ASSIGNMENT OF CASES EXCEL LINK

RULES:

1. If the digest has been copied from the internet, make sure the digest is recit ready. Omit the
unnecessary facts which are not relevant to the case so we can use the same as reviewer for
exams. Focus mainly on the topic involved in the case based on the syllabus.
2. Font - Arial, 10, Black, Justify, Single Spacing.
3. Format:
Doctrine - should be italicized
Facts,
Issue(s),
Ruling(s).

Intel re Judge Duque:

● Di sya fact heavy, important facts lang and doctrine. But sometimes depends sa case, if important
case she might require more detailed facts
● Sa recit, she focuses on concepts, elements and doctrine
● Need to read cases cos we can't survive daw if magskip tayo. Exam nya is marami cases na
lalabas
● Nambabagsak syuhhh

A. PRELIMINARIES, BASIC CONCEPTS & PRINCIPLES

Topic: Procedural law; Remedial Law; Rules of Court

1. Bustos vs. Lucero, G.R. L-2068, October 20, 1948 - HARVEY JAY DAMIAO
Doctrine:
As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that which declares what acts are crimes and prescribes the
punishment for committing them, as distinguished from the procedural law which provides or regulates
the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished.

Preliminary investigation is eminently and essentially remedial; it is the first step taken in a criminal
prosecution. It is not an essential part of due process of law. It may be suppressed entirely.

Facts:
Petitioner was informed of the criminal charges filed against him in which he entered the plea of not
guilty.

Then his counsel moved that the complainant present her evidence so that she and her witnesses could
be examined and cross-examined in the manner and form provided by the law. The fiscal and the private
prosecutor objected to the said motion, invoking Section 11 of Rule 108, and the objection was sustained.

Sec. 11. Rights of defendant after arrest. — After the arrest of the defendant and the delivery
to the court, he shall be informed of the complaint or information filed against him. He shall also
be informed of the substance of the testimony and evidence presented against him, and, if he
desires to testify or to present witnesses or evidence in his favor, he may be allowed to do so.
The testimony of the witnesses need not be reduced to two writings but that of the defendant
shall be taken in writing and subscribed by him.
The counsel of the accused announced his intention to renounce his right to present evidence, and the
justice of peace forwarded the case to the court of first instance. The counsel for the accused-petitioner
filed a motion with the CFI praying that the record of the case be remanded to the justice of peace of
Masantol, Pampanga, on order that the petitioner might cross-examine the complainant and her
witnesses in relation to their testimony. The motion has been denied and because of that a special civil
action of mandamus was then instituted. The accused-petitioner squarely questioned the validity of the
provision of Section 11 of Rule 108, on the ground that it deprives him of the right to be confronted with
and cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution, which is contrary to the provision of Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution (now Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution).

Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution) states that The Supreme Court shall have the
following powers:

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and
legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade,
and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts
and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 11 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court infringes Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution.

Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that Section 11 of Rule 108, like its predecessors, is an adjective law and
not a substantive law or substantive right. Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in
this respect may be said to be synonymous. Substantive rights are a term which includes those rights
which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations, while substantive
law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and
duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer.

On the other hand, adjective or remedial law, prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains redress
for their invasion. As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that which declares what acts are crimes
and prescribes the punishment for committing them, as distinguished from the procedural law which
provides or regulates the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished. Preliminary
investigation is eminently and essentially remedial; it is the first step taken in a criminal prosecution.

As a rule of evidence, Section 11 of Rule 108 is also procedural. The Supreme Court do not believe that
the curtailment of the right of an accused in a preliminary investigation to cross-examine the witnesses
who had given evidence of his arrest is of such importance as to offend against the constitutional
inhibition. The Supreme Court said that preliminary investigation is not an essential part of due process of
law. It may be suppressed entirely, and if this may be done, mere restriction of the privilege formerly
enjoyed thereunder cannot be held to fall within the constitutional prohibition.

While section 11 of Rule 108 denies to the defendant the right to cross-examine witnesses in a
preliminary investigation, his right to present his witnesses remains unaffected, and his constitutional right
to be informed of the charges against him both at such investigation and at the trial is unchanged. In the
latter stage of the proceedings, the only stage where the guaranty of due process comes into play, he still
enjoys to the full extent the right to be confronted by and to crossexamine the witnesses against him. The
degree of importance of a preliminary investigation to an accused may be gauged by the fact that this
formality is frequently waived.

Topic: Jurisdiction in General - Original, Exclusive, Concurrent and Appellate Jurisdiction;

Criminal Jurisdiction — Elements.
2. People v. Mariano, G.R. No. L-40527, June 30, 1976 - HENRI CASTILLO
Doctrine:
The conferment of jurisdiction upon courts or judicial tribunals is derived exclusively from the constitution
and statutes of the forum. Courts of First Instance are not vested with concurrent jurisdiction with
the military tribunal over offense of Estafa. The Judicial act of 1948 sec. 44 states that the Court of
First Instance shall have original jurisdiction in all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by the law
is imprisonment for more than six months or a fine of over 200 pesos.

Definition of Jurisdiction:
-basic foundation of judicial proceeding. Latin Words “juris” & “dico” – I speak by the law” – fundamentally
the power or capacity given by the law to a court or tribunal to entertain, hear, and determine certain
controversies. Jurisdiction is the right of a judge to pronounce a sentence of the law in a case or issue
before him, acquired through due process of law; it is the authority by which judicial officers take
cognizance of and decide cases.

Definition of Criminal Jurisdiction:

- the authority to hear and try a particular offense and impose the punishment for it.

Facts:
Mariano was charged with Estafa.

Mariano then filed with the court a motion to quash all information, since the same subject matter was
decided upon by the Military Tribunal with the case against Mayor Constantino Nolasco with the
crime of Malversation of public property.

The respondent judge then granted the motion on the basis that the court indeed had no jurisdiction over
the case, citing that a military commission had already ruled on a malversation case against Mayor
Nolasco involving the same properties questioned at bar.

The respondent judge noted that a case having been heard and decided by a competent tribunal gives
no jurisdiction to his court to pass a new judgment on the same subject matter.

The PEOPLE then appealed and the Supreme Court having citing the Judicial Act of 1948 and the fact
that Estafa and Malversation are 2 different and distinct offense and that the military commission
has no authority over the charges placed on Mariano, decided that lower court committed a grave
error in saying that they had no jurisdiction over the matter.

Issue:
Whether or not the court of First Instance & the military tribunal exercise concurrent jurisdiction over the
case of estafa committed by Mariano?

Ruling:
No. The Court of First Instance & the Military Tribunal do not exercise concurrent jurisdiction over the
case of estafa committed by Mariano as so implied by the Judicial Act of 1948.

The Judicial act of 1948 sec. 44 states that the Court of First Instance shall have original jurisdiction in all
criminal cases in which the penalty provided by the law is imprisonment for more than six months or a fine
of over 200 pesos.

In line with this, as so ordered by the Supreme Court the respondent judge was to continue the criminal
case against Mariano.
Topic: Requisites for Valid Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction

3. Asistio v. People, G.R. No. 200465, April 20, 2015 - GRAYSON YAMBAO
Doctrine:
Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments of the complaint or Information, in relation to the
law prevailing at the time of the filing of the complaint or Information, and the penalty provided by law for
the crime charged at the time of its commission.

Facts:
Petitioner Asistio was charged with violation (of Section 46) of the Cooperative Code of the Philippines
(RA No. 6938) for allegedly amassing a substantive amount of money by entering into exclusive
dealership agreements with Coca-Cola in her private capacity instead that of A. Mabini Elementary
School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative where she was previously the Chairperson and Managing
Director for the sale of soft drinks at the same school.

After an investigation, a member representing the Cooperative, filed the Information before the RTC but
the latter dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction. The RTC stated that offenses bearing a penalty of
imprisonment which does not exceed six years are within the exclusive jurisdiction of first-level courts
(i.e., MeTC/MTC/MCTCs). After the RTC denied their motion for reconsideration, the member and the
OSG appealed the case before the Court of Appeals which reversed the RTC’s decision. Thus, petitioner
Asistio filed the instant petition for certiorari.

Issue:
Which court has the jurisdiction over the case?

Ruling:
The Regional Trial Court

The Court held that in criminal cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments of the
complaint or Information, in relation to the law prevailing at the time of the filing of the complaint or
Information, and the penalty provided by law for the crime charged at the time of its commission.

The Court held that (Section 32 of) B.P. (Blg. 129, as amended), provides that the MeTC has exclusive
jurisdiction over offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six years, irrespective of
the amount of fine and RTC if punishable with imprisonment exceeding six years by virtue of Sec.
20.

In the instant case, the Supreme Court affirmed CA’s ruling that the RTC, not the MeTC, has jurisdiction
over Asistio’s criminal case for violation of a Republic Act (Section 46 of RA 6938.) The Court gave
credence to the submission of the OSG that Section “47” is a clerical error because the “liability of
directors, officers and committee members” is undisputedly governed by Section 46 of RA 6938, while
Section 47 thereof deals with the compensation of directors, officers and employees.

Following this interpretation, violation of Section 46, therefore, is punishable by a fine of not less than Five
thousand pesos (P5,000.00), or imprisonment of not less than five (5) years but not more than ten (10)
years or both at the court’s discretion, which under B.P. Blg. 129, shall be within the jurisdiction of the
RTC.
Topic: Requisites for Valid Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction

4. Cabral vs. Bracamonte, G.R. No. 233174, January 23, 2019 - HANNA DADIA
Doctrine:
In all criminal prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or
territory wherein the offense was committed or where any one of the essential ingredients took place.

In this case, what is punished in the form of estafa alleged in the information is not the non-payment of a
debt, but the criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check. The pieces of evidence on record point
only to one place: Makati City. The element of deceit took place in Makati City where the worthless check
was issued and delivered, while the damage was inflicted also in Makati City where the check was
dishonored by the drawee bank.

Facts:
Bracamonte and Cabral executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) in Makati City for the purchase
of shares of stock. Bracamonte issued a postdated check to Cabral simultaneous to the execution of the
MOA. The check was later dishonored in the drawee bank in Makati City due to insufficiency of funds.
Consequently, Cabral instituted a complaint for estafa against Bracamonte in Paranaque City for failure
to settle the obligation.

Bracamonte moved to quash the Information contending that the venue was improperly laid in Paranaque
City, because the postdated check was delivered and dishonored in Makati City. Hence, there was a
failure on the part of the prosecution to show how the elements of the crime charged were committed in
Paranaque City.
Meanwhile, Cabral asserted that since the negotiations on the MOA were conducted in a warehouse in
Paranaque City, where he agreed to sell his shares, then the RTC of Paranaque City has proper
jurisdiction over the case.
Issue:
Whether the RTC of Paranaque has proper jurisdiction to try the case

Ruling:
NO, the RTC of Paranaque does not have jurisdiction over the case.

The Court held that “territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction
to take cognizance of or try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. In all criminal
prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory wherein the
offense was committed or where any one of the essential ingredients took place”. In other words, the
place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential
element of jurisdiction.
In this case, the crime allegedly committed by Bracamonte is estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of
the RPC. The elements of such crime consists of the following: (1) the offender has postdated or issued a
check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time of the postdating or issuance; (2) at the time of
postdating or issuance of said check, the offender has no funds in the bank or the funds deposited are not
sufficient to cover the amount of the check; and (3) the payee has been defrauded. In this form of estafa,
it is not the non-payment of a debt which is made punishable, but the criminal fraud or deceit in the
issuance of a check.
The Supreme Court reiterated the findings of the CA that: 1) Cabral and Bracamonte executed a MOA in
Makati City; 2) Bracamonte issued and delivered a postdated check in Makati City simultaneous to the
signing of the agreement; 3) the check was presented for payment and was subsequently dishonored in
Makati City.
As such, the Court does not see why Cabral did not file the complaint before the Makati City trial court.
Not only were the MOA and subject check executed, delivered, and dishonored in Makati City, but it was
also expressly stipulated in their agreement that the parties chose Makati City as venue for any action
arising from the MOA because that was where it was executed. Therefore, it is clear from the foregoing
that the element of deceit took place in Makati City where the worthless check was issued and delivered,
while the damage was inflicted also in Makati City where the check was dishonored by the drawee bank.

Topic: Exercise of Jurisdiction; Estoppel

5. Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, G.R.No. L-21450, April 15, 1968 - JOHN RG DELA CRUZ
Doctrine:
It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to assure affirmative relief against
his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction.

The question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties
becomes unimportant in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the
judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a
practice can not be tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.

Tijam is an exception to the rule in jurisdiction over subject matter is conferred by law and not by
conduct of the parties.

Facts:
On July 19, 1948 — barely one month after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 296 known as the Judiciary
Act of 1948 — the petitioner (i.e, spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog) commenced a case in the
Court of First Instance (CFI) against the spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio to recover
from them the sum of money (i.e P1,908.00) with legal interest thereon.

As prayed for in the complaint, a writ of attachment was issued by the court against defendants’
properties, but the same was soon dissolved upon the filing of a counter-bond by defendants and the
Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. hereinafter referred to as the Surety, on the 31st of the same month.

After trial upon the issues thus joined, the CFI rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and, after the
same had become final and executory, upon motion of the latter, the CFI issued a writ of execution
against the defendants. The writ having been returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the issuance of
a writ of execution against the Surety’s bond against which the Surety filed a written opposition. The CFI
denied this motion on the ground solely that no previous demand had been made on the Surety for the
satisfaction of the judgment. Thereafter, the necessary demand was made, and upon failure of the Surety
to satisfy the judgment, the plaintiffs filed a second motion for execution against the counter-bond. Upon
the Surety’s failure to file an answer to the motion, the CFI granted the motion for execution and the
corresponding writ was issued.

Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that the same was issued without the
required summary hearing provided for in Section 17 of Rule 59 of the Rules of Court. As the CFI denied
the motion, the Surety appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) from such order of denial and from the one
denying its motion for reconsideration. Not one of the assignment of errors raises the question of lack of
jurisdiction, neither directly nor indirectly.
The CA decided the case affirming the orders appealed from. After the Surety received notice of the
decision, it filed a pleading entitled MOTION TO DISMISS, alleging substantially that appellees’ action
was filed in the CFI of Cebu on July 19, 1948 for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only; that a month
before that date Republic Act No. 296, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, had already
become effective, Section 88 of which placed within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all
civil actions where the value of the subject matter or the amount of the demand does not exceed
P2,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs; that the CFI therefore had no jurisdiction to try and decide the
case.

Issue:
Whether the Surety is barred from raising the jurisdictional issue by laches.

Ruling:
Yes. A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different
reasons. Thus, we speak of estoppel in pais, of estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to
do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could
have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the CFI of Cebu to take cognizance of the present
action by reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the
original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the
proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the CA, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain
affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an
adverse decision was rendered by the CA that it finally woke up to raise the question of
jurisdiction. If such conduct is to be sanctioned, the SC would in effect be declaring as useless all the
proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment
creditors to go up their Calvary once more.

Topic: Criminal jurisdiction of courts in particular

6. Eileen P. David v. Glenda S. Marquez, G.R. No. 209859, June 5, 2017 - MARI LOREN
FRANCIA
Topic: Criminal jurisdiction of courts in particular. Highest Court: Supreme Court.

Doctrine:
Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction.
Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
SEC. 15. Place where action is to be instituted. - a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be
instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where
any of its essential ingredients occurred.

Sec. 9 of RA 8042, however, fixed an alternative venue from that provided in Section 15(a) of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure, i.e., a criminal action arising from illegal recruitment may also be filed where the
offended party actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense and that the court where the
criminal action is first filed shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts.

Facts:
In a Sinumpaang Salaysay filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila, Respondent Glenda
Marquez alleged, among others, that she is a resident of Sampaloc, Manila and that sometime in
March 2005, petitioner approached her in Kidapawan City and represented that she could recruit her
to work abroad. It was further alleged that petitioner demanded payment of placement fees and other
expenses from the respondent for the processing of the latter's application, to which the respondent
heeded. Respondent's application was, however, denied and worse, the money that she put out therefor
was never returned. Petitioner further averred that she was never engaged in the recruitment business.
Two separate Informations were filed against petitioner for Illegal Recruitment and Estafa, respectively.
Further, petitioner argued before the Prosecutor that assuming arguendo that the allegations of
recruitment were true, the case should be filed in Kidapawan City and not in Manila. The petitioner
argued that the City Prosecutor of Manila had no jurisdiction over the case as the alleged crime
was committed in Kidapawan City.

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court:

Warrants of arrest were issued against the petitioner. The RTC ruled that it has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the case, citing Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8042 (RA 8042), which explicitly states that:
A criminal action arising from illegal recruitment as defined herein shall be filed with the Regional Trial
Court of the province or city where the offense was committed or where the offended party actually
resides at the time of the commission of the offense.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner maintained that the alleged crimes were
committed in Kidapawan City, not in Manila as alleged in the Informations. Petitioner further alleged that
there is no showing that respondent is an actual resident of Manila but as per her Reply-Affidavit, Manila
is merely her postal address. Hence, petitioner again raised a jurisdictional issue in the said motion.
In an Order dated January 26, 2012, this time the RTC of Manila reconsidered its May 13, 2011 Order,
finding that it had no jurisdiction to try the cases since the crimes of Illegal Recruitment and
Estafa were not committed in its territory but in Kidapawan City.
Thus, the instant Motion for Reconsideration of the petitioner is hereby GRANTED. On the same date, the
RTC also issued an Order pertaining to the issuance of Warrants of Arrest against herein accused is
hereby cancelled and set aside.

Respondent, through the public prosecutor, then filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC denied
respondent's motion for reconsideration, ruling that as stated in respondent's Sinumpaang Salaysay, the
essential elements of Illegal Recruitment and Estafa took place in Kidapawan City and not in Manila. The
allegation that several deposits for the payment of the placement fees were made in Manila is of no
moment, according to the RTC, considering that the main transaction actually took place in
Kidapawan City, which is the basis for determining the jurisdiction of the court.
Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals:

The CA ruled that the RTC has jurisdiction over the cases of Illegal Recruitment and Estafa, citing
Section 9 of RA 8042, which provides that a criminal action arising from illegal recruitment may be filed
in the place where the offended party actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense.
According to the CA, it was established that herein respondent was residing in Sampaloc, Manila at the
time of the commission of the crimes. Therefore, the two (2) Informations herein were correctly filed with
the RTC of Manila, pursuant to Section 9 of RA 8042. The petition for certiorari is GRANTED.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in its Resolution. Hence, this Petition.

Issue:
Whether the RTC of Manila have jurisdiction over the cases of Illegal Recruitment and Estafa?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the RTC of Manila has jurisdiction over the cases of Illegal
Recruitment and Estafa.

Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. As explained by this Court in the case
of Foz, Jr. v. People: the jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations
in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the
case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed
somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.

Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

SEC. 15. Place where action is to be instituted. - a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be
instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or
where any of its essential ingredients occurred.

Sec. 9 of RA 8042, however, fixed an alternative venue from that provided in Section 15(a) of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure, i.e., a criminal action arising from illegal recruitment may also be filed where
the offended party actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense and that the court
where the criminal action is first filed shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts.

It has been found by both the RTC and the CA that the respondent resides in Manila; Hence, the filing of
the case before the RTC of Manila was proper. Likewise, with the case of Estafa arising from such
illegal recruitment activities, the outright dismissal thereof due to lack of jurisdiction was not proper,
considering that as per the allegations in the Information, the same was within the jurisdiction of Manila.
During the preliminary investigation of the cases, respondent even presented evidence that some
of the essential elements of the crime were committed within Manila, such as the payment of
processing and/or placement fees, considering that these were deposited in certain banks located in
Manila. Thus, it bears stressing that the trial court should have proceeded to take cognizance of the case,
and if during the trial it was proven that the offense was committed somewhere else, that is the
time that the trial court should dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction.

The Decision dated May 29, 2013 and Resolution dated November 6, 2013 of the Court of Appeals are
hereby AFFIRMED.

Topic: Retrospective vs. prospective application of procedural law

7. People vs. Lacson, G.R. No. 149453, April 01, 2003 - EDGAR SUPERIO
Doctrine:
Retroactive law - a law that operates to make criminal or punishable or in any way expressly affects an
act done prior to the passing of the law

Facts:
The respondent and his co-accused were charged with multiple murder for the shooting and killing of
eleven males, all of whom were identified as Kuratong Baleleng Gang members. The Court held that,
while Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure could be applied retroactively, it is
still necessary to determine whether the requirements for its application are present. It emphasized that
the new rule establishes a time limit to punish the State for its inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases that
have already been filed in court.

Section 8, Rule 117 Provisional dismissal. — A case shall not be provisionally dismissed
except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.

The petitioners argue in support of their Motion for Reconsideration that:

(a) Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure does not apply to Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689; and

(b) the time-bar in the said rule should not be retroactively applied.

According to the petitioners, Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure does not
apply to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 because the necessary conditions for its
application were not met when Judge Agnir, Jr. issued his March 29, 1999 resolution.

The petitioners argue that even if the respondent expressly consented to the provisional dismissal of
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, as well as all heirs of the victims, were served with
copies of Judge Agnir, Jr.'s resolution dismissing the eleven cases, the two-year bar in Section 8 of Rule
117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be applied prospectively rather than retroactively
against the State. Applying the time limit retroactively to the criminal cases against the respondent and his
co-accused would be a violation of the People's right to due process and would unduly impair, reduce,
and diminish the State's substantive right to prosecute the accused for multiple murder.

The respondent, for his part asserts that the new rule under Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure may be applied retroactively since there is no substantive right of the State that may
be impaired by its application to the criminal cases in question since 'the State's witnesses were ready,
willing and able to provide their testimony but the prosecution failed to act on these cases until it became
politically expedient in April 2001 for them to do so. 'According to the respondent, penal laws, either
procedural or substantive, may be retroactively applied so long as they favor the accused. He asserts that
the two-year period commenced to run on March 29, 1999 and lapsed two years thereafter was more
than reasonable opportunity for the State to fairly indict him.

Issue:
Whether or not the time-bar in said rule be applied prospectively or retroactively.

Ruling:
No. Time-bar should not be applied retroactively. Though procedural rules may be applied retroactively, it
should not be if to do so would work injustice or would involve intricate problems of due process. Statutes
should be construed in light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils to be remedied. This is because
to do so would be prejudicial to the State since, given that the Judge dismissed the case on March
29,1999, and the New rule took effect on Dec 1,2000, it would only in effect give them 1 year and three
months to work instead of 2 years.

At that time, they had no knowledge of the said rule and therefore they should not be penalized for that.
"Indeed for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the accused
alone." The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the State and the accused. It
should not be emasculated and reduced by an inordinate retroactive application of the time-bar therein
provided merely to benefit the accused. To do so would cause an injustice of hardship to the state and
adversely affect the administration of justice. To require the State to give a valid justification as a
condition sine qua non to the revival of a case provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the
accused before the effective date of the new rule is to assume that the State is obliged to comply with the
time-bar under the new rule before it took effect. This would be a rank denial of justice. The State must be
given a period of one year or two years as the case may be from December 1, 2000 to revive the criminal
case without requiring the State to make a valid justification for not reviving the case before the effective
date of the new rule. Although in criminal cases, the accused is entitled to justice and fairness, so is the
State.

Other case digest:

Facts:
Before the court is the petitioner’s motion of reconsideration of the resolution for the determination of
several factual issues relative to the application of Sec. 8 Rule 117 of Revised Rule of Criminal Procedure
on the dismissal of the cases against the respondent. The respondent was charged with the shooting and
killing of eleven male persons. The court confirmed the express consent of the respondent in the
provisional dismissal of the aforementioned cases when he filed for judicial determination. The court also
ruled the need to determine whether the other facts for its application are attendant.

Section 8, Rule 117 Provisional dismissal. — A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except
with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the requisites for the applicability of Sec. 8, Rule 117 of 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure were complied with in the Kuratong Baleleng cases

a. Was express consent given by the respondent?

b. Was notice for the motion, the hearing and the subsequent dismissal given to the heirs of the
victims?

Ruling:
Section 8, Rule 117 is not applicable to the case since the conditions for its applicability, namely:

1) prosecution with the express consent of the accused or both of them move for provisional dismissal,

2) offended party notified,

3) court grants motion and dismisses cases provisionally,

4) public prosecutor served with copy of orders of provisional dismissal, which is the defendants burden to
prove, which in this case has not been done

a. The defendant never filed and denied unequivocally in his statements, through counsel at the
Court of Appeals, that he filed for dismissal nor did he agree to a provisional dismissal thereof.

b. No notice of motion for provisional dismissal, hearing and subsequent dismissal was given to
the heirs of the victims.

2. WON time-bar in Sec 8 Rule 117 should be applied prospectively or retroactively.

Time-bar should not be applied retroactively. Though procedural rules may be applied retroactively, it
should not be if to do so would work injustice or would involve intricate problems of due process.

Statutes should be construed in light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils to be remedied. This is
because to do so would be prejudicial to the State since, given that the Judge dismissed the case on
March 29,1999, and the New rule took effect on Dec 1,2000, it would only in effect give them 1 year and
three months to work instead of 2 years.

At that time, they had no knowledge of the said rule and therefore they should not be penalized for that.
“Indeed for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the accused
alone.” The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the State and the accused. It
should not be emasculated and reduced by an inordinate retroactive application of the time-bar therein
provided merely to benefit the accused. To do so would cause an injustice of hardship to the state and
adversely affect the administration of justice.

B. RULE 110- PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES

Topic: Effect of the institution of criminal action on the prescriptive period

1. People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 168641, April 27, 2007 - ALEXANDRA MAUREEN
GARCIA
Doctrine: The filing of the complaint with the fiscal’s office suspends the running of the
prescriptive period.

The prescriptive period remains tolled from the time the complaint was filed with the Office of the
Prosecutor until such time that respondent is either convicted or acquitted by the proper court.

Facts:

On June 12, 1999 conflict arose between private complainant and Bautista. On August 16, 1999, the
former filed a complaint for Slight Physical Injuries before the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP), which
issued a resolution dated November 8, 1999, recommending the filing of the case. The resolution was
approved by the City Prosecutor. It was only on June 20, 2000 that the information was filed in MeTC.
Bautista sought for its dismissal on the ground that at the time the information was filed, the 60-day period
of prescription from the date of its commission had already lapsed. The CA ruled that the offense already
prescribed because the filing of the case in the OCP interrupted the prescriptive period but such period
resumed when the City Prosecutor approved the recommendation of the investigating prosecutor to file
the proper criminal information.

Issue:
Whether the prescriptive period resumed after the investigating prosecutor’s recommendation to file the
proper criminal information was approved by the City Prosecutor

Ruling:

No. Art. 91 of the RPC provides that the period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on
which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be
interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such
proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for
any reason not imputable to him.
The proceedings against Bautista were not terminated upon the City Prosecutor’s approval of the
investigating prosecutor’s recommendation that an information be filed with the court. The prescriptive
period remains tolled from the time the complaint was filed with the Office of the Prosecutor until such
time that respondent is either convicted or acquitted by the proper court. The Office of the Prosecutor
miserably incurred some delay in filing the information but such mistake or negligence should not unduly
prejudice the interests of the State and the offended party. It is unjust to deprive the injured party of the
right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All that the victim of the
offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.

2. Zaldivia v. Reyes, 211 SCRA 277 - CHA

Doctrines: Words in a statute should be read in relation to and not in isolation from the rest of the
measure, to discover the true legislative intent.

1) Section 1, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure does not apply to offenses which are
subject to summary procedure

2) The charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez is
governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure and not Section 1 of Rule 110

3) Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, the running of the prescriptive period shall
be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that.

4) The proceedings referred to in Section 2 of Act No. 3326 are judicial proceedings, contrary to the
submission of the Solicitor General that they include administrative proceedings.

5) In case of conflict, the Rule on Summary Procedure as the special law prevails over Section 1 of
Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and also Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
must yield to Act No. 3326

Facts:
A complaint was filed before the fiscal’s office constituting an offense in violation of a city ordinance. The
fiscal did not file the complaint before the court immediately but instead filed it 3 months later. The
defendant’s counsel filed a motion to quash on ground that the action to file the complaint has prescribed,
invoking that under Act No. 3326, violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two
months from the commission of the offense governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure. The
prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was suspended upon the filing of the complaint with the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, saying that Rule 110, Section 1, last paragraph of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure which provides that “in all cases such institution interrupts the period of the
prescription of the offense charged,” applies to all cases including those falling under the Rule on
Summary Procedure.

Issue:
1) Whether or not the filing of information/complaint before the fiscal office constitutes a violation
against a special law/ordinance interrupts prescription.
2) Whether the phrase, “in all cases such institution interrupts the period of the prescription of the
offense charged” applies to cases falling under the Rule on Summary Procedure

Held:
1) No. The mere filing of complaint to the fiscal’s office does not interrupt the running of prescription
on offenses punishable by a special law. The complaint should have been filed within a
reasonable time before the court. It is only then that the running of the prescriptive period is
interrupted.
 2) No, Rule 110, Section 1 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure meaningfully begins with the phrase,
“for offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases,” which plainly
signifies that the section does not apply to offenses which are subject to summary procedure. The
phrase “in all cases” appearing in the last paragraph obviously refers to the cases covered by the
Section, that is, those offenses not governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure.

As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers are
violations of municipal or city ordinances, the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation
of a municipal ordinance, is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110. If there is a
conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as special law. And if there be a conflict between
Act. No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield
because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to “diminish, increase
or modify substantive rights” under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription in
criminal cases is a substantive right.
The prosecution in the instant case is for violation of a municipal ordinance, for which the penalty
cannot exceed six months, and is thus covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure. The
prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the Zaldivia commenced from its alleged commission
on May 11, 1990, and ended two months after, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1 of
Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding that
could have interrupted the period was the filing of the information with the MTC of Rodriguez, but
this was done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had already prescribed.

3. Sanrio Company Ltd. v. Lim, G.R. No. 168662, February 19, 2008 - TRACE MAGNO
Doctrine:
The filing of the complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation interrupts the period of prescription of
criminal responsibility.

Thus, the prescriptive period for the prosecution of the alleged violation of the IPC was tolled by
petitioner's timely filing of the complaint-affidavit before the TAPP.

Facts: Petitioner (Sanrio) manufactures Hello Kitty products and distributes them in the Philippines. It was
divulged to Sanrio that its products were being counterfeited by respondent (Edgar Lim.) The executive
judge then issued a search warrant on May 30, 2000. Agents of the NBI searched the premises of
Orignamura Trading. They were able to seize various Sanrio products. It was only almost two years later
on April 4, 2002 that Sanrio filed a complaint-affidavit in the DOJ against Edgar Lim for violation of
Section 217 of the Intellectual Property Code (IPC). However, it was dismissed due to insufficiency of
evidence. On May 3, 2003, Sanrio filed a petition for certiorari with the CA but it was dismissed on the
ground of prescription because no complaint was filed in court within two years after the commission of
the alleged violation. Sanrio contended that filing of the complaint in DOJ tolled the two-year prescriptive
period.
Issue: Whether the filing of the complaint in the DOJ tolled the prescriptive period
Ruling: Yes, Section 2 of Act 3326 provides that the prescriptive period for violation of special laws starts
on the day such offense was committed and is interrupted by the institution of proceedings against the
accused.
Sanrio filed its complaint-affidavit one year, ten months and four days after the NBI searched
respondent’s premises and seized Sanrio merchandise therefrom. Although no information was
immediately filed in court, respondent’s alleged violation had not yet prescribed. The prescriptive period
for the prosecution of the alleged violation of the IPC was tolled by Sanrios’s timely filing of the complaint-
affidavit before the TAPP.

4. Panaguiton, Jr. v. DOJ, G.R. No. 167571, November 25, 2008 - HARVEY JAY
DAMIAO
Doctrine:
Any kind of investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty person which may ultimately lead to his
prosecution should be sufficient to toll prescription.

Facts:
Cawili borrowed money from Panaguiton. As security, he issued three checks bearing his signature and
that of his business associate Tongson. Upon presentment on March 18, 1993 the checks were
dishonored. However, it was only on August 24, 1995 that Panaguiton filed a complaint against Cawili and
Tongson for violation of BP 22 before the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office. On March 15, 1999, Assistant
City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint against Tongson and held that the case had already prescribed
pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides that violations penalized by BP 22 shall prescribe
after four years. It was ruled that the four-year period started on the date the checks were dishonored, or
on January 20, 1993 and March 18, 1993; the filing of the complaint before the Quezon City Prosecutor
on August 24, 1995 did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period, as the law contemplates
judicial, and not administrative proceedings; and thus, considering that from 1993 to 1998, more than four
years had already elapsed and no information had as yet been filed against Tongson, the alleged
violation of BP 22 imputed to him had already prescribed.

Issue:
Whether or not the filing of the complaint before the prosecutor tolled the running of prescriptive period.

Ruling:
Yes. The term “proceedings” should now be understood as either executive or judicial in character.
Executive when it involves the investigation phase, and judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment
stage. With this clarification, any kind of investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty person which
may ultimately lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to toll prescription.

Panaguiton filed his complaint-affidavit within the four-year prescriptive period. He timely filed his appeals
and his motions for reconsideration. However, from the time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the
Office of the City Prosecutor up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, nine years had
elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner’s control as had already initiated the active prosecution
of the case as early as August 24, 1995. Panaguiton’s filing of his complaint-affidavit before the Office of
the City Prosecutor signified the commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused
and effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged with under BP
22.

5. SEC v. lnterport Resources Corp., G.R. No. 135808, October 6, 2008 - HENRI
CASTILLO

Doctrine:
Indubitably, the prescription period is interrupted by commencing the proceedings for the prosecution of
the accused. In criminal cases, this is accomplished by initiating the preliminary investigation. The
prosecution of offenses punishable under the Revised Securities Act and the Securities Regulations
Code is initiated by the filing of a complaint with the SEC or by an investigation conducted by the SEC
motuproprio. Only after a finding of probable cause is made by the SEC can the DOJ instigate a
preliminary investigation

Facts:
The Board of Directors of IRC approved a Memorandum of Agreement with Ganda Holdings Berhad.
Under the Memorandum of Agreement, IRC acquired 100% or the entire capital stock of Ganda Energy
Holdings, Inc., which would own and operate a 102 megawatt gas turbine power-generating barge. The
agreement also stipulates that GEHI would assume a five-year power purchase contract with National
Power Corporation. At that time, GEHI's power-generating barge was 97% complete and would go on-line
by mid-September of 1994. In exchange, IRC will issue to GHB 55% of the expanded capital stock of IRC
amounting to 40.88 billion shares which had a total par value of P488.44 million.On the side, IRC would
acquire 67% of the entire capital stock of Philippine Racing Club, Inc.. PRCI owns 25.724 hectares of real
estate property in Makati. IRC alleged that on 8 August 1994, a press release announcing the approval of
the agreement was sent through facsimile transmission to the Philippine Stock Exchange and the SEC,
but that the facsimile machine of the SEC could not receive it. Upon the advice of the SEC, the IRC sent
the press release on the morning of 9 August 1994.The SEC averred that it received reports that IRC
failed to make timely public disclosures of its negotiations with GHB and that some of its directors,
respondents herein, heavily traded IRC shares utilizing this material insider information. On 16 August
1994, the SEC Chairman issued a directive requiring IRC to submit to the SEC a copy of its aforesaid
Memorandum of Agreement with GHB.

In compliance with the SEC Chairman's directive, the IRC sent a letter to the SEC, attaching thereto
copies of the Memorandum of Agreement. SEC Chairman issued an Order finding that IRC violated the
Rules on Disclosure of Material Facts, in connection with the Old Securities Act of 1936, when it failed to
make timely disclosure of its negotiations with GHB. In addition, the SEC pronounced that some of the
officers and directors of IRC entered into transactions involving IRC shares in violation of Section 30, in
relation to Section 36, of the Revised Securities Act.

Respondents filed an Omnibus Motion, dated 21 September 1994, which was superseded by an
Amended Omnibus Motion, filed on 18 October 1994, alleging that the SEC had no authority to
investigate the subject matter, since under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1758, jurisdiction was conferred upon the Prosecution and Enforcement
Department (PED) of the SEC. SEC issued an Omnibus Order creating a special investigating panel to
hear and decide the case. Respondents filed an Omnibus Motion for Partial Reconsideration,
questioning the creation of the special investigating panel to hear the case and the denial of the Motion
for Continuance. The SEC denied reconsideration in its Omnibus Order dated 30 March 1995.

The respondents filed a petition before the Court of Appeals. CA promulgated a Decision where it
determined that there were no implementing rules and regulations regarding disclosure, insider trading,
or any of the provisions of the Revised Securities Acts which the respondents allegedly violated. The
Court of Appeals likewise noted that it found no statutory authority for the SEC to initiate and file any suit
for civil liability under Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act. Thus, it ruled that no civil,
criminal or administrative proceedings may possibly be held against the respondents without violating
their rights to due process and equal protection. It further resolved that absent any implementing rules,
the SEC cannot be allowed to quash the assailed Omnibus Orders for the sole purpose of re-filing the
same case against the respondents. Hence, this petition.

Respondents have taken the position that this case is moot and academic, since any criminal complaint
that may be filed against them resulting from the SEC's investigation of this case has already
prescribed. They point out that the prescription period applicable to offenses punished under special
laws, such as violations of the Revised Securities Act, is twelve years under Section 1 of Act No. 3326,
as amended by Act No. 3585 and Act No. 3763. Since the offense was committed in 1994, they
reasoned that prescription set in as early as 2006 and rendered this case moot.
Issue:
Whether or not the case is already moot because the offense has already prescribed. (NO)

Ruling:
It is an established doctrine that a preliminary investigation interrupts the prescription period. A
preliminary investigation is essentially a determination whether an offense has been committed, and
whether there is probable cause for the accused to have committed an offense.

Under Section 45 of the Revised Securities Act, which is entitled Investigations, Injunctions and
Prosecution of Offenses, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) has the authority to "make such
investigations as it deems necessary to determine whether any person has violated or is about to violate
any provision of this Act XXX." After a finding that a person has violated the Revised Securities Act, the
SEC may refer the case to the DOJ for preliminary investigation and prosecution.

While the SEC investigation serves the same purpose and entails substantially similar duties as the
preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ, this process cannot simply be disregarded. In Baviera
v. Paglinawan, this Court enunciated that a criminal complaint is first filed with the SEC, which
determines the existence of probable cause, before a preliminary investigation can be commenced by
the DOJ.

A criminal charge for violation of the Securities Regulation Code is a specialized dispute. Hence, it must
first be referred to an administrative agency of special competence, i.e., the SEC. Under the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, courts will not determine a controversy involving a question within the jurisdiction of
the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion
requiring the specialized knowledge and expertise of said administrative tribunal to determine technical
and intricate matters of fact. The Securities Regulation Code is a special law. Its enforcement is
particularly vested in the SEC. Hence, all complaints for any violation of the Code and its implementing
rules and regulations should be filed with the SEC. Where the complaint is criminal in nature, the SEC
shall indorse the complaint to the DOJ for preliminary investigation and prosecution as provided in
Section 53.1 earlier quoted.

It should be noted that the SEC started investigative proceedings against the respondents as early as
1994. This investigation effectively interrupted the prescription period. However, said proceedings were
disrupted by a preliminary injunction issued by the Court of Appeals on 5 May 1995, which effectively
enjoined the SEC from filing any criminal, civil, or administrative case against the respondents herein.
Thereafter, on 20 August 1998, the appellate court issued the assailed Decision in C.A. G.R. SP. No.
37036 ordering that the writ of injunction be made permanent and prohibiting the SEC from taking
cognizance of and initiating any action against herein respondents. The SEC was bound to comply with
the aforementioned writ of preliminary injunction and writ of injunction issued by the Court of Appeals
enjoining it from continuing with the investigation of respondents for 12 years. Any deviation by the SEC
from the injunctive writs would be sufficient ground for contempt. Moreover, any step the SEC takes in
defiance of such orders will be considered void for having been taken against an order issued by a court
of competent jurisdiction.

Accordingly, it is only after this Court corrects the erroneous ruling of the Court of Appeals in its
Decision dated 20 August 1998 that either the SEC or DOJ may properly conduct any kind of
investigation against the respondents for violations of Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities
Act. Until then, the prescription period is deemed interrupted.

To reiterate, the SEC must first conduct its investigations and make a finding of probable cause in
accordance with the doctrine pronounced in Baviera v. Paglinawan. In this case, the DOJ was precluded
from initiating a preliminary investigation since the SEC was halted by the Court of Appeals from
continuing with its investigation. Such a situation leaves the prosecution of the case at a standstill, and
neither the SEC nor the DOJ can conduct any investigation against the respondents, who, in the first
place, sought the injunction to prevent their prosecution. All that the SEC could do in order to break the
impasse was to have the Decision of the Court of Appeals overturned, as it had done at the earliest
opportunity in this case. Therefore, the period during which the SEC was prevented from continuing with
its investigation should not be counted against it. The law on the prescription period was never intended
to put the prosecuting bodies in an impossible bind in which the prosecution of a case would be placed
way beyond their control; for even if they avail themselves of the proper remedy, they would still be
barred from investigating and prosecuting the case.

Indubitably, the prescription period is interrupted by commencing the proceedings for the prosecution of
the accused. In criminal cases, this is accomplished by initiating the preliminary investigation. The
prosecution of offenses punishable under the Revised Securities Act and the Securities Regulations
Code is initiated by the filing of a complaint with the SEC or by an investigation conducted by the SEC
motuproprio. Only after a finding of probable cause is made by the SEC can the DOJ instigate a
preliminary investigation. Thus, the investigation that was commenced by the SEC in 1995, soon after it
discovered the questionable acts of the respondents, effectively interrupted the prescription period.
Given the nature and purpose of the investigation conducted by the SEC, which is equivalent to the
preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases, such investigation would surely
interrupt the prescription period.

6. Disini v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 169823-24, September 11, 2013 - GRAYSON

YAMBAO
Doctrine: An Information cannot be quashed if the Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the case,
if the offense has not yet prescribed, and if the Information is sufficient in form and substance.

Facts: The Office of the Ombudsman filed two informations charging Disini in the Sandiganbayan with
corruption of public officials, penalized under Article 212 in relation to Article 210 of the Revised Penal
Code, and with a violation of Section 4 (a) of Republic Act 3019 (R.A. No. 3019), also known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Thereafter, Disini filed a motion to quash, alleging that the criminal actions had been extinguished by
prescription, and that the information did not conform to the prescribed form. The Prosecution opposed
the motion to quash.

Later on, Disini voluntarily submitted himself for arraignment to obtain the Sandiganbayan’s favorable
action on his motion for permission to travel abroad. He then entered a plea of not guilty to both
informations.

The Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash. Disini moved for reconsideration but the same was
denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue: WON the motion to quash should be granted on the grounds that (1) the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction, (2) the offenses has prescribed, and (3) Information does not conform substantially to the
prescribed form.

Ruling: NO. The motion to quash cannot be granted since the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction, the
offense has not yet prescribed, and the Information substantially complied with the prescribed form.

FIRST GROUND: The motion cannot be quashed on the ground that the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction.

In fact, Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case pursuant to PD No. 1606 as amended. That Disini
was a private individual did not remove the offenses charged from the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Section 2 of E.O. No. 1, which tasked the PCGG with assisting the President in “[t]he recovery of all ill-
gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or
sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his
administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using
their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship,” expressly granted the authority of the
PCGG to recover ill-gotten wealth covered President Marcos’ immediate family, relatives, subordinates
and close associates, without distinction as to their private or public status.

Despite Disini being a private individual, and despite the lack of any allegation of his being the co-
principal, accomplice or accessory of a public official in the commission of the offenses charged.

SECOND GROUND: The motion to quash cannot be granted on the ground of prescription since
prescription did not yet set in.

The offense of corruption of public officials as well as violation of RA 3019 prescribe in 15 years.
Moreover, prescription begins to run from the date of discovery of the crime and shall only be interrupted
upon the filing of complaint or information in Court (Article 91, Revised Penal Code).

In this case, prescription has not yet set in because it was only five years elapsed from 1986, the time of
the discovery of the offenses charged, up to April 1991, the time of the filing of the criminal complaints in
the Office of the Ombudsman.

THIRD GROUND: The motion to quash on the ground of insufficiency in form and substance cannot be
granted.

The fundamental test in determining whether a motion to quash may be sustained based on this ground is
whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, will establish the essential elements of the offense as
defined in the law. Extrinsic matters are not considered. The test does not require absolute certainty as to
the presence of the elements of the offense; otherwise, there would no longer be any need for the
Prosecution to proceed to trial.

In this case, the criminal cases have sufficiently complied with the requirements of Section 6, Rule 110 of
the Rules of Court. The elements for corruption of public officials was sufficiently alleged in the
information. This is because the facts alleged in the information would establish the elements of the
offense of corruption of public officials. The sufficiency of the allegations in the information charging the
violation of Section 4 (a) of R.A. No. 3019 is similarly upheld because the allegations in the information
charging the violation of Section 4 (a) of R.A. No. 3019, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the
elements of the offense.

7. People v. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 152662, June 13, 2012 - HANNA DADIA
Doctrine: The Court cited the case of Panaguiton Jr. v. DOJ, wherein it ruled that the commencement of
the proceedings for the prosecution before the Office of the City Prosecutor effectively interrupted the
prescriptive period for the offenses under BP Blg 22.

Hence, in this case, the commencement of the period of prescription commenced “sometime within 1995”
when Pangilinan was notified by the private complainant of the dishonor of the checks and the five-day
period granted by the law elapsed. However, the prescriptive period was interrupted on 16 September
1997, when the private complainant filed a complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor.

Facts: This case involves the determination of the period of prescription for violations involving BP Blg.
22 (Bouncing Checks Law”).
Respondent Pangilinan issued two checks in favor of private complainant Virginia Malolos in the total
amount of P8,604,000.00. The checks was later on dishonored and thus, two counts for violation of BP 22
both dated 18 November 1999, were filed against Pangilinan on 3 February 2000 before the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC).

However, Pangilinan contends that her criminal liability has already been extinguished by prescription.
The MeTC granted her motion, but the decision was reversed by the RTC stating that the criminal action
had not yet prescribed considering that the complaint started have been filed with the Office of the
Prosecutor on 16 September 1997. The CA reversed the RTC decision and dismissed the case on the
grounds of prescription.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the institution of criminal actions, whether filed
with the court or with the Office of the City Prosecutor, interrupts the period of prescription of the offense
charged. Hence, the filing of the complaint-affidavit by Virginia on 16 September 1997 with the Office of
the Prosecutor effectively interrupted the running of the prescriptive period in the case.

Pangilinan contends that the filing of the complaint before the City Prosecutor’s Office did not interrupt the
running of the prescriptive period considering that the offense charged is a violation of a special law.

Issue: Whether the filing of the affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of BP Blg 22 against
Pangilinan with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on 16 September 1997 interrupted the
period of prescription of such offense

Ruling: YES, the filing of the complaint-affidavit with the City Prosecutor interrupted the period of
prescription.

At the outset, the Court held that Act No. 3326 (An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of Special
Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin), as amended, is the law
applicable to BP 22 cases wherein it was provided that for violations of special laws, the prescriptive
period shall be after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less
than two years. It also provided that the prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for
reasons not constituting jeopardy.

Hence, since BP 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30)
days but not more than one year or by a fine for its violation, it therefore prescribes in four (4) years. The
running should be tolled upon the institution of proceedings against Pangilinan.

The Court cited a series of cases explaining that there are no longer distinction between cases under the
RPC and special laws with respect to the interruption of the prescriptive period. In Panaguiton Jr. v. DOJ,
the Court ruled that the commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution before the Office of the
City Prosecutor effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses under BP Blg 22.

The Court upheld the factual finding of the CA that the reckoning date of the commencement for the
period of prescription under BP Blg. 22 is “sometime in the latter part of 1995”. In this case, this is the
period within which Pangilinan was notified by the private complainant of the fact of dishonor of the
checks and the five-day period granted by the law elapsed.

8. Chua v. Padillo, G.R. No. 163797, April 24, 2007 - JOHN RG DELA CRUZ
Doctrine: The public prosecutor’s exercise of his discretionary powers is not absolute.

Facts: Sps. Padillo were engaged in the money lending business. They engaged the services of their
niece Marissa to serve as firm manager. They discovered that Marissa abused their confidence and
committed illegal activities. Sps Padillo filed complaint against Marissa, Wilson and Renita before the City
Prosecutor, who filed an information for estafa. Believing that they should be charged with higher offense,
Sps. Padillo appealed to the Secretary of Justice who modified the charge and directed the filing of an
information for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document against Marissa but
absolved Wilson and Renita for insufficiency of evidence. The CA modified the ruling to charge Wilson
and Renita with the same offense charged Marissa. Wilson and Renita contended that the prosecutor’s
control on what crime should be charged is absolute and not appealable.

Issue: Whether the prosecutor’s control over the prosecution of the offense is absolute

Ruling: No. The resolution of the investigating prosecutor is subject to appeal to the Secretary of Justice
who exercises control and supervision over the investigating prosecutor. The Secretary of Justice may
affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify the ruling of said prosecutor.” In special cases, the public prosecutor’s
decision may even be reversed or modified by the Office of the President.

The CA may review the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, on the ground that he committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
Not even the SC can order the prosecution of a person against whom the prosecutor does not find
sufficient evidence to support at least a prima facie case. The only possible exception to this rule is where
there is an unmistakable showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutor.

9. Bureau of Customs v. Peter Sherman, et al., G.R. No. 190487, April 13, 2011 - MARI
LOREN FRANCIA (see second digest below)

Topic: Control of prosecution

Doctrine: All criminal actions commenced by complaint or information are prosecuted under the direction
and control of public prosecutors. In the prosecution of special laws, the exigencies of public service
sometimes require the designation of special prosecutors from different government agencies to
assist the public prosecutor. The designation does not, however, detract from the public prosecutor
having control and supervision over the case.

Facts: Mark Sensing Philippines, Inc. (MPSI) caused the importation of 255, 870,000 pieces of finished
bet slips and 205, 200 rolls of finished thermal papers from June 2005 to January 2007. MSPI facilitated
the release of the shipment from the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ), where it was brought, to the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) for its lotto operations in Luzon.
MSPI did not pay duties or taxes, however, prompting the Bureau of Customs to file, under its Run After
The Smugglers Program, a criminal complaint before the Department of Justice against herein
respondents MSPI Chairman Peter Sherman, Managing Director Michael Whelan, Country Manager Atty.
Ofelia B. Cajigal and Finance Manager and Corporate Secretary Teodoro B. Lingan, along with Erick B.
Ariarte and Ricardo J. Ebuna and Eugenio Pasco, licensed customs broker who acted as agents of MSPI,
for violation of Section 3601 vis-à-vis Sections 2530 (f) and (l) 5and 101 (f) of the Tariff and Customs
Code of the Philippines, as amended and Republic Act No. 7916.
State Prosecutor Rohaira Lao-Tamano found probable cause against respondents and accordingly
recommended the filing of Information against them.Respondents filed a petition for review before the
Secretary of Justice during the pendency of which the Information was filed before the Court of Tax
Appeals.
The Secretary of Justice reversed the State Prosecutor’s Resolution and accordingly directed the
withdrawal of the Information. In the meantime, Prosecutor Lao-Tamano filed before the CTA a Motion to
Withdraw Information with Leave of Court. The CTA granted the withdrawal of, and accordingly dismissed
the Information. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration filed on September 22, 2009 was Noted Without
Action by the CTA by Resolution.
Issue: Whether the CTA gravely abused its discretion when it only noted without action petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration. (NO)

Ruling: It is well-settled that prosecution of crimes pertains to the executive department of the
government whose principal power and responsibility is to insure that laws are faithfully executed.
Corollary to this power is the right to prosecute violators.
All criminal actions commenced by complaint or information are prosecuted under the direction and
control of public prosecutors. In the prosecution of special laws, the exigencies of public service
sometimes require the designation of special prosecutors from different government agencies to assist
the public prosecutor. The designation does not, however, detract from the public prosecutor having
control and supervision over the case.
As stated in the above-quoted ratio of the October 14, 2009 Resolution of the CTA, it noted without action
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, entry of judgment having been made as no Motion for Execution
was filed by the State Prosecutor.
By merely noting without action petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, the CTA did not gravely abuse its
discretion. For, as stated earlier, a public prosecutor has control and supervision over the cases. The
participation in the case of a private complainant, like petitioner, is limited to that of a witness, both in the
criminal and civil aspect of the case.
Parenthetically, petitioner is not represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in instituting the
present petition, which contravenes established doctrinethat "the OSG shall represent the Government of
the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation, or matter requiring the services of lawyers."

Other Case Digest of Bureau of Customs v. Peter Sherman, et al., G.R. No. 190487, April 13, 2011 -
Cha

Doctrine: All criminal actions commenced by complaint or information are prosecuted under the direction
and control of public prosecutors.
Facts: MSPI caused importation of finished bet slips but failed to pay duties and taxes, prompting the
Bureau of Customs to file a criminal complaint before the DOJ against MSPI Directors and Officers for
violation of Tariff and Customs Code. The State Prosecutor found probable cause and recommended the
filing of an information. They filed a petition for review before the Secretary of Justice but during its
pendency the information was filed before the CTA. The Secretary of Justice reversed the State
Prosecutor’s Resolution and directed the withdrawal of the same. The State Prosecutor filed a Motion to
withdraw the information before the CTA which dismissed the Information. The Bureau of Customs filed a
motion for reconsideration but it was noted without action by the CTA since there was no MR filed by the
State Prosecutor.
Issue: Whether the Bureau of Customs may file an action without the intervention of public prosecutor
Ruling: No. The prosecution of crimes pertains to the executive department of the government whose
principal responsibility is to insure that laws are faithfully executed. Corollary to this power is the right to
prosecute violators. In the prosecution of special laws, the exigencies of public service sometimes require
the designation of special prosecutors from different government agencies to assist the public prosecutor.
The designation does not, however, detract from the public prosecutor having control and supervision
over the case.
By merely noting without action the Bureau of Customs’ motion for reconsideration, the CTA did not
gravely abuse its discretion. A public prosecutor has control and supervision over the cases. The
participation in the case of a private complainant, like Bureau of Customs, is limited to that of a witness,
both in the criminal and civil aspect of the case. The Bureau of Customs is not represented by the Office
of the Solicitor General in instituting the present petition, which contravenes established doctrine that “the
OSG shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials
and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation, or matter requiring the services of lawyers.”
10. People v. Cinco, G.R. No. 186460, December 4, 2009 - EDGAR SUPERIO
Doctrine: It is not necessary to state in the information the precise date the offense was committed except
when it is a material ingredient of the offense.

Facts: AAA filed a complaint of two counts of rape against Cinco. An information was filed charging the
latter with rape. However, the precise date on which the crime was allegedly committed was not stated in
the information. Thus, Cinco contended that the information is void and the same shall be dismissed.
Issue: Whether there is a need to state the precise time and date of the commission of the offense
Ruling: No. To be considered as valid and sufficient, an information must state the name of the accused;
the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and
the place where the offense was committed. This will enable the accused to suitably prepare for his
defense, since he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.
In rape cases however, failure to specify the exact dates or times when the rapes occurred does not ipso
facto make the information defective on its face. The date or time of the commission of rape is not a
material ingredient of the said crime because the gravamen of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman
through force and intimidation. The precise time when the rape took place has no substantial bearing on
its commission. As such, the date or time need not be stated with absolute accuracy. It is sufficient that
the complaint or information states that the crime has been committed at any time as near as possible to
the date of its actual commission.

11. Estodillo v. Baluma, A.M No. RTJ-04-1837, March 23, 2004 - ALEXANDRA
MAUREEN GARCIA

Doctrine: There is no requirement that the information be sworn to.

Facts: Visitacion Estodillo, mother of Jovelyn filed a complaint against Judge Teofilo when the latter
dismissed the information against the father of Jovelyn for violation of child abuse. Judge Teofilo
reasoned that since the information was not sworn under oath by the prosecutor, the same is not valid
and should be dismissed.

Issue: Whether there is a need for the information to be sworn under oath by the prosecutor

Ruling: No. Section 4, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that an
information is an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor
and filed with the court. If an information should be sworn to under oath, the rules would have so provided
as it does for a complaint which is defined as a “sworn written statement charging a person with an
offense, subscribed by the offended party, any peace officer, or other public officer charged with the
enforcement of the law violated.”

The information need not be under oath, the reason therefore being principally that the prosecuting officer
filing it is charged with the special duty in regard thereto and is acting under the special responsibility of
his oath of office. Clearly, Judge Teofilo had confused an information from a complaint.

12. Cudia v. CA, 284 SCRA 173 - CHARLENE LEMUEL DE LEON

Doctrine: An information, when required to be filed by a public prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by
another. It must be exhibited or presented by the prosecuting attorney or someone authorized by law. If
not, the court does not acquire jurisdiction.

Facts: Cudia was arrested at Mabalacat, Pampanga for possessing an unlicensed revolver. The City
Prosecutor of Angeles City filed an information charging him of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition. The information stated that the crime was committed in the City of Angeles, Philippines. The
case was raffled to Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC. Subsequently however, the provincial prosecutor
of Pampanga also filed an information charging Cudia with the same crime. The case was likewise raffled
to Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC. Since two separate informations for the same offense had been
filed against Cudia, the City prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 11542 filed a Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw
the Information, stating that through inadvertence and oversight, the Investigating Panel hastily filed the
Information in Criminal Case No. 11542, despite the fact that Cudia was arrested at Bgy. Sta. Inez,
Mabalacat, Pampanga, within the jurisdiction of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga and not in the
City of Angeles where the City Prosecutor has jurisdiction over the same. Cudia filed his opposition to the
motion, but the trial court nonetheless, granted the motion to dismiss filed by the prosecutor in Criminal
Case No. 11542.

Issue: Whether the duplicity in the informations filed for the same offense would result in double jeopardy
Ruling: No. Presidential Decree No. 1275, in relation to Section 9 of the Administrative Code of 1987,
provides that the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, not the City Prosecutor, should prepare
informations for offenses committed within Pampanga but outside of Angeles City.
Petitioner, however, insists that his failure to assert the lack of authority of the City Prosecutor in filing the
information in question is deemed a waiver thereof. As correctly pointed out by the CA, petitioner’s plea to
an information before he filed a motion to quash may be a waiver of all objections to it insofar as formal
objections to the pleadings are concerned. But by clear implication, if not by express provision of the
Rules of Court, and by a long line of uniform decisions, questions relating to want of jurisdiction may be
raised at any stage of the proceeding. It is a valid information signed by a competent officer which, among
other requisites, confers jurisdiction on the court over the person of the accused (herein petitioner) and
the subject matter of the accusation. An infirmity in the information, such as lack of authority of the officer
signing it, cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent.
There must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or information in the former prosecution. If the
complaint or information was insufficient because it was so defective in form or substance that the
conviction upon it could not have been sustained, its dismissal without the consent of the accused cannot
be pleaded. As the fiscal had no authority to file the information, the dismissal of the first information
would not be a bar to petitioner’s subsequent prosecution. Jeopardy does not attach where a defendant
pleads guilty to a defective indictment that is voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution.

13. Girlie M Quinsay v. People, G.R. No. 216920, January 13, 2016 - TRACE MAGNO
Doctrine:
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior
written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the
Ombudsman or his deputy.

Facts:
In 2012, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City issued a Pasiya (Resolution) finding probable
cause against petitioner for violation of Section 10 of RA 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act). Consequently, a Pabatid Sakdal (Information) was filed
before the RTC charging petitioner of such crime.

Petitioner moved for the quashal of the Information against her on the ground of lack of authority of the
person who filed the same before the RTC. Petitioner pointed out that the Pasiya was penned by an
Assistant City Prosecutor (ACP) and approved by a Senior Assistant City Prosecutor (SACP), while the
Pabatid Sakdal was penned by the ACP, without any approval from any higher authority, albeit with a
Certification claiming that the ACP has prior written authority or approval from the City Prosecutor.
Petitioner claimed that nothing in the aforesaid Pasiya and Pabatid Sakdal would show that the ACP
and/or the SACP Hirang had prior written authority or approval from the City Prosecutor to file or approve
the filing of the Information against her and as such, the Information must be quashed for being tainted
with a jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured.

The OCP-Makati countered that the review prosecutor, the SACP, was authorized to approve the Pasiya
pursuant to OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32. Further, it maintained that the Pabatid Sakdal was filed with
the prior approval of the City Prosecutor as shown in the Certification in the Information itself.

The RTC denied petitioner's motion to quash for lack of merit, finding the Certification attached to the
Pabatid Sakdal to have sufficiently complied with Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. The CA
affirmed the RTC ruling, holding that, pursuant to Section 9 of RA 10071 (Prosecution Service Act of
2010), as well as OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32, the City Prosecutor of Makati authorized the SACP to
approve the issuance of, inter alia, resolutions finding probable cause and the filing of Informations before
the courts. As such, the SACP may, on behalf of the City Prosecutor, approve the Pasiya.

Issue:
Whether or not the Assistant City Prosecutor has the authority to file the information.

Ruling:
No. Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states that the filing of a
complaint or information requires a prior written authority or approval of the named officers therein before
a complaint or information may be filed before the courts, thus:

SECTION 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review.

xxx

No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior
written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the
Ombudsman or his deputy.

Thus, as a general rule, complaints or informations filed before the courts without the prior written
authority or approval of the foregoing authorized officers renders the same defective and, therefore,
subject to quashal pursuant to Section 3 (d), Rule 117 of the same Rules (d) That the officer who filed the
information had no authority to do so. Unfortunately, the same could not be said of the Pabatid Sakdal or
Information filed before the RTC, as there was no showing that it was approved by either the City
Prosecutor of Makati or any of the OCP-Makati's division chiefs or review prosecutors. All it contained
was a Certification from the ACP which stated, among others, that "DAGDAG KO PANG
PINATUTUNAYAN na ang paghahain ng sakdal na ito ay may nakasulat na naunang pahintulot o
pagpapatibay ng Panlunsod na Taga-Usig".

In the cases of People v. Garfin, Turingan v. Garfin, and Tolentino v. Paqueo the Court had already
rejected similarly-worded certifications, uniformly holding that despite such certifications, the Informations
were defective as it was shown that the officers filing the same in court either lacked the authority to do so
or failed to show that they obtained prior written authority from any of those authorized officers
enumerated in Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
14. People v. Danilo Feliciano, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196735, May 5, 2014 - HARVEY JAY
DAMIAO
Doctrine:
The test of sufficiency of an information is whether it enables a person of common understanding to know
the charge against him, and the court to render judgment properly. The purpose is to allow the accused to
fully prepare for his defense, precluding surprises during the trial.

Facts:
members of a fraternity (Sigma Rho) were eating lunch when they were attacked by masked men carrying
baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of them sustained injuries that required hospitalization. One of them
died from his injuries.

An information for murder was filed against several members of the Scintilla Juris fraternity and separate
informations were also filed against them for the attempted and frustrated murder of Sigma Rho fraternity
members.

RTC found them (Alvir, Feliciano Jr., Soliva, Medalla and Zingapan) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder and attempted murder. Others were acquitted. The case against Guerrero was ordered archived
by the court until his apprehension. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.

Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellants’ constitutional rights were violated when the information against them
contained the aggravating circumstance of the use of masks despite the prosecution presenting
witnesses to prove that the masks fell off.

Ruling:
No. The Court held that an information is sufficient when the accused is fully apprised of the charge
against him to enable him to prepare his defense. The argument of appellants that the information filed
against them violates their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against them is not valid. The Court found no merit on the appellants’ arguments that the prosecution
should not have included the phrase “wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise” in the information
since they were presenting testimonial evidence that not all the accused were wearing masks or that their
masks fell off.

It should be remembered that every aggravating circumstance being alleged must be stated in the
information. Failure to state an aggravating circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not be
appreciated as such

It was, therefore, incumbent on the prosecution to state the aggravating circumstance of “wearing masks
and/or other forms of disguise” in the information in order for all the evidence, introduced to that effect, to
be admissible by the trial court.

In criminal cases, disguise is an aggravating circumstance because, like nighttime, it allows the accused
to remain anonymous and unidentifiable as he carries out his crimes.

The introduction of the prosecution of testimonial evidence that tends to prove that the accused were
masked but the masks fell off does not prevent them from including disguise as an aggravating
circumstance.

What is important in alleging disguise as an aggravating circumstance is that there was a concealment of
identity by the accused. The inclusion of disguise in the information was, therefore, enough to sufficiently
apprise the accused that in the commission of the offense they were being charged with, they tried to
conceal their identity.
The introduction of evidence which shows that some of the accused were not wearing masks is also not
violative of their right to be informed of their offenses.

The information charges conspiracy among the accused. Conspiracy presupposes that “the act of one is
the act of all.” This would mean all the accused had been one in their plan to conceal their identity even if
there was evidence later on to prove that some of them might not have done so.

15. People v. Canares, G.R. No. 174065, February 18, 2009 - HENRI CASTILLO
Doctrine: It is not necessary to state in the information the precise date when the offense was committed,
except when it is an essential element of the offense.
Facts: Two informations were filed against Canares charging him of the crimes of rape and attempted
rape in relation with RA 7610. The first information provided that sometime between the years 1992 to
1995, Canares raped AAA who was then only nine years old. The second information on the other hand
provided that on March 25, 1999, Canares attempted to rape AAA. The trial court acquitted Canares of
the crime of attempted rape but found him guilty of the crime of rape. On appeal, the decision of the trial
court was affirmed by the CA.
Canares argues that he should not have been convicted of rape because the information was defective
for it failed to specify with certainty when the alleged rape was committed.
Issue: Whether the exact date and time of the commission of the rape should be alleged in the
information
Ruling: No. An information, under Section 6, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure,
is deemed sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the
statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party;
the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
Section 11 of the same Rule also provides that it is not necessary to state in the complaint or information
the precise date the offense was committed except when the date of commission is a material element of
the offense. The offense may thus be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to
the actual date of its commission. At the minimum, an indictment must contain all the essential elements
of the offense charged to enable the accused to properly meet the charge and duly prepare for his
defense.
When the time given in the information is not the essence of the offense, such time does not need to be
proven as alleged; the complaint will be sustained if the proof shows that the offense was committed at
any time within the period of the statute of limitations and before the commencement of the action.

16. People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 159450, March 30, 2011 - GRAYSON YAMBAO
Doctrine: It is not necessary to state in the information the precise date when the offense was committed,
except when it is an essential element of the offense.

Facts: An Information was filed against Cristobal charging her of qualified theft. The RTC found Cristobal
guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Cristobal appealed, but the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence,
this petition.

Cristobal argues that the information was defective because it was stated therein that the crime was
committed on or about January 2, 1996, although the evidence presented during trial shows that the
crime and the actual taking was committed on December 29, 1996. According to her, she could not be
convicted on the basis of the information for it unduly prejudice her rights as an accused to be informed of
the charges against her as to enable her to prepare for her defense.

Issue: Whether the information filed was fatally defective

Ruling: No. An information, under Section 6, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, is deemed sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given
by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed. Section 11 of the same Rule also provides that it is not necessary to state in the complaint or
information the precise date the offense was committed, except when the date of commission is a
material element of the offense. The offense may thus be alleged to have been committed on a date as
near as possible to the actual date of its commission. At the minimum, an indictment must contain all the
essential elements of the offense charged to enable the accused to properly meet the charge and duly
prepare for his defense.

The information in Criminal Case No. 8539 states that the offense was committed in the first week of July
1995; it likewise alleged that the victim was below 12 years old at the time of the incident. These
allegations sufficiently informed the appellant that he was being charged of rape of a child who was below
12 years of age. Afforded adequate opportunity to prepare his defense, he cannot now complain that he
was deprived of his right to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him.

17. Lazarte, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 180122, March 13, 2009 - HANNA DADIA
Doctrine: In an information filed against an accused, the acts or omissions complained of must be alleged
in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is
intended to be charged and enable the court to know the proper judgment. The information must allege
clearly and accurately the elements of the crime charged. What facts and circumstances are necessary to
be included therein must be determined by reference to the definition and elements of the specific crimes.

Facts: A.C. Cruz Construction was awarded by the National Housing Authority (NHA) the original contract
for the infrastructure works on the Pahanocoy Sites and Services Project. However, for failure to comply
with the work instruction, A.C. Cruz Construction’s services were terminated by the NHA. But since A.C.
Cruz Construction had already started with the project, it was paid an amount in proportion to what have
they accomplished. Subsequently however, the COA found out that the alleged accomplishments of A.C.
Cruz Construction were just ghost activities. An information was filed against several NHA Officials,
including Lazarte, Jr., for allegedly conspiring with one another to cause the amount of P232,629.35 to be
paid to A.C. Cruz Construction.

Lazarte, Jr. moved to quash the information filed against them alleging that the Information was defective
because the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense and that the prosecution failed
to determine the individual participation of all the accused in the information. The Sandiganbayan denied
Lazarte, Jr.’s motion to quash. His motion for reconsideration was denied.

Issue: Whether the information was defective

Ruling: No. The information in this case alleges the essential elements of violation of Section 3(e) of RA
3019. The information specifically alleges that petitioner, Espinosa and Lobrido are public officers being
then the Department Manager, Project Management Officer A and Supervising Engineer of the NHA
respectively; in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to the office and while in the
performance of their official functions, connived, confederated and mutually helped each other and with
accused Arceo C. Cruz, with deliberate intent through manifest partiality and evident bad faith gave
unwarranted benefits to the latter, A.C. Cruz Construction and to themselves, to the damage and
prejudice of the government. The felonious act consisted of causing to be paid to A.C. Cruz Construction
public funds in the amount of P232,628.35 supposedly for excavation and road filling works despite the
fact that no such works were undertaken.

Conspiracy can be a mode of committing a crime or it may be constitutive of the crime itself. Generally,
conspiracy is not a crime in our jurisdiction. It is punished as a crime only when the law fixes a penalty for
its commission such as in conspiracy to commit treason, rebellion and sedition.
When conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of conspiring and all the elements of said crime must be
set forth in the complaint or information. But when conspiracy is charged only as the mode of committing
the crime, there is less necessity of reciting its particularities in the information because conspiracy is not
the gravamen of the offense charged. The conspiracy is significant only because it changes the criminal
liability of all the accused in the conspiracy and makes them answerable as co-principals regardless of
the degree of their participation in the crime. The liability of the conspirators is collective and each
participant will be equally responsible for the acts of others, for the act of one is the act of all.

18. Maximo v. Villapando, Jr., G.R. No. 214925 & 214965, April 26, 2017 - JOHN RG DELA
CRUZ
Doctrine: No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without
the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the
Ombudsman or his deputy. An Information, when required by law to be filed by a public prosecuting
officer, cannot be filed by another. The court does not acquire jurisdiction over the case because there is
a defect in the Information. There is no point in proceeding under a defective Information that could never
be the basis of a valid conviction. In the case at bar, if indeed there was no proof of valid delegation of
authority as found by the CA, the Court is constrained not to accord the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions in the filing of the Amended Information.

Facts: Petitioner Villapando filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City, a complaint
against respondents Maximo and Panganiban and other directors/officers of ASB Realty Corp. (ASB) for
Violation Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree. The said criminal complaint was
dismissed by the OCP-Makati in its Resolution.

Maximo instituted a Complaint for Perjury, Incriminating Innocent Person and Unjust Vexation against
Villapando. The complaint was assigned to Assistant City Prosecutor Evangeline ViudezCanobas. ACP
Canobas issued a Resolution 19 on August 3, 2011 finding probable cause against Villapando for the
crime of perjury but dismissed the complaints for unjust vexation and incriminating innocent person. The
Resolution was approved by Senior Assistant City Prosecutor (SACP) Christopher Garvida. OCP-Makati
issued an Order denying Villapando's Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Canobas Resolution.

Panganiban also filed a Complaint for Perjury and Unjust Vexation against Villapando. The complaint was
assigned to ACP Benjamin S. Vermug, Jr. ACP Vermug, Jr. issued a Resolution finding probable cause
against Villapando for the crime of perjury but dismissed the complaint for unjust vexation. The Resolution
was approved by Senior Assistant City Prosecutor Garvida who recommended for the filing of an
Amended Information before the METC to include Panganiban as one of the complainants. OCP-Makati
issued an Order denying Villapando's Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Vermug Resolution.

Aggrieved, Villapando filed separate petitions for review of the Canobas Resolution and the Vermug
Resolution dated March 31, 2012 and May 7, 2012, respectively, before the DOJ. DOJ denied the
petition. Villapando elevated the case to the RTC of Makati City which denied the petition. He raised
before the CA that the Information was filed without the prior written authority of the City Prosecutor
Feliciano Aspi of Makati which is contrary to Section 4 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. The CA
dismissed the case reversing the RTC‘s decision. Maximo and Panganiban filed a petition for review on
certiorari.
Maximo and Panganiban argued in their petition that the CA erred in holding that the Information did not
comply with the rule requiring prior written authority or approval of the City or Provincial Prosecutor. They
pointed out that the Information bears the certification that the filing of the same had the prior authority or
approval of the City Prosecutor who is the officer authorized to file information in court. According to them,
there is a presumption that prior written authority or approval of the City Prosecutor was obtained in the
filing of the Information, such that, the non-presentation of Office Order No. 32, which was the alleged
basis of the authority in filing the Information, is immaterial.

Issue: Whether or not the Amended Information is valid?

Ruling: No. Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states that the filing
of a complaint or information requires a prior written authority or approval of the named officers
therein before a complaint or information filed before the courts, viz.:

Section 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. - If the investigating prosecutor finds
cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and information. He shall certify
under oath in the information that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has personally
examined the complainant and his witnesses; that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has
been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof; that the accused was informed of the
complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and that he was to given an opportunity submit
controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall recommend the dismissal of the complaint.

Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the record of the case to th provincial or city
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within ten
(10) days from their receipt thereof and shall immediately inform the parties of such action.

No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior
written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the
Ombudsman or his deputy.

Thus, as a general rule, complaints or informations filed before the courts without the prior written
authority or approval of the foregoing authorized officers render the same defective and, therefore,
subject to quashal pursuant to Section 3 ( d), Rule 117 of the same Rules. The Court cited the cases of
People v. Garfin and Tolentino v. Paqueo wherein the Court had already rejected similarly-worded
certifications uniformly holding that, despite such certifications, the Informations were defective as it was
shown that the officers filing the same in court either lacked the authority to do so or failed to show that
they obtained prior written authority from any of those authorized officers enumerated in Section 4, Rule
112 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

In the case at bar, if indeed there was no proof of valid delegation of authority as found by the CA, the
Court is constrained not to accord the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions in
the filing of the Amended Information. The Court find untenable the argument of Maximo and Panganiban
that the issuance of the Order dated February 21, 2012, bearing the signature of the City Prosecutor,
denying Villapando's Partial Motion for Reconsideration, in effect, affirmed the validity of the Information
filed.

19. People v. Teodoro, G.R. No. 172372, December 4, 2009 - MARI LOREN FRANCIA
Doctrine: In statutory rape, time is not an essential element except to prove that the victim was a minor
below twelve years of age at the time of the commission of the offense.
Facts: Three informations were filed against appellant Teodoro charging him of the crime of statutory
rape for allegedly raping the victim AAA. The RTC ruled in favor of the prosecution and found Teodoro
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of statutory rape. On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the
decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition.

Teodoro questions his conviction alleging that one of the informations, was defective for failure to state
the exact date of the commission of the crime.

Issue: Whether the information was defective

Ruling: No. An information, under Section 6, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure,
is deemed sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the
statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party;
the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
Section 11 of the same Rule also provides that it is not necessary to state in the complaint or information
the precise date the offense was committed, except when the date of commission is a material element of
the offense. The offense may thus be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to
the actual date of its commission. At the minimum, an indictment must contain all the essential elements
of the offense charged to enable the accused to properly meet the charge and duly prepare for his
defense.

The information in Criminal Case No. 8539 states that the offense was committed in the first week of July
1995; it likewise alleged that the victim was below 12 years old at the time of the incident. These
allegations sufficiently informed the appellant that he was being charged of rape of a child who was below
12 years of age. Afforded adequate opportunity to prepare his defense, he cannot now complain that he
was deprived of his right to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him.

20. People v. Del.fin, G.R. No. 201572, July 9, 2014 citing People v. Opemia, 98 Phil 698 -
EDGAR SUPERIO
Doctrine: It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was
committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have
been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission.The foregoing rule,
however, is concededly not absolute. Variance in the date of commission of the offense as alleged in the
information and as established in evidence becomes fatal when such discrepancy is so great that it
induces the perception that the information and the evidence are no longer pertaining to one and the
same offense. In this case, despite the disparity as to the date of the alleged murder, the court believes
that there is no mistaking that both the information and the evidence of the prosecution but pertain to one
and the same offense.

Facts: On the night of 27 September 2000, one Emilio Enriquez, a 51-year-old fisherman from Navotas
City was killed after being gunned down at a store just across his home. Suspected of killing Emilio was
the appellant. On 13 March 2001, the appellant was formally charged with the murder of Emilio before the
RTC of Malabon. When arraigned, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Trial thereafter ensued. During
trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of one Joan Cruz and a certain Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez.
Joan is an eyewitness to the gunning of Emilio. She is also the live-in partner of the victim. Dr. Marquez,
on the other hand, is a Philippine National Police physician who examined post-mortem the corpse of
Emilio. He issued Medico-Legal Report, which revealed that Emilio died as a consequence of two (2)
gunshot wound. Appellant offered the alibi that he was fishing on the seas of Bataan on the date and time
of the supposed shooting. According to the appellant, he left for the seas at about 3:00 p.m. of 27
September 2000 and only returned at around 4:00 a.m. of the next day. Appellant also testified that he
was accompanied on this fishing trip by three other individuals one of which was Rene. Rene initially
corroborated on all points the testimony of appellant. However, Rene later admitted that he, the appellant
and their other companions actually left for their fishing trip at 3:00 p.m. of 26 September 2000 not the
27th; and returned to shore at 4:00 p.m. of 27 September 2000 not the 28th. Thus, at the date and time of
the supposed shooting, Rene and the appellant were already in Navotas City. The RTC rendered a
Decision finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of murder. CA rendered a
Decision affirming the conviction of the appellant. In this appeal, appellant assails the validity of the
information under which he was tried and convicted. He specifically points out to the discrepancy between
the date of the commission of the murder as alleged in the information i.e., "on or about the 27th day of
November 2000" and the one actually established during the trial i.e., 27 September 2000. Appellant
protests that the failure of the information to accurately allege the date of the commission of the murder
violated his right to be properly informed of the charge against him and consequently impaired his ability
to prepare an intelligent defense thereon.

Issue: Whether or not the variance in the date of the commission of the murder as alleged in the
information and as established during the trial invalidates the information.

Ruling: The SC sustains the validity of the information under which the appellant was tried, and convicted,
notwithstanding the variance in the date of the commission of the crime as alleged in the information and
as established during the trial. In crimes where the date of commission is not a material element, like
murder, it is not necessary to allege such date with absolute specificity or certainty in the information. The
Rules of Court merely requires, for the sake of properly informing an accused, that the date of
commission be approximated:

Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name
of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of
as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of
the offense; and the place where the offense was committed. When an offense is committed by more than
one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information.

Sec. 11. Date of commission of the offense. - It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information
the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense.
The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual
date of its commission.

The foregoing rule, however, is concededly not absolute. Variance in the date of commission of the
offense as alleged in the information and as established in evidence becomes fatal when such
discrepancy is so great that it induces the perception that the information and the evidence are no longer
pertaining to one and the same offense. In this event, the defective allegation in the information is not
deemed supplanted by the evidence nor can it be amended but must be struck down for being violative of
the right of the accused to be informed of the specific charge against him. In the case of Opemia, an
information for theft of large cattle committed on 18 June 1952 was filed against four accused. After all of
the accused entered a plea of not guilty and during trial, the prosecution adduced evidence to the effect
that the purported theft was committed in July of 1947. The prosecution thereafter moved for the
amendment of the information to make it conform to the evidence with respect to the date of theft. The
trial court rejected the motion and instead dismissed the information altogether. The period of almost five
years between 1947 and 1952 covers such a long stretch of time that one cannot help but be led to
believe that another theft different from that committed by the Defendants in 1952 was also perpetrated
by them in 1947.

In this case, however, the court finds applicable, not the exception in Opemia, but the general rule.

Despite their disparity as to the date of the alleged murder, the court believes that there is no mistaking
that both the information and the evidence of the prosecution but pertain to one and the same offense i.e.,
the murder of Emilio. What clearly appears to this Court, on the other hand, is that the inaccurate
allegation in the information is simply the product of a mere clerical error. This is obvious from the fact
that, while all its supporting documents point to the murder as having been committed on the 27th of
September 2000, the information's mistake is limited only to the month when the crime was committed.
Such an error is evidently not fatal; it is deemed supplanted by the evidence presented by the
prosecution.
21. People v. Anguac, G.R. No. 176744, June 5, 2009 - ALEXANDRA MAUREEN
GARCIA
Doctrine: The character of a crime is determined neither by the caption or preamble of the information nor
by the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law,
but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the information.

Facts: Two separate informations were filed against Anguac charging him of rape and violation of RA
7610, Section 5(a). The informations were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. RTC 2756-I and RTC 2757-I,
respectively. After trial, the RTC ruled in favor of the prosecution and found Anguac guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC but treated the crime of rape
charged in Criminal Case No. RTC 2757-I as a violation of Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610 instead of Sec. 5(a) as
found by the RTC. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in convicting Anguac for violating RA 7610, Section 5(b)

Ruling: No. While the Information pertaining to that criminal case charged accused-appellant with
violation of Sec. 5(a) of RA 7610, the facts alleged in it constitute elements of a violation of Sec. 5(b) of
the same law. The character of the crime is determined neither by the caption or preamble of the
information nor by the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being
conclusions of law, but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the information. Even if the
designation of the crime in the information of Criminal Case No. RTC 2757-I was defective, what is
controlling is the allegation of the facts in the information that comprises a crime and adequately
describes the nature and cause of the accusation.

Sec. 5(a) of RA 7610 refers to engaging in or promoting, facilitating, or inducing child prostitution. Sec.
5(b), on the other hand, relates to offenders who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse.The informations charged
accused-appellant with having sexual congress with AAA through force, threats, and intimidation. These
allegations more properly fall under a charge under Sec. 5(b).

22. People v. Quemeggen, G.R. No. 178205, July 27, 2009 - CHARLENE LEMUEL DE
LEON
Doctrine: The nature and character of the crime charged are determined not by the designation of the
specific crime, but by the facts alleged in the information.

Facts: Four men, Quemeggen and De Luna were arrested for allegedly robbing the passengers of a
jeepney. However, Quemeggen was able to escape which prompted the other police officers to run after
Quemeggen. The three suspects were left under the care of a police officer, Suing, while the other police
officers pursued Quemeggen. Taking advantage of the situation, the three suspects ganged up on Suing;
de Luna held his hand, while the other suspect known as Weng-Weng shot him on the head. The
suspects escaped. Although Suing was brought to the hospital, he eventually died.

An information was filed against appellants charging them of the crime of Robbery with Homicide. The
RTC found them guilty. The CA however modified the decision of the trial court and convicted
Quemeggen of Robbery, and de Luna of the separate crimes of Robbery and Homicide. Hence, this
petition.

Issue: Whether the CA’s convictions against Quemeggen and de Luna are erroneous
Ruling: No. Though appellants were charged with Robbery with Homicide, Quemeggen is guilty of
robbery, and de Luna of two separate crimes of robbery and homicide. Controlling in an information
should not be the title of the complaint or the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or
part thereof allegedly violated, these being, by and large, mere conclusions of law made by the
prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited.There should
also be no problem in convicting an accused of two or more crimes erroneously charged in one
information or complaint, but later proven to be independent crimes, as if they were made the subject of
separate complaints or informations. As worded, the Information sufficiently alleged all the elements of
both felonies.

23. Matrido v. People, G.R. No. 179061, July 13, 2009 - TRACE MAGNO
Doctrine:
It is the allegations in the information that determine the nature of the offense, not the technical name
given by the public prosecutor in the preamble of the information.

Facts:

Matrido was the credit and collection assistant of Empire East Land Holdings, Inc. She was tasked to
collect payments from the clients of Empire East. For failure of Matrido to remit the payments she
collected from the clients of Empire East, an information was filed against her charging her of qualified
theft. The RTC found her guilty. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition.
Matrido argues that her right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her was
violated when she was convicted for the crime of qualified theft despite the fact that the prosecution
presented evidence trying to prove estafa.

Issue:
Whether or not the appellate court erred in affirming the trial court's ruling of qualified theft despite the fact
that prosecution tried to prove during the trial the crime of estafa.

Ruling:

No. It is of no concern to the accused what is the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged.
It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits. That to which his attention should be directed, and in
which he should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not did he commit a crime
given in the law some technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the
information in the manner therein set forth.
Petitioner took, intending to gain and without the use of force upon things or violence against or
intimidation of persons, a personal property belonging to private complainant, without its knowledge and
consent, gravely abusing the confidence reposed on her as credit and collection assistant who had
access to payments from private complainant’s clients, specifically from one Amante Dela Torre.

24. Malto v. People, G.R. No. 164733, September 21, 2007 - HARVEY JAY DAMIAO
Doctrine: An erroneous designation of the offense in the information does not vitiate the same if the facts
alleged clearly recite the facts constituting the crime charged.

Facts: An information was filed against Michael John Z. Malto, a philosophy professor, for an offense
designated as child prostitution under Sec. 5 (a) of R.A. 7610. However, the information alleged that
Malto “did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take advantage and exert influence,
relationship and moral ascendancy and induce and/or seduce his student at Assumption College,
complainant, AAA, a minor of 17 years old, to indulge in sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct for
several times with him as in fact said accused has carnal knowledge,” which properly falls under Sec. 5
(b) of R.A. 7610.

Issue: Whether Malto may be convicted in spite of the wrong designation of the offense in the information

Ruling: Yes. The accused is entitled to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him to avoid surprises on the accused and to allow him the opportunity to prepare his defense
accordingly. Hence, a complaint or information is sufficient only if it contains the designation of the
offense, as given by the statue, or at least refer to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.

However, what determines the crime charged in the information is not really the title of the information or
the designation of the offense, but the actual facts as recited therein. In this case, even if the trial and
appellate courts followed the wrong designation of the offense, Malto could be convicted of the offense on
the basis of the facts recited in the information and duly proven during trial.

25. People v. Bernabe Pareja, G.R. No. 202122, January 15, 2014 - HENRI CASTILLO
Doctrine: An accused cannot be convicted of a crime which is not indicated or included in the offense as
charged in the information.

Facts: An information was filed against Pareja, charging him of raping his stepdaughter. During trial, the
prosecution was able to prove that Pareja penetrated AAA’s anal orifice. The trial court convicted Pareja
of rape by sexual assault.

Issue: Whether Pareja may be convicted of rape by sexual assault

Ruling: No. The accused has the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him to avoid surprises on the accused and to allow him the opportunity to prepare his
defense accordingly.
Rape by sexual assault is not indicated in the information, which charged Pareja with rape by carnal
knowledge. Rape by sexual assault is not necessarily included under rape by carnal knowledge and vice
versa; the two offenses are fundamentally different from each other. Rape by sexual assault is committed
by inserting the penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object into the
genital or anal orifice of another person; while rape by carnal knowledge is committed only through penile
penetration of the vagina. Pareja may not be convicted of rape by sexual assault even if it be duly proven
by the prosecution during trial.

26. People v. Guillermo Lomaque, G.R. No .. 189297, June 5, 2013 - GRAYSON

YAMBAO
See below other case digest

Doctrine: Denial could not prevail over the victim’s direct, positive and categorical assertion..

Facts: Appellant was charged under separate Informations for 13 counts of Rape by Sexual Intercourse
allegedly committed against his stepdaughter "AAA". Except as to the dates of occurrence and the age
of "AAA" at the time of the commission of the crimes, the accusatory portions in the Informations are
similarly worded.

In addition, appellant was also charged with Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to Section 5 of Republic
RA No. 7610, as amended.
At arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty to all the Informations. Soon the cases were set
for Pre-Trial where only the minority of "AAA" was stipulated upon. Accordingly, the joint trial on
the merits ensued.

He denied that he sexually abused AAA, claiming that he could not have committed the crimes
charged because as a biomedical technician, he was deployed all over the country to repair hospital
equipment. He offered several plane tickets in support of this allegation. He likewise testified that his
parents-in-law and sister-in-law were living with them.

After trial, the RTC found "AAA" to be a credible witness and rejected the defense of denial and alibi
proffered by the appellant. Consequently, it rendered a Decision dated October 23, 2007 which
declared appellant guilty of seven counts of rape by sexual intercourse, one count of rape by sexual
assault and one count of Acts of Lasciviousness. Accordingly, the RTC sentenced appellant to
imprisonment and ordered him to pay damages.

Appellant thus assailed his conviction before the CA.

In his Brief, appellant faulted the trial court in giving full weight and credence to "AAA’s" testimony
and in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. The OSG, for the plaintiff
appellee People of the Philippines, on the other hand prayed for the affirmance of the assailed
Judgment contending that "AAA’s" testimony is clear, candid and straightforward. It contended that
appellant’s culpability was established beyond reasonable doubt.

The CA, however, was not impressed with the arguments of the appellant, and hence rendered its
Decision dated July 30, 2009 affirming the Decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of appellant for the crimes
of rape and acts of lasciviousness.

Ruling: YES. In his attempt to discredit "AAA," appellant contends that "AAA’s" silence and failure to
divulge her alleged horrifying ordeal to immediate relatives despite the claim that it happened for several
times run counter to the natural reaction of an outraged maiden despoiled of her honor.

We are not persuaded. "AAA’s" momentary inaction will neither diminish nor affect her credibility.
"The filing of complaints of rape months, even years, after their commission may or may not dent the
credibility of witness and of testimony, depending on the circumstances attendant thereto." "It does
not diminish the complainant’s credibility or undermine the charges of rape when the delay can be
attributed to the pattern of fear instilled by the threats of bodily harm, specially by one who exercises
moral ascendancy over the victim. "In this case, not long after the initial rape, appellant threatened
"AAA" that he would kill her and her mother if ever she would tell anyone about what happened. At
that time, "AAA" was only 11 years old and was living under the same roof with the latter whom she
treated as a father. Obviously, the threat "AAA" received from appellant, coupled with his moral
ascendancy is enough to cow and intimidate "AAA." Being young and inexperienced, it instilled
tremendous fear in her mind. In People v. Domingo, we ruled that the effect of fear and intimidation
instilled in the victim’s mind cannot be measured against any given hard-and-fast rule such that it is
viewed in the context of the victim’s perception and judgment not only at the time of the commission
of the crime but also at the time immediately thereafter. In any event, "the failure of the victim to
immediately report the rape is not necessarily an indication of a fabricated charge.

"AAA" having positively identified the assailant to be the appellant and no other, the latter’s proffered
defense of denial must fail. "Denial could not prevail over the victim’s direct, positive and categorical
assertion."As to his alibi, appellant failed to substantiate the same with clear and convincing
evidence. The plane tickets he submitted in evidence to show that he was in other places during the
incidents are irrelevant. As correctly observed by the RTC, the tickets were all issued in 1994 while
the incidents subject of the Informations charging appellant with rape transpired from 1996 to 1999.
Thus, appellant’s alibi being uncorroborated and unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence,
is self-serving and deserves no weight in law.

In fine, "AAA’s" woeful tale of her harrowing experience in the hands of the appellant is impressively
clear, definite and convincing. Her detailed narration of the incidents, given in a spontaneous
and frank manner and without any fanfare, were beyond cavil well-founded. We therefore sustain
the RTC’s and the CA’s findings of appellant’s guilt.

Other case digest:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GUILLERMO LOMAQUE

G.R. No. 189297, June 5, 2013, Del Castillo, J.

Facts: An information charging Guillermo Lomaque of rape (Paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the RPC as
amended by RA 8353 in relation to Section 5 of RA 7610) was filed. The information alleged that
Lomaque “commited acts of sexual assault upon AAA by removing her shorts and inserting his penis
inside her vagina and having carnal knowledge of her against her will and without her consent.” During
trial, AAA solemnly testified that Lomaque merely put his penis in AAA’s mouth. No objection was heard
on the part of Lomaque regarding AAA’s testimony.
Issue: Whether Lomaque may be convicted of the crime of rape by sexual assault
Ruling: Yes. The information states that the crime was committed by Lomaque’s act of inserting his penis
inside AAA’s vagina. However, the latter testified later on that Lomaque merely put his penis in her mouth.
Lomaque’s failure to register any objection that the information alleged a different mode of the
commission of the crime of rape was fatal to his cause. He may be convicted of the crime of rape by
sexual assault.

27. People v. Amodia, G.R. NO 173791, April 7, 2009 - HANNA DADIA

Doctrine: A mistake in the name of the accused in the information is not equivalent, and does not
necessarily amount to, a mistake in the identity of the accused as the person who committed the crime,
especially when sufficient evidence is adduced to show that the accused is pointed to as one of the
perpetrators of the crime.

Facts: Pablo Amodia and three other accused allegedly killed Felix Olandria by stabbing. Their neighbors
in Makati City saw Amodia as among the assailants. An information was filed charging “Pablo Amodia”
and his fellow accused of the crime of murder. Amodia raises the defense of mistaken identity, claiming
that his real first name is “Pablito” and not “Pablo” as stated in the information. During trial, two of the
neighbors who were within a few meters away from the scene testified. They consistently and
categorically pinpointed Pablo/Pablito Amodia as one of the persons who killed Felix Olandria.

Issue: Whether Amodia may be convicted even if his name is misspelled in the information

Ruling: Yes. Pablo/Pablito Amodia was positively identified by his neighbors, who had known him for
years. The association of the eyewitnesses with Pablo/Pablito Amodia, whom they knew for years,
rendered them familiar with Pablo/Pablito, making it highly unlikely that they could have committed a
mistake in identifying him as one of the assailants. In any case, whether or not Pablito’s name is
misspelled in the information is immaterial and will not render his identification as a participant in the
stabbing uncertain.

28. People v. Mendoza, G.R. Nos. 132923-24, June 6, 2002 - JOHN RG DELA CRUZ
Doctrine: Aggravating and qualifying circumstances must be alleged in the information; otherwise they
cannot be appreciated.
Facts: Two informations were filed against Marcelo Mendoza, charging him with simple rape for having
carnal knowledge of one Michelle G. Tolentino on two different occasions in the year 1995. During trial,
the prosecution presented evidence to prove the qualifying circumstance of use of a deadly weapon. As a
result, the trial court convicted Mendoza of two counts of qualified rape, punishable by death.

Issue: Whether the qualifying circumstance of use of a deadly weapon may be appreciated

Ruling: No. Since the qualifying circumstance of use of a deadly weapon was not alleged in the
information, it would be a denial of Mendoza’s right to be informed of the charges against him if he is
charged with simple rape and be convicted of qualified rape punishable by death. Mendoza cannot be
punished for an offense graver than that for which he was charged.

29. People v. Tampus, et al., G. R. No. 181084, June 16, 2009 - MARI LOREN FRANCIA
Doctrine: Every information must state the qualifying and the aggravating circumstances attending the
commission of the crime for them to be considered in the imposition of the penalty.

Facts: An information was filed in court charging Montesclaros of qualified rape. The information alleged
that Montesclaros conspired with and gave permission to Tampus for him have carnal knowledge of AAA,
a minor, while AAA was drunk. During trial, the prosecution was able to prove that Montesclaros was
AAA’s mother and that she caused the intoxication of her daughter prior to the sexual congress.

Issue: Whether Montesclaros should be convicted for qualified rape

Ruling: No. Both the circumstances of minority and the relationship of the offender to the victim should be
alleged in the information before the qualifying circumstance under Article 266-B (1) of the RPC may be
appreciated. Since only the minority of the victim was alleged in the information, the failure to allege the
relationship of the offender to the victim meant that the qualifying circumstance found under Art. 266-B (1)
of the RPC should not be appreciated. Montesclaros may only be convicted of the crime of simple rape.

30. People v. Alfredo, G.R. No. 188560, December 15, 2010 - EDGAR SUPERIO
Doctrine: Exemplary damages may be granted when the circumstances of the case show the highly
reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender, even if no aggravating circumstances were alleged
in the information.

Facts: Two informations were filed against Alfredo charging him with rape by carnal knowledge and rape
by sexual assault of AAA, a pregnant woman. Both informations did not contain any aggravating
circumstance. The trial court eventually convicted Alfredo and ordered him to pay exemplary damages.
Alfredo questions the award of exemplary damages, claiming that exemplary damages may only be
awarded if the crime was attended by at least one aggravating circumstance as alleged and proved
before the court.
Issue: Whether AAA may recover exemplary damages
Ruling: Yes. Article 2230 of the Civil Code states that “[i]n criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a
part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances. x x x” The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, in turn, requires that the aggravating
circumstances must both be alleged and proved before the same may be appreciated in court.
However, since Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages are corrective in nature
and are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrongdoings, exemplary damages may thus be
awarded in criminal cases even in the absence of an aggravating circumstance. To apply Article 2230 of
the Civil Code strictissimi juris in criminal cases defeats the underlying public policy behind the award of
exemplary damages to set a public example or correction for the public good.
Alfredo sexually assaulting a pregnant woman shows moral corruption, perversity, and wickedness. The
award of exemplary damages under Article 2229 of the Civil Code is warranted, even if no aggravating
circumstance is alleged or proved in the criminal case.

31. Matalam v. Sandiganbayan, 455 SCRA 736 - ALEXANDRA MAUREEN

GARCIA
Doctrine: Substantial amendments to the information after the plea are generally proscribed and requires
a new preliminary investigation. However, the same may be allowed if it is beneficial to the accused, or if
the charge is related or included in the original information.

Facts: An information was filed before the Sandiganbayan, charging Matalam, et al. with violation of Sec.
3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, for their refusal to pay the money claims of DAR employees during the
period when said employees were illegally terminated. After the defense had presented its evidence, the
court admitted the amended information submitted by the prosecution. The amended information charged
only Matalam still with violation of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, but this time for the illegal dismissal
of the DAR employees. Matalam prayed for another preliminary investigation.

Issue: Whether another preliminary investigation should be conducted in view of the amended
information
Ruling: Yes. After the plea is entered, only a formal amendment may be allowed, and the same must be
made with leave of court and without prejudice to the rights of the accused.
The amendments made are substantial. A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts
constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are
merely of form. Although the charge of refusal to pay money claims and illegal dismissal are related, the
prohibited act allegedly committed changed. Moreover, although the two offenses fall under the same
provision of the statute, the element of evident bad faith in refusing to pay money claims is different from
evident bad faith in illegal dismissal. Since the case did not fall under the exemptions where substantial
amendment may be allowed without a new preliminary investigation, and since Matalam did not waive his
right, another preliminary investigation should be conducted.

32. Ricarze v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 160451, February 9, 2007 - CHARLENE

LEMUEL DE LEON
Doctrine: There is a formal amendment when a defense under the information as it originally stood would
be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be
equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other.

Facts: Eduardo G. Ricarze, an employee of Caltex Philippines, Inc., obtained Caltex’s PCIBank checks
payable to a Dante Gutierrez. Ricarze forged the signatures of Caltex’s authorized signatories and the
payee and deposited the check. PCIBank cleared the check and appropriated Caltex’s funds to Ricarze.

Caltex discovered the scheme and filed a complaint for estafa against Ricarze. Unknown to the public
prosecutor, PCIBank remitted back to Caltex the amounts it paid to Ricarze.
Two informations for estafa were filed designating Caltex as the offended party. After arraignment,
PCIBank filed a motion to amend the information to correct the erroneous designation of the offended
party.
Issue: Whether an amendment in the information is allowed after arraignment
Ruling: Yes. After the entry of a plea, only a formal amendment may be made but with leave of court and
if it does not prejudice the rights of the accused. An amendment to an information which does not change
the nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect the essence of the offense or deprive the accused
of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance.
The substitution of Caltex by PCIB is not a substantial amendment. The substitution did not alter the basis
of the charge in both informations, nor did it result in any prejudice to Ricarze. The documentary evidence
in the form of the forged checks remained the same, and all such evidence was available to petitioner well
before the trial. Ricarze cannot claim any surprise by virtue of the substitution.

33. Pacoy v. Judge Cajigal, G.R. No. 157472, September 28, 2007 - TRACE MAGNO
Doctrine: In determining whether the change effected an amendment or a substitution of the information,
the test is that where the second information involves the same offense, or an offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the first information, an amendment of the information is sufficient.

Facts: An information for homicide was filed, alleging that SSGT. Jose M. Pacoy “with intent to kill, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot his commanding officer x x x.” The information
likewise contains the statement, “With the aggravating circumstance of killing [his commanding officer] in
disregard of his rank.” The accused pleaded not guilty to the charge of homicide.
On the same day after the arraignment, Hon. Afable E. Cajigal ordered the prosecutor to amend the
information to murder, based on the Judge’s view that the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank
qualified the crime to murder. The designation of the offense in the information was amended accordingly.
Issue: Whether the change in the designation of the offense requires another preliminary investigation
Ruling: No. Where the new information charges an offense which is distinct from that initially charged, a
substitution is in order, which results in the dismissal of the original information, the conduct of another
preliminary investigation, and another arraignment under the new information.
A change in the designation of the offense as found in the caption of the information constitutes a mere
formal amendment and not a substantial amendment or a substitution of the original information. Apart
from the caption containing the designation of the offense, no other change was made regarding the
recital of facts which constitute the offense charged or determine the jurisdiction of the court.

34. People v. Chingh, G.R. No. 178323, March 16, 2011 - HARVEY JAY DAMIAO
Doctrine: When two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information but the accused
fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict the appellant of as many as are charged and proved,
and impose on him the penalty for each offense, setting out separately the findings of fact and law in
each offense.

Facts: Armando, in an information, was being charged with two offenses, rape under paragraph 1 (d),
Art. 266-A of the RPC, and rape as an act of sexual assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A. Armando
was charged with having carnal knowledge of VVV, who was under 12 years of age at the time, under
paragraph 1 (d) of Article 266-A, and he was also charged with committing an act of sexual assault by
inserting his finger into the genital of VVV under the second paragraph of Article 266-A. The prosecution
sought to establish that Armando inserted his penis, and also his finger in VVV’s private part.

Issue: Whether Armando can be convicted two offenses in one information

Ruling: Yes. The information has sufficiently informed accused-appellant that he is being charged with
two counts of rape. Two offenses were charged, which is a violation of Section 13, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states that “[a] complaint or information must charge only
one offense, except when the law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses.” Nonetheless,
since Armando failed to file a motion to quash the information, he can be convicted with two counts of
rape according to Section 3, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
35. Foz, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 167764, October 9, 2009 - HENRI CASTILLO
Doctrine: Jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or
information, and the offense must have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.

Facts: A libel case was filed by Dr. Portigo against the petitioners at RTC Iloilo. In the information, it
was alleged that Dr. Edgar Portigo is a physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo City and the alleged
libelous article against him was written in Panay News, a daily publication with considerable circulation
in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region. The RTC found the petitioners guilty. The CA affirmed. In
their petition to the SC, petitioners raise for the first time the issue that the information charging them
with libel did not contain allegations sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Iloilo City.

Issue: Whether the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 23 had jurisdiction over the libel case

Ruling: No. Considering that the information failed to allege the venue requirements for a libel case under
Art. 360 of the RPC, the RTC of Iloilo City had no jurisdiction to hear this case.The criminal action and
civil action for damages in cases of written defamations shall be filed simultaneously or separately with
the CFI of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the
offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense.

The allegations in the information only showed that Iloilo was the place where Panay News was in
considerable circulation but did not establish that the said publication was printed and first published in
Iloilo City. Also, while the information alleges that Dr. Edgar Portigo is a physician and medical
practitioner in Iloilo City, such allegation did not clearly indicate that he was actually residing in Iloilo City
at the time of the commission of the offense. It is possible that Dr. Portigo was actually residing in another
place.

36. Mary Rose Boto v. Senior Assistant City Prosecutor Villena, A. C. No. 9684, September 18,
2013 - GRAYSON YAMBAO
Doctrine: Jurisdiction is conferred by law and is not within the courts, let alone the parties themselves, to
determine or conveniently set aside.

Facts: An information was filed charging Boto with libel before the MeTC. Before the scheduled
arraignment, she filed a motion to quash the information on the ground of lack of jurisdiction as the crime
of libel falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC and that there was no such crime as internet libel.
Villena, the trial prosecutor, opposed the motion to quash and contended that the court had already
determined probable cause when it issued the warrant of arrest, effectively mooting the resolution of any
issue concerning jurisdiction, venue and sufficiency of evidence against the complainant.

Issue: Whether the MeTC had jurisdiction over the offense of libel

Ruling: No. Art. 360 of the RPC explicitly provides that jurisdiction over libel cases are lodged with the
RTC. The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations shall be filed
simultaneously or separately with the RTC of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and
first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense.

Jurisdiction cannot be waived except for those judicially recognizable grounds like estoppel. It is not
mooted by an action of a court in an erroneously filed case. When the law or procedure is so elementary,
not to know, or to act as if one does not know it, constitutes gross ignorance of the law, even without the
complainant having to prove malice or bad faith.

37. Hector Trenas v. People, G.R. No. 195002, January 25, 2012 - HANNA DADIA
Doctrine: In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional.

Facts: A criminal case for estafa was filed against Atty. Treas before the RTC of Makati City. Elizabeth
alleged that she entrusted to Atty. Treas an amount for the titling of a property. For failure to transfer the
title of the property, Atty. Treas issued to Elizabeth a check for refund. When the said check was
deposited at Equitable PCI Bank dela Rosa-Rada Branch at Makati City, the same was dishonored by the
drawee bank.

Petitioner asserts that the prosecution witness failed to allege that the acts material to estafa had
occurred in Makati City, that nowhere in the evidence presented by the prosecution does it show the
money was given to and received by petitioner in Makati City, that the Deed of Sale prepared by petitioner
was signed and notarized in Iloilo City and that the only time Makati City was mentioned was with respect
to the time when the check provided by petitioner was dishonored by Equitable-PCI Bank in its dela Rosa-
Rada Branch in Makati. Petitioner contends that the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case.

Issue: Whether the RTC of Makati City had jurisdiction over the estafa case

Ruling: No. A court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense committed outside
its limited territory. Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case cannot be conferred upon the
court by the accused, by express waiver or otherwise. That jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign
authority that organized the court and is given only by law in the manner and form prescribed by law.

Although the prosecution alleged that the check issued by petitioner was dishonored in a bank in Makati,
such dishonor is not an element of estafa under Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC. There being no showing
that the offense was committed within Makati, the RTC of that city has no jurisdiction over the case.

38. Lee Pue Liang v. Chua Pue Chin Lee, 703 SCRA 240 - JOHN RG DELA CRUZ
Doctrine: The offended party in the commission of a crime, public or private, is the party to whom the
offender is civilly liable, and therefore the private individual to whom the offender is civilly liable is the
offended party.

Facts: Petitioner, on behalf of Centillion Holdings, Inc. (CHI), caused the filing of a verified Petition for
the Issuance of an Owner’s Duplicate Copy which covers a property owned by CHI which was
subsequently granted. Respondent, joined by her brother Nixon Lee, filed an Omnibus Motion praying,
among others, that the Order be set aside claiming that petitioner made a willful and deliberate assertion
of falsehood in his verified petition, affidavit and testimony, as he perfectly knew that respondent was in
possession of the owner’s duplicate copy, the latter being the Corporate Treasurer and custodian of vital
documents of CHI. He thus accused petitioner of committing perjury.

The City Prosecutor filed the information for perjury, punishable under Art. 183 RPC. At trial, petitioner’s
counsel moved in open court that respondent and her lawyer in this case should be excluded from
participating in the case since perjury is a public offense and there is no mention of any private offended
party. Petitioner asserts that respondent is not the proper offended party that may intervene in this case.

Issue: Whether respondent may intervene in the perjury case

Ruling: Yes. Section 12, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, defines an
offended party as “the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed.”
Even assuming that no civil liability was alleged or proved in the perjury case being tried in the MeTC,
whether public or private crimes are involved, it is erroneous for the trial court to consider the intervention
of the offended party by counsel as merely a matter of tolerance. Where the private prosecution has
asserted its right to intervene in the proceedings, that right must be respected. The right reserved by the
Rules to the offended party is that of intervening for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability borne
by the criminal act and not of demanding punishment of the accused. Such intervention is always subject
to the direction and control of the public prosecutor.

C. RULE 111 -PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION

1. Ricarze v. Court of Appeals, supra - MARI LOREN FRANCIA

Doctrine:

Facts:

Issue:

Ruling:

2. Cruz v. Mina, G.R. No.154207, April 07, 2007 - Edgar Superio Jr.

Doctrine: Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable except in instances when no actual damage results from an offense, such as espionage,
violation of neutrality, flight to an enemy country, and crime against popular representation. The basic rule
applies in the instant case, such that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery
of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with criminal action, unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.

Facts: On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of
Appearance, as private prosecutor, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 for Grave Threats, where his father,
Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness. The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student,
justifies his appearance as private prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court and the ruling of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr. that a non-lawyer may
appear before the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers
that his appearance was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a written authority of
Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case. However, in an
Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear as private prosecutor
on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A
of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid
down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation of trial. On February 13, 2002, petitioner filed
before the MeTC a Motion for Reconsideration. In an Order dated March 4, 2002, the MeTC denied the
Motion for Reconsideration. On April 2, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Certiorari
and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against the
private respondent and the public respondent MeTC. After hearing the prayer for preliminary injunction to
restrain public respondent MeTC Judge from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the
Certiorari proceedings, the RTC, in a Resolution dated May 3, 2002, resolved to deny the issuance of an
injunctive writ on the ground that the crime of Grave Threats, the subject of Criminal Case No. 00-1705, is
one that can be prosecuted de oficio, there being no claim for civil indemnity, and that therefore, the
intervention of a private prosecutor is not legally tenable. On May 9, 2002, the petitioner filed before the
RTC a Motion for Reconsideration. Pending the resolution of the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration
before the RTC, the petitioner filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration dated June 7, 2002 with the
MeTC seeking the reversal of the March 4, 2002 Denial Order of the said court, on the strength of Bar
Matter No. 730, and a Motion to Hold In Abeyance the Trial dated June 10, 2002 of Criminal Case No. 00-
1705 pending the outcome of the certiorari proceedings before the RTC. On June 5, 2002, the RTC
issued its Order denying the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. Likewise, in an Order dated June 13,
2002, the MeTC denied the petitioner’s Second Motion for Reconsideration and his Motion to Hold in
Abeyance the Trial on the ground that the RTC had already denied the Entry of Appearance of petitioner
before the MeTC

Issue: Whether or not the private prosecutor may rightfully intervene to prosecute the civil aspect

Ruling: Yes. Petitioner argues that the RTC erroneously held that, by its very nature, no civil liability may
flow from the crime of Grave Threats, and, for this reason, the intervention of a private prosecutor is not
possible. It is clear from the RTC Decision that no such conclusion had been intended by the RTC. In
denying the issuance of the injunctive court, the RTC stated in its Decision that there was no claim for civil
liability by the private complainant for damages, and that the records of the case do not provide for a
claim for indemnity; and that therefore, petitioner’s appearance as private prosecutor appears to be
legally untenable. Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony
is also civilly liable except in instances when no actual damage results from an offense, such as
espionage, violation of neutrality, flight to an enemy country, and crime against popular representation.
The basic rule applies in the instant case, such that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with criminal
action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no
reservation, waiver, nor prior institution of the civil aspect in Criminal Case No. 00-1705, it follows that the
civil aspect arising from Grave Threats is deemed instituted with the criminal action, and, hence, the
private prosecutor may rightfully intervene to prosecute the civil aspect.