Dakota Warrington

Online Class
Judicial Opinion Assignment

Issue: The search was invalid because probable cause had not been
demonstrated to obtain a warrant.

Holding: Yes

Reasoning:

The warrant issued by the Magistrate in this scenario can be deemed

invalid by looking at the precedent set by Spenelli v. United States. In
Justice Harlan’s opinion given in the case it was found there was no
attempt to validate the credibility of the source or the information given
in the tip. This can be applied to the case at hand in two ways.

1. There is no proof that the voice-mail left on Detective Banichek’s

phone came from a reliable source, and no way to prove that it could
have been.
2. The information given in the anonymous tip describes normative daily
actions taking place (i.e. picking up a brown, paper wrapped package
from the post office). It is also unclear as to how the anonymous
caller obtained their knowledge about the contents of the package, and
where it is to be stored.

This ruling can also be upheld by the precedent set by Justice Rehnquist’s
ruling in Illinois v. Gates, which further elaborates on the invalidity of
search warrants issued by a non-credible source mentioned as the main
distributor of information in the affidavit submitted to the Magistrate.
Furthermore, I concur with his implication that the Spinelli ‘two-
pronged’ test, though useful in determining validity, is to technical when
testing probability before issuing a search warrant. Also, that the
‘totality-of-circumstance’ approach is a much more applicable way to
approach such a subject. In using this method we recognize the lack of
legal prowess non-lawyers have when drafting affidavits. We also
recognize Detective Banichek’s hastiness to secure the search warrant,
and his knowledge of the area mentioned in the tip to pursue the
information given to him. However, I do not believe that the above
factors outweigh the overall implication that the tip did not pass the two-
pronged test in its inability to contain a credible source with equally
credible information. Therefore, I remain adamant that the search
warrant issued by the Magistrate to search the home located at 714
Bongwater Dr. invalid.

II

Issue: The search of Ganja’s house was unconstitutional because the

warrant was not issued for his property.

Holding: No, the search of the house was constitutional

Reasoning:

In hindsight the search of Ganja’s house would seem unconstitutional

because the first argument made by the petitioner was answered in the
affirmative. However, these two issues at hand are separate from each
other, and this issue should be reviewed without bias from the former.
Here we find constitutional value upheld by the officers conducting
the search based on the officer’s judgment. I accept this as a rationale
reasoning for my decision because the judgment made in this instance is
coherent with the level of knowledge obtainable by the officers involved.
Recognizing the fact that the officers noticed the difference in addresses
prior to entering the premises, and sought an explanation can conclude
this. Having been told by the gas company that there was no account that
existed at 714, but rather at 714 ½ it is safe to conclude that the officers
made adequate attempts to provide explanation for the discrepancy. With
that being said it would seem acceptable that the officers assumed there
must have been a mistake while drafting the affidavit, and with all other
variables being consistent (i.e. the blue Accord, and the package) it
would be within constitutional bounds to carry out the search. This
further upholds precedent set by Justice Stevens in Maryland v. Garrison,
where again the constitutionality of the police conducting the search is
judged based on the information available to them at the time. Also, that
evidence found to the contrary outside of the available information given
to the officers at that instance cannot be applied in such a way that it
refutes the constitutionality of the search being carried out. Another
aspect that supports my rationale is that the officers conducted the search
within the confines of what they believed to be the correct address
provided by the search warrant.
In regards again to the case of Maryland v. Garrison, and to further
my reasoning we look at the dissenting opinions of Justices Blackmun,
Brennan, and Marshall. Within their opinions of dissent we see an
argument made that reasonable efforts were not made to obtain
information regarding the floor plan of the building that was to be
involved in the search. If adequate efforts were made then the realization
of there being two apartments on the third floor would’ve came before
the search took place. This governs here in the reassurance that
reasonable efforts were made to obtain information regarding the address
of the residence, and that there was no way for someone investigating the
property to know of the existing 714 address. Given the fact that this
unknown address was simply a garage behind the house that was paid for
by the same owner I find it appropriate to assume that this information
couldn’t have been gathered prior to the issuance of the warrant. All this
into consideration, there was no unconstitutional activity that took place
in this instance.

III/IV

Issue: The search of Ganja’s underpants was unconstitutional

Issue: The search of Ciccone’s bra was unconstitutional

Holding: No; No

Reasoning:

As we look at the ruling for the previous petitioner’s argument with an

unbiased perspective in regards to argument number 1, we now look at
the third argument in the opposite manner. In determining the holding
for this issue at hand we must take into account that the police were
determined to have acted constitutionally in carrying out the search
warrant at the address at 714 Bongwater Drive. In further analysis the
precedent set forth by Richards v. Wisconsin requires that the ‘knock-
and-announce’ law be applied when there is no apparent threat of danger
and/or the destruction of evidence. This law is indeed seen as a
discretionary act, and should be speculated on in a case-by-case basis. In
our case I find it necessary to apply the knock-and-announce law because
there was no immediate threat of danger or the assumption that evidence
was being destroyed. Given these two facts the police officers knocked
once, and no acknowledgment was made from inside the house that the
knock was heard. After knocking for a minute longer, and with no
answer from the other side, the uniformed officers entered the home of
Ganja through the unlocked door. I find this to be constitutional, and the
petitioner using the above-mentioned rule cannot combat entering the
home using this precedent. This also sets a precursor in the examination
of the case Hudson v. Michigan, which again uses the knock and
announce rule to allow the occupants of the house time to prepare for the
presence of the police (i.e. putting clothes on and getting out of bed). I
find this notion applicable, but in the case at hand I disagree, and again
would refute the argument on the basis that this would have given time to
conceal the marijuana cigarette Ganja contained within his underpants. I
also find it important to take into consideration the nature of the search.
The initial search was based on the assumption that crack cocaine was
being stored in the house, and it would be reasonable for the officers to
assume that it could be found on the persons occupying the house.
Taking all of these facts into consideration I hold that the officers acted
within their constitutional bounds while entering the house, and had
enough reasonable suspicion to search the subjects under the impression
that the substance they sought as mentioned in the warrant could be
found on the occupants.

Issue: The search of Petitioner’s apartment was not proper because no

consent was given to search

Holding: No, consent was given

Reasoning:

We see in officer Link’s testimony that prior to searching the residence

pursuant to the search warrant he asked Ganja and Ciccone if there were
any drugs or weapons in the house that any of the officers should know
about. In response to officer Link’s question Ciccone replied, “Go ahead
and search the place…” which would suffice as a form of consent to
continue with the search. With the prior realization that indeed the
warrant issued was invalid, gaining further verbal consent from the
occupants of the apartment to search further solidifies the
constitutionality of the search. I further the reasoning for my decision by
warranting the case Chimel v. California as adequate evidence to support
my opinion. In the precedent set by this case it was decided that, when a
constitutional arrest was made then the matter of searching the premises
is not bound by the need for the issuance of a proper warrant. Justice
Stewart in writing the opinion decided that it is more appropriate to look
at if the search was warranted. The opinion of this particular case also
stated that the search minus the warrant is considered constitutional if the
search is conducted, “where the search was made in order to find and
seize things connected with the crime”. In our case the fact that a
subsequent search was made after finding the marijuana cigarette in the
underpants of the owner of the house it is constitutionally sound to search
the entire premises. With these things being held constant, the argument
made by the petitioner regarding the lack of consent to search the
apartment is decided in the negative. In fact consent was given, and
given the nature of the events, facts of the case, and precedent set forth
by subsequent court’s decisions all contain reasons allocated to support
the holding.
 VI

Issue: The use of Ciccone’s statements violated her Fifth Amendment

Rights

Holding: Yes

Reasoning:

Here there are no facts in the case that support the prostitute conviction
given to Ciccone in the case at hand. The only thing that would allow
this conclusion to be made would be the use of Ciccone’s incriminating
statement made when the woman was asked about her prior prostitution
record. With that being said it is found that these statements made not
under interrogation, without being in the presence of council, and without
being read her Miranda rights cannot be used against her in a court of
law, and therefore the incriminating statement used as evidence to
convict Miss Ciccone of prostitution is null and void. To further aid in
the examination of the path taken to this conclusion we look towards a
literal meaning found in the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. This
amendment directly protects one from voluntarily or involuntarily
subjecting oneself to criminal prosecution. This can come from physical
or verbal means of incrimination, and extends its rights to Ciccone in the
case at hand, in the repetitive notion that her statements alone found her
to be guilty of prostitution in a court of law.

VII

Issue: The exclusionary rule forbids the admission of the physical

evidence and statements into court

Holding: No the physical evidence is admissible; Yes the statements are

inadmissible

Reasoning:
The court’s decision in convicting Mr. Ganja on the grounds of the
possession of marijuana is to be upheld. However, the conviction of
prostitution regarding Miss Ciccone is to not be upheld. The basis for
this decision is rooted by the insufficient evidence presented to the court
by the facts of the case that would allow for the conviction of
prostitution. As mentioned in the former Miss Ciccone’s statements were
the only things that allowed for such a conviction and since found being
inadmissible in a court of law there is no such evidence that would
support this claim against her. With this fact holding constant in the
petitioner’s argument, the account of Mr. Ganja soliciting a prostitute is
not found to be constitutionally sound, and therefore Mr. Ganja’s
conviction should be thrown out.
I again would like to reiterate that the finding of a marijuana cigarette
is still admissible which helped aid in the conviction of being in the
possession of an illegal drug. We find these to be held constant in the
trial case of U.S. v. Leon in which it was decided by Justice White that,
although the search warrant obtained was found to be unconstitutional (as
is the same in our case) the good-faith of the officers conducting the
search follow the guidelines set forth by a warrant that they believed to
be valid. This act of good-faith allows any evidence found to be still
admissible in the court, which would further support my decision that,
the search and/or evidence found to be upheld as admissible and hold a
standard of being constitutionally sound.