American and Russian diplomats agreed that
they would organize the Geneva II peace conference. They planned to invite
the Assad government and the main opposition groups to the table, with the
152 Lukacs Krajcsir
main regional states (excluding Iran and Israel), as well as great powers and
international organizations (the European Union and the Arab League).
Their aim was to resolve the conflict and set a transitional government with
representatives from all the political, ethnic, and religious sides. The Geneva
II peace conference took place on 22 January 2014. From the Chinese side,
Wang Yi took part. During the talks, he presented Beijing’s updated, now
five-point proposal, to solve the Syrian crisis:45
1 The issue of Syria must be resolved through political means

2 The future of Syria must be decided by its own people
3 An inclusive political transition process must be promoted
4 National reconciliation and unity must be achieved in Syria
5 Humanitarian assistance must be delivered to Syria and to its neigh
bouring countries
Despite the long preparation and large international attention, the Geneva II
ended in failure and the second round in February yielded no tangible results.
However, this did not mean that Chinese diplomacy gave up its mediatory
role in the Syrian crisis. On 15 April 2014, the President of the Syrian
National Coalition arrived in Beijing—this was the first time when a Syrian
opposition leader went to the East Asian country. He met with the Chinese
Foreign Minister, and, during the four-hour consultation, Wang Yi told him
that Beijing was making efforts to organize the Geneva III conference.46
Although China negotiated with the Syrian opposition, Beijing did not turn
its back on Assad. On 22 May 2014, China and Russia voted against a draft
resolution in the Security Council on “strong condemnation the widespread
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by the Syrian
authorities and pro-government militias, as well as the human rights abuses
and violations of international humanitarian law by non-State armed
groups”.47 Also, they rejected that Assad should be brought to the Interna
tional Criminal Court. This was the first time since the Crimea crisis and East
Ukraine armed conflict that Beijing and Moscow vetoed a resolution toge
ther. After the vote, the Sino–Russian cooperation reached a new level. The
Yancheng, which escorted the ship carrying Syrian chemical weapons, took
part in a joint drill with the Russian nuclear-powered cruiser Pyotr Velikiy in
the East Mediterranean Sea on 25 January 2015.48 Four months later, in the
same region, the Linyi and Weifang missile frigates and the replenishment
ship Weishanhu launched a joint military exercise with their Russian coun
terpart, named China-Russia Joint Maritime Exercise 2015.49
China and the Russian Intervention

It was not very surprising when the news broke about a direct Russian mili
tary support for the Syrian Armed Forces. For Moscow, the possible fall of
the Assad regime always meant a serious geopolitical, security and military
relapse in its North Africa and Middle East policy, rather than economical
setbacks. The loss of the Russian military bases and one of its main arms
buyers, the increasing threat from terrorist organizations whose members
(Chechnya, Dagestan and other Caucasian regions) with Russian citizenship
could carry out attacks in Russia, the weakening of the position of Moscow’s
allies (like Iran) in the region, were all at stake if the enemies of Damascus
achieved victory.
These factors were behind the growing number of Russian arms supplies to
Syria. Also, Moscow did everything to defend Damascus from a Western-Arab
military campaign—not just in the United Nations, but in the Eastern Medi
terranean Sea too, as it happened in 2013 after the chemical attack. However,
when the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Levant [Daesh] emerged in 2014, the
former economic and military support from Russia were neither enough nor
efficient. From the end of June 2014, the ‘caliphate’ conquered large parts of
Eastern Syria and Western Iraq. One of the key movements was the capture of
Palmyra in May 2015. After the terrorists took control of the historical ruin city,
a great number of analysts suggested that this was a huge defeat for the Syrian
army. Bashar Assad made a formal request to Russia for military support in the
way of airstrikes and, if possible, ground forces. The official answer came on 30
September 2015, when the Federation Council (Upper House of the Russian
Federal Assembly) granted the request to deploy the Russian Air Force in Syria.
The Western countries and its allies denounced Russia for its role in the war,
meanwhile, Moscow’s closest partners (like China and Iran) agreed with this
military campaign.
China was among the supporters. Unlike in 2013 when Beijing rejected any
foreign military action in Syria, the Chinese government fully agreed with
Russia’s intervention in 2015. In the Chinese view, the Russian–Syrian mili
tary cooperation was a legal act, because the US-led coalition “has not
received either the agreement of the UN Security Council, nor the blessing of
the Syrian government”.50 Moreover, they said that Russia’s military action in
Syria had been considerably more successful than that of the Western states.51
Very similar voices appeared in Chinese media too. They wrote—for example
in the China Daily—that Russian involvement is more a “sensible strategic
move” to combat extremists and, with the cooperation of the Syrian army
ground forces, it could prove more efficient than that of the American led
coalition.52 In addition, when a Russian Su-24 warplane was shot down by
the Turkish Air Force at the end of 2015, Beijing stood by Moscow. Chinese
officials said that the Russian bomber was brought down when performing a
“counter-terrorism mission in Syria”, and referred to this incident as “a loss
to the international campaign against terrorism”.53 At the same time, the
Chinese leaders, diplomats, and commentators did not stop arguing that only
the Russian (and Iranian) military help is not enough to resolve the conflict.
Xie Xiaoyan, China’s special envoy to Syria, noted that “Russia’s military
operations in Syria in the past six months have effectively curbed the spread
of extremists and terrorists there. I think this is encouraging progress”,
154 Lukacs Krajcsir
however, later in his statement he underlined that the war still needs a poli
tical solution.54 Yet, thanks to the expansion of the Daesh and its actions
against Chinese citizens around the globe, China’s traditional position of non
intervention shifted considerably in the following months.
Chinese Boots in Syria?

The growing threat from extremist groups and the more frequent attacks
against Chinese targets affected China’s foreign and security policy.55 This
does not mean that Beijing turned its back on the “traditional non-interven
tion” doctrine or took part in any military coalition against the Daesh.
Although many—in and outside of China—voiced their demands to launch
military actions against the ‘caliphate’, Beijing remained undeterred. How
ever, in the last few years, a shift has occurred in China’s attitude toward the
conflict. The first sign was when, in December 2015, the Communist Party of
China passed the new anti-terror act. From a foreign policy perspective,
Paragraph 59 of the law is the most important:56
After People’s Republic of China organizations, personnel, or important

facilities based abroad suffer a serious terrorist attack, upon discussion
and consent of the concerned nation, the national leading institution for
counter-terrorism efforts may organize diplomatic, public security,
national security and other such departments to appoint staff members to
go abroad and develop response efforts.
In short: this allows the People’s Liberation Army to deploy units abroad for
counterterrorism missions if the local government asks for it. Since the act was
approved, anti-terrorist exercises have been held in China’s neighbouring countries
(Tajikistan and Afghanistan); Beijing has deployed Chinese soldiers and transport
aircrafts in Djibouti and has given military and policy training to the local secur
ity forces in many countries, including Russia.57 Some analysts suggested that
after the passage of the anti-terror act all obstacles were removed from a direct
Chinese military intervention in Syria. Indeed, rumours of Chinese military pre
sence arose even before the new anti-terrorist law: for example, the case of the
Jinggangshan warship in 2013 or reports about the Liaoning (Chinese Type 001
aircraft carrier) having joined the Russian–Iranian campaign. In addition, senior
officers in the Syrian governmental forces talked about an “imminent Chinese
help” and an increase in the presence of Chinese soldiers across the country.58
That this kind of news did not come only from news agencies, but from
Chinese military officials and diplomats was remarkable. In August 2016,
Rear Admiral Guan Youfei, the director of the Office of International Mili
tary Cooperation of the Central Military Commission (CMC) visited
Damascus. He met with his Syrian counterpart and Russian high-ranking
officers present in Syria. During the talks, Youfei assured pledged Chinese
military assistance in the training of personnel.59
In late 2017, stories surfaced in Arab media about the possible deployment
of the Chinese “Night Tigers” or “Tigers of Siberia” in Tartus.60 These
reports—which cited alleged sources in the Chinese Ministry of Defense—
assumed that the mission of the Chinese Special Forces is to combat the
Uyghur members of radical groups, who are also in the Idlib province.61 On 5
August 2018, the Chinese Embassy in Damascus released a letter written by
Qi Qianjin, in which the ambassador spoke about the “tightening interna
tional cooperation in the eradication of extremism.”62 A few days earlier, Qi
in his interview with the Syrian newspaper Al-Wat.an said “that his country’s
army is ready to participate with the Syrian Arab Army in some way.”
Moreover, Military Attaché Wong Chang claimed that military cooperation is
“already underway”.63
However, until the writing of this chapter, there had been no reliable sour
ces, which verified the presence of Chinese soldiers in Syria. Neither a
revealing photo nor a video surfaced on the internet. Many analysts and
scholars have raised concerns about a Chinese military intervention in Syria,
because of legal and technical obstacles.64 Of course, the Chinese leadership
always denied such rumours. A few days after Qi Qianjin’s remarks, Chinese
Special Envoy Xie Xiaoyan stated that Beijing had never deployed military
units in the Syrian battlefields and such assumption—even from lower Chi
nese officials and diplomats—is “a false picture of the Chinese policy”.65 The
People’s Liberation Army also reaffirmed that China would not actively
intervene in the military conflict in Syria.66 Galia Lavi and Assaf Orion sug
gested in their analysis that the Chinese advisers sent to Syria dealt only with
“soft issues”, such as medicine and logistics.67
Thus, the “Chinese boots on Syrian ground” assumption is still not proven,
but Beijing’s more active role is unquestionable in the fields of diplomacy,
humanitarian aid and in the reconstruction of Syria.
Political and Humanitarian Support

During his trip to Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Iran in January 2016, Chinese
President Xi Jinping offered a $35 million humanitarian aid package to war-
torn states, such as Libya, Syria and Yemen.68 In his keynote speech at the
United Nations Office in Geneva in early 2017, Xi committed China to pro
vide $30 million in humanitarian assistance for refugees and displaced per
sons in Syria.69 In the same year, Beijing funded a $1.5 million World Food
Program initiative to feed newly arrived Syrian refugees in Jordan.70 More
over, the Chinese government donated a few million dollars to specialized
agencies of the United Nations (World Food Program) or health organiza
tions such as the International Red Cross and the Red Crescent Movement.71
Meanwhile on the international level, Beijing still stood by Damascus.
China—again with Russia—exercised its veto in December 2016, demanding
a seven-day cessation of hostilities in Aleppo, and in February 2017, a draft
resolution seeking to impose sanctions on anyone who is involved in the use
156 Lukacs Krajcsir
of chemical weapons. In addition, Liu Jieyi, Chinese Ambassador to the
United Nations, abstained in October 2016 and April 2017 on the resolu
tions.72 Moscow repaid the Chinese help by inviting Beijing to the Astana
Process, which was originally launched by Russia, Iran and Turkey. In early
2018, Russia hosted the Congress of Syrian National Dialogue in the Black
Sea resort of Sochi, which China attended as an observer. Logan Pauley, an
analyst of The National Interest, wrote that the East Asian country could be
even the fourth “guarantor state”.73 In 2013, the Chinese leadership still
rejected any Western military action against Syrian pro-governmental forces.
When, after the Khan Shaykhun chemical attack (April 2018), the United
States carried out missile strikes against the Syrian army’s bases, China
strongly accused Washington of bypassing the United Nations Security
Council and violating international law. Moreover, Beijing warned the Trump
administration that the strikes “are also going to add more factors to com
plicate the resolution of the Syrian crisis”.74
After the American airstrikes, China intensified its efforts to find a political
solution to the Syrian conflict. Xie Xiaoyan, the country’s first special envoy
for the Syrian crisis, organized an international forum on 13–14 May 2018.
The “International Symposium on the Prospect of a Political Settlement of
the Syrian Issue” was the first time when China hosted an event that was
attended by officials and academics from the United States to Iran. At the
conference, Xie presented Beijing’s new peace plan:75
a.) Maintaining communication with all relevant parties

b.) Supporting the United Nations as the central channel for mediation efforts
c.) Actively participating in different peace talks, such as Geneva and Astana
d.) Assisting Syrian civilians and assuring counterterrorism and ceasefire
efforts
e.) Assisting reconstruction efforts in Syria
The first four points have already been analysed up until this point in this
chapter. The following section focuses on the last point, the reconstruction of
Syria.
Chinese Assistance in the Reconstruction of Syria

The scale of the nine-year-long fighting in Syria is catastrophic, which also
explains why it is one of the most devastating conflicts since World War II. In
June 2021, the number of casualties (mostly civilians) was estimated to be
around 6,000, 6.1 million Syrians fled the country, and 6.6 million people
were displaced internally.76 At the same time, the property damage reaches
roughly $400 billion and the productivity loss to gross domestic product could
be around $268 billion.77 Damascus does not have the money and even the
necessary manpower and technical knowledge to perform alone a full
recovery.78
The so-called “Friends of Syria” coalition (notably the United States, the
United Kingdom and France) stressed many times that they will not give any
type of help or aid to Syria—at least while Assad is in power. Years before,
Assad already asked for more economic assistance from its closest allies:
Moscow and Tehran. Indeed, the two countries had already spent billions of
dollars on the Syrian regime’s survival, but their expenditures were primarily
military and security related.79 This, however, does not mean that Russian and
Iranian companies were not present in Syria and have not taken part in the
reconstruction efforts in the country. But in their Syria policy, the military
intervention has a higher priority, which means that they rather pay the costs of
the military campaign first. Also, it should be mentioned that both countries’
economic assistance has its own limits: in the last few years, the Russian and
Iranian economy have suffered from dozens of economic issues, including sanc
tions, which has forced them to spend more money on their own population’s
needs and demands and less on their external interests. Finally, the reconstruc
tion of Syria is hindered by some Western and Arab countries that, in the last
few years, have applied sanctions against Damascus, Moscow and Tehran.
Therefore, the Syrian government needed another financial supporter that
was strong enough to bear the costs of the reconstruction and was not under
international economic sanctions—the obvious choice was China. While Beij
ing still does not want to send its soldiers to Syria, the Chinese leadership has
no objection against increasing economic assistance for the Syrian government.
Despite the grim security situation and continuous fighting in the Arab coun
try, the East Asian state did not fully withdraw from Syria, as it happened in
the case of Libya (2011) or Yemen (2015).80 It is true that investments dropped
from $16.6 million to $11 million by 2015, but Chinese businessmen did not
entirely leave the Syrian market nor terminated all former contracts.81 On the
contrary: even during the Daesh rampage in Syria and the Russian military
intervention, Chinese companies made new deals. Therefore, it was no surprise
that, after the collapse of the “caliphate” and the turning of the tide on the
Syrian battlefields, Assad asked for more help. During an interview in April
2017, the Syrian President said that China is involved in several industrial
projects and will be active “in every sector with no exception”.82 He repeated
the words of the Syrian Ambassador to China: “Only China can play a leading
role in helping Syria realize its reconstruction”.83
Beijing agreed with the Syrian requests and did not hesitate to give economic
assistance. In 2017, Chinese companies had contracts worth $10 million in
Syria.84 Every year, dozens of Chinese delegations travel to the country. For
example, Qin Yong, Vice Chairman of the China-Arab Exchange Association,
made four trips to Syria only in 2017.85 Also in summer 2017, Beijing hosted
the “First Trade Fair on Syrian Reconstruction Projects”: the Chinese pre
sented the plan of an industrial park that could house up to 150 enterprises,
and the Chinese government even pledged $2 billion to the project.86 Despite
the difficulties (the slowness in the implementation of projects, nepotism and
corruption on the Syrian side), China continued its economic help in 2018. In
158 Lukacs Krajcsir
the same year, China became Syria’s largest trade partner: 80 per cent of the
Arab country’s export targeted the East Asian state. At the China-Arab States
Cooperation Forum in July, Xi Jinping announced a $20 billion loan package
to the Arab countries—out of which one or two billion was allocated to
Syria.87 In addition, more than 200 Chinese companies took part in the “60th
Damascus International Trade Fair” on 6–15 September, 2018. According to
Chinese sources in 2018, a car factory in Homs started producing Chinese
brand vehicles, such as Changan and Geely cars, which—according to local
sources—are more “fashionable, practical and easy to operate” than the Ira
nian ones.88 The State Grid Corporation of China showed interest in rebuilding
Syria’s power generation infrastructure. In October 2018, they donated 800
electrical power generators to Latakia.89 Not far from that city, Tartus became
also a point of interest to China. A statement from the Chinese embassy in
Damascus affirmed the importance of the port.90
Conclusion: Cooperation or Competition?

China, Russia, and Iran are interested in ending the war in Syria, but for dif
ferent reasons. Moscow would like to complete its military campaign as soon
as possible, because it would like to avoid the “Afghanistan Syndrome”: the
rise of the costs of their operations and an increase in the number of Russian
casualties, which not only burdens the country’s economy, but harms Putin’s
position, both domestically and internationally. In the Russian geopolitical
thinking, the Syrian naval and airfields have the highest priority—the Russian
leadership prefers to spend its resources on rebuilding, developing, and protec
tion of those naval and airfields than on civilian reconstruction projects. The
Russian government must take into account the other actors’ geopolitical,
security and military goals. With a bad political move or military decision,
Putin can jeopardize the lives of more Russian soldiers and civilians in the
Arab country. Also, Moscow must pay attention to other non-regional actors
too. Maybe there are several more important disputes between the West and
Russia than the Syrian conflict—from Ukraine crisis to the “fake news” and
cyber wars—the United States, along with Western European countries, have
made clear that they will lay sanctions on anybody who makes businesses with
the Syrian government. From an economic standpoint, the Russian leadership
opines that Syria is not worth putting the Russian economy in a much worse
situation than it is in now.
Above all, even Russia’s closest partners can be described as competitors in
Syria. Indubitably, from military and political perspectives, China and Iran
are Russia’s most important allies in the Syrian conflict. Yet still, when it
comes to the economic questions, Beijing and Tehran can be seen as serious
rivals to Moscow. Despite the fact that Russia has the highest number of
companies in the East Mediterranean country, Iranian businessmen and
investors could successfully compete with them in the fields of energy, agri
culture, tourism and infrastructure. Moreover, in 2019 there were reports
91
about clashes between Iran-backed militias and Russian soldiers. Furthermore,
neither of the these countries has the ability to aid the Syrian reconstruction
efforts without possible negative effects on the their domestic economic and/or
their foreign policy. It can be a long debate what priorities the Assad regime
considers the most important now: to finish the war as soon as possible; to return
to the international community; or to fix relations with regional countries.
However, it is undeniable that the restoration of Syria is undoubtedly among the
top objectives. Damascus desperately needs foreign aid and investors not only to
start new projects, but to finish the ongoing rebuilding plans in cities such as
Aleppo and Homs, which have been under governmental control for years. As
this matter has great economic and propaganda purposes, the Syrian govern
ment cannot afford a long delay or the cancellation in the announced rebuilding
projects.
For this reason, Beijing is an attractive alternative for Assad. Unlike the
Russians and Iranians, the Chinese economy could bear the international
consequences of aiding Syria, while, at the same time, it would not put a
heavy burden on its own economy. The Syrian leadership knows that Beijing’s
stance regarding the conflict has changed significantly since 2011. At first, the
Syrian crisis was only a marginal issue in Chinese foreign policy and all pro-
Damascus steps can be described as diplomatic gestures towards Russia. Only
when hundreds of fighters with Chinese citizenship appeared in religious
extremist groups, the Syrian conflict became a security question for the Chi
nese government. Nevertheless, Beijing did not have to send its own armed
forces to Syria, because the Russian and Iranian military help was enough to
stabilize Assad’s position in the country and deal with the Uyghur and Hui
militants. Since Xi’s Middle East trip in 2016, the humanitarian and financial
aids, investments and any other economy-related assistance became the main
points in China’s Middle East policy. Therefore, a major portion of the aid
and loan packages available can be invested in Syria too.
It is true that Chinese enterprises are facing several challenges in the East-
Mediterranean state: political instability, security problems, corruption, the
uncertain outcome of the investments and issues regarding loan repayments. In
addition, Chinese firms that make deals with the Syrian regime could risk
American or other sanctions. Despite the high risks, the possible profits are
greater. Beijing is fully aware of the potential pitfalls but they have not prevented
the Chinese leadership from reaffirming their commitment to the Syrian recon
struction every year. For example, during an interview with the TASS Russian
News Agency in early June 2019, Xi Jinping said that “China stands ready to
participate in Syria’s reconstruction within its own ability and do the best to help
the Syrian people resume their normal life and production soon.”92
Why has Syria’s position changed so significantly in China’s Middle East
policy? The short answer: the Belt and Road Initiative. As one of the political
and media advisers of Bashar Assad pointed out “the Silk Road is not a silk
road if it does not pass through Syria, Iraq and Iran, as Syria enjoys a high
rank in the 2nd Belt and Road Summit because it is a cornerstone on the
160 Lukacs Krajcsir
historic Silk Road”.93 The Chinese political support, the humanitarian aid
and long-term development assistance are all linked to the project, which, in
Beijing’s view, could bring peace, stability and prosperity to the targeted
areas. Syria sits at the crossroads of branches in the Belt and Road Initiative,
and provides the most direct land route to China’s energy and resource
investments in the Persian Gulf and Africa. Moreover, this region could serve
as a potential alternative route to the Mediterranean Sea, bypassing the Suez
Canal and the Gulf of Aden, where the security situation sometimes is worse
than in Syria.
Without any doubt, the Sino–Russian cooperation and the good relations
between Beijing and Moscow are one of the greatest achievements in both
countries’ foreign policy in the last three decades. Yet, Xi Jinping’s vision of
the Belt and Road Initiative is far more important in the Chinese geopolitical
thinking than cooperation with Moscow. If more active Chinese financial and
humanitarian assistance leads to a lesser Russian influence in Syria, the Chi
nese leadership is willing to pay the price. In sum, it could be argued that
when it comes to the Syrian conflict, China is the most important ally of
Russia at the global level, but at the same time, Beijing also poses the biggest
challenge for Moscow within Syria.
Notes
1 Han, “Syria plans to do sanction-busting business with China, but will Beijing play
along?”, South China Morning Post, 19 December 2019.
2 Ibid.
3 After the vote the United States Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo said: “To Russia
and China, who have chosen to make a political statement by opposing this resolution,
you have blood on your hands”. This Security Council resolution would have extended
a cross-border humanitarian aid to millions of Syrian refugees. [Al-Araby, 22
December 2019].
4 Ramani, “How are Russia and China responding to the Caesar Act?”, Middle
East Institute Middle East-Asia Project, 14 October 2020.
5 The first country in the region was Egypt: On 18 May 1956, Cairo recognized the
People’s Republic of China and, twelve days later, official relations were established
between the countries. Upon the move of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the United States
declared its financial withdraw from the Egyptian Aswan Dam project.
6 Zambelis, “The Geopolitics of Sino-Syrian Relations”, China Brief 8 (2008).
7 Shichor, The Middle East in China’s Foreign Policy 1949–1977 (1979), pp. 74–75.
8 The crisis ended after Khrushchev sent three warships to Syria and 1200 Egyptian
troops were moved to the East Mediterranean country. Meanwhile, the southern
units of the Soviet Army were in combat readiness and Turkey mobilized its own
army—some small incidents happened across the borders. Finally, the tension
eased at the end of October 1957.
9 Shichor, The Middle East in China’s Foreign Policy 1949–1977 (1979), p. 74.
10 In February 1958, Syria and Egypt formed the United Arab Republic. Despite the
strong support of the Syrian people (especially the army and the nationalist intel
lectuals and parties) in the beginning, the state collapsed three years later, after a
successful coup in the “Northern Region” (Syria).
12 Jad-ıd was seen as a strong supporter of the close Soviet–Syrian relationship, so
much that there were even accusations that he was an agent of the Committee for
State Security, the KGB. [Golan, Soviet Policies in the Middle East: From World
War Two to Gorbachev (1990), p. 145.]
13 Freedman, Moscow and the Middle East: Soviet Policy since the Invasion of
Afghanistan (1992), p. 40.
15 There is still no consensus among experts and historians why have the Soviets
changed their view. According to Freedman: “The Soviet leaders may have taken
Assad’s warning seriously, or they may have concluded that it was counterproductive
to get too closely involved in internal Syrian politics. In any case, by the end of 1969
they had disassociated themselves from the power struggle in Syria, which Assad
seemed certain to win. The Soviet leaders may have taken some consolation from
the fact that Assad was more willing to cooperate with the other Arab states than
Jadid was…” [Freedman, Moscow and the Middle East: Soviet Policy since the
Invasion of Afghanistan (1992), p. 40]. But Golan thinks that: “With the rise of Sadat
in Egypt, the deterioration in Soviet–Egyptian relations, particularly the expulsions
of the Soviet advisers from Egypt, the Soviet-Syrian relationship assumed greater
importance for Moscow. Syria began to act as something of a mediator for Moscow
in cases of Soviet difficulties, such as the post-1971 deterioration with Numeri in the
Sudan and with Egypt itself. Also some of the strategic losses in Egypt were to be
compensated by facilities in Syria” [Golan, Soviet Policies in the Middle East: From
World War Two to Gorbachev (1990), p. 146].
16 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).
17 Mistry, Containing Missile Proliferation (2003), p. 106.
18 Zambelis, “The Geopolitics of Sino-Syrian Relations”.
19 Lin, “Syria in China’s New Silk Road Strategy”, China Brief 10 (2010).
20 Macleod, “From Syrian fishing port to naval power base: Russia moves into the
Mediterranean”, The Guardian, 8 October 2008.
21 Sassoon, “China and Iraq”, in The Red Star and the Crescent: China and the
Middle East, ed. Reardon-Anderson (2018), p. 156.
22 Krajcsír, “Kína és a szíriai válság [China and Syrian Crisis]”, in Kínai álom – Kínai
valóság [Chinese Dream – Chinese Reality], ed. Salát Gergely (2014), p. 230.
23 Lavi, and Orion, “Will China Reconstruct Syria? Not So Fast”, Institute for
National Security Studies Insight 1187 (2019).
24 Krajcsír, “China and Syrian Crisis”, p. 230.
25 Security Council Resolution (draft), UN Doc S/2011/612 (4 October 2011).
26 Bin, “Succession, Syria … and the Search for Putin’s Soul”, Center for Strategic
and International Studies 14 (2012).
27 Security Council Resolution (draft), UN Doc S/2012/538 (19 July 2012).
28 Szczudlik-Tatar, “China’s Position During the Crisis in Syria”, Polski Instytut
Spraw Miedzynarodowych Bulletin 76 (2012), p. 780.
29 Qian, and Fulton, “China-Gulf Economic Relationship under the “Belt and Road”
Initiative”, Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies 11 (2017), p. 15.
30 Bin, “Succession, Syria … and the Search for Putin’s Soul”
32 On 4 April 2012, Kofi Annan presented his peace plan for Syria, which consisted
of six points was very similar to that of China. However, the United Nations
Supervision Mission operated for only a few months and did not achieve results.
33 “Envoy urges China to play ‘active role’ in Syria crisis”, South China Morning
Post, 31 October 2012.
34 He occupied this post until 14 May 2014.
35 “Brahimi urges China to play ‘active role’ in solving Syria crisis”, The National, 31
October 2012.
162 Lukacs Krajcsir
36 Gladstone, “China presents plan to end Syrian conflict”, The Tech, 2 November 2012.
37 “Syria chemical attack: What we know”, BBC, 24 September 2013.
39 “Remarks by the President to the White House Press Corps”, The White House
Office of the Press Secretary, 20 August 2012.

40 Ren, “Interpreting China’s (Non-)Intervention Policy to the Syrian Crisis: A Neo
classical Realist Analysis”, The Ritsumeikan Journal of International Studies 27
(2014), p. 272.
41 Until today, the role of the Jingganshan is still a mystery. The Chinese, the local
Arab and Western sources are very controversial: some suggests that the warship
was in the Persian Gulf, others claim that it was chasing Somali pirates in the Gulf
of Aden and one or two writes that they patrolled in the East Mediterranean and
waited for an order to evacuate Chinese citizens from Syria.
42 Security Council Resolution 2118, UN Doc S/Res/2118 (27 September 2013)
43 Xinhua, “China welcomes adoption of Security Council resolution on Syria”,
Xinhua, 28 September 2013.
44 Sun, “China’s Military Relations with the Middle East”, in The Red Star and the
Crescent: China and the Middle East, ed. Reardon-Anderson (2018), p. 100.
45 Calabrese, “China and Syria: In War and Reconstruction”, Middle East-Asia
Project (2019).
46 The Geneva III was organized in 2016, but without Chinese participation.
47 Schaack, Imagining Justice for Syria (2020), pp. 127–128.
48 Sun, “China’s Military Relations with the Middle East”, p. 99.
49 Ibid., p. 99.
50 Goldstein, “China Is Studying Russia’s Syrian Gambit”, The National Interest, 26
March 2018.
51 Kaczmarski, “China on Russia’s intervention in Syria”, Ośrodek Studiów
Wschodnich Commentary 193 (2016), p. 3.
52 China Daily, 14 October 2015.
53 Kaczmarski, “China on Russia’s intervention in Syria”, p. 2.
54 Blanchard, “China’s new Syria envoy praises Russian military mission”, Reuters, 8
April 2016.
55 The Uyghur radical extremist carried out few terrorist attacks in China. For
example a hit-and-run outrage in Tiananmen Square in 2013, a mass stabbing at
the railway station of the city of Kunming on 1 March 2014, and the attack of the
Biacheng coal mine in which nearly fifty Chinese died. Also Da-‘iš targeted Chinese
citizens not in the country but across the world: they took hostages in Iraq (Fan
Jinghui) and in Mali (three Chinese engineers). In mid-2016 a suicide bomber
exploded himself at Chinese Embassy in Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan)—only the terrorist
died and three embassy employees were injured.
56 For unofficial English translation of the Chinese Counter-Terrorism Law see: The
US-China Business Council website.
57 Xu, “Evolving Sino-Russian Cooperation in Syria”, Peace Brief 236 (2017), p. 2.
58 Aboufadel, “Chinese Military Advisors Expected to Join the Russians in Syria”,
Al-Masdar News, 27 September 2015.
59 Clarke, “Is China’s Uyghur Challenge Changing Its Calculus on Syria?”, The
Diplomat, 7 December 2017.
60 Al-Araby, 29 November 2017.
61 The official Chinese sources noted that 300 Chinese citizens were known to be
fighting; other sources mentioned 1,000. [Dorsey, “China’s Uyghurs: A Potential
Time Bomb”, in The Red Star and the Crescent: China and the Middle East, ed.
Reardon-Anderson (2018), p. 251.]
62 Pauley, “China Stakes Out a Role for Itself in Post-war Syria”, Asia Times, 3
October 2018.
63 Pauley, and Marks, “Is China Increasing Its Military Presence in Syria?”, The
Diplomat, 20 August 2018.
64 Dr John Calabrese, a professor and director of Middle East-Asia Project at the
Middle East Institute writes in his analysis that maybe not People’s Liberation
Army units, but rather Chinese private military companies (PMCs) could spring
up in Syria, tasked with protecting project assets and staff. He mentioned the
Shandong Huawei Security Group whose mercenaries have been officially deployed
in Iraq and Afghanistan [Calabrese, “China and Syria”].
65 Aboufadel, “Chinese military will not deploy to Syria for Idlib offensive”, Al-Masdar
News, 20 August 2018.
66 Pauley, and Marks, “Is China Increasing Its Military Presence in Syria?”
67 Lavi, and Orion, “Will China Reconstruct Syria?”
68 Singh, “China’s Middle East Tour”, Foreign Affairs, 24 January 2016.
69 Calabrese, “China and Syria”.
70 “China conclude food aid programme for Syrian refugees”, The Jordan Times, 14
March 2018.
71 Calabrese, “China and Syria”
72 Security Council Resolution (draft), UN Doc S/2016/846 (8 October 2016) and
Security Council Resolution (draft), UN Doc S/2017/172 (28 February 2017).
73 Pauley, “China Is Using Syria’s Peace Process for Its Own Ends”, The National
Interest, 31 March 2018.
74 Zhou, “China opposes Western air strikes on Syria, calls for talks”, South China
Morning Post, 14 April 2018.
75 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 14 May 2018.
76 “Over 606,000 people killed across Syria since the beginning of the “Syrian Revo
lution”, including 495,000 documented by SOHR”, Syrian Observatory for Human
Rights, 1 June 2021.
78 Bashar Al Assad says it will need $195 billion to rebuild Syria. Estimates from
United Nations organizations are $250 billion or higher.
79 The costs of Russian military and economic involvement are $2.5–4.5 billion a day
since September 2015. The State Department estimates that Iran has spent over
$16 billion in Syria since 2012. [Hatahet, “Russia and Iran: Economic Influence in
Syria”, Chatham House (2019), p. 3.]
80 Dorsey, China and the Middle East: Venturing into the Maelstrom (2019), p. 200.
81 Lavi, and Orion, “Will China Reconstruct Syria?”.
82 The interview ended with a discussion of the study of Assad’s son of the Chinese lan
guage, which is also a gesture of friendship to China. [Elazar, “Moving Westward: The
Chinese Rebuilding of Syria”, Begin-Sadat Center Perspective Paper 673 (2017), p. 2.]
84 Xu, “Evolving Sino-Russian Cooperation in Syria”, p. 3.
85 Morris, “China extends helping hands to rebuild Syria”, China Daily, 10 February 2018.
87 China Daily, 10 July 2018.
88 Iran Khodro was launched in March 2007 and used to produce several models
before the outbreak of the Syrian crisis. It was the only foreign car factory which
reduced production but still remained in Syria. [Pauley, “China stakes out a role
for itself in post-war Syria”.]
89 Lyall, “China in Postwar Syria”, The Diplomat, 11 March 2019.
90 Tay, “As the US withdraws from Syria, China may boost its influence in the
country”, CNBC, 4 April 2019.
91 For example, at end of May 2019, the Russian military police raided Iranian-backed
militiamen and several Iranian militia leaders were arrested. [Bhadrakumar, “Friction
growing between Russia and Iran”, Asia Times, 31 May 2019.]
164 Lukacs Krajcsir
92 “Xi expounds China’s position on Syrian conflict, Venezuelan crisis, Iran’s nuclear
issue”, Xinhua, 5 June 2019.
93 “Shaaban: China’s Invitation to Syria to Participate in Belt and Road Forum
Defies US Sanctions”, Syrian Arab News Agency, 26 April 2019.
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Sun, Degang, “China’s Military Relations with the Middle East”, in The Red Star and
the Crescent: China and the Middle East, ed. James Reardon-Anderson (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 83–102.
“Syria Chemical Attack: What We Know”, BBC, 24 September 2013, available online
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23927399.
Szczudlik-Tatar, Justyna, “China’s Position During the Crisis in Syria”, Polski Instytut
Spraw Miedzynarodowych Bulletin no. 76 (August 2012), pp. 780–781.
Tay, Shirley, “As the US Withdraws from Syria, China May Boost its Influence in the
Country”, CNBC, 4 April 2019, available online https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/05/as
us-withdraws-from-syria-china-may-boost-influence-in-the-country.html.
“Unofficial Translation of the Counter-Terrorism Law of the People’s Republic of
China”, The US-China Business Council, available online www.uschina.org/china
hub/unofficial-translation-counter-terrorism-law-peoples-republic-china.
“US Slams ‘Shameful’ China, Russia Veto on Syria Aid”, Al-Araby, 22 December
2019, available online https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/News/2019/12/22/US-slams
shameful-China-Russia-veto-on-Syria-aid.
“Xi Expounds China’s Position on Syrian Conflict, Venezuelan Crisis, Iran’s Nuclear
Issue”, Xinhua, 5 June 2019, available online www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-06/
05/c_138116801.htm.
Xu, Yixiang, “Evolving Sino-Russian Cooperation in Syria”, Peace Brief no. 236
(September 2017), pp. 1–4.
Zambelis, Chris, “The Geopolitics of Sino-Syrian Relations”, China Brief vol. 8, no. 20
(October 2008), available online www.jamestown.org/program/the-geopolitics-of-sino
syrian-relations/.
Zhou, Laura, “China Opposes Western Air Strikes on Syria, Calls for Talks”, South
China Morning Post, 14 April 2018, available online www.scmp.com/news/china/dip
lomacy-defence/article/2141732/china-opposes-western-airstrikes-syria-calls-talks.
9 The Israel Factor in the Dynamic
Relations between China and the
Islamic World
Zhiqun Zhu
Introduction
China’s growing influence in the developing world is a litmus test of what
kind of global power it will become in the 21st century. The study of
China–Middle East relations is a window through which one can learn
about China’s foreign policy objectives, its strategies, and its challenges.
This chapter examines how and why China has maintained good relations
with both Israel and the Islamic world.
Since its founding in 1949, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has
maintained friendly relations with the Islamic world, countries that span the
Middle East, North Africa, Southeast Asia, and other parts of the world. The
strong relationship between China and the Islamic world is a part of China’s
solidarity with developing countries and a prime example of South–South
cooperation. Among Islamic states or Muslim-majority nations, China has
very close ties with Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates
(UAE), Egypt, Djibouti, Jordan, Qatar, and Malaysia, to name just a few.
China divides its diplomatic relations into several categories based on the
importance and closeness of the relationship, such as “all-weather strategic
partnership”; “comprehensive strategic partnership”; “strategic cooperative
partnership”; and “strategic partnership.”1 China has an “all weather strate
gic partnership” with Pakistan, four comprehensive strategic partnerships in
the Middle East – Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iran and Egypt – and two strategic
partnerships – Qatar and Djibouti. In comparison, China’s relations with
Israel have been labeled as a “comprehensive innovation partnership,” the
only one of its kind in China’s diplomatic relationships worldwide. Thus, it is
clear that China puts the Islamic world and Israel into different categories
and attempts to maintain good relations with both sides and in different ways.
China–Arab relations are strong, with regular high-level meetings and
diplomatic exchanges. President Xi Jinping has visited several Arab states
but has not visited Israel yet. China’s relations with the Arab states are
likely to grow enormously thanks to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). For
example, during Mohammed Bin Zayed’s official trip to Beijing in July
2019, China and the UAE announced that they were aiming to reach $200
DOI: 10.4324/9781003269175-9
The Israel Factor 169
billion in bilateral trade by 2030. In addition, Arab states have supported
China’s efforts to promote global development. Six Arab states were found
ing members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB): Saudi
Arabia, the UAE, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman.
On the other hand, China–Israel relations have a shorter history. Israel was
the first country in the Middle East and one of the first non-communist countries
to recognize the PRC in January 1950. However, due to Chinese participation in
the Korean War as well as pressure from the United States, officialization of
diplomatic relations between the PRC and Israel was postponed until 1992.
Israel’s exclusion from the Bandung conference in 1955 and China’s support for
Arab nations further alienated the two countries.
Trade between China and Israel started in the 1970s. In 1987, Israeli Prime
Minister Shimon Peres appointed Amos Yudan to set up the first official gov
ernment-owned company to establish and foster commercial activities between
companies in China and Israel.2 Prior to the establishment of full diplomatic
relations in 1992, Israel and China established representative offices in Beijing
and Tel Aviv respectively in 1990.3
China and Israel have a special relationship in the contemporary world
mainly due to China’s sheltering of European Jews during WWII. The
Shanghai Jewish Refugees Museum, which opened in 2007, features docu
ments, photographs, films, and personal items documenting the lives of some
of the 25,000 Jewish residents in Shanghai. Moreover, a Jewish community
existed for 800 years in Kaifeng, China, from the 11th century to the early
20th century. There was also a Jewish community in Harbin in the early 20th
century where most of those escaping the pogroms, expulsions, restrictions, as
well as the Russo–Japanese War (1904–5) and the WWI (1914–8), sought
refuge in China.4
Ho Feng Shan – Consul General of the Nationalist Chinese government in
Vienna – played a critical role in helping Austrian Jews to flee Europe. Between
1938 and 1940, Ho issued thousands of visas to Jews who were desperately
trying to escape from Nazi-occupied Austria. While many countries refused to
issue visas in fear of aggravating the Nazi government, Ho courageously threw
his weight and support behind the Jews. Ho issued visas for Shanghai, an open
city that did not require a visa to visit. It turned out that many holders of Ho’s
visa did not travel to Shanghai, rather, they were able to use the papers to get a
transit visa to escape elsewhere such as the United States and Palestine. Ho was
hailed as the “Chinese Schindler.”5 Ho died in 1996, and Israel posthumously
bestowed him the title of “Righteous Among the Nations” in 2000, one of the
highest civil honors.6
When WWII broke out in 1939, more European Jews took refuge in
Shanghai than in any other city. After the end of the Pacific War in 1945, the
Jewish refugees slowly left Shanghai, however, they always looked upon it as
their second home, calling the city “Noah’s Ark.”7 When visiting Shanghai in
May 2013, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu hailed the city’s role
as a “haven” for Jewish people fleeing Nazi-occupied Europe in the 1930s and
170 Zhiqun Zhu
8
40s. In 2015, 70 years after the end of WWII, Israel released a documentary
named “Thank you Shanghai,” in which Netanyahu said Israel was “eternally
grateful” to China.9
Shaul Eisenberg (1921–97) was one of those Jewish refugees who went to
Shanghai and later built an impressive global business empire, which included
Israel Corporation and Beit Asia, with controlling interests in the Israel
Chemicals conglomerate and in Israel’s biggest shipping company, Zim
Navigation. Known as “the King of China,” Eisenberg was believed by many
to be the first person to connect commercial businesses between Israel and
China, including military contracts, after successfully bridging South Korean
and Japanese companies with Chinese businesses. Eisenberg reportedly flew a
group of Israeli arms experts to Beijing in his private plane in 1979.10 He died
in Beijing during a trip in 1997.
The Chinese embrace of the Jewish people has been based in part on their
admiration for the Jews’ contributions to humanity, their ability to survive, as
well as shared values such as family, frugality, hard work, education, and
ancient civilizations. Moreover, the Chinese admire the Jewish culture and
Israel’s achievements. For example, a 12-episode documentary, titled “The
Road to Jewish Civilization,” was produced by China Central Television
(CCTV) in 2011, in cooperation with the Embassy of Israel in Beijing, and
highlighted the Jewish culture’s emphasis on education and innovation.11
Episode 12, “On the Shoulder of Education,” notes that the Jews account for
only 0.3 percent of the world’s population, however, they constitute 22.35
percent of Nobel Prize laureates to date.12
Undoubtedly, China’s relations with both the Islamic world and Israel are
strong but are based on different historical contexts and geopolitical con
siderations. Relations between China and the Islamic world highlight cultural
bonds and solidarity as developing nations, while Israel–China relations were
built upon historical interactions, mutual admiration, and economic com
plementarity. The parallel relationships serve China’s commercial, political,
strategic, and cultural interests.
What Do China and Israel Want from Each Other?

As part of China’s “going global” strategy, Chinese businesses invested a total of
$12.78 billion in Israel from 2005 to 2021, according to the American Enterprise
Institute.13 Chinese firms have made significant inroads in Israel, including the
2011 purchase by ChemChina of 60 percent controlling interest in Makhteshim-
Agan, one of the world’s largest pesticide production and distribution compa
nies, and the 2014 takeover of Tnuva, Israel’s largest producer of dairy products,
by China’s Bright Food.14 Furthermore, several Chinese companies have been
involved in major transportation and infrastructure projects in Israel. For
example, the state-owned China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation
Ltd. (CCECC) built the Carmel Tunnels in Haifa in 2010 as well as the tunnels
for the underground sections of the Tel Aviv metropolitan area’s light rail.15 In
addition, a group of Chinese companies won most of the tenders to build a pro
posed railway from Ashdod to Eilat, the so-called Red-Med Railway. In 2014, a
Beijing-based firm, China Harbor, won a tender to build the new port in
Ashdod.16 In 2015, the Shanghai International Port Group (SIPG) entered an
agreement, with a $2 billion commitment to develop and operate a new port in
Haifa for the next 25 years. The port went operational in September 2021.
Strategically, the port of Haifa is a frequent port of call for the US Sixth Fleet
and serves as the base for Israel’s strategic submarines, which is the main reason
that Chinese investment in Haifa has raised a red flag.
China’s prime interests in Israel are in advanced technologies and Israel’s
location as a potential hub for the BRI. China is particularly interested in
Israel’s expertise in energy, health care, biotech, water and agriculture tech
nologies, and information technology, among others. China’s other interests
in the region include enhancing its global presence and searching for a better
position in, and understanding of, the Middle East. China also wants to reach
out to US allies and partners either to strengthen China’s relations with the
United States through its allies or to influence and divide the US’ alliances.
Domestically, China is facing many problems, including pollution,
desertification, and an aging population. As China restructures and
upgrades its economy, the country needs assistance in integrating high-tech
into its economy. As Israel is a global powerhouse in science, technology,
and innovation, it can help China solve some of these problems. For example,
the two countries have created professional training programs in agriculture,
entrepreneurship, and public health, in the past years, which have allowed Israeli
companies to penetrate the Chinese market. Moreover, as China is shifting its
investment destinations from developing countries to developed countries,
working in Israel allows China to accumulate experience and demonstrate that it
can responsibly operate, build, invest, and compete in advanced economies.
In addition to the vast investment opportunities, Israel’s strategic location and
easy access to the Mediterranean Sea have attracted China’s attention. Israel has
the potential to be an important stop on the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road,
connecting the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea through the Gulf of
Aqaba and the Suez Canal. When meeting with Prime Minister Netanyahu in
Beijing, in March 2017, President Xi proposed that the two countries would
“steadily advance major cooperative projects within the framework of jointly
building the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk
Road.”17 At the same meeting, the Israeli Prime Minister responded by saying
that “the Israeli side is ready to actively participate in infrastructure and other
cooperation under the framework of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st
Century Maritime Silk Road.”18 In addition, Netanyahu called trade relations
between the two countries “a marriage made in heaven.”19
As a sign of deepening trade ties, Chinese telecommunication companies
Huawei and ZTE won the tenders to build cellular networks in Israel. However,
in recent years, Israel has been under heavy pressure from the United States to
exclude Chinese carriers in its 5G network.20
172 Zhiqun Zhu
In 1992, when diplomatic relations were established, bilateral trade was just
$51.5 million.21 By 2020, trade had risen to $15.70 billion.22 As such, China has
quickly become Israel’s second largest trading partner, trailing the United States.
To bolster Israel–China cooperation in several domains related to innovation,
the two countries established the China-Israel Joint Committee on Innovation
Cooperation in May 2014. Nevertheless, in comparison to the United States,
China’s trade with Israel and investment in Israel are relatively small.
According to the Office of the US Trade Representatives, the US-Israel
Free Trade Agreement was established in 1985, which was the first free trade
agreement entered into by the United States. Since its entry into force, trade
between the two countries had increased tenfold to $49 billion in 2016.23
Israelis now invest close to $24 billion in the United States, nearly triple what
it was a decade earlier. Meanwhile, Israeli firms represent the second-largest
source of foreign listings on the NASDAQ, after China – and more than
Indian, Japanese, and South Korean firms combined. Moreover, Israel is
home to more than 2,500 U.S. firms employing some 72,000 Israelis, and
thousands more jobs are supported indirectly by these employers.24
Israel’s interests in China are primarily economic and strategic. Economic
cooperation with China brings tangible benefits to Israel, such as fine con
sumer products from China, local jobs generated by Chinese investments,
growing tourists from China, upgraded infrastructure, and penetration into
the Chinese market for Israeli businesses. During his March 2017 visit to
China, Prime Minister Netanyahu met with the heads of some of China’s
largest businesses, including online retailer Alibaba, search engine Baidu,
computer maker Lenovo, beverage maker Wahaha and cinema and real estate
conglomerate Wanda. After meeting with some of “the largest corporations
in China,” Netanyahu said that “A large portion of them [is] investing in
Israel and a large portion of them will invest in Israel. This means jobs, the
development of businesses and a link to the major Chinese markets.”25 Chi
nese exports to Israel are highly diversified. There are products important for
manufacturing and construction, such as mechanical equipment, metals and
chemicals. Moreover consumer goods like cosmetics and home appliances
provide quality, yet affordable choices that improve Israeli life.26
As a key US ally, Israel is unlikely to jeopardize relations with the United
States in order to expand relations with China. Israel and China have had tech
nology and defense cooperation since the 1980s, although due to the US inter
vention, deeper cooperation has encountered some difficulties. Under pressure
from Washington, Israel canceled attempted sales of the Phalcon airborne early
warning and control radar system and planned upgrades of the Harpy unman
ned aerial drone system to China in 2000 and 2005, respectively.27 Nevertheless,
not all US and Israeli interests align with each other. For its own national
interests, Israel will not always follow the United States in international affairs
and may not join the United States in a new Cold War with China.
Strategically, developing strong relations with China helps Israel to diver
sify its political and economic partnerships. As China advances in its BRI and
its interests in the region continues to grow, it will inevitably become more
involved in Middle Eastern affairs. Israel will seek China’s neutrality, if not
support, in the Israel–Arab conflict, given China’s long-standing solidarity with
Palestine, Iran and other rivals and enemies of Israel in the region. Moreover,
Israel is eager to engage China about its future role in the Middle East and
hopes to affect Chinese policy on issues of non-proliferation, especially China’s
position on Iran’s nuclear program. In line with the urge to advance these
interests and objectives, Prime Minister Netanyahu has made developing
Israeli–China relations “a strategic goal.”28
Engagement Strategies
China and Israel have adopted various strategies in their deepening engagement.
Such strategies include highest level visits and official interactions, active
participation by business communities, cultural and educational exchanges as
well as tourism promotion.
Top Down
Generations of Israeli leaders have pursued China-friendly policies. Israel’s
first prime minister David Ben-Gurion predicted in the 1960s that the PRC
would become the most important power in the world within two decades.
Ben-Gurion also praised French President Charles de Gaulle for recognizing
the PRC in January 1964, and, whenever possible, he tried to convince
Washington to improve relations with Beijing.29 More recently, Prime
Minister Ehud Olmert visited China in 2007 and President Shimon Peres
attended the 2008 Beijing Olympics opening ceremony. Netanyahu visited
China twice after becoming Prime Minister again in 2009. Netanyahu
asserted that Israel would be “a perfect junior partner” to China’s econ
omy and welcomed Chinese investment in Israel.30 The three bilateral
agreements that the two countries signed during Netanyahu’s 2017 visit
included one that would allow 20,000 Chinese workers to get work visas
permitting them to work on Israeli construction sites.31
Bilateral relations took a hit after the arms sales incident in 2000. However,
since 2004, at least one high-ranking Chinese official at the level of foreign
minister or above has visited Israel every year.32 President Xi has not visited
Israel yet, but in October 2018, Vice President Wang, paid a four-day visit
to Israel, meeting with government and business leaders, co-hosting the
Innovation Summit in Tel Aviv with Prime Minister Netanyahu, and signing
eight key agreements in fields such as science and technology, digital health,
and agriculture.33 Wang was the most senior Chinese official to visit Israel in
nearly two decades. In April 2000, Jiang Zemin became the first-ever leader
of the People’s Republic to visit Israel. Netanyahu hailed Wang’s visit as “a
tremendous compliment to Israel and a reflection of the growing ties
between China and Israel.”34
174 Zhiqun Zhu
China has become more involved in Middle Eastern affairs in recent years.
For example, the Chinese government announced in May 2013 that it would
arrange a meeting between Prime Minister Netanyahu and Palestinian
Authority President Mahmoud Abbas when both leaders simultaneously were
visiting the country, should the leaders be willing to do so.35 Unfortunately, the
offer was not accepted by either side. In separate meetings with Netanyahu and
Abbas, however, Xi urged both leaders to re-start peace talks as soon as pos
sible, which was reflective of China’s intent to strengthen its diplomatic role in
a region where its influence has historically been weak.36 To further get
involved and facilitate the Arab–Israeli peace process, China appointed a spe
cial envoy on Middle Eastern affairs in 2002. Wang Shijie, former Chinese
Ambassador to Bahrain, Jordan, and Iran, was appointed the first Special
Envoy and was succeeded by Sun Bigan in June 2006. In 2009, the post was
taken over by Ambassador Wu Sike. In September 2019, senior diplomat and
former vice foreign minister, Zhai Jun, was appointed the new envoy on the
Middle East. In May 2016, China also appointed Xie Xiaoyan, a former
ambassador to Iran, as its first special envoy for the Syrian crisis as it sought a
more active role in the Middle East. On various occasions, Chinese officials
have reiterated China’s commitment to playing a constructive role in main
taining peace and stability in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf region. On
October 20, 2020, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi attended a ministerial
meeting of the UN Security Council on the situation in the Persian Gulf region
via video link. He put forward three proposals: First, adhering to the rule of
law to contribute to the peace of the Gulf; second, upholding good neighbor
liness to contribute to the security of the Gulf; and third, championing fairness
and justice to contribute to the stability of the Gulf.37
Bottom Up
Bilateral cooperation at the local and business levels is dynamic and does
not necessarily follow the political trends. For example, despite former US
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s warning, during his March 2019 visit to
Israel, that China’s investment into the country could hinder US–Israel
cooperation, over 100 Israeli startups and companies attended the annual
GoforIsrael Conference in Jinan, Shandong Province, in May 2019. This
conference was organized by the Cukierman and Co. Investment House, a
leading Israeli investment company, and the Catalyst CEL Fund, a private
Israeli equity firm.38 According to Edouard Cukierman, chair of the
Cukierman and Co., fears over doing business with China were overblown,
and the US–China trade war launched by the Trump administration actu
ally represented an opportunity for Israel, since Israeli tech companies have
fewer constraints or concerns to work with their Chinese counterparts.39 Avi
Luvton, Asia-Pacific director at the Israel Investments Authority, concurred
and said that he was not aware of any Israeli firms shying away from China
because of the United States.40
The Israel Chamber of Commerce in China (IsCham) was established in 2008
as a non-profit and non-governmental organization, with offices in Beijing,
Shanghai and Tel Aviv. IsCham represents and assists the Sino–Israeli business
community in developing commercial relations between China, Israel, and the
Jewish world. In another example, GoforIsrael has been one of the most influ
ential business conferences in Israel for over 20 years. The Conference addresses
current issues in fundraising and establishes strategic alliances globally between
Israeli companies, businesses and financial institutions. Cukierman & Co first
put together a Go4China conference in Tel Aviv in 2012 and brought investment
conferences to China in 2014. GoforIsrael was a huge success in 2018 with three
conferences in Israel, Hong Kong, and Foshan, China. The Foshan conference
was attended by over 100 Israeli startups and “high-tech” companies. The high
light included meetings between Israeli entrepreneurs and hundreds of Chinese
investors.41
Cultural and Educational Exchanges

Israel has an embassy in Beijing and four consulates in other Chinese cities:
Shanghai, Guangzhou, Chengdu, and Hong Kong, the second largest number of
its diplomatic missions overseas after the United States. In comparison, Israel
only has an embassy and one consulate in India and Russia respectively. These
growing diplomatic interactions have allowed the two countries to establish joint
research and education programs. For example, by the end of 2018, there were at
least six joint campuses, institutions or centers in China, including a special
research center for Israel Studies at Tongji University between Tongji Uni
versity and Tel Aviv University, a joint research center between Tel Aviv
University and Tsinghua University, a joint lab between University of Haifa
and East China Normal University, a joint center for entrepreneurship and
innovation for Ben Gurion University of the Negev and Jilin University, a
joint agricultural training center at China Agricultural University, as well as
the Guangdong Technion-Israel Institute of Technology.
By 2014, China had opened two Confucius Institutes in Israel.42 The first
was established in Tel Aviv University in 2007 and the second at Hebrew
University of Jerusalem in 2014. Despite some problems that the Confucius
Institutes have faced in recent years in the West, the two Confucius Institutes
in Israel have worked with their Chinese counterparts and the Chinese
embassy in Israel to ensure their successful operation.43 The Confucius Insti
tutes successfully disseminated the Chinese language instruction in Israel.
Moreover, numerous schools in Israel have been offering programs to learn
Chinese, and Israel’s Ministry of Education was planning to authorize the
Chinese language as a subject in high school matriculation exams in 2017.44
According to the Council for Higher Education (CHE) in Israel, around
5,000 Chinese students were studying for degrees in Israel in 2019.45 In the
previous year, more than 1,000 Chinese students were enrolled in Israel and
about 500 Israeli students studied in China. The University of Haifa, for
176 Zhiqun Zhu
example, boasted 200 Chinese students among its student body in 2016, a 100
percent increase from 2013 when the school had just 20 Chinese students.46
The Technion-Israel Institute of Technology also saw an influx of Chinese
students in recent years. During the 2016–7 academic year, the school had
117 full-time Chinese students, and 177 Chinese students enrolled in its
summer school of engineering.47
Tourism
Israel and China signed a ten-year multiple entry visa agreement in 2016.48
Under the new visa program, Chinese business people and tourists will be
allowed to enter Israel multiple times with the same visa, which will be valid
for ten years. The same will apply for Israeli citizens visiting China. Israel is
only the third country, after the United States and Canada, to have such an
arrangement with China. With the new visa policy, China quickly became
Israel’s fastest growing source of tourists in 2017. To facilitate travel, direct
flights were added between the two sides. Before the COVID-19 that disrupted
international travel, there were 13 weekly direct flights between Tel Aviv and
four Chinese cities – Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Chengdu – provided
by Air China, El Al, Hainan Airlines and Sichuan Airlines. In 2017, for the
first time, the number of Chinese tourists surpassed 100,000, doubling the
figure for 2015. Before the pandemic the two sides were hoping to increase
Chinese tourists to 400,000 by 2020, and the Israeli Tourism Bureau has been
training Mandarin-speaking tour guides. According to China’s Central Bureau
of Statistics, a total of 70,800 Chinese tourists visited Israel from January to
May in 2019, up from 46,900 in the same period in 2018.49 Understandably the
global pandemic that started in 2019 has changed all these plans.
Challenges from the United States

Growing China–Israel relations cause concerns not only in the Islamic world
but also for the United States. US concerns regarding this growing relation
ship are twofold. Explicitly, it is concerned about security, especially the
potential transfer of US defense-related technology to China and other tech
nologies and capabilities that could strengthen China’s military edge. Impli
citly, it feels threatened by growing Chinese influence in Israel, and the
Middle East. The United States worries that Chinese companies operating in
Israel may have ties to the Chinese military, according to Shira Efron, a
scholar who studies China–Israel relations.50 The United States is also con
cerned about growing Chinese investments in key Israeli infrastructure, parti
cularly the port of Haifa, which is home to Israel’s nuclear submarine force.
As trade expectation theories suggest, improving trade and investment
connections make parties more dependent on each other, which increases the
cost of conflict, leading to a sort of commercial peace. This is why Israeli
officials talk about the MAGIC (Mediterranean-Arabia-Gulf International
51
Corridor) that the expanded port of Haifa can create. Increased capacity at
the port will make it possible to serve markets beyond Israel’s borders, by
connecting Israel with Jordan and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. Such a
regional transportation system, it is argued, can help to enhance trade rela
tions and contribute to the promotion of peaceful co-existence in a region
marred by conflict.52 However, this new terminal is only about one kilometer
away from the docks where the American warships anchor when they make a
port call to Haifa.
The Obama administration did not pay much attention to this, but when
Trump took office in 2017, it became an issue against the backdrop of the
US–China trade war, and was rapidly turning into a problem as big as the
arms sales debacle in 2000.53 During their visits to Israel in January and
March 2019 respectively, both John Bolton, former National Security Advisor
to Trump, and former Secretary of State Pompeo, warned Israel of security
risks from Chinese investments in sensitive sectors and locations and threa
tened to reduce security cooperation between the United States and Israel.54
The US suspects that the Chinese will be able to spy on US Navy ships.
Israeli companies operating in domains that may have national security
implications, such as cybersecurity, energy, and mobility, may find their abil
ity to do business with certain American partners, especially government
entities, diminished if they have Chinese partners, former US ambassador to
Israel Daniel Shapiro said in January 2019.55 President Trump, himself,
warned Prime Minister Netanyahu during the latter’s visit to Washington,
DC in March 2019 that if Israel did not curb its ties with China, its security
relations with the United States could suffer. Trump reportedly made the
demand after he recognized Golan Heights as part of Israeli territory.56 In
response to repeated stern warnings from the United States, Netanyahu sent
National Security Council head Meir Ben-Shabbat to Washington, DC in
April 2019 to discuss the issue with his American counterpart.
The US Senate’s National Defense Authorization Act for the 2020 fiscal year
raised “serious security concerns” over the Haifa port deal.57 A Chinese-operated
port could keep the US Navy away from Haifa and imperil security ties between
Israel and its closest ally. The sponsor of the Act, Senator Jim Inhofe, is a strong
supporter of Israel, and his adoption of such a strident language sent Jerusalem a
clear message.58 The United States urged Israel to establish an inter-agency
committee like the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
(CFIUS) to scrutinize Chinese investments in Israel.
The Trump administration threatened to punish US allies, including Israel, if
they worked too closely with China. For example, former Secretary of State
Pompeo said during an interview in Jerusalem in March 2019, that “we want to
make sure that countries understand and know these risks” and that “intelli
gence sharing might have to be reduced” and “co-location of security facilities
might have to be reduced.”59 In particular, Pompeo targeted Huawei repeatedly
in his comments during his foreign trips, warning allies that partnership with the
Chinese tech giant could imperil their security. Moreover, he warned “if certain
178 Zhiqun Zhu
systems go in certain places, then America’s efforts to work alongside you will be
more difficult, and in some cases, we won’t be able to do so.”60
Critics argue that allowing Beijing a foothold in strategically important a
location could compromise Israeli intelligence assets and even lead US
military vessels to avoid docking at Haifa altogether.61 They also suggest the
Knesset needs to pass legislation to monitor foreign investment in Israel.
Amid mounting US pressure to take a tougher stance on Chinese invest
ment, some Israeli officials were countering that these concerns were over
blown and that investments were vetted for security risks. For example, one
senior Israeli government official had stated that “the security warnings
about the Chinese are a joke, completely mad,” adding that “if they want to
gather intelligence, they can simply rent an apartment in Haifa instead of
investing in ownership of a port.”62
For China, the opportunity to increase its presence and influence in the
territories of a close US ally has significant implications for its international
status. From the realist perspective, if Israel does not bend to US pressure in
this saga, it would signal to other countries and the United States itself that
its power is declining while China’s is growing. China also fears a “domino
effect”—if the agreement between SIPG and Israel were canceled over secur
ity and strategic concerns, other countries might begin to re-examine their ties
with China, including more rigorous checks of all contracts, which could
endanger China’s BRI.63 On its part, China has repeatedly blasted the US
warnings, calling the pushback “ridiculous.”64 Chinese Foreign Ministry
spokesperson, Hua Chunying, said the United States “has been abusing
‘national security’ to smear and strike down normal business activities of
Chinese enterprises.” She added that the United States has been “consistently
ignoring facts and seeing enemies wherever it looks.”65
Israel has to reconcile two conflicting policies, one is to encourage foreign
investment and expand international market for Israeli goods and services,
and the other is to defend national and strategic assets and infrastructure
from being controlled or taken over by foreign governments and corpora
tions, even if they are not enemies or hostile to Israel. Like the United
States, Israel also faces the problem of espionage and theft of advanced
technologies. Particularly, Russia and Iran in recent years have enhanced
their collection of information and espionage efforts in Israel, to obtain
access to Israeli hi-tech companies and those connected in some way to the
United States.66 Already, Israel has barred China from competing in the
tender process for a massive infrastructure project involving the establish
ment of a new international airport, Israeli media reported in January 2019.
According to the report, it was decided that only NATO countries would be
permitted to participate in the bidding process, as a means of excluding
China from the competition.67 In 2019, bidding from Chinese companies for
building the world’s largest water desalination plant in Israel was also
rejected for reasons including the plant being close to a number of highly
sensitive security sites such as the Palmachim air force base.68
Since 2017 Chinese investment in the West has dropped mainly due to
China’s own tighter control on finance outflows and Western countries’ scrutiny
of Chinese investments on national security grounds. As Chinese companies are
increasingly banned or discouraged from investment in the United States and
Europe, Israel is likely to grow as a market for Chinese technology investment
and acquisitions.
Discussion
In July 2019, a group of 22 nations signed a letter addressed to the president
of the United Nations Human Rights Council and the High Commissioner
for Human Rights, calling on China to end its massive detention program in
Xinjiang. The signatories expressed concern about “credible reports of arbi
trary detention” in Xinjiang and “widespread surveillance and restrictions,”
particularly targeting Uyghurs and other minorities.69 Days later, a group of
37 countries submitted a responsive letter in defense of China’s policies.70
Noticeable are the geographic and political divergences between the two lists
of signatories. The first was dominated by Western states, mostly in Western
and Northern Europe, and the second included many African and Middle
Eastern countries. Importantly, the first letter did not include a single sig
nature from a Muslim-majority state while the second featured many,
including Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt, UAE, Syria, Kuwait, and Qatar.71
Notably, the United States, Turkey and Israel, did not appear on either list,
while Russia signed the letter supporting China. This war of words demon
strates China’s growing economic and diplomatic influence globally and the
strong alliance between China and the Islamic world.
With China’s market and capital, Israel’s hi-tech industries, and the innovative
spirit of both nations, China–Israel relations have much room to grow, and
China’s influence in Israel will continue to increase. As a leading China
scholar in Israel has concluded, China will have influence in Israel “at a level
that currently seems the stuff of fantasy.”72 “The Evolving Israel-China
Relationship” report published by RAND in 2019 summarizes the current
status of the bilateral relationship succinctly and argues that Israel–China
relations are broadening and deepening on multiple fronts. In the political
and defense realm, relations are “cordial but not particularly warm,” with
each side having other, more preferred partners.73 Economic relations are
“much stronger,” while educational and cultural relations are somewhere in
between. Notably there is “a lot of potential for growth” in the realm of
tourism.74 The RAND report concludes that Israel–China relations, which
are being consolidated, will lead to a conflict of interests between Israel and
the United States.
Will Israel develop an independent foreign policy from the United States?
Should Islamic countries worry about growing China–Israel relations? So far,
both the government and Israel’s business sector see little credible threat to
Israeli sovereignty or are concerned that critical technologies are being
180 Zhiqun Zhu
transferred to Chinese investors.75 The Israeli government has established a
thoughtful balance between commercial and national security interests, banning
trade with China in most military sales, while, at the same time, welcoming
infrastructure and technology investments. China’s interests in Israel are mainly
in civilian technologies like health, agriculture, fintech, mobility and advanced
manufacturing. Chinese companies are as free to purchase products and services
in these fields as they are throughout the West, including in the United States.76
Clearly the more serious tensions get between the United States and China, the
more pressure US allies, such as Israel, will face from Washington to limit the
development of their relations with China. Countries such as Israel that heavily
depend on the United States for security but have growing ties with China may
find themselves between a rock and a hard place.
What does the growing China–Israel relations mean for the Islamic world?
First, the close alliance between Israel and the United States on one hand, and the
long-standing relations between China and Islamic countries, on the other, will
pose limitations to a strong China–Israel partnership. Secondly, China and Israel
do not agree on the future relations between Israel and the Palestine. China has
historically supported Palestinians’ position as reflected by President Xi’s address
to the Arab League in 2016 when he called for the establishment of a Palestinian
state with East Jerusalem as its capital.77 China has criticized Israel’s construction
of settlements and the security barrier. Additionally, after the victory of Hamas in
the 2006 Palestinian election, China acknowledged it as the legitimately elected
political entity in the Gaza Strip despite Israeli and US opposition.78
Another major disagreement between the two countries is over Iran. China
has been a major trading partner and diplomatic partner of Iran and has
opposed sanctions imposed during negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program.
Israel considers a nuclear-armed Iran an existential threat to its national
security. A multibillion dollar, 25-year economic and security agreement
between Iran and China signed in 2021 is clearly “bad news” for Israel.79
Conclusion
China has vested interests in maintaining close and strong ties with the Isla
mic world as fellow developing countries. They share many common interests
such as economic development and modernization, and they often join hands
in resisting pressures from the West on issues such as human rights. On the
other hand, Israel–China relations are mutually beneficial, and China will
continue to develop dynamic exchanges with Israel.
Though China–Israel relations are growing, it is highly unlikely that Israel
will ditch the alliance with the United States in order to form stronger ties
with China. Beijing’s long-standing solidarity with Islamic states, especially
China’s close relations with Iran and its support for Palestine, continue to
frustrate Israel. Recognizing the constraints in the bilateral relationship,
China and Israel are realistic about how far their engagement can go while
aiming to develop the relationship to its fullest potential.
All in all, China’s influence is expanding to different parts of the world and
China is interested in developing friendly relations with all countries, big or
small, near or far. China’s foreign policy is pragmatic and is not guided by
any ideological principles. China–Israel relations are developing, but not at
the expense of China–Islamic relations. In other words, China’s deep-rooted
interest in, and solidarity with, Islamic countries, are unlikely to change
despite its growing relations with Israel, and China–Israel relations is unlikely
to supersede China’s relations with the Islamic world.
Notes
1 Major categories of Chinese diplomatic relations include: “all-weather strategic
partnership - 全方位戰略夥伴關係”; “comprehensive strategic partnership - 全面
戰略夥伴關係”; “strategic cooperative partnership - 戰略合作夥伴關係”; “strate
gic partnership - 戰略夥伴關係”; and “comprehensive innovation partnership全面
创新夥伴關係.”
2 “Israel’s International Relations: Israel-China Relations,” Jewish Virtual Library.
https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/israel-china-relations.
3 For an overview of China-Israel relations, see Zhiqun Zhu, “China-Israel Rela
tions: Past, Present and Future,” EAI Background Brief, no. 1473, East Asian
Institute, National University of Singapore, October 31, 2019.
4 Aron Shai. China and Israel: Chinese, Jews; Beijing, Jerusalem (1890–2018).
Boston, MA: Academic Studies Press, 2019: 21.
5 Liu Hanlu, “The Chinese Schindler,” China Daily, July 9, 2021. Industrialist Oskar
Schindler saved 1,200 Jews during World War II by employing them in his factory
located in Poland.
6 Wayne Chang, “Ho Feng Shan: The ‘Chinese Schindler’ Who Saved Thousands of
Jews,” CNN, July 24, 2015.
7 Casey Hall, “Jewish Life in Shanghai’s Ghetto,” The New York Times, June 19, 2012.
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/20/travel/jewish-life-in-shanghais-ghetto.html.
8 James Griffiths, “Shanghai’s Forgotten Jewish Past,” The Atlantic, November 21,
2013.
9 Liang Jun, “Israeli Embassy Releases Video ‘Thank You, Shanghai’ for the Help
in WWII,” People’s Daily Online, August 28, 2015.
10 David B. Ottaway, “Israelis Aided China on Missiles,” The Washington Post, May
23, 1988.
11 “The Road to Jewish Civilization” was called “a land of wonders” in Israel.
12 Documentary: The Road to Jewish Civilization, China Central TV, 2011. A synopsis of
the documentary can be found at the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website: https://m
fa.gov.il/MFA/AboutTheMinistry/Events/Pages/Documentary-Road_Jewish_Civilizati
on.aspx
13 According to the AEI China Global Investment Tracker, during the same period
(as of August 1, 2021), China invested $64.97 billion in Pakistan, $42.80 billion in
Saudi Arabia, $36.16 billion in UAE, $26.56 billion in Iran, $24.70 billion in
Egypt, $25.13 billion in Iraq.
14 Adam Jourdan and Tova Cohen, “China’s Bright Food to Buy Control of Israel’s
Tnuva to Boost Dairy Sales,” Reuters, May 21, 2014.
15 “Israeli Light Rail Conducts 1st Test Drive With Chinese-Made Electric Train,”
Xinhua, June 11, 2021.
16 Grace M. Lavigne, “China Wins Tender To Build Port in Israel,” The Journal of
Commerce Online, June 20, 2014.
182 Zhiqun Zhu
17 Liu Hua, “Xi Jinping Meets with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu,” Xinhua,
March 21, 2017.
18 Ibid.
19 “China blasts US over warnings on Israeli infrastructure projects,” Ynetnews.com,
January 23, 2019. https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-5451158,00.html.
20 “Israel, U.S. Near Deal to Exclude China from Israeli 5G Networks: U.S. Offi
cial,” Reuters, August 14, 2020.
21 Zhiqun Zhu, “China-Israel Relations: Past, Present and Future,” EAI Background Brief,
no. 1473, East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore, October 31, 2019.
22 Based on statistics from Tradingeconomics.com, in 2020, Israeli imports from
China were $11.69 billion and Israeli exports to China $4.11 billion.
23 https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/israel-fta.
24 The information is from the US Embassy in Israel website, https://il.usembassy.
gov/our-relationship/policy-history/fact-sheet-u-s-israel-economic-relationship.
25 Raphael Ahren, “Netanyahu: Israel is ‘Perfect Junior Partner’ for China’s Econ
omy,” The Times of Israel, March 20, 2017.
26 “Flourishing in the New Era: China-Israel Economic and Trade Cooperation,”
The Jerusalem Post, October 21, 2018.
27 Yitzhak Shichor, “The US Factor in Israel’s Military Relations with China,” China
Brief, The Jamestown Foundation, May 24, 2005.
28 Jonathan Pollack and Natan Sachs, “China, Israel and the United States: Pro
ceedings from the U.S.-China-Israel Trilateral Conference,” Washington, DC: The
Brookings Institution, February 2014: p. 3.
29 Yitzhak Shichor, “My Heart is in the West and I am at the End of the East:
Changing Israeli Perceptions of Asia,” in Alfred Wittstock, ed. The World Facing
Israel—Israel Facing the World: Images and Politics (Berlin: Frank and Timme,
2011), pp. 247–250.
30 Raphael Ahren, “Netanyahu: Israel is ‘Perfect Junior Partner’ for China’s Econ
omy,” The Times of Israel, March 20, 2017.
31 Ibid.
32 For a list of high level visits between the two sides, see Chinese Foreign Ministry
website at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/yz_676205/
1206_677196/sbgx_677200/t312274.shtml.
33 “Co-hosting trade conference with Netanyahu, China’s VP hails Israeli technol
ogy,” The Times of Israel, October 25, 2018.
34 Raphael Ahren, “PM Lauds ‘Growing Friendship’ Between Israel, China as he
Hosts Vice President,” The Times of Israel, October 23, 2018.
35 “Xi urges Netanyahu to Re-start Middle East Peace Talks,” The South China
Morning Post, May 10, 2013.
36 Ibid.
37 “Wang Yi Attends UNSC Ministerial Meeting on the Situation in the Persian Gulf
Region,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People’s Republic of China, October 21, 2020.
38 Joshua Davidovich and Shoshanna Solomon, “Israeli Firms Fly out to Woo China
Investors despite Myriad of Potential Hazards,” The Times of Israel, May 26,
2019.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 From GoForIsrael website (https://goforisrael.com/about-us/).
42 See a list of Confucius Institutes around the world, including in Israel, at https://
www.digmandarin.com/confucius-institutes-around-the-world.html.
43 David Stavrou, “Chinese Institutes at Universities Are Under Fire, but Israeli
Scholars Insist There’s No Undue Influence,” Haaretz, April 20, 2019. https://
www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-chinese-institutes-on-campuses-are-under
fire-israeli-scholars-deny-undue-influence-1.7141138. Also see Aron Shai, China
and Israel: Chinese, Jews; Beijing, Jerusalem (1890–2018). Boston, MA: Aca
demic Studies Press, 2019: 226–238.
44 Aron Shai, China and Israel: Chinese, Jews; Beijing, Jerusalem (1890–2018).
Boston, MA: Academic Studies Press, 2019: p. 234.
45 “Int’l Students Day: Israel Becomes Home to 12,000 International Students,” The
Jerusalem Post, November 17, 2019.
46 “Chinese Enrollment at Israeli Universities Skyrockets,” The Jerusalem Post,
August 14, 2017.
47 Ibid.
48 “Israel and China to Sign 10-Year Multiple Entry Visa Deal,” The Times of Israel,
March 27, 2016.
49 “Chinese Tourists to Israel Jump 51 pct in First 5 Months of 2019: Report,”
50 Kuo, Mercy A. “Israel Balancing US-China Relations: Geostrategic Context:
Insights from Shira Efron,” The Diplomat, April 16, 2019.
51 Altay Atlı, “China, Israel, and the Geopolitics of Seaports,” The Diplomat, July
16, 2019.
52 Ibid.
53 Amiram Barkat, “US Presses Israel on China’s Haifa Port Investment,” Globes,
January 6, 2019. https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-us-presses-israel-on-chinas-haifa
-port-investment-1001267903.
54 Ibid.
55 “China blasts US over warnings on Israeli infrastructure projects,” Ynetnews.com,
56 “Israel, US Discuss Future of Chinese Investments,” Asharq Al-awsat, April 16,
2019. https://aawsat.com/node/1681591.
57 See the text of the Act at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CRPT-116srpt48/
html/CRPT-116srpt48.htm.
58 Daniel Samet, “Israel May Live to Regret Its Warming Ties With China.” Haar
etz, June 24, 2019, https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-israel-may-live-to-r
egret-its-warming-ties-with-china-1.7402453
59 Joel Gehrke, “Pompeo: China Threatens US-Israel Intelligence Sharing,”
Washington Examiner, March 21, 2019.
60 Ibid.
61 “Has Israel Made a Huge Mistake Letting a Chinese Firm Run Part of Haifa
Port?” The Times of Israel, December 20, 2018.
62 “Israeli Officials Discount U.S. Concerns Over China: ‘The Security Warnings Are a
Joke’,” Haaretz, January 17, 2019. https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/business/isra
eli-officials-discount-u-s-concerns-over-china-the-security-warnings-are-a-jo-1.6850841.
63 Roie Yellinek, “US-Chinese Competition over the Haifa Port,” BESA Center Per
spectives Paper No. 1071, The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, January
23, 2019.
64 “China slams United States over concerns regarding lease of Haifa port,” Cleveland
Jewish News, January 23, 2019. https://www.clevelandjewishnews.com/jns/china-slam
s-united-states-over-concerns-regarding-lease-of-haifa/article_1faa
0867-df96-58c8-b59c-1f1e1881c433.html.
65 “China Slams United States over Concerns Regarding Lease of Haifa Port,” Cleveland
s-united-states-over-concerns-regarding-lease-of-haifa/article_1faa0867-df96-58c8-b59c
1f1e1881c433.html.
66 Yossi Melman, “China: The Elephant in the Room,” The Jerusalem Report,
March 11, 2019.
184 Zhiqun Zhu
67 “Israel Said to Bar China, Turkey from Bidding for $40 Million Airport Tender,” The
Times of Israel, January 23, 2019. https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-said-to-ba
r-china-turkey-from-bidding-for-airport-tender/amp/?__twitter_impression=true.
68 Amos Harel, “With Its National Security at Stake, Israel Takes Sides in U.S.-China
Trade War,” Haaretz, May 26, 2019.
69 “22 Countries Sign Letter Calling on China to Close Xinjiang Uyghur Camps,”
CNN, July 11, 2019.
70 “North Korea, Syria and Myanmar Among Countries Defending China’s Actions
in Xinjiang,” CNN, July 15, 2019.
71 Catherine Putz, “Which Countries Are For or Against China’s Xinjiang Policies?”
The Diplomat, July 15, 2019.
72 Aron Shai. China and Israel: Chinese, Jews; Beijing, Jerusalem (1890–2018).
Boston, MA: Academic Studies Press, 2019: p. 243.
73 Shira Efron, Howard Shatz, Arthur Chan, Emily Haskel, Lyle Morris, and
Andrew Scobell. “The Evolving Israel-China Relationship,” Santa Monica, CA:
Rand Corporation, 2019: p. 80.
74 Ibid.
75 Dorian Barak and Yuelin Dang, “Israel navigates US-China trade tensions,” Asia
Times, June 29, 2019.
76 Ibid.
77 “China’s Xi Calls for Creation of Palestinian State,” Al Jazeera, January 22, 2016.
78 “Palestinians Welcome Chinese Peace Initiative,” Al-monitor.com, March 31, 2021.
79 “China-Iran: Bad News, but it Could be Worse for Israel – Analysis,” The Jer
usalem Post, March 29, 2021.
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China (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2021).
“Wang Yi Attends UNSC Ministerial Meeting on the Situation in the Persian Gulf
Region,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People’s Republic of China, October 21, 2020.
“Xi urges Netanyahu to Re-start Middle East Peace Talks,” The South China Morning
Post, May 10, 2013.
Yellinek, Roie. “US-Chinese Competition over the Haifa Port,” BESA Center Perspec
tives Paper No. 1071, The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, January 23, 2019.
Yellinek, Roie, “Israel in the Sino-US Great Power Competition,” Asia Pacific Bulletin,
East-West Center, March 5, 2019.
Zhu, Zhiqun. “China-Israel Relations: Past, Present and Future,” EAI Background Brief,
no. 1473, East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore, October 31, 2019.
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China Social Sciences Press, 2013).
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of China-Arab States Economic and Trade Relations Annual Report) (Beijing: Social
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Peking University Press, 2015).
10 China’s Security Cooperation with
Bangladesh and Pakistan in the
Context of ‘Belt and Road Initiative’
Implications for Indian Ocean Geopolitics
Noor Mohammad Sarker
Introduction
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is, by far, the largest intercontinental mega
project of the twenty-first century.1 Given its historical and cultural aspects, both
the overland and the maritime silk routes of BRI have underlying connections
with South Asia. The active participation of Bangladesh and Pakistan in BRI
from this region clasps a greater strategic importance for China. It has unlocked
a new set of opportunities to strengthen China’s long-standing bilateral security
engagements with these two countries. China–Pakistan bilateral relationship has
already been reached into the stage of “all-weather friendship,” thanks to their
sharing of land-boundary as well as to the contemporary settings of regional
power politics in South Asia.2 China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) falls
under China’s Silk Road initiative, whereas the Gwadar seaport of Pakistan is
one of the checkpoints of China’s Maritime Silk Road (MSR). China–Pakistan
engagements under BRI have further strengthened their strategic partnership in
the security arena.3 Correspondingly, Bangladesh and China have been going
through deeper economic, security and cultural engagements since 1975,
which have officially been termed as a “strategic partnership” in recent
years by both countries.4 Though Bangladesh does not share a border with
China, the former holds a key geographical position in both the land and
the maritime routes of BRI. Bangladesh is one of the four members of
BCIM-EC (Bangladesh, China, India, Myanmar-Economic Corridor),
which aims to revive the ancient Southern Silk Road under BRI, and its
Chittagong seaport falls under the sea route of MSR.5
Considering these developments, the present study aims to analyze China’s
security cooperation with Bangladesh and Pakistan in the context of BRI and
its implications to the individual interests and achievements of these three
countries in the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean. This chapter develops its
arguments in several stages. It explores the geopolitical importance of the
Indian Ocean and describes China’s Belt and Road initiative. Then, the
chapter delves into the geostrategic connotation of Bangladesh and Pakistan
to BRI along with short depictions on their individual security cooperation
with China. The study also briefly contextualizes the “India Factor” in this
DOI: 10.4324/9781003269175-10
China’s Security Cooperation with Pakistan and Bangladesh 189
regard. The subsequent section of this chapter describes some converging
points of China–Bangladesh and China–Pakistan security cooperation in the
context of regional power politics in the Indian Ocean. It also explains the
rationale behind obtaining the different strategic approaches by Bangladesh
and Pakistan in their individual security cooperation with China. Based on
the analytical frameworks of structural realism in international relations and
.
security strategies of the small states, proposed by Vaicekauskaite,6 the study
seeks to establish its hypothesis that, regardless of geographical differences,
China–Bangladesh and China–Pakistan bilateral security collaborations are
leading to a win-win situation for these three countries altogether in the given
anarchic structure of the Indian Ocean geopolitics.
Geopolitical Importance of the Indian Ocean

The Indian Ocean is one of the most significant geopolitical hubs of the
twenty-first century. It is the third largest ocean in the world with an area of
about 73,556,000 square kilometers. The combined land and sea area of the
Indian Ocean Region (IOR) occupies 20.7 percent of the earth’s surface.7
IOR is the home of approximately 39 percent of world’s population, living in
51 of its littoral and surrounding countries.8 About two-third of world’s crude
oil, one-third of world’s bulk cargo and half of the world’s container traffic
moves through this Ocean.9 These affirm the strategic importance of the
Indian Ocean sea-lines of communication (SLOCs). Additionally, Bab-el-
Mandeb and the Straits of Hormuz in the West, and Malacca, Sunda and
Lombok Straits in the East serve as the major chokepoints of IOR. These
SLOCs and chokepoints are critical for 80 percent seaborne trade of oil
crossing through them.10 This geographical area is often considered as a
cluster of sub-regions in the realm of world politics. These sub-regions are
merely placed along the two bays of the Indian Ocean: the Arabian Sea and
the Bay of Bengal.11
The Indian Ocean is a critical geographical area for some of the world’s
major economies. China, the world’s second largest economy, for example,
conducts around 90 percent of its foreign trade in goods through maritime
transport, nearly 70 percent of which pass through the Indian Ocean. About
two-thirds of China’s domestic requirements of crude oil come through the
SLOCs of the Indian Ocean.12 Likewise, India relies on the Indian Ocean for
about 80 percent of its import of crude oil, which accounts for nearly 3.28
million barrel per day.13 The country also imports 45 percent of its liquefied
natural gas by sea.14 Above and beyond, the United States has been counting
on the Indian Ocean SLOCs to meet its energy needs since the early twentieth
century.15 These regional and extra-regional great powers are, therefore, keen
to employ their maximum efforts to ensure an uninterrupted flow of trade and
energy in IOR, which has already amplified a race on their individual naval
power projection in the region, coupled with the increasing involvement of
other powers in the grand-chase, like Australia, Japan, France and Russia.16
190 Noor Mohammad Sarker
Hence, many analysts often acknowledge the importance of the region as a
“center stage” of great power politics in this Asian Century.17
Besides countering each other’s strategic influence in IOR, this volume of
naval deployments by the great powers is also aimed at responding to a
number of non-traditional security threats, such as maritime piracy, arms
smuggling, drug trafficking, human trafficking and natural disasters, which
have become serious concerns to the uninterrupted flow of international trade
and commerce through the Indian Ocean.18 For instance, in between 2007 to
2012, more than 150 ships, along with 3,000 crew members, were held hostage
by the pirates in the Western part of the Indian Ocean.19 A series of sea-borne
terrorist attacks in recent years, notably the attack on French oil tanker in
October 2012 and attacks in Mumbai in November 2008, also indicate the
security exposure of the IOR against terrorism.20 Besides, the Ocean’s surface
has suffered natural disasters derived from the adverse impacts of climate
change, including storms, cyclones and sea-level rise at a regular basis.21
Considering the geopolitical importance of the Indian Ocean for global trade
and energy flow, both regional and extra-regional powers are therefore
focusing on deepening their political influence over IOR in order to respond
to the existing traditional and non-traditional security threats in the region.
The Belt and Road Initiative: An Overview

China has put forward a fresh and inclusive version of globalization by
pioneering the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the twenty-first century.22
The initiative was proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013 under
the broad heading of “The Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century
Maritime Silk Road.”23 BRI consists of two outward-facing models of con
nectivity, whereas the “Belt” refers to the overland connectivity and the “Road”
indicates to the maritime connectivity. During his official visit to Astana,
Kazakhstan, President Xi first talked about the prospect of the revival of the
ancient trade routes, popularly known as the “Silk Route,” which once con
nected most of Asia to Europe and Africa.24 Hence, the Silk Road Economic
Belt (SREB) denotes the overland dimension of BRI, which will connect the
Eurasian continent.25 SREB is comprised of six exclusive economic corridors:
New Eurasian Land Bridge Economic Corridor; the China-Mongolia-Russia
Economic Corridor; China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor; China-
Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor; China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
(CPEC); and Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar-Economic Corridor (BCIM
EC).26 Besides, the maritime dimension of the initiative was also pointed out by
President Xi during his state visit to Indonesia in October 2013.27 The Maritime
Silk Road is a complementary initiative to SREB that “begins in Fuzhou’s
Quanzhou in southeast China’s Fujian province and extends south into the
ASEAN nations, crosses the Malacca Strait, and turns west to countries along
the Indian Ocean before meeting the land-based Silk Road in Venice via the Red
Sea and Mediterranean.”28 MSR is planned to revive the ancient maritime trade
route that once covered over 90 offshore countries of the different regions of the
world with a total length of 14,000 kilometers.29
This grand connectivity project encompasses more than 60 countries in 10
different geographical regions of the world, about 70 percent of world popula
tion, 29 percent of global GDP, 55 percent of world GNP, 75 percent of global
energy reserves, and 40 percent of global trade.30 In 2015, the Chinese govern
ment has set some major objectives of BRI, which include building a community
of shared interests, destiny, and responsibility featuring mutual political trust,
economic integration and cultural inclusiveness.31 As the pioneer of the project,
China has taken the primary responsibility to fund BRI. The country has
already established several financial institutions in this regard, such as the Asian
Infrastructure Development Bank (AIIB), the China’s Silk Road infrastructure
fund, and the New Development Bank of BRICS countries—Brazil, Russia,
India, China, and South Africa.32 Among these, AIIB is the largest, which, by
2020, consists of 103 member states, representing about 79 percent of global
population and around 65 percent of global GDP.33 As of September 2021,
AIIB’s registered capital is around US$ 96,770.1 million, of which China alone
has provided US$ 29,780.4 million (more than 30 percent).34
Geostrategic Importance of Bangladesh to BRI

Bangladesh, a littoral country of the Indian Ocean, is located in the north of
the Bay of Bengal. The Bay covers the northeastern section of the Indian
Ocean and serves as the midpoint of the Indo-Pacific region.35 Bangladesh
holds an outstanding geopolitical importance as a coastal country of the Bay
with 710 kilometers-long coastline.36 The country is the gateway between
South and Southeast Asia, both in terms of land and maritime routes.37
Bangladesh has been maintaining a growth rate of 7 percent in average for the
last decade.38 The maritime areas are the arteries of the Bangladeshi econ
omy. The country’s coastal zone is bestowed with living and non-living
resources, including fishery, energy, minerals, and hydrocarbons.39 In terms of
fisheries, there are about 475 species of fish in the maritime domain of Ban
gladesh, which contributes about 2.73 percent of the country’s total GDP,
about 4.9 percent of its total export earning, and about 12 percent of its total
employment.40
The strategic importance of Bangladesh as an Indian Ocean littoral country
was substantially increased with the demarcation of its maritime boundary with
Myanmar in 2012 and with India in 2014.41 Bangladesh now enjoys its sover
eignty over 166,000 square kilometers of sea area in the Bay of Bengal and a
legitimate access to the Indian Ocean.42 This newly obtained maritime area has
enabled Bangladesh to boost up its national development through effective uti
lization of blue economy and empowered to govern the adjacent sea routes of the
Indian Ocean.43 This has also provided Bangladesh with an opportunity to join
China’s BRI through the maritime dimension. Though these two countries do
not share a physical border with each other, the extended maritime area of
Bangladesh has widened the scope of its bilateral cooperation with China to
counter the emerging traditional and non-traditional security threats in the Bay
of Bengal.44
Geographically, Bangladesh is a part of both overland and maritime routes
of BRI. It is one of the four members of BCIM-EC, which aims to physically
connect southern China’s Yunnan province with India’s west Bengal via
Myanmar and Bangladesh.45 Under BRI scheme, China has been providing
technical and financial assistance to Bangladesh in infrastructure developments
that can be associated with BCIM. For example, two Chinese companies are
working in the constructions of Padma Bridge over the Padma River and
Multilane Road Tunnel under the Karnaphuli River in Bangladesh, both can be
linked with the overland connectivity of BCIM.46 Besides, Bangladesh’s mar
itime trade routes in the Bay of Bengal and its seaports are integral parts of
MSR. The Chittagong seaport of Bangladesh and its overland routes could
provide important passage for China’s landlocked southern provinces to get
access to the Indian Ocean.47 Therefore, in terms of geostrategic calculations,
BRI remains crucial for Bangladesh to boost up its emerging role as a hub of
regional connectivity in Asia.
China–Bangladesh Security Cooperation

Over the last two decades, China has emerged as a strategic security partner
for Bangladesh.48 The first notable milestone of their security cooperation
was the bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement in 2002, which cleared the
way for military-to-military cooperation between these countries in terms of
training, maintenance, technical services, and relevant intelligence sharing.49
Besides, most of the existing military equipment of Bangladesh’s defense
forces, especially army and navy, are made in China.50 According to the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Bangladesh was
the second largest destination of China’s export of military equipment in
2018.51 In the aftermath of Bangladesh’s maritime boundary demarcations
with Myanmar and India, the country established a legal claim on a vast area
in the Bay of Bengal and got rightful access to the Indian Ocean.52 These
developments elevated the necessity of strengthening its navy and coast guard
to protect the newly obtained maritime area from security threats.53 While
understanding the changing contexts, Bangladesh formulated a strategic
initiative, first produced in 2009 and revised in 2017, to increase the efficiency
and technological capability of its navy under its Forces Goal 2030.54
According to the strategy, the Bangladeshi navy will undergo massive expan
sion and modernization. It will be equipped with modern ships and arma
ments, and its naval capabilities will be advanced from solely surface
platforms into “three dimensions”—aviation, surface and submarines.55
Based on the history of long-standing bilateral military cooperation, Ban
gladesh finds China as the most lucrative option to advance its naval strength.
For the last few decades, China has been experiencing a rapid technological
development in constructing naval ships and armaments, which has already
enabled the country to have world-class blue water navy.56 In this regard,
Bangladesh has grasped the opportunity of utilizing its existing strategic
relations with China and thereby strengthening its naval power. The maritime
route of BRI merges the strategic interests of both countries in the Indian
Ocean. To guarantee an uninterrupted flow of maritime trade in the Indian
Ocean by maintaining the naval balance among the regional and extra-
regional powers and by countering piracy as well as maritime terrorism have
been converging the aspirations of these two countries.
Under the framework of bilateral security cooperation, China has been pro
viding technical expertise, building infrastructural capabilities, and selling
modern naval equipment to Bangladesh.57 In terms of technical support, China
offered shipping designs and technologies to the shipyards of Bangladesh’s navy
in 2015–16.58 Besides, China sold a large number of naval equipment to Ban
gladesh in the last few years. According to SIPRI, China supplied five maritime
patrol vessels, two corvettes, and anti-ship missiles to Bangladesh since 2010.59
Bangladesh purchased two Durjoy-class patrol boats from China in 2013. These
patrol boats are equipped with lighter C-704 anti-ship missiles and are con
sidered similar to the type 056 naval ships. In 2014, China delivered two ex
Jianghu-III frigates to Bangladesh.60 In March 2015, Bangladesh procured two
frigates, named Abu Bakar and Ali Haider, from China.61 Later, in early 2016,
Bangladesh received two Type 056 corvettes from China, named BNS Shadhi
nota and BNS Prottoy, both were built by China Shipbuilding and Offshore
International Company. These corvettes are equipped with C-802 anti-ship mis
siles, 76-millimeter and 30-millimeter naval guns, and FN-3000N surface-to-air
missiles.62 As a part of its “three dimension” goal, Bangladesh purchased two
refurbished submarines from China, named BNS Nabajatra and Joyjatra. These
are Chinese Ming-class submarines with an overall length of 76 meters and
maximum speed of 18 knots under sea, including the capability to launch Yu-3
and Yu-4 type heavyweight torpedoes.63 China delivered these two diesel-electric
submarines to the Bangladeshi navy in November 2016.64
Geostrategic Importance of Pakistan to BRI

Located in the northwest of South Asia and northern side of the Arabian Sea,
Pakistan’s geographic position carries an enormous significance for the strategic
calculation of great power politics in the Indian Ocean. Its 650-miles-long
coastline in the Arabian Sea and its access to the Indian Ocean draw consider
able attention from the regional and extra-regional powers spurring them to hold
a strategic relationship with the country. Geographically, Pakistan’s maritime
area in the Arabian Sea is closer to the Persian Gulf. The Strait of Hormuz in the
Persian Gulf accounts for 35 percent of the world’s total oil supply, most of
which pass through Pakistan’s maritime area.65 In this milieu, BRI provides an
immense opportunity for Pakistan to maximize its geostrategic advantages of
being an Indian Ocean littoral country. BRI revives Pakistan’s place at the center
of connectivity between Central Asia and the Indian Ocean region.66 One of the
six land corridors of BRI is exclusively focused on China–Pakistan multimodal
connectivity, known as China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Through
CPEC, Pakistan seems to provide a transit opportunity for China to connect the
latter’s landlocked western provinces with the Indian Ocean. The corridor also
facilitates gas and oil supplies from the Arabian Sea to the mainland China.67
Hence, Pakistan’s coastline in the Arabian Sea is an integral part of the Maritime
Silk Road, which “supplies a new channel for the Chinese enterprises to go
global.”68 CPEC is a meeting point between the land and maritime dimensions
of BRI, and destined to promote both regional connectivity and economic
development in the Asian continent.69
Spanning an approximate length of 3,000 kilometers, the economic corridor
connects Pakistan’s port city of Gwadar with China’s Kashgar, located in
northwestern landlocked province of Xinjiang.70 The CPEC project was laun
ched during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Pakistan in April 2015.
During the visit, a total of 51 bilateral agreements were signed between these
countries on infrastructure, energy, transportation and industrial cooperation,
with a special focus on the implementation of the economic corridor.71 In order
to utilize the maximum geopolitical and geo-economic opportunities of Pakistan
in BRI, Xi announced for US$ 46 billion of Chinese funding on a series of
infrastructural projects along CPEC, including a seaport, an airport, gas pipeline
and around 2,000 kilometers of railway.72 With all these, CPEC has turned into
the flagship project of BRI.73 The fund of the project was later increased up to
US$ 62 billion in 2017 with a roadmap of its completion in 2030.74 The gov
ernments of China and Pakistan have come up with a consensual definition of
CPEC in 2017, which asserts the key motives of the project as follows:
The CPEC is a growth axis and a development belt featuring com

plementary advantages, collaboration, mutual benefits, and common
prosperity. With the comprehensive transportation corridor and industrial
cooperation between China and Pakistan as the main axis, and with
concrete economic and trade cooperation, and people-to-people exchan
ges and cultural communications as the engine, CPEC is based on major
collaborative projects for infrastructure construction, industrial develop
ment and livelihood improvement, aimed at socio economic development,
prosperity and security in regions along it.75
The construction of a deep seaport in Pakistan’s Gwadar city, located in the

southwestern province of Baluchistan, has been the cornerstone of CPEC.
Gwadar seaport is designed to become the commercial hub for South and
Central Asia.76 Therefore, CPEC is often considered as a “Game-Changer” in
South Asian geopolitics.77 Gwadar port carries huge economic and strategic
importance for China. It provides an alternative and convenient passage for
China’s western provinces to the Arabian Sea. It enables China to bypass its
long-distant trading routes through the Malacca Strait in the Indian Ocean
78
and reduces the distance from around 12,000 to around 3000 kilometers. The
construction of Gwadar port under CPEC provides a scope of economic pros
perity and development for the western provinces of China. Through infra
structural developments and increasing financial activities, it is likely to create
the employment opportunities for over two million people as well as to improve
the socio-political condition of the Western provinces in Pakistan as well.79
China–Pakistan Security Cooperation

Following their emergence as independent countries in the mid-twentieth
century, both China and Pakistan soon recognized each other’s geopolitical
significance. Indo–Pakistan conflicts about Kashmir and the China–Indian
Border War in 1962 have provided a scope for the long-standing China–
Pakistan defense partnership against their common strategic adversary in the
region—India.80 Accordingly, they soon fortified their relationship by con
cluding a boundary agreement on March 2, 1963.81 Since then, on many
occasions, China assisted Pakistan in many ways to improve the latter’s
national defense.82 For example, after the US sanctions in 1965, China
emerged as the key alternative source of conventional weapons for Pakistan.
During 1980, Pakistan’s army was using about 75 percent of its tanks and the
Pakistani air force was flying about 65 percent of its aircraft that were made
in China.83 Pakistan built its first defense industry with the help of China as
well. It is generally believed that China’s technological assistance to Pakistan’s
nuclear program enabled the latter to test its first nuclear bomb in 1998 and
to develop its nuclear missile program.84
Moreover, China has been playing a decisive role in the development of the
Pakistani military by providing both arms and technical support.85 Pakistan
has been the largest importer of China’s arms since 1991. In the period of
2014–8, for example, 37 percent of China’s total arms exports was heading to
Pakistan, which accounts for 70 percent of the total arms imported by Pakistan
at the same time.86 Moreover, in early 2018, China also announced the sale of
sophisticated optical tracking systems to Pakistan, which are used for the
nuclear missiles with multiple warheads.87 Both countries have joint coopera
tion programs on developing modern tanks and producing JF-17 jet fighter
planes.88 In the initial years of their military cooperation, the main focus was
on the development of the Pakistan army and air force. However, with the
rising importance of the Indian Ocean in the regional as well as global power
politics over the decades, in addition to the fact that China and Pakistan have
converging geopolitical interests, their bilateral security cooperation has exten
ded to the maritime dimension as well. Since 2003, for example, both countries
have been undertaking regular naval exercises in the Arabian Sea.89 Later, in
2007, Pakistan invited China to participate in a naval exercise, named Aman,
which also continued in 2009, 2011, 2013, 2016 and 2017 as a multilateral
naval exercise. For example, Russia and the US were among 37 countries that
participated in the 2017 Aman naval exercise.90
Given the rising traditional and non-traditional threats from the sea, both
China and Pakistan are keen to ensure maximum security of their naval
facilities and SLOCs in the Indian Ocean. Accordingly, in November 2016,
Chinese and Pakistani navies conducted a joint naval exercise in the East
China Sea off the coast of Shanghai. Among other segments, the exercise
included anti-submarine warfare (ASW) techniques.91 Apart from training- and
experience-sharing programs, China has been the major source of Pakistan’s
naval equipment. Back to 2005, for example, China sold four F-22p frigates
and six Z-9c helicopters to Pakistan along with the transfer of technology. The
deal was worth of US$ 750 million and was regarded as the “milestone in the
defense cooperation” between China and Pakistan. Three out of those four
frigates were initially made in China and delivered to Pakistan by 2010,
whereas the last one was built with the technical assistance from China at
Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works (KSEW), a state-owned shipyard of
Pakistan.92 Pakistan signed another agreement with China Shipbuilding
Industry Corporation in 2015, which included the purchase of six petrol boats
along with the transfer of technology to the Pakistani navy. By 2016, Pakistan
also ordered four fast attack missile boats equipped with C802/803 anti-ship
missiles and four marine patrol vessels from China.93
In order to further improve Pakistan’s naval capacity and turn it into a strong
blue water navy, Pakistan entered into a bilateral agreement with China in 2015
for purchasing eight Chinese type 039 and type 041 Yuan-class diesel-electric
submarines along with the transfer of technology. The agreement was worth
around US$ 5 billion.94 Besides, in reference to China State Shipbuilding Cor
poration (CSSC), The Economic Times reported in January 2019 that, in order to
extend its cooperation with Pakistan as well as to ensure naval balance of power
vis-à-vis India in the Indian Ocean, China has been constructing four naval
warships to be delivered to Pakistan. The report also claimed that these warships
will be equipped with the most advance features, including anti-ship, anti-sub
marine and air-defense capabilities.95
The “India Factor” in China–Bangladesh and China–Pakistan

Security Cooperation in the Indian Ocean
Given the geo-strategic and geopolitical realities in South Asia, any discus
sion about the security initiative in the Indian Ocean essentially includes
India’s role in it. Being an India-centered region, South Asian countries
simply cannot ignore the “India factor” in their international relations. India
regards itself as “net security provider”96 in the region and considers the
Indian Ocean as its exclusive backyard as well as the “interior line” of
national defense.97 However, the Chinese naval deployments in the Indian
Ocean in the last few years and its rising operational capabilities have chal
lenged India’s monopoly in this area.98 Increasing economic and security
cooperation between China and a number of Indian Ocean littoral countries
under the BRI project has also weakened India’s long-standing strategic
supremacy over the region. Therefore, India observes BRI as a tool of China’s
forthcoming hegemony over South Asia, which contradicts with the India-led
security architecture of the region.99 Accordingly, China’s increasing maritime
security cooperation with Bangladesh and Pakistan under BRI has raised
criticisms among Indian security experts and policymakers about the possible
Chinese militarization of the Indian Ocean.100
India perceives the Maritime Silk Road as a possible Chinese strategic encir
clement of India and identifies it as a “String of Pearls” strategy101 in the Indian
Ocean. China’s assistance to the Indian Ocean littoral countries, such as Bangla
desh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Myanmar, in terms of security assistance and
modernization of civilian seaports has been conceived by India as the gradual
development of possible Chinese military bases in this region in the near future.
Therefore, India seems more suspicious about the strategic aspects of BRI, rather
than considering its economic objectives.102 Consequently, the country has intro
duced its “Project Mausam” as a strategic response of BRI in the Indian Ocean.
While a part of the Maritime Silk Road under BRI seeks to revive the ancient
sea-based trade routes between China and South Asian littoral countries, the
India-led Mausam project “aims to reestablish the cultural connectivity that
monsoon winds and seafarers enabled across the Indian Ocean.”103
Besides, India has also strengthened its military build-up and naval deploy
ment in critical chokepoints in the Indian Ocean. India’s naval capability has
been reinforced with the inclusion of nuclear submarines and aircraft carrier
INS Vikramaditya, equipped with Mig-29 fighter planes and Kamov heli
copters.104 Indian Navy has deployed maritime patrol aircraft in its naval bases
in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, located at the western mouth of the
Malacca Strait in order to monitor PLAN’s movement.105 The extra regional
powers, such as the United States and Japan, also appear to be supportive of
India’s dominant role in this region. The regular trilateral Malabar naval exer
cises since 2015 among these countries, for instance, are frequently assumed to
be aimed at countering China’s assertiveness in the Indian Ocean.106 Moreover,
the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad)107 among the US, Japan, Australia
and India is also pointed out as a multilateral approach to contain China’s
growing naval strength in the Indo–Pacific arena. India’s objective in Quad is to
counter MSR by seeking extra-regional cooperation and, thereby, to strengthen
its own geopolitical influence in the Indian Ocean.108
China–Bangladesh and China–Pakistan Security Cooperation in the

Indian Ocean: Converging Strategic Factors
Bangladesh and Pakistan are two Muslim-majority countries of South Asia,
sharing a common colonial legacy and a closer sub-continental cultural heri
tage.109 They were initially formed as a single nation-state in 1947 following
the British partition of greater India into two parts, based on religion: Islam
and Hinduism. From 1947 to 1971, the land of Bangladesh was identified as
East Pakistan, while the current Pakistan was called West Pakistan. Largely,
due to their political and economic differences, East Pakistan declared the
Liberation War on March 26, 1971 from the central authority of West Pakistan
and, after a nine-month-long war, acquired independence on December 16.110
From that point forward, the political relationship between Bangladesh and
Pakistan has been going through many ups and downs on account of different
political regimes in these two countries.111 However, Bangladesh and Pakistan
are members of numerous international and regional platforms, including the
United Nations (UN), The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM), Commonwealth, D-8 Organization for Economic
Cooperation, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC),
and so on.112
Notwithstanding, Bangladesh and Pakistan individually maintain warm
relations with China in terms of political, economic, and security aspects.
China and Pakistan are both nuclear powers and share a land-border with
each other, whereas Bangladesh is neither a nuclear power nor shares any
direct border with China. Yet, there are some overlapping strategic factors
between Bangladesh and Pakistan, which have led to the development of their
individual relationships with China. First, both Bangladesh and Pakistan
have numerous issues of contention in their individual political relations with
India in South Asia, though the nature of those issues varies between Indo–
Bangladesh and Indo–Pakistan relations, directed by their different geo
graphical and geopolitical settings. However, China has gradually come to the
picture as a regional status-quo power for Bangladesh and Pakistan. Taken
together, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and China share land borders with India,
while Bangladesh and Pakistan share their maritime borders with India as well.
India has been a common strategic competitor for China and Pakistan in the
South Asian region. The “India factor,” therefore, serves as one of the key fac
tors in bringing China and Pakistan closer to each other, especially in military
and strategic aspects. On the other hand, though Bangladesh and India do not
share any history of war against each other, the former, however, being a small
state in the region, fears the hegemonic behavior of its neighbor.113 Unlike
Pakistan, Bangladesh relies on India for the critical supply of some food items.
Besides, India’s lopsided geographical, economic, and military establishments
vis-à-vis Bangladesh and its regular interference in the internal affairs of the
country have gradually fueled an anti-Indian sentiment in Bangladesh.114 In this
regard, China has emerged as a strategic balancer for Bangladesh vis-à-vis India
over the last few decades. As of 2021, China stands as the largest trading partner
as well as the largest supplier of military weapons for Bangladesh.115
Furthermore, China has been a long-standing and reliable security partner for
both Bangladesh and Pakistan. China is closely involved in the development and
modernization of defense industries in these two countries. Moreover, given
India’s rising naval strength in the Indian Ocean as well as its hegemonic posture
in South Asia, both Bangladesh and Pakistan have realized the necessity to
develop their individual navies and, thereby, to ensure strategic balance in IOR.
These developments have gradually brought China in the equation. Rapid
technological advancements, constant introduction of modern equipment
and increasing professional efficiency of PLAN have enabled China to emerge
as a dominant blue water naval power in the Indo-Pacific. These factors have
also motivated Bangladesh and Pakistan to seek naval cooperation with
China and, thereby, to build up a three-dimensional blue water navy of their
own, as mentioned above.
Analytical Framework: Structural Realism and the Security Strategies

of Small Powers
The study proposes the structural realist school of international relations as a
theoretical tool to explain the context of regional geopolitics in the Indian
Ocean and the rationale behind the security strategies of Bangladesh and
Pakistan within this given context. Structural realism, primarily advocated by
Kenneth Waltz in his book Theory of International Politics (1979), assumes
that international politics is an anarchic realm among the conflicting states,
followed by the absence of any supranational authority above these states to
control their behavior.116 To Waltz, “self-help” is the best way out for the
survival of the states in this anarchic world order.117 The great powers in the
international system enjoy relative autonomy to choose their individual sur
vival strategies vis-à-vis small powers.118 In the Indian Ocean geopolitical
structure, China and India are among the great powers and enjoy broader
policy choices.119 On the other hand, Bangladesh and Pakistan have limited
policy options due to their relative power gap vis-à-vis China and India. In
order to survive in this anarchic regional order, small powers, like Bangladesh
and Pakistan, need to adapt to particular security strategies.120
.
In this regard, Vaicekauskaite detailed four security strategies for small
states in contemporary international politics, which they can follow in their
individual relationships with great powers.121 First, small states can go for an
“alliance” strategy with a stronger power or with the group of other small
states nearby. Small states, in that case, may take the policy of bandwagoning
or making alliances with the threatening power. They can also make an alli
ance with another strong power or a group of small states in order to balance
against the threatening power, which is also known as balancing strategy.122
Second, “strategic hedging” refers to a context where small states maintain
simultaneous ties with two competing great powers.123 Evelyn Goh defined the
concept “as a set of strategies aimed at avoiding (or planning for contingencies
in) a situation in which states cannot decide upon more straightforward alter
natives such as balancing, bandwagoning, or neutrality.”124 Third, small states
can also pursue “neutrality” in terms of their relationship with two or more great
powers. Fourth, the “alliance shelter” strategy emerges in the context where
small states seek to ally themselves with the strong power in order to reduce their
social, economic, or political vulnerability.125
Figure 10.1 shows that, given the anarchic structure of the Indian Ocean
regional politics, the relative condition of Bangladesh and Pakistan directs the
Strategic hedging Strategic balancing

China
with China vis-à vis-à-vis India by maintaing
vis India informal alliance with China
Converging Interests in the

BCIM (BRI) Indian Ocean: CPEC (BRI)
1. Economic development through
the rising volume of international
trade in the indian Ocean
2. Development of defense forces,
especially naval, to secure SLOCs
Bangladesh in the Indian Ocean Pakistan
3. Balancing against India’s naval
• No border power in the Indian Ocean
• Sharing land
with China border with
• Trade China
dependency Similarities:
• Insignificant
over India • Muslim majority countries Trade volumne
• Non-nuclear • Active members of OIC with India
power • Bodering with India • Nuclear power
• Indian ocean littoral countries

• Common cultural and historical roots
of the greater Indian subcontinent
Major
Differences
Figure 10.1 China–Bangladesh and China–Pakistan Win-Win Strategic Cooperation

in the Indian Ocean, with a Focus on BRI
Source: Author.
nature of their individual strategic relationship with China. In this regard, the
geographical factor stands as the key differential denominator between Ban
gladesh and Pakistan. Compared to Bangladesh, Pakistan enjoys a greater
autonomy in terms of its geographical settings with India. Pakistan has a
direct border with China in its northeastern part and an incessant access to
the Indian Ocean through the Arabian Sea in the south. China–Pakistan land
border provides a strong impetus for Pakistan to keep up a sound political,
economic, and security relationship with China. Moreover, Pakistan shares a
larger land border with Iran and Afghanistan in the west compared to its
border with India in the east.126 Regardless of their geographical proximity,
Pakistan maintains an economic relationship with India that is inept to
influence the bilateral foreign policy decisions from both sides. Hence, these
developments have enabled Pakistan to maintain an all-round cooperative
partnership with China in the twenty-first century for ensuring its strategic
balancing vis-à-vis India.
On the other hand, Bangladesh is geographically surrounded by India from
all sides, except a relatively smaller southeastern part bordering with Myan
mar.127 This geographical setting allows India to frequently interfere over the
domestic political and economic affairs of Bangladesh. It also limits
Bangladesh’s scope to enjoy a greater autonomy to shape its bilateral rela
tionships with other states.128 Therefore, Bangladesh’s geographical proximity
and interdependent political as well as economic relations with India limit its
option to go for a strategic cooperation with China. As a result, Bangladesh
seeks to balance in its relationship with India by pursuing strategic hedging
with China vis-à-vis India.
Hence, Bangladesh and Pakistan pursue different strategies in their security
partnership with China. However, in both cases, whether it is an informal alli
ance strategy by Pakistan or a strategic hedging by Bangladesh towards China,
the key strategic objective of both countries remains the same—supporting
China as a status quo power vis-à-vis India in the geopolitics of the Indian
Ocean. Given this issue of adapting different strategies, China–Bangladesh and
China–Pakistan security cooperation, however, have brought win-win gains for
Bangladesh, Pakistan, and China altogether by serving their individual security
interests and providing them strong incentives with regard to their individual
geopolitical positioning nearby the Indian Ocean Region.
From China’s perspective, the bilateral security cooperation with Bangladesh
and Pakistan provides security assurances for China’s uninterrupted trade and
energy supplies from and to Africa, Europe, and the Middle East, which is vital
to keep up the speed of its national development. The country relies on the
Indian Ocean SLOCs for 80 percent of its crude oil and 50 percent of its nat
ural gas imports, which have, until now, passed through the Malacca Strait.129
China faces grave security challenges following India’s rising military build-up
and naval deployments nearby these SLOCs. On the other hand, the United
States has also sought to increase its naval presence in the Indian Ocean up to
60 percent under its “pivot to Asia” policy since 2011.130 Hence, in the coming
years, any naval blockade by India or the U.S. on the SLOCs through the
Malacca Strait will severely harm the national economy of China. Coupled
with these issues, the emerging non-traditional threats in the Indian Ocean,
such as piracy and terrorism, have also become the foremost concerns as many
Chinese trading ships and cargo vessels pass through this region. In order to
mitigate these threats, China is not willing to rely on the naval supports of the
US or India.131 Consequently, since the beginning of 2000s, China’s maritime
strategy has incorporated the idea of “far seas protection” which includes the
construction of its independent blue water naval strength in the greater Indian
Ocean.132 Accordingly, China looks at utilizing its security cooperation with
Bangladesh and Pakistan to reinforce PLAN’s strategic presence in the Indian
Ocean, and thereby to ensure the safety of its trade and energy flows as well as
its economic establishments in the region.
On the other hand, Bangladesh and Pakistan have also benefitted from
their individual security cooperation with China. Given their geographical,
demographical, and economic aspects, neither Bangladesh nor Pakistan alone
can play the balancing role vis-à-vis India in South Asia. For both countries,
China has gradually emerged as a power to balance against India. China’s
role in this regard can be explained in two ways: first, it plays the critical role
in the development of military strength of Bangladesh and Pakistan by pro
viding them financial support, supplying them with modern weaponry, and
training their soldiers; and second, through PLAN’s presence in the Indian
Ocean, China also undertakes joint naval programs with Bangladesh and
Pakistan, which further strengthen their strategic cooperation. Therefore, even
if they apply different strategies with regard to their security cooperation with
China, both Bangladesh and Pakistan need China’s cooperation and PLAN’s
strong naval presence in IOR.
Conclusion
The extraordinary pace of economic growth and the remarkable development of
the military strength over the last few decades have enabled China to extend its
influence in regional and international politics. Uninterrupted domestic energy
supplies from the Middle East and securing international trade routes to main
tain its own economic growth have been the two compelling factors that China
seeks to guarantee by improving its bilateral political and security relationships
with the countries along the Indian Ocean. Incidentally, BRI emerges as the
latest manifestation of China’s quest for boosting up its strategic relationship
with the Indian Ocean littoral countries, like Bangladesh and Pakistan. Being an
India-centric region, China–Bangladesh and China–Pakistan security coopera
tion carry a greater geopolitical implication for South Asia. BRI has brought a
new dimension to these long-standing bilateral security partnerships by empha
sizing the role of Bangladesh and Pakistan to secure their strategic maritime
areas in the Indian Ocean. In this regard, this chapter has contributed to the
existing literature by analyzing the linkages between China–Bangladesh and
China–Pakistan security cooperation and how they function simultaneously to
ensure a balance of power in the Indian Ocean geopolitics.
This chapter assessed the rationale behind the different strategic approaches
taken by Bangladesh and Pakistan in their individual relationships with
China. In this regard, their relative geographical proximity to China vis-à-vis
India played the key role. Second, the chapter explained the decisive role of
the “India Factor” in determining the nature of Indian Ocean geopolitics as
well as the essence of any security engagements of IOR countries with other
regional and extra-regional players. Additionally, by applying theoretical
.
arguments of Waltz and Vaicekauskaite, this research identified two different
strategies adopted by Bangladesh and Pakistan as small states in their indi
vidual security cooperation with China under the anarchic structure of Indian
Ocean geopolitics. Finally, this chapter spelled out individual interests and
achievements of China, Bangladesh and Pakistan out of these two sets of
bilateral security engagements and explained how it brought about a win-win
situation for all three states regardless of their diverse geographical position
ing nearby the Indian Ocean Region.
Pakistan’s geographical closeness with the energy-rich Middle Eastern
countries and its proximity to the Strait of Hormuz provide some strong reasons
for China’s greater interest on the development of China–Pakistan security
cooperation. However, regardless of Bangladesh’s lopsided geographical pro
pinquity with India and the absence of a land border with China, the China–
Bangladesh security cooperation has been flourishing over the years in manifolds
largely due to their complementary strategic interests, such as the development
of regional connectivity in the Indian Ocean. Hence, these two sets of bilateral
security engagements serve China’s strategic interest in the Indian Ocean
unevenly, but positively. Moreover, BRI’s fresh approach to ascertain con
nectivity between China and the Indian Ocean, especially under MSR, has
added further strategic value to these bilateral security engagements.
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119 Scott, “The Great Power ‘Great Game’ between India and China: ‘The Logic of
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120 Although both possess nuclear capabilities, Pakistan is a weaker power compared
to India in respect of their economic size, demography, military strength and
budget. For details, see: The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS),
Military Balance 2018 (2018), pp. 260–266, 291–294. And for details on Ban
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.
121 Vaicekauskaite, “Security Strategies of Small States in a Changing World”
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122 For more understanding about balancing under alliance strategy, see: Walt,
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.
(2017), pp. 10–11.
124 Goh, Meeting the China Challenge: The U.S. in Southeast Asian Regional
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.
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126 Kaplan, Monsoon: the Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power (2010), p. 67.
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128 Chowdhury, “Foundations of Bangladesh’s Foreign Policy Interactions,” ISAS
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129 Karim, “China’s Proposed Maritime Silk Road” (2015), p. 304.
130 Chitty; Ahlawat; Li, and Gopal, “The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative and the
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131 Wang, “The security of the Chinese sea lanes in the Indian Ocean,” South Asia
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132 Penghong, “Maritime Asia: A Chinese Perspective”, in The Changing Maritime
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11 China’s Changing Posture towards
Afghanistan
A New Classical Realist Explanation
Sehar Sabir
Introduction
On September 11, 2001, the United States witnessed multiple terrorist attacks
in New York, Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania. The attacks turned out to
be catastrophic not only for the U.S. but also for Afghanistan. This develop
ment was not confined to these two states but provided a new reference point
in contemporary international politics with the start of a post-September 11
era. Though Afghanistan went out of focus after the withdrawal of Soviet
forces in the post-Cold War period, the country again came into limelight as
the U.S. blamed the state for providing sanctuaries and safe heavens to the
Islamic militants who plotted the massive attacks on that day. Within hours
after the assault, the U.S. moved its resources to convince the international
community that the terrorist attacks were not only aimed at the U.S. but the
entire international community. Washington also mobilized the powers and
potentials of the United Nations to take action against Al-Qaeda. The per
manent members of the United Nations Security Council (China, France,
Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) unanimously passed
Resolution 1373,1 which condemned the terrorist attacks. The US-led coali
tion invaded Afghanistan under “operation enduring freedom.” In 2003, the
United Nations created the International Assistance Force (ISAF) to assist
the interim government in Afghanistan. However, with the beginning of the
insurgency by the Taliban, the war was prolonged and took close to twenty
years until August 2021 for the United States to leave Afghanistan and give
way for a full Taliban takeover.
In the wake of the War on Terror, Afghanistan’s neighbors excluding
China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan stood with
the US in order to avoid a spill-over effect of the extremism on one hand and
to eradicate fear of instability in the region being spread by the expansion of
terrorism on the other. Among these, one neighbor, China, behaved excep
tionally and took a different course of action. Despite sharing a common
border with Afghanistan and facing the threat of instability that negatively
impacted its economic interests, Beijing maintained a somewhat eccentric
policy and it has been regarded as keeping the lowest profile in Afghanistan.2
DOI: 10.4324/9781003269175-11
China’s Changing Posture towards Afghanistan 217
Chinese foreign policy towards Afghanistan has evolved from maintaining a
low key position to gradual involvement but preserving the non-interference
principle. Afghanistan has remained in the periphery of China’s foreign
policy. Nevertheless, even though Beijing has maintained a low-key position3
in Afghanistan, it has not lowered the level of bilateral relations.4 Afghani
stan, being situated in China’s neighborhood, has remained a factor in Chi
nese foreign policy and the instable political situation in Kabul has been a
matter of concern for Beijing.
Although China did not veto the US-led intervention in Afghanistan, she
restrained to be a part of ISAF and the Northern Distribution Network
(NDN).5 There can be two different arguments about this policy; first this was a
deliberate choice by Beijing to avoid the wrath of terrorism and averse the risk of
spill-over and, second, Beijing’s behavior was a typical example of bide your time
and hide your capabilities, that also fits to the notion of non-interference as one
of the basis of Chinese foreign policy. Nevertheless, the risk-averse policy did not
keep China safe from terrorism. China’s Xinjian Uyghur Autonomous Region
(XUAR) borders with Afghanistan through Wakhan Corridor and, thus, bears
the consequences of instability in Afghanistan. In the post-war scenario, mem
bers of the international community have been engaged in providing humani
tarian aid and assistance to support the Afghan interim government. Among
these, the United States, the United Kingdom, India, Japan, and Germany, were
the largest donors.
Despite sharing common threats and interests with Kabul, Beijing has not
invested heavily in Afghanistan economically, yet it was involved in recon
struction and rehabilitation activities and maintained modest reconstruction
aid commitment of around US$ 250m between 2001 and 2012.6 In 2012,
China upgraded her relationship with Afghanistan to the strategic level which
primarily benefits China as the Afghan president re-affirmed One-China
Policy. In 2014 alone, on the request of the newly elected Afghan president,
Ashraf Ghani, China pledged US$ 250m and the training of 3,000 Afghan
professionals in all fields.7 Politically, China’s active involvement in Afghani
stan began in 2011 following the Istanbul meeting.8 By the end of 2010, Pre
sident Obama announced that the United States will start withdrawing U.S.
troops from Afghanistan starting in July 2011.9 In 2012, President Xi
announced the New Neighborhood policy,10 which initiated a series of major
developments. For instance, in the same year, China’s Security Chief visited
Kabul and his visit was marked as an important event, marking the first visit
by a Chinese senior official11 in decades. Additionally, China also endorsed
the decision by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to make
Afghanistan an observing member.
In 2014 China appointed a special envoy12 to Afghanistan and committed
to more economic support for sustainability. In October 2014, China hosted
the fourth ministerial conference of the Istanbul process on Afghanistan. A
few months later in February 2015, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited
Afghanistan and committed support for Afghan Political, security and
218 Sehar Sabir
economic transition. By the end of 2015, China became the largest source of
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to Afghanistan.13
In addition, in 2007, the Metallurgical Corporation of China (MCC) and
Jiangxi Copper Corporation (JCCL) agreed to make the single largest foreign
investment in Afghanistan to date—$4.4 billion—when they won a tender to
develop what geologists believe is the world’s second largest undeveloped
copper deposit at Aynak in Logar Province, 35 kilometers southeast of
Kabul.14 In 2011, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and its
Afghan partner, Watan Oil & Gas, secured the rights to three oil blocks in the
provinces of Sari-i-Pul and Faryab in northwestern Afghanistan, which
CNPC expected to invest $400 million initially to develop.15
In 2009, the Af-Pak and COIN policies of the Obama Administration
changed the dimension of politics in the region.16 On the one hand, the US
approved the demand to send more troops to Afghanistan, while on the other
hand announced the gradual withdrawal of the North Atlantic Treaty Orga
nization (NATO) and ISAF from Afghanistan.17 With the implementation of
that policy, US troops started evacuating the bases in Afghanistan that had to
be completed by the end of 2014.
In 2014, Afghanistan once again emerged as “strategic Knot”18 for the
region’s security, as the new situation was expected to emerge as a result of
the US exit and new players taking more responsibilities. India: the first
country with which Afghanistan signed a Strategic Partnership agreement in
October 201119 also played major role in the Istanbul Process and focused its
investment in infrastructure, dam construction, as well as energy, mining,
education and small-scale industries. India has invested around $2 billion in
Afghanistan and is the fifth largest donor20 to Kabul after the United States,
United Kingdom, Japan, and Germany. India constructed Afghanistan’s par
liament building,21 assisted Afghan National Security Force, and trained
police, diplomats, lawyers, doctors, and engineers. Interestingly, Manmohan
Singh visited Afghanistan in 2005 as the first Indian Head of Government in
29 years, and the first foreign head of state to visit Afghanistan since 2001. It
can be observed that New Delhi joined the process of Peace Building in
Afghanistan within immediate effect after the fall of the Taliban and main
tained its presence throughout the period from October 2001 until the re-
takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban in 2021.
Afghanistan presents an interesting case to analyze the limits of the regio
nal states to compete and cooperate over security and regional stability, as
well as over its natural resources. China considers Afghanistan important not
only for its domestic and external security reasons but for its grand strategy
towards Central and South Asia. India, on the other hand, is already con
cerned over Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean and considers Afghanistan
within its “extended neighborhood,” while American growing concern and
support for Quad Alliance through US–Indo–pacific Command (INDOPA
COM) shows her interests in the region. China has changed its position from
restrained and somewhat reluctant observer to a vigorous actor in
Afghanistan. In this regard, Beijing has shifted its policy form passive to
active involvement by enhanced participation in reconstruction and peace
process and, last but not least, a link can be established between Beijing’s new
policy and the US withdrawal announcement.
Why had China transformed its policy from restrained observer to vigorous
actor in Afghanistan? What explains this shift in Beijing’s policy towards
post-US situation in the region in general and Afghanistan in particular? The
US withdrawal provided regional states the necessary reason to act more
vigorously, considering domestic resources and relative positions in the
regional scenario. At the same time, policies of all the stakeholders underwent
gradual transformation as more responsibilities were put on the regional
setup, creating competition for influence to maintain a regional balance.
Consequently, Afghanistan occupied a significant position in the policy of
interconnectedness in broader context of overall change in China’s global
policy with President Xi’s objective of rejuvenation of a great nation,
peaceful rise and harmonious world. Additionally, the change of leadership
at domestic level is taken as an intervening factor to mobilize and invest
more resources in Afghanistan.
Theoretical Framework
In neo-classical realism, which was introduced by Rose in 1998, foreign policy
outcomes of states are based on systemic and domestic variables. According
to Rose,
the scope and ambition of the country’s foreign policy is driven first and
foremost by its place in the international system and specifically by its
relative material power capabilities, this is why they are realists. They
argue further, however, that the impact of such power capabilities on
foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressure must be
translated through intervening variables at the unit level, this is why they
are neoclassical.22
According to Janeau,23 neo-classical realism puts forward a well-defined causal

chain comprising of three steps: first, the independent or the exogenous variable
or a country’s relative material power in the anarchical international system,
second is the intervening or the endogenous variable or the domestic level
“transmission belt,” which sieves systemic forces. Third, is the dependent vari
able or the foreign policy outcome. Hence, utilizing the variables in China, the
theory helps explain what leads to its decision-making in foreign policy.
Using Neo-Classical Realism, the researcher explains how the combination
of systemic forces such as US announcement of withdrawal from Afghani
stan, noteworthy presence of a rival regional power in Afghanistan (namely
India), and the perception and calculation of the leaders at domestic level
changed China’s policy towards Afghanistan through mobilization of
220 Sehar Sabir
resources, enhanced presence and increased engagement. This shift is explained
by using changes both at international and domestic levels, Beijing’s threat per
ception, and recognition of relative capabilities and positioning in the interna
tional system. Whereas changes at the domestic level have been taken as an
intervening variable to explain more vigorous presence of China in Afghanistan.
By using neo-classical realism to guide the theoretical framework of the
research, two cases are compared, keeping the international change constant
i.e. China is taken as a case study in two different time periods whereas India
is taken as an external factor, a potential rival, emerging regional state, and
competitor in the long run. China’s growing status in international politics,
overall more engagement in world politics are considered as constant features
whereas the change in the regional scenario i.e. US withdrawal announcement
and India’s presence in Afghanistan, is taken as a triggering factor (external
variables), and the change of leadership in China i.e. with President Xi’s rule
in China under the slogan of “Shared Destiny through connectivity,” and
China’s advancement is considered as an intervening variable that catalyzed
the process of China’s enhanced participation in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan’s Role in China’s Foreign Policy

To streamline and focus on relative literature this chapter categorized
studied material in groups, mainly divided on geo-strategic, geo-economic
and Sino–Indian competing lines. The studied articles, books, and reports
link China’s concerns with domestic and National Security, particularly
stability in Xinjiang and the rest of China in general. For instance, Tatar
attributes domestic stability as a factor for China’s enhanced participation in
Afghanistan.24 Michael Clarke is of the same view that in the post-Cold War
era, China’s approach towards Afghanistan has been shaped by the desire both
for security in Xinjiang and for geopolitical advantage in Central Asia. In this
regard, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) can be broadly understood in this
context; one to integrate Xinjiang’s development with the rest of China and to
utilize its geopolitical position to facilitate a China-centric Eurasian geo-eco
nomic system.25 However, there are twofold implications in contextualizing the
BRI as a geo-economic order and Xinjiang calculus for geo-strategic reasons,
as in the latter case China shares an interest with the US in combating radical
Islamism in Afghanistan, while geopolitical calculus of the BRI points to the
incompatibility of interest with the US.26
Scobell’s work can be summarized in a single point; Islamic extremism and
its spill-over in the region, particularly in Xinjiang in aftermath of the US exit,
which urged china to formulate a strategy of engagement in Afghanistan.27
Furthermore, Chinese policy evolved significantly since 2001 and gradually
shifted from a decade-old largely hands-off approach to a more cohesive and
enhanced approach, because of the number of factors, both external and inter
nal. A number of scholars visualize China’s policy in a broader perspective of
energy security by putting Afghanistan’s geo-strategic position in lieu of
connectivity from Central Asia. Wang Jisi explains that under Deng’s lea
dership, China kept a low-profile policy as part of China’s grand strategy,
which is being reconsidered and now China is engaged with West policy and
has enhanced its capabilities. China’s geo-strategic focus has turned towards
Central Asia and South Asia mainly through communication and develop
ment projects in Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, and in Central Asian countries
through the Caspian Sea and all the way to Europe.28
Seerat29 and Ziegler30 highlight weaknesses and strengths of China to deal
with Afghanistan. Both are of the view that China’s stakes involve diversifica
tion of energy resources by investing in Central Asia’s gas-rich energy hub,
whereby Afghanistan owing to its geo-strategic location occupies a very sig
nificant position as a corridor for international transportation. Apart from
looking at the region as a source of energy, Beijing has serious national security
concerns as well. However, unlike many other players, China has an advantage
of leading the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), an organization that
can be channeled to facilitate peace building process.
Hugo Chéné’s work endorses the same. According to him, Chinese economic
interests are related to its strategic stakes. With Xi Jinping’s BRI plan, Chinese
policy is based on sustaining growth, ensuring domestic stability and preserving
a non-interference policy. China kept a low but proactive profile when it came
to Ashraf Ghani’s request in 2014 to engage with Pakistan for stability in
Afghanistan, or as Chéné calls it, China was a “mediator but not a game
changer.”31 Khan is of the view that Constructive engagement with Afghani
stan will serve the Chinese strategic, economic and security interests. Though
security is the immediate objective, yet the long-term aim is economic and
strategic cooperation. China not only has the resources but the will also to play
a significant role in Afghanistan.
Criticizing China as a “free-riding,” opportunistic state and its security
concerns in Xinjiang, Clarke argues that China has three primary goals with
respect to Afghanistan that mirror those toward the other states in “Greater
Central Asia” i.e. security in Xinjiang, the development of greater economic
links, including investment in natural resources, and to combat influence of
the US and India.32 China’s peaceful rise includes elements of external and
internal balancing to combat and manage US unipolarity in the international
system.33 Li also focuses on Xinjiang as the core factor in China’s Look West
policy; he is of the view that the importance given to the role played by the
local government in Xinjiang has contributed to the cementing of China’s ties
to Central Asia. Xinjiang has functioned as an indispensable factor in China’s
Look-West and Act-West policies towards Central Asia and beyond.34 Xin
jiang appears to enjoy many more opportunities and a very significant role in
China’s relations with countries in its West.35 Among many others, Scobell,
Ratner and Beckley link this Look West policy with Xinjiang.36
Additionally, China has limited goals in Afghanistan, as it lies in the per
iphery of Beijing’s foreign policy. Nevertheless, there have been high-level
official contact between the two countries since 2001.37 In 2006 alone, both
222 Sehar Sabir
states signed the treaty of Good Neighborly Friendship and Cooperation38
and several other agreements to cooperate in fighting terrorism, organized
crime and drug trafficking. Chinese goals have both domestic and interna
tional elements and they include an ever-present concern about a vacuum
resulting from US and NATO withdrawal from war-torn countries in the
region like Afghanistan. This has caused a shift in the regional security
structure and China has been forced to increase its regional responsibility.39
Though security and economic cooperation is the main objective, China has
refused military involvement and takes a cautious approach towards the
Taliban.40
Because of its geopolitical position, Afghanistan is part of the BRI, thus it
adds an international element to China’s overall approach towards Afghanistan.
The domestic element for Beijing is China’s economic interests, which are pri
marily in the Aynak copper mine and the Amu Daria (The Oxus River) oil field;
both can be achieved only through political reconciliation in Afghanistan.41
A number of scholars take on a Pakistan centric explanation about China’s
engagement in Afghanistan, such as Ayesha Siddiqa who considers China’s
role in Afghanistan-Pakistan sub-region and its impacts on the region. Chi
nese interests in the region are based on its geo-political (political competition
with emerging Asian power i.e. India) and geo-strategic needs (energy and
other resources to expand economic potential). The importance of the region
lies in its natural wealth of which China seeks to acquire its share through
participation in exploration process to further boost the Chinese position as a
regional and global power, Siddiqa argues. However, the sustainability and
work standards are questionable: the region appears to be an “economic
colony rather than equal opportunity partnership.”42
Raghav Sharma43 also argues that Beijing’s Afghanistan policy is influ
enced by its desire to protect its strategic partnership with Islamabad in South
Asia, contain the spread of Islamic radicalization, curtail the proliferation of
drugs and further its commercial interests. In addition, China’s growing
interest in South Asia is due to the region’s strategic importance which offers
China access to two oceans and to expand its energy routes.44 Pakistan, in
such a scenario becomes of vital importance45 for China, and instability in
Afghanistan is a matter of concern for Beijing.
For both China and India, pose a significant challenge to the interests of
one another in Afghanistan. For example, Bose highlights that the most sig
nificant factor and daunting task, affecting India’s (and China’s) role in a
Post-2021 Afghanistan will be the management of Sino–India relations.46
Relying on regional organization and hopes for positive bilateralism between
the two, Bose refers to the fact that China invited India to join its Belt and
Road Initiative.47 In addition, through SCO’s mechanism, China, India and
Russia have good reasons to cooperate in Afghanistan.
On the other hand, India’s economic engagement in Afghanistan has also
increased. Price has mentioned that the total value of trade between the two
countries increased from $80 million in 2001 to $280 million in 2010.48
During this period, Afghanistan became a member of the South Asian Asso
ciation for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) (in 2007) in accordance with a
proposal by the Indian government, moreover, India became Afghanistan’s
fifth largest source of imports, and accounts for 20 percent of total exports
from Afghanistan.49 Afghanistan’s inclusion in SAARC is not desirable for
China and Pakistan, as both resist the establishment of India’s regional
hegemonic order.50
The combination of a long-term Western commitment towards Afghani
stan coupled with an increasing focus on Pakistan, created leverage for the
latter against India; in January 2010, under Pakistani pressure, India was
excluded from the International Conference on Afghanistan held in Istan
bul.51 Initially, the US was concerned about Indian involvement in Afghani
stan, largely reflecting Pakistani concerns. Now it wants more active Indian
involvement, although with the caveat that the US recognizes Pakistan’s likely
concern at an Indian military presence in Afghanistan.52 India hosted an
Investment Summit on Afghanistan in Delhi in June 2012, inviting other
“Heart of Asia” countries, which sought to highlight the opportunities for
investing in Afghanistan.53 The emerging sectors highlighted by India as
being potentially very productive were “mining, infrastructure, tele
communications, agro-based and small-scale industries, as well as health,
pharmaceuticals, education and information technology.” The largest Indian
activity in Afghanistan is the successful tender by a consortium of seven
Indian public- and private-sector companies to develop the Hajigak iron-ore
mine with a planned investment of $6.6 billion.54
Moreover, as Ganguly55 opines, there is no doubt that Indian involvement
in Afghanistan is based on its concerns over relations with Pakistan. The US
was content over the Indian investment in Afghanistan, yet the US was
denied a major role for New Delhi to appease Pakistani concerns. This
changed, however, with the deteriorating Pak–US relations.56 India has pro
vided $8 million worth of high-altitude warfare equipment to Afghanistan,
high-ranking military advisors and helicopter technicians from RAW.57 All
these efforts have become possible because of the US and ISAF military pre
sence which have provided a “security umbrella” for India. The US’ search
for a multi-pronged approach to the conundrum in Afghanistan has provided
India some leeway to play a wider role despite Pakistan’s oft-stated objections.
Furthermore, Indian concerns about the PRC’s attempts to penetrate in
Afghanistan in the quest for its substantial mineral resources, have been
resonating sound.
India’s 1990s policy towards Taliban was dependent on external powers i.e.
Russia and Iran.58 As New Delhi found common ground with Moscow and
Tehran, they viewed the US as an unwelcomed power in the region and con
sidered Taliban as a threat to their domestic security.59 However, the strategic
intents of both Russia and Iran now have changed and complicated situation
for India. Moscow does not oppose Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan and has
one major concern in Afghanistan that is Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK).60
224 Sehar Sabir
China, Pakistan, and Russia trilateral meeting in December 2016, noted sig
nificant change in Russian policy which the US blamed for arming Afghan
Taliban covertly.61 Hence with the change in policy by other stakeholders,
India is in a complicated situation and will have to adjust its policy towards
the Taliban.
With the fall of Kabul in 2021, all of the stakeholders have repositioned
themselves due to the evolving situation and unfolding events in Afghanistan.
China, though, have not shown intent to recognize Taliban government in
Afghanistan yet Beijing moved quickly to stake out an independent position,
calling upon the international community to furnish assistance without con
ditions, unfreeze assets, and “remove obstacles to reconstruction.”62 China,
along with Pakistan, was also one of the first countries to offer foreign aid
since the Taliban took power, pledging $31 million worth of grain, winter
supplies, vaccines, and medicine.63
External Factors Contributing Towards Change in China’s Stance

According to Chinese officials, Afghanistan and Pakistan should be viewed
separately and not within an “Af-Pak” framework presented by the US policy
under Obama Administration. Through that vantage point, China maintains
good relations with both countries. Foremost, Chinese domestic security is
being challenged by the presence of a Muslim minority in the western province
of Xinjiang who advocate for greater autonomy and even independence.64 The
Chinese government sees this issue under her broader policy of countering
“extremism, separatism, and terrorism” for which it is also pursuing at the
multilateral level, including through the SCO. Consequently, China is con
cerned about how to address the issue in its neighborhood including with
Afghanistan and Pakistan, which are both bordering Xinjiang province.
The second major concern for Beijing is Chinese commercial interests and
investments in Afghanistan. The natural resources of Afghanistan includes
precious metals and minerals which, according to geological research, amount
to 1,400 types of minerals and ores.65 In 2007, China leased the Aynak
copper mine to build oil and gas pipelines to be benefitted by all the parties
involved. The pipelines are important for China to diversify its energy supply
route through South and Central Asia and provides an alternative with less
risk from challenges posed from other maritime powers. To address the pro
blems in Xinjiang, the Chinese policy to develop its connection to the Ara
bian Sea through the Gwadar port of Pakistan paves the way towards
connectivity, which is expected to curb the menace of “extremism, terrorism
and separatism” through economic development.
In the aftermath of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Chinese
response were of mixed nature. China wants to play a more active role, but it
will weigh the sensitivities of neighboring nations in a troubled corner of the
world. As Zhang Li argues, “I don’t think that the U.S. withdrawal also
means a Chinese withdrawal, but especially in security affairs in Afghanistan,
China will remain low-key and cautious.” Adding that, “China wants to play
more of a role there, but each option in doing that will be assessed carefully
before any steps are taken.”66
China did not contribute to the multilateral fund to sustain the Afghan
national security forces.67 “They’re concerned that there is going to be a
security vacuum and they’re concerned about how the neighbors will behave,”
according to Li.68 The, then, Afghan foreign ministry spokesperson Musazai
argued that China is taking a more active role is getting directly and openly
involved in efforts to stabilize Afghanistan, “China has close ties with
Afghanistan, it also has very close ties with Pakistan and if it can help
advance the vision of peace and stability in Afghanistan we welcome it.”69
According to Jaspal, “China’s strategic interests in Pakistan, Iran, and the
Central Asian States make it a natural strategic competitor to the U.S in
Afghanistan.”70 Therefore, “the role of India, which the Americans have
envisaged in their Af-Pak strategy, is against China’s strategic and economic
interests in Afghanistan.”71 Beijing certainly endeavors to check both the US–
NATO-led ISAF military presence on the Chinese periphery beyond 2014,
and the increasing Indian participation in Kabul’s affairs, directly and indir
ectly, through siding with Pakistan’s strategic imperative in the solution of
Afghanistan’s present imbroglio.72 Moreover, Beijing had indicated that in the
process of the political settlement in Afghanistan, it would not have opposed
engaging the Taliban in the future political system in Kabul.73
In the June 2012 SCO Summit which was held in Beijing, Afghanistan was
given observer status. The Afghanistan contact group was working since 2005,
and SCO-Afghanistan Action Plan was also agreed in 2009 yet assigning
Afghanistan Observer status was a symbolic move from the Chinese side to
show the commitment towards peaceful and stable region.74 After the afore
mentioned Summit in 2012, China and Afghanistan signed an “Agreement of
Strategic Partnership”75 to expand cooperation in various fields, including
political, economic, cultural and security. During the meeting of the signing
ceremony a five-point proposal was put forth by Chinese President Hu Jintao:
(i) to deepen political mutual trust and maintain close high-level contact
in order to enhance strategic communication (ii) to expand cooperation
in areas of economy and trade, contracted projects, resource and energy
development, agriculture and infrastructure (iii) to increase people to
people exchanges, cooperation in educational, media and cultural train
ings, (iv) to enhance security cooperation and jointly combat the “three
forces” of terrorism, separatism and extremism including trans-boundary
crimes and drug trafficking, (v) to expand multilateral coordination and
cooperation in order to support Afghanistan’s peaceful reconstruction
and regional peace and prosperity.76
Chinese President Hu Jintao committed to “encourage capable Chinese com

panies to invest in Afghanistan and promised to continue actively
226 Sehar Sabir
participating in international and regional cooperation concerning Afghani
stan.”77 The purpose of signing the agreement for China was primarily related
to regional stability. Without such a concern, China would not have con
sidered building a strategic partnership with such a fragile and unstable
country.78
Internal Factors Contributing Towards Change in China’s Stance

Good neighborly relations have always been the priority of Chinese for
eign policy makers, as they believe that having good relations with neigh
boring countries ultimately secures the stability and development at home.
There are ancient Chinese sayings that guide this belief, such as “bene
volence and good neighborliness are treasured assets of a country”79 and
“a close neighbor is better than a kinsman afar.”80 In 2013, President Xi
announced a new neighborhood diplomacy81 and during state visits to
Russia and four Central Asian states, he made positive contributions to
regional security and cooperation. To curb the menace of the three evils
(extremism, terrorism and separatism), China not only has actively acted
through the platform of SCO, rather, it has been engaged through strategic
partnership with South Asian and East Asian countries as well. Since
2013, China under this policy of neighborhood diplomacy has introduced
several new initiatives, including the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road,
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and the construction of the
Economic Belt.82 With Afghanistan becoming the 80th member of AIIB
which provides funds for the construction of several infrastructure projects,
Afghanistan will be integrated into cohesive economic and social develop
ment. AIIB funds provide support for the implementation of the projects
which creates solar energy and railway links between Afghanistan, Kyr
gyzstan, Tajikistan, Iran and China.83
The new neighborhood diplomacy’s key concepts revolve around “amity,
sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness,” as put forth by President Xi’s
speech at the National Work Forum on Neighborhood Diplomacy in October
2013. For the security of Asia, President Xi gave the concept of “common,
comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable” security in Asia during the
Shanghai Summit of the Conference of Interaction and Confidence Building
Measures in Asia (CICA) which showed China’s changed outlook and will
ingness to assume a more responsible role in its adjacent regions.
In spite of the fact that Afghanistan is the largest source of concern for
China in its west, it is occupying a more significant place in China’s foreign
policy and is part of China’s new neighborhood diplomacy, before and cer
tainly after the Taliban takeover in 2021.84 From increasing economic invest
ment to infrastructure development, from strengthening the domestic socio-
political setup to political reconciliation, and from humanitarian assistance to
engagement in peace the process, Afghanistan has become an important for
eign policy consideration for China.
Since 2001, China has waived off Afghanistan’s matured debts and pro
vided the country with a 1.52 million Renminbi grant.85 With the successful
political transition in the country, China welcomed the new Afghan govern
ment in 2014, however China is thoughtful for opting for a strategy in
recognition of Taliban government in 2021. President Xi Jinping sent Minis
ter of Human Resources and Social Security, Yin Weimin, to attend the
inauguration of former president Ashraf Ghani on September 29, 2014. In a
meeting the following Weimin conveyed President Xi’s invitation to the new
Afghan President to visit Beijing and encouraged the signing of a “bilateral
strategic partnership of cooperation.”86
During the visit of Abdullah Abdullah, the former Chief Executive of
Afghanistan to China, both states shared the idea of the China-Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan-Afghanistan-Iran Railway project and agreed to enhance commu
nication regarding the said project. To pay more attention to information and
communication technologies, the states agreed to strengthen discussion over
“Afghan Satellite 2” cooperation project.87 Such projects are important as they
involve the greater region and take on a multilateral framework. Moreover, one
of the major components of China’s presence in Afghanistan has focused on
building infrastructure to develop connectivity in the country. The first project
by the Chinese government was the reconstruction of the Republic Hospital as
part of the Chinese government’s commitment to provide the US $150 million in
assistance for reconstruction. The Chinese Ambassador, Sun Yuxi, inaugurated
the project which cost US $4.35 million and was officially inaugurated on
August 2, 2003.88
During the meeting with Afghan Chief Executive Officer, Xi Jinping stressed
that
China supports Afghanistan to integrate itself into regional cooperation,

and stands ready to help the country promote connectivity with neigh
boring countries, seek synergy between China’s ‘Belt and Road’ initiative
and Afghanistan’s transformation and development strategy, and
strengthen comprehensive cooperation between the two sides, so as to
promote the common development of the two countries.89
Through this approach, China has opted for an inclusive approach

towards the political situation in Afghanistan and has focused on the
inclusion of all stakeholders in order to achieve long-term stability in
Afghanistan that directly impacts regional stability in China’s immediate
neighborhood. “The Chinese side firmly supports the peaceful reconcilia
tion process of Afghanistan and the inclusive process of Afghan-led and
Afghan-owned reconciliation, which is a fundamental way for Afghanistan
to realize long-term peace and stability,” Xi stated.90 For China, political
stability is of utmost importance and is a prerequisite to address her con
cerns for security in the Xinjiang province as a gateway to Central Asia
and a key player in BRI.91
228 Sehar Sabir
To narrow the differences between Afghanistan and Pakistan, China has
been playing an active role since 2012. According to Small, this shift in tri
lateral ties is the clearest sign of Beijing’s willingness to play an enlarged
political role in post-2014 scenario.92 In this larger picture of neighborhood
policy, China pledged to train Afghan police since 2012, when Zhou Yongkao
(Domestic Security Chief and a member of the CCP’s Central politburo)
made a surprise visit to Kabul and signed agreements on increased security
and economic cooperation, including a deal to help “train, fund and equip
police.”93 This was the first time after 1966 that a senior Chinese leader vis
ited Afghanistan, according to Small, and Yongkao represents China’s secur
ity and intelligence apparatus which demonstrated Beijing’s intention to be a
player in Afghanistan’s dark arts.94
This cooperation was extending and new areas for collaboration were con
tinuously being added up until the Taliban takeover in 2021. In March 2016,
during the visit to Kabul, General Fang Fenghui, the Chief of the General
Staff of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) urged that “besides development
and economic cooperation, his country would extend 480 million Chinese
Yuan (nearly $72 million) in military aid to Afghanistan.”95 During a meet
ing with Abdullah Abdullah, Xi Jinping shared his view with Afghanistan’s
leaders that “China firmly supports Afghanistan to fight terrorism, and will
continue to provide support for the country to strengthen the construction of
security capability.”96
China has been assisting Afghanistan during humanitarian crises through
financial assistance and provision of commodities to alleviate the situation in
the country. China has provided aid for Afghan refugees since 2001, in addi
tion to China’s assistance in education, health, sports, food and infrastructure.
Moreover, China donated 43,800 tons of wheat to Afghanistan in 2008 worth
million 30 million Renminbi,97 and humanitarian items worth $250,000 in
2010,98 in addition to 100 ambulances in 2011.99 In 2010, China donated $1
million to Afghanistan’s Ministry of Public Health.100 In 2013, China opened
the Confucius Institute at Kabul University and committed to provide scho
larships to Afghan student.101 In the same year, China donated 200 million
Renminbi to Afghanistan.102
In other examples, China provided non-emergency humanitarian supplies
to the Afghan government to assist the vulnerable Afghan families in
December 2016.103 In August 2017, the Red Cross Society of China’s com
mitment to treat Afghan children having congenital heart disease started
when 21 children arrived in Urumqi for treatment.104 The project was funded
by the Belt and Road Fraternity Fund. China also provided and delivered the
first batch of emergency food aid to Afghanistan as part of the 2 billion of aid
that it committed to developing countries during the Belt and Road Interna
tional Cooperation Summit in 2017. Under the World Food Program, China
also provided Afghanistan with U.S$ 1 million in emergency food to help the
Afghan people survive the food crisis.105
Conclusion
China has always been cautious of direct engagement in any country’s inter
nal affairs and has refused to take part in multilateral military efforts led by
NATO in Afghanistan and in other countries. With the US withdrawal from
Afghanistan, China has the opportunity to fill the power vacuum. However,
managing the threats emanating from the Taliban is China’s primary concern.
Again, one can see the interplay of both external and internal variable
impacting state behavior in the long-run. The US withdrawal, fall of Kabul,
the domestic security situation, has increased the significance of Afghanistan
for China and has presented Beijing with new opportunities in the region.
Notes
1 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373.
2 Christian Le Miere, “Kabul’s New Patron? The Growing Afghan-Chinese Rela
tionship,” Foreign Affairs. Available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ea
st-asia/2010-04-13/kabul-s-new-patron.
3 Low Profile policy of China by Yan Xuetong, “From Keeping a Low Profile to
Striving for Achievement Debate on ‘Keeping’,” The Chinese Journal of Inter
national Politics, 2014, 153–184.
4 Zhao Huasheng, China and Afghanistan: China’s Interest, Stances, and Per
spectives. March, 2012, Center for Strategic and International Studies. Washing
ton, D.C. p.2.
5 Northern Distribution Network (NDN), a series of commercially based logistical
arrangements connecting Baltic and Caspian ports with Afghanistan via Russia,
Central Asia, and the Caucasus was opened up in 2008 in order to continue
supplies to the NATO after tensions emerged on Afghanistan–Pakistan border.
6 Zhao Huasheng, March 8, 2015, “What is Behind China’s Growing Attention in
Afghanistan.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
7 China–Afghanistan Joint Statement on Deepening Strategic and Cooperative
Partnership available at http://mfa.gov.af/en/news/chinan-afghanistan-joint-sta
tement-on-deepening-strategic-and-cooperative-partnership (November 7, 2014)
also in “China pledges financial, training assistance to Afghanistan,” China
Daily, October 31, 2014, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/
2014-10/31/content_18835431.htm
8 Istanbul Conference or “Heart of Asia” is a region led dialogue mechanism
which consists of 14 local and 17 supporting countries. China is one of the
founding members of the Istanbul process. By hosting the conference China
emphasized the Five principles articulated by Chinese Premier Li Kiqiang were
(i) Afghanistan should be led by Afghans (ii) political reconciliation should be
promoted in an attempt to reach a political solution that is generally accepted
and widely supported (iii) economic renewal should be striven for (iv) Afghani
stan’s own path to development should be explored (v) strong external support
should be provided.
9 Hillary Rodham Clinton, Hard Choices, Simon & Schuster, UK, 2014, p.133.
10 For details on New Neighborhood Policy see, Zhao Huasheng, Afghanistan and
China’s new neighbourhood diplomacy, International Affairs, 92:4 (2016), 893.
11 Dirk Van der Kley, China’s Foreign Policy in Afghanistan, October, 2014, Lowy
Institute, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1044343/top-security-officia
l-zhou-yongkang-makes-landmark-afghan-visit
230 Sehar Sabir
12 Ibid.
13 “The Belt and Road Upgrades China-Afghanistan Relations” 25/03/216. Avail
able at http://af.china-embassy.org/eng/sgxw/t1350774.htm
14 Erica Downs, “China Buys into Afghanistan,” SAIS Review vol. XXXII no. 2
(Summer–Fall, 2012): 65.
15 Eltaf Najafizada, “PetroChina Parent Signs Accord to Develop Afghanistan
Oilfields,” Bloomberg Businessweek, December 29, 2011, http://www.busi
nessweek.com/news/2011-12-29/petrochina-parent-signs-accrd-to-develop-afgha
nistan-oilfields.html.
16 Zhao Huasheng, “Afghanistan and China’s New Neighbourhood Diplomacy,”
op. cit. p.18
17 Michael D. Swaine, “China and the ‘AfPak’ Issue”. China Leadership Monitor,
No. 31.
18 Tariq Muhammad Ashraf, “Afghanistan in Chinese Strategy Towards South and
Central Asia,” China Brief, Vol 8, Issue 10, May 13, 2008. Available at https://jam
estown.org/program/afghanistan-in-chinese-strategy-toward-south-and-central-asia/
19 Rabia Akhter, Jayita Sarkar, “Pakistan, India and China after U.S. Drawdown
from Afghanistan,” 2015, Center for Security Studies, Zurich.
20 Gareth Price, “India’s Policy towards Afghanistan,” August, 2013. Asia ASP
2013/04, Chatham House: London, p.5.
21 “Modi Inaugurates New Afghan Parliament Built by India in Kabul,” Hindustan
Times, December 25, 2015. Available at http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/
modi-in-kabul-pm-meets-ghani-to-inaugurate-afghan-s-parl-building/story-wua
2CtN8gj4IQsRnmNknHM.html
22 Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World
Politics, Vol. 51, No. 1 (October, 1998):146.
23 Thomas Juneau, “Neoclassical Realist Strategic Analysis: A Statement,” Conference
Paper, presented in European Consortium on Political Research: Graduate Student
Conference, Carlton University, Ottawa, 30 August–1 September, 2010.
24 Justyna Szczudlik-Tatar, “China’s Evolving Stance on Afghanistan: Towards
More Robust Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics,” Strategic File PISM,
The Polish Institute of International Affairs No. 22(58), October, 2014, pp.1–6.
25 Michael Clarke, “‘One Belt One Road’ and China’s emerging Afghanistan
Dilemma,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 5 (2016),
pp.563–579.
26 Ibid., 564.
27 Andrew Scobell, “China Ponders Post-2014 Afghanistan: Neither “All in” Nor
Bystander,” Asian Survey, Vol. 55, No. 2 (2015), pp.325–345.
28 Wang Jisi, “China’s Search for Grand Strategy: A Rising Great Power Finds its
Way,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 2(March/April, 2011), pp.68–79.
29 Rustam Ali Seerat, “China’s Role in Afghani-Taliban Peace Talks: Afghan Per
spectives,” Analysis ICS No. 3, Institute of Chinese Studies, India, Aug 2015,
pp.1–9.
30 Charles E. Ziegler, “The Energy Factor in China’s Foreign Policy,” Journal of
Chinese Political Science, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Spring, 2006), pp.1–23.
31 Hugo Chéné, “China in Afghanistan: Balancing Power Projection and Minimal
Intervention,” IPCS Special Report#179, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies,
India, 2015, p.11.
32 Michael Clarke, “China’s Strategy in ‘Greater Central Asia’: Is Afghanistan the
Missing Link?” Asian Affairs: An American Review, Vol. 40, No. 1 (2013), p.1.
33 Ibid., 5.
34 Miangjiang Li, “From Look-West to Act-West: Xinjiang’s Role in China-Central
Asian Relation,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 25, Issue 100 (2016),
p.515.
35 Ibid.
36 Andrew Scobell, Ely Ratner, Michael Beckley, “China’s Strategy Toward South
and Central Asia: An Empty Fortress,” Research Report, RAND corporation,
USA, 2014.
37 Huasheng, “China’s Interests, Stances and Perspectives,” p.2.
38 Ibid.
39 Huasheng, “Afghanistan and China’s New Neighbourhood Diplomacy,” p.903.
40 Huasheng, “China’s Interests, Stances and Perspectives,” p.7.
41 Huasheng, “Afghanistan and China’s New Neighbourhood Diplomacy,” p.904.
42 Ayesha Siddiqa, “Expansion by Stealth: China’s Interests, Infrastructure & Invest
ments in Pakistan & Afghanistan,” CIDOB Policy Research Project, Barcelona
Centre for International Affairs, 2012, p.9.
43 Raghav Sharma, “China’s Afghanistan Policy: Slow Recalibration,” China
Report, Vol. 46, Issue, 3(2010), pp.201–215.
44 Andrew Small, The China Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2015). See also, Andrew Small, “China’s Caution on
Afghanistan-Pakistan,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 33, Issue, 3 (2010),
pp.81–97.
45 Small, The China Pakistan Axis.
46 Srinjoy Bose, “India and China: An Agenda for Cooperation on Afghanistan,”
Occasional Paper ICS No.9, Institute of Chinese Studies, India, Oct, 2014, pp. 1–17.
47 Ibid., 9.
48 Price, “India’s Policy towards Afghanistan,” p.7.
49 Ibid., 7.
50 Melanie Hanif, “Indian Involvement in Afghanistan in context of the South
Asian Security System,” Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Summer,
2010):13–26.
52 Ibid.
53 “Delhi Investment Summit on Afghanistan,” Press Release, Ministry of External
Affairs Government of India, June 25, 2012.Available at http://mea.gov.in/press
releases.htm?dtl/19887/Delhi+Investment+Summit+on+Afghanistan.
55 Sumit Ganguly, “India’s Role in Afghanistan,” CIDOB Policy Research Project,
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, Norway, January 2012, pp.1–9.
56 Ibid., 5.
57 Shashank Joshi, “India’s Af-Pak Strategy,” RUSI Journal, Vol. 155, Issue, 1
(February/March 2010), 22.
58 Avinash Paliwal, “New Alignments, Old Battlefield: Revisiting India’s Role in
Afghanistan,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 15, 2017.
59 Ibid., 2.
60 Ibid., 4.
61 “US Officials in Afghanistan Suggest Russia Arms Taliban,” Al Jazeera, April
25, 2017. Available at http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/04/officials-afghanista
nsuggest-russia-arms-taliban-170424204006251.html.
62 Laura Zhou, “China Urges US to Unfreeze Assets Belonging to Afghanistan,”
South China Morning Post, September 15, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/
china/diplomacy/article/3148815/china-urges-us-unfreeze-assets-afghanistan-and
remove?module=lead_hero_story&pgtype=homepage.
63 “China Offers $32m in Emergency Aid to Afghanistan,” BBC News, September
9, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-58496867; “China Says U.S.
and Allies have Duty to aid Afghanistan,” Reuters, September 8, 2021, https://
www.reuters.com/world/china-says-us-allies-have-duty-aid-afghanistan-2021
09-08/.
232 Sehar Sabir
64 Kerry Dumbaugh, “The U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan-Pakistan: Chinese Views
and Interests,” CNA China 中 Studies, MISC D0023544.A1/Final September
2010, pp. 5–8.
65 Sakhi Danish, “One Belt One Road and its impact on Afghanistan,” The Daily
Outlook Afghanistan, April 3, 2017. Available at http://www.outlookafghanistan.
net/topics.php?post_id=17814.
66 Sanjeev Miglani, “China Steps Up Afghan Role As Western Pullout Nears,” Reuters,
June 3, 2012. Available at https://www.Reuters.Com/Article/Us-Afghanistan-China/
China-Steps-Up-Afghan-Role-As-Western-Pullout-Nears-Idusbre85203320120603.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, “Af-Pak and Regional Peace in China’s Perspective: A
Critical Appraisal,” Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 64, No. 4 (October 2011),
pp.29–50.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid., pp.29–50.
73 Subhash Kapila, “Afghanistan in China’s Strategic Calculus,” Analysis Paper,
No. 3804, South Asia Analysis Group, May 10, 2010. Available at http://www.
southasiananalysis.org/5Cpapers39%5Cpaper3804.html.
74 Sandra Destradi, Nadine Godehardt and Alexander Frank, “The ISAF With
drawal from Afghanistan Perception and Reaction of Regional Powers,” SSOAR
GIGA Focus, No. 5, 2012, p.1.
75 “Joint Declaration between The People’s Republic of China and The Islamic
Republic of Afghanistan on Establishing Strategic and Cooperative Partnership,”
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, June 8, 2012.
Available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/yzs_663350/
gjlb_663354/2676_663356/2678_663360/t939517.shtml.
76 “China, Afghanistan in Strategic Partnership,” The China Daily, June 8, 2012.
Available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-06/08/content_15489241.
htm.
77 Ibid.
78 Feng Zhongping and Huang Jing, “China’s Strategic Partnership Diplomacy:
Engaging with a changing world,” Working Paper, No. 8, European Strategic
Partnerships Observatory, June 2014.
79 Ruan Zongze, Chen Yurong, Lan Jianxue, Song Junying, and GuoJinyue,
“China’s New Neighborhood Diplomacy: Seeking Stability Through Management
and Planning,” CIIS Report No. 9, China Institute of International Studies,
February 2016, p.6.
80 Zongze, Yurong, Jianxue, Junying and Jinyue, “China’s New Neighborhood
Diplomacy,” p.6.
81 In October 2013 the Central Committee of the CPC held a meeting dedicated to
neighbourhood diplomacy. Xi Jinping, the General Secretary, attended the
meeting and made the keynote speech on October 25. Available at http://www.
fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/zyxw_602251/t1093113.shtml.
82 Zongze, Yurong, Jianxue, Junying and Jinyue, “China’s New Neighborhood
Diplomacy,” 9.
83 Kinling Lo, “China-led AIIB Ushers in Afghanistan as China Seeks to Expand
its Influence,” The South China Morning Post, October 16, 2017. Available at,
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2115457/china-led-a
iib-ushers-afghanistan-full-member. See also “Afghanistan Becomes Full AIIB
Member,” China Economic Review, October 16, 2017. Available at, https://china
economicreview.com/afghanistan-becomes-full-aiib-member/.
84 “Forging Ahead with Determination, Playing the Main Melody of Asian Coop
eration,” comments by Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin’s on Asian situation
and neighbourhood diplomacy, December 31, 2013. Available at http://www.fmp
rc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1114403.shtml.
85 “China Pumps Adrenalin into the “Heart of Asia,” The Daily Times, November
3, 2014. Available at https://dailytimes.com.pk/102621/china-pumps-adrenalin-in
to-the-heart-of-asia/.
86 S. Raza Kazemi, “On the Road through Beijing (and Kathmandu): The New
Afghan Leadership’s Attempts to Engage with Asia,” Afghanistan Analysis Net
work, Date: October 29, 2014. Available at https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/
on-the-road-through-beijing-and-kathmandu-the-new-afghan-leaderships-attemp
ts-to-engage-with-asia/.
87 Yao Jing, “Promoting Visit” to Deepen Friendship Between China and Afgha
nistan, The Daily Outlook Afghanistan, May 25, 2016. http://outlookafghanistan.
net/topics.php?post_id=15348. See also http://af2.mofcom.gov.cn/article/bilatera
lvisits/201606/20160601333422.shtml.
88 “China Aid Afghan Hospital Project Starts,” Economic and Commercial Coun
selor’s Office of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Islamic
Republic of Afghanistan. August 4, 2003. Available at http://af.mofcom.gov.cn/aa
rticle/jmxw/200308/20030800114822.html.
89 Xi Jinping Meets with Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah of Afghani
stan, Economic and Commercial Counselor’s Office of the People’s Republic of
China in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. June 6, 2016. Available at http://a
f2.mofcom.gov.cn/article/bilateralvisits/201606/20160601333415.shtml.
90 Ibid.
91 Baisali Mohanty, “China-India Rivalry Could Have Deadly Consequences for
Afghanistan,” The Diplomat, March 9, 2017. Available at https://thediplomat.com/
2017/03/china-india-rivalry-could-have-deadly-consequences-for-afghanistan/.
92 Andrew Small, “China’s Afghan Moment,” Foreign Policy, October 3, 2012.
Available at http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/10/03/chinas-afghan-moment/.
93 Rob Taylor, “Top China Official Visits Afghanistan, Signs Security Deal,” Reu
ters, September 23, 2012. Available at, https://www.reuters.com/article/afghanista
n-china/top-china-official-visits-afghanistan-signs-security-dea
l-idUSL4E8KN00U20120923.
94 Andrew Small, “China’s Afghan Moment,” Foreign Policy, October 3, 2012.
Available at http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/10/03/chinas-afghan-moment/.
95 “China to Extend $72m in Military Aid to Afghanistan,” The Daily Outlook
Afghanistan, March 2, 2016. Available at http://outlookafghanistan.net/national_
detail.php?post_id=14613.
96 “Xi Jinping Meets with Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah of Afghani
stan,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, May 17, 2016.
97 Aid data: Database, Available at http://china.aiddata.org/projects?utf8=%E2%9C
%93&search=Afghanistan&recommended_research_string%5B%5D=Recomm
ended+For+Research.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
103 “China Provides Humanitarian Aid to Afghanistan,” Xinhuanet, December 22,
2016. Available at http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-12/22/c_135924384.
htm see also “China Provides humanitarian aid to Afghanistan,” China Daily,
December 22, 2016. Available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2016-12/22/
content_27742488.htm.
234 Sehar Sabir
104 “Afghan Children Arrive in China for Treatment,” Pajhwok Report, August 31,
2017. Available at https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2017/08/31/afghan-children-arri
ve-china-treatment.
105 “Contribution From China To Boost WFP Emergency Food Assistance to Vul
nerable Afghans,” World Food Program, October 16, 2017. Available at https://
www.wfp.org/news/news-release/contribution-china-boost-wfp-emergency-food
assistance-vulnerable-afghans.
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Index
Page numbers in italics refer to tables and figures
Afghanistan 122, 154, 158, 200, 216–229 China Harbor Engineering Company
Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud 57 (CHEC) 9, 108
Algeria 30, 33 China’s influence 11, 23, 75, 83–85,
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 99, 100–102, 104, 109–110, 168,
(AIIB) 10, 79, 83, 107–108, 169, 178–179
191, 226 China–MENA relationship 6–9, 12,
13–14; future of 22–26
Bahrain 1, 2, 8, 74, 76, 78, 98, 101, 105, China–Pakistan Economic Corridor
107, 124, 126, 174 (CPEC) 10, 194
Bangladesh 105, 188–203 China–Russia relationship 11, 152
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 1, 3–4, China–U.S. relationship 11, 68, 99, 104,
9–10, 15, 21, 22, 26, 34, 48, 58, 74, 79, 110; U.S. economy 8, 12
83–84, 88, 86–87, 98–101, 105–106, Chinese exports 8, 19, 24, 58–59, 60, 64,
107–108, 109, 120–121, 122, 125, 148, 172; Chinese SITC Section 7
129, 131–134, 145, 159–160, 168, (SITC7) 59, 60–63, 65, 66, 69
171, 178, 188, 190–197, 200, 202, Chinese imports; natural gas 7; oil 2,
220–222, 227 6–8, 10, 20–21, 23, 25, 38, 58, 64
bilateral trade 8, 9, 58–59, 62–64, 67, 77, Chinese investment 7, 9, 10, 14–22, 58,
120, 123, 131, 148, 169, 172 68, 76, 79, 85–87, 99, 132, 148–150,
Brzezinski, Zbigniew 6 171–172, 173–174, 178–179, 218, 221,
Bandung Conference (1955) 75, 76, 83, 226; BRI-related investments 21–22,
86, 169 26, 34; by region 15, 17, 29–33; T–test
comparisons 34
Chen, James 12, 19, 22–23 Chinese investment by sector; agriculture
Cheng, Jospeh 78, 86 18, 31 33, 148, 158; energy 7, 17–19,
China–Arab Exchange Association 157 31, 32, 33, 77, 82, 108, 123; finance 18,
China–Arab States Cooperation Forum 33, 77; metals 17, 18, 31, 33; real
158 estate 13, 18, 19, 20, 26, 31, 33;
China’s foreign policy and the Middle technology 19, 20, 31, 33, 62 69
East 1, 2–4, 12, 40, 43, 58, 68, 74–89, transport 9, 18; 31, 33
99, 102, 103, 106, 109, 120, 121, 150, Clarke, Michael 220, 221
154, 159–160, 168, 179, 181, 217, 219, Comprehensive Strategic Partnership
220–221, 226; foreign policy goals (CSP) 38–39, 45, 67
74, 75 conflict 5, 11, 16, 23, 37, 39, 43, 45,
China–GCC Free Trade Agreement 76, 64, 81, 121, 125, 130, 133, 146, 147,
98–99 149–150–160, 173, 177, 195
China’s growth rate (GDP) 18, 120 Covid-19 pandemic 82–84, 88, 176
Index 239
D-8 Organization for Economic Role Theory 35–36, 40–41, 50–51;
Cooperation 198 sanctions 2, 23, 38, 57–68, 77–78, 85,
Direction of Trade 7, 21 124, 157, 180
Dorsey, James M. 8, 11, 12, 13, 23 Iraq 6, 16, 30, 33, 43, 77, 78, 98, 103,
Dusek, Mirek 10 104, 106, 121, 123–125, 126, 128,
129–130, 133, 148, 153, 159
economic power 5, 108, 120 Islamic world 3, 168–181, 223
economic reform 74, 75, 81, 98 Israel 6, 43, 146, 168–181; China–Israel
economic strategies 14; the “xiang xi kai Joint Committee on Innovation
fang” approach 5 Cooperation 172; China and Jewish
Economic Times, The 196 refugees, 169–170
Egypt 16, 18, 30, 33, 102, 126, 155, 168
energy sector 7, 17–19, 32, 77, 82, Jinping, Xi 9, 26, 47–48, 58, 66, 67, 79,
108, 123 82–83, 99–100, 155, 158, 159, 168,
energy security 19, 22, 38, 39, 64, 75, 190, 227–228
81–82, 87, 98, 103–104, 106, 110, Jintao, Hu 57, 100, 148, 255
130, 220 Jisi, Wang 221
engagement strategies; challenges; Joint Comprehensive Plan of
cultural and education exchanges; Action (JCPOA) 16, 17, 57,
tourism 62, 103
Enlai, Zhou 46, 82, 146 Jordan 8, 30, 33, 145, 155, 174, 177
Esfandiary, Dina 66
European Council on Foreign Kairouz, Maroun 10
Relations 64 Karasik, Theodore 79, 81
Kaufman, Alison 43–44
Farrell, Henry 68 Khamenei, Ali 57–58, 67
“Five principles of Chinese foreign Kliman, Daniel 80
policy” 75 Kuwait 21, 30, 33, 76, 101, 107
Garver, John 39, 45–46, 47, 49, 65, 102 Lawson, Fred 82, 84–85
Goh, Evelyn 199 Lavi Galia 155
Grace, Abigail 80 Legrenzi, Matteo 82, 84–85
Great Power and Middle Power Li, Zhang 24
dynamics 2, 24, 35–40, 47, 49–51 Libya 30, 33, 61, 105, 125, 127, 130, 133,
Guang, Pan 24 148–149, 155, 157, 124
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 2, Liu, Zhongmin 24
98–110, 123–124, 129, 149–150
Maritime Silk Road (MSR) 79, 99, 105,
Harnisch, Sebastian 41 171, 188, 190, 194, 197, 226
Harris, Lillian Craig 5 Mearsheimer, John 37
Holsti, K.J. 40, 47, 49 Molavi, Afshin 14–16, 78
human rights 23, 84, 101, 149, 152, Morocco 8, 30, 33
179, 180
Hundred, Thousand, and Ten Thousand NATO 120, 126, 146, 178, 218, 222,
Talents Project 83 225, 229
HSBC China 132 Newman, Abraham 68
Niblock, Tim 10
Indian Ocean; geopolitical importance Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) 198
188, 189–190, 191; the “India Factor”
188, 196–197, 198, 202; security Oman 8, 30, 33, 76, 80, 98, 99,
192–193, 195–196, 199–202; strategic 100–101, 105–106, 107–108, 124,
factors 197–199 129, 169
Iran; China–Iran partnership 2, 23, 35, One Belt, One Road Initiative, see Belt
45, 48, 57–58, 60, 64–68, 69, 77, 109; and Road Initiative (BRI)
240 Index
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, Syria; China–Syria Friendship
The (OIC) 198, 200 Association 146; Sino–Syrian relations
Orion, Assaf 155 146–148, Syrian crisis 146, 148, 150,
152, 156, 159, 174
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)
127–128 Tabatabai, Arianne 66
Persian Gulf 5–7, 12, 24, 39, 48, 64, technology transfer 62, 69, 77, 86, 87
75–89, 98–99, 101, 103, 104, 106, trade flows 8, 26, 69
108–110, 148, 150, 160, 174, 177, 193 Tunisia 30, 33, 149
politics and security 109, 11–12, 109 Turkey 30, 33, 60, 62, 63, 101, 120–144,
148, 156; economic competition 121,
Qatar 6, 21, 25, 30, 33, 76, 78, 83, 85, 100, 122–125
105, 107, 123, 126, 128, 149, 168–169
United Arab Emirates 8, 16, 21, 30, 33,
Realist School of International Relations 39, 64, 76, 124, 129, 130, 145, 149,
35, 199 168–169
Rose, Gideon 219 United Nations (UN) 129, 130, 198, 216,
Rouhani, Hassan 48, 57–58, 67 101, 149–151, 153, 155–156, 179
United Nations Conference on Trade
sanctions 23, 38, 57–68, 77, 78, 85, 124, and Development (UNCTAD) 60
145, 155–157, 158–159, 180, 195 United Nations Security Council 11, 109,
Saudi Arabia 16–18, 20–21, 25, 30, 33, 145, 150–151, 153, 156, 174
37, 39, 64, 76–80, 98, 100–101,
.
103–108, 110, 124–127, 132, 149, 155 Vaicekauskaite, Živile. Marija 189,
sea–lines of communication (SLOCs) 199, 202
127, 189, 196, 200, 201
security relations 177, 200, 202, Walker, Stephen 40
104–106, 125 Waltz, Kenneth (Theory of International
Shanghai Cooperation Organization Politics) 36–37, 199
(SCO) 48, 57, 67, 120, 217, 224–225 Wu, Jianmin 16
Sike, Wu 174
Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) 79, Yemen 30, 33, 103, 105, 127, 155, 127
171, 190–191, 194, 197 Yi, Wang 67, 79, 151–152, 174, 217
South Asian Association for Regional Yongkao, Zhou 228
Cooperation (SAARC) 198, 223
State Council, The 9 Zarif, Mohammad Javad 48–49,
Suez Canal 8–9, 19–20, 160, 171 66–67, 69

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China’s Economic and Political Presence in

the Middle East and South Asia

Mehran Haghirian is a PhD Candidate at the Gulf Studies Program in Qatar

Luciano Zaccara is a Research Associate Professor at the Gulf Studies Center

Russia’s Middle East Policy

Iran’s Foreign Policy in the South Caucasus

How China’s Rise is Changing the Middle East

Iran’s Regional Relations

Constituting the Political Economy of the Kurds

Reimagining Arab Political Identity

For a full list of available titles please visit: https://www.routledge.com/Durham­

ISBN: 978-1-032-21604-1 (hbk)

Typeset in Times New Roman

List of illustrations vii

2 China in the Middle East and North Africa: An Empirical

3 The Sino–Iranian Relationship: A Role Theory Approach to a

4 Iran’s ‘Eastward Turn’ in a Turning World: Reassessing Sanctions

6 Strategic Transformations of China’s Relations with GCC States:

7 The Emerging Security Role of Turkey and China in the Middle

9 The Israel Factor in the Dynamic Relations between China and

10 China’s Security Cooperation with Bangladesh and Pakistan in

11 China’s Changing Posture towards Afghanistan: A New Classical

MENA Economies, 2018 (Billions USD) 8

2.4 Chinese Investment by Region and Diﬀerent Periods of Time

2.5 Chinese Investment Around the Globe, 2005-2018 (Millions

2.6 Growth Rate of Chinese Investment (%) 15

2.7 Chinese Investment in the MENA Countries between 2005–

2018 (Millions USD) 17

2.8 Share of Chinese Investment in Each Sector between 2005–

2018 (% Total 2005–2018) 18

2.9 China’s GDP Growth Rate, 1983–2019 (%) 18

2.10 Chinese Investment in MENA by Sector between 2005–2018

2.11 Share of Top Three Sectors in Chinese MENA Investments,

2.12 Number of MENA Countries with Chinese Investment in the

2.13 BRI Related Investment around the World, 2005–2018

10.1 China–Bangladesh and China–Pakistan Win-Win Strategic

Cooperation in the Indian Ocean, with a Focus on BRI 200

viii List of illustrations

2.2 Chinese Investment in the MENA Countries, 2005–2018

2.3 Chinese Investment by Region and Sector (Millions USD) 31

2.4 Chinese Investment in the Energy Sector by Region and Year,

2005–2018 (Millions USD) 32

2.5 Chinese Investments in MENA Countries Between 2005–2018

by Country and Sector (Millions USD) 33

2.6 T-test Comparison between BRI-Related vs. Non-BRI Related

2.7 T-test Comparison between BRI-Related vs. Non-BRI Related

2.8 Regional Distribution of the Number of Non-BRI and BRI

related Investments, 2014–2018 34

4.1 Chinese trade with Iran under sanctions (USD thousands) 59

4.2 Proportion of SITC7 exports to sum of three partners (China,

4.3 Ratio of Chinese to EU28 SITC7 exports 63

According to Harris, for China to achieve its “rightful international place,” it

China–MENA Relations: An Analytical Framework

2018 Bilateral Trade with China (Billions USD)

China-MENA Trade (Billions USD) U.S.-MENA Trade (Billions USD)

Politics and Security

Historical, Ethnic, and Cultural

A further driver of Chinese policy towards the MENA is mounting concern

The Analytical Framework of China–MENA Relations

For a full list of available titles please visit: https://www.routledge.com/Durham

China’s major strategic target is to maintain sub-regional peace, partici

The decline of China–Iran trade under U.S. secondary sanctions sub