Phoenicia: 15 Hellenistic

)
2. |
15 HELLENISTIC
We
PHOENICIA
JOHN
D. GRAINGER
CLARENDON PRESS, OXFORD

1991
that Mtenttinede
CLAREMONT
SCHOOL GF THEOLOGY
Claremont, CA
Oxford Unwwersity Press, Walton Street, Oxford ox2 6DP
Oxford New York Toronto
Delhi Bombay Calcutta Madras Karachi
Petaling Jaya Singapore Hong Kong Tokyo
Nairobi Dar es Salaam Cape Town
Melbourne Auckland
and associated companies in
Berlin Ibadan
Oxford is a trade mark of Oxford University Press
Published in the United States

by Oxford University Press, New York
© fj. D. Grainger 1991
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,

stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
electronic, mechanical, photocpying, recording, or otherwise, without
the prior permission of Oxford University Press
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
(Data available)
ISBN 0-19-814770-8
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Grainger, John D., 1939-
Hellenistic Phoenicia| John D. Grainger.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Phoenicians. 2. Hellenism. I. Title.
DS82.G73 1992
939' .44—dc20
ISBN o-19-814770-8
Typeset by Butler and Tanner Ltd, Frome and London

Printed in Great Britain by
Bookcraft (Bath) Ltd
Midsomer Norton, Avon
Pe tae
eee te,
Ver, ae
oe 1a
1 oN
CONTENTS
List of Maps vl
Abbreviations vil
Introduction
Ws The Time of Troubles, 360-287 Bc

Ze The Ptolemaic Peace, 287-225 Bc
3. Conquest, 225-193 BC
4. The Seleukid Peace, 193-129 Bc 106
5 Autonomy and Independence, 129-64 Bc 129

6 . The Roman Take-over, 64-15 BC 159
7 . Phoenicians Overseas 187
Index 225
LIST‘\OF*MAPS
_ . Greater Phoenicia
. Akhaimenid Phoenicia
. Phoenicia and Antiochos III 86
. Phoenicia in the First Century Bc 130
. Phoenicians in the East 188
. Phoenicians in the West 200
ND. Phoenicians in the Aegean
WO
LP
DOO
NI 204
ABBREVIATIONS
AAAS Annales Archéologiques Arabes Syriennes

ANRW Aufstieg und Niedergang des Rémischen
Welt
ANSMN American Numismatic Society
Museum Notes
App., CW. Appian, Civil Wars
App., Syr. Appian, Syrian Wars
Arr., Anab. Arrian, Anabasis of Alexander
Austin M. M. Austin, The Hellenistic World
Strom Alexander to the Roman Conquest
(Cambridge 1981)
Bagnall, Ptolemaic Possessions R.S. Bagnall, The Administration of the
Ptolemaic Possessions outside Egypt
(Leiden, 1976)
BASOR Bulletin of the American Society for Orien-
tal Research
BCH Bulletin de Correspondence Hellénique
Bellinger, ‘End’ A. R. Bellinger, “The End of the Se-
leucids’, Transactions of the Connecticut
Academy of Arts and Sciences, 38 (1949)
Betlyon, Mints J. W. Betlyon, The Coinage and Mints
of Phoenicia (Chico, Calif., 1982)
BMB Bulletin du Musée de Beyrouth
BMC Phoenicia G. F. Hill, Catalogue of Coins in the
British Museum: Phoenicia (London,
1910)
BMC Seleucid Kings P. Gardner, Catalogue of Coins in the
British Museum: the Seleucid Kings of
Syria (London, 1878)
Brown J. P. Brown, The Lebanon and Phoenicia
(Beirut, 1969)
CIG Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum
(ET Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum
GIS) Corpus Inscriptionum Semiticarum
C. ord. Ptol. M.-T. Lenger, Corpus des ordonnances
des Ptolemées, 2nd edn. (Brussels, 1980)
Curtius Curtius Rufus, History of Alexander
Diod. Diodoros
Durrbach, Choix F. Durrbach, Choix d’inscriptions de
Delos (Paris, 1921)
vill Abbreviations
FGH F. Jacoby, Fragmente der griechischen
HMistoriker (Berlin and Leiden, 1923-
57)
Gjerstad, SCE E. Gjerstad, Swedish Cyprus Expedition
IV/2 (Stockholm, 1948)
Grainger, Cities J. D. Grainger, The Cities of Seleukid
Syria (Oxford 1990)
Head, HN B. V. Head, Historia Numorum (Oxford
IQII)
Honigmann, ‘Hist. Top.’ E. Honigmann, ‘Historische Topo-
graphie von Nordsyrien in Altertum’,
Houghton
ZDPV (1923)
A. Houghton, Coins of the Seleucid
Empire from the Collection of Arthur
Houghton (New York, 1983)
IG Inscriptiones Graecae
IGLS Inscriptions Grecques et Latines de Syrie
IGR R. Cagnat (ed.), Inscriptiones Graecae
ad res Romanas pertinentes
JANES Journal of Ancient Near Eastern Studies
JNES Journal of Near Eastern Studies
Jones, CERP A. H. M. Jones, Cities of the Eastern
Roman Provinces, 2nd edn. (Oxford,
josi: AF
1971)
Josephus, Antiquitates Fudaicae
Jos., BF Josephus, Bellum Fudaicum
Kindler (ed.), Proc. A. Kindler (ed.), Proceedings of the
International Numismatic Convention,
Jerusalem 1963 (Tel Aviv, 1967)
Macc. Maccabees
Millar, ‘Phoenician Cities’ F. G. Millar, ‘The Phoenician Cities:
A Case Study in Hellenisation’, Pro-
ceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical
Society (1983), 55-71.
MUSF Meélanges de l Université Saint-Fosephe
Newell, WSM E. T. Newell, The Coinage of the Western
Seleucid Mints (New York, 1941)
Nicolaou, Hist. Top. Kition I. Nicolaou, Historical Topography of
Kition, Studies in Mediterranean
History, 43 (Goteborg, 1976)
NNM American Numismatic Society,
Numismatic Notes and Monographs
OGIS W. Dittenberger (ed.), Orientis Graeci
Inscriptiones Selectae (Leipzig, 1903)
Abbreviations ix
Pliny, VH Pliny, Natural History
Plut. Plutarch
Pol. Polybios
RE Pauly, Wissowa, etal., Real-Encyclopddie
der classischen Altertums-Wissenschaft
Rev. Num. Revue Numismatique
Rey-Coquais, Arados J.-P. Rey-Coquais, Arados et sa perée
(Paris, 1974)
Rouvier J. Rouvier, ‘Numismatique des villes
de Phénicie’, Journal Internationale
d’ Archéologie Numismatique 3, 4, and 5
(1902-5)
SEG Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecarum
Seyrig, ‘Aradus’ H. Seyrig, ‘Aradus et sa perée sous les
rois Seleucides’, Syria, 28 (1951), 206—
7
Seyrig, ‘Eres’ H. Seyrig, ‘Eres de quelques villes de
Syrie’, Syrta, 27 (1950), 5-50
St. Phoen. v E. Lipinsky (ed.), Phoenicia and the East
Mediterranean in the First Millenium Bc,
Studia Phoenicia, v (Louvain, 1987)
St. Phoen. viii C. Bonnet, Melgart, Mythes et Cultes de
l’Heracles tyrien en Mediterranée, Studia
Phoenicia, viii (Louvain, 1988)
TAPA Transactions and Proceedings of the Amer-
ican Philological Association
ZDPV Aeutschrift fiir Deutsche Paldsteins Verein
ZPE Keuschrift fiir Papyrologie und Epigrafik
INTRODUCTION
Explaining the title of a book may well be a mistake, for, if it

needs to be explained, should it not be changed? Nevertheless
I will essay here a justification of my title, for both of the words
in it pose problems.
Take ‘Phoenicia’ first. The place is known, even well
known—Tyre, Sidon, and so on. But what were its boundaries?
What is to be included, and what ignored? Should, for instance,
Carthage be included? The Rivista di Studi Fenict is full of work
on Carthage and Sicily and the west generally; D. B. Harden’s
book The Phoenicians deals with both eastern and western groups.
This would suggest the inclusion of both; but, by the period I
am considering, the westerners can no longer be described as
Phoenicians, rather as Carthaginians. They have a distinctive
history, and so the westerners can be omitted. But then, what
of Cyprus? From Phoenicia, it is ‘west’, and it was an area of
colonial expansion, just as was North Africa, and yet the island
itself is obviously in the eastern Mediterranean. So Cyprus is
questionable. So also, therefore, must Palestine be a marginal
case, for there Phoenicians were similarly involved in a colonial
context. So, largely because their histories illuminate that of
the Phoenician homeland, both of these lands are included
as long as distinctively Phoenician political entities existed in
them.
Then there is that elastic term ‘Hellenistic’. Like all artificial
historical terminology, the word can only be used loosely;
setting edges to it is dangerous. As an example, consider the
usual commencing date, 323 Bc, marked by the death of Alex-
ander the Great. This is an awkward, indeed a ludicrous break-
point. Taken in a seriously objective way, either 325 or 320
would be better, the first marking Alexander’s return from the
east and the start of his only serious attempt to rule his empire,
2 Introduction
the second marking the end of the brief attempt to keep that
empire in one piece. Neither of these, of course, is any real
improvement, for they all occur in the middle of the process of
Macedonian expansion and conquest. The start of that process
is the accession of Philip II in 359. As it happens, this is also a
much more convincing date for beginning a more or less self-
contained historical era for Phoenicia, for in 360 began a series
of events which I have chosen to call, with acknowledgements
to Russian history and A. J. Toynbee, the “Time of Troubles’.
Thus, in this study the term ‘Hellenistic’ is used in a very
loose sense to indicate that period of time between the ending
of the Persian empire and the beginning of the Roman. Neither
of these ‘events’ has a clear, datable beginning, and so I have
included in the study both the final generation of the Persian
period and the first half-century of the Roman. In chrono-
logical, as much as in geographical, terms, the boundaries of
the study are fuzzy.
The Phoenicians have been the subject ofa fascinating article
by Professor Fergus Millar, where he concentrates on the
problem of Hellenization. That article has been one of the
origins and inspirations of this study. In a larger study such
as this, however, Hellenization can only be one theme. The
Phoenicians were, and are, known above all as traders. Thus,
their economy has to be a second theme. Yet neither of these
can be understood without establishing a clear outline of the
political history of the cities, both as a group, and—much more
difficult—individually. This provides, therefore, the major
framework within which the other themes of trade and Hel-
lenization will be studied.
There are, of course, major problems of evidence in a study
of this sort, for no ancient source makes any attempt to tell
the story of the Phoenicians. Indeed, if there had been more
evidence, this would not be the first modern study of the Hell-
enistic period in Phoenicia. Academic historians, like truffle-
hounds, only go to where there are traditional rewards to be
had. The absence of an ancient account of Phoenician history,
however, cannot be a reasonable excuse for failing to study the
subject. If it is important—as I obviously feel it is—it should
be studied, despite the shortage of evidence. And when one
looks at the information actually available, there is enough, as
Introduction a
I hope to show in the following pages, to make a coherent
account possible.
The importance of the subject lies in the fact that the Phoe-
nicians existed in the beginning of the Hellenistic period, and
that they survived. Their methods of survival, the compromises
they made to do so, and their varying responses to Greek culture
and Macedonian power, are significant matters in ancient
history. They can be contrasted with two other groups: the
Greeks, who shared with them the practice of urban living,
and the Jews, with whom they shared culture, religion, and
language. All three peoples had to face the overwhelming pres-
ence of Macedonian and Roman power in the Hellenistic
period; the Phoenician response is as valid as that of the Greeks
and the Jews, and it is different, and the reasons for the differ-
ences are the best reasons for studying them.
Myriandros ?
SYRIA
Lapethos
CYPRUS ><
Idalion
Tamassos®
Aradose
ee
Tripolis s
50 100 150 200 km
Phoenician cities etc. in italic typeface
/)
Map 1. Greater Phoenicia
THE TIME OF TROUBLES
360-287 BC
The coastlands of the eastern Mediterranean can be described

in various ways. A modern geographer will probably begin
with the coast itself and move inland, detailing the successive
longitudinal zones, first the coast, then the mountain ranges,
the trench of the rift valley, and finally the desert.' The Roman
compiler Pliny the Elder, reflecting the political situation ofhis
own day, started from the south and moved northwards, dealing
first with Palestine, then Phoenicia, and finally northern Syria.”
The sailor Skylax in the mid-fourth century Bc began in the
north and listed the places he would call at on a coasting voyage
from Greece to Egypt, ignoring the inland areas.’
None of these is a good enough approach to Phoenicia for
Skylax’s time. He was compiling a sailor’s manual of the whole
Mediterranean, for the use of Greek sailors; similarly, Pliny was
noting the details of the Roman Empire. Neither had his view
fixed on Phoenicia as a whole and as a distinct land. A Phoeni-
cian, adopting the home-based point of view which is natural
for everyone, would surely begin in the middle.
In the mid-fourth century Bc, in about 350, when Skylax
wrote, and in a brief period of calm in the turbulent affairs of
the eastern Mediterranean, that hypothetical Phoenician would
begin with the main Phoenician cities, six in number. The most
important city was Sidon, built on a small promontory and
' —D. Baramki, Phoenicia and the Phoenicians (Beirut, 1961), 1-5, does this, and so does
the volume Syria in the Admiralty Geographical Handbooks series (London, 1943);
D.S. Walker, The Mediterranean Lands (London, 1960), 429-35, starts with the rift valley
and moves westwards to the coast; cf. also E. de Vaumas, ‘Les Conditions naturelles
de occupation humaine au Liban’, Annales de Géographie, 57 (1948), 40-9.
2 Pliny, WH, v. xiii. 66.
3 C. Muller, Geographi Graeci Minores, i (Berlin, 1835), Skylax, 104; J. Elayi, “The
Phoenician Cities in the Persian Period’, JANES 12 (1980), 13-28, is a useful discussion
but rather ignores changes during the long Akhaimenid period; cf. also F. Verkinderen,
‘Les Cités phéniciennes dans l’empire d’Alexandre le Grand’, St. Phoen. v. 287-94.
6 The Time of Troubles, 360-287 BC
partly sheltered from the seaward side by a low islet. The city
looked both to the sea, with its two harbours on either side ofthe
promontory,‘ and partly to the land, where a slight widening of
the narrow coastal plain provided a rich agricultural base for
the production of necessary foodstuffs.? Long before, the city
had been divided between maritime and landward sections,
but they had since fused.
Two other cities had grown up on islands near the coast.
Forty kilometres to the south of Sidon was Tyre. Like Sidon, it
had two sections, but the strait between island and mainland
had prevented fusion. The repeated threat of attack had dimin-
ished the mainland branch, called Palaityros by the Greeks,
but the island-city flourished.® A hundred kilometres north of
Sidon, the other island-city, Arados, exhibited the same pattern:
an island, a mainland section, called Marathos, and a mainland
coastal plain as a source of food.’ It is striking that all the
great cities have this division. Arados and Marathos, Tyre and
Palaityros might be explained by- the island-situations of the
two main cities, but there are also Byblos and Palaibyblos
and Great Sidon and Little Sidon. Presumably there is some-
thing significant about this in the Phoenician past, but, if so,
it had ceased to affect matters by the Persian and Hellenistic
periods.
Between Sidon and Arados were two other cities. Byblos was
exceedingly ancient, with a history of contacts with Egypt going
back to the third millenium and an ancient temple still in use,
testifying to its age. Now, as a city, it had fallen into some
decay.® The city, though, like Sidon and Tyre and Arados, was
still ruled by its own line of kings, which gave it a status denied
its humbler neighbours. North of Byblos, in the plain of Akkar,
* R. Mouterde, A. Poidebard, and J. Lauffray, Sidon, aménagements antiques
du port de
Saida (Beirut, 1951); corrected by H. Frost, ‘The Offshore Island of Sidon and
other
Phoenician Sites in the Light of New Dating Evidence’, International Journal
of Nautical
Archaeology and Underwater Exploration, 2 (1973), 75-94.
° Admiralty Geographical Handbooks, Syria, 261-2.
® Alexander demolished Palaityros during the siege (Arr., Anab.
u. viii, 3; Curtius
Iv. li. 4) but it was still there to be noted by Strabo xv1. ii. 24.
” Strabo xvi. ii. 12.
®* W. A. Ward, ‘Egypt and the East Mediterranean from Predynastic Times
to the
End of the Old Kingdom’, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient,
6 (1963),
1-57; M. Dunand, ‘L’Architecture 4 Byblos au temps des Achémenides’,
BMB 22
(1969), 9495 and 98, suggests a certain Prosperity in the city, but little
else supports
the idea, certainly not by comparison with the other three greater cities.
The Time of Troubles, 360-287 BC 7
was Tripolis. The origin of this city is unclear, for it is nowhere
mentioned in the earlier records, and, further, is odd in having
a Greek name.’ Its description by Diodoros'® is of a very strange
settlement, in which there were in fact three separate settle-
ments, each founded by one of the three main Phoenician cities:
Arados, Tyre, and Sidon, with the Sidonian section the biggest.
These facts make it clear that it was a relatively late foundation,
of the fifth or fourth century.!!
This conclusion does not in fact explain much, and certainly
not why the three cities should co-operate in such a venture.
Actually, of course, their co-operation was distinctly limited,
for the three suburbs remained separate. So there must have
been something else which attracted all three settlements to
that site, and which was able to maintain the peace between
them. The clue as to what the attraction was lies in the under-
standing of certain events in 345, when Tripolis was the scene
of the start of a rebellion against Persian authority. Many years
ago, K. Galling pointed out that Diodoros’ account of these
events includes two distinct ways of referring to the rebels: ‘the
city of the Sidonians’ and ‘Sidon’.’? The latter clearly refers to
the city of Sidon itself, but in the context, ‘the city of the
Sidonians’ is actually Diodoros’ way of referring to the Sidonian
suburb of Tripolis. He also remarks that it was in that suburb
that the Persian ‘satraps and generals’ dwelt, and that it was
friction between the Persian officials and the inhabitants of the
Sidonian suburb which began the revolt. Further, he describes
Tripolis as ‘important’, which it was not at any time in the
Akhaimenid or Hellenistic periods, and he remarks that it was
in Tripolis that the Phoenicians met in council.
The best interpretation of this set of facts is that it was at
the unoccupied site of Tripolis that the Persian governor of
Phoenicia established his headquarters. The three main cities
established suburbs there, partly to keep in touch with the
° Millar, ‘Phoenician Cities’, 56-7.
'0 Diod. xvi. xli. 1; Strabo xv1. ii. 15 repeated the tripartite division.
NJ. Elayi, ‘Studies in Phoenician Geography during the Persian Period’, NES 41
(1982), 83-110, claims that the discovery of Late Bronze Age pottery at Tripolis means
that the foundation of the city is ‘undoubtedly ancient’ (p. gr). It does nothing of the
sort, unless there is a continuous and substantial occupation between the Late Bronze
Age and the Persian period. This does not seem to exist.
'2 K. Galling, ‘Die Syrische-Palastinische Kiiste nach der Beschreibung bei Pseudo-
Skylax’, <DPV 61 (1938), 66-99.
Land over 1000 m
25 50 Orontes
Arados e
Eleutheros
* Tripolis
¢ Damascus
Map 2. Akhaimenid Phoenicia

The Time of Troubles, 360-287 Bc 9
governor. (Byblos, weaker and closer than the others, would
scarcely need to place a colony there.) Partly also they would
want to exploit the market his court provided. It will have been
a fairly populous place, for ‘satraps and generals’ require staffs
and families and slaves to support them, and luxuries as well
as plainer food. Hence the Phoenicians’ ‘council’, whatever it
was. [he actual governor was probably of a rank below satrap,
but the satrap was peripatetic, and would visit regularly. No
doubt a palace for his use existed in the city.!%
There was a sixth Phoenician city, another monarchy, which
is usually ignored because it was not on the mainland. Yet it
was no further away from Tripolis than Tyre was from Arados.
This was the city of Kition in Cyprus, partly Cypriot, partly
Greek in population, but also with an ancient Phoenician par-
ticipation, at least six centuries old by the time of Skylax: in
the fourth century it was a vigorous and locally powerful city."
These six places were the Phoenician core-territory. Each
had its own section of mainland, within which were subordinate
towns and villages. Arados had a string of village-ports along
its adjacent mainland, Gabala, Balanaia, Paltos, Enydra, as
well as Marathos; its power also stretched inland along the
north bank of the Eleutheros river as far as Mariamme, thus
giving Arados control over the first stages of the route into the
interior between the mountain ranges of the Bargylos and
Lebanon.’°
Tripolis dominated the rich plain of Akkar, south of the
Eleutheros. Only one named place, a village or town called
Trieris, can be suggested to be part of the territory of Tripolis.'®
An organized Tripolitan territory is perhaps unlikely, since an
organized Tripolitan government did not exist, the ‘city’ being
instead ‘three cities, at a distance ofa stade from one another’.!”
'3 The discovery of an architectural fragment, a ‘bull-capital’, at Sidon has lead to
speculation that it was from ‘a palace of the Persian king’ (D. Harden, The Phoenicians
(London, 1963), 55), because it was in the Persian style and can be paralleled at Susa.
This is, of course, not proved. The Phoenicians were notoriously eclectic in their artistic
tastes, and a copy of an exotic architectural style is just what would have appealed to
them (G. Conteneau, ‘Deuxiéme mission archéologique a Sidon’, Syria, 4 (1923), pl.
44). Once this is out of the way, there is no reason to locate the events of 345 at Sidon
rather than Tripolis.
‘4 E. Gjersted, ‘The Phoenician Colonisation and Expansion in Cyprus’, in Report
of the Department of Antiquities of Cyprus, 1979, 230-254.
'S Strabo xiv. ii. 12; Arr., Anab, m. xiii. 8.
16 Skylax, 104 (n. 3). '7 Diod., Xvi. xli. 1.
The area should thus be seen more as a section of Persian
imperial territory, directly subject to the local governor. In
support of this notion, let me instance the facts that there were
at Tripolis both a governor’s palace and a ‘paradise’,'® an area
set aside for the governor’s hunting pleasure. As such it would
be both imperially owned land and fairly extensive. It would
also be preserved relatively clear of peasant settlement.
The establishment of the new urban centre at Tripolis, which
had grown large enough to be thought of as urban by 350,
was bound to stimulate the expansion of farming in the local
neighbourhood. Settlement in the countryside, therefore, would
be expected as a result, and this would be fairly recent, say at
most a century old in Skylax’s time. Certainly archaeological
discoveries in the area are fairly few for the Persian period—
Sheikh Zenad’’ and Tell Arka*’ having been explored, with
only the former revealing Akhaimenid-period remains. This
may be more the result of an absence of exploration than a true
absence of settlement.
Yet it would make sense historically and strategically that
settlement in the area was both thin and late. The Eleutheros
valley, which leads into the plain of Akkar from the east, is the
obvious route for an invader from the north or the east seeking
to approach the coast. The plain of Akkar was the invader’s
first opportunity to deal with Phoenicians, and their normal
action was to perpetrate frightfulness. Assyrians and Baby-
lonians had done this repeatedly in Syria for two centuries and
more before the Persian conquest.”! Thus the plain of Akkar
was more likely to suffer depopulation than almost anywhere
else in Phoenicia, and it would be the last to recover. To extend
the point, the first city the invaders reached was usually Byblos,
and Byblos was the weakest of the cities—the connection seems
obvious, though not proven. The cities least likely to suffer were
the island-cities, Tyre and Arados, and they had flourished.
'® Diod., xvi. xli. 2 and 5.

'° Capt. de la Bassetiére, ‘La Nécropole de Cheikh Zenad’, Syria, 7 (1926),
195-208.
* E. Will,J.M. Dentzer, and J. P. Thalmann, ‘La 1° Campagne de fouilles
a Tell
Arga (Liban Nord)’, BMB 26 (1963), 61-79, and J. P. Thalmann, ‘Tell
Arga (Liban
Nord), campagnes I-III (1972-1974), chantier I, rapport préliminair
e’, Syria, 55
(1978), 1-152.
oH . Oded, Mass Deportations and Deportes in the Neo-Assyrian Empire
(Wiesbaden,
1979):
The Time of Troubles, 360-287 Bc II
Byblos is absent from Skylax’s list, which may be due to
the city’s decline, or to the bad state of preservation of the
manuscript; just as significant, though, is the absence of any
other place which is said to be subject to Byblos. Skylax regu-
larly comments when a place was subject to Tyre or Sidon, but
never mentions a Byblian subordinate. It may be that Byblos’
grip on its territory was so weak that the nearby towns had
asserted an effective autonomy. There was a town at Botrys
near the headland of Mount Theuprosopon. Byblos had a twin,
as did Tyre and Arados, called Palaibyblos. This can hardly
be an ancient settlement pre-dating Byblos itself, for Byblos was
incredibly ancient even then, and knew it, so the settlement
of Palaibyblos perhaps drew its name (Greek, of course, not
Phoenician) by analogy from those other twins. The name,
however, does suggest that it was joined to Byblos, was, that is,
part of the city’s territory. Skylax lists three more places,
Berytos, Borinos, and Porphyreon, but all these are closer to
powerful Sidon than to weak Byblos, and if subject to any
Phoenician city, then Sidon is the most likely. Skylax does refer
to two of them—Berytos and Porphyreon—as poleis, which in
Greek terms should mean that they possessed at least some
autonomy. Borinos seems otherwise unknown; the state of Sky-
lax’s manuscript is such that it could be a corruption of another
name.
One reason for doubting Sidonian control of the coast to the
north of the city is that both Sidon and Tyre seem to have
concentrated more on controlling the coast to the south. This
expansion had been achieved through Persian goodwill and
encouragement, and it meant complete Phoenician control over
the whole coast as far as Askelon, close to Egypt. But the
Persians had made sure that that control was divided between
Tyre and Sidon, and, further, that the division was complex
and awkward, thus successfully guaranteeing that the two cities
were rivals and enemies rather than co-operating friends:
The town of Sarepta was Tyrian according to Skylax, even
though it was close to Sidon. He also mentions more than
once a place called Ornithopolis, which appears to have been
Sidonian. If it was between Sarepta and Tyre, the alternation
Sidon/Tyrian Sarepta/Sidonian Ornithopolis/Tyre, would be
typical of the situation on the coast south from Tyre.
12 The Time of Troubles, 360-287 Bc
Tyre itself had control of a string of towns immediately to
the south of it, Palaityros, Ekdippa, and Ake, but then Sidon
had possession of the villages around Mount Carmel, named as
Sykaminos and Adaros by Skylax, while archaeological traces
suggest (no more) others.*? A Tyrian river is listed next, then
Sidonian Dor. South of Dor was Strato’s Tower, not mentioned
by Skylax. This may have been founded by king Abdastart of
Sidon during the fourth century, but it now seems more likely
to be a later foundation. Recent excavations have identified a
building as the original Phoenician fortification under the later
remains of Roman Caesarea, though dating is not precise
enough to decide the problem.” Joppa is probably noted by
Skylax, but without assigning it to any Phoenician city. He has
been assumed to be wrong,”* for Dor and Joppa are known to
have been Sidonian in the sixth century.” Yet Skylax is careful
in his other attributions, and evidence of Sidonian control in
the sixth century is not serious evidence of its control in the
fourth. Too much had happened. It seems better therefore to
accept the non-attribution of Skylax, and to count Joppa as the
one place on the coast which was not under Phoenician control.
It would, after all, be merely one more element in the manifestly
Persian divide-and-rule organization of the whole area. Further
on, however, Askelon was Tyrian, and beyond that no more
ports existed.
The Phoenician cities had thus established a tight grip on
the Palestinian coast, to such a degree that it is reasonable to
include that coast as part of Phoenicia as it existed c. 350 BC.
Looking north from Arados, however, the equivalent control
does not seem to exist. Skylax names no settlement north of
Arados, but he does note what he calls the Thapsakos River,
which is presumably the Orontes, giving access towards the
Euphrates crossing at Thapsakos. Arados did control its peraia
in Alexander’s time, a string of coastal settlements reaching
north for 80 km. to beyond Gabala;*° beyond that again, there
* Elayi, ‘Phoenician Geography’, 100-2.

5 Ibid. 99-100; A. Raban, ‘The City Walls of Straton’s Tower: Some New Archaeo-
logical Data’, BASOR 268 (1987), 71-88; R. Arav, Hellenistic Palestine,
British Archaeo-
logical Reports International Series, 485 (Oxford, 1989), 20-5.
* Elayi, ‘Phoenician Geography’, 98-9.
% J. P. Pritchard, Ancient Near Eastern Texts (Princeton, NJ, 1955), 662 (sarcophag
us
of Eshmunazar). 6 Arr., Anab., U1. xiii. 8.
existed a number of small settlements which had a disturbed
history during the Persian period, such as Ras Ibn Hani, Ras
Shamra, and Ras el-Bassit.*’ There is no serious indication that
these were subject to control by any Phoenician city—in the
context it would be Arados, which was perhaps regarded as
having quite enough territory already. But there are clear signs
of a commercial presence,” and there is one item of general
history which shows this. In 404 Bc the Persian prince and
pretender Kyros the Younger halted at Myriandros on the Gulf
of Alexandretta to replenish his army. He was met there by a
fleet of 200 merchant ships from Phoenicia.”? It seems a reason-
able assumption that the rendezvous was named because it was
a common port of call for Phoenician ships. It may therefore
be suggested as an area of Phoenician influence which extended
north from Arados’ area of control; this would thus complement
the string of Tyrian and Sidonian settlements along the southern
coast.
The three main cities had achieved their superior status in
part because of their harbours. All three were the product of
many centuries of planning and construction, and show a
careful understanding of the behaviour of the sea and its
currents. Arados had produced a high wall, itself protected by
a fore-wall upon which the sea beat, and had thus both pro-
tected itselfand developed a sheltered harbour on the mainland,
or lee, side. Another island, Mahrud, part of the same reef
which formed Arados island itself, was used intermittently, and
there were mainland landing places as well. Construction works
at Arados continued in the Persian period.* Tyre had a similar
site to Arados, and there are clear signs of continuous building
all through the Iron Age and into the Persian period. The
technique at Tyre was to provide sheltered anchorages by
7 A, Bounni, ‘La Quatriéme Campagne de fouilles (1978) 4 Ras Ibn Hani’, Comptes
Rendus de l’Académie des inscriptions et belles lettres (1979), 177-294; J. Stucky, Ras Shamra
Leukos Limen (Paris, 1983); P. Courbin, ‘Rapport sur la sixieme campagne de fouilles
(1976) a Ras el-Bassit (Syrie)’, AAAS 27-8 (1977-8), 29-39.
28 The main evidence is imported Greek pottery, which is most easily recognizable
(listed by C. Clairmont, ‘Greek Pottery from the Near East’, Berytus, 11/2 (1955), 85-
141). The Phoenician pottery is less distinctive, though P. J. Riis claims to have
recognized it at Sukas (Sukas, i (Copenhagen, 1970), 114-18). Sukas, being south of
Gabala, was part of the Aradian peraza, so the local pot was by definition Phoenician.
29 Xenophon, Anabasis, i. 4.
30H. Frost, ‘The Arwad Plans, 1964: A Photogrammetric Survey of Marine Instal-
lations’, AAAS 16 (1966), 13-28.
building walls to connect reefs. These are now largely under-
water, but seem to have been visible in the ancient past. Close
to the city were a series of docks and wharves, both to the south,
forming the ‘Egyptian’ harbour, and to the north, forming the
‘Sidonian’ harbour.*!
Sidon, a mainland site, was not so dissimilar. It had a small
semi-circular harbour to the south of the city, and to the north
constructions in the sea provided artificial reefs and improved
the facilities of the natural reef. Again, Persian-period con-
struction has been detected. In all cases the constructions show
a profound understanding of the local currents, and of the
effects the constructions would have on those currents. What
exists now, of course, is the final form of the harbours, and we
do not know what mistakes were made and what constructions
had to be dismantled when things went wrong; but it is evident
that the final form was the result of centuries of work and
experience, and of trial-and-error construction.”
Such gross elements in the city plans as the harbours can be
discussed because they survive to be studied, and, it must be
admitted, they are studied because the Phoenicians’ reputation
as seamen draws scholars’ attention. At the same time the rest
of the city plans are not seriously investigated for the very
good reason that they have been obliterated by the subsequent
continuous occupation of their sites. The cities may have been
in a poor way when nineteenth-century travellers visited them,
but even at their nadir they were inhabited.*? Further, their
wealth or their strategic situations, or both, have ensured that
building has been almost as continuous as their inhabitation.
Therefore, a discussion of the internal arrangements of the cities
in the Hellenistic period is futile. Even the location of the Tyrian
temple of Melqart is unknown.** Such details as have been
recorded are mainly of the Roman (and medieval) periods, or,
*! H. Frost, Under the Mediterranean (London, 1963), chs. 5 and 6; A. Poidebard, Un
grand port disparu: Tyr (Paris, 1939).
3? See refs. in n. 4, above, and Frost, Under the Mediterranean, chs. 5 and 6.
*° See the illustrations in E. Renan, Mission de Phénicie (Paris, 1864).
** C. Bonnet, in St. Phoen. viii, vaguely places the temple in the southern part of the
island; M. Chehab, Tyre (Beirut, n.d.), says it was ‘in the centre’ (p. 25); Harden,
Phoenicians, makes no attempt to locate it. He claims that it is possible to gain> evidence
of internal arrangements from the study of ‘colonial’ cities, but this is a dangerous
assumption. It is scarcely possible to understand British cities by studying American,
or Spanish by looking at Latin American cities.
in the case of Byblos, the Bronze Age.*° Only in the case of
Marathos have we visible remains of any Hellenistic buildings—
the temple and the stadium—but they are scarcely enough to
permit generalization. The condition of the area at present
largely precludes excavation, so no further discussion is worth
while.
In Cyprus the main Phoenician centre at Kition was well
enough fortified to stand several sieges later in the century, and
the city had a wall which had determined its plan for centuries.*©
In other respects, however, the Phoenician situation in the
island was different from that in the homeland across the water,
for the geography of Cyprus permitted a very different Phoe-
nician pattern of control to develop. Kition, on the south coast,
had as its hinterland not a range of mountains, as in the
homeland, but the island’s fertile central plain. A secondary
Phoenician centre was established 20 km. inland at Idalion,*’
and further penetration towards the ore-bearing Troodos
mountains reached Tamassos.** Phoenician control over the
central third of the island was confirmed by control of Lapithos
on the north coast.*9
Kition, however, was not a Phoenician city from its origins.
A case has been made out for regarding it as originally a Greek
city with a substantial Phoenician mercantile presence, though,
in fact, the original population was Cypriot rather than Greek,
and the Greeks were originally immigrants as much as were the
Phoenicians. The degree of integration is not at all clear, but
power was seized by a self-consciously Phoenician dynasty
under Akhaimenid sponsorship in the period of the Perso-Greek
wars.*° Briefer periods of control over the cities of Marion on
the north-west coast and of Salamis on the east coast are also
known, though both had reverted to Greek control by the mid-
fourth century.*! The king of Kition who gained power in about
3° Chehab, Tyre, provided pictures of Roman monuments in Tyre; one glance at
these huge constuctions shows that they provide no evidence for the Hellenistic period.
36 V. Karagheorgis, Fouilles de Kition, i-v (Nicosia, 1974-85) summarized by him in
‘Kition, Mycenaean and Phoenician’, Proceedings of the British Academy (1973), and
Kition, Mycenaean and Phoenician Discoveries in Cyprus (London, 1976).
37 Gjerstad, SCE, IV/2, 479-81.
38 Athenaeus iv. 167c-d (=Duris, frag. 4=FgH, IIA, 139); Gjerstad, SCE IV/2,
497.
39 Gjerstad, ‘Phoenician Colonisation’, 244-8.
© Nicolaou, Hist. Top. Kition, 320.
‘1 Gjerstad, ‘Phoenician Colonisation’, 252-3.
361, a man called Pumyaton, built up a formidable kingdom
in the southern part of the island. Kition and Idalion were
united into one kingdom before he became king, and he pur-
chased Tamassos from its spendthrift king for fifty talents.”
This made him lord of'a quarter of the island, the major local
power, sufficient to survive both the enmity of the Greek rulers
of Salamis, and the power of Macedon.
The contrast between the confident and successful pen-
etration inland in Cyprus and the situation on the Levant
mainland is stark. The Phoenicians on the mainland had con-
trolled the coast for even longer but had made much less
progress into the interior. The reason was, of course, geography.
Where inland penetration was less difficult, it occurred. The
example of Arados shows this. Apart from spreading its auth-
ority north along the coast to Gabala and beyond, Arados had
also moved inland along the Eleutheros gap to dominate that
major passage from its advanced post at Mariamme, and there
is also evidence of penetration up the slopes of the Bargylos,
north of the Eleutheros. There the temple of Baal Shamin at
Baitokaike, high on the summit of the Bargylos, overlooks both
the coastal slopes and the Eleutheros valley. These hills are
much less steep and less rugged than the Lebanon mountains,
and the existence of the temple, with its close relationship with
Arados, is a sign that Arados controlled not just the coast but
the whole coastal plain up to the top of the mountains.*%
There were other major temples placed inland of the other
major cities. Their existence has been used to suggest that they
were specially selected ‘high places’ such as the Syrian-Hebrew
religion delighted in. Certainly, Baitokaike would fit such a
description. The others, however, are less obviously ‘high’ and
more clearly inland. Inland of Byblos, at the source of the
Adonis river, was a major shrine to Adonis at Aphaka.** Inland
of Sidon, on the Nahr Barouk, a major shrine to Eshmun was
developed by the kings of Sidon during the Persian period,
a2 C1Saie 1Os
* H. Seyrig, ‘Questions Aradiennes: 2. La Communauté aradienne’, Rev. Num., 4
(1964), 28-43, and Rey-Coquais, Arados, 123-6, put forward a theory of that relation-
ship which has the temple at the heart of an amphictyonic league; this seems over-
elaborate, and, if true, would need to be applied to the other Phoenician cities,
since
they each had their inland temples.
“ Brown, 33 (Lucian); 37 (Zosimus); 38 (Sozomen).
The Time of Troubles, 360-287 Bc iy
though this is not seriously a ‘high’ place. Similarly the temple
at Marathos grew notably during this time.*® Thus three of
the major cities had important temples placed inland, in the
mountains, though no similar temple has yet been located in
the territory attributable to Tyre.
These temples suggest some at least of the penetration inland
and uphill achieved by the Phoenicians, but they are perhaps
also misleading. They have attracted both comment and
archaeologists, as have other temples, for they tend to produce
gratifyingly spectacular finds, both sculptural and archi-
tectural. What has not been done is any serious survey and
excavation work to locate the extent of rural settlement and
occupation. Clearly the cities were surrounded by cultivated
fields and populated villages, but how extensive these were is
impossible to gauge. Some general observations can be made,
though. In Roman times, the forests were already restricted to
the higher slopes, and the Emperor Hadrian had the bounds of
the royal forests marked.*’ The temples high up in the moun-
tains were perhaps fairly isolated, without much more than local
farms near to them. It seems possible that Byblos’ hinterland,
geographically difficult, was deforested early, for the city had
been a shipbuilding and industrial centre for several millenia.
The plain of Akkar was, it seems, only thinly occupied, possibly
marshy and requiring settled political conditions for attempts
at drainage, reclamation, and settlement to be instituted. The
Aradian peraia consisted of a series of small ports, no more than
villages, with only Mariamme, the Baitokaike temple, and an
unlocated place called Sigon inland. This suggests that the
utilization of the land was largely restricted to the coastal areas,
though this does not necessarily mean that the inland areas
were wholly deserted.
In general terms land-occupation in the Syro-Palestinian
* M. Dunand, ‘Le Temple d’Eshmoun 4 Sidon: essai de chronologie’, BMB 25
(1973), 7-25; id., ‘Le Statuaire de la favissa du temple d’Eshmun a Sidon’, in Archdologie
und Alten Testament, Festschrift fur Kurt Galling (Tibingen, 1970), 61-8.
© N. Saliby, ‘Essai de restitution du temple d’Amrit’, in XJ° Congrés Internationale
@ Archéologie Classique, Damascus 1971, AAAS 21 (1971), 293-8, for a summary of the
temple excavations; Dunand, ‘Les Sculptures de la favissa du temple d’Amrit’, BMB
7 (1944-5), 99-107; 8 (1946-8), 81-107 and the accompanying plates; I have not seen
the final excavation report, published Paris, 1988.
‘7 IGLS, viii, p. 3 is a collection of these inscriptions with a set of essays on the Forest
by J.-F. Breton; cf. also R. Meiggs, Trees and Timber in the Ancient Mediterranean (Oxford,
1982), esp. ch. 3, and Admiralty Geographical Handbooks, Syria, go-8.
area was at a very low ebb during the Persian period, and it is
tempting to apply this knowledge to rural Phoenicia as well.”
But conditions were not the same, for in Phoenicia there were
still cities in existence. In the rest of the Levant the cities
had died, repeatedly devastated and depopulated by earlier
conquerors. The presence of cities guaranteed a fairly intensive
rural occupation as well, at least locally, as a source of foodstuffs
for the urban population. In the same way the presence of
cities guaranteed a source of urban services to the peasantry—
craftsman’s products, a market for their produce, protection,
justice—which lifted the rural standard of living appreciably
above that of a pure peasantry. The urban-rural symbiosis in
Phoenicia was thus a guarantee of a healthy society, capable of
adaptation, of wealth-production, and of expansion.
This pattern cannot be applied to the Phoenician extension
southwards into Palestine. Archaeological work in Palestine
has located Persian occupation levels at a number of sites.
Phoenician remains, pots, metalwork, even buildings, have been
recognized and catalogued. But then Phoenician occupation
has been presumed, and this does not necessarily follow. The
presence of ‘Phoenician’ pottery does not imply Phoenician
occupation of Palestinian sites any more than the presence of
Attic Greek vases implies Athenian colonization. The Phoeni-
cians, after all, were traders, who would be expected to sell
home-produced goods abroad. Nor can a style of building
necessarily imply Phoenician occupation; styles can be copied,
though buildings are rather more suggestive than pots, and
very much more so than valuable goods such as metalwork and
ivories.”° It is necessary, in fact, to base conclusions about the
presence of Phoenicians in Palestine on a combination of written
sources—meaning Skylax—with archaeology. In such a case
the argument for Phoenician occupation fades. There are clear
signs of Phoenicians at Skylax’s places on the coast, and Strato’s
Tower seems to have been built at about the right time.>! But
*° Grainger, Cities, ch. 1, on north Syria.
* E. Stern, Material Culture in the Holy Land in the Time of the Persian Empire, 538-332
Bc (Warminster, 1982).
°° Elayi, ‘Phoenician Geography’, 97-104 rather pushes the evidence too far; ead.,
Pénétration grecque en Phénicie sous Vempire perse (Nancy 1988), lays great stress on Greek
pottery, perhaps too much so, though her conclusions are admirably restrained.
°! A. Raban, ‘The City Walls of Straton’s Tower: Some New Archaeological Data’,
intensive colonization is not in evidence, and in most places the
possible Phoenician presence is distinctly limited.
This, of course, raises the question of the degree of reliability
to be placed in Skylax. But Phoenician control, meaning control
of Palestinian coastal towns by Phoenician city-governments,
can be achieved without serious Phoenician colonization, or
even occupation. So long as that limitation is accepted, then
Skylax’s information can also be accepted. A relatively thin
Phoenician presence would make subsequent events along that
coast much easier to understand.
It can be safely assumed that the Phoenician cities along
the Lebanese coast controlled the seaward slopes of Mount
Lebanon as far as, and including, the forest. Beyond the Mount,
however, the matter of control is more debatable. The eastern,
landward, slope is steep and leads down into the Bekaa valley,
which is drained by the headwaters of the Litani in its southern
half and the Orontes to the north. The southern half is much
more fertile than the north, and a survey of the northern half
has found very little occupation in the Persian period.*? No
similar survey of the south has been undertaken, but it can
safely be assumed that, since it is more fertile, it was more
densely populated. Given the paucity of occupation in the
north, this does not necessarily mean very much.
Further, it is not clear whether the Bekaa should be con-
sidered Phoenician at all at this time. It will be argued later
that in the Hellenistic period it should be included,** but for
the Persian period the data are woefully thin. During Alex-
ander’s siege of Tyre he had to campaign briefly into the
interior, reaching, so it is said, the Antilebanon, to deter raids
by Arabs.** These people can be assumed to be the ancestors of
the later Ituraeans, who were at times regarded as Arabs,
presumably because of the language they spoke. This in turn
suggests that they were in the process of moving into the Bekaa
from further east. Indeed, one source suggests that they were
raiding, if not living, on Mount Lebanon itself.» They were,
BASOR 268 (1987), 71-88; L. I. Levine, Roman Caesarea, ch. 1; Arav, Hellenistic Palestine,
29-38; E. Will, ‘La Tour de Straton: mythes et réalites’, Syria, 64 (1987), 245-51,
doubts the Phoenician origin of the name.
°° A. Kuschke, S. Mittmann, U. Miiller, Archdologischer Survey in der nordlichen Biga
(Wiesbaden, 1976). easee Clie: * Plut., Alexander, xxiv. 10-14.
°° Curtius Iv. ii. 24.
that is, fighting on the Tyrian and Persian side during the
siege, though not presumably because they felt themselves to be
Phoenician. Self-defence against Macedonian foragers and the
prospect of loot seem quite sufficient explanations.
The Phoenician power thus outlined, dominating the fertile
centre of Cyprus and controlling almost the whole Levant
coast from Askelon to Gabala and perhaps to Myriandros, was
greater in geographical terms than at any time in the past (or
in the future). This was due less to the Phoenicians’ own exer-
tions than to the support of the Akhaimenid imperial govern-
ment. The Persians had no real choice in the matter, for a naval
presence in the eastern Mediterranean was clearly required,
and the only alternatives to the Phoenicians, the Egyptians
and the Greeks of Asia Minor, were quite unreliable. The
Phoenicians, on the other hand, were conspicuously loyal from
the time of Dareios I onwards,” gaining thereby a practical
domination in their home waters, and encouragement to
expand on land. For it was the Persian government which
had permitted the expansion of Phoenician control southwards
along the Palestinian coast, and Persian support which per-
mitted the Phoenician power in Cyprus to reach to the north
coast, and presumably the same can be said of the Aradian
extension northwards to Gabala and beyond.
The relationship between Persian and Phoenician states was
thus partly an alliance and partly one of lord and vassal; but
there could be no suggestion of equality; when severe pressure
was exerted on the Persian state, this inequality inevitably
caused suffering to the subordinate partner. And as this pres-
sure steadily increased in the first half of the fourth century,
the governments of the Phoenician cities had to try to cope
with it.
In their formal constitutions the major cities were all mon-
archies. So far as can be discerned these were hereditary, though
this is not certain. It appears, for instance, to be clearly estab-
lished that the Kitian kingship in Cyprus was hereditary, with
a line of six successive kings from c. 480 onwards.°” Certainly
the first three kings were father, son, and grandson, though the
relationship of the last three to the earlier group and to each
a H. Hauben, “The King of the Sidonians and the
Persian Imperial Fleet’, Ancient
Society, 1 (1970), 1-8. *” Nicolaou, Hist. Top. Kition, 322-4.
other is not clear. The hereditary nature of the other monarchies
can be established with about the same degree of probability,
but there are also problems. The basic trouble is the sheer
quantity of kings. Whereas the Kitian kingship was held by just
six men from c. 480 to 312, an average of twenty-eight years
per reign, for Sidon one reading counts thirteen kings between
c. 535 and 332, an average reign of seventeen years; alternatively
another reading of the evidence produces fifteen kings between
c.490 and 332, giving an even lower average of ten or eleven
years per reign.** Every study of these kings, including both
studies by Betlyon, proposes a different sequence of kings or of
dates, or both. The basic problem is that most of the evidence
is numismatic, and this tends to lead to conclusions which defy
common sense. It is, for instance, not at all obvious to me
that coins of Mazday, the Persian satrap, should interrupt the
sequence of royal coins: his coins could easily be minted at
the same time as the kings. For Arados a ratio of eight kings in
sixty years has been suggested.*? The evidence for eight kings is
that eight different letters were found on the Aradian coins—
but more than half of the coins in the hoard were illegible, so
there could well be more: the dating evidence is not good,
and the period over which these kings stretch could well be
much longer. For Tyre and Byblos kings are known, but not the
total period of their reigns, nor even the total number of
kings.
An average reign-length of seven or eight years, or of ten or
eleven, over a period of sixty years, as suggested for Arados and
Sidon, is difficult to accept, but over 160 years it is even worse;
one of two conditions is implied: either the order of succession
was not from father to son, but by inheritance by the senior
58 J. B. Peckham, The Development of the Late Phoenician Scripts (Cambridge, Mass.,
1968); E. T. Mullen, ‘A New Royal Sidonian Inscription’, BASOR 216 (1972), 25-30;
M. Dunand, ‘Les rois de Sidon au temps des perses’, MUS7 49 (1975-6), 493-9;J.W.
Betlyon, ‘A New Chronology for the Pre-Alexandrine Coinage of Sidon’, ANSNM 21
(1976), 11-35; id., Mints; G. C. Polselli, ‘Nova Luce sulla datazione dei re Sidonii?”,
Rivista di Studi Fenici 12/2 (1985); J. Elayi, Sidon, Cité Autonome de l’Empire Perse (Paris,
1989), 246-8.
59 J. Elayi and A. G. Elayi, ‘A Treasure of Coins from Arwad’, JANES 18 (1988),
24.
i cap. Naster, ‘L’Ordre de succession des rois de Byblos d’aprés leurs monnaies’,
Bulletin de la Société Francaise Numismatique, 20/6 (1965), 478; Betlyon, Mints, 52-9, 116—
21; Elayi, ‘Le Monnayage de Byblos avant Alexandre; problémes et perspectives’,
Transeuphraténe, 1 (1989), 9-20.
male in the family.®' This is a system which was operated
later among Muslim dynasties, such as Khedivial Egypt where
between 1848 and 1873 there were four reigns, averaging about
eight years, much the same as suggested for Phoenicia.
Another possibility is‘that the Phoenician cities experienced a
great deal of political instability, resulting in depositions and
assassinations. Neither of these conditions can be shown actually
to have existed. The patrilineal succession at Kition over four
generations seems established, but the situation there is clearly
different. Since Kition was basically a non-Phoenician city,
different modes of succession might well have operated, even if
the dynasty itself was Phoenician. It is thus necessary to look
at the situation in the Phoenician mainland as a whole, to see
if the conditions there provide a clue. And in fact the fourth
century Bc in the Levant was a time of warfare, revolution,
and conquest. Repeatedly armies marched through the land,
causing damage simply by their presence and passage, even
before any fighting took place. The basic cause was the weak-
ness of the Persian imperial government, and this problem was
never solved, not even by its replacement two-thirds of
the way through the century by a Macedonian imperial
government. Indeed, from Phoenicia’s point of view, that
can only be regarded as the culminating disaster of the whole
series.
Egypt separated itself from Persian control in 405 and main-
tained its independence for sixty years. Repeated Persian
attempts were made to recover the lost province. These attempts
failed for sixty years, usually because of an interruption from
elsewhere or because of the incompetence of the commander.
It was the sheer length of this business which most affected
Phoenicia, for it was inevitable that the base for the Persian
offensives would be in or near the Phoenician cities. At one
point in 362/1 the Egyptian king actually launched a spoiling
invasion which reached and occupied Sidon briefly, before he
was overthrown by a military coup in his rear.®? Sidon does not
seem to have suffered from Persian recriminations in this case,
but king Abdastart I was deposed and a new one, Tennes,
*! D. Henige, ‘Comparative Chronology and the Near East: A Case
of Symbiosis’,
BASOR 261 (1986) 60-1.
* Earl of Cromer, Modern Egypt (London, IQII), 122.
°° Diod., xv. xcii. 3-5; Plut., Agesilaos, 36-40.
installed. The next Persian attack, in 3951/0, was defeated, even
though commanded by the Great King Artaxerxes III Okhos
in person.®*
It has to be said, though, that this reconstruction of events
must be regarded as tentative. Some students insert a period of
rule by the satrap Mazday between Abdastart and Tennes®
based upon some coins, but such evidence is distinctly shaky: it
is only recently that a period of rule by Evagoras of Salamis
had been discarded from the sequence. It is also a presumption
that Abdastart I was deposed, and Tennes installed. But the
basic sequence is correct.
This episode is also involved with the Satraps’ Revolt, led by
Orontes, in many accounts. It is now argued that this was
essentially an Anatolian affair,°° and certainly the student of
Phoenicia notices no especial satrapal connection. This is not
to say that the Egyptians did not take advantage of the revolt,
but at least it relieves me of having to go into details on it.
Furthermore the dates of all this are variable, largely due to
the confusion of our ancient source Diodoros over these episodes;
he seems to have tried to conflate two accounts, with little
success.°’ It is fairly clear that there were two expeditions led
by Artaxerxes III Okhos against Egypt, and that the second
should be placed in 345-344, because the siege of Sidon, which
is precisely dated to 345, preceded it. The first expedition was
probably in 351/o when Tennes had been king for up to ten
years.
The strain on the Phoenician cities amid all this military
activity was very great. Perhaps the profits were also great. The
cities were the only places in the Levant where armaments
could have been manufactured in quantity; they were the only
places which could provide seaborne transport; they will have
been the main source of food supplies for the Persian forces. No
doubt the cities were laid under contribution, to provide ships
and men by decree of the Great King, yet the Persian treasury
will also have been pouring out treasure in payment for supplies
and soldiers. The cities were well placed to take government
64 Diod., xv. xliv. 1; Demosthenes xv. 11; Isocrates, Philip, 101; A. T. Olmstead,
History of the Persian Empire (Chicago, 1948), 436-41.
6 Betlyon, Mints, 14-16 and 18; Polselli, ‘Nova Luce’, 173.
6° M. Weiskopf, ‘The So-called “Great Satraps’ Revolt”, 366-360 Bc’, Historia,
Einzelschriften 63 (Stuttgart, 1989). PS Diodiaexvexde 3-0:
contracts. At the same time that government was cavalier in its
methods. In one Persian attempt Ake was taken as the Persian
base.” It is thus likely to have ceased to be Tyrian territory.
One theory has it producing coins dating to a system beginning
in 347 BC, but the reason for this is unknown. It seems a
reasonable conjecture, however, that Ake had grown under the
stimulus of the war and that the Persians had then operated
their normal divide-and-rule policy by allowing it to separate
from Tyre.
Okhos mounted his second attempt to conquer Egypt in the
mid-340s.”” Perhaps the separation of Ake from Tyre, dated to
347 by Ake’s new era, was a preparation for this, for it had
been used before as Persian headquarters. Egypt’s first line of
defence was Phoenicia, as the raid of 360 to Sidon had shown,
and it seems reasonable to detect the Egyptian diplomatic
hand behind subsequent events. The Persian army was being
gathered in Babylonia under Okhos’ personal supervision when
a riot occurred at Tripolis. The cause is said to have been the
overbearing nature of the Persian officials,”! but this is scarcely
a sufficient cause, since such an attitude would have been quite
normal, and indeed probably expected. There must have been
something else, and it is significant that the first thing the rebels
did was to contact the Egyptian king, Nektanebo.’2 The riot
appears to have developed in the Sidonian section of Tripolis,
and it grew into a rebellion when a direct attack was made on
the Persian ‘paradise’, a hunting-park near Tripolis,”? thus
signifying a direct defiance of Persian authority. Diodoros
implies that the rebellion spread to other Phoenician cities,’*
but there is no evidence for any other city than Sidon being
actively involved. So the connection was Egypt-Sidon-the
Sidonian suburb of Tripolis. In fact, after the initial riot, Tri-
polis is never mentioned again, and no events other than
those
at Sidon are recorded. It is best to conclude that the
attempt
to spread the revolt failed, and that Sidon was left alone
to face
® Died. .xv.-xli..9,
°° E. T. Newell, The Dated Alexander Coinage of Sidon and Ake (New
Haven, Conn.,
1916); I. L. Merker, ‘Notes on Abdalonymus and the
Dated Alexander Coinage of
Sidon and Ake’, ANSNM 11 (1964), 13-20; A. Lemaire, ‘Le Monnayage de Tyr et
celui dit d’Akko dans la deuxiéme moitié du IV siécle
av. J.C.’, Rev. Num., 18 (1976),
11-24. ” Diod., xvi. xlii. 1. ™ Ibid. xli. 2.
” Tbid. 3 (2s lidiga: ™ Tbid. 3.
the Persians: Diodoros comments that the capture of Sidon led
to the surrender of ‘the rest of the cities’,’? but he wrote in
ignorance of the geography. To reach Sidon Okhos’ army had
to pass Arados, Tripolis, Byblos, Botrys, and Berytos. He would
not have left them hostile and untaken in his rear; therefore, it
follows that they were not involved in the revolt (see map 2).
It has also been suggested that the revolt spread to Palestine.
The evidence is entirely archaeological, and consists of locating
any change of occupation or a destruction which can be dated to
the fourth century Ba.’”° The theory is a misuse of archaeological
evidence and betrays a complete misunderstanding ofits nature,
as well as displaying a complete disregard for the evidence
of several Persian campaigns in Palestine during the century.
The notion is bad archaeology and bad history, and can be
ignored.
The relations between the various cities become apposite at
this point, but are not easily characterized. One item which has
appeared to suggest a closeness amounting almost to federation
is Diodoros’ remark, concerning the riot at Tripolis, that it was
there that the Phoenicians ‘held their common council’.’” This
has been elaborated into a ‘federal league’, with Tripolis as a
sort of neutral stateless Washington DC. But this is to misread
the evidence, which is purely Diodoros’ word, in a sentence
which begins with a demonstrable falsehood, for he claims that
Tripolis has ‘the highest repute amongst the cities of Phoenicia’:
this is manifest nonsense. The explanation of the data is that
Tripolis was the governor’s seat, and that it was there that the
envoys of the cities met him and each other. There was no
federation.
At the same time, they were all Phoenicians, a distinct people
speaking a particular language, recognizably different not only
Diod., xvt. xlv. 6.

7° D. Barag, ‘The Effects of the Tennes Rebellion on Palestine’, BASOR 183 (1966),
6-12. Diodes SV Lexi
78 Olmstead, Persian Empire, 434. Harden (Phoenicians, 76) emphatically denies the
existence of a ‘confederacy’, but he is considering an earlier period; J. Teixidor,
‘L’Assemblé legislative en Phénicie d’apres les inscriptions’, Syria, 57 (1980), 453-64,
takes evidence from Greece and Italy only, which cannot be used for conditions in
Phoenicia. It may also be pointed out that Diodoros’ term is ‘synedrion’, meaning
council, whereas a ‘federal’ council would more likely be a ‘koinon synedrion’, but there
is no evidence that Diodoros was being in any way technical in his language. Still, it
provides some slight support for the negative interpretation.
from the Greeks, but from other Syrians as well. They could
co-operate with each other, as on a Persian military expedition,
for example, but they did not usually do so, and at Tripolis
they kept separate establishments. They had elaborated myths
to explain their relationships by language, and they were proud
of their cultural achievements, always recalling their invention
of the alphabet, for example,’? and they all worshipped the
same deities—yet they were capable of fighting and betraying
each other. Sidon fought alone against Okhos as Tyre was to
do against Alexander—and Alexander had help fom Arados
and Sidon and Byblos. Yet in their agony they remembered
their kinship, and Tyrians were sent to Carthage, Kition
recalled its Tyrian origin, Sidonians are said to have rescued
Tyrians from Alexander, just as Tyrians are said to have rescued
Sidonians from Okhos. This is to say, they were independent
cities of one people, like the Greeks, capable of making up their
own political minds, and keeping uninvolved when, say, Sidon
got itself into an impossible situation and was subject to attack
by its imperial overlord.
This uninvolvement included Kition, though the Greek cities
of Cyprus rebelled, under the leadership of the king of Salamis,
apparently in imitation of the Phoenician action.®° One may
detect the fine hand of Nektanebo here too, surely. The only
possible beneficiary of all this was the Egyptian king. It was
not likely that Salamis and Sidon would defy the power and
determination of Okhos for very long, but he might be induced
to use up his strength on these subsidiary problems and so have
none left for Egypt.
Okhos was equal to the occasion. Presumably apprised accu-
rately of the true scale of the rebellions, he used satraps to deal
with them. The satrap of Karia, Idrieus, newly appointed and
keen to gain favour, was ordered to recruit a Greek mercenary
force and tackle Cyprus;*! the satraps of Syria and Kilikia
were sent against Phoenicia.** Meanwhile Okhos continued his
military preparations and began moving his main army north
from Babylon.**
” Millar, ‘Phoenician Cities’, 67; in fact, it was actually invented by their
prede-
cessors, whom we call Canaanites, before the great disruptive invasions
ofthe thirteenth
and twelfth centuries Ba; cf. W. Culican, The First Merchant Adventurers (London,
1966),
1227, * Diod., xvi. xlii. 3. BU bid.
ee bidet 83 Ibid. 1; xliii. 1
The Time of Troubles, 360-287 Bc ay
The attack on Phoenicia was the first to develop. The two
satraps joined their forces and marched south.** Their route
would have been through the Eleutheros gap towards Tripolis.
There is no hint of Aradian involvement in any part of the
rebellion. On the contrary, the fact that Arados is never men-
tioned is a clear indication that the city was on the Persian side.
It must be assumed that these satraps succeeded in recovering
whatever of Phoenicia had been lost to the Persian authority,
with the exception of Sidon, where king Tennes had persuaded
Nektanebo to supply 4,000 Greek mercenaries, commanded by
Mentor of Rhodes.® Upon this rock the satraps’ campaign was
stopped. Meanwhile news arrived from Cyprus of rich pickings
in the wealthy and undefended countryside. Many of the mer-
cenaries hired by the satraps decamped to join the looting of
Cyprus.*°
Thus Sidon was left to Artaxerxes himself to deal with.
Tennes took thought to the future. He considered what support
Nektanebo could provide, saw the lack of any other support,
and decided to give in. His motive is alleged to be personal
safety, but it is clear that he hoped to continue as king as well.
He sent a messenger, a man called Thettalion, to negotiate
his surrender. This was accomplished, and Thettalion even
persuaded Okhos to shake hands on the deal.*’
All this had been done in secret; meanwhile the situation
inside Sidon had developed so that it was no longer under
Tennes’ full control. So, when Artaxerxes’ army arrived at
_ Sidon, Tennes had to resort to subterfuges to accomplish his
surrender. He reached an understanding with Mentor first.
Then he took the hundred richest men out of the city, sup- |
posedly to supplicate Okhos, in reality to be betrayed to him.
Okhos had them executed. Tennes then brought 500 wealthy
Sidonians with olive branches before Okhos, and again
betrayed them to execution. Tennes and Mentor arranged to
let the Persian forces into the city. Okhos then had Tennes
executed. The Sidonians resisted the Persian occupation, and
in the fighting much of the city was burnt, largely by deliberate
self-immolation by the Sidonians.*®
This at least is the story as related by Diodoros. It can be
BT ibide xii 0. So" Lbidy 8-9: a" Ibid, 2:
8 Tbid. xliii. 1-4. 88 Tbid. xlv. 1-6.
taken, if one wishes, at face value, as a tale of deceit, betrayal,
Justified retribution, and punishment for rebellion. But Diodo-
ros’ account in many respects is unsatisfactory. His description
of the events which preceded the siege is terribly confused, and
yet suddenly he provides a lucidly clear description of the siege
itself. It is surely suspicious that Tennes gets all the blame, and
it is just as suspicious that the description of the self-immolation
of the Sidonians is so reminiscent of that of the Carthaginians
two centuries later, or of Punic behaviour as known in Sicily,
that battleground of Greeks and Carthaginians, which was also
Diodoros’ own homeland. Diodoros reports that forty thousand
died in the city, yet ten years later the city was both populous
and flourishing when Alexander came.
Diodoros’ account, in other words, is a literary composition,
providing an interpretation of events such as would be expected
by a public habituated to the notion of Punic despair and self-
immolation in defeat. The basic facts can be accepted, though
the numbers are so rounded as to excite suspicion. An altern-
ative explanation for the events can be suggested.
Sidonian society is portrayed as being stratified by wealth.
The king, whose power was limited, either by custom or by
constitution, was the head of state, in charge of both military
and external affairs. A small group of very wealthy men, con-
ventionally numbering ‘one hundred’ in Diodoros, had some
authority, sufficient for them to be a credible group for Sidon
to send out as representatives of the city in the process of
surrender. A second group, ‘five hundred’, had less power, and
were Clearly distinguished both from the ‘one hundred’ on the
one side and from the general mass of the people on the other.
Then there were the rest, the great majority of the city’s popu-
lation, conventionally numbering ‘forty thousand’. Their aspira-
tions in the crisis of this rebellion were different from those of
the king and from either of the other, wealthier, groups. For,
between the departure of the ‘five hundred’ and the arrival of
the Great King’s occupying force, and independently of their
own king, the ordinary people had determined to resist, to the
extent of burning the ships in the harbour to prevent escape.
Those ships, by a reasonable assumption, belonged to the
wealthy class and to the king.
Thus there were three policies being pursued in this crisis.
The ‘people’ were determined on resistance to the extent that
they were resolved to prevent escapes. Then there was the
policy ofthe rich, both the ‘one hundred’ and the ‘five hundred’,
who had accepted the rebellion when it started, but had begun
to take the sensible view when the Great King’s army arrived
to camp at their very gates. Then there was the policy of king
Tennes, who conducted negotiations with Nektanebo, with
Mentor, and with the Great King, and whose policy is char-
acterized by Diodoros as simply personal survival.
Tennes must have believed he had support in Sidon for his
policy. Even before Mentor’s 4,000 troops arrived from Egypt,
Sidon was in rebellion against the Persians. So Tennes led a
united city into rebellion, but he was not followed by any of
the other Phoenician cities. When this became clear, Tennes’
position in Sidon became at once unstable, since any sort of
victory of one city against the whole might of the Persian empire
was unbelievable. So he eliminated his opponents, the wealthy,
but then was himself eliminated by the Great King. Tennes’
support in the city, therefore, rested on his apparent control of
the poorer citizenry, who acquiesced in the elimination of the
rich, but who fought on when their champion was himself
executed. They may not even have known of Tennes’ betrayal,
only of his execution.
What was going on in Tennes’ city was, in precise terms, a
revolution. Tennes’ power was being restricted by the influence
of the rich, either by entrenched constitutional rights of con-
sultation, or by some less formal device. He therefore, in classic
fashion, appealed beyond the rich to the poor. They were
happy enough to support him against the rich, who were
the rentiers and employers, and were likely enough arrogant,
greedy, and unpopular. What went wrong with Tennes’
scheme was that it had to be conducted by proxy. He had to
use the Great King as his executioner, and the Great King
was more powerful, more foxy, and even more ruthless than
Tennes, besides having his own policy. In this Sidon figured as
a lesson by which other enemies were to learn. His destruction
of Sidon, tales of which, suitably exaggerated, are the basis
for Diodoros’ account, was intended to frighten others. And
it worked. When he invaded Egypt, the prospect of fighting
on long enough to earn a Sidonian-type destruction unnerved
so many that the Egyptian will to resist collapsed.®®
That not all the Sidonians died, as Diodoros suggests, is
shown by a Babylonian tablet which records the arrival of slaves
captured at the city. They reached Babylon and Susa in mid-
October of 345.°° The revolt thus took place in the summer of
that year. There will have been other people enslaved, and there
will have been other refugees. The confusion of the capture, and
the revolutionary atmosphere, make it likely that others had
escaped before the capture, out to sea or inland up the
mountain. The detail in Diodoros of the people burning the
ships to prevent escapes rather implies that some had already
taken that route out. We must also disbelieve the destruction
by burning and all the more so the final detail that Okhos sold
the site to speculators who then got rich on the gold and silver
they dug out of the smoking ruins.®! The fact that Sidon was
flourishing ten years later disproves all this and indicates that
many of those who survived returned when the Persian army
had moved on.
Tennes, of course, did not survive, but a new king was
immediately appointed. This was another Abdastart, whom
the Greeks called Strato, and whom we refer to as Abdastart
II. It seems, according to the numismatic investigations—and
coins are the only evidence for this—that he lasted no
more than two or three years, and was succeeded by another
king of the same name} whom we call Abdastart III. It is un-
necessary to postulate a period of rule by the Persian satrap
Mazday. Coins were certainly produced in his name, but
there is no reason to assume he displaced the king. It is ex-
tremely unlikely that Abdastart II was Tennes’ heir, just as it
is unlikely that Tennes, appointed after the Egyptian-inspired
rebellion of 360, was related to his predecessor. The thought
occurs that the short-lived Abdastart II might be the same
man as the Absastart whom Tennes himself replaced. Such
speculations are encouraged by the exceedingly difficult
nature of the evidence, which is almost entirely numismatic.
It can be said that the monarchical regime continued in Sidon,
*° Diod., xvi. xlvi. 4- li. 3; Olmstead, Persian Empire, 437-41.
°° S. Smith, Babylonian Historical Texts (London, 1924), 148-50.
9! Diod., xv. xlv. 5-6.
* J. W. Betlyon, ‘A New Chronology of the pre-Alexandrine Coinage of Sidon’,
ANSNM 21 (1976), 30-4; id., Mints, 18-22.
though no doubt the population as a whole remained subdued.
The Persian government could feel pleased with the results
of Okhos’ westward expedition. The final result was the
reconquest of Egypt, but on the way he had dealt firmly with
rebel Sidon, and had settled the difficulty of Cyprus through
Idrieus. In the matter of relations with the Phoenician cities,
four of the six had remained loyal, one, Tripolis, had not
persisted in rebellion, and Sidon had been taught a memorable
lesson. It must be presumed that Sidon’s punishment included
the loss of its Palestinian outposts. When Alexander marched
that way in 332, no hint of Sidonian possessions there emerged.
Tyrian possessions were perhaps also eliminated at the same
time. Ake seems to have been separated off already, and this
had left Tyre with only Askelon and the unknown place between
Dor and Strato’s Tower. Okhos’ southward expedition would
have been a suitable occasion for reorganizing the whole area,
and Gaza was perhaps strengthened as a guard on the route
to Egypt at that time. Certainly the Palestinian coast was
dominated by Phoenician outposts when Skylax wrote, but they
had all gone when Alexander passed by, and the most obvious
occasion for the change is the campaign by Okhos.
The Phoenician cities were valued by the Persians because
of their fleets, and because of the trade they conducted, and
thus the tax revenue they provided. The burning of the Sidonian
ships during the capture ofthe city will have caused a significant
reduction in the Persian naval strength, but since that strength
was spread through all the cities (as well as Cyprus and Kilikia)
it was still possible for Okhos to mount a combined naval
and military invasion of Egypt after his capture of Sidon. He
disposed of a fleet of more than 80 ships, for one commander
had 80 and another had ‘a few’.** Before the Sidonian cata-
strophe, that city is said to have had a fleet of 100 ships, mainly
triremes, with some quinqueremes.** How many were burnt it
is impossible to say, just as the replacement rate is unknown.
Tyre, Arados, and Byblos also had fleets, though it seems that
Sidon’s was probably the largest. All four cities sent contingents
to the Persian fleet which operated in the Aegean in 334-331,
during Alexander’s war.” This fleet is said to be 300 strong”®
93 Diod., xvi, xlvii. 3-4. 94 Tbid. xliv. 6.
9 Arr., Anab., I. xiii. 7. © Thid. I. xviii. 5.
Che, The Time of Troubles, 360-287 BC
or alternatively, 400.°’ It included ships contributed by the
Cypriot kings as well.?? When it broke up two ofthe contingents
are noted—8o ships from three Phoenician cities, and 120
from Cyprus””—thus implying up to 100 Tyrian ships. The 80
Phoenician ships which joined Alexander during the siege of
Tyre came from Arados, Byblos, and Sidon'®’ but exactly how
many more ships each city had is unknown, and how many
had not deserted from the Persian fleet is also unknown. After
the battle of Issos the renegade Macedonian Amyntas burnt a
number ofships at Tripolis and took others to Egypt.'°! Whose
ships were they, and did they escape when his force was elim-
inated? Certainly the Persian fleet in the Aegean was still 100
strong in 332 after all the desertions and after at least one serious
defeat,'° by which time every port in the eastern Medi-
terranean was in Alexander’s hands. The number of the Persian
fleet was thus nearer 400 than 300, of which about half were
Phoenician.
The four Phoenician cities of the mainland had thus con-
tributed 200 ships to the Persian fleet and to these must be
added those burnt or seized at Tripolis by Amyntas, and those
held back in each city, which suggests a total of at least 300
and perhaps more, though 500 seems to be too many. During
Alexander’s war considerable numbers of these ships were
destroyed, for Phoenicia provided the largest contingent to the
Persian fleet, and so it follows that most of the destruction will
have fallen on them. In the Aegean, a contingent of 8 ships
under Datames was lost,'°’ over go at the conquest of Lesbos,!™
and an unknown number in the disintegration of the Persian
fleet in the face of the Macedonian offensive commanded by
Hegelochos.’*” An unknown number were burnt by Amyntas
and a larger (but still unknown) number were destroyed in the
Tyrian siege. It was possible, however, for Alexander to send
offa fleet of 100 ships, from Cyprus and Phoenicia, to reinforce
Amphoteros on news of trouble in the Peloponnese.!
*” Diod., xvn, xxix. 2 and xxxi. 3; P. A. Brunt in app. II of his Loeb edition ofArr.,
Anab., accepts 300 as the more likely figure, but does not discuss the matter.
°° Curtius. rv. iii. 16; Arr., Anab., m1. ii. 3. % Arr., Anab., W. xx. 1-3.
0° Tbid. xx. 1; Curtius, rv. iii. 11_(only Cypriots).
1! Arr., Anab., 11. xiii. 2-3; Curtius, 1Vv. i. 27. ' Curtius, rv. v. 17-18.
103 Arr., Anab., 1. ii. 4-5. 10 Curtius, um. v. 18.
Arr., Anab., ut. ii. 3-7; Curtius, rv. v. 14-41. © Arr., Anab., m1, vi. 3.
The Time of Troubles, 360-287 BC oy
If the Phoenician combined fleets were between 300 and 500
in strength, with a rising proportion being of the quinquereme
size, then this made the cities as a group a naval power of
the same potential as Athens, which could launch 410 ships
(including 18 quadriremes) in 330.'°’ Since the ability to man
such ships was a function of the population base, this suggests
that the combined Phoenician population was about that of
Attika, or perhaps a little more. Athens’ practice of manning
some ships with non-Athenians was no doubt also pursued by
the Phoenician cities. Precise figures are impossible; here I am
concerned to establish an order of size. Sidon’s casualties are
put at 40,000 in the Persian conquest;' Tyre’s casualties and
survivors in 332 are put at 25,000!” or 38,000.''° Whether these
figures are men, or men, women and children, is not clear, but
if each figure is doubled to include the rural population, and
equivalent numbers for Byblos, Arados, and Kition are added,
the minimum Phoenician population comes to over a quarter
of a million, which is not far off the usual calculation for
Attika.
With a relatively small population, divided among at least
six separate cities, and their main strength in ships which had
been sent to the Aegean, the Phoenician cities were in no state
to resist the invading Macedonian army on land, an army which
had already defeated the Great King’s own army. Indeed, four
of the cities made no attempt at all to resist, and no-one ever
blamed them. The problem arises in trying to explain why the
fifth, Tyre, did not give in as well.
Alexander’s destruction of the Persian force at Issos will have
become known within a few days in Phoenicia. Arados, after
all, is only a little over 200 km. from the battlefield, and a ship
could cover that distance in a day or two. Some time later,
perhaps ten days after the battle, a force of 8,000 Greek mer-
cenaries marched to Tripolis, seized the ships they needed
and sailed off.'!'' No attempt was made to stop them. Then
Alexander and his army approached.
Arados was first in his path. Its king, Girastart (Gerostratos
to the Greeks), was with the fleet in the Aegean, and it was his
107 IG u/2, 1627, |. 268. Fivr years later the total of quadriremes rose to 50 (Ibid.
1629, I. 811) and two quinqueremes had been built as well.
108 Diod., xvi. xlv. 5. 109 Curtius, Iv. iv, 15-16.
"0 Arr., Anab., 1. xxiv. 4-6. "Ml Tbid. xiii. 2-3; Curtius, rv. 1. 5-6.
son ‘Strato’ (i.e. Abdastart), who had to decide the correct
response. Whether it was because he was uncertain, or scared,
or by advice, he not only submitted, but came out of his island
and met Alexander on the mainland, offering a crown and
his kingdom’s submission. Alexander in return confirmed
Abdastart’s authority, at least temporarily, and did the
Aradians the favour of camping at Marathos and eating up
their supplies.'!”
Abdastart’s decision was undoubtedly the result of careful
calculation. He had a realistic alternative, as Tyre showed later:
he could have defied Alexander on the island, called back
his father and the fleet, and probably would have survived.
Alexander could occupy the mainland, Arados’ peraza, but he
would not have been able to take the island, which was much
further from the mainland than Tyre, while Arados’ fleet
remained in control of local waters. If Arados had resisted, it
is likely that other cities would have resisted as well, or perhaps
Just stayed neutral—though neutrality was scarcely an option
for minor powers in this crisis. Supplies could have been
acquired from Phoenicia, Egypt, Cyprus. It was a believable
option. And it would have stopped Alexander in his tracks for
months, as Tyre’s defiance did.
Alexander successfully took Byblos as well, again even though
the king was absent.'!’ Defiance was not really possible for
Byblos, a mainland settlement. At Sidon the situation was
different again: a mainland city, but one whose king was actu-
ally present. This was Abdastart III, the successor of the man
who was appointed by the Persians after their capture and
burning of the city thirteen years before. Presumably he was
excused from commanding his fleet because he was needed in
the city to prevent an awkward rebellion.!!* Alexander’s arrival
was therefore the signal for his removal, and it is reported that
he died a violent death, either at Alexander’s or his people’s
hands.''°
A member of the royal house, Abdalonymos, was located
working as a gardener, so it was said. This must mean he was
excluded from power, and perhaps also from the city itself. He
"2 Arr., Anab., U1. xiii. 7-8; Curtius, rv. i. 5-6.
"3 Arr., Anab., 1. xv. 6 and xx. tr. Mle bids xv. 6:
"9 Athenaeus, xii. 531d—-e, quoting both Theopompos and Anaximenes.
was enthroned,''® thus establishing a powerful Macedonian
supporter—powerful because of his acceptability to his
people—in the third Phoenician city.
Tyre, of course, was different. Alexander approached with
his army, as he had the other cities. As at Arados, he was met
by a deputation from the city, including the king’s son, for the
king was with the fleet in the Aegean. So far, so familiar.
The same process had occurred at Arados, but this time the
delegation’s submission was less than whole-hearted, so it
appeared. Alexander stated a wish to sacrifice in the Melqart
temple in the city. The delegation tried to deflect him to another
Melgart temple at Palaityros, on the mainland. Alexander took
this as it was clearly meant, as a rebuff.!!”
These negotiations display a typical process of cross-purposes
and misunderstandings. Alexander had not insisted on visiting
Arados on its island, and the Tyrians might well expect him to
stay on the mainland again. Their offer ofa substitute sacrifice
on the mainland may have been genuine, but they should have
realized that anything less than enthusiastic submission would
be inadequate. It is evident that Alexander felt that in this case
he must test the sincerity of the city’s submission, as he had not
felt he need do at Arados, and as soon as he did so it became
clear that the Tyrians were not sincere. In effect the Tyrians
were claiming the right to neutrality, that is, to independence,
and were reserving to themselves the right to admit, or refuse
to admit, anyone they chose. In the circumstances, a claim of
independence was a defiance of Alexander, and looked very
like support for Alexander’s enemy.''®
But why did the Tyrians do this? They must have known
how Alexander would react. Neutrality was not an option, so
they must choose between supporting Alexander or Dareios.
The sensible thing would seem to be to submit with a sufficient
display of sincerity, as the other three mainland cities had
done. So at least it appears to us, who know what happened
afterwards. But the Tyrians must have calculated that Alex-
ander’s victory was by no means assured. He had won battles
N6 Diod., xvr. xlvii. 1-6, transferring the story from Tyre back to Sidon; Curtius,
Ved. 16-20" |UStin, xia O-
"7 Arr., Anab., m1. xv. 6-xvii. 4; Curtius, Iv. ii. 1-5; Diod., xvu. xl. 2-3; Justin x1. x.
N8 A.B. Bosworth, Conquest and Empire (Cambridge, 1988), 65.
and sieges, but he still had enemies, and his army as it moved
further south along the Phoenician coast had got into a par-
ticularly difficult position. It was at the end of a long line of
communications, in an area with few supplies, facing an island
in the sea, which sea was dominated by hostile ships. But the
main reason for Tyre’s defiance—for all those arguments were
no different from the situation since Issos—was the new deter-
mination of the Persian government.
Alexander had rejected Dareios’ peace terms while at Mara-
thos. Dareios in reply had begun the process of collecting a
new army, but he had also sent out instructions for resistance
to the invaders. Asia Minor flared up in warfare again, Agis
of Sparta was encouraged, a revolt developed in Thrace, the
attempt by Amyntas to seize Egypt was put down. And Tyre
pinned down Alexander’s main force while all this activity
developed. The reason Tyre resisted was because it was
ordered to.''
There may be even more to it than that. When the siege was
over and the killing was finished, Alexander carefully spared
the life of Azemelek, the Tyrian king.'”° He, like Girastart of
Arados and Ainel of Byblos, had been with the fleet, com-
manding his city’s detachment in the Aegean, and his son had
had to cope with Alexander at first.'”’ He had returned during
the siege, with his ships. The fact that he was spared suggests
that he had not been commanding the resistance; more, it
suggests that he had counselled submission (he will have known
this was the policy of Girastart and Ainel), and that Alexander
knew it too. This, if true, means that someone else was leading
the defence of the city: perhaps Azemelek’s son, who led the
delegation to Alexander; more likely those in the city who
favoured Persia. The common people seem to have been as
determined to resist Alexander in 332 as the Sidonians had
been to resist Artaxerxes in 345. And this was so right from the
start. In T'yre’s case the wealthier element were perhaps equally
determined. Alexander picked out 2,000 men for special
execution when he had taken the city.'*? Perhaps these were
the Medizers: their number suggests they were the Tyrian
equivalent ofthe ‘one hundred’ and the ‘five hundred’ at Sidon.
'? P. Green, Alexander ofMacedon (Harmondsworth, 1974), 242-3.
120 Arr., Anab., 11. xxiv. 5 IM lbiduxve 7. "2 Curtius, Iv. iv. 17.
The Time of Troubles, 360-287 BC a7
Yet then Alexander left Azemelek in office as king. Once more,
the situation within the city suggests a revolution, but this time
the king was helpless to resist public opinion; but he also
survived, this time.
It is also evident that the Tyrians felt that they had sufficient
power—military power, not just naval—to defy Alexander’s
army until either he gave up, or relief came. The fact that they
held out for seven months shows that they had some basis
for this confidence, and this in turn argues that there was a
substantial quantity of military expertise in the city. The same
must also be said of the Sidonians in 345, facing the Persians.
This is something which our sources do not mention, though,
of course, the Carthaginians had a formidable military repu-
tation in Sicily, and Pumyaton was a powerful presence in
Cyprus. Tyre’s military strength presumably came in part from
the manpower of her fleet, which would include marines, and
perhaps from stray mercenaries and Persians, even if they are
not mentioned in our accounts. But the main strength of the
city lay in the determination of the people to resist, and the
ingenuity by which they devised methods of doing so. It is
noticeable that no Phoenician army was fielded, but that resist-
ance always took place behind city walls, where military expert-
ise was at a discount—until the moment of assault, when a
small number of professionals could be deployed to block the
gap broken in the walls by the besiegers. On the whole, however,
it is clear that the Tyrian defenders, as the Sidonians had been,
were amateurs.
The siege itself lasted seven months, and taxed the ingenuity
of both sides to their limits. Without going into details, for the
story is well known and has been retold often, some elements
are worth emphasis. In particular, Tyre fought alone. None of
the other cities made any attempt to help, apart from Sidon’s
apparent rescue of some escapees at the end. The only outside
interference came from some hillmen, described as Arabs, whom
Alexander raided in the Antilebanon.'*? They cannot have been
a serious threat at such a distance. Tyre attempted to use
Carthage as a refuge,'** but the distance was presumably too
123 Ibid. ii. 24; Plut., Alexander xxiv. 10-14.
2 Diod., xv. xli. 2 (some women and children sent) and xlvi. 4 (most of the non-
combatants sent).
great, and the Carthaginian religious envoys in the city during
the siege did nothing to help. They were captured with the king
in the Melqart temple at the end.'” It has been suggested that
the great expansion of the city of Carthage in the fourth century
BC was the result of receiving refugees from Tyre.'”° The con-
nection is impossible to document, and ‘fourth century’ occu-
pation is far too vague a term to be attached to a single event
such as a siege at the other end of the Mediterranean. Expansion
of the city through prosperity and natural growth is a better
explanation, if less dramatic, though it is quite possible that
numbers of refugees from Tyre would flee to Carthage to escape
their city’s troubles. And, despite the great length of the siege,
Dareios did nothing to help. Tyre was, in its agony, truly
independent.
Once again, at the end, as with Sidon, a Phoenician city was
given over to the sack. This time the casualties are numbered
more plausibly: 8,000 dead, 2,000 executed, 13,000 enslaved,
15,000 escaped.'*’ The escapees are said to have been rescued
by the Sidonians, a claim widely doubted. But Sidon may
have benefited from Tyrian assistance in its own agony, and
Sidonians at least could understand what Tyre was suffering.
If we substitute ‘took refuge with’ for ‘were helped to escape
by’ the Sidonians, this may be more acceptable. At least this
time we do not have an insistence on the least plausible result—
a wholesale killing of the entire population.
So some survived. Alexander garrisoned the city, now no
longer an island, and imposed a governor, Philotas, in the
area.'** After a delay, he permitted the rebuilding and repeopl-
ing of the city, for it was garrisoned—and thus presumably
both fortified and populated—next year.'?® The garrison, at
least, were Greeks and Macedonians under a Macedonian
officer. The civilian population will have been a mixture of
local Tyrians who had been on the mainland during the slege,
returned escapees, survivors (as, for example, Azemelek the
king), and Greeks who were seeking a new home. The authority
in the city was divided between the king and the garrison
"5 Arr., Anab., 11. xxiv. 5.

? Elayi, “The Relations between Tyre and Carthage in the Persian Period’, JANES
13 (1981), 25-6. 7 Arr., Anab., 1. xxiv. 4-6; Curtius, rv. iv. 15-17.
128 Curtius, IV. v. 9. 9 Arr., Anab., m1. vi. 1; Curtius, rv. viii. 16.
commander, and it would seem that the population was divided
too.
During the siege the Cypriot kings also made their
submission, having carefully gauged the position and abstracted
their ships from the Persian fleet. Their ships were loaned to
Alexander at a crucial moment in the siege,'*° and this, com-
bined with the essential marginality of Cyprus to the war,
prejudiced Alexander in favour of non-interference in Cypriot
matters. Pumyaton, the king of Kition, submitted more reluct-
antly than the others, which is not surprising considering the
value to him and his dynasty of the Persian connection. He was
permitted to rule on, but it seems that his latest acquisition,
Tamassos, was taken from him and given to Salamis, for an
inscription of 323 records him as king of Kition and Idalion
only.'*' Pumyaton may not have coined between 333 and 323,'*
which leads to the suspicion that Alexander prohibited him
from producing coins. This sounds unlikely. Alexander himself
had no time for Cyprus in those years, no Macedonian satrap
was imposed on the island, and a prohibition which is unen-
forceable is pointless. It is better to seek another explanation.
It may be that Pumyaton did not need any new coins. The
enforced peace reduced his need for troops at the same time as
the continued Macedonian demand for troops reduced the
available supply. The increased trade produced greater rev-
enues: new coining was thus unnecessary. Maybe Alexander
imposed a large regular tribute on Pumyaton which prevented
him from using precious metal for coins. These are as likely
explanations for the lack of Kitian coins as a hypothetical
prohibition by Alexander.
The result of Alexander’s visit to Phoenicia was the second
destruction of a Phoenician city within fifteen years. His con-
firmation or replacement of the various kings had demonstrated
quite clearly where authority really lay, and Alexander had left
behind at least one garrison (in Tyre) and possibly two (maybe
there was another at Marathos), a local governor, and a satrap
based in Syria as a general supervisor. From the Phoenician
point of view nothing had really changed very much (unless
BOAT Anant sng. GIS S15 Vs
132 Nicolaou, Hist. Top. Kition, 325; but Gjerstad, SCE, 1v/2, 507, and G. Hill, A
History ofCyprus (Cambridge, 1940), i. 152 disagree.
you were T’yrian, of course) except the language of the orders
!%8
they received.
Alexander marched to Egypt, then back though Phoenicia,
pausing pointedly at Tyre to celebrate games and conduct
another sacrifice to Melqart,'** and then he and his army
marched off to the east. For the next eight years the only
Macedonians seen in Phoenicia were garrisons and transients,
either going east as reinforcements, or returning west after
discharge. Alexander’s death did not at once disturb this peace-
ful moment, but in the next couple of years the warfare of his
successors gradually approached Phoenicia once more.
The repetitive campaigning in Syria by the Persians during
the first two-thirds of the century were now succeeded by
repetitive Macedonian campaigning which went on for another
generation after Alexander’s death. This time the object of the
campaigning was less the conquest of Egypt and more the
attempt of the Egyptian ruler Ptolemy to prevent or to anti-
cipate attack. In such a circumstance the Phoenician cities
became major points of control, since they were the only seri-
ously fortified places between the Euphrates and Egypt for most
of the time.
The process began in 321 when Attalos, the brother-in-
law of the murdered regent Perdikkas, and now leader of the
remnants of the Perdikkan party, arrived at Tyre. Ptolemy had
repulsed Perdikkas’ invasion of Egypt, but Attalos had saved
the Perdikkan fleet, and at Tyre he easily persuaded the Mace-
donian commander Archelaos to join him and to hand over
a
treasure which had been left with Archelaos by Perdikkas.!%°
At Tyre other Perdikkan loyalists gathered, to the number
of
10,000 men with 800 cavalry, so we are told.!°° The size of
the
fleet is not known, but we can be sure that any ships at
Tyre
when Attalos arrived will have been incorporated into
his fleet.
In all this there is no sign that anyone paid any attenti
on to
the Tyrian king. In the end Attalos took his men off
to adven-
tures and failure in Asia Minor. There is no reason
to believe
he left any men or ships in Tyre when he left.
The satrap of Syria from soon after Alexander’s
death was
"5 'Verkinderen, ‘Cités Phoeniciennes/Alexandre’, 294~308.
'f Arr., Anab., mi. vi. 1. ' Diod., Xvi. xxxvii. 3-4.
8 Arr., Successors ofAlexander, frag., 1, 39.
The Time of Troubles, 360-287 Bc 4I
Laomedon of Mitylene.'*’ He was very much a disregarded
figure in the events of the time and seems not to have had much
in the way of armed force at his disposal. Other generals were
able to march into and through his satrapy without much ado,
and without reference to him. His basic weakness meant that
any of his neighbours could occupy Syria with little trouble.
Ptolemy was the first to do so, as soon as the death of the regent
Antipatros in 319 in effect dissolved the agreement on the
partition of the empire which had been reached at Tripara-
deisos after Perdikkas’ death. The number of enemies which
Ptolemy could see on the distant horizon prompted him to seize
control of the Syrian approaches to Egypt as a defensive move.
He sent an army under a general called Nikanor into the
southern half of Syria.'** The vagueness of the report we have on
this military promenade leaves Nikanor’s precise reach unclear.
However, in later attempts to seize Egypt’s approaches Ptolemy
never moved north of the Eleutheros gap: perhaps this first time
he also restricted his advance. Diodoros’ words imply that
Nikanor took over all Laomedon’s satrapy (and Laomedon too,
who was imprisoned). Later, however, Eumenes came south
intending to challenge Ptolemy’s control of Phoenicia, and
camped for a time in north Syria.'*? No fighting took place
between their forces, which suggests either that Ptolemy with-
drew from North Syria before Eumenes’ advance, or that Pto-
lemy’s forces were never there. The latter explanation is
probably the better. Nikanor, therefore, removed Laomedon,
occupied Syria as far north as the Eleutheros gap, and ‘secured
the allegiance of the cities of Phoenicia’, as Diodoros puts it.
This means the kings of the cities submitted to him and thus
to Ptolemy. To make the point quite clear, Nikanor ‘placed
garrisons in’ the cities. If he stopped at the Eleutheros, he
left one city, Arados, untouched. Ptolemy never did show
any interest in Arados, and probably he did not do so now.
But a suggestion has been made that Marathos had had a
Macedonian garrison under Alexander and presumably after-
wards.'*° The basis of this idea is the appearance of a Mace-
donian shield on Arados’ coinage,'*’ but there is no other
137 Diod., XVII. iil. I. 138 Tbid. xliii. 2. 189 Tbid. Ixi. 4—-Ixii. 2.
40 Rey-Coquais, Arados, 151-2.
141 H. Seyrig, ‘Questions Aradiennes: 2. La Communauté aradienne’, Rev. Num., 4
(1964), 31 n. 3; cf. Rey-Coquais, Arados, 152-3.
evidence for it. If the garrison existed, one wonders who the
commander now looked to for orders. Perhaps he was only
too pleased to welcome Eumenes, who at least wielded some
authority. This garrison can only have been weakened both in
numbers and in authority by the various campaigns.
Eumenes recruited troops in north Syria, but failed to chal-
lenge Ptolemy’s hold on Phoenicia. Then he retreated eastwards
before the advance of Antigonos, again from the north. Anti-
gonos also recruited in north Syria,'*? and also failed to chal-
lenge Ptolemy in Phoenicia and the south. When he returned
to the west late in 316, having eliminated Eumenes, he was
challenged to fight for his conquests.'*? Antigonos did so, and
as a first priority swept Ptolemy’s forces out of all Phoenicia
and most of Palestine, except Tyre.!**
Ptolemy’s forces appear to have evacuated their holdings in
advance of Antigonos’ troops, and only at Tyre did they remain
to resist. From the Phoenician cities they seem to have left by
sea, taking with them all the ships they could find, along with
their crews.'* There is no sign that these ships and crews ever
returned to their homes, at least not in any organized body.
How many of the men got home on their own is anyone’s guess,
but it must be assumed that this evacuation caused a significant
loss of population in those cities. What is more, the loss came
disproportionately among young males, the most vigorous and
economically active part of the population. Beyond that, it is
also clear, not least from what Antigonos did next, that the
cities were deprived of their whole sea-going potential. If they
wanted to return to the sea they would first have to buy
or build new ships. It almost seems as though the various
Macedonians they came into contact with were concerting
efforts to destroy the Phoenicians as a power and a people. The
Macedonians would no doubt have denied any such intention,
but they will have wasted little sympathy on Phoenician prob-
lems.
Tyre was besieged, though apparently only in a lethargic
manner, for no incidents are known;'** it was more a blockade
than an active siege. Antigonos’ more immediate purpose was
naval. He ordered the construction of a new fleet. The whole
142
Diod., xv. Ixxiii. 1. M8 Ibid. xrx. lvii. 1. 4 Tbid. lviii. 1
145" Dbid: 2. "6 Thid. 1; lix. 2 and Ixi. 5.
length of the Lebanon coast from the Eleutheros to Sidon was
organized for the purpose, craftsmen recruited, trees cut and
transported, shipyards established or taken over in Tripolis,
Byblos, and Sidon; even more ships were built in Kilikia from
trees cut in the Taurus; a contract was put out to Rhodes for
yet more.'*” At one time Antigonos talked of building 500
ships, but he cannot have meant it. His comment came as the
Ptolemaic fleet of 100 ships sailed past,'*® and was designed to
raise the morale of his men. Antigonos had delegated part of
the work to ‘the kings of the Phoenicians’, but this can mean
only the kings of Byblos and Sidon, for Tyre was in the hands
of Ptolemy and Arados is not mentioned in the account we
have.
The Ptolemaic fleet was, of course, composed of the ships
stripped from Phoenicia by Ptolemy’s men on their retreat. It
was commanded by Seleukos, another refugee from Antigonos,
and was sailing to spoil as much as possible of Antigonos’
preparations. Antigonos had stirred up the Cypriot kings by
sending a messenger, Agesilaos, to make alliances with four of
the kings in the island. These were men who were disgruntled
at being dominated by Nikokreon, the king of Salamis, who
was a long-standing ally of Ptolemy. So far this was an inter-
Greek dispute, with Pumyaton of Kition at first uninvolved,
but it would not long remain so. Ptolemy sent, presumably in
the fleet commanded by Seleukos, a reinforcement of 3,000
troops to the island, but this seems not to have been enough,
so he sent 10,000 more.’*° It is evident that there was major
trouble in the island, and that this diversion of a substantial
part of Ptolemy’s armed forces permitted Antigonos to move
closer to Egypt, and he captured Joppa and Gaza before return-
ing to the siege of Tyre.'°
Ptolemy had sent his brother Menelaos to take command
along with Seleukos in Cyprus. They swiftly conquered the four
cities whose kings had taken Antigonos’ part, and then turned
on Kition.'*! Pumyaton had apparently tried to remain neutral
in this war of Macedonians, but this was not permitted to him,
any more than it had been to Tyre in Alexander’s war. Neutrals
were regarded as hostile, and Kition was besieged. ‘Thus Kition
47 Diod., x1x. 2-5. ae) Ubi os M49 Thid. Ixii. 3-4.
150 Tbid. lix. 2. 15! Tbid. Lxii. 5-6.
was under siege by the forces of Ptolemy and Tyre was under
siege by those of Antigonos simultaneously (and two years later
Carthage came under siege by Greeks from Sicily). Phoenicians
of a paranoid disposition could be excused for believing in a
Greek conspiracy.
Seleukos appears to have captured Kition, but Pumyaton
retained his throne. At Tyre the siege lasted a year and a
quarter, and only ended when Ptolemy’s garrison was on
the verge of starvation. This siege could not begin to bite
until Antigonos’ new fleet was large enough to establish a
local command of the sea in the approaches to Tyre. When
it did so capitulation was only a matter of time. Conditions
in the city don’t bear thinking about. If the garrison was on
the verge of starvation, any civilians still in the city were no
doubt actually starving, or dead. The Ptolemaic soldiers
were permitted to leave, and were immediately replaced by
a powerful Antigonid garrison.'°? Once again no mention
is made in any part of the account of the Tyrian king or his
people.
The siege at Tyre was also notable for Antigonos’ proclama-
tion of his war aims, which included, very much as a minor
matter, his intention to promote the freedom of the Greek
cities.'°° Ptolemy replied in the same vein.'** It can scarcely
have failed to be noted that both commanders were busy besieg-
ing cities at the time of their proclamations—but, of course,
these cities were not Greek.
Pumyaton did not long survive the first siege and capture of
his city. He was contacted again by Antigonos—or he may have
initiated the negotiations—and was discovered by Menelaos
doing so. He was executed.’ There is no sign that his city had
to be besieged again, but either now or after Seleukos’ earlier
siege, a determined effort was made to destroy the foundations
of the Phoenician power in the city. It had, as mentioned before,
been a city with a strong Phoenician element in its population,
but with Greek and native Cypriot groups as well, the whole
topped off by a Phoenician dynasty installed, encouraged, and
supported by Persia. It was thus only a matter of time, in
the new international circumstances, before Pumyaton was
™ Diod., xm. Iai. §- 159 Thid. g-4. ' Tbid. xii. 1.
9 Ibid. Ixxix. 4, presuming ‘Pygmalion’ really means Pumyaton.
removed. The city itself was also reduced. The main Phoenician
temple, of Melqart, was destroyed, as was another of Phoenician
type nearby. Just to make sure, the city wall was also pulled
down.'°® Ptolemy could perhaps point to these actions as the
freeing of a Greek city from a Phoenician yoke, if he had
the gall, but the disarming of the city left it a prey to him
and his army. For a year or so Nikokreon of Salamis saw his
kingdom expand over much of the island,'*’ but Ptolemy was
not fighting for anyone’s benefit but his own. Nikokreon was
soon eliminated (by means of a spectacular suicide-immola-
tion) along with the other city kings, and Cyprus became a
Ptolemaic possession under direct Ptolemaic rule.'? It was
as though the aggressive Phoenician king required powerful
Greek monarchies to face him: remove him and they became
unnecessary.
At about the same time that Pumyaton was finally going
down to defeat and death, the mainland cities became once
more the bones of contention. The defeat at Gaza in 312 of
Antigonos’ army under Demetrios allowed Ptolemy once more
to reach north into Phoenicia. Demetrios’ retreat stopped at
Tripolis, which he made his base, and from which he sallied
forth to defeat a probe north by a Ptolemaic general.'°? Ptolemy
himself took Sidon by persuasion, but was defied at Tyre by
Antigonos’ commander there, Andronikos.'® So Tyre once
more came under a fairly slack siege. Andronikos was expelled
from the city by his men, who continued to defy Ptolemy;
presumably, since Ptolemy took Andronikos into his service,'®!
Andronikos had tried to persuade his men to join Ptolemy, and
had failed. Before any more fighting could take place, Ptolemy
heard of the arrival of Antigonos in Syria with reinforcements.
There was no point in fighting overwhelming odds, so Ptolemy
retreated, carefully destroying the fortified towns of Palestine
as he went.'® One of these was Ake, destroyed therefore in the
same year as Kition. As a result, both cities ceased to be
Phoenician.
156 Nicolaou, Hist. Top. Kition, 52; Karagheorgis, Fouzlles de Kition, iii. 9.
157 Diod., xtx. Ixxix. 5 and xx. xxi. 1-3, presuming ‘Nikokles’ really means Niko-
kreon; Marmor Parium (FGH, 239) B 17 (= Austin, 21).
158 Marmor Parium B 17.
159 Diod., xix. Ixxxv. 4-5; xcill. 1-2. 160 Tbid. Ixxxvi. 1.
61 Thid. 2. 18 Thid. xciii. 4-7.
For ten years Phoenicia had a respite from war, the longest
period of peace since before Alexander’s invasion. All the sur-
viving cities were now under one ruler. Antigonos seems to have
been perfectly willing to work through the local kings; at least
there is no sign of friction, though neither is there any sign of
loyalty. Sidon had surrendered suspiciously quickly to Ptolemy
in 312 and Tyre had held out only because of its Macedonian
garrison in Antigonos’ employ. After Ptolemy’s retreat, Anti-
gonos’ overwhelming power was no doubt sufficient to ensure
quiet, reinforced by the defeat of Ptolemy’s navy at Salamis in
306.
The outbreak of war again in 302 necessarily involved the
Phoenicians. Ptolemy had not given up his ambition to gain
control of Palestine and Phoenicia to form a glacis for Egypt,
and the cities themselves still stood out as the major fortified
centres in the whole of Syria. Control of them was necessary
for anyone hoping to control Palestine from Egypt, for Palestine
itself was vulnerable if the cities were in antagonistic hands.
Similarly, if Phoenicia was under Ptolemy’s control, it provided
a solid base for a further advance northwards, if required. So,
when Antigonos retreated beyond the Taurus in 302 to defend
Asia Minor against the joint attack of Lysimachos and Seleukos,
Ptolemy moved north from Egypt to occupy Palestine and
Phoenicia once more.
This time it was Sidon which resisted him,'® though pre-
sumably Tyre had been bypassed since it was in Demetrios’
control later. Palestine was once more Ptolemy’s but without
control of Phoenicia it was a useless conquest. When distorted
versions of the indecisive fighting in Asia Minor arrived at
Sidon, Ptolemy made a truce for four months with whoever
commanded in the city and then returned to Egypt.!* He left
garrisons in other places he had captured, however, which can
only mean the ‘cities’ of Palestine, which had presumably been
refortified by Antigonos. This is not by any means a panic-
stricken evacuation. The truce shows clearly that Ptolemy
intended to return, and no doubt the four months of the truce
allowed both sides to avoid winter fighting, and to determine
Just what had happened in the north.
'3 Diod., xx. exiii. 1. ee Nbidaios

The winter did not provide firm information, other, perhaps,
than that the rumours which had prompted the original truce
were distorted. Ptolemy therefore moved back into Palestine—
already garrisoned, of course, by his men—and into Phoenicia
after the expiry of the truce. This will have been about March.
He was able to occupy only Tripolis and Byblos, it seems, and
to re-establish his frontier on the Eleutheros, before the news
arrived of the end of Antigonos at the Ipsos battle. News will
also have arrived, later, of the decision of Ptolemy’s allies,
Seleukos, Lysimachos, and Kassandros, to divide the spoils
between them. Ptolemy was to get nothing.!®
Seleukos was thus faced by an apparently well-established
Ptolemy when he came to take up his share of Antigonos’
empire, Syria and Mesopotamia. Yet Ptolemy’s power was
actually fairly fragile, for he had little in the way of sea strength
(his fleet had been destroyed only five years before) and his all-
too-frequent marches in and out ofPalestine and Phoenicia had
created the presumption that he was very likely to give up his
conquest easily. By contrast with Seleukos, however, his power
was formidable. Seleukos had no fortified base in the area,
other than the badly placed and probably antagonistic city of
Antigoneia, and he had no ships at all, so that Ptolemy’s small
fleet was necessarily the more powerful of the two. So Seleukos
took to ‘megaphone diplomacy’, loudly proclaiming that he did
not give up his claim to the south but that neither would he
enforce it—yet.'©
The real problem for both men was Demetrios. He was still
a power in the area by virtue of his inheritance of possession of
Cyprus, Tyre, and Sidon,'®’ and by the fact that he had the
only fleet which counted. It may be also that he still held Arados
island; there is no evidence either way, but the possibility
does exist; certainly Seleukos controlled the mainland and thus
exercised a stranglehold over supplies to the island, which thus
largely nullified its effectiveness as a base. Demetrios came east
in 298 and seized control of Kilikia from Kassandros’ brother
Pleistarchos. Seleukos, more threatened by this than Ptolemy,
induced Demetrios to form a marriage alliance, with Seleukos
marrying Demetrios’ daughter Stratonike.'™
165 Plut. Demetrios, xxx. 1; Pol V, Ixvii. eS eDioduexmn as:
167 Plut. Demetrios, xxxii. 4 and xxxiii. 1. 168 Tbid. xxxi. 4-6.
Now it was Ptolemy’s turn to feel threatened. Demetrios
used his base at Tyre (presumably) to mount a raid as far as
Samaria,'® but then decided that easier pickings lay in the
Aegean. He did not give up his bases in the east, but neither
did he make any serious use of them. Thus, both Seleukos
and Ptolemy nervously watched them, prepared for Demetrios’
possible return, but they also looked for an opportunity to seize
them. Ptolemy was clearly in a better position to expand. He
was the stronger, he had ships, and he had a well-established
interest in all three places going back to 319. This did not
prevent Seleukos from making an attempt to pre-empt Pto-
lemy’s claim. At one point he demanded the cession of Tyre
and Sidon from Demetrios, who indignantly refused.'’”? But
Demetrios by this time was fully occupied in trying to seize
more of the lands of the Aegean, where Kassandros’ death had
left instability. Ptolemy had taken the opportunity to seize
Cyprus,'’' and Seleukos, rebuffed by Demetrios, moved into
Kilikia,'’? as much to prevent Ptolemy from occupying it as to
expand his own lands.
The two Phoenician cities still in Demetrios’ hands fell to
Ptolemy, but precisely when and how this happened is not
clear. They must have been in Demetrios’ control in 294 or so,
when Seleukos asked him for them. Demetrios refused to hand
them over and reinforced their garrisons.'’”? It may be that
Ptolemy seized them at the same time as he acquired Cyprus,
but it seems unlikely. He had to fight for Cyprus, including a
siege of Salamis of some length, and it would be imprudent for
him to divide his forces between Cyprus and the mainland—
especially when Demetrios’ fleet was more powerful than his
own, and Ptolemy was never imprudent. So it can be assumed
that Demetrios held on to Tyre and Sidon after Ptolemy had
conquered Cyprus. At the other extreme it is clear that Deme-
trios did not control them in 286, when he began his final
doomed campaign. The two cities do not figure in this
campaign, and when Seleukos captured Demetrios in the
Amanus in the spring of 285 he did not demand the cities, as
he would surely have done had Demetrios still possessed them.
'®° Eusebius, Chronicorum, ed. A. Schoene, ii. 118.

'° Plut. Demetrios, xxxii. 5. 71 Thid. xxxv. 2.
172 Tbid. xvii. 1. 73 Tbid. xxxili. 1.
So Ptolemy seized the cities some time between 294 and 286.
The obvious time is when Demetrios fell into difficulties in 288,
when he was expelled from Macedonia. He had been busy for
much of his reign, too busy to go to the rescue of his garrisons
himself. Yet he could always reinforce them, as he did in the
face of Seleukos’ threat, and a relatively small increment of
force is all he would need to send to encourage the resistance.
It is difficult to believe that a long-drawn-out siege of either
place would have escaped a mention somewhere in our (admit-
tedly fragmentary and exiguous) sources, though the possibility
obviously exists.
We must assume therefore that Ptolemy acquired control of
these cities by negotiation. That would mean that the garrisons
were persuaded to join Ptolemy, and to persuade them he
would need to be able to threaten them with a siege and its
attendant horrors, to promise them employment in his own
forces, and to point to the unlikelihood of Demetrios being
able to come to their assistance. Demetrios’ collapse in 288
is the only time this set of circumstances was present. Ptolemy
was well known for employing other commanders’ forces—
and even disenchanted commanders as well. Sieges, especially
of Phoenician cities, and especially by the forces of Demetrios
Poliorketes, were notoriously unpleasant. No garrison would
willingly undergo such an experience if there was a way
out. The troops could argue that Demetrios’ inability to
support them dissolved their allegiance to him. All the signs
thus point to 288 or 287 as the time Ptolemy acquired the two
enies!74
When Tyre and Sidon changed hands, this marked the end
of the Phoenician time of troubles. Since 345, these cities had
been through a very bad time. Of the original six cities three
had‘suffered siege and sack (Sidon, Tyre, and Kition), one of
them twice. All six had changed masters at least four times and
in some cases six times. In every case the only result of Phoe-
nician resistance to any of these changes was siege and destruc-
tion. One city, Kition, had ceased to be Phoenician except in
the sense of having a Phoenician element in its population,
174 TM. Merker, ‘The Ptolemaic Officials and the League of the Islanders’, Historia,
19 (1970), 41-55; J. Seibert, ‘Philokles, Sohn des Apollodoros, Konig der Sidonier’,
ibid. 337-51; Bagnall, Ptolemaic Possessions, 11.
and their temples had suffered destruction. The Phoenician
expansion into Cyprus had been eliminated, so had that into
Palestine, where the string of Sidonian and Tyrian outposts of
the Persian period had ceased to be Phoenician. Even some
land which could arguably have been considered part of the
Phoenician ancestral homeland, Ake and its territory, had
ceased to be obviously Phoenician; the city itself had suffered
destruction and was soon to be founded anew as a Greek city.
Every change of master had been accomplished by violence
or the threat of violence. In the two great sacks, Sidon and
Tyre, the loss of life had been so great as to stimulate historians
to exaggeration. The Ptolemaic evacuation of 315 had removed
most of the Phoenician naval strength and much of the young
male population. Antigonos’ fleet-building had been carried
out by conscripted Phoenician skilled labour. And every time an
army marched through or to Phoenicia, food was requisitioned.
There can be no doubt that the Phoenician population was
substantially less in 288 than it had been sixty years before,
partly because its homeland had been amputated, but also
because of killings, starvation, and emigrations, forced and
voluntary.
The experience will have had deep effects on the survivors;
their traditions must have changed to cope with the new
situation. Their cultural heritage was also surely mutilated
beyond repair, leaving an impoverishment which Greek culture
could hope to fill. Three centuries later, Josephus commented
that the archives at Tyre went back a long way!” and Philo of
Byblos later claimed to summarize the Phoenician historian
Sanchuniathon.'”° Philo may well be correct, though he pro-
vides precious little historical information in his summary, but
strong doubts about Josephus’ claims must be expressed. Tyre’s
experience at the hands ofits various conquerors was so violent
and destructive that the survival of any records at all is
extremely doubtful.!7’
The lack of Phoenician resistance after the siege of Tyre in
332 was surely deliberate. The Phoenicians clearly took the
1S Jos., AF vill. 55.

° L. Troiani, L’Opera storiografia de Filone da Byblos (Pisa, 1974); A. I. Baumgarten,
The Phoenician History of Philo ofByblos (Leiden, 1981)
'7 Millar, ‘Phoenician Cities’, 64.
lesson of Sidon and Tyre to heart: do not resist overwhelming
force. All cities co-operated with the repeated conquests. The
one exception proves the rule. Pumyaton kept out of the various
conflicts until 314—312, then resisted. The result was execution
for him and oblivion for his city. The history of the surviving
cities after the final Ptolemaic captures in 288 or 287 shows that
the lesson did not need a further repetition.
2
THE PTOLEMAIC PEACE

287-225 BC
The Ptolemaic acquisition of four-fifths of mainland Phoenicia

proved to be definitive. The inability of Demetrios Poliorketes
or Seleukos Nikator to challenge Ptolemaic control was evident
from the first. Demetrios went down to humiliation, desertion,
defeat, and capture by Seleukos in 285 and died in 283. Seleukos
himself had announced his policy of no war, no peace with
Ptolemy as early as 301, and busied himselfin building up his
strength, partly in defence, partly with a view to acquiring yet
more territory. As it happened he found Asia Minor his most
lucrative field of operations, until he was killed in 281, charac-
teristically in the act of acquiring yet more territory.
Seleukos, however, did have to deal with one Phoenician
city: Arados. This city appears so seldom in the extensive written
sources for the time of Alexander and his quarrelsome successors
that it seems justifiable to suggest that the city’s rulers delib-
erately adopted a policy of invisibility and co-operation with
whoever was locally powerful. Its king’s son had welcomed
Alexander in 333,’ and the city and a place on its mainland,
probably Marathos, minted coins for Alexander. Marathos was
described as a great and flourishing city by Arrian’s source, and
it was the obvious place for a mint. Wherever it was, the mint
continued operating until 300, finishing with an issue in the
name of Seleukos.?
Seleukos’ arrival in Syria posed a serious problem both for
Arados and for Seleukos. It was clear that Ptolemy was not
interested in moving his frontier north of the Eleutheros—not
with untaken Sidon and Tyre in his rear, at least—and Seleukos
was not strong enough to attempt a challenge to that frontier.
The river thus became the frontier by default. Arados is just to
' Arr., Anab., 1. xiii. 7. > Newell, WSM, nos. 1244, 1246.
The Ptolemaic Peace, 287-225 BC 53
the north of the river mouth, and the land which was its peraia,
its mainland territory, stretched as far south as that river. Thus
the city became poised between the two Macedonian warrior-
kings, neither of whose appetites for territory could be assumed
to have been assuaged more than temporarily.
Seleukos had to move very cautiously.’ His new territories
were potentially or actually hostile to him, being inhabited
by Greeks and Macedonians whose loyalty was to the dead
Antigonos and now perhaps to the living Demetrios, and by
Syrians and Phoenicians, whose loyalty was given to no one for
the moment. Seleukos’ solution to this difficulty was creative.
He founded a network of cities for his Greeks and Macedonians,
and he conciliated the Syrians. Once the cities were in place he
was able to be less conciliatory to the Syrians, but by then his
policy was working and there was no good reason to change it.
For Arados this meant that Seleukos and the city in effect
formed an alliance. Inevitably it was unequal, but Arados had
a number of advantages which could be utilized. Possession of
a fleet was one. It is possible that Arados’ fleet was gathered
up in the Ptolemaic retreat in 315,* but there had been time to
build a new one since. Whatever size it was 1n 301, it was bigger
than any fleet the land-locked Seleukos had, and it would
be correspondingly valuable to him. His immediate decision
to found fortified sea-cities with large artificial harbours at
Seleukeia-in-Pieria and Laodikeia-ad-Mare shows his alertness
to the issue, but it was obviously going to take years to build the
cities, dig their harbours, and construct and man the ships he
required. In the mean time he would have to rely on the navy
of Arados.
Arados on its island was also in a powerful geographical
position. It had never been attacked, so far as we know, unlike
Tyre, and the reason was its greater distance from the main-
land—two kilometres compared with Tyre’s few hundred
metres. Yet Arados island is only small, and was heavily popu-
lated, which rendered access to the mainland a vital matter—
literally one of life and death. Thus, Seleukos was in a more
powerful position in this sense because his land army could
easily control the coastlands and therefore he could control
Arados’ main food source.
3 Grainger, Cities, 54-8.
54 The Ptolemaic Peace, 287-225 BC
This raises the problem of Arados’ peraia. When Alexander
arrived, the city controlled all the coast from Gabala to the
Eleutheros and inland as far as Mariamme and the unknown
Sigon.” What Alexander did about this is not clear, but it seems
likely that Arados lost control of the mainland. At least two
mints operated in the peraia during the reign of Alexander,
probably at Marathos and Karne.® This suggests Macedonian
control. In fact it has been suggested also that a ‘Macedonian
colony’ was established at Marathos, the idea being based on
the occurrence of a shield, a common Macedonian symbol, on
coins produced at Marathos.’ This may or may not be so, and
as evidence it is pretty feeble, but Marathos was a major
port in north Syria, and it is likely to have had a Mace-
donian garrison and Macedonian officials, and to have been
a transit point for Macedonian and Greek troops travelling
between Alexander in the east and Greece in the west. This
does not need to be designated a ‘colony’, which then has to
be terminated. All that needs to happen is for the traffic to
cease and the garrison to move. This also can explain why
the mint was there—and Karne was also a harbour®’—for it
was primarily to supply cash to pay soldiers and to pay for
supplies that Alexander and his military successors required
mints.
Thus, the importance of the ports of the peraia, the unlike-
lihood of Alexander permitting any political authority except
himself and his agents on the Mediterranean seaboard, and
the evident exercise of Macedonian authority by means of a
garrison and a mint all suggest that Arados lost control of its
peraia when Alexander arrived. Antigonos’ grand shipbuilding
programme in 315-314” tends to confirm this, for Arados and
Tyre were the only Phoenician cities not mentioned in his
organization, Tyre because it was in Ptolemy’s hands still, and
Arados because, being confined to its island, it would not have
been involved in shipbuilding, given the quantities of wood
required.
Yet it is clear from Arados’ subsequent history that the one
constant element in the city’s political requirements was control
* Diod., xrx. lviii. 2. > Arr., Anab., 11. xiii. 8.
° Rey-Coquais, Arados, 154-6. ” Tbid.
8 Strabo, xvi. ii. 12. ° Diod., x1x. lviii. 1-6.
of the peraia. Without that the city was at the mercy of whoever
controlled the mainland; united with it the city was effectively
autonomous, and, in the end, independent. Thus, it can be
assumed as given that Alexander’s confiscation of the peraia
both bred resentment and stimulated attempts at recovering
control. Until Seleukos arrived in 301 there was no situation of
a sufficiently delicate balance on the mainland for the city to
exert its influence, but Seleukos was weak and Arados was
very useful to him. I suggest, therefore, that Arados’ control
over the perata was restored in 301 or 300, as the city’s
price for establishing itself firmly on Seleukos’ side. It would
take a while for this to be negotiated; in the mean time the
Marathian mint continued to produce coins, now in Seleukos’
name, and it had time to produce one coin issue before closing
down.'® The mint would be closed as soon as the peraia be-
came Aradian again, for one effect of Arados’ restoration to
the peraia would be the withdrawal of Seleukid troops from
the area.
The question of the monarchy at Arados is just as difficult
to sort out. Alexander received the surrender of the city in
333 and presumably permitted the king to continue ruling
there, since the king himself was still with the Persian fleet
and later joined Alexander, apparently voluntarily.'’ At the
same time the coin series minted at the city under the king’s
authority ended, and the mint produced coins for Alexander.”
At some point in the next century the monarchy itself was
abolished, for in 218 Antiochos III dealt directly with ‘the
Aradians’.'*
There were a number of occasions when abolition could have
taken place during that century. Antigonos’ arrival in 315 is
one, particularly since Arados is not recorded as participating
in the shipbuilding programme he began then. On the other
hand, he did call in ‘the kings of the Phoenicians’ and this
phrase suggests (no more) three rather than two (‘Tyre was not
his yet). This is a slender thread, and it is just as easy to assume
Arados’ absence from this conscription, but there is no reason
to assume that Antigonos would abolish one kingship and keep
the rest, and no cause for him to do so. The arrival of Seleukos,
10 Newell, WSM, no. 1240; Seyrig, ‘Aradus’, 206-7. a Arr., Anab.,1.xx. 3.
2 Newell, WSM, nos. 1244, 1246. * Pol., v. xviii. 7.
on the other hand, may be a more convincing occasion for
abolition, for the presumed Aradian king had been a supporter
of Antigonos, and his removal might well be a quid pro quo for
the restoration of the peraia to the city. Then in 259 the city
and the peraia (hence the two were united at the time) began a
new era, which was to be used on coins of the various settlements
for the next two centuries and more.'* It has been assumed that
the abolition of the monarchy might provide a suitable occasion
for instituting a new era, and this may also have been done in
other Phoenician cities already. At the same time, we are
profoundly ignorant of any events in and about Arados during
most of the century, and the abolition of the kingship must
remain a theory only. It is, for example, noticeable that the
new era is only known from coins minted seventeen years later,
and this suggests that the event commemorated might not have
seemed so important at the time, but only in retrospect. In
addition, of course, the abolition of the monarchy is not necess-
arily the most memorable event to the Aradians. There may
well have been a different and equally good reason for insti-
tuting a new era which we do not know and cannot guess. In
that case the arrival of Seleukos in 301-300 might well provide
a more suitable moment for the abolition of the monarchy:
The situation south of the Eleutheros was inevitably more
complicated. Seleukos had to deal with only one city, but
Ptolemy with four, which came into his hands several times and
at different times. There was no reason for the cities in the 280s,
for example, to suppose that the new Ptolemaic control was
likely to be any more lasting than the earlier ones imposed in
320 or 312—though a good hard look at the international scene
might suggest that relative calm had at last returned. The
elimination of Demetrios in 285 and still more his death in 283
perhaps compelled an acknowledgement that the Ptolemaic
power looked more firmly grounded in Phoenicia this time
round—the more so in those cities which had been in Ptolemy’s
hands since 302 or 301. The peaceful replacement of Ptolemy
I Soter by his son Ptolemy II Philadelphos over the period 285-
283 would be another indication ofstability, an unusual matter
since none of these Macedonians had yet handed his power on
to his son successfully and in peace.
'* Seyrig, ‘Arados’, 206-20; Jones, CERP, 239.
The methods of control by the Ptolemies were accordingly
established gradually, being elaborated over time. However,
just what the stages were and how long each lasted is impossible
to detail. Sources are meagre, and possibly misleading.
Common sense, political and strategic, indicates that garrisons
were posted in all the cities. This was a very sensitive frontier
area and a fairly heavy concentration of armed force, military
and naval, is to be expected. Tyre had held a Macedonian
garrison since Alexander’s conquest’’ and an obscure attempted
coup at T’yre in the early third century may have been by the
commander of the city garrison, a man called Theodotas.'®
Tyre was also fortified and garrisoned in 218, when it was seized
by a disaffected soldier for Antiochos III.'’ Evidence from Sidon
consists of the painted gravestones of a group of soldiers
from Asia Minor, Greece, and Crete, all areas from which
the Ptolemies recruited mercenaries.'* A cavalry commander
is recorded at Tripolis in 258/7.'? Orthosia was fought over, it
seems, and stood a siege in the 240s,” and a place so close to
the Eleutheros frontier surely had a garrison. This is as much
as can be said, based on present available evidence, but cumu-
latively it is good evidence for a continued heavy military
presence.
Orthosia’s appearance as a fortified post capable of standing
a siege points up another development. A frontier zone is necess-
arily studded with fortifications, and clearly Orthosia was one
of these. Another was probably at Arka, a long-fortified site
which has produced Hellenistic pottery; the Hellenistic building
remains have been substantially destroyed by later Roman and
Byzantine work, but the place was certainly strong in the late
second and early first centuries, when it became the basis for a
new principality.?! These two places, set back from the actual
boundary, which was the river, effectively blocked the passage
south towards the Phoenician cities, which were themselves
fortified.
1 See Ch, 1.
6 Lucian, De Calumnia, 2, roughly dated by M. Launey, Recherches sur les armées
hellénistiques, 2nd edn., (Paris, 1988), 240-1, on the assumption that it is part ofa true
story: there must be doubt about it.
Pole va lxiie oe 18 See n. 104 below.
19 G. Vitelli, et al., Papiri greci e latini (¥lorence, 1912), no. 495.
20 Eusebius, Chronicorum, no. 495. ed. A. Schoene, i. 251. 21 See'Ch. 5.
The inland frontier was marked by two more fortified posts,
Brochoi and Gerrha, placed on either side of a lake in the
southern Bekaa valley.” Technically it is likely that the north-
ern Bekaa was Ptolemy’s as well, but it was less fertile than the
southern part, and was left largely unoccupied,” or at least
unfortified, so that its largely desert condition would deter
Seleukid attack. The establishment of the frontier at Gerrha
and Brochoi brought the fertile southern half of the Bekaa firmly
into Ptolemaic control, and further served to dominate the
Arabs who were living in the area, whom Alexander had
encountered in the siege at Tyre.** The stony wastes of the
northern half of the Bekaa were thus left very thinly occupied,
producing little or no surplus; the area performed the function
of a resourceless no-man’s-land as a further defence in front of
the Ptolemaic forts. Brochoi and Gerrha were therefore per-
forming a dual function as garrisons in an area which was
potentially hostile, and as forts blocking one of the three routes
south from Seleukid Syria. The third route, along the eastern
foot of the Antilebanon mountains, in the desert lands, was
even more difficult, and that was blocked at its southern end
by the fortified city of Damascus.
In terms of administrative geography the coastal area was
divided up among the cities, but where the civic boundaries
were is as unclear as most things. The cities themselves seem to
have shed their kingships soon after the definitive Ptolemaic
acquisition. No king at Byblos is known after Ainel, who was
confirmed in office by Alexander, though there was still a king
in the city in 315 when Antigonos made him build ships. It
seems unlikely that Ainel himself could have lived much longer,
and in the absence of coin evidence it is not possible to decide
if he had a successor. The kings had to cope with frequent
changes of allegiance during the Macedonian civil wars, and it
would not be difficult to change sides a little too late or a little
too early. Pumyaton of Kition timed things wrongly in 312 and
the kingship there was soon abolished. (Kingship in the rest of
Cyprus soon followed.) The same could have happened in
mainland Phoenicia at any time from then on. Once the
2 Pol. v. xlvi. 1 and Ixi. 8.
*° A. Kuschke, et al., Archdologischer Survey in den nérdlichen Biga (Wiesbaden, 1976).
** Plut., Alexander, xxiv. 10-14.
example was made of one of the kings, it would be increasingly
easy to repeat. The proximity of Byblos to the northern Pto-
lemaic boundary, and the military weakness of the city might
persuade Ptolemy to eliminate the monarchy at the first oppor-
tunity, that is, in 302 or 301. Such records as we have do
indicate an early demise.
Tyre is just as awkward a problem. Alexander confirmed the
kingship of Azemelek but the city changed hands repeatedly
from then until 287. It seems unlikely that Azemelek could have
personally lasted so long, particularly if, as Betlyon has argued,
his reign began as early as c. 347,” though it is not wholly
impossible. Repeated destruction, capture, depopulation, and
garrisoning was Tyre’s fate during that time, and despite fairly
good sources for much of these events, no mention anywhere is
made ofa Tyrian king after the capture of the city by Alexander.
The mint produced coins for Alexander, then for Philip Arrhi-
daios, in the name of Alexander again, and then for Demetrios,
but never for a local king after Azemelek. Given all this, one
might feel that the kingship had vanished at some point between
332 and, say, 300 at the latest. But the city began a new era in
274, and, as with Arados, this is generally taken to mark the
replacement of the monarchy by a republican constitution.
Certainly the era is used in inscriptions in which the people
of Tyre are apparently the sovereign authority;”° that is, the
monarchy has gone. But the monarchy’s abolition does not
necessarily link chronologically with the new civic republican
constitution. Tyre had been used, above all, as a military strong
point since Alexander’s time. Apart from sieges, it had suffered
partial depopulation at least twice, first in the massacre and
enslavement after Alexander’s successful assault, and then when
Ptolemy’s forces were besieged by Antigonos’ until the city was
reduced by starvation. Under Demetrios’ control, the city was
largely cut off from its trading hinterland, and there can have
been little opportunity for the population to recover. Thus, in
all this time, the local ruler was in fact the commander of the
garrison. It was as such that Andronikos first defied Ptolemy
and then tried to surrender to him.’’ He clearly had complete
authority in the city, subject only to the objections of his
25 Betlyon, Mints, 58. TCU al ok
27 Diod., x1x. Ixxxvi, 1-2.
mercenary comrades, and he had noneed todefer toany king. This
military regime necessarily continued throughout Demetrios’
rule, for Tyre was under constant threat, if not actual attack
from Ptolemy. It would continue as well for some time following
Ptolemy’s acquisition in 287. By 274, though, the eastern Medi-
terranean had settled down, politically and militarily. The only
threat to Ptolemaic power in Phoenicia was from Seleukos’ son
and successor Antiochos I, who was deeply involved almost
everywhere he could look, particularly in Asia Minor. The era
of 274, in other words, does not necessarily commemorate the
end of the city monarchy, for which we have no evidence for
the previous sixty years. Instead it could mark the grant of some
sort of civic status by Ptolemy II Philadelphos, and the removal
of direct military rule from the city. This would be something
more to be celebrated and commemorated than the peaceful
removal of a moribund kingship. There is thus no proof that
the kingship lasted so long, and in the absence of the positive
identification of aTyrian king it would be better to assume the
early abolition of the monarchy, perhaps even during Alex-
ander’s time, though it is more likely to have happened during
the Macedonian wars.
There is, however, a further detail which must enter into
consideration here. 274 is also the date when, by most cal-
culations, Ptolemy II and Antiochos I came to blows in what
is usually called the ‘First Syrian War’, a conflict which lasted
until 271 or thereabouts.”* This is not a war of which much is
known, but the coincidence of date is clearly worth remark.
For what happened is that Tyre underwent some sort ofpolitical
change in the year in which war began between Tyre’s political
overlord and the pretender to that overlordship. The question
then is, to what extent are these two events connected? It
cannot safely be assumed that they were not connected. If the
monarchy was abolished in 274 this might indicate treasonable
activity by the king, which, in the context of this war, would
not be too unlikely—Antiochos provoked trouble in Cyrene,
for example. The abolition of the monarchy, therefore, would
be an act of Ptolemy, but this would render the city unreliable
to the Ptolemaic government, and it would thus need a bigger
*8 A notorious problem, this war; cf. E. Will, Histoire politique du monde hellénistique,
i.
(Nancy, 1979), 144-50.
garrison because of the Seleukid threat. This scenario has its
attractive aspects. The garrison certainly continued, but then
that is to be expected under all circumstances.
At the same time, the notion that the era of freedom begin-
ning in 274 marks the end of military government of the city
might seem unlikely at the start of awar. But it is necessary to
distinguish between the presence of a garrison and military
rule: in this case the former continued, while the latter ended.
It would presuppose Tyrian popular loyalty to Ptolemy, and
a reply by Ptolemy graciously acceding to Tyre’s wish for
autonomy. This is not unlikely in the context of a new war, for
it might well bind the city closer to the Ptolemaic cause than
brute force would do. Of course, a decision on all this will be
based on guesswork and intuition, but I do incline towards the
second alternative, with the monarchy long gone by 274, and
that year marking the beginning of responsible autonomous
government in the city.
Sidon, again, is different. The enthronement of Abdalonymos
by Alexander ensured popular support for the city monarchy,
but how long Abdalonymos lasted is not at all clear. An inscrip-
tion from Kos has been taken to show that he was still in office
about the end of the century, but it cannot be stretched to mean
that, for, although it refers to him, it does not prove he was
reigning at the time, nor can it be dated at all accurately.” If
he did survive until about 300, Abdalonymos will have
successfully negotiated his way through repeated changes of
control, and it does seem unlikely, as at Tyre, that anyone could
so survive. In particular, the evacuation of 315, when Ptolemy
took all the ships of the city back to Egypt, is likely to have
involved the king as well. Certainly a king existed there next
year, when he was summoned to build ships for Antigonos, but,
if it was Abdalonymos, he still had to survive Ptolemy and
Antigonos in 312, and Ptolemy again in 302, when the city was
first besieged by Ptolemy and later retained by Demetrios.
Whenever he actually died, it seems reasonable to conclude
that it was Abdanolymos who was buried in the royal necropolis
east of the city, in the so-called ‘Alexander’ sarcophagus.*° This
29M. Sznycer, ‘La Partie phénicienne de l’inscription bilingue greco-phénicienne
de Cos’, Arkhaiologion Deltion, 35 (1980), 17-30.
5° The original report of the excavation of the necropolis is O. Hamdy-Bey and
splendid piece of sculpture was prepared by a Greek artist for
a man who revered Alexander, for the sculptures commemorate
the victory in battle of the Macedonian king. Abdalonymos is
the obvious candidate. The rest of the necropolis contains other
examples of Greek work, and it seems logical to accept that this
was not only a royal tomb, but a family sepulchre. The dates
of the various burials are not precisely known, and the allocation
of particular sarcophagi to particular kings is only conjectural.
The history of Sidon, however, suggests that there were at least
three royal families—that of Abdalonymos, known to have been
of a royal family opposed to the kings in office before him,
Abdastart II and III, who were of the second family, and,
third, the family of Tennes (if any survived) known to have
been opposed by the Abdastarts. The line of Abdastart I,
Tennes’ predecessor, may have been a fourth, unless all three
Abdastarts were of one family. The royal tombs of the family
of Abdalonymos clearly do not contain members of either of
the other families, but one of the sarcophagi has the name of
Tabnit, a king of the early fifth century.
Abdalonymos’ tomb chamber also contained the bodies of
three other people, sex unknown, but presumably his own
children, for the coffins were smaller than his, and plain. The
implications are that his children did not succeed him on the
throne—or they would have their own tomb chamber—and
that he died in peace in Sidon, for it is clear that the burial took
place and was sealed. Hence Abdalonymos may be presumed to
have died during one of the periods of peace for the city, at
some time between his accession in 332 and the end of the
century. ‘’he sarcophagus must have taken some time to carve,
and the extension of the tomb will have required some time
to excavate. We may presume the king did not die for some
years.
The problem is complicated rather than clarified by the
existence of another king of Sidon, Philokles, who appears in
several sources as a high official of Ptolemy, especially in naval
T. Reinach, Une nécropole royale a Sidon (Paris, 1892, 1896); an account of the discovery
and excavation, with extensive quotation, is in N. Jidejian, Sidon Through the Ages
(Beirut, 1971), 120-37; a reconsideration of the tomb is in H. Gabelmann, ‘Zur
Chronologie der Konigsnecropole von Sidon’, Archdologischer Anzeiger (1979), pt. 1,
163-77, who tries to allocate sarcophagi to kings. See also J. Elayi, ‘Les Sarcophages
phéniciens d’époque perse’, [ranica Antiqua, 33 (1988), 275-322.
affairs in the Aegean in the 280s.°! He died in 278. His office
as king must have been more or less nominal, since he seems to
have spent most of his time in Greek waters as Ptolemy’s
representative,” but the real difficulty is his acquisition of the
throne. If Ptolemy acquired control of Sidon in 287 (or even as
early as 296) Philokles must either have been king already and
deftly changed sides, or was installed as king by Ptolemy. On
the whole, the second possibility, installation, has seemed the
more acceptable, even though it is not Ptolemy’s usual pro-
cedure. It has been suggested that Philokles was a refugee
prince, kept by Ptolemy as a pretender as against Antigonos’
and Demetrios’ man.** Certainly Ptolemy used pretenders—
Seleukos was one—but one would like more evidence for Philo-
kles’ being used in this role. For, given the history of Sidon,
Philokles was presumably a pretender belonging to a royal line
opposed to the king who had been supported by Antigonos and
Demetrios. The city’s monarchy had been so unsettled since
360 that at least four possible royal lines could have existed, so
there were probably plenty of candidates around for Ptolemy
to choose from. In 332, after all, Alexander had found one
easily enough. The most economical theory would be that
Philokles was a pretender of the line of Abdastart II and III,
which was, perhaps, the oldest of the royal lines. It seems
unlikely that the line of Tennes would be acceptable to the
Sidonians, and Abdalonymos was probably not acceptable to
Ptolemy, if he had been loyal to Antigonos.
Further, there is the matter of his name. He is called, in
inscriptions referring directly to him, and thus ee ane
correctly, Philokles son of Apollodoros.** Both names are wholly
Greek, and under any other circumstances he would be con-
sidered to be a Greek—or, rather, it would never occur to
anyone to think of him as anything but Greek. As he was king
of the Sidonians, however, it is assumed that both names are
Greek translations of Phoenician names, and he is assumed to
31 H. Hauben, ‘Philocles, King of the Sidonians and General of the Ptolemies’, Si.
Phoen., v. 13-27, with full references to earlier studies.
32 He is commemorated in inscriptions at Athens (JG, m/2, 3425), Samos (SEG, 1.
363), Delos (Durrbach, Choix, 85), and Nikouria by Amorgos (JG, xm/7, 506).
33 Hauben, ‘Philocles’, 41-8.
34 Listed in W. Peremans and E. van’t Dack, Prosopographia Ptolemaica, V1, Studia
Hellenistica, 17 (Louvain, 1968), no. 15085; see also Hauben, ‘Philocles’, n. 2.
be Sidonian because he was king there.*? It is, of course, possible,
but one wonders: why? Is it really so unthinkable that he was
Greek or Macedonian? After all, his work was as Ptolemy’s
admiral. He operated in the Aegean, and it was in Greece that
he was commemorated. It would not be the first time Ptolemy
promoted another to be king: he had made his brother Menelaos
into king of Cyprus. In such circumstances the title ‘king of the
Sidonians’ might be considered honorary. Perhaps it gave the
admiral a status in the Ptolemaic fleet, which was at least partly
manned by Phoenicians, which helped establish his authority.
These possibilities need to be taken into account, and to my
mind the idea of an honorary monarchy seems worth more than
a passing thought.
For the Sidonians, Philokles’ kingship can only have been
irrelevant. His long absence meant that they were effectively
autonomous. This may even have been part of Ptolemy’s design.
And surely their king’s long absence can only have inclined the
Sidonians towards republicanism. It was.not, of course, their
inclinations which were decisive, but those of Ptolemy II Phil-
adelphos, and he will not have been concerned to change
matters until Philokles’ death. Meanwhile Sidon continued to
be defended by its Macedonian garrison, and the commander
of that garrison will have had a major influence, to put it no
stronger, in the government of the city.
If Philokles was of one of the old royal lines, or if he was
Greek or Macedonian, he is likely to have been less than popular
in the city, and this would encourage Ptolemy II to proceed
with the abolition of the monarchy. An inscription said to be
of about the middle of the third century is dated to the year 14
of the era of Sidon.” If the era dated from the death ofPhilokles,
which took place soon after 278, then the fourteenth year would
be between, say, 264 and 260, near enough to mid-century to
be accepted. So such evidence as there is suggests the abolition
of the monarchy as a result of the death of the last king.
Each of the Ptolemaic Phoenician cities thus suggests a
different date and a different reason for the abolition of the
civic monarchy. Arados is probably different again, and Kition
yet again. It is only in retrospect that a deliberate policy of
abolition can be extracted from the sequence of events. More
%* Hauben, ‘Philocles’, 424. 38 IG, 1/2, 1335b.
likely, each abolition was a reaction to a separate event. The
problem of the sources means that there are plenty of possible
explanations of those events. The ending of the various mon-
archies would seem to have been spread over half a century or
so, from Kition in 312 to Tyre in 274 or Arados in 259—
remembering the strong possibility that abolition took place
earlier in both Tyre and Arados. It is clear that Ptolemy I’s
actions at Kition had little or no influence on his dealings with
the mainland cities, though it might be that the abolition of the
old monarchies thereby became a more likely option. Demetrios
would seem to have maintained the Tyrian and Sidonian mon-
archies—unless they had disappeared in his father’s time—and
Ptolemy I did so as well. Seleukos probably also continued to
accept the Aradian monarchy. The Byblian kingship, however,
may have been eliminated early, and this will have raised the
issue on the mainland, though the other three cities were not
nearly so close to being moribund. It would seem to be the
innovation of Ptolemy II to favour quite deliberately the
replacement of the monarchies he controlled. Even then, the
differing dates of abolition at Tyre and at Sidon show that he
moved cautiously in a potentially difficult area. He would not
wish to alienate the Phoenicians too much: they were in a
strategically very sensitive position.
After the abolition of the monarchies the cities were probably
provided with a republican constitution by which the com-
munity became ‘the Aradians’’’ and ‘the Sidonians’,** and it
seems likely that Sidon at least greeted this development by
counting the years from its beginning. It seems that, just as the
kings dealt with the cities individually, so the cities themselves
reacted differently. This emphasizes that each had a distinct
and differing experience; simply because they were all Phoe-
nician does not mean they were identical.
The new constitutions were no doubt of the usual Greek
type—boule and demos, council and assembly—but adapted to
the local situation. One of the chief magistrates at Sidon was
called a shofet,** but whether this was an annual or a lifetime
office, single or multiple, powerful or powerless, is quite
27 Polen ve lxwiiey 7: 38 1G, 1/2, 1335b.

39 L.. Moretti, Iscrizione agonistiche greche (Rome, 1941), 41 (=Austin, 121); ‘shofet’
is a back-translation of the Greek dikastes in the inscription.
unknown. Reference to Carthaginian sufetes is no use—quite
apart from our ignorance of their role—since it would be a
decision of the Ptolemaic government which would decide such
things. Also at Sidon there was a man with the title archon,”
but again we have no information about the office.
All that these references do is to demonstrate that offices with
these titles existed, and therefore with more-or-less defined
duties and powers. Who chose them—king or people? or were
some hereditary?—and how extensive the citizenship of each
city was is also unknown. Arados, Sidon, and Tyre all referred
to themselves or were referred to by others in the usual Greek
way as ‘the Aradians’, ‘the Sidonians’, ‘the Tyrians’, but even
the most restricted oligarchic regimes adopted such terms. At
a guess there was a formal citizenship comprising all free males,
while actual governing power was concentrated in a fairly
narrow oligarchy. There is no reason to believe that this
situation was either universal in the Phoenician cities, or un-
changing. Quite obviously it contained the potential for
revolution, but real power, military power, lay in the hands of
the king, Ptolemaic or Seleukid, and kings probably favoured
oligarchies. But any relaxation of royal power would clearly
make life suddenly much more interesting.
The power of the Ptolemaic king in Phoenicia was wielded
by men who had authority over the whole area, but not over
the whole administration. There was a financial official who
controlled the revenue collection of ‘Syria and Phoenicia’,*!
which was the Ptolemaic term for all the land from Gaza to the
Eleutheros. In the nature of his duties, this was a permanent
post. There was also a military command which appears to
have covered a similar area,” though perhaps only the Phoe-
nician area is meant—‘Koile Syria’ is the term, which is vague.
However, this post may not have been permanently occupied.
It is attested only in wartime, and it may only have been
occupied in emergencies. There were permanent garrisons,
however, and there were permanent revenue collectors.
*° Papyri in the University ofMichigan, I ed., C. C. Edgar 3; it is difficult to suggest the
scope of the office, and dangerous to equate it with a Greek example.
* C. ord. Ptol., 22 (=Austin, 275(6) ); Bagnall, Ptolemaic Possessions, 18-19; H.
Liebesny, “Ein Erlass des Kénigs Ptolemaios IT Philadelphos tiber die Deklaration von
Vieh und Sklaven in Syrien und Phoenikien’, Aegyptus, 16 (1936), 257-91.
© Bagnall, Ptolemaic Possessions, 14-16.
The whole area was divided into administrative units called
hyparchies.* In Palestine these are clearly based on the pre-
existing Persian local administrative areas (which in fact are
the same as the earlier Babylonian and Assyrian units).** In
Phoenicia the issue is complicated by the existence of the cities
and their monarchies, and by the proximity of the frontier. It
is impossible to say for certain where the boundaries of the
hyparchies lay, though it can be assumed that they followed
those of the city-territories. The term, in fact, is always applied
to a person in our sources, not to a territory; it may have been
a travelling appointment, or territorially variable.* Thus one
would assume Tyre and Sidon each formed a hyparchy, and
perhaps Byblos and Tripolis, though these two might be thought
to have been united. The frontier areas both along the Eleu-
theros and in the Bekaa are more likely to have been under
direct military control. But all this is little more than a guess.
In the Seleukid state, similarly, the administration is unclear;
there were satrapies, but it is not known whether Arados was
ever part of one—probably not, but, again, that is no more
than a guess.
The Ptolemaic-Seleukid symbiosis did not ensure peace, but
it did limit hostilities, and the frontier deterred aggression, for
it was fortified on both sides—Seleukos developed a powerfully
defended area of his own facing the Ptolemaic zone.*° The so-
called Syrian Wars were largely fought in the Aegean and Asia
Minor, at least until the 220s.*’ Behind the screen of forts from
Orthosia to Damascus, Phoenicia had peace for fifty years, the
longest peaceful period since the fifth century. As with all
societies of their type, the time of peace witnessed a rapid
economic and demographic recovery.
South of Tyre, at Umm el-Amed, in a small plain facing the
sea and bounded by two capes, a farm had been established
43 C. ord. Ptol., 21 (= Austin, 275(a) ); cf. Bagnall, Ptolemaic Possessions, and Liebesny,
‘Ein Erlass des Kénigs Ptolemaios II’.
#4 M. Avi-Yonah, The Holy Land from the Persian to the Arab Conquests (538 BC-AD 640)
A Historical Geography (Grand Rapids, Mich., 1966), ch. 1, and esp. the maps scattered
through the text.
4 Pol., v. xx. 10 and Ixxi. 11; C. ord. Ptol., 21; Been Ptolemaic Possessions, 14—
16. *© Grainger, Cities, 59 and 107-8.
47 See now the chapter by H. Hauben on this in Cambridge Ancient History, vii, pt. 1
(2nd edn.), 412-445, significantly entitled: ‘The Syrian-Egyptian Wars and the New
Kingdoms of Asia Minor’.
since about 700 Ba.** Occupation was confined to a simple
domestic building, perhaps occupied by a family, no more,
until the establishment of the Ptolemaic peace. Then, during
the rule of Ptolemy I, a temple was established, with the king
commemorated in a Phoenician inscription. The manufacture
of olive oil either began or expanded, and oil-presses were
constructed. More domestic buildings attest a growing popu-
lation, and a second temple, to Milk-Astart, was established.
Construction was far enough advanced by 222/1 to have porti-
coes finished. Quite probably by then also the water supply had
been canalized and at least one large building, suggested by
the excavators to be a ‘public building’, had been built. All this
investment and construction was undefended, there being no
wall around the settlement. The whole complex is a tribute to
the peace produced by Ptolemaic rule.
Going north from Tyre, about the same distance brought the
traveller to Sarepta.*? This was an older and larger settlement,
overshadowed by both Tyre and the nearer Sidon. Despite the
gruesome fates of the larger cities, the excavators of Sarepta
found no evidence of destruction at any stage during the Iron
Age, Assyrian, Babylonian, or Persian periods, and they suggest
that the Persian period witnessed the beginning of an expansion
of trade and production which continued on into the Hellenistic.
Buildings of the two Hellenistic periods were scarcely identi-
fiable in the relatively small areas excavated, but even there it
was Clear that there was considerable continuity from the earlier
periods into the later.
About half-way between Tyre and Sarepta, in the valley
of the Litani, a few kilometres from its mouth, was another
sanctuary, at a place now called Kharayeb.® This was older,
*° M. Dunand and R. Duru, Oumm el-Amed (Paris, 1962).
*® W. P. Anderson, Sarepta I, The Late Bronze Age and Iron Age Strata of Area II, ¥
(Beirut, 1988); I. A. Khalifeh, Sarepta II, The Late Bronze Age and Iron Age Periods of Area
II, X (Beirut, 1988); and J. B. Pritchard, Sarepta IV, The Objects from Area II, Y (Beirut,
1988);J.B. Pritchard, Recovering Sarepta, a Phoenician City (Princeton, NJ, 1978), is all
too brief on the Hellenistic period. Summaries—very brief—of current archaeological
work in Lebanon in 1983 are in M. Chehab, ‘Découvertes Phéniciennes au Liban’, in
Atti del I Congreso Internazionale di Studi Fenici e Punici, Roma 1979 (Rome 1983), 165-72;
there is likely to be little to add since then, given the Lebanese collapse.
°° M. Chehab, ‘Les Terres cuites de Kharayeb’, BMB 10 (1951-2), 7-184; B.
Kaoukabani, ‘Rapport préliminaire sur les fouilles de Kharayeb, 1969-70’, BMB 26
(1973), 41-59.
as a sanctuary, than Umm el-Amed, though about the same
age as the original settlement there. It was relatively poor,
exhibiting only two building phases in the central courtyard.
But the second phase was of Ptolemaic date. The cult seems to
have changed somewhat under Ptolemaic influence, adding Isis
to the original Astarte, but Egyptian influence had been long
present—or rather people who visited the site had included
many who left figurines of such Egyptian gods as Bes. The
rebuilding clearly implies an increase in wealth, whether from
an increase in popularity or a government subsidy, and the
addition of Isis to the cult shows the attempt to attract the
attention of Greeks out of Egypt.
The great cities do not exhibit such architectural develop-
ments, because the Hellenistic remains are still largely built
over, and because the Roman remains are always more massive
than those underneath. But these three sites in the countryside,
a temple, a temple-and-village, and a small town, all show the
rapid revival of life and the increase in wealth which took place
during the Ptolemaic peace. At the Eshmoun temple near
Sidon, the evidence of a new prosperity is less obvious, partly
because the Hellenistic period is less closely dated. Yet the
excavator did note that two buildings and a pool were Hellen-
istic constructions. The tradition of offering statuettes of children
died out, but one of presenting statues of athletes began—
clearly Greek influence was at work. Expansion certainly
took place, but nothing abrupt is detectable, and gradual change
seems to characterize it best.*!
Two of these four sites—Umm el-Amed and Sarepta—show
a certain specialization in the production of olive oil. This is,
of course, scarcely sufficient to suggest a semi-industrialised
production of oil for export, but the Umm el-Amed site does
have that aspect. The two sites also give indications of imports
from overseas, in the form of quantities of the amphorae com-
monly called ‘Rhodian’. Trade is, of course, the economic
activity most closely associated in the modern mind with the
Phoenicians. Yet it is difficult to be at all precise about goods
and destinations and, above all, quantities.
It is best to begin with the products of the land. Phoenicia 1s
51 Dunand, ‘Le Temple d’Eshmoun a Sidon, essai de chronologie’, BMB 26 (1973),
7-25.
a fertile country. The coastal plains, usually small except in the
Sidon area, are fertile and they were presumably almost as
intensively cultivated then as they are now. However, that they
could alone feed the city populations seems unlikely: the plains
are not very large. The slope of the mountain, now heavily
populated, was undoubtedly the source of the timber used for
shipbuilding, and thus was less heavily populated and cul-
tivated in the past than it is now. If the evidence from Umm
el-Amed of the increase in the production of olive oil can be
extended to other areas, this implies that the production of
basic foodstuffs for immediate local consumption was replaced
by semi-industrialized production of olive oil, and probably
wine, for which Phoenicia was later famous. If local food pro-
duction declined, imports of basic foods must have occurred
to replace the loss. Presumably, imports and increased local
production both took place. Certainly the olive oil—a basic
Mediterranean food, of course—was produced at Umm el-
Amed for export. The excavator suggested that it was delivered
to Tyre in accordance with the Ptolemaic government pro-
gramme of compulsory purchase.” Even if this dirigiste system
is not wholly accepted,” the oil must have gone to somewhere
tobe sold, since it is clear that the production was too great for
local consumption, and Tyre is the obvious place. And if this
happened at the small settlement of Umm el-Amed, rather
isolated as it was and fairly distant from the city, then it also
happened elsewhere.
So olive oil was produced for export and this was in large
measure a new industry, or at least one which was vastly
increased in scale. A much older industry was purple dye, the
practical chemistry of which was known in the Bronze Age.**
Difficult, expensive, and labour intensive, this was an industry
which automatically responded to increases in wealth by
increases in production, and the circulation of the released silver
of the Persian hoards, together with the inflation of royalty since
Alexander’s death, provided precisely the right environment for
* Dunand and Duru, Oumm el-Amed, 84.
°° A. E. Samuel, The Shifting Sands of History: Interpretations of Ptolemaic Egypt, Pub-
lications of the Association of Ancient Historians, 2 (Lanham, Md., 1989), chs. 3 and
4; N. Lewis, Greeks in Ptolemaic Egypt (Oxford, 1986); A. K. Bowman, Egypt after the
Pharaohs, 332 BC-AD 642 (London, 1986).
** L. B. Jensen, ‘Royal Purple ofTyre’, JNES 22 (1963), 104-18.
the expansion of the purple industry. Tyre is traditionally the
major centre, but the deposits of murex-shells scattered along
the whole Phoenician and Palestinian coasts show that the
industry grew where the shells could be fished.
Tyre’s sufferings in the time of warfare which followed Alex-
ander’s arrival had been bad enough, but potentially worse was
the connection of the city’s island to the mainland. This, of
course, made the city much more vulnerable to a land force,
but in peacetime it also might have wrecked the harbour system
of the city. It seems likely that, as at Arados, the lee-side of the
island was the favoured anchorage of the ships which called at
Tyre, and the new causeway not only blocked that anchorage
but altered the local currents so that other harbour changes
would develop. The archaeological investigation of Tyre has
not been able to distinguish clearly the Hellenistic construc-
tions, partly because of later Roman work, but it is clear that
there must have been much to do, and the period of Ptolemaic
rule is the time it would have had to be done.”
Shipbuilding was a necessary industry for the trading cities.
Antigonos used shipwrights in his naval building programme
of 315-314, and the building of the new ships took place at
Tripolis, Byblos and Sidon.’® Given those places, Tyre and
Marathos no doubt had shipways as well, though construction
at Arados is rather more doubtful. Theophrastos, writing in the
late fourth or early third centuries, remarked that cedar was
used for triremes, but that it was used because of a shortage of
pine;?’ this sounds very much like the emergency construction
set on by Antigonos’ order.
Timber was one of Phoenicia’s great resources, but the indus-
trial development of the area was clearly having a deleterious
effect on those resources. Not only was timber used for ships—
both warships and merchant ships—but it was used as fuel for
many other industries. Theophrastos mentions two especially
55 Poidebard, et al., Sidon: aménagements antiques du port de Saida (Beirut, 1952); id., Un
grand port disparu: Tyr (Paris, 1939); H. Frost, Under the Mediterranean (London, 1963);
id., ‘The Offshore Island of Sidon and other Phoenician Sites in the light of New
Dating Evidence’, International Journal of Nautical Archaeology and Underwater Exploration,
2 (1973), 75-94; id, ‘The Arwad Plans, a Photogrammetric Survey of Marine Instal-
lations’, AAAS 16 (1966), 13-28.
56 Diod., xix. lviii. 3.
57 Theophrastos, Hist. Plant., v. vii. 1 (= Brown, 96).
located in Phoenicia, burning lime to make mortar®® and a
technique for producing pitch which involved burning the
living tree.°® Further, an old-established industry at the cities
or, at least, Tyre and Sidon, was bronze manufacture,” while
Sidon was known for the manufacture of glass,®! both of which
consumed great quantities of fuel.
Olive oil, dyed cloth, wooden ships, metal, glass: these were
the exportable products of Phoenicia, all based on local prod-
ucts. Imports were almost everything else, from food and raw
materials to manufactures. Despite the lack of direct evidence,
it must be assumed that the cities relied heavily on imports of
grain for their basic food needs.” Olive oil was produced locally,
as noted already, but wine was certainly imported. Rhodian
amphorae are found on every site,” attesting to the import of
whatever goods were contained in them. How far the Phoe-
nicians went in search of these goods is as difficult to estimate
as any other aspect of this subject. Two possible sources of
evidence suggest themselves: coins and Phoenicians abroad;
neither is in any way satisfactory. The use of coins depends on
their being found, which is not a great problem since one can
assume that a reasonably random pattern of discovery would
reflect the incidence of deposition, and the finds of coins might
be assumed to reflect the movement of goods in reverse. In
other words, coins were exported in exchange for imported
goods, so the finding-places of coins should be the sources of the
goods. This is the impulse behind a map constructed to show
the find-spots of Aradian coins. What it shows is not the extent
of Aradian trade, but the extent of Greco-Roman civilization,
from Baktria to Spain, or perhaps simply the extent of coin-.
use. ‘Trade, however, does not operate simply as a direct
exchange. Often it will be triangular, or quadrilateral, or a type
°® Theophrastos, On Stones, 64-9 (= Brown, 49); cf. E. R. Caley andJ. F. C. Richards
(eds.), Theophratus On Stones (Columbus, Ohio, 1956), 60.
°° Theophrastos, Hist. Plant., 1x. iii. 4 (=Brown, 98).
°° Biblical references include: 1 Kgs. 7: 14-15 and 45; 2 Chr. 23; Ezek. 27: 13; also,
in early Roman times, Philo of Alexandria, Embassy to Gaius, 221.
°! Strabo, xvu. ii. 25; Pliny, WH, xxxvr. lxv-lxvi. 190-3; see also ch. 6.
® L. Casson, ‘The Grain Trade of the Hellenistic World’, TAPA 85 (1954), 168—
87, ignores Syria and Phoenicia, but emphasizes the fact that Egypt was the major
supplier.
°° e.g. Dunand and Duru, Oumm el-Amed; Pritchard, Sarepta IV; Dunand, “Temple
d’Eshmoun’. ** Rey-Coquais, Arados, map 2.
of barter. And the Ptolemaic silver-to-gold ratio was different
from other areas, so mutual circulation did not occur.© Even
if the Phoenician cities imported wheat from Syria, which would
be an obvious source of foodstuffs, there is thus no sign of that
in the coins found in Syria. Further, there is no guarantee that
finds of coins reflect any aspect of trade. Coins were minted by
governments for the convenience of governments, which often
meant for the purpose of paying soldiers.® The finds of coins
are less likely to reflect trade than the movements of troops and
the places where they were stationed. This is not to say that
there was no relation between trade and coins. The Phoenician
cities more than many other places would have appreciated the
commercial usefulness of coins, and their governments to have
minted coins for commercial use. But the relationship of trade
movements and coin find-spots is not direct, and so the dis-
tribution of coins cannot be used to suggest patterns of trade.
The evidence of Phoenicians abroad is no better as evidence
for trade, though their records of themselves have been taken to
reflect the network of trading relations developed by Phoenician
merchants.°’ Yet when the records are contemplated from this
viewpoint there are drawbacks and it quickly becomes clear
that no reliance can be placed on them with regard to trade.
Three examples will suffice. There were Phoenicians living and
working in Cyprus still, despite their political elimination with
the death of Pumyaton and the destruction wrought on the
Phoenician sections of Kition. At least one family of Phoenician
origin was high in the Ptolemaic administration of the island,
if the title (in Phoenician) ‘chief of the land’ means anything.
It has been suggested that it stands for strategos, used by Pto-
lemaic governors of the island, but no proof is forthcoming.”
The dedication which gives us the information is at Larnaca,
from the temple of Melgart, which goes to confirm the
® G. K. Jenkins, ‘The Monetary Systems in the Early Hellenistic Time with Special
Regard to the Economic Policy of the Ptolemaic Kings’, in Kindler (ed.), Proc., 53-
74, is a good summary of the problem, with a bibliography.
6° M.I. Finley, The Ancient Economy (London, 1973), 166-9; T. R. Martin, Sovereignty
and Coinage in Thessaly (Princeton, NJ, 1985), esp. ch. 7.
°7 e.g. by Rey-Coquais, Arados, 191 ff.
68 J. L. C. Gibson, A Textbook of Syrian Semitic Inscriptions, iti (Oxford, 1982), 135-
41; this inscription is most recently discussed by A. Parmentier, ‘Phoenicians in the
Administration of Ptolemaic Cyprus’, St. Phoen., v. 403-12.
69 Bagnall, Ptolemaic Possessions, 42-5; Parmentier, ‘Phoenicians’, 405, 411-12.
Phoenician origin of the family. Another inscription connects
them with Lapithos.”° It would not be surprising to see the Phoe-
nician survivors linking together during the third century in the
face of the overwhelming Greek presence in Ptolemaic Cyprus.
It is, however, very difficult to see them as the ruling class of
Lapithos,’! especially since the record comes from Larnaca.
The Phoenician presence in Cyprus is in fact quite insignificant
in total. Their political power had vanished almost as though
it had never been. Descendants of Phoenicians merged into the
Greek population, and Cyprus ceased to be, in any real sense,
part of Phoenicia. Above all, none of this provides any evidence
for trading relations. Quite the reverse, in fact, for these Phoe-
nicians were clearly domiciled in Cyprus.
There are Phoenicians recorded in various places in the
Aegean, but, once again, their significance is not great. For
example, a man called Herakleides, described as a Phoenician
and a blacksmith, is recorded at Delos in 269.’? Can this be
seen as an example of Phoenician trade? Or is it simply the
record of an emigrant who seems to have done rather well? For
trade to be adduced more evidence is clearly needed. And the
evidence of Phoenicians abroad is often of this sort: individuals
who have gone overseas to practise their craft,’? or as slaves, or
as wives or husbands. As a record of trade these records are
largely useless.
This applies just as forcibly, ifnot more so, to the Phoenicians
domiciled in Egypt. There had been a Phoenician presence
there since at least the Persian period, to go no further back, and
people calling themselves Phoenicians, answering to Phoenician
names and writing (and presumably speaking) the Phoenician
language, lived in Memphis well into the Ptolemaic period.
In the second century Bc a man called Felastart recorded, in
Phoenician, five generations of his family who had lived in
”° A. Honeyman, ‘Larnax te Lapethou: A Third Phoenician Inscription’, Le Museon,
51 (1938), 285-98; Parmentier, ‘Phoenicians’, 409.
” Parmentier, ‘Phoenicians’, 405-6.
” IG, x1/2, 154, A 37; cf. J.-P. Rey-Coquais, ‘Une prétendue ‘‘dynastie”’ syrienne
dans la Delos hellénistique’, MUS7 37 (1960-1), 249-54.
” In general see the discussions of M. Lacroix, ‘Les Etrangéres 4 Delos pendant la
période de l'indépendance’, Mélanges Gustave Glotz, ii (Paris, 1932), 501-25; M. F.
Baslez, ‘Le Role et la place des phéniciens dans la vie économique des ports de l’Egée’,
St. Phoen. v. 267-85; J.-P. Rey-Coquais in JGLS, vii. 87-90, lists the references to
Aradians and Marathians abroad.
Memphis,’ which must reach back to the time of Ptolemy I.
It was a Phoenician shipwright who worked out how to launch
Ptolemy IV’s monstrous 40-bank ship.’”° Yet these men, again,
do not provide evidence for Phoenician trade; even Phoenician
traders in Egypt do not do that: they are evidence only of
Phoenicians working and trading overseas,’° and this is the case
in all these examples.”
Quantification of trade is a task which cannot even be con-
templated, since no data exist. We do not know with any
pretence at accuracy any of the relevant numbers—population,
numbers of seamen, numbers of ships, production quantities,
wealth in total or in breadth of distribution, levels of supply
and demand. For none of these can any figures even be sug-
gested which will not be a guess.
Thus the only possible account of Phoenician trade in the
third century Bc is necessarily impressionistic, and inevitably
wrong. The one fact which is more telling than any other is
that Phoenicia, both the cities and the rural areas, both Seleukid
and Ptolemaic, quite clearly underwent a marked revival
during the two generations after the establishment of peace.
The evidence is in the new building, including the installation
of quantities of oil-making plant, and thus also of the planting
of large numbers of olive trees, notoriously slow to come to full
fruition. Given the geographical constraints of the land itself,
this increase in wealth is clear evidence of an increase of trade.
Given, also, Phoenicia’s geographical position, one would
suppose that the two markets in which Phoenician merchants
were most active would be the Aegean and Egypt. Olive oil
exported to both would be a basic trade, particularly to Egypt
where the demand amongst the Greeks and Macedonians will
have been high and where the olive tree does not grow.” The
basic trade to the Aegean was no doubt in grain from Egypt.
Both of these commodities feature in the collection of papyri
™ J. T. Milik, ‘Le Papyrus araméen d’Hermoupolis et les cultes syro-phéniciens en
Egypte perse’, Biblica, 48 (1967), 546-622.
79 Athenaeus, v. 204c, quoting Kallixenos.
7° —D. J. Thompson, Memphis under the Ptolemies (Princeton, NJ, 1988), passim; in
addition some at least of the Syrians listed by G. Vaggi ‘Siria e Siri nei documenti
del’Egitto greco-romano’, Aegyptus, 17 (1937), 3-51, will have been Phoenicians.
77 For an overview of Phoenicians overseas throughout the whole period of this
study, see ch. 7.
78D. S. Walker, The Mediterranean Lands (London, 1960), fig. 6, p. 39.
generated by the activities of Zenon on behalf of the Egyptian
minister Apollonios in Palestine during 259-257. Phoenician
references are only incidental in this archive, but trade and
trade-goods figure prominently.’”? Slaves were clearly a major
export from Palestine, and one of the significant exporting ports
was Tyre. In one incident recorded in the letters an agent called
Menekles, who lived in Tyre, became involved in a dispute with
the customs officers for having landed slaves without obtaining a
permit.®° Since they had been brought from Gaza to Tyre, the
slaves were obviously destined to be sent on to be sold some-
where north or west of Tyre.*! That we do not know their
destination is an example of the limitations of this type of source.
The reverse direction is recorded by one Demetrios, who sailed
from Cyprus, called at Tyre, and overspent there. Demetrios
wrote for a resupply, which he proposed to collect at Berytos.”
Tyre was clearly a market-city of notable proportions. Sidon
was another, for the archon there, Theodotos, sent a gift of
Attic honey to Apollonios.* These few details are enough to
demonstrate the activity of these two cities as entrepots, and to
the goods noted so far may perhaps be added the frankincense
mentioned by the comic poet Hermippos as imported to Athens
in the late fifth century.** The incense was from southern
Arabia, and no doubt the trade through the ports of Phoenicia
will have continued into and throughout the Hellenistic period.
Hermippos also noted the import of dates and fine flour from
Phoenicia:® both local products. Syrian wheat was a plant
which was transplanted to Egyptian soil in the third century,
but it was distinctive enough to retain its name.*
Phoenicia, politically and economically in the Ptolemaic
® V. Tcherikover, ‘Palestine under the Ptolemies’, Mizraim, 4-5 (1937), 9-90; G.
M. Harper, ‘A Study in the Commercial Relations between Egypt and Syria in the
Third Century before Christ’, American Journal of Philology, 99 (1924), 1-35. A recent,
brief survey is by R. H. Smith, ‘The Southern Levant in the Hellenistic Period’, Levant,
22 (1990), 123-30.
*° C. C. Edgar (ed.), Catalogue général des antiquités égyptiennes du Musée de Caire: Aenon
Archive (Cairo, 1925-31), no. 59093.
*! Tcherikover, ‘Palestine under the Ptolemies’. ® P. Zen. 59016 (n. 78).
*° C. C. Edgar (ed.), Papyri in the University ofMichigan Collection, i, Zenon Papyri (Ann
Arbor, Mich., 1931), no. 3.
** Athenaeus i, 27° (= Hermippos, frag. 63, = Brown, 21).
* Tbid. 28* (= Hermippos, frag. 67,= Brown, 21).
%° H. A. Thompson, ‘Syrian Wheat in Hellenistic Egypt’, Archiv fiir Papyrusforschung,
9 (1930), 207-13.
sphere, as was much of the Aegean during the third century,
was ideally placed to act as middleman in the trade between
the two regions. On the other hand, there seems little need to
comtemplate much Phoenician participation in trade further
to the west, unless to Carthage. The demand in the eastern
Mediterranean for metals would be best satisfied by way of
Carthage, involved in the great metal source of Spain, and
Phoenician traders could most easily buy the ingots of metal at
Carthage. We know of both religious and trading contacts
between Tyre and Carthage in the fourth and the second
centuries, but not in the third. It does seem reasonable to
assume that these contacts existed, however.®’
Phoenicians were also exhibiting at the same time that
characteristic quality of the age, the easy absorption by one
god of others of the same type. Thus Astarte at Kharayeb
adopted characteristics of Isis, so becoming more familiar to
the Greeks of Egypt.** This was not merely a local phenomenon:
in an invocation to the goddess Isis in a papyrus of the early
second century AD, she is equated with Astarte of Sidon.®*?
Eshmun at his great temple near Sidon had already acquired
some Greek sculptural decoration in the fourth century and the
place and its god were thus more easily accessible to Greeks.°°
Yet this tendency, of which it might be said the Phoenicians
were the originators, even before the Persian period,”! did not
really go very far. Astarte-Isis was still Astarte, Eshmun was
Eshmun still, Melqart might be equated with Herakles,” but
it was Melqart to whom the Carthaginians paid their first-
fruits. That is to say, the gods to whom the Phoenicians in their
homeland gave their allegiance remained the same gods as
before, even if, for the benefit of non-Phoenicians, superficial
additions were made to the appearances of the gods and their
temples.
As an antidote to this rather thin syncretization there is the
eiSee- che 7: 88 Kaoukabani, ‘Fouilles de Kharayeb’, 57.
89 B. P. Grenfell et al., The Oxyrhynchus Papyri (London, 1898- ), no. 1380.
9° Dunand, ‘Temple d’Eshmoun’, 17-20 and plates II-VI;J.Elayi, Pénétration Grecque
en Phénicie sous ’empire perse (Nancy, 1988).
9! TP). Harden, The Phoenicians (London, 1963), 84 and go; Elayi, Pénétration grecque,
148.
us Arr., Anab., 1. xvi. 1-7; St. Phoen., viii is essentially about the pre-Hellenistic
periods; Pt. IIA considers the ‘assimilation’ of Melqart to Herakles, with some reference
to Hellenistic materials.
example of a shrine of Astarte at Wasta, on the road from Sidon
to Tyre. It seems to have developed as a shrine in the Ptolemaic
period, but only one datable dedication exists, and it may have
existed in a local form for centuries, even millenia. There are
graffiti, and the cave is marked by triangles, presumably as a
fertility symbol. Every dedicator has a Phoenician name,
though one is in Safaitic, an Arabic dialect from the Trans-
jordanian desert, and another, the datable one, is in Greek.
This cave-shrine is in an area which was open to the full
influence of passing Greeks, and later Romans, but it remains
resolutely local, Phoenician and traditional.%
The Wasta grotto is much closer to the actual beliefs and
practices of the ordinary Phoenicians than any discussion of
Hellenization or of the various gods, goddesses, or temples. Most
people probably scarcely distinguished the various supernatural
beings, and it seems likely that their beliefs were closer to a
generalized superstition and a wish for the deity to listen,
whatever it was called, than to the full-blown theology of
academic studies.** The graffiti at Wasta are good examples of
this basic layer of popular belief.
The superficial alterations of the names of gods, and the
Greek decorations in their temples, is one aspect, of course, of
the process which modern historians call Hellenization, the
apparent adoption of Greek culture by non-Greek populations.
Everything is grist to this mill: pottery, soldiers, kings, gods,
money, cities, colonization, and so on. The very indis-
crimination has generated a backlash. The emphasis for Egypt,
for example, is now on the continued and unadulterated Egyp-
tian culture, beside which there was an imported Greek culture;
and the two rarely interpenetrated. The evidence for Phoe-
nicia is a good deal more ambiguous than that extreme view.
It is well to discriminate between types of evidence. The use
of a certain type of pottery scarcely seems good evidence for a
change in cultural attitudes and beliefs. The import of Rhodian
amphorae for their contents cannot be said to have involved
the adoption of Greek belief-systems. Greek wine did not bring
°° A. Beaulieu and R. Mouterde, ‘La Grotte d’Astarte 4 Wasta’, MUS 27 (1947-
8), 3-20; J. T. Milik, ‘Le Graffito phénicien en caractéres grecs de la Grotte d’Astarte
a Wasta’, MUS7 31 (1954), 3-13.
** J. Teixidor, The Pagan God (Princeton, NJ, 1977).
° Samuel, Shifting Sands, ch. 3; Lewis, Greeks in Ptolemaic Egypt, chs. 7 and 8.
Platonic philosophy. In the same way it is not reasonable to
claim Hellenization because Greek coins circulated: there were
no others. It might indicate a local shift in market practices, in
the use of cash rather than barter, but that cannot seriously be
called Hellenization, certainly not in Phoenicia, where coinage
had long been familiar, and probably not anywhere else.
As with small things, so with large. The adoption of the
practices of Greek architecture is only marginally to be con-
sidered as Hellenization. It is not the appearance of a building
which is an index of a culture so much as what went on inside
it. The Eshmun temple near Sidon had Greek sculpture, but
the god was still Eshmun, and the religious practices were still
Phoenician. In the cities the Hellenistic architecture is scarcely
visible under the accumulation of Roman and medieval
remains, but one would need evidence of constitutional prac-
tices and of the curriculum of the schools to be convinced of the
existence of a Hellenized urban community.
The demonstration that the Phoenicians had adopted Greek
mores more than superficially must include evidence of the use
of the Greek language, and of Greek forms of education. Thus
it is necessary to consider the results of that education, which
must be in written form. So if there is evidence of men of
Phoenician origin writing in Greek on typically Greek subjects,
particularly philosophy, we can then pronounce those men to
be Hellenized. One immediately thinks of Zeno of Kition, born
in that city about 335, and domiciled in Athens from about
313 or so, having left Kition just at the crisis of Pumyaton’s
monarchy.” But the evidence for his Phoenician origin is poor,
for Kition was as much Greek in its population as it was
Phoenician.’’ Beyond Zeno there is only one Phoenician who
appears at any level as an author during the third century,
another philosopher called Zeno, from Sidon, who is no more
than a name to us.” But there are no historians, poets, or
playwrights, so far as is known. They may have existed in
Phoenician, but it is perhaps unlikely; they certainly did not
exist in Greek.
The reason, of course, is that it would take time and resources
% Diogenes Laertius VII, 28; OCD, 1144; A. A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy, 2nd edn.
(London, 1986), 109-10.
97 Nicolaou, Hist. Top. Kition, 321. % OCD, 1144.
to develop the educational system which would teach the skills,
processes, language, modes of thought required. No educational
system can be set up quickly; the first generation of students is
likely to become the teachers of the next generation, and only
then will there become clear signs ofa cultural creativity beyond
a very basic level. In Phoenician terms, the time of troubles
which continued through to the 280s would inhibit investment
in such long-term matters as gymnasia and schools. Only after
peace was assured—say, from about 280—could such invest-
ment be contemplated, and then, given the impoverishment of
the area after all the fighting, only on a restricted scale. Before
about 230 a sufficiently wide spread of Greek education would
scarcely exist in Phoenicia for the process of cultural Hel-
lenization to become self-sustaining.
This is not necessarily contradicted by the appearance of
winners at Delos in 269: Timokrates of Byblos and Sillis of
Sidon.” Both were, in fact, victors in boxing, scarcely the most
prestigious of the sports, and the one least requiring a serious
education in Greek mores. Further, it could be argued that
Timokrates was a good Greek name, even if he came from
Byblos, and it is perfectly possible that he was the son of a
Greek or Macedonian. There had been and continued to be
considerable migration from the Aegean area into Syria and
Phoenicia. On the other hand, Sillis was a well-attested Phoe-
niclan name, and he can be accepted as Phoenician-born.!™
It is noteworthy that he came from Sidon, even in the Persian
period the Phoenician city most receptive of Greek culture, as
is shown by the reputation of King Abdastart I (‘Strato’) as a
philhellene,'*’ the Greek sculpture in the Eshmun temple near
the city, and the Greek reliefs sculpted on the sarcophagi from
the city’s necropolis, which were surely royal.'° It is also notice-
able that this was the city of the only Greek philosopher from
the Phoenician mainland of the third century, the previously
mentioned Zeno. It would appear that Sidon took to Greek
culture earlier than any other city of Phoenicia.
° IG, x1/2, 203, |. 68.
'00 OQ. Masson, ‘Recherches sur les phéniciens dans le monde hellénistique’, BCH,
93 (1963), 679-700, esp. 679-87. '! CIG, i. 126, no. 87.
102 The most famous being the ‘Alexander Sarcophagus’ now in the Istanbul Archaeo-
logical Museum; cf. J. J. Pollitt, Art in the Hellenistic Age (Cambridge, 1986), 38-40;
T. B. L. Webster, Hellenistic Art (London, 1967), 38-41. See also n. 30, above.
Apart from these two preliminary examples, which must be
regarded as atypical, the earliest evidence for personal Hel-
lenization appears in the last quarter of the third century,
between 220 and 200, roughly. It is also characteristic that the
man involved was wealthy, politically important, and that he
excelled at the activity which often permits outsiders in a society
to effect an entry: sport. Diotimos son of Dionysios, a Sidonian,
won the chariot race at the Nemean Games, and the city set
up his statue to commemorate the deed.'” It is revealing in a
number of ways. The man himself and his father have Greek
names, and the inscription is in Greek, while the defensive pride
of the words is just what one might expect from men still unsure
of their cultural place and yet proud to claim Greekness. And,
of course, the whole notion of celebrating an individual for
success in a sport is profoundly Greek. Diotimos is described as
a ‘judge’, dikastes, equated with the Phoenician shofet, and it is
assumed that this was a civic position—yet this was a Phoe-
nician office, with no direct Greek parallels. The inscription
rather desperately links Sidon with the Greek Thebes by refer-
ring to the Kadmos story, but there was, it seems, no Sidonian
sculptor capable of executing the statue and a Cretan pro-
fessional was employed. The limits of Hellenization are thus
revealed: it is a process confined to the rich—who were the only
ones wealthy enough to afford the education—but it clearly
pervades only the ruling group (the oligarchy?) of the city; no
artisan, such as a sculptor, has achieved the required skill.
By contrast there is the temple-village at Umm el-Amed,
noted earlier. It was prosperous enough to expand during
the Ptolemaic period, with two temples and numerous other
buildings, domestic and industrial, being built. It was clearly
in contact with the city, and finds of coins attest the reception
of either wealth or visitors or both.’ It was close to the main
coast road, and not far from Tyre. It was in contact, in other
words, with the wider world. Yet of Hellenization there is no
sign. Every one of the sixteen inscriptions is in Phoenician, and
Greek appears only on the imported coins. The buildings show
103 Moretti, Iscrizione agonistiche greche, 41 (=Austin, 121); E. Bikerman, ‘Sur une
inscription grecque de Sidon’, Mélanges syriens offerts a René Dussaud (Paris, 1939), 91—
10 Dunand and Duru, Oumm el-Amed: 18 Ptolemaic coins, of which 9 were minted
at Tyre.
no sign of being other than the traditional Phoenician type, in
so far as that existed. The pottery is the usual local type with the
addition of Rhodian amphorae; in contrast to the ‘innumerable’
fragments of local pottery, there was evidence of only thirty or
so imported pots. There is nothing here to suggest anything
except a local satisfaction with the culture the community has
inherited. There is no Hellenization.
The peace enforced by the first three Ptolemies enabled
their section of Phoenicia to recover from the ravages of three-
quarters of a century of warfare, but it was a Phoenician
recovery, in which Phoenician enterprise had infinitely more
effect than Greek. The Ptolemaic influence was positive only
in maintaining peace; the actual investment was done by Phoe-
nicians. Again, Umm el-Amed provides the evidence: no Greek
influence beyond the absolute minimum of humdrum material
objects, but the farm which existed in the fourth century was a
well-off temple settlement a century later. Yet real wealth, as
opposed to comfort, was generated in the cities, where Diotimos,
with his chariot team and his political position, is an example.
There is, therefore, a division within the Phoenician society
between the rich, Hellenized ruling class in the cities and the
Phoenician rural class, who, if Umm el-Amed is any guide,
were doing quite well. In between will have been a third group,
with urban poor, Phoenician in language, no doubt, but with
some hellenised trappings. There is no sign of any sort of Marxist
class war, other than the usual and universal antagonism
between rich and poor, but the potential for conflict is there.
Such Hellenization as took place within the city among the
poor perhaps came from contact with the Greeks of the garri-
sons. A group of gravestones from Sidon were gathered at the
end of the last century, and their illustrations show the dead to
have been soldiers.'° There are about twenty individuals
known, and all are Greek, mainly from Crete and Asia Minor,
but three are from Gytheion in Lakedaimon, and one is from
the uplands of Perrhaibia. The illustrations are painted on
' Overlapping publication by P. Perdrizet, ‘Stéles peintes de Sidon’, Revue Archéo-
logique, 1904 (I), 234-44; L. Jalabert, ‘Nouvelles stéles peintes de Sidon’, ibid. (11); 2—
16; and G. Mendel, Catalogue de sculptures du musée Impériale Ottomane, i (Istanbul,
1908), 258-70; see the discussion by Launey, Armées Hellenistiques, 80-1; one reading
is corrected by L. Robert ‘Notes d’épigraphie hellénistique, XLIII, épitaphe d’un
mercenaire a Sidon’, BCH, 59 (1935), 428-30.
panels hollowed out above the inscriptions and show the dead
either alone or with companions, dressed in uniform and armed.
The date of these stones is either third or second century Bc,
and thus the soldiers were either Ptolemaic or Seleukid. It
scarcely matters, for there can be no dispute that these men
were one of the primary agents for Hellenization in the eastern
cities. Yet some are not even Greek—several were Pisidians—
and soldiers at any time are scarcely the best representatives of
higher culture. This may be the reason for the remarkably slow
process of Hellenization in Phoenicia. At least these men would
be neutral in any internal conflict within the city, under the
direct command of their Greek commanders. But, of course, no
imperial government would look kindly on internal upheavals
in important or strategic cities—and the Phoenician cities were
both—and so the troops would almost invariably be used in
support of the rulers. This is, after all, the function of all
occupying forces, and the soldiers’ presence would be a daily
reminder to the Phoenicians of their subordinate status.
There was also another potential source of conflict, invisible
as yet in the Ptolemaic sphere, but which had developed in the
more lightly controlled Arados. Whatever had changed in 259,
whence the city and its peraza dated their era, whether it was
the abolition of the monarchy or something else, that event also
coincided with the opening of a war between the Seleukid and
Ptolemaic states.'°° Some fighting seems to have occurred in
Syria, as one would expect, though most of the action we
know of took place in Asia Minor and the Aegean. Ptolemy II
personally led an expedition into Syria,'”’ though it seems likely
that this was defensive, for in the event it was the Seleukid
Antiochos II who made the running in the war. The connection
between Arados’ new era and the war is, so far, only coinci-
dental in time, though it is fairly obvious that there is more to
it than that. Any change involving such a strategically sensitive
place at the start of a new war is clearly more than a mere
coincidence in time.
The next war, the ‘Third Syrian’, directly involved Syria
106 Seyrig, ‘Aradus’, 215; Will, Histoire Politique, 1. 234-43.

‘07 &, Bresciani, ‘La Spedizione di Tolomeo II in Siria in un Ostrakon Demotico
inedito da Karnak’, Das Ptolemdische Agypten, Akten des internationalen Symposions 27-29
September 1976 in Berlin (Mainz, 1978), 31-7.
and Arados, without any doubt this time. Ptolemy III inaug-
urated his reign in 246 with a spectacular invasion of Seleukid
Syria,'°® which began a war lasting five years or so, and left
him in possession of Seleukeia-in-Pieria, the city which, as a
later Seleukid counsellor said, was the sacred hearth of the
kingdom of Seleukos.'° Arados thus became of enhanced
importance in the Seleukid state, for it was now one of only two
seaboard cities fronting on the Mediterranean, the other being
Laodikeia-ad-Mare, which itself was apparently threatened
by a close Ptolemaic garrison.'!° Arados’ appreciation of this
situation led to negotiations with Seleukos II.''! The implied
threat was that the city would, if Seleukos failed to produce
acceptable concessions, join Ptolemy. This Seleukos had to
prevent, for Aradian defection would leave him without access
to the sea anywhere. The concessions he gave could, of course,
be limited since the very fact of these negotiations suggested
that Arados did not really wish to join Ptolemy, whose control
over the other Phoenician cities was just what Arados was
anxious to avoid. Thus there was the basis for an agreement.
Arados secured from the king a clear increase in its autonomy.
The agreement, as summarized for us by Strabo, refers only to
the city being available as a refuge for men out of political
favour on the mainland. But it is the implication of this for
relations between the city and the king which is important. If
political refugees could live in safety on Arados island, this
meant that the king’s writ did not run there. What is more, the
king apparently promised not to confiscate the possessions of
the refugees, which allowed Arados to charge them heavily for
the privilege of refuge. In the confused state of the Seleukid
kingdom, with a Ptolemaic invasion complicated by rebellions
in Asia Minor and Baktria, and a nomad invasion of Parthia,
any agreement with Arados which reduced the problems
Seleukos II faced was to be welcome; it had further advantages,
for, by providing a safe refuge of the king’s mainland enemies,
there would no chance of driving them to extremes, and it
might encourage them to give up the struggle earlier. The
'8 P. Gurob (=FGH, 160, = Austin, 220); M. Holleaux, Etudes d’épigraphie et

@ histoire grecques, ed. L. Robert, iii (Paris, 1942), 281-310.
Pola val Vil,
"10 J.-P. Rey-Coquais, ‘Inscription découverte a Ras Ibn Hani’, AAAS 26 (1976),
51-61. "! Strabo, xvi. ii. 14.
attraction of a safe and wealthy refuge in Arados will have
sapped their determination. Both parties gained substantially
from this agreement. But the agreement had been extracted
from the king in a moment of weakness, under threat, and
marked a clear reduction in his power in his own kingdom.
If Arados expected the agreement to last much beyond the
immediate political crisis of the kingdom, the citizens were
extremely short-sighted.
Campaigns
¢ Apamea
Gabala
SS Battles
25
Arados e ;
oe
* Gerrha
aee eee
_—* Damascus
HERMON
Ptolemais-Ake
Map 3. Phoenicia and Antiochos III

4
CONQUEST
225-193 BC
After two generations of peace for most of Phoenicia, warfare

returned to the area in the 220s, and continued on and off for
thirty years, resulting in the replacement of Ptolemaic rule
by that of the Seleukid kings. Suitably enough, the political
problems began in the Seleukid part of Phoenicia, Arados and
its peraia.
There is no reason to believe that Seleukos II had been
pleased to have had to concede part of his authority to the city
of Arados in 242 or thereabouts.' Yet, once conceded, the deal
they had made kept Arados quiet and loyal throughout the
long series of wars which the king had to wage to recover his
heritage. Then, even when he was more or less free of pressing
problems elsewhere, the basic strategic position of Arados
remained the same: it was an island, at some distance from
the shore, bordering on hostile (Ptolemaic) territory; thus any
pressure from Seleukos could be met by an Aradian rebellion.
Yet Arados clearly did not seriously wish to rebel; there had
been plenty of opportunities for that in the past half century.
And Arados’ peraia, the long strip of the mainland which was
part of the Aradian state, was always a hostage to fortune. So,
without a new factor becoming evident, the situation remained
in balance.
In 230 or 229 that new factor was introduced. In the Aradian
year 30 (230/29 Bc) Marathos and Simyra produced coins of
their own, and five years later (Aradian year 35=225/4 BC)
Gabala and Karne did so as well. All these places are in the
Aradian peraia. All the coins they produced are in silver, with
~ others in bronze, of good metal, and dated in Phoenician script.
At the same time Arados itself continued producing coins as
before, to the same standard and dated in Phoenician; the
' Strabo, xvi. ii. 14.
88 Conquest, 225-193 BC
earliest of these is dated to Aradian year 17 (243/2 Bc) which
probably supplies the date for the agreement with Seleukos II.
There follow irregular issues, five in the next ten years, as
though the city was simply minting when cash was needed.’
The right of minting was a royal one, to be conceded to cities
only when necessary. Arados had clearly acquired that right in
242. And now, first two, then two more of the places on its
peraia acquired that right. This could only have come from the
king, and so it was a deliberate royal act. Then there is the
matter of the places to which the right to coin was given. They
are a very odd collection indeed. Marathos, to be sure, was a
well-known and substantial settlement, Arados’ main port on
the mainland,’ but the others were little more than villages, if
even that. Simyra has been identified with Tell Kazel, 15 km.
south-east of Marathos and a couple of kilometres inland.*
Excavations of the tell have shown that the earlier flourishing
settlement, dating back to the Bronze Age, was dying during
the Persian and Hellenistic periods.* No doubt those two or
three kilometres from the coast were to blame, and the prox-
imity of the Ptolemaic frontier cannot have helped. Karne has
not been excavated, but at no time did it ever show any signs
of greater life than that of a village. What gave it some import-
ance was its use by the Aradians as their main naval station on
the mainland.° This does not seem to have stimulated much
settlement. It is buried under Roman, medieval, and modern
Tartus. Gabala, 60 km. north of Arados, on the coast, with a
delightful semi-circular harbour, was moving up in the world;
but in the early Hellenistic period it had not gone very far; it
was not until the first century Bc that it was capable of being
seen as a town.’
So these places do not merit, by themselves, being made the
sites of mints, except Marathos. It follows that the king had
some other motive. None of them, again excepting Marathos,
> Seyrig, ‘Aradus’, 216.

° RE, xiv. 1431-8; Marathus, 2.
* M. Dunand and N. Saliby, ‘A la Recherche de Simyra’, AAAS
7 (1957), 3-16.
° M. Dunand, M. Bounni, and N. Saliby, ‘Fouilles de Tell Kazel,
rapport pre-
liminaire’, AAAS 14 (1964), 3-14.
° Strabo, xvi. ii. 12; RE, x. 1964; Karne, 1.
” H. Seyrig, ‘Questions aradiennes: 1. Gabala’, Rev. Num., 4 (1964),
9-28; RE, vii.
415; Gabala, 5.
Conquest, 225-193 BC 89
ever produced many coins. There was only one issue from
Karne, in the year 35 of the Aradian era, and from the others
one in go and one in 33 from Marathos, and issues in 30, 33
and 35 from Gabala and Simyra.® There seems to have been
no royal need for coinage to be available in this area at this
time. So the reason must be local, concerning the places them-
selves. All were part of the Aradian territories on the mainland:
establishing mints which produced both royal coins and the
places’ own coins can only mean that Seleukos had detached
the peraca from Arados’ control, by the expedient of granting
those places autonomy, probably very much on the same terms
as Arados itself.
If this is so, then certain points follow. There must have been
local support for Seleukos’ move, in the places themselves,
which means that the Aradians had become disliked by their
mainland subjects. This would not be unlikely. Autonomy for
Arados will quite likely have bred arrogance in the Aradian
oligarchy. The mainland was Arados’ source of food, and even
water.’ The mainland centres were thus subject to the authority
of the Aradians, and some of the people at least seem to have
resented this. It was a contest which continued for another
century, carefully fanned by the Seleukid kings at intervals, but
when the kings finally failed, Arados proved to be the stronger
of the two Aradian factions. For the moment Seleukos II’s
stroke had clipped the power of Arados without deflecting the
city’s ambitions or seriously reducing its wealth. The peraia was
still the island’s source of food and the island was still the
mainland’s only serious market. The symbiosis continued, with
the added element of political instability.
Instability was also the condition of the Seleukid kingdom as
a whole. This condition eventually persuaded the Seleukid
government that the best way to solve, or evade, the internal
problems was to export them. The obvious target for a Seleukid
ruler who wished to unite his kingdom behind him was Pto-
lemaic Phoenicia and Palestine. The young and impressionable
Antiochos III was persuaded.'° So, with Asia Minor detached,
8 Td. ‘Monnaies hellénistiques: XVIII, Seléucus III et Simyra’, Rev. Num., 11 (1971),
7-11; RE, iiia, 217-8, Simyra. 9 Strabo, xvi. ii. 13.
10 Pol., v. xli. 1—xlii. 7; M. Holleaux, ‘La Premiere Expedition d’Antiochos-le-Grand
en Koile Syrie’, Etudes d’épigraphie et d’histoire grecques, ed. L. Robert, iii (Paris, 1942),
311-5; cf., on the whole period, E. Will, ‘Les Premieres Années du régne d’Antiochos
go Conquest, 225-193 BC
with Baktria independent, and with Iran in rebellion, he led
an army south from Apamea into the Bekaa valley to attack
the Ptolemaic forces at Gerrha and Brochoi.!!
The choice of route is a sure sign that the Phoenician coastal
route was considered to be too difficult. Apart from the fortified
cities dotted along it, and the forts close to the frontier, the
Ptolemaic fleet controlled the sea. The Seleukid fleet had been
destroyed back in the 240s, and cannot have been rebuilt, since
Seleukos IT and Seleukos III had controlled scarcely any part
of the coast. Of course, there was Arados, presumably still a
local naval power, but it is likely that Antiochos could not rely
on Arados. The city’s punishment by his father was scarcely
going to produce a willing and enthusiastic contingent of ships.
Hence the attack along the Bekaa valley.
The Seleukid army stopped at Gerrha and Brochoi, whose
strength had been increased by ramparts and fences linking
them together.’? Attacks failed. Camped in the semi-desert of
the northern half of the Bekaa, the army ran short of supplies;
that is, the Ptolemaic defensive system was operating perfectly.
A small Ptolemaic force, inside powerful defences, defied the
full royal army ofthe Seleukid king. And, of course, the attempt
to avoid dealing with the internal problems of the Seleukid
state was a failure. Nobody rallied to the king’s cause; indeed
the rebels prospered, and conquered Babylonia. This provoked
a retreat by Antiochos III since at the rate things were going
he might just get into Palestine when the rest of his kingdom
fell to the rebel.
For the next three years (221-218) Antiochos and Phoenicia
ignored each other, though nervousness in the Ptolemaic
government surely grew with the news of Antiochos’ steady
growth in power and _ authority. Eliminating internal
opposition, both from those in rebellion and from those at his
court, Antiochos returned to the west in 219, still young, still
dependent on advice, but now with better advisers, and having
gained considerable self-confidence. The war with Ptolemy was
at once resumed. The capture of Seleukeia-in-Pieria from the
III (223-219 av. J.-C.), Revue des études Grecques, 75 (1962), 72-112; H. H.
Schmitt,
Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Antiochos der Grosse und seiner Keit, Historia,
Einzelschriften 6
(Wiesbaden, 1964).
ty Pols Wa xlve 7=xlvivets bid. xlvi. 3.
Conquest, 225-193 BC gI
Ptolemaic garrison in 219'° carried a clear threat to other
Ptolemaic holdings, and to the Phoenicians in particular. Anti-
ochos now had another port. It had been captured by the army,
but a small part had been played by the Seleukid fleet,'* which
now appears for the first time since 246. Where it came from is
not stated, but there are really only two possibilities: Laodikeia-
ad-Mare, the only Mediterranean seaport left to the dynasty
until Seleukeia’s recapture; and the Aradian peraia. This latter
possibility implies that the Aradian fleet had been taken over
by Seleukos II at the same time as he ‘liberated’ the mainland,
or that one result ofthat liberation had been to make it available
for shipbuilding. Perhaps all these sources contributed to the
fleet which Antiochos used. Arados’ own fleet is another pos-
sible source, but it can have been no more reliable in 219 than
for the previous decade. On the whole it seems most reason-
able to assume that Antiochos had ordered ships to be built at
Laodikeia while he was busy in the east. The only sure way
to win wars, he may have realized, was to control the means
himself.
Seleukeia’s capture also meant that Antiochos’ options for
the campaign against Phoenicia and Palestine were enlarged.
Now he had no need to guard his rear, the more so since the
forces of Achaios, the rebel king of the Seleukid possessions in
Asia Minor, had refused to march against Syria. Antiochos
could now therefore advance in full force southwards, and he
now also had the choice of either the inland or the coastal route.
But there still remained the problem of Arados, which had to
be induced to become a more enthusiastic participant in the
fighting. The Seleukid fleet which had taken part in the attack
on Seleukeia was apparently not a match for the full Ptolemaic
fleet, even with Arados’ participation; without it, and with
that fleet sullenly glowering in its rear, any Seleukid naval
expedition south of Arados was out of the question.
It seems that Antiochos’ plan was to ignore the Ptolemaic
lands and move next into Asia Minor to deal with Achaios.
Given the humiliation he had already faced in the south this is
understandable, but he was induced to change his mind by
news of disaffection in the Ptolemaic army in Phoenicia and
Palestine. There, the supreme commander, Theodotos of
Rol usascmi— ix.) 3 Me bide lxixee 1:
Aitolia, had incurred the suspicion of Ptolemy IV; he then
confirmed those suspicions by offering to change sides and join
Antiochos.'° The chance was too good to miss, and Antiochos
marched south, once more into the Bekaa, and once more came
up against the fortified position at Gerrha and Brochoi.!®
This time, however, two things were different. The king
himself was much more confident, and had clearly learned a
lot about conducting a war and commanding an army. Second,
the Ptolemaic commander was distracted by events in his rear.
Theodotos as commander-in-chief in Phoenicia and Palestine
had been based at Ptolemais-Ake, but it seems that he had been
able to bring over only the troops of his own headquarters and
those of Tyre close by under the local commander Panaitolos.!’
Possibly he had been forced to hurry his move, since his replace-
ment, a general called Nikolaos, was appointed before news of
Theodotos’ move could have got to Egypt. Nikolaos had
sufficient forces with him to shut Theodotos and Panaitolos
within their cities, and Theodotos sent an urgent plea to Anti-
ochos for help.'®
Antiochos divided his army. Leaving Brochoi under siege, he
set off himself with the light troops to relieve the sieges. This
attempt failed when he was intercepted near Berytos by a
Ptolemaic detachment. He was able to defeat this force, but
then decided that he was not strong enough to reach the
besieged cities with the light troops alone. The rest of the army
was thus sent for.'? The routes these forces took are not known.
Antiochos could have taken his light troops over the mountai
ns,
perhaps by the route of the modern road from Beirut
to Damas-
cus. This would bring him to the coast south of Beirut,
and
the place at which he had to fight would be about
the estuary
of the Damour river. He is recorded to have won that
fight but
it is evident that the Ptolemaic force had simply withdra
wn, to
occupy an even better position which lay behind
them.2° Thus
the king needed the rest of his army, which, consisti
ng of the
more heavily armed troops and the baggage
, could only
move more slowly than his own detachment.
They also will
have crossed the mountain, and when they
were present,
4 Pol., v. xl. 2-3 and Ixi. 3. '© Tbid. xli. 7.
hid 5: '8 Thid. 8.
'? Ibid. Ixi. 8—Ixii. 1. 2° Ibid. Ixi. g—lIxii. 1.
he could advance southwards. This was sufficient to persuade
whatever troops lay between Antiochos near Berytos and
the besieged cities to remove themselves, and Antiochos’ army
advanced to the rescue of the besieged. Nikolaos also with-
drew. Tyre and Ptolemais were thus acquired, together with
two generals, their garrisons and, in Ptolemais’ harbour, forty
warships.”!
Antiochos had taken very serious risks. The point about the
route his army took is that he left in his rear numerous Ptolemaic
garrisons, not just those at Gerrha and Brochoi, but those in
the north, at Orthosia, perhaps at Arka, certainly at Botrys,
Byblos, and even Berytos, and he even ignored the garrison
of Sidon as he passed it. Even though the garrisons are not
explicitly attested at the time, such places will not have been left
unguarded. All this risk was less for Theodotos’ and Panaitolos’
sakes than for the cities they held and, above all, for those
warships. Possession of that portion of the Ptolemaic fleet tipped
the naval balance from Ptolemaic supremacy to evens—if
Arados’ fleet joined Antiochos’.
War had returned to Phoenicia with a vengeance. Armies had
marched through its countryside, one city had been besieged, all
were threatened, and the situation which had been achieved at
the end of the campaign guaranteed that there would be more
fighting next year. Antiochos achieved some further advances
in Palestine, but the end-result was a considerable intermingling
of forces, and an armistice for four months which froze the
position for the winter.” In Phoenicia, Tyre was now garrisoned
by Seleukid troops, but all other places were Ptolemaic still.
The winter must have been most uncomfortable for all, par-
ticularly in the knowledge that the war would break out again
in the spring. It was most unlikely that the Phoenician cities
would escape damage, and at least one could expect to be
besieged, perhaps Tyre by Ptolemaic forces, perhaps Sidon by
those of Antiochos.
When the truce expired, a Ptolemaic force blocked the coast
road south, not far from the site of Antiochos’ small victory the
year before.?* Tyre and Ptolemais-Ake were thus, at the least,
under Ptolemaic blockade, and Antiochos had to deal with the
21 Pol., v. xii, 1-3. 22 Thid. 5-7 and Ixvi. 1-2.
3 Tbid. Ixviii. 5-6.
northern Phoenician area first of all. This time there could be
no bypassing and masking of fortresses; conquest had to be
systematic.
He began with Arados. The notice we have describes him
visiting Marathos, where he met a delegation from Arados
and composed the differences between the islanders and the
mainlanders by uniting the two.”* The process is visible numis-
matically by the cessation of mainland coinings.?? What it
meant, of course, was the victory of the islanders. The mainland
was handed back to Arados, and was henceforth under that
city’s control. One can imagine the usual political purge of the
leaders of the formerly independent cities. For Antiochos the
result was the removal of a problem in his rear for the forth-
coming campaign, and the full-hearted participation of the
Aradian fleet in the naval war. For Arados it meant the res-
toration of something close to the position which had existed
between 242 and 230, though, at a guess, the old refugee-
clause was probably cancelled. Antiochos did not need to
make such a concession while he controlled the mainland,
and Arados would not insist on it if the mainland was the
price.
It may have been the delay caused by the negotiations at
Marathos which allowed the Ptolemaic army to take up a good
defensive position before Antiochos could reach it. At all events
he was actually left free to occupy northern Phoenicia without
interference. This he did. There was resistance, but Antiochos
was clearly intent on systematic conquest. He was not, this
time, prepared to leave any unconquered garrisons in his rear
while an army of the enemy blocked his advance south. It seems
that the two first defensive points, Orthosia and Tripolis, were
taken without fighting. That is to say, since they are not men-
tioned in Polybios’ account of the campaign, that is what must
be assumed. The next two places, Kalamos and Trieres, were
taken and burnt, which presupposes that they were defended.
Both were small, much smaller than Tripolis, for instance, or
even Orthosia. It seems possible that the Ptolemaic forces were
small in northern Phoenicia, and were thus only defending
small places. Rounding the cape of Theuprosopon, Antiochos
occupied Botrys and Berytos, and presumably Byblos as well.
* Pol., v. Ixviii. 7. 2° Seyrig, ‘Aradus’, 206-20.
It is odd, to say the least, that the two largest cities in Antiochos’
path are not mentioned in Polybios’ account.”°
The Ptolemaic army awaited him at a position called Por-
phyrion, identified with a site in a bay south of Berytos between
the capes Ras el-Sediyatt and Ras Nebi Younis. It was, in fact,
the first of three lines of defence (or, if the previous fights at
Kalamos and Trieres are counted, the third of five). Behind the
Porphyrion position, about 2 km. south, was another line at
Platanos, and beyond that was Sidon, strongly held. Antiochos,
who had clearly learnt a good deal about generalship in the
past three years, won so decisively at Porphyrion that he was
able to ‘bounce’ the Platanos line and reach all the way to
Sidon.?’ The strategy now changed. With all the Phoenician
coastline from Arados to Sidon in his control, and south of that
Tyre and Ptolemais-Ake as well, Antiochos could afford to
mask Sidon and plunge into Palestine. The Porphyrion battle
had also been a sea-fight, with the remains of Ptolemy’s fleet
defending the coastline against the Seleukid fleet which will
have included Antiochos’ own ships, Arados’ fleet, and those
forty Ptolemaic ships captured at Ptolemais the year before.”
After the land battle, the Ptolemaic fleet retired,” presumably
to Sidon, while Antiochos brought his own fleet on past to
Tyre,*° thus cutting Sidon off by sea as well as by land from
contact with Egypt.
Antiochos went on to a systematic conquest of Palestine, from
the Sea of Galilee to Gaza, but he never did take Sidon, nor
did he turn north to gain control over the southern Bekaa
valley, where the fortresses of Gerrha and Brochoi continued in
Ptolemaic hands. Further inland Damascus was held for
Ptolemy as well. Thus, when in 217 his army was beaten, quite
unexpectedly, in battle at Raphia, Antiochos at once lost the
whole of his conquests. He could not hold Palestine in the face
of the victorious Ptolemaic army, and his route home to Syria
lay past a band of powerful Ptolemaic forts. He himself had
shown the relative ease by which a powerful army could fight
its way along the Phoenician coast, and with Sidon in his hands,
Ptolemy was half way to the Eleutheros. Not surprisingly the
26 Pol., v. lxviii. 8.
27 Ibid. g-lxix. 10; B. Bar-Kochva, The Seleucid Army, Organisation and Tactics in the
Great Campaigns (Cambridge, 1976), 124-7.
28 Pols ve lxixs 7-8: Ibid. 11. 3° Thid. Ixx. 3.
destruction of Antiochos’ army brought Ptolemy’s forces right
back to the original frontier along the Eleutheros. And this
time there was no hope of a rebellion in Ptolemy’s rear which
Antiochos could exploit. Peace was made. Phoenicia was
returned, except for Arados, to Ptolemy.*!
Ptolemy himself came to put the government of his recap-
tured provinces on a sound footing.*? No doubt those who had
welcomed Antiochos too vociferously were punished, if they
had stayed. There is one inscription which records, in a way,
the reconquest. It was found at Libo,® a village in the northern
Bekaa, well in advance of the Ptolemaic defence line at Gerrha
and Brochoi. It is perhaps an altar, dedicated to Ptolemy IV
and his sister-wife Arsinoe and to Sarapis and Isis. The man
who had it made called himself Marsyas son of Demetrios, of
Alexandria, an archigrammatos—chief scribe. Clearly an import-
ant man, clearly performing some function or other in this
remote spot. Not the place one would usually look to find a
Greek-Egyptian bureaucrat. The visit of this man to Libo must
reflect some administrative need, and the obvious one is in
connection with the settlement of the area after the war. The
comprehensive defeat of Antiochos may have encouraged the
Ptolemaic government to permit the advance of settlement
north into the Bekaa—or perhaps this was simply a recognition
of an advance which had already taken place. The same thing
was happening on the Seleukid side, where the earliest resettle-
ment of the acropolis at Hama, for instance, is dated about
200.°* This is a sign that the long peace of the third century
BC, so recently interrupted, had encouraged a growth of
population and an expansion of settlement. For the Ptolemaic
bureaucrat this represented a problem of administration, no
doubt—and, of course, one of taxation as well. Perhaps no one
asked the soldiers, but it was ominous for the effectiveness of
the defensive system at Gerrha and Brochoi if settlement and
cultivation and thus food supplies should exist and be available
to the north of the position. The real strength of the Gerrha—
*' Peace: Pol., v. Ixxxvii. 1 and 4-8.
2 Tid. 3.
33H. Salamé-Sarkis, ‘Inscription au nom de Ptolemée IV Philopator trouvée dans
le nord de la Beqa’, Berytos, 34 (1986), 207-9.
** A. P. Christensen and C. F. Johansen, ‘Les Poteries hellénistiques et les terres
sigillées orientales’, Hama iii/2 (Copenhagen, 1971).
Brochoi line was that it blocked the Seleukid advance and
pinned the enemy army down in a land which was more or less
desert. Now it was no longer a desert. The forts would have to
hold out longer, next time.
It must have been clear to all involved that there would be
a ‘next time’; that it was highly unlikely that Antiochos would
accept his defeat as permanent. He was, after all, still only 26
years old. Yet there was little the Ptolemaic government could
do to anticipate or delay the eventual attack. Diplomacy and
military help might prolong the resistance of Antiochos’ other
enemies, but in the end he would return to the only place he
had suffered defeat. Hence preparations to meet the attack
must be made in Phoenicia and in Palestine, but these could
only be the usual ones: fortifications, stockpiling of supplies,
recruiting troops. Even here the possibilities were limited. The
Ptolemaic government might make a mighty effort in 218-217
and raise an army of 75,000 men,” but it could not maintain
such an army beyond the moment of the crisis, for basic financial
reasons. It had to rely on the likelihood of a warning being
given, and, while Antiochos was busy in Asia Minor and in the
east, there was no possibility of him launching an attack on
Phoenicia and Palestine.
It seems, however, that the state of cold war which may be
said to have existed between Antiochos and Ptolemy was not
just a frozen condition. There are hints of more active measures,
especially on the Seleukid side. In 212, for instance, the mint
at Arados began producing coins of the Ptolemaic standard,
but dated to the Aradian era.*° There had been very few coins
produced in the Ptolemaic Phoenician mints for thirty years.?’
The Aradian coins were presumably produced to meet a
demand for such coins, but the fact that they were produced
outside the Ptolemaic state’s boundaries was a clear blow to
the Ptolemaic government’s prestige. It may well have been
designed that way. One cannot help wondering just how
involved Antiochos himself was in this. The issue started as he
was beginning his campaigns towards the East, and ended in
35 Pol., v. Ixv. 1-10.
36 O. Morkholm, ‘The Ptolemaic Coins of an Uncertain Era’, NNM (1975-6), 23-
58; id., ‘The Ptolemaic Coinage in Phoenicia and the Fifth War with Syria’, Egypt and
the Hellenistic World, Studia Hellenistica, 27 (Louvain, 1983), 241-51.
37 Morkholm, ‘Ptolemaic Coinage in Phoenicia’, 243.
the year he arrived back from the eastern expedition. This
seems to be too coincidental to be a mere coincidence.
It is also clear that, when the campaign which we call the
Fifth Syrian War actually began, there had been widespread
tampering with the loyalty of senior officers on the Ptolemaic
side. There are several instances of men—like Theodotos and
Panaitolos before them—changing sides without indulging in
any serious resistance. In some cases they turn up again as
Seleukid officers in the same posts as before, as in the case of
Ptolemy son of Mnaseas who had been and became governor
of Palestine.*® This suborning of Ptolemaic officers was not done
in a day. Theodotos and Panaitolos no doubt gave the king the
idea, but the extent of the later defection is so great that one
has to assume that there had been widespread preparation
beforehand. What better conditions than the absence of Anti-
ochos in the east, lulling the Ptolemaic government into a sense
of peace, but with the promise of a return strengthened and
toughened, with an experienced and hardened army. This
might well be sufficient to entice experienced soldiers and gover-
nors away from loyalty to the intrigue-ridden, effete, murderous
court at Alexandria.** No matter how exaggerated the stories
of that court, the soldiers can only have had contempt for the
behaviour they heard about. And even (one can hear the
whisperers saying), even the coinage has now to be made in
Antiochos’ lands.
Antiochos returned from the east in 205, but did not at once
renew the war for Syria, instead being concerned to clear up
some problems of authority in Asia Minor. But upheavals in
Egypt soon attracted him to another invasion of Phoenicia and
Palestine. The menace was clear to the Egyptian government
by 203, when Agathokles, governing for the infant Ptolemy V,
scattered envoys from Syria to Rome in an attempt to gather
support.*® A long-standing rebellion in southern Egypt"! had
*® D. Gera, ‘Ptolemy Son of Thraseas and the Fifth Syrian War’, Ancient Society, 18
(1987), 63-73.
39 Pol., XV. Xxiv—xxxvi, a highly coloured, moralistic account of great verve, to be
accepted only with reservations. © Thid. xv. xxv. 13-15.
‘1 P. W. Pestman, ‘Harmachis et Anchmachis, deux rois indigénes du temps des
Ptolemées’, Chronique d’Egypte, 40 (1964), 157-70; W. Peremans, ‘Les Revolutions
égyptiennes sous les Lagides’, Das Ptolemaische Agyptens; K. Vandorpe, ‘The Chronology
of the Reigns of Hurganophor and Chaonnophris’, Chronique d’ Egypte, 71 (1986), 204-302.
sapped the strength of the Ptolemaic government, and now
murders and intrigues in Alexandria, and an infant king,
threatened worse. Antiochos was approached either to deter him
or to ascertain his intentions, or both, but at the same time,
and more constructively, a Greek general, Skopas, was engaged
to recruit troops in Greece.”
All this had been undertaken by the time Agathokles fell
from power in 203. But his policy was continued by his successor
Tlepolemos.** Within Phoenicia there are numismatic signs of
preparations by the opening of new mints throughout the land.
Whereas since the 240s there had been little minting activity,
now mints began production in at least seven places, and
perhaps eight, including Tyre, Sidon, Berytos, Byblos, and Tri-
polis.** In fact, this may have begun before the fall of Agatho-
kles, for some of the coins appear to date from the reign of
Ptolemy IV, though the end of that reign is not securely dated.*
These coins were clearly being produced because the Ptolemaic
government required cash to be available locally in Phoenicia
and Palestine, which must mean that troops had been installed
in garrisons there, in increasing numbers, from about the last
year of Ptolemy IV.
The Ptolemaic preparations, which thus seem to have begun
late in the reign of Ptolemy IV, say in 205, and continued under
his successor, were based on the well-tried plan, successful in
218-217, of using Phoenicia and Palestine as a buffer to absorb
the Seleukid assault. By the time Antiochos had fought his way
down to southern Palestine, the calculation was that his forces
would have been reduced by casualties and by the need to
garrison the conquered territory. It was for this purpose, after
all, that Ptolemy I had acquired that territory in the first place.
Antiochos, therefore, had to try to avoid this sapping of his
strength. A victorious battle early in the war would be his best
strategy, but the Ptolemaic forces could scarcely be expected to
provide the opportunity for that.
The details of the campaigns are largely unknown,* and the
* Pol., xv. xxv. 16-17. 3 Tbid. xvi. xxi. 1.
** Morkholm, ‘Ptolemaic Coinage in Phoenicia’, 244-8.
T_C. Skeat, The Reigns of the Ptolemies (Munich, 1954, 1969).
46 The basic chronology was sorted out by M. Holleaux, ‘Etudes d’histoire hel-
lénistique: la chronologie de la cinquiéme guerre de Syrie’, Alio, 8 (1908), 267-81;
Schmitt, Untersuchungen . . . Antiochos der Grosse, effectively ignores this war.
fate of the cities of Phoenicia in particular is impossible to
discover—except in the final result. It seems that Antiochos
used a new approach route, since the Ptolemaic garrisons of
Phoenicia were strong enough to force him to undertake a series
of sieges. The Gerrha—Brochoi problem remained almost as
difficult as ever, and two failures there had taught Antiochos to
avoid that route. There was, however, a third line of approach,
which had been used at least once in the past, by a detachment
of Alexander’s army under Parmenio.*’ This involved his army
in a southward march along a route to the east of the Anti-
lebanon and then an attack on Damascus. If that city with its
rich oasis was taken, then the whole Ptolemaic position in
Phoenicia and the Bekaa was outflanked, for Palestine could
then be entered from the north-east. The difficulty was in the
approach, for the land east of the Antilebanon is desert, and
there would be no doubt that part of the Ptolemaic preparations
will have involved removing into storage all the available food
supplies in the countryside.
Nevertheless Antiochos succeeded. The method is detailed in
a stratagem of Polyainos,*® which is undated and is ascribed to
‘Antiochos son of Seleukos’. This has been assumed to refer to
Antiochos I,*? but Antiochos III’s father was also a Seleukos,
and the incident fits far better into his life and campaigns than
into his great-grandfather’s. Having threatened Damascus,
Antiochos withdrew his forces and organized a religious cel-
ebration. The Ptolemaic commander in the city, Dinon, relaxed
his guard. Antiochos then took a picked force on a forced
four-day march on minimum rations through the desert, and
surprised and captured the city. The real clue lies in the four
days. It would take something like that to accomplish a march
from, say, Larissa or Laodikeia-ad-Libanum to Damascus, and
it was, and is, desert all the way east of the Antilebanon.
The defence of the Ptolemaic position was thus breached,
and Antiochos was able to move on into Palestine. There was
no need to attack the walled and well-defended Phoenician
cities, which could be left to themselves for the moment. Anti-
ochos would be quite happy to see the Ptolemaic forces dis-
*7 Arr., Anab., 0. xv. 1; Curtius, m1. xii, 27—xiii. 17.
‘8 Polyainos, Iv. 15.
* e.g. E. R. Bevan, The House of Seleucus, i. 234.
tributed in these garrisons, except for the fact that the main
Ptolemaic army was still elusive. During 201 he gradually
occupied much of Palestine, though the southern gateway,
Gaza, was held by the Ptolemaic forces for a long time.™ It is
quite likely that there were other untaken places in Palestine.
The continued minting of Ptolemaic coins in the years 3, 4 and
5 of Ptolemy V (i.e. either 202/1-200/199 or 201/0-199/8)*!
shows that the Phoenician cities were also Ptolemaic still. The
activities of the Ptolemaic army next year also suggest that
Gerrha and Brochoi were theirs. In no sense could Antiochos
be said to have conquered the Ptolemaic lands, though if he
was left alone he would clearly do so eventually.
It was time, therefore, for the Ptolemaic countermove. But
this time Antiochos did not march all the way south to meet
the enemy at Raphia. Probably he did not have the chance, for
Skopas, the Ptolemaic commander, moved in the winter of
201/0.” The most sensible interpretation of this is that he
intended to reoccupy the lost lands and so make Antiochos do
the work all over again. In this he was successful, except in the
vital final detail: he failed to retake Damascus. Just as Anti-
ochos’ failure to take Gaza had permitted the Ptolemaic riposte,
so Antiochios’ hold on Damascus allowed him to resume the
offensive. In the summer he advanced, met Skopas’ army at
Panion, the springs of the Jordan, and beat it.°°
Skopas, with about 10,000 men, made good his retreat to the
coast, moving into Sidon* with the intention of waiting for
relief from Egypt. We do not know if he chose Sidon or if it was
in fact the only place he could reach. His force was clearly
formidable still. The 10,000 fugitives would be joined to the
Sidon garrison, and there were sufficient supplies to last the
whole force for several months®»—a clear testimony to the
effectiveness of the Ptolemaic preparations, but also, since it
was reduced to famine, to the inability of the Ptolemaic govern-
ment to recover from the defeat of its main field army in battle.
5° Pol., xvi. xviii. 2 and 22a; xxix. xii. 8.
5! A. B. Brett, ‘Dated Coins of Ptolemy V’, ANSMWN 11 (1947), I-11.
Poll xvie sxxix. 05 Jos, Al7, Xai. 130.
Pol.. xvi, xviii—xix; Jos., Af, xii. 131; Hieronymos, Jn Danielam, xi. 15-16; Bar-
Kochva, Seleucid Army, 146-57.
** Hieronymos, Jn Danielam, xi. 15-16.
% Tbid.; Holleaux, ‘Cinquiéme guerre’, 275.
Once more a Phoenician city found itself helplessly battered
by a war in which it was a mere pawn. Through the autumn
and winter of 200/199, Sidon stood a siege. Meanwhile, other
sections of Antiochos’ army were mopping up the newly
replaced Ptolemaic garrisons. Antiochos himself is suggested to
have operated east of the Jordan, in Batanea, and he took
Abila and Gadara before going on to Jerusalem.*® Since this
information is in a Jewish source, attention is clearly on Jeru-
salem, but one cannot believe it was his preferred destination
when Sidon was held by Skopas and his army, or when another
Ptolemaic army might still emerge from Egypt at any moment.
If Antiochos was not conducting the siege of Sidon himself, he
will have been guarding the route from Egypt, opportunely
collecting allegiances as and when he could.
It proved to be impossible for the Ptolemaic government to
raise another army good enough or big enough to challenge
Antiochos’ force. Nor was it possible, it seems, to use naval
forces to assist Skopas. After several months, in the early part
of 199, Sidon became Seleukid, this time permanently. The
other Phoenician cities were taken by the Seleukid forces at
some point, but exactly when and in what order and how is
quite unknown. The Ptolemaic coins of all the cities end in
201/0 or 200/199. Those of Joppa include an issue—but only
one—of Ptolemy V’s sixth year, which was probably 199-8.°”
The city must have fallen even later than Sidon, in 199.
At his third attempt, therefore, Antiochos had conquered the
lands his dynasty had claimed for a century. It seems that he
did not much alter the Ptolemaic system of government which
he found in operation.** Perhaps his new subjects found his yoke
somewhat lighter, in general accordance with Seleukid practice.
Perhaps, on the other hand, the essential continuity between
Ptolemaic and Seleukid rule meant no change, and this
extended to actual personnel as well as their offices, including
the appointment of the renegade Ptolemy son of Thraseas
as
°° Jos., AF, xii. 136, quoting Polybios.

*” Brett, ‘Dated Coins of Ptolemy V’.
°8 -Y. Landau, ‘A Greek Inscription found near Hefzibah
’, Israel Exploration
Journal,
16 (1966), 54-70; J. Robert and L. Robert, ‘Bulletin épigraph
ique’, Revue des Etudes
Grecques,
83 (1970), 469-73; J. E. Taylor, ‘Seleucid Rule in
Palestine’, Ph.D. thesis
(Duke University, 1979).
governor. For Palestine there was a governor over the whole
region. For Phoenicia, on the other hand, things might be very
different.
The Phoenician cities’ situation had in fact changed quite
fundamentally. Until 198 the cities had been divided between
the two kingdoms, and had become the frontier—had, in fact,
been acquired by Ptolemy I to be his first line of defence for
Egypt. In Arados this situation had been used as an opportunity
for enlarging the city’s area of autonomy. For the cities of the
Ptolemaic area, by contrast, this had meant strict regulation
and burdensome garrisons. It had meant, further, that the
hinterland of the cities, the Bekaa valley especially, but also the
whole area within the great bend of the Orontes, had been
effectively a desert zone, which could contribute little or nothing
to the economic well-being of the cities.
The elimination of the frontier thus meant a good deal more
than the removal of a few customs posts. The hinterland was
now no longer a no-man’s-land between two hostile kingdoms;
instead it became an area open for settlement and colonization,
and hence an area from which, after a time, the Phoenician
cities would be able to draw supplies. The cities themselves
became less strategically important, and so their garrisons
would be reduced. The Palestinian cities were now the Seleukid
frontier area, and thus Ptolemais-Ake became the centre of
Seleukid power, facing south, as it had been the centre of
Ptolemaic power, facing north. But, for the Phoenicians, the
political and military pressures were clearly relaxed.
We are quite uninformed about the arrangements Antiochos
made with or for the individual Phoenician cities. The garrisons
could be reduced, but not eliminated, and ultimate control
must lie with the garrison commanders. But there is plenty of
scope, even so, for civil autonomy. This must mean some sym-
biosis between the Seleukid garrison and the city oligarchies.
No doubt Ptolemaic partisans were swiftly removed, if they had
not already removed themselves, and the cities could appoint
officials friendly to Antiochos. Certainly Antiochos swiftly
restarted the Tyrian mint®’ though only for the production of
59 E. T. Newell, ‘The First Seleucid Coinage of Tyre’, NM, 10 (1921), and “The
Seleucid Coinage of Tyre: A Supplement’, NVM, 73 (1936).
bronze coins.®° He was also confident enough to sail off to Asia
Minor in 197. In fact, the Tyrian mint produced bronze coins
depicting the stern of a warship; perhaps Antiochos’ fleet was
partly Tyrian.°!
Yet there was no absolute guarantee that Phoenicia was
finally settled. It had been retaken from Antiochos’ grasp once
already. Anyone with any historical sense could have pointed
to the repeated conquests of Ptolemy I a century before. Nor
could Antiochos himself rely on Phoenician acquiescence and
loyalty. He had the experience of dealing with Arados, whose
ambition for autonomy was well known; an ambition for full
independence could be implied there; a further ambition for
empire was also known, as Marathians could testify. The other
Phoenician cities could be presumed to harbour similar
ambitions.
There was thus the possibility of upheavals from below, if the
Seleukid grip should slacken. It was also possible that the
Ptolemies might return. In 194~3 Antiochos arranged a mar-
riage between his daughter Kleopatra and the now-adult
Ptolemy V. It is said that the princess’s dowry was Koile
Syria®’—that is, all or part of the Palestinian area. Josephus
may well be correct in interpreting this to mean only the
revenues went to her husband. Certainly no part of the land
was ever handed over to Ptolemy V. The very idea of Antiochos
III tamely delivering any part of his conquests to anyone is
absurd; that he should give Koile Syria to Ptolemy, after three
wars, is quite unbelievable. Even the thought of sharing the
revenues is hard to accept, though Antiochos was rich beyond
most men’s dreams. Appian is perhaps correct in his surmise
that the marriage was designed to keep Ptolemy V quiet during
Antiochos’ problems with Greece and Rome.** A promise might
do that, together with a new wife.
The reaction in the newly conquered territories can only
have been an increased uncertainty, for the very suggestion will
have disturbed the new settlement. The Ptolemaic party in the
old Ptolemaic cities will have been encouraged, and instability
°° O. Morkholm, ‘The Monetary System of the Seleucid Kings
until 129 Bc.’ in
Kindler (ed.), Proc., 75-87.
*! Newell, ‘First Seleucid Coinage of Tyre’ (1921).
* App., Spr i. 5; Jos., A, xii. 154.
93 Jos., Aj, xii, 154-5. # App., Spr; i. 5:
was surely the result. Antiochos’ reception of Hannibal (who
landed at Tyre on his flight from Carthage®) might have
soothed some Phoenician pride, but the reminder of Punic
military prowess can only have been disturbing. The conquest
of Antiochos looks definitive in hindsight; at the time it was
not. After all it had taken nearly a quarter of a century to
achieve. Its reversal was quite imaginable.
8 Livy, xxx. xlix. 5; Nepos, Hannibal, 7; Justin, xxx. 1.
4
THE SELEUKID PEACE
193-129 BC
The inclusion of the Phoenician cities in the huge Seleukid

empire, rather than the much smaller Ptolemaic kingdom, does
not seem to have seriously affected the cities’ economic fortunes.
There is little sign of any difference in trade or trading direction
between the third and second centuries, except in a certain
intensification of previous practice. Perhaps the Egyptian
market was more difficult to enter, since it was now foreign
territory, but detail and evidence is lacking. The merchants
themselves are unlikely to leave epigraphic traces of their pres-
ence, for they were often mobile. Thus Hannibal located a
Tyrian merchant called Ariston in Ephesos in 194 and per-
suaded him to take a message to Carthage.! It was clearly not
a suspicious matter that a merchant of Tyre should travel from
Ephesos to Carthage. Hannibal also seems to have been able
to locate such a man in Ephesos easily. Yet it must be said that
there is no indication that Ariston’s connection with Tyre was
a mercantile one. If he was in Ephesos it is unlikely that he was
transporting goods of Phoenicia.”
Phoenician exports will not have changed: manufactures such
as glass, textiles, metalwares; raw materials such as wood.
Imports will have included food and raw materials for the
manufacturing industries, as before. Olive oil was clearly
produced still in such large quantities that export is certainly
the driving-force behind that production. Certain cities had
certain specialisms, such as Sidon and glass-making.? No city
seems to have been the main builder of ships, and all were
producers of purple-dyed textiles‘—woollens, cottons, carpets,
' Livy, xxxiv. Ixi. 2-4.
* The changing pattern of Phoenician trade, which was only partly affected by the
sovereignty issue, is considered in detail in ch. 7.
* Pliny, WH, v. xvii. 76; Strabo, xvi. ii. 25.
* L. B. Jensen, ‘Royal Purple of Tyre’, INES 22 (1963), 106.
The Sekeukid Peace, 193-129 BC 107
tapestries, linens, silks. Some of these fabrics were manufactured
from local production; others were woven from imported yarn
or rewoven from imported fabric. Cotton, though a native plant
in the Middle East, seems not to have been grown for weaving.
Instead cotton cloth was imported from further east;° silk may
be Syrian-grown,° though imports from China were of much
higher quality, and later there was a practice of re-weaving
Chinese imports. The industry was well established in the early
Roman period, and a considerable earlier development seems
likely though there is no Hellenistic evidence.’
All this was the traditional economic activity of the Phoe-
nicians. What was new, not only for then but for the whole
Hellenistic world, was the greater availability of coined precious
metal. Alexander’s conquest had released the accumulated
hoards of the Akhaimenid kings, to which were added imports
and newly mined metal. This money circulated at a greater
speed, partly because of increased demand for goods from
people who had acquired a share of the released wealth. One
result of the increased circulation of coin was that prices rose,
inevitably, and, as in other periods of inflation, they rose more
rapidly than the wages of craftsmen.® The evidence is mainly
from the Aegean, but there seems to be no good reason to
reject it on that account. Rising prices would also affect similar
societies, especially the Phoenician cities, closely in contact with
the Aegean. Craftsmen may well have suffered, but merchants
thrived in such conditions, buying from the craftsmen, selling
wherever a profit could be returned. Thus the Phoenician
merchants, intermediaries between manufacturers and cus-
tomers, and intermediaries also between the mainland of Asia
and Egypt and the coastal lands of the Mediterranean, were in
a position to gain great wealth. Their products—expensive
glass, purple cloth, carpets, tapestries, gold, ivory, perfume—
were of the type of goods in demand among the wealthy. Quality
> E. H. Warmington, The Commerce between the Roman Empire and India (Cambridge,
1928), 210-2 and n. 46, p. 373; F. M. Heichelheim, ‘Roman Syria’, in T. Frank (ed.),
An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome, iv: 2, (Baltimore, Md., 1938).
6 F. E. Day, ‘Aristotle: ta Bombykia’, Studi Oriental: di Giorgio della Vida, 1 (Rome,
1956).
7 L. C. West, ‘Commercial Syria under the Roman Empire’, TAPA 55 (1924), 168.
8 This is the burden ofthe article by W. W. Tarn: “The Social Question in the Third
Century’, in id., The Hellenistic Age: Aspects ofHellenistic Civilisation (Cambridge, 1923),
108-40.
108 The Sekeukid Peace, 193-129 BC
and good workmanship, precious metals and rich fabrics, were
the requisites, not quantity. These were ideal conditions for
small groups of merchants in manufacturing cities to succeed.
The customers for whom the Phoenician craftsmen and mer-
chants worked were in large part Greeks or Greek-speakers.
There will have been some who spoke other languages, or were
not Greeks, but not many—one thinks of Carthaginians,
Iberian chiefs and kings, Romans, and other Italians, but even
these were often able to converse in Greek and many were so
swamped in Greek culture as to be reckoned Greeks. Thus, it
is not surprising that Phoenicians abroad largely used Greek.
Their inscriptions are usually in Greek, or in both Greek and
Phoenician.’ The language of commerce was Greek, because it
was the language all had in common. Greek names were taken
by Phoenicians abroad, often translations of their own Phoe-
nician names, but sometimes transliterations, or even adap-
tations. And, of course, Greek invaded the Phoenician
homeland. There will have been plenty of Greeks settled there.
In the Ptolemaic state this included soldiers and officials and
these will have been the groups sent in by the Seleukids as
well. Again, the language and administration was Greek. The
Phoenician language was clearly in retreat, though it seems
probable that most men of any position could still speak and
read the language locally. Phoenician letters appear on some
of the coins, not simply odd letters, but whole phrases, clearly
designed to be understood,'® Phoenician is used on inscrip-
tions,'’ and in neither case would it have been sensible to do so
unless the language could be understood.
The country temples, as already noted, continued to use
Phoenician in their inscriptions, both those which recorded
building and those marking graves. And these temples con-
tinued to be only superficially affected by Greek culture. The
gods and goddesses remained Phoenician, as were, no doubt,
their worshippers. Indeed, the manifest prosperity of the
temples would suggest to their believers that a continuation
° O. Masson, ‘Recherches sur les phéniciens dans le monde hellénistique’,
BCH 93
(1963), 679-700; P. M. Fraser, ‘Greek—Phoenician Bilingual Inscription
s from Rhodes’,
Annual of the British School at Athens, 65 (1970), 31-6.
"° O. Morkholm, ‘The Monetary System of the Seleucid Kings until 129
B.C.’ in
Kindler (ed.) Proc, 75-87; J. C. Milne, ‘The Coinage of Aradus in
the Hellenistic
Period’, Iraq (1938), 15.
"' e.g. M. Dunand and M. Duru, Oumm el-Amed (Paris, 1962).
of the worship of the inhabiting deities would be a sensible
precaution. Wealth indicated power, in other words, both in
human and divine matters. Thus, the basic culture remained
Phoenician, but the more superficial aspects of life might appear
to be Hellenized. Most merchants will have been fluent in both
languages and both cultures. Yet it was the Phoenician who
was reacting to the Greek, and it was the Greek culture which
was invading the Phoenician homeland, not the other way
around. Phoenicians in Greece took Greek names and their
children became Greeks. Greeks in Phoenicia remained Greek,
and the local Phoenicians accommodated them by learning
their language. But only in the cities: the countryside remained
Phoenician, in language and culture. Yet even here it would
be necessary to learn and use Greek, for the temples involved
in olive oil manufacture had to sell to the city. Connections
thus clearly existed, and Greek language and culture seeped
out of the cities along the roads and into the countryside.
Hellenization, therefore, was a desperately slow process.
There is surely no doubt that the Phoenicians knew what was
happening and there will have been a variety of responses
available for individual use. The extremes would be total rejec-
tion and total acceptance. Total rejection of Hellenization
would mean resisting the change obdurately: speaking only
Phoenician, worshipping Phoenician gods, marrying only into
a family with similar ideals, emphasizing the Phoenician past
and its culture. Total acceptance would mean one would learn
Greek, speak Greek, consort with Greeks, send one’s sons to be
educated in the gymnasium. Most people would adopt neither
of these positions, but would adapt themselves to circumstances,
speaking Greek or Phoenician as required, probably, in most
cases, more or less indifferently. Perhaps most would be some-
what confused, feeling as though they belonged to neither
culture, and being despised by the two groups of extremists, who
were, no doubt, admired for their stand while paradoxically
exasperating everyone else. It must be presumed, that is to say,
that this was a live political and social issue in the Phoenician
cities, and thus variations in responses can be expected not only
among individuals but between cities as well.
The evidence for Hellenization in the cities consists of the
response of the educated classes, and thus in the visible results
of Greek education—the production of sporting victors and of
philosophers. In both of these Sidon was clearly more Hel-
lenized than any of the others. This, of course, had already
been the case in the Ptolemaic period, but the evidence then was
rather thin—one philosopher and two victors. In the Seleukid
period, however, Sidon blossomed, producing two _philo-
sophers—another Zeno and one called Boethus—during the
second century Bc, and a poet, Antipatros, who flourished about
120 Bc. Three men are perhaps not many, but not many cities
produced even three. By contrast, Tyre could boast of the
philosopher-poet Meleagros, who actually came from Gadara,
though the fact that he chose to live in Tyre suggests that city’s
receptivity to his Hellenic culture.”
In sporting achievements the difference is even more marked.
Sidon had already produced victors at Delos and the Nemea
in the time of the Ptolemies, and in the Seleukid period this
continued, with two victors in the Panathenaia in the 180s, and
a pancratiast victor at the Theseia about 142.'? Another is
undated.'* By contrast, Tyre had only two recorded victors—
at the Panathenaia about 180 and one which is undated'°—in
the whole Hellenistic period. Only Berytos produced another
victor from Phoenicia, in the Panathenaia horse race in
166/165.'° Arados had no victor at all until the Roman period.
The predominance of Sidon is thus very marked. Combined
with the record of more literary products noted already, it is
legitimate to conclude that Sidon’s acceptance of Hellenization
was more enthusiastic than that of any other city in Phoenicia.
This is no doubt partly a reflection of the hard time Tyre had
in the time of troubles, but Tyre had clearly recovered from
this by the time of the Seleukid conquest, for the city produced
a Panathenaic victor. Even if such a reason could apply to
Tyre, it certainly could not fit Arados, where no sign of either
2 See OCD, 73, 171, 667, 1145 for these people, and A. S. F. Gow and D. L. Page,
Hellenistic Epigrams (Cambridge, 1965), on Meleagros. For a view of the interpenetration
of the two cultures, cf. P. K. Hitti, Lebanon in History (London, 1967): ‘Lebanon, still a
Semitic country with a veneer of Hellenism’ (206).
'9 IG, 1/2, 2314, |. 21 (dated only to the decade 191/82) and ibid. 960, 1. 16.
'* P. Le Bas and W. H. Waddington, Inscriptions grecques et latines receullies en Gréece et
en Asie Mineure, iti (Paris, 1870), 1866c: ‘Diotimos son of Abdoubastes in the agonothesia
of Apollophanes’.
'° IG, 1/2, 2315, ll. 27-8; IG vu, 417, ll. 39-40.
'° IG, u/2, 2316, Il. 50-2.
The Sekeukid Peace, 193-129 BC III
literary or sporting achievement can be discerned until the
Roman period,'’ in spite of Marathos’ possession of an unde-
niably Hellenistic stadium.'* The explanation of the disparity
between Sidon and the rest must lie in Sidon’s acceptance of
Greek culture and the other cities’ indifference to it.
This division is, of course, a similar situation to that which
obtained to the south among the Jewish community in
Palestine. It is, in fact, the common experience of all non-Greek
communities in the east.'? The Phoenicians coped with this
cultural conflict without serious difficulties, as did all the other
communities except the Jews. The leadership of the prominent
members of the community, typified by the participation of
Diotimos of Sidon in the Nemean Games, apparently without
serious dispute, provided a model for others. Among the Jews
the prominent members of the community were divided on the
issue and this division was ideological.”
The Phoenician community itself was deeply divided, but in
a different way. The men who identified themselves in inscrip-
tions abroad did so as men of Arados or Tyre or Sidon or
Byblos, not as Phoenicians.”’ Of course, Greeks did the same,
being notoriously rivalrous. If we can read into Phoenicians’
self-identification the same or similar feelings as those displayed
by Greeks, then it can be assumed that the Phoenician cities
entertained feelings ranging from friendly rivalry to detestation
for each other. When in the reign of Antiochos IV (175-164
BC)” the cities were able to proclaim themselves on their coins,
Byblos proclaimed itself as ‘Gebal the Holy’,” thus emphasizing
its antiquity and claiming a religious supremacy in default of
real power. Berytos was just as overweening, taking to itself the
title ‘Metropolis of Canaan’.** Neither of these places was of
more than minor importance in the Hellenistic scheme of things,
" IGLS, vii. 4001.
'8 S. Abdul-Hak, ‘Découvertes archéologiques récentes dans les sites gréco-romaines
de Syrie’, Atti del VII Congresso Internazionale de Archeologia Classica, iii (Rome, 1961), 32-6.
'° For studies of reactions: 8. K. Eddy, The King is Dead (Lincoln, Neb., 1961), and
A. Momigliano, Alien Wisdom: The Limits of Hellenisation (Cambridge, 1975).
?° V. Tcherikower, Hellenistic Civilisation and the Jews, 2nd edn. (Philadelphia, Pa.,
1961); M. Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism, tr.J.Bowden (London, 1981).
2! Examples are the winners of races noted above; in the Roman period, however,
at least one Olympic winner was identified as ‘Aurelius Helix of Phoenicia’ (L. Moretti,
Olympionikai (Rome, 1957), no. 144). 22 Morkholm, Antiochus IV, 123-30.
3 Rouvier, no. 658. 2* Ibid. no. 457.
and both were only second-rate powers even within Phoenicia.
Their self-identification was nevertheless nothing less than arro-
gant. Tyre and Sidon were mutually insulting, claiming rival
honours as the leading city of Phoenicia. Sidon listed its his-
torical achievements as ‘the Metropolis of Kambe, Hippo,
Kition and Tyre’,” a not very subtle put-down of its neigh-
bour—and also wrong, for Kambe (i.e. Carthage) was certainly
a Tyrian foundation, and Kition’s Phoenician connection was
ancestrally with Tyre.”° Tyre replied that it was ‘the Metropolis
of the Sidonians’.”’ Agreed, all this is ‘pompous’”® and has its
ludicrous aspects; but it is also powerful evidence of civic pride
and nostalgia for perceived past glories and a lost independence.
It is also clear that these cities were actively maintaining an
interest in their history and their individuality, even if, as is
usual when history becomes a political football, they get the
facts wrong.
The existence of this pride was ominous for the Seleukid
rulers. The rivalry was perhaps only held in check by the
overlordship of more powerful political entities. It seems likely
that, left to themselves, the Phoenician cities would have been
as quarrelsome and destructive as their Greek and Italian
compeers. Arados had demonstrated a wish for independence
from the beginning, as well as a determined enmity towards
similar aspirations among its immediate mainland neighbours.
The legends on the Phoenician coins show that these feelings
were shared by all the other Phoenician cities.
Since they were not permitted to fight each other, it seems
likely that the energies of the citizens had become concentrated
on industrial and commercial ventures. For there is no doubt
of the energy. This was a society which was adventurous and
innovative, whose direction of expansion was concentrated
overwhelmingly into commercial areas by virtue of being
blocked from expanding elsewhere. (The same response at Car-
thage, at the same time, was to rouse the anger and appre-
hension of Cato.)
One route of expansion available to the Phoenicians was the
settlement, or resettlement, of the hinterland of the cities. No
25
BMC Phoenicia, pp. cvi-cvii and Sidon, nos. 87-91.
26
Nicolaou, Hist. Top. Kition, 313; not universally accepted, though.
27 BMC Phoenicia, p. cxxxiii. 8 Morkholm, Antiochus IV, 128.
» A. E. Astin, Cato the Censor (Oxford, 1978), 127.
doubt the reduction of the forest was steadily providing more
land in the mountains for settlement, but the major area which
had become available since 200 Bc was the old no-man’s-land
between Apamea in the north and Brochoi and Gerrha in the
south. This area was not wholly empty, of course, for settlements
clearly existed at such places as Libo, where the inscription to
Ptolemy IV was set up in 217,°° or at Larissa on the Orontes,
and perhaps Laodikeia-ad-Libanum even further south.*! Yet
wherever archaeological investigation in this area has taken
place there is a blank in occupation before about 200 Bc. One
of the prime settlement sites was the old Iron Age city-site of
Hamath, on a high, defensible tell overlooking and controlling
a river-crossing, but no Hellenistic pottery earlier than 200 Bc
has been found there.*? The same is the case at Laodikeia-
ad-Libanum.*’ It seems likely that certain places had small
garrisons,** but after 198 Bc these were of much reduced sig-
nificance since the frontier they guarded had gone. It is of
interest in this connection that Gerrha and Brochoi, the Pto-
lemaic forts, are heard of no more. Instead there developed in
the southern Bekaa the later cities of Abila, Chalkis, and Helio-
polis as centres for the Ituraeans of that valley and the Anti-
lebanon. The forts are last heard of after the Fifth Syrian War
which ended in 195; Chalkis is first recorded in 64.*° All are in
the territory later occupied by the Ituraeans, and both Chalkis
and Abila are clearly connected with that people. Reading the
connection backwards in time is more difficult, but the
geographical identity of the area is clear. Gerrha is often identi-
fied as the predecessor of Chalkis*® but it is not universally
accepted.*’ Baalbek developed as the religious centre of the
area, but only after the Seleukid conquest, so far as can be seen,
for it is not recorded before 64 Bc, as Heliopolis.*®
Since Chalkis and Heliopolis existed in recognizable urban
3° -H. Salamé-Sarkis, ‘Inscription au nom de Ptolemée IV Philopator trouvée dans
le nord de la Bega’, Berytos, 34 (1986), 207. 3! Grainger, Cities, 107-8.
32 A. P. Christensen and A. P. Johansen, ‘Les poteries hellénistiques et les terres
sigillées orientales’, Hama 3/2 (Copenhagen, 1971).
33 P. J. Parr, ‘Tell Nebi Mend-Qadesh’, Archiv fiir Orientforschung 26 (1978/9),
pny eupe Cities, 107-8. 35 Jos., AJ, xiv. 40.

3° e.g. by Honigmann, ‘Hist. Top.’, no. 195, and Jones, CERP, 254.
37 e.g. E. Will, ‘Un vieux probléme de la topographie de la Beqa antique: Chalcis
du Liban’, ZDPV 99 (1983), 141-6. 7 BY Jos,.4\ Zexiv. Ao
form in 64 Bc, their development had taken place in the previous
years, between 198, when they did not exist, and 64, when they
did. Urban centres do not develop in isolation, but in the
context of the development of rural settlement and a local
agricultural surplus. Here therefore is a case of expansion and
of both urban and rural growth, in the southern Bekaa.
This is also the case in the area to the north, between
Heliopolis-Baalbek and the Orontes as far north as Apamea.
Hama, Larissa and Laodikeia-ad-Libanum have been men-
tioned already, but, once again, it is only in the context of rural
settlement and expansion that these towns could exist and grow.
The whole rural process took place quietly but steadily, without
any official encouragement or organization. None of the villages
in the area had a Greek name; all were Semitic in language.*®
Official interest, had it existed, would surely have seized upon
some of the places and given them dynastic names. Some towns
did acquire such names—Larissa was a settlement of Alex-
ander’s time, Laodikeia-ad-Libanum had been named so by
the time it was used as a camp by Antiochos III in 219;*
Antiochos IV renamed Hamath as Epiphaneia about 170. But
these were few; the villages were many, and all of their names
show clearly that the process of settlement was one by the local
Semitic population.
The area in which this new settlement took place had by no
means lost all of its strategic significance with the removal of
the frontier. Instead of a barrier, it had now become a link,
joining the three sections of the Seleukid state in the Levant:
the Seleukis in the north, Palestine in the south, and Phoenicia
along the coast. There were, as always, three land routes joining
these areas: along the coast, through the Bekaa, and along the
eastern foot of the Antilebanon. The ‘official’ settlements at
Epiphaneia and Larissa and Laodikeia were presumably
designed as garrison centres aiming to control the route south
from Apamea to the Bekaa. One incidental result of the estab-
lishment of this line of fortifications was to provide protection
of a sort against raids by nomad bands from the eastern desert
into the land west of the river. Thus not only did the area cease
* See the lists drawn up by J.-C. Balty, ‘L’Apameéne antique et les limites de la
Syria secunda’, La Géographie administrative et politique d’ Alexandre @ Mahomet (Strasburg,
n.d.), 41-75. * Pol., v. Ixviii. 7.
to be a potential battleground between Seleukids and Ptolemies
as a result of the Seleukid conquest of the south, but it also
acquired protection from other enemies as well. Its increased
use as a routeway now required it to produce food supplies,
and further, the land was no doubt rich in agricultural potential
after its long dereliction.
How far this resettlement was specifically Phoenician is
impossible to say. The evidence of Semitic-language village
names does not seem to be so specific as to isolate one Semitic
dialect from another. But Arados, for one, had an old interest
in the land through the Eleutheros gap, had controlled Mari-
amme in Alexander’s time, and even in the second century still
included Baitokaike within the bounds of its peraia. Later, in
the Roman period, Emesa called itself a ‘Phoenician’ city,"
while Roman provinces organized out of the original Syrian
province were called ‘Phoenice’ and ‘Phoenice Libanensis’ and
included not only the Hellenistic Phoenicia but Antilebanon
and the Emesan area as well, as far east as the desert.*? It would
in fact be very natural for Semitic-speaking villagers settling in
this new land to look to the Phoenician cities for support,
encouragement, finance, and as markets. They were models
of Semitic settlements which were succeeding, as surely they
themselves hoped to do, in a Greek cultural environment.
This resettlement of the old borderlands becomes visible
during the Roman period, and so it had begun well beforehand.
The settlers came from all directions—or, at least, such must
be the assumption. Some will have moved in from the coast,
and these will have been Phoenicians, some will have been the
descendants of people long settled in the area, in well-protected
sconces, such as Mariamme or Larissa. Others came in from
the desert, perhaps as raiders, more likely in search of land to
farm, since even to a hardened nomad it is better to farm for
food than to herd goats in the desert. In the south the Ituraeans
expanded along the Bekaa valley and up the mountain slopes
on either side. For all these the only sympathetic culture-groups
*! Millar, ‘Phoenician Cities’, 58—9: three references to people from Emesa who are
described as ‘Phoenicians’, including the Empress Julia Maesa and a character in
Heliodoros’ novel Aethiopica.
® Cf. A. H. M.Jones, The Later Roman Empire, i (Oxford, 1964), maps I and II, and
the provincial lists, pp. 1458-9.
were the Jews of Judaea and the Phoenicians in their cities.
And for all of them the government was composed of tax-
collecting Greek soldiers. Greco-Semitic hostility resulted.
The tax-collecting was especially diligent and annoying
during the period after 190. Antiochos III fell into war with
Rome and was beaten. The Roman terms of peace included
the payment of a huge indemnity, 1,000 talents a year for twelve
years to Rome, and 577 to Eumenes of Pergamum over five
years, on top ofthe confiscation of Antiochos’ war-chest of 3,000
talents after the lost battle of Magnesia.** This was nearly eight
times the sum Carthage was paying, and over a much shorter
period. The aim was clearly to destroy Antiochos’ power by
draining his kingdom of wealth. In effect, a substantial fraction
of Alexander’s Persian loot was moving even further west. Rome
was becoming the new Persepolis.
The money had to be extracted largely from current taxation.
The king did not have a great store left after his war-chest went.
Antiochos III looked to seize stored riches in temples and lost
his life in an attempt on one in Persis.** Yet these temple deposits
were not really so very large, and the next king, Seleukos IV,
struggled all his reign to pay the indemnity. In theory it should
have been paid by the time he died, in 175, but his successor
Antiochos IV found he still had some to pay.* Paradoxically,
the fact that it was paid, if somewhat late, is a sign of the wealth
of the kingdom. It is also a sign that the Seleukids did not make
any attempt to hoard a great store of wealth, but that their
taxation revenue was spent as fast as it was received. Even after
paying off the indemnity, and winning victories, Antiochos IV
was without ready cash in 165, though it must be allowed that
this particular king was famous for his generosity.*°
The Phoenician cities will have suffered the heavy taxation
along with every other community, and perhaps would notice
it the more since their wealth would provide the king with an
immediate target. If Heliodoros, the minister of Seleukos IV,
was prepared to break into the temple in Jerusalem,*’ he was
equally prepared to seize accumulated wealth in other temples.
*® Pol., xxi. xvii. 4-6 and xlii. 19-21.
jig e ate ;
* Diod., xxvu. iii and xxix. xv; Strabo, xv. i. 18.
*® Livy, xm. vi. 6-9.
*° 1 Mace. 3: 29.
47
2 Macc. 3: 7-40.
The Sekeukid Peace, 193-129 BC PEy
No doubt those of Phoenicia suffered in this way. Antiochos IV
was equally ruthless, seizing wealth both in Jerusalem* and in
the east." It was a sign that the heaps of precious metal sent
into circulation by Alexander had finally run out.
Antiochos IV was not simply a man who despoiled temples.
His policies were clearly designed to enhance his kingdom’s
power and prestige. He appreciated, as few of his family ever
did, the need to enlist the Semitic populations of his kingdom
to the support of the dynasty. That, at least, is the presumption
which it is necessary to make to explain his deeds. He par-
ticipated in a ceremony at Hierapolis by which he became the
husband of the goddess Atargatis, becoming, that is, the earthly
incarnation of Hadad.” Hierapolis was the major centre left of
the worship of the native ‘Syrian goddess’, and this ceremony
was designed to appeal to the goddess’s worshippers, who were
mainly, in her homeland, Syrians in origin and language.>!
Antiochos’ policy at Jerusalem can best be seen in the same
light. Hierapolis had been a Greek city since the time of Seleukos
I; now, in 168 or 167, a group from Jerusalem proposed to
convert that city also into a Greek city. They had the name all
ready, ‘the Antiochenes in Jerusalem’, as a pleasant flattery of
the king. Antiochos was happy enough to accept both the plan
and the flattery. There was nothing unlikely about it, and
though the existence of two parties in the city was well enough
appreciated, that was also scarcely unknown elsewhere.
The same policy of recognition of the Semitic component in
the kingdom and conciliation of it appears in the king’s dealings
with Tyre. If Jerusalem was only just getting round to becoming
a ‘proper’ city of Greek type in the 170s and 160s, and if
Hierapolis had been a Greek city since the 290s, but had
retained its aggressively Syrian goddess and temple unchanged,
then Tyre was another version of the same process of Hel-
lenization. The Tyrians had probably not had much distance
to go along this road, for the tribulations of the time of Alex-
ander and after had certainly reduced the Phoenician popu-
lation of the city. The ranks of Tyrian citizens in the Ptolemaic
aio Miace.<5? 15: * Diod., xxx, xviiia; 1 Macc. 6: 1-4.

°° Granius Licinianis, ed. M. Flemisch (Leipzig, 1904), xxvmt.
*! A sanctuary of the Syrian goddess, staffed from Hierapolis, was established at
Delos, where the worshippers were Greeks and Romans—see ch. 7.
period were probably filled by immigrants, some from the
surrounding country, some from other Phoenician cities, and
some from Greece. Those Greeks are perhaps the people who
instituted the quinquennial games in honour of Melqart, whom
the Greeks always recognized as Herakles. The holding of such
games clearly marks Tyre as a Hellenized city, since they imply
so much which was Greek in culture—athletics, competition,
the gymnasium, Greek education, a Greek form of worship.”
The games will have been held in a stadium on the mainland,
such as that whose remains are still visible at Marathos, the
mainland suburb of Arados.** Since the site of Marathos was
deserted by the Roman period in favour of Antarados, a little
way north along the coast, the stadium was built in the second
or third century Bc.
Antiochos IV came to Tyre to attend the games of Melqart
on the first occasion they were held during his reign, probably
in 173.°* This was, as is everything a king does, a political
gesture, an honour to the city and its god. It was especially
suitable that it was to this festival that ‘the Antiochenes in
Jerusalem’ sent money for a sacrifice. The envoys could not
bring themselves to give the money to Melgart, so it went to
help outfit ships for the king’s fleet.°° Tyre seems to have been a
place Antiochos used as his headquarters rather than Ptolemais-
Ake, for it was also at Tyre that he judged the dispute over
the high-priesthood at Jerusalem.°® Some of the Tyrians are
claimed, in a Jewish source, to have expressed themselves in
support of the anti-Hellenizers in Jerusalem.*’ This is not sur-
prising. The Hellenization of Tyre will have been an unpopular
development with some in that city, and the tribulations of
another Semitic community over the same issue will have been
familiar to most politically alert Tyrians. When the Jerusalem
High Priest Onias was taken into custody by Antiochos he was
sequestered first at Antioch and later at Beroea,*® both Greek
52.
2 Macc. 4: 18.
*8 §. Abdul-Hak, ‘Découvertes archéologiques récentes dans les sites Gréco-Romains
de Syrie’, in Atti del VI Congreso Internazionale di Archeologia Classica, iii (Rome, 1961),
29-6.
** 2 Macc. 4: 19-21; the date is uncertain, but not especially important; RE, i. 2347,
Antaradus.
5° 2 Macc. 4: 19. 56 Tbid. 4: 44.
7 Ibid. 4: 40. %8 Jos., AJ, xii. 383-5; 2 Macc. 13: 4-8.
The Sekeukid Peace, 193-129 BC 11g
cities rather than Hellenized Semitic settlements. The choice
was surely deliberate.
Antiochos also attempted the unification of his own kingdom
with that of Ptolemy, only to be stopped by Rome. This failure
had certain effects within the Seleukid realm, where some
groups attempted to use the king’s humiliation to their own
advantage. He raided Jerusalem in response to some develop-
ment of a pro-Ptolemaic nature there,’ and a cryptic note from
a much later source reports that he made war on Arados.°
These two events are surely connected, and in more than a
chronological sense. There were strong connections already
between the Phoenician and Jewish communities, as the visit
of the ‘Antiochenes in Jerusalem’ to the Melqart games at
Tyre showed. Their languages were very similar, and their
problems were much the same. Both were attempting to
adjust their Semitic societies to the reality of Seleukid power,
though with only intermittent success, and in the end with
very different results. It seems clear enough, though, that the
underlying aim of both societies, particularly in the relatively
more prosperous times they had now reached, was political
independence. Some thought that the best route to that goal
lay in adopting Greek forms, including the Greek city, others
thought the best way was to reject such forms and wait for
an opportunity to strike out on their own. Thus, to some in
Jerusalem and to some in Arados it seemed that Antiochos
IV’s defeat in Egypt was the moment at which to strike for
independence.
They were wrong. Antiochos still had his army, and was
prepared to use it. At Jerusalem he seized some of the wealth
of the temple and permitted a massacre: the Greek party thus
triumphed. Arados was more difficult, at least in the short term.
The city was still on its island, but had a hostage in its union
with the adjacent mainland. All Antiochos had to do was
consult his family’s history and then repeat the actions of
his grandfather, using the power of his army to sever that
union.
What Arados had done is unknown, but there is a hint in the
fact that both Arados and Marathos had been producing coins
59 1 Mace. 1: 20-9; 2 Mace. 5: 11-17.
6° Porphyry, frag. 54 (= FGH, IIB. 1227).
separately from 171 onwards.®! This suggests that the two
communities were again in dispute. Antiochos III in 218 had
composed the last quarrel by restoring Arados’ control over the
peraia. Now Antiochos IV composed this new quarrel—if such
was the trouble—by reversing that decision. Arados had con-
sistently pursued two aims since the period of the Akhaimenids,
and perhaps before: independence and control of the peraia.
The city had now lost both; but there is no sign that these aims
had changed.
It may also be that Antiochos was looking to inflict a lesson
on dissidents. Possibly also he had repented of his conciliatory
policy towards his Syrian subjects. Certainly it is from about
this time on that the king gave permission for the cities of his
kingdom to produce their own coins, both in silver and in
bronze. This was a privilege Arados had long exercised; now
Arados was only one among many coining centres.”
Antiochos’ policy of establishing mints in many cities does
not necessarily imply that those cities had acquired some form
of autonomy.” For a start these coinages were largely of bronze,
silver being still reserved to the king. Further, of the bronze
issues, some at least are recognized as ‘royal’,®* which seems to
mean that they were issued by royal authority. Two other kinds
of coins have been labelled ‘semi-autonomous’ and ‘auto-
nomous’,” but the precise meanings of these terms in political
terms are obscure, to say the least. The basic fact which shows
through all discussions of the subject is that of royal authority.
It was only by authority of the king that these mints were set
up or any of these coins were minted, even if local centres were
able to trumpet their civic pride by including individualized
slogans, such as those of the Phoenician cities mentioned above.
In Phoenicia the coins came from Tyre and Sidon in the
greatest numbers. These had not been royal mints since their
definitive conquest by Antiochos III, having produced only
bronze. The sequence of coining was often interrupted, and
this likely enough reflects the needs of the government—royal
authority again—since there was no need to make new coins
* Seyrig, ‘Aradus’, 216 and 219.
8 Morkholm, Antiochus IV, lists the active mints on p. 126;
there were over twenty
of them eS ibid, 175.
- e.g. Antioch, Ptolemais-Ake, Seleukeia-on-the-Tigris,
and Susa (ibid. 125).
des ‘Monetary System’, 82-6.
unless they were needed. Ptolemais-Ake, for example, produced
fairly limited coinages during the reign of Seleukos IV, and in
the first part of that of Antiochos IV. In the second part of
Antiochos’ reign, however, production suddenly increased. In
the twelve years of Seleukos’ reign only one obverse die had
been used, and in the first part of Antiochos’ reign only two
more, an average of, say, one in five or six years. In the later
part of Antiochos’ reign, twelve obverse dies were used, in no
more than six years: two per year, an increase in production by
eight times.®° The reason is obvious enough: the war into Egypt
followed by the Jewish rebellion. This does not, that is, reflect
the commercial importance of the site of the mint, but the
political importance of Ptolemais-Ake as the government centre
for Palestine. The continuing importance of the place is indi-
cated by the small regular coinages, and these would perhaps
reflect its commercial importance, since the coins were in some
senses produced to reflect local needs in paying taxes. Thus, the
more or less regular coinages from Tyre and Sidon presumably
reflect the commercial importance of those two cities.
Under Antiochos IV, for the first time, there were also coins
produced in other Phoenician cities than Arados, Tyre, and
Sidon. This is an indication that the new coining towns,
Tripolis, Byblos, and Berytos, had a local importance, less than
that of the three main cities, but greater than that of the other
settlements, Sarepta, for instance, or Orthosia. This is a result
of developments over the previous generation, as the prosperity
which resulted from the Seleukid peace spread outwards from
the great cities to their smaller brethren. It was as a result of
this development that Marathos was able to challenge Arados,
and that Tripolis, Byblos, and Berytos were able to become
coining centres.°” Archaeologically, the development of Sarepta
probably came during this period as much as in the preceding
Ptolemaic peace.”
The peaceful period of Seleukid rule did not last as long as
its Ptolemaic predecessor, and it was disrupted from within the
kingdom rather than by invasion from without. The Seleukid
eo Tbid.77=3:
87 Td., Antiochus IV, 126.
68 The excavators could not distinguish third- and second-century remains, but the
datable amphorae are spread throughout both periods; cf. J. B. Pritchard, Sarepta VI
(Beirut, 1988), 18-24.
realm was troubled by disputed royal successions from its origin,
and scarcely one royal death had been surmounted without
trouble. Antiochos IV’s death was no exception, for his nephew,
Demetrios I, came to seize his inheritance from the son of
Antiochos IV, and this was in a sense preliminary to the bout
of civil war, rebellion, and dissension which began in 153 and
lasted for fifteen years. That in turn was succeeded by a short
period of peace and then by the continual warfare which finally
destroyed the whole state.
In all this Phoenicia was intimately involved. The cities of
Phoenicia were large and rich and powerful, and were thus
prizes to be won in a war, especially a civil war, for the resources
which they provided were the means to the achievement of
power by their rulers. Demetrios I, for example, arrived from
Italy at Tripolis. From there he organized the coup which
removed both his cousin Antiochos V and the assertive minister
Philip before Demetrios himself moved to Antioch.® The choice
of Tripolis for his landing is one which suggests a close acquaint-
ance with the geopolitical situation in the kingdom, for the city
neatly separated the Phoenician cities of the south from the
predominantly Greek cities of the north and the interior, and
provided easy communications to the south along the coast, to
the east and north through the Eleutheros gap—and to the
west by sea should the worst happen.
Demetrios was able to defeat rebellions in the east and in
Judaea, but proved to be too dangerous for his external enemies,
who combined to bring him down. Their instrument was a
pretended son of Antiochos IV, given the name Alexander as
well as his own name of Balas, and a. mercenary army. He
contrived to seize Ptolemais-Ake and was married to Ptolemy
VI’s daughter Kleopatra Thea.”° This all put Phoenicia on the
spot, for the cities were now between the two fires of Demetrios
in the north and Alexander in the south. Alexander successfully
established control over the Phoenician cities during 151-150,
and his coins were minted in Tyre, Sidon, and Berytos.’' These
remained active mints for Balas all though his reign, as did Ake,
but this solidarity, if that was what it was, broke at the end.
Balas had gained support not only from Demetrios’ external
°° Jos., AF, xii. 389; 2 Macc. 14: 1; 1 Mace. 7: I-4.
” Diod., xxx1t. ge. ”’ Morkholm, ‘Monetary System’, fig. 1 (p. 85).
enemies, but from the Jewish rebels as well. The result was a
revival and extension of the strength of the Maccabaean rebels
in Judaea, and an extension of Ptolemaic power into coastal
Palestine, so that by 146 Ptolemy VI was minting coins in Ake.””
Neither of these movements actually reached Phoenicia—for
Ake had not been a Phoenician city for two centuries—but the
effects of the upheaval were certainly felt. The group in the
town of Shechem who called themselves Sidonians in a letter
to Antiochos IV did so in the knowledge that they were a colony
from the Phoenician city.” Another group also calling itself
Sidonians is known in the southern town of Marisa.’ Both were,
no doubt, remnants of old Phoenician enterprise, probably of
the Akhaimenid period, but their self-designation suggests a
continued contact with their original homeland. Both were
deeply affected by the Jewish rebellion, and the Phoenician
trading connections with the south were no doubt disturbed,
to say no more, by the troubles.
Worse followed. The simultaneous deaths of Alexander Balas
and Ptolemy VI in battle in 145 left the field clear for the son
of Demetrios I, the child Demetrios II. But his methods—or
perhaps those of his allies, the mercenary captains Lasthenes
the Cretan and Jonathan Maccabaeus”—caused powerful dis-
affections in Syria and yet another rebellion. This was led, in
the name of an infant son of Alexander Balas, by the soldier
Diodotos of Kasiana,’° who, when his ward died, made himself
king as Tryphon.’’ Demetrios II’s unpopularity allowed
Tryphon to advance from the interior and to gain control
over a variety of places. Tyre and Sidon coined for Demetrios
throughout the civil war, and were thus held by loyal garrisons
of Demetrios’,”® but Tryphon was able to capture Berytos.””
This town had been growing in importance, to judge by the
increase in its minting activity, from no issues in the third
century BC to seven between 150 and 126.°° Now it was
destroyed.*! Tryphon also took Byblos, always apparently easy
to capture, and established a mint there when he became king.®”
?2 Tbid. 80, n. 26 and refs. 3 Jos., Af, xii. 259. * OGIS, 593.
3 1 Macc. 11: 31-2; Jos., AJ, xiii. 126-7; Diod., xxxmi. iv. 1.
7® Diod., xxx. 4a. ™ Wiod., XXXII. xxviii. 1.
78 Morkholm, ‘Monetary System’, fig. 1 (p. 85).
79 Strabo, xvi. ii. 19. 89 BMC Phoenicia, Berytus, nos. 1-13.
8! Strabo, Xvi. ii. 19. 82 Houghton, no. 702.
Exactly what is meant by the destruction of Berytos is a
problem. Some time later Marathos and Simyra are said to
have been destroyed, but in this case it seems to mean not
so much a physical destruction as political. In the case of
Berytos the meaning appears to be actual physical destruc-
tion, but there are signs that the city either continued to exist
or recovered to some degree fairly quickly. Coins were issued
from the city in the 120s,°° and men living in the Aegean
island of Delos about the same time claimed it as their
homeland.** Thus ‘destruction’ is perhaps not to be taken
too literally, though it must imply a violent capture and sack
at the very least.
To accomplish all he did Tryphon will have marched through
Phoenicia, and the conflict marked by the destruction of Berytos
was presumably not confined to that event. The fields and
suburbs of the resisting cities will have suffered. Another aspect
of the troubled period is shown by what happened at Arados.
The separation of Arados from its former mainland territory
continued to rankle. Under Alexander Balas, a most easy-
going king, his minister Ammonios was open to bribery. Arados
bribed him to seize control of Marathos on the island’s behalf:
the price is said to have been three hundred talents. The
Marathians were alerted by one of their citizens who had been
in Arados and had heard the plan discussed. When the royal
forces approached, the gates were shut, and the coup failed.*®
The episode is a vivid indication of the disorder into which
the kingdom had fallen, which permitted encroachments from
south and east, and rebellions from within.
Arados did not have much longer to. wait, as it happened.
The attempted revolution of Tryphon could only partially
succeed because of the unpopularity of Demetrios II. When the
latter went off to the east and was captured by the Parthians,
the way was open for Demetrios’ brother Antiochos VII Sidetes
to take power. He reached Seleukeia-in-Pieria in 139, married
Kleopatra Thea (ex-wife of both Alexander Balas and Deme-
trios II) and swiftly acquired control over the garrisons his
* G. MacDonald, Catalogue of the Greek Coins in the Hunterian Collection, iti (Glasgow,
1905), p. 96, no. 24, p. 236, nos. 1 and 2.
* Durrbach, Choix, 118, 119, and 121.
8 Diod., xxxml. v. 1-5.
brother had left.*° He retired northwards by way of Orthosia®’
perhaps losing his treasure on the way;** Tryphon’s support
ebbed. He was cornered and killed during 138.°? In that interval
of uncertainty Arados succeeded in making itself so useful to
the new king that it regained the right to mint silver, and began
doing so at once, inaugurating a sequence of coinage which
lasted almost a century.” This seems to have accomplished at
least part of the political programme which the city had pursued
during the whole Hellenistic period, namely, autonomy for
Arados as a city. But the second part of the programme, control
of the peraia, was unattainable while a powerful Seleukid king
controlled the mainland.
During the troubles of the 140s Tyre’s coins had proclaimed
the city to be ‘holy’ and ‘asylos’.*! The first time this appears
is on coins of 141/0, when the slogan appears in full, after which
it is abbreviated. This was clearly a defensive gesture, whereby
the city armed itself with the protection of a god—presumably
Melqart—and arranged a more reliable protection from other
communities which guaranteed assistance.”? Kings perhaps
granted such protection, but they were the least reliable of all
protectors. Demetrios II had several times reversed his policies
and broken agreements when it suited his momentary needs.
And Tyre held Demetrios’ garrison.” It is, however, the first
sign, outside of Arados, that one of the Phoenician cities was
taking decisions affecting foreign affairs, and the reason must
have been obvious. Not far along the coast was the ruin of
Berytos, destroyed only a few years before. To the south was
the turmoil of Judaea, where the rebels, having skilfully played
kings off one against the other in the past few years, had
expanded their control from the Judaean hills to the coast on
the west, and beyond the Jordan on the east. Simon Mac-
cabaeus had been appointed satrap in the south by Tryphon,
86 7 Macc. 15: 10; Jos., Af, xili, 222-3.
87 + Mace. 15: 34.
88 H. Seyrig, ‘The Khan el-Abde Find and the Coinage of Tryphon’, VNVM 119
(1950), 6-7.
89 Jos., AF, xiii. 224; Strabo, xiv. v. 2.
%° Seyrig, ‘Aradus’, 216 and 220.
9! BMC Phoenicia, Tyre, 233; Babelon, 976.
® Seyrig, ‘Les Rois seléucides et la concession d’asylie’, Syria, 12 (1933), 35-9; W.
Wirgin, ‘On the Right of Asylum in Hellenistic Syria’, Numismatic Chronicle (1982),
137-48. % Justin, xxxix. I—a governor implies a garrison.
and then by Demetrios,” and had used his position to expand
northwards into Galilee where there were several clashes
between his troops and Seleukid soldiers in the 140s.%° His forces
were, in Galilee, dangerously close to Tyre, the southern city
of Phoenicia.
The advent of Antiochos VII, therefore, unburdened by the
accummulated resentments directed at Demetrios II, not only
removed Tryphon but provided a focus of loyalty to all those
who felt threatened by such events. Antiochos spent some years
reducing the power of the Maccabees, so that Simon’s son
and successor, Hyrkanos, was constrained to accept Seleukid
overlordship once more.” Tyre coined for Antiochos all through
his reign®’ and Ake only in 135/4 and Sidon only once**—no
doubt the end of the Jewish war removed the need for more
than one mint. By the late 130s, therefore, the Seleukid peace,
under a strong king, had been restored.
It turned out, of course, that this restoration of peace was
only temporary, that it was more in the nature of a pause
between bouts of civil war, but this is only clear in retrospect.
The future could equally well have been one of another half-
century of peace. The civil wars had been a difficult time for
all, and Phoenicia had suffered with the rest, but the effects
had been much less than in the Macedonian civil wars following
Alexander’s death, except in occasional unfortunate places. The
successive periods of profound peace under first the Ptolemies
and then the Seleukids, scarcely interrupted by the campaigns
of Antiochos IIT, had enabled the Phoenician cities to expand
and grow rich. The expansion had been economic, demographic,
and agricultural, and the civil wars between 153 and 138 had
not been prolonged or destructive enough to affect that growth
at all seriously.
The exception, of course, was Berytos, destroyed. It was very
much the exception in the whole eastern Mediterranean world,
for no other city suffered such a fate at Greek hands. (It is
perhaps only a coincidence that the destruction of Berytos
happened within a year or so of the Roman destructions of
94
1 Mace. 11: 59. °° e.g. ibid. 63-74. %° Jos., AJ, xiii. 242-4.
*” Tyre: Morkholm, ‘Monetary System’, 85; E. T. Newell, ‘The Seleucid Coinage
of Tyre: A Supplement’, VM 73 (1936); Sidon: BMC Seleukid Kings, nos. 1-2.
°° Morkholm, ‘Monetary System’, 85.
Corinth and Carthage. Or was Tryphon showing that a Greek
could be as ruthless as a Roman, just as Antiochos IV had
mounted a triumph to outshine that of Aemilius Paullus?) But
perhaps Berytos was not thought of as a Greek city; certainly
it had coined as Laodikeia of Canaan,” which would scarcely
be a Greek way of describing Phoenicia.
The rest of Phoenicia had survived more or less unscathed.
Armies had traversed the land, and garrisons occupied the
cities, but these were by no means uncommon occurrences;
garrisons, in fact, were an inescapable fact of life in every city.
More disturbing was the political eruption going on in Judaea.
The Semitic populations of the Phoenician cities will have had
some sympathy with the Jews in their fight for their own cultural
and religious customs. The Jewish religion had strong echoes
in other Semitic religious practices, and the reaction against
Hellenization which the rebellion became certainly also existed
in Phoenicia, if on a much less intense scale. In fact, of course,
the Jewish revolt was essentially a rural phenomenon for a long
time, and in rural Phoenicia there was as powerful a resistance
to Hellenization as in Judaea. It was not necessary for the rural
Phoenicians to transform their resistance into a violent one
because no pressure was exerted on them to change, and because
the intensified religious tradition which was Judaism did not
exist.
The rural resistance to Hellenization is shown in the con-
tinued vitality and prosperity of the Phoenician country-
shrines. The minor temple at Umm el-Amed, for example,
continued to bury its dead near the temple, and to com-
memorate them in the Phoenician language; it continued to
build and recorded a major extension in the 130s in a Phoe-
nician inscription.'°° Inland in the Bekaa valley the rural
Ituraeans, speaking an Arabic dialect, continued to expand
along the valley, and were soon to move through the mountains
to cast greedy eyes on the rich cities of the coast.'°' Other
Semitic speakers were expanding their agricultural control over
the hinterland of Arados, around Mariamme and Masyaf and
as far as the Orontes.
All this development took place because the Seleukid dynasty
99 Rouvier, no. 457. 100 Dunand and Duru, Oumm el-Amed.
101 See Chs. 5 and 6.
enforced peace on groups who would have quarrelled and
fought each other had they had the chance. As soon as the
Seleukid grip was relaxed—as in the 140s, with the feckless
Alexander Balas on the throne—so trouble began: Arados con-
spired to seize Marathos, the Jews raided into the plains again,
the Phoenician cities had already boasted of their rivalry on
their coins. This was the reverse side of the Seleukid prosperity.
It attracted external predators, and at the same time gave
leisure to those within the kingdom who still harboured old
ideas and grudges. Thus Tryphon’s career included arousing
the predatory habits of the Arab nomads in the Syrian desert,
encouraging the cupidity of Jewish rebels in Judaea, inspiring
the growth of pirates along the Kilikian coastline, and destroy-
ing Berytos. In the process he inspired Tyre to proclaim itself
holy and inviolable as a means of defence, and provided the
opportunity for Arados to seize the chance of enlarging its area
of autonomy.
»
AUTONOMY AND INDEPENDENCE
129-64 BC
In 130 Bc Antiochos VII, having reduced his inheritance to

order in Syria and Palestine, set off eastwards to recover that
which had been lost. He was defeated and killed in the campaign
which followed, and most of his army with him.' The Parthian
king had released Antiochos’ brother Demetrios II during the
war, hoping to provoke trouble in Antiochos’ rear.*? Demetrios
reassumed the kingship, but soon had to face rebellion and
usurpation fomented from Egypt. Civil war became endemic
in the remaining Seleukid lands for nearly ten years from 129
BC.
The defeat of Antiochos had been the signal for a number of
minor political entities in the Seleukid kingdom to strike out
for independence. One of these was Arados. For that city the
necessary condition for independence was an assured food
supply, which meant Aradian control over its peraza. Attempts
to establish such control had failed often enough in the past,
partly due to royal hostility and partly to the enmity of Mara-
thos, the main settlement on the mainland, which had no wish
to be taken over. Royal hostility there might still be, but the
king or kings were too busy to bother much with the relatively
unimportant Arados. Marathian hostility was the more
immediate problem.
Arados came up with the most drastic solution possible:
the destruction of the offending settlements, in particular of
Marathos and Simyra. This action, and the nature of the action
itself, suggests that there were other problems for Arados than
the traditional one of independence and the peraza. For the
~ action the city took was to seize the lands of Marathos and
Simyra and to distribute those lands among Arados’ own
' Diod., xxx1v/xxxv. 15-19; Justin xxxviii. 10; Jos., AJ, xiii. 250-3; App., Syr., 68.
2 App., Syr., 68; Jos., AF, xiii. 253.
Autonomy and Independence, 129-64 BC 131
citizens.’ The redistribution of land was the characteristic
demand ofthe poor in Hellenistic revolutions, along with cancel-
lation ofdebts and sometimes liberation ofslaves. Thereisno evid-
ence of these latter two items in Arados’ case, but there is an
indication that the city had been facing a major social problem
for some years. The story of Arados’ attempt on Marathos nearly
twenty years before, in the time of Alexander Balas, is told by
Diodoros in a way which shows that Arados’ social situation
was in a very excited state.* The men of the ‘mob’ were prepared
to violate the sacred persons of Marathian envoys in order to
achieve its ends, and though shamed into giving up their assault
the first time, they renewed the attack later, and quite delib-
erately killed all ten of the envoys. Diodoros has them acting
‘In a frenzy’, ‘rushing about’, acting ‘in a fury’. The language
is just the sort used by the established rulers to describe the
actions of the landless poor.
The situation in Arados city, therefore, by about 145, appears
to have been dangerously explosive. The leaders of the com-
munity, who were presumably the wealthy merchants, were
already pointing to Marathos as the source of all their woes,
and had convinced the poor that the elimination of the main-
land city was the key to their future well-being. In this way the
wealthy oligarchy was presumably able to keep the lid on the
Aradian pot until the opportunity arrived to put their aims into
effect. That is to say, the Aradian acquisition of the peraia was
a revolutionary act, one directed by the Aradian government,
to be sure, but revolutionary none the less. The fate of the
people of Marathos and Simyra is unrecorded, but one would
guess that they were enslaved and sold away.
This new Aradian peraia, however, was not the same area of
land which the city had claimed in the past. In the first place,
the lands distributed to the Aradians are specifically stated to be
those of Marathos and Simyra, which are the two southernmost
communities ofthe peraia. Yet, three other communities, Karne,
Balanaia, and Paltos, are said also to be part of Arados’ little
empire.’ The first, Karne, was Arados’ mainland naval base,
at a small harbour a little north of Marathos, and as such it
will have become part of Arados’ city-territory. The other two
are further north still, and are separated from the distributed
3 Strabo, xvi. ii. 12. * Diod., xxx. v. 1-6. 5 Strabo, Xvi. ii. 12.
132 Autonomy and Independence, 129-64 BC
lands by an extension of the Bargylos hills which reached to the
cliff-bound coast. North again, beyond these towns, the next
harbour-town of Gabala had been Aradian in Alexander’s
time,° and in the changes and crises of the late third century.
In the 80s Bc it can be seen to be a separate autonomous
community,’ and thus it was not taken over by Arados in 129.
Inland, however, the temple at Baitokaike appears to have
resumed its close association with Arados,® if, indeed, that
association was ever broken. The temple, high on the southern
slopes of the Bargylos and overlooking the major routeway
through the Eleutheros gap, was the furthest inland point of
Arados’ new little empire. Whether the newly seized lands
included the fertile basin of Boqaia, due south of Baitokaike, and
the source of the Eleutheros is not known. Certainly Mariamme,
Aradian in Alexander’s time, was no longer attainable, but the
Boqaia would be a very worthwhile acquisition.
The Aradians, therefore, set themselves clear and attainable
targets. The core of the new territory consisted in the lands
which were now distributed among the restless revolutionary
people of Arados itself, including the lands of the destroyed
Simyra and Marathos; geographically these would be the plain
from the Eleutheros northwards to the hills separating Karne
from Balanaia and Paltos, and inland to the foothills below
Baitokaike. To the north there were small communities, Paltos
and Balanaia, whose lands were not seized, but which became
part of the Aradian state. Inland the temple of Baitokaike was
apparently also a buffer zone. To the south the boundary, as
before, lay along the Eleutheros. For the Aradians, one of the
beauties of the whole scheme lay in the fact that any expenses
they incurred could be offset by the sale of their enslaved
enemies. Revolution paying for itself.
The reason for this Aradian revolution is partly the weakness
of the royal government in the particular crisis of 129-8 Bc,
and partly the peculiarly difficult situation which had built up
° Arr., Anab., 11. xiii. 8.
” H. Seyrig, ‘Questions aradiennes: Gabala’, Rev. Num., 4 (1964), 16-21
® IGLS, vii. 4028; this is one of the intractable problems of Hellenistic Syria; see
Seyrig, ‘Aradus et Baetocaece’, Syria, 28 (1951), 191-206; Rey-Coquais, Arados,
passim;
K. Rigsby, ‘Seleucid Notes: IV. Baetocaece’, TAPA 110 (1980), 248-54; A. Baroni, ‘I
terreni ei privilegi del Tempio di Zeus a Baitokaike’, in B. Virgilio (ed.), Studi Ellentistici
(Louvain, 1984), 135-67.
in Arados over the previous generation. Arados was a small
island, which had prospered as a maritime trading state, so that
its population had grown. It was heavily built up, with houses
of several storeys,’ and the denser the population the more
vulnerable the city became to external pressure. So long as
peace was maintained on the mainland the city could be assured
of its food supply, since the kings would ensure that trade
continued, if only for the sake of their tax revenues. Disturb-
ances, however, meant instant danger for the city and for its
rulers.
In addition a new problem had arisen since the 140s. One of
Tryphon’s political moves had been to encourage the develop-
ment of pirate bases, though the problem was not new'°—
perhaps, failed to prevent them growing might be better—
and these were largely concentrated along the coast of Rough
Kilikia, more or less the borderlands between the Seleukid
section of Kilikia, the plain, and whoever exercised power
beyond. Arados was staunchly anti-pirate, using its fleet to
combat the menace, and the reason is clearly self-interest.
Unrestrained piracy was a menace both to Arados’ trade by
sea and to its supplies of raw materials and food. To some
degree the failure of supplies from the mainland could have
been made good by importing food from Kilikia or Cyprus, but
in 129-128 both areas, land and sea, had become disturbed:
there was no safe supply anywhere. This was the moment which
the Aradians must have dreaded, and their response was their
revolution. It was clearly well prepared, limited in size and
scope and aims, and based entirely on the self-interest of Arados
itself. Thus as soon as its aims were achieved, the city became
conservative. There was no question of this particular revolu-
tion being exported. By the time the mainland had settled
down to peace again Arados’ revolution was years in the past,
and it would be easy for the king to accept the situation—
helped no doubt by handsome gifts—rather than taking the
risk of promoting more disturbance by attempting to reassert
his authority. In other words, the Aradian revolution had
achieved the aims for which the city had worked for over two
centuries: independence and empire. The failure of the kings to
° Strabo, xvi. ii. 13.
10 Tbid. xvi. v. 2; H. A. Ormerod, Piracy in the Ancient World (Liverpool, 1924), ch. 6.
exert themselves to establish their authority over Arados after
128 in effect granted that city its independence, and with it the
control, direct and uncontested, over the peraza.
This was clearly a situation which was unique. There was no
other city in Phoenicia (or perhaps anywhere in the Medi-
terranean world) whose conditions and priorities in any way
resembled those of Arados. The response of that city to its
peculiar difficulties could be expressed in terms of the normal
tensions experienced in other cities, no doubt, but the com-
bination of revolution, restraint, ambition, acceptance, and sub-
sequent conservatism was unique. At the same time, the net
result of Arados’ action could not but have an effect on the
other cities in its area. Other Phoenician cities undoubtedly
took note of Arados’ actions, and undoubtedly considered
whether they should follow suit. But none of them had Arados’
particular problems of construction on an island site and depri-
vation of mainland territory. Other Phoenician cities, that is,
already had control over their contiguous territories, and thus
had no immediate fears for their supplies. At the same time
Phoenicians generally had suffered from the royal conflicts, and
the outbreak of a new civil war was bound to have effects on
them. Thus Arados’ actions in developing an independent state
on the flanks of the unruly Seleukid kingdom will have been
one model to which Phoenician cities might aspire if the going
became too rough.
The northern section of Arados’ old peraia, centred around
the town of Gabala, was now left adrift. This was clearly a
deliberate and ruthless decision on the part of the Aradians, for
what reason we can only conjecture. Perhaps the southern
part was sufficient for Arados’ requirements. Perhaps Gabala
objected so strongly to incorporation that Arados did not insist.
Perhaps, going beyond Gabala, Laodikeia-ad-Mare entered
objections to Arados’ conduct, and insisted on Gabala remain-
ing as a buffer between the two. Conjectures; there is no
evidence. In fact, there is nothing known about Gabala for
forty years, until 86 Bc, when the city—as it must now be
called—began issuing its own coins.'! These issues continued at
irregular intervals for thirty years or more, presumably to meet
local needs. The issues begin just at the time when the Seleukid
"' Seyrig, ‘Gabala’, 9.
kings finally fade into insignificance, their treasure wasted and
their political credit exhausted. Gabala had never been a city
big enough to promote its own independence, and was always
overshadowed by its bigger neighbours in Arados and Laodi-
keia. It would seem, therefore, that the city acquired inde-
pendence by default, simply because there was no one about
who could rule it. If such is the case, that independence could
have come at any time between Arados’ revolution and the first
issue of Gabalan coins, between 129 and 86. The issue of coins
can only be seen as an affirmation of that independence, not
the initial claiming ofit.
The greater Phoenician cities, however, were made ofsterner
stuff, and it was only two years before Arados’ example was
followed by the other Phoenician city which was geographically
in the best situation to make a strike for autonomy: Tyre. And
again the acquisition of autonomy is clearly bound up with
events on a wider stage. Demetrios II’s return in 129 provoked
a widespread Syrian rebellion,'? and Ptolemy VII Euergetes II
sent in a pretender to head the movement. This was another
Alexander, nicknamed Zabinas, who claimed to be a son of
Antiochos VII.'% He had sufficient support to win over most of
the cities and to defeat Demetrios in battle in 126 near Damas-
cus. Demetrios was shut out of Ptolemais-Ake, to which he had
fled since his wife was there, and sailed up the coast to Tyre.
There he was murdered.'*
Who carried out the murder is unclear, for the blame was
given variously in the ancient world, as one would expect. One
account, in Justin, says the governor of the city was responsible,
and that the deed took place as Demetrios was landing. He was
supposed to be heading for sanctuary in Tyre. Others blamed
Kleopatra Thea, Demetrios’ wife, who had already shut him
out of Ptolemais, and another version simply blames his
enemies, but adds that he was tortured before being killed. All
in all, it seems that Justin’s version, apart from being the most
circumstantial, is the most likely. Kleopatra’s hatred is obvious,
but if she wanted him dead, why not do the job at Ptolemais?
She was capable of murder, and did indeed murder her own
son Seleukos V later in the year. To blame Demetrios’ enemies for
2 Jiastinyxxxix, es '3 Jos., AJ, xiii. 267-8; Justin, xxxix. 1.
14 App., Spr., 68; Justin, xxxix. 1; Jos., A7, xiii. 268.
his death is only to state the obvious, and still admit that the
precise identity of those enemies was unknown. Torture is simply
an added refinement to the story and need not be believed.
So it is best to accept that the governor of Tyre organized
the killing. If it took place as Demetrios was landing, then
presumably the governor was already prepared and had given
his orders. This was—also presumably—intended to prevent
Demetrios from reaching sanctuary. There is no need to believe
that Kleopatra Thea had any hand in this, and, in fact, if
Demetrios sailed directly from Ptolemais to Tyre, it is unlikely
that she could have had time to inform the governor in advance.
So it would seem to have been the governor’s own decision.
Another enemy who wanted Demetrios dead was, of course,
Alexander Zabinas, but it is clear that Demetrios had outrun
any pursuit Alexander had organized after his victory in the
neighbourhood of Damascus, and it seems unlikely that Alex-
ander could have given orders to the governor.
The governor, however, might have been acting on con-
tingency orders. The question arises, therefore: whose governor
was he? The mint at Tyre produced coins in the name of
Demetrios II in every year from 130/29 to 126/5.!° Thus, it is
reasonable to assume that the governor who killed Demetrios
was aman Demetrios himself had either appointed or confirmed
in office. This is itself confirmed by Demetrios’ own act, for he
would scarcely have landed at a place where he knew or sus-
pected the governor to be hostile. The governor, therefore, both
betrayed and murdered his own king.
The next coins produced by the Tyrian mint are coins of the
city itself, and no king coined in the city’s mint again.!® Two
points therefore follow. First, there is a clear connection between
the killing of king Demetrios and the acquisition of autonomy by
the city; second, the city was successful in making its autonomy
accepted by the kings. Further, that autonomy was apparently
accepted not only by the Seleukid kings, who were the most
likely to object, but also by a series of local powers—the Jewish
kingdom to the south, and the Ituraean princes inland.
'° Complete annual sets recorded in E. T. Newell, ‘Seleukid Coinage
of Tyre: A
Supplement’, VWVM 73 (1938), and G. MacDonald, Catalogue
of the Greek Coins in the
Hunterian Collection, iii (Glasgow, 1905)—that is, coins dated
183, 184, 185, 186, and
187 of the Seleukid era, which is 130/29, 129/8, 128/7, 127/6
and 126/5 Bc.
'° BMC Phoenicia, Tyre, no. 44.
The connection between the death of Demetrios and the
city’s autonomy is quite unfathomable. Possibilities suggest
themselves. Gratitude on the part of Demetrios’ many enemies
is one, though kings and queens who are murderers, rebels, and
usurpers are not the beings most likely to allow feelings of
gratitude to affect their conduct. Revulsion by the citizens at
the governor’s actions is also possible, but if he had the power
to enforce such an order, he presumably also had the power to
face down the indignation of the unarmed citizenry. Revulsion
is perhaps a likelier feeling, however, if the citizens took seriously
the label of ‘holy’ which the city had held for some years, and
if Demetrios was known to have been heading for sanctuary in
a temple. Perhaps the revulsion at the governor’s treachery
was harnessed by local political leaders who wished to follow
Arados’ example and seize power in their city in defiance of the
kings.
Whatever the precise local reasons—and there could be any
number of others—the fact is that the seizure of independence
was successful. There is no sign of it being granted by any of
the kings, and so it is best to assume that the deed was done
without reference to any kings. It was certainly a good time for
such actions, as Arados had already shown. The civil warfare
went on for another five years, during which both Alexander
Zabinas and Kleopatra Thea died, and at the end of which
Antiochos VIII Grypos, a son of Demetrios and Kleopatra,
emerges as sole ruler.’’
Grypos might have been expected to take revenge on Tyre
for his father’s death, and to squeeze the autonomy of both .
Tyre and Arados in the interests of extending his own power.
He did neither. If the governor had been blamed for Demetrios’
death, and if the Tyrians had overthrown him subsequently,
then there is an explanation for the failure of Grypos to take
revenge—or, of course, he might simply have been the sort of
man not given to avenging slights. But the failure to recover
control over the two independent cities—cities whose inde-
pendence was self-proclaimed—is a more serious, less personal
matter. Perhaps Grypos simply was not powerful enough to
recover control over the Aradian peraza or the landward terri-
tories of Tyre. If he did not make the effort, then, it is perhaps
"” Bellinger, ‘End’, 63.
because he was either too lazy, or that he could not afford the
strength because of other problems. Laziness may well have
been a factor. What we know of him suggests a hedonist, but
he never gave up the struggle in the long war with his cousin
and half-brother, Antiochos IX Kyzikenos, so laziness can
perhaps be discounted. Preoccupation with other problems may
be a more likely explanation. It seems likely that the threat
from Kyzikenos was ever-present, though it did not materialize
until 114 or 113. Then there were the threats from the Jewish
state in Palestine or the Parthian kingdom now established in
Mesopotamia. For Grypos to have tied down his army into a
difficult war against Arados (and how do you besiege an island?)
or Tyre (notoriously strong on its peninsula) would be to
provide any or all of these active enemies with the chance of
some rapid conquests. So Arados and Tyre kept their inde-
pendence by default. By failing to challenge their claims, Grypos
was effectively recognizing their independence.
The northern and southern Phoenician cities had thus led
the way, almost simultaneously, in achieving freedom ofaction.
The rest did not follow. The third of the three great cities,
Sidon, for which only numismatic evidence exists, produced
coins for Demetrios II until 127/6,'* that is, not in the last year
of his reign, but this does not necessarily mean a change of
allegiance, since the city’s mint did not produce any more coins
until 122/1.'? Undated coins of Demetrios were also issued at
Berytos,”° which later produced coins of Alexander Zabinas, as
also did Tripolis.”' Such as it is, this suggests that these Phoe-
nician cities remained with Demetrios until he died, but then
acquiesced in the rule of Zabinas. There seems to have been no
question of warfare, at least until the arrival of Demetrios at
Tyre. Possibly this was due to Arados’ independence, which
partially blocked access to the coast road from the north and
from inland. It is noticeable, in this regard, that the decisive
battle between Alexander and Demetrios was fought in the
territory of Damascus, and that the coins from that city show
that Demetrios held the city at the beginning of 1 27/6, but that
'8 Rouvier, no, 1271.
’ E. Babelon, Les Rois de Syrie, d’Arménie et de Commagene (Paris, 1890), no. 1352.
20 MacDonald, 236, nos. 1 and 2.
*! Berytos: MacDonald, 96, no. 54; Tripolis: Babelon, no. 1353.
Alexander took it from him in that year.”? So Alexander was
invading Demetrios’ territory by the Damascus route, either
through the Bekaa and along the valley of the Barada river, or
along Parmenio’s old route east of Antilebanon. The second
seems the more likely, for the southern end of the Bekaa was
blocked by the Ituraeans, and the Barada gorge is not a sensible
invasion route, for it can be blocked too easily.
Coins in the joint names of Kleopatra Thea and Antiochos
Grypos were produced in Sidon in 122/1,7 and in Grypos’
name alone continuously until 114/13,°* but neither Berytos nor
Tripolis seem to have produced any coins during Grypos’ sole
reign between 121 and 114. Sidon produced coins of Grypos’
cousin, rival, and enemy Kyzikenos in 113/12 and the year
following, and a further series in the Seleukid year beginning
in 111.” But during that year Sidon gained autonomy.”° Since
Kyzikenos was in control of the city for two full years or more
before the achievement of autonomy, it was presumably either
from him or despite him that this autonomy was acquired.
The evidence is, of course, numismatic, and hence liable to
change due to new discoveries or re-attributions. What the
coins show is in fact the name of the king whose employees
minted them, and it is an inference from that fact that the king
thus controlled the whole city. This may not actually have been
the case, or it may be that the coins were produced for the
king by an autonomous city. Sidon illustrates the problem, for
alongside all the changes in royal coinage from 121/o0 onwards,
the mint there also produced coins for the city, with no reference
to the king or kings. These coins carry the legend ‘holy and
asylos and nauarchides’, thus claiming the protection of the gods,
of other cities, and of a fleet.?’” This can only mean that the city
was reasonably well-armed and prepared to defend itself. By
emphasizing the existence of its fleet, the city was clearly
addressing itself to the pirates whose activities were becoming
the more serious and threatening as the Hellenistic kingdoms,
» Bellinger, ‘End’, 63.
3 Rouvier, nos. 1272 and 1273 (coins of both 191 and 192 sE—122/1 and 121/o0 Bc);
Houghton, nos. 721 and 722.
*4 Rouvier, nos. 1274~9 (coins of years 193, 195, 196, 198); Gardner, BMC Seleucid
Kings, coins of 197; Houghton, nos. 723, 724.
25 Houghton no. 725; Rouvier, no. 1280. ° Head, HN, 797-8.
27 Rouvier, no..1293, dated 191 sE (=121/0 BC).
and especially the Seleukid, progressively failed. This was
undoubtedly a common Phoenician reaction, for Strabo com-
ments approvingly that Arados, despite temptation, never fell
into the trap of becoming a pirate city.”* The Phoenician cities
had more to lose than most by the unrestrained activities of the
pirates, and the inability of the Seleukid rulers to protect those
cities from piratic depredations will have been one factor in the
developing movement for independence.
The coin of Sidon claiming protection is clearly dated to 191
SE, that is, 121/o0 BG, and those ‘autonomous’ coins which follow
are also dated by the Seleukid era, while the city’s mint con-
tinued to produce royal coinage for the next ten years. The
royal coins were produced every year (except 118/17, but that
may be only due to the absence of a coin of that year in
the major collections), and autonomous city-coins were also
produced at intervals, in 121/0, 119/18, 116/15 and 114/13.
This parallel coinage, with the royal portrait on one set and
the city coins claiming protection from everyone except the king,
suggests a divided mind in the city, and vividly illustrates
the declining powers of the monarchy under Antiochos VIII
Grypos.
Despite this it is customary to date Sidon’s autonomy from
111/10, when coins appear dating from a new era. Three years
earlier, in 114/13, the new challenger for the Seleukid kingdom,
Antiochos IX Kyzikenos, arrived in Syria and swept all before
him in his first campaign. Grypos lost control of every royal
mint during the next year, including Sidon, where Grypos’ last
coins are dated 114/13 and Kyzikenos’ first are dated 113/12.
Kyzikenos’ support faded almost at once and Grypos slowly
and erratically recovered.” It is in this context that Sidon
received its official grant of autonomy, for that is surely what
is commemorated by the new era. Kyzikenos held control of
the mint, and so presumably of the city as well, until 111/10,
and so he was the grantor. Since he was losing control, perhaps
the grant was made partly to spite his rival. Grypos’ advancing
recovery could be slowed if he came up against newly auto-
nomous cities. Grypos himself did the same thing, giving
autonomy to Seleukeia-in-Pieria in 109.°°
28 Strabo, xvi. ii. 14. *° Bellinger, ‘End’, 66-8.
*® OGIS, 257 (= Austin, 173).
These grants have to be regarded with a degree of scepticism.
It is clear that autonomy in a legal sense meant nothing to a
king whose army was powerful enough to enter and control a
city. Seleukeia, for example, was never free of royal rule, even
though it was formally autonomous. Grypos kept his grip firmly
on it, as did later kings. So these autonomy grants were only as
effective as the city could make them. Arados never seems to
have been troubled by any force on the mainland, and gained
a reputation for being hostile to pirates. The obvious conclusion
is that the city was well armed and fully capable of defending
itself and its territory. It had a naval base at Enydra, north of
Marathos, which was declining, and south of Antarados, which
was growing, and so therefore well-placed for defence. But it
must also have had a land force of a respectable size. Arados
city itself was invulnerable on its island, at least until some
other power produced an overwhelming naval force, but its
peraia could easily be overrun. And if it was, as past experience
showed, this was extremely dangerous for Arados, which tended
to succumb almost at once. By the time of the civil war between
Grypos and Kyzikenos, mainland armies were much smaller
than those of, say, Antiochos III or IV, and were generally
preoccupied by the immediate dynastic enemy, but the city
would need to be on the lookout for dangers and would need
to have a reasonable force always available to discourage
attacks. It was visited by one of the Seleukid pretenders, Anti-
ochos X, but it seems evident that he got no encouragement
and swiftly moved on.*!
Tyre was another of these cities which stayed clear of all
political entanglements with great success. From its eman-
cipation from royal control in 126, the city was, to all appear-
ances, ignored by all the rival royal warriors. And yet it was
surrounded by vigorous, warlike, expansionist powers. Pto-
lemais-Ake was in the hands of either Grypos or Kyzikenos
between 114/13 and 111/10, and then in Kyzikenos’ control,?2
and neither of these was slow to expand his control. To the
south and inland was the expansionist Jewish state, ruled from
134 to 108 by the warrior John Hyrkanos, who used the Seleukid
débacle to conquer Idumaea to the south and the land of the
31 Jos., AJ, xiii. 367; Bellinger, ‘End’, 73-4.
% Bellinger, ‘End’, 67-9 and 87.
Samaritans to the north, including the powerful city of Samaria,
which was besieged for a long time and destroyed when
captured.*’ Inland, to the east of Tyre, was the land of the
Ituraeans, again a vigorous people whose expansion from their
original base in the southern Bekaa was in all directions except
towards Tyre and Sidon. This is surely strange. The Ituraeans
clashed with the Jews,** menaced Damascus,” and spilled over
the Lebanon range to reach the sea at Byblos*°—but apparently
made no attempts on the richer cities of the Phoenician coast
closest to them. Further, one of the few indications we have of
the extent of ‘Tyre’s territory is a comment in Josephus that the
village of ‘Kedasa’ was Tyrian*’ (see map 4). This is Kedesh
Naphthali, to the north of Galilee.** It is almost forty kilometres
in a straight line from Tyre, close to the Huleh valley which
was one ofthe prizes in warfare in the area, and south of Panion,
which became Paneas, a city disputed between Jews and Iturae-
ans. In other words it is necessary to find a reason why these
predatory states did not expand into Tyre’s territory. Admit-
tedly the source for our knowledge of Tyre’s possession of
Kedasa is late—the massacres of Jews in AD 66—but the gospel
stories also imply large territories for both Tyre and Sidon.*? It
is possible that the cities were given extensions of their territories
by one of the Roman rulers who had taken against either the
Jews or the Ituraeans. This does seem to be a reasonable
explanation for the great extensions of Sidonian and Damascene
territories which are noted later.*° But Kedasa is more awkward
to account for. In the first place, if Tyre were to expand its
control inland, it would naturally reach to about Kedasa, which
is on the more gentle slopes of the southern part of the Mount.
It is, therefore, not necessarily a place to which either Jews or
Ituraeans would extend their rule, for both were based at a
considerable distance away from Kedasa, and both were
blocked from expansion to Kedasa by the trench of the Huleh
lake and the swamps of the upper Jordan. It is thus quite as
reasonable to find Tyre in occupation of Kedasa in the Hel-
lenistic period as it was in the early Roman period.
33 Jos., AJ, xiii. 275-81. ** Ibid. 318-19.
35 Tbids.418. %° Strabo, xvi. ii. 18. 2 Jos, Bose ano;
*® Thid. 459; Jos., AJ, xiii. 154; M. Avi-Yonah, The Holy Land from the Persian to the
Arab Conquests (Grand Rapids, Mich., 1966), 130.
39 Mark 7: 24 and 31. *° Strabo, xv1. ii. 14.
Yet the village was clearly vulnerable if either Jews or Iturae-
ans chose to attack, and so Tyre’s possession, if it be accepted,
leads on to the conclusion that its large territory was not an
object of attack by either the Jewish state or the Ituraeans.
The reason must be either that Tyre was too powerful to be
challenged, or that neither power saw any reason to attack it.
Other Phoenician cities were well armed, so far as we can See,
Sidon and Arados with fleets,*! Arados by implication with
land forces, as already argued. Tyre would surely not neglect
such an obvious precaution, especially in a country riven by
war and civil war, and so both a Tyrian naval force and a
Tyrian army can be presumed. But the same problem exists
here as came into view over Arados: Tyre might well be rich
and populous, but it could not possibly support a large enough
force to challenge any of the greater territorial states. To
attempt to do so would produce early bankruptcy. So we have
to assume that Tyre’s forces were relatively small and were
effective mainly as a defensive or raiding force—and that they
were widely recognized as such, and so posed no threat to the
city’s neighbours. This means that widespread Tyrian conquests
are out of the question; and yet Tyre controlled a village 40
km. inland.
The other possibility is that none of Tyre’s potential enemies
was actually her enemy: that, in fact, Tyre was on friendly
terms from an early date with both the Ituraeans and the Jews.
For the Ituraeans the evidence is simply the lack of any hostility,
although it is odd otherwise that the Ituraeans expanded in
every direction but that towards Tyre and Sidon. For the Jewish
state, however, there are two items of evidence which tend to
give support to the idea.
The long reign of John Hyrkanos had culminated in a major
Jewish expansion northwards in 109-8. This was a difficult
campaign, revolving around the year-long siege of the Greek
city of Samaria. As a result of the conquest of that city, the city
of Skythopolis also fell to Hyrkanos and southern Galilee was
united with the Jewish state. This in turn brought the Jewish
boundary into contact with the Ituraeans.*? After Hyrkanos’
death his son Aristoboulos fought these Ituraeans and is said to
*' Sidon: Rouvier, no, 1293; Arados: Strabo, xvi. ii. 14.
2 Jos., AF, xiii. 275-81.
have required his new subjects to convert to Judaism. All this
appears to mean that some Ituraeans had spread south into
Galilee and were now incorporated into Aristoboulos’ lands.”
Other Ituraeans remained outside the Jewish state and became
consolidated into the Ituraean principality to the north, based
in the southern Bekaa. Perhaps this consolidation took place in
the face of the threat by the Jewish conquest of Galilee.
Aristoboulos’ conquest also brought his power so far north
as to face both Ptolemais-Ake and Tyre on the coast. The next
Jewish ruler, Alexander Iannaios, shifted the axis of attack from
the hills to the coast, and began his reign with a siege of
Ptolemais-Ake.** For the inhabitants the prospect was very
frightening. Hyrkanos had totally destroyed Samaria. Hyr-
kanos and Aristoboulos had presented their beaten enemies
with the choice of conversion, or expulsion, or death. The Pto-
lemaitans cast about for assistance. Zoilos, the tyrant of Dor
and Strato’s Tower to the south, came to their aid, but he could
only provide a small force. The rulers of Egypt and Cyprus,
Kleopatra III and her son Ptolemy Lathyros—who were
mutual enemies—were appealed to, and the city’s envoys who
went to Lathyros in Cyprus listed the allies they had or hoped
to have: Gaza, Zoilos, the Sidonians, and many others.*? From
the point of view of this study the most glaring omission is Tyre.
Zoilos and Gaza were already scared of the Jewish power, and,
with the example of Samaria before them, with good reason.
They thus huddled together with Ptolemais in self-defence.
Tyre was the next city north, Ptolemais’ immediate neighbour.
One would have thought it was just as threatened, and just as
vulnerable. Why, therefore, was it not on Ptolemais’ side, when
every other coastal city from Sidon to Gaza was?
Actually there was one other city apart from Tyre which was
not on the envoys’ list. This was Askelon, which appears to
have made a sensible accommodation with the Jews and was
thus unmenaced.*® Here, in other words, is an alternative to
the unremitting hostility displayed by Samaria and Ptolemais
and Gaza, and it seems likely that this is the explanation for
Tyre’s absence from the list: it was, that is, friendly with the
8 Jos., AJ, xiii. 318-19. “ Thid. 324. © Tbid. 325-9.
*° A. Spaer, ‘Ascalon, from Royal Mint to Autonomy’, Festschrift
fiirLeo Mildenburg
(Wetteren, 1984), 229-40.
Jewish state. In support of this notion it can be pointed out that
the money which was used in the temple at Jerusalem was
Tyrian;*’ there is also a single coin of John Hyrkanos which has
been counter-marked by the Tyrian mint to guarantee it as
legal currency in the city.*®
These items individually are perhaps not very powerful, but
put them all together and the totality is impressive. The totality
is a situation in which the independent city of Tyre establishes
friendly relations with the rising power of the interior, the
Jewish state of John Hyrkanos, a relationship which can be
construed as a political alliance. Each partner had gains to be
made from the relationship. The city gained protection from
attack, a market area where its goods were accepted—an
increasing market area, a consideration which was surely
important to the commercial city of Tyre—and a guarantee of
its mainland possessions, which were its source of food supplies
and of trading goods. Hyrkanos gained a friendly port, secure
communications with the outside world, and a guard on his
northern flank. That they were not in physical contact until
104 perhaps assisted in the establishment of this friendship, but
that friendship certainly survived the establishment of mutual
boundaries. The friendship may have begun in the early
moments of the Jewish rebellion, for it was at Tyre that the
Hellenizers of Jerusalem had been received by Antiochos IV,
and were encouraged by him, but had received a less welcoming
reception at the hands of some of the Tyrians.*® There were few
enough friends of the rebellious Jews for any impression of
friendship to be cultivated.
There was another bond between the two: both were self-
consciously Semitic. This emerged in the Jewish state as a
virulent anti-Hellenism at times. It was the original ideological
basis for the Maccabaean revolt, and could be called up every
now and then as a justification for the destruction of a Greek
city, for example, or for a military campaign into a Greek
area.’ Tyre was also in many ways a Semitic city. There had
long been signs of this in the coinage, where Phoenician script
47 Y. Meshorer, ‘One Hundred Ninety Years of Tyrian Shekels’, ibid. 171-9.
‘8 A. R. Bellinger, “The Coins’, Dura Final Report, VI (New Haven, Conn., 1949),
no. 1681a; cf. also Seyrig, ‘Monnaies contremarquees en Syrie’, Syria, 35 (1958), 187—
97, for a discussion ofthe significance of the practice.
49 2 Macc. 4: 49. °° i.e. Samaria (Jos., 47, xiii. 318-9.)
146 Autonomy and Independence, 129-64 BC.
was used by all the coining cities.°' Melqart was still the city’s
main god. Tyre had kept up relations with Carthage until
that city’s destruction in 146 Bc.°? Whereas Sidonians appear
repeatedly in the victors’ lists of the Greek festival games, there
are only two Tyrians, one in 180 at the Panathenaia,® the other
an undated example at Delphi.** This suggests (no more) a
great deal more enthusiasm at Sidon for the Hellenization
which resulted in gymnastic prowess than at Tyre. Again, these
are small details which have to be taken together to mean
much, and it is quite possible that the conclusion they lead to
is wrong. But these are the bits of evidence which we have to
use, and it seems to me that the conclusion is reasonable:
that Tyre was almost as self-consciously Semitic as the Jewish
Hasmonaean state.
It would not be surprising if this feeling were quite wide-
spread in the area. The progressive decline of the Seleukids had
opened the way for the Semitic inhabitants of Syria—Phoenicia—
Palestine to establish their own independence for the first time
since the Assyrian conquests in the eighth century sc. All
through the area different Semitic speaking groups appeared,
like the rocks exposed by a retreating tide. The Greek presence
retired to the cities of the plains and the coasts when the power
of the kings waned, and the Semites who had been submerged
for centuries re-emerged.” The process began in the Judaean
hills in the 160s Bc, but before 100 it was also operating in
the Lebanese hills with the emergence of the Ituraeans as an
organized political entity. Further north Emesa had become
the base for a dynasty of Arab rulers out of the desert whose
raiding disturbed the whole area between the Antilebanon and
Apamea. The ground had already been prepared for this by
the resettlement by Semitic-speaking peasants of the area west
of the Orontes. Further north an Arab sheikh had helped
Diodotos-Tryphon get started in his rebellion in 145 by helping
in the capture of the Greek city of Chalkis. Into all this the
assumption of independence by the Phoenician cities of Arados
and ‘Tyre fitted well enough. It seems reasonable to suppose
5! See e.g. BMC Phoenicia, Tyre, Sidon, Aradus. ° Pol., XXXI. xii. 12.
3 IG, u/2, 2315, ll. 27-8. * IG, vu, 417, ll. 39-40.
°° Grainger, Cities, ch. 7, for the argument on this as applied to north Syria and for
full references to the following details.
that the process to some extent fed on itself: that the success of
one group in establishing its independence encouraged others
to do the same. It would also be reasonable to suppose that
these groups were in communication with each other, and that
they should avoid conflict with each other if possible. How far
this was a dominating factor in political relationships is difficult
to estimate. It seems unlikely to have been more than a passive
element in calculations, and specifically pro-Semitic feelings (as
opposed to anti-Greek feelings) were perhaps no more than
background factors. That is, racism was not a major matter,
but xenophobia probably was.
The independence ofTyre being secured by its own strength,
by its friendships, and by the declining power ofits enemies, the
other Phoenician cities were to some extent protected from
attack from the south. Sidon’s independence came in 111-10
partly as a result of this, but the independence of the two
neighbouring cities immediately re-awoke the old rivalry
between them. This had been expressed on their coins earlier,
and a century later it was still notorious. The omission of Tyre
and the inclusion of Sidon in the list of the friends of Ptolemais-
Ake during the attack by Aristoboulos in 103 is another sign.
At the same time the inclusion of the Sidonians in that list shows
that the citizens of the city had a sufficient military power to
be worth cultivating. It produced, as did Tyre, a long series of
coins which proclaimed its autonomy.*° Only once, after its
new era began, did the city coin again for a king, and this was
Antiochos IX Kyzikenos, who was the apparent grantor of that
independence. These coins are dated by the independence era,
and there is only one issue known, of the year 5, that is, 107/6
Bc.’ The dating used, and the fact that the autonomy-series
continued, rather implies that the city was doing the king a
favour. This, though perhaps unlikely, is always a possibility.
There is, however, another possible explanation. Kyzikenos
tried to involve himself in the siege of Samaria by John
Hyrkanos, but was beaten and retreated, so Josephus says, to
Tripolis.°* How he got there is not made clear, though a brief
coinage of Kyzikenos at Damascus in the latter part of 109-8°°
suggests that his route lay east of the Antilebanon and then
°° BMC Phoenicia, Tyre, nos. 44 ff.; Sidon, nos. 99 ff. °7 Rouvier, no. 1299.
%8 Jos., AF, xiii. 278-9. °° Bellinger, ‘End’, 69-70 and n. 50.
back to the coast through the Eleutheros gap. His army had
been augmented by the loan of six thousand soldiers from
Ptolemy Lathyros,® so it will have been at least double that, and
perhaps a good deal larger, and that may be the explanation for
the coins of Sidon of that date—to pay his soldiers. This may
have been a special contract, but it is also possible—and perhaps
more likely—that the army was big enough to overawe Sidon
and gain admission to the city. Sidon, with its earth-bound
mainland site, was always more vulnerable than Arados on its
island or Tyre on its thin peninsula.
Kyzikenos coined at Tripolis finally in 105/4,°' but never
again at Sidon. Nor did he coin again at Tripolis. The exact
date of the autonomy of Tripolis is uncertain, but 105/4 seems
the earliest possible date. A new era began there in 64, the era
of Pompeius, and coins of the preceding autonomous era are
known up to year 32. So it is argued that the era of autonomy
must begin between 105-4 and 95-4, which are the extremes
which still permit 32 annual coinings.® But there is also a coin
of year 41,°° and this fits in very well with the era beginning in
105-4. If this is the case, then Kyzikenos can be seen to have
repeated at Tripolis his earlier action at Sidon: having occupied
the city, he was then compelled to evacuate it, and as a parting
shot at his rival presented the city with the gift of autonomy.
Certainly Tripolis was geographically as well placed to
endure independence as was Sidon, but economically it was not
in so fortunate a situation. The city was built at the end of a
rocky promontory where the present suburb of al-Mina—‘the
Port’—exists.** It was thus in a good position for defence, and
in a good place to exploit its maritime position. But it was not
a very large place, nor does it ever seem to have been able to
dominate its hinterland, for which it had to compete with both
Orthosia to the north and Botrys and Byblos to the south. All
of these were small cities, and so there were four small cities
competing for the same area. Not surprisingly all four of them
failed.
60 Jos., AJ, xiii. 278.
°! BMC Phoenicia, p. cxx; Seyrig, ‘Eres’, 39, lists references at n. 3 to which can now
be added Houghton, no. 693. ® Seyrig, ‘Eres’, 39-41.
°° BMC Phoenicia, Tripolis, no. 41 (dated 73/2 Bc by the Tripolitan era of 112/1; by
the era of 105/4 this becomes 66/5 Bc).
° G. Rawlinson, History ofPhoenicia (London, 1889), 80.
The problem for all four—apart from their rivalry—was the
appearance in the hills of an outpost of the Ituraeans. These
people had originated, of course, further south, in the fertile
southern section of the Bekaa valley. This had been the area
held in strength by the Ptolemies, based at the twin forts of
Gerrha and Brochoi. When Antiochos III took over this area
he had no further need for strong garrisons there and it can be
assumed that the two forts were either de-fortified or held only
lightly. The heavy hand of government being removed, the
peasantry would be able to extend their holdings. In particular
there is a strong tradition that the Ituraeans came into the
valley from the Antilebanon and further east for they are at
times called Arabs.® Certainly almost the whole of Antilebanon
was in Ituraean hands, and they controlled the steppe- and
lava-lands south of Damascus as well. Further it is clear that
the mountains were to them much less of an obstacle than to
other peoples. Hence their colonization of the Lebanon above
Tripolis and Byblos.
The governmental centre of the main Ituraean principality
was named Chalkis. Its location is uncertain. The Ptolemaic
fort at Gerrha does not seem to be the place,®’ and alternative
sites are either fairly close to Gerrha but nearer to the Anti-
lebanon, or somewhere further north along the valley towards
Baalbek.® The name Chalkis is significant, since it implies
Greek presence, for the name is Greek, after all, and gives a
clue as to the reason for the growing power of the Ituraeans in
the area. The name implies the presence of copper, though this
has been doubted.’? Yet the name cannot be accounted for in
any other way. It was awarded some time in the second century
BC, and that was not a time when new Greek settlements were
being made, so there must be a special reason for the name,
and a description of the place’s distinguishing characteristic—
a copper mine, for example—would be the best explanation.
65 Curtius, Iv. li. 24. © Jos., AJ, xili. 392.
67 Even those who suggest it (Honigmann, ‘Hist. Top.’, no. 195, or Jones, CERP,
254) tend to be tentative.
88 Honigmann, ‘Hist. Top.’, no. 136, equates it with modern Anjarr, but shows
Chalkis separately on his map and rather closer to Antilebanon.
6° E. Will, ‘Un vieux probléme de la topographie de la Beqa antique: Chalcis du
Liban’, <DPV 99 (1983), 141-6.
7° Brown, 55, comment on 2 Sam. 8: 3-12, and 59 on Eusebius, Martyrs ofPalestine,
X11, I-2,
The people who would be expected to exploit that metal would
be the Phoenicians from the coast, whose bronze industry was
old and famous.’!
The Ituraean principality which emerged by 100 Bc was
based partly on Chalkis, but also further north along the valley
at Baalbek—“‘Baal of the Bekaa’. This was an old holy site, the
high place of the valley. Here is a repetition of the pattern
already detected in the Phoenician cities, the city twinned with
a holy site some distance away: Arados and Baitokaike, Byblos
and the Adonis temple, Sidon and the Eshmun temple. That
is, the emerging Ituraean polity has all the appearance of
being strongly influenced in religious and cultural terms by the
Phoenicians on the coast.
The Ituraeans spread, taking the southern Bekaa as their
base, in all directions except due west. They were in northern
Galilee when Aristoboulos conquered and converted them.”2
They spread into Trachonitis and Batanaia to the south-east,
if that was their destination and not their place oforigin.”? They
threatened Damascus at one point,’* and occupied both slopes
of the Antilebanon, and Abila, Chalybon, and Iabruda on the
south and east slopes were theirs in the early Roman period,
and presumably before.’”* Northwards they spread to control
Baalbek and the valley of the upper Orontes, and then spread
over the Lebanon to frown down on the small cities of the
northern Lebanese coast.’ They did not spread south-west,
because there the cities of Sidon and Tyre blocked their advance
and prevented their consolidation. I am envisaging this ‘spread’
of peoples as a slow migration of a fairly poor peasant people
into lands which were themselves poor. They made a living
from the slopes of Antilebanon—the east slopes, at that—which
must be very difficult. They occupied the upper slopes of Mount
”’ Brown 56-8, noting bronze manufacture at Tyre (1 Kgs. 7: 13-15 and 2 Chr. 2:
11~14), Sidon (Philo of Alexandria, Embassy to Gaius, 221-6 and 337),
and Berytos
(OGIS, 590), the dates thus running from the tenth century BC to AD 220.
2 Jos., AF, xiii. 318.
® Tbid. 184 and Jos., BY, 1. 377.
™ Jos., AT, xiii. 392.
® Abila: Jos., AJ, xix. 276 and xx. 142, and Bf, 1. 201 and 247; Chalybon: JGR
ii. 1089, 1090; Iabruda: C. Clermont-Ganneau, ‘Un édit du roi Agrippa IT’,
Receuil
d’ Archéologie Orientale, 7 (Paris, 1906), 54-76; A. H. M. Jones, ‘The Urbanisation
of the
Ituraean Principality’, Journal ofRoman Studies, 21 (1931), 265-75.
7© Strabo, xvi, ii. 18.
Lebanon, certainly to the west and possibly the steep and
wooded and difficult eastern-facing slopes too. They were
habitually written off as hillmen—for instance, by Strabo’7—
and constantly castigated as ‘robbers’ and ‘brigands’.”® By this
presumably is meant their practice of raiding from the hills into
the plains, which is no more than the Jews of Judaea were doing
on a more massive scale into the Plain of Esdraelon and the
Shephelah of Palestine. On the north-west the Ituraeans raided
into the territories of the smaller Phoenician cities, on the east
they menaced the tranquillity of Damascus.
Damascus had become the one place under Seleukid control
which gave access to both Syria and Palestine. The inde-
pendence of Tyre and Sidon on the coast and the developing
power of the Ituraeans in the Bekaa blocked the western and
central routes. Damascus controlled the third, which itself was
menaced by the Ituraean hillmen of the Antilebanon. And
when the Ituraean threat developed sufficiently to envelop
Damascus itself, the citizens took matters into their own hands.
They handed over their city to Aretas, king of the Nabataeans,
who brushed off an attempt by Alexander Iannaios to inter-
wenes”
By this time, the mid-80s Bc, the Ituraeans were organized
into a principality. In fact this had probably been the case for
some years, but it was only from the mid-8os that we happen
to have a record of the fact. The ruler of the time of the contest
for Damascus was Ptolemy son of Mennaias.*° He remained
ruler until 40 Bc,®! which suggests that he was a comparatively
young man when he inherited the post. ‘Inherited’, though, is
an assumption. It is assumed that his father Mennaias had been
ruler before him, and it may be that there had been an even
earlier ruler. One late source, Stephanos of Byzantion, refers to
a man called ‘Monikos’ as the first ruler,8? and it has been
assumed that he and Mennaias were one and the same.” This
may be so, but the names are not really very similar. There is
not really any need to conflate them. Stephanos actually called
Monikos the founder of the city of Chalkis, whereas Mennaias
7 Tbid. 78 e.g. Jos., BT, i, 398; Strabo, xvi. ii. 10 and 18.
79 Jos., AF, xiii. 392. 80 Tbid. 8! Thid. xiv. 330.
8 Stephanos of Byzantion, s.v. Chalkis of Lebanon.
83 e.g. by Jones, CERP, 254.
was the founder of the Ituraean principality, if he was anything
more than the father of Ptolemy.
The title taken by Ptolemy was ‘tetrarch’, and on the coins
that he eventually got around to having minted he also called
himself high priest.2* This was clearly a hit at the Jewish
kingdom to his south, but it also emphasized the connection
with Baalbek, which was the temple his priesthood presumably
served. His principality was therefore solidly based in a defined
territorial area, and a particular national group, centred on a
temple at Baalbek of which he was high priest, and politically
centred on a city at Chalkis which Strabo later described as the
acropolis of the Bekaa.® It will have become the stronger as
Ptolemy himselflived on. His reign of over forty years is precisely
what was needed to consolidate the local state. He seems,
despite the Damascus incident, to have reigned in peace for
most of the time, and he became exceedingly rich, being able
to produce 1,000 talents to buy off Pompeius.*°
The end of Seleukid control over Damascus more or less
coincided with the end of Seleukid control of northern Syria.
As in Damascus the coup de grdce was given by the citizens of the
major centre, in this case the city of Antioch, and, as in the
case of Damascus, the alternative to Seleukid rule was rule by
another king. The Antiochenes chose to submit themselves
to rule by Tigranes of Armenia,*’ who spent the next years
expanding his control over northern Syria and into Palestine.
His traces are faint enough, and there are two directly con-
tradictory traditions about his rule: one that it was a time of
exceptional peace, and the other that his rule expanded though
violent conquest.®
The actual process seems to have been a mixture of the two.
Tigranes was happy to accept formal submission and just as
keen to grant formal recognition of autonomy. Laodikeia-ad-
Mare received such a grant in 81,"° and so did Apamea in 76.
This meant, of course, that Tigranes was committed to defend
those cities against any enemies, and in the Syrian context that
meant the Semitic lords and princes whose rise had coincided
with the Seleukid débacle. In Phoenicia Tigranes also gave a
** Head, HN, 783, 784. 8 Strabo, xvr. ii. 18. % Jos., Aj, xiv. 40.
87 Justin, xl. 1, *° Violent: App., Syr., 48; peaceful: Justin, xl. 1.
8 Seyrig, ‘Eres’, 28. *° Ibid. 17; a grant, or claim, ofasylia.
grant of autonomy to Berytos in 81-0,”! but no other trace of
his presence is known. By 69, when his homeland was invaded
by the Romans under L. Licinius Lucullus, he was besieging
Ptolemais-Ake.””
How Tigranes reached Ptolemais has never been made clear.
The fact that he gave autonomy to Berytos suggests that he was
prepared to protect that city against any enemies, and in this
case that can only mean the Ituraeans of Mount Lebanon. So
it also suggests that he and his army were physically able to
reach Berytos. Since later he was also able to reach Ptolemais
with an army, it seems likely that he could march along the
Phoenician coast, though it does not mean he was welcome. No
doubt Berytos opened its gates to him, but others may just have
watched stonily from their walls as he passed. His army, unlike
those of the late Seleukids, was undoubtedly powerful enough
to perform such a march, and it may well be one of the sources
of the tradition that he had to conquer by violence. His rule
was quite ephemeral, and its existence is more a testimony to
the hopelessness of the last Seleukids and the chaos they left
than to his own power. In Syria he had no serious political
effect; any political powers he found there still existed when he
left.
Thus, Ptolemy son of Mennaias was not disturbed in his
tetrarchy any more than Aretas the Nabataean or the kings of
the Jews in Palestine. Tigranes’ power was great enough to
deter any attacks, so it seems—except the Roman, of course—
but he did not usually go out of his way to attack others. So all
a man like Ptolemy needed to do was to keep his head down
until the storm had passed.
This would not necessarily apply, however, to the minor
political entities, such as the ‘bandits’ whose activities so stained
the Ituraean name amongst their neighbours. Strabo records
that they had established strongholds at two places, Sinna and
Bourama, on Mount Lebanon.” These are now unlocated, but
it seems unlikely that Tigranes would bother with them, though
they may well be the source of the threat to Berytos. These,
and the groups who had become established at the north end
! BMC Phoenicia, p. li; Seyrig, ‘Eres’, 38. % Jos.. AF, xiii. 419-21.
% Strabo, xvi. ii. 18; Honigmann ‘Hist. Top.’ nos. 116a and 427a makes no attempt
to locate them.
of Mount Lebanon, had escaped the control of Ptolemy in
Chalkis, and during Tigranes’ time there was nothing Ptolemy
could do about it.
This northern branch of the Ituraean expansion had its centre
at a hill fortress called Arka, now Tell Arka.” Its situation was
precisely what one would expect of a base for hillmen raiding
into the plains: a rocky hill at the foot of the mountains, facing
the rich plains. It was also no more than 5 km. from the coast,
and almost on the border between Arados’ mainland territories
and whatever political entity controlled the land south of the
Eleutheros river. It was at once a base for advances into the
plain, a fortified storehouse for the loot thus collected, and a
defensible fortress preventing reprisal raids into the mountains.
It was also a base to which the young men of the hills could
gravitate in the sure hope of employment and adventure; that
is, the lord of Arka could rely on a human reservoir to reinforce
him whenever necessary.
Such a situation could never have arisen while a king ruled
all the land, for a royal army would be able both to scour the
hills and take the castle at the same time. For the fragmented
polities of the Phoenician coast, however, the problem was
insoluble. None of them could gather a sufficient force to erase
the threat, and they would find it difficult to combine to resist
it; after all, Tyre and Sidon could not combine to face the threat
of Alexander Iannaios. The nearest Phoenician town to Arka
was Orthosia, and once more the Ituraeans of Arka could not
have chosen a better place to commence expansion into the
coastlands, for Orthosia was probably the weakest of the Phoe-
nician towns of the area, and was certainly captured by them.”
It appears that the Ituraean raids were directed to the lands
south of the Eleutheros, and that Arados’ territory north of the
Eleutheros was untouched—or, rather, it is more likely that
Arados had shown that it was capable of defending itself, and
was thus left alone.
Not so the cities and towns south of the Eleutheros. Con-
trolling Orthosia on the coast and Arka a few kilometres away
in the foothills, they were able to infiltrate southwards, raiding
and conquering. When all this took place is not clear, as usual,
* Jones, CERP, 456; n. 45, discusses the problem of Arka with reference
to the
ancient sources. %® Strabo, xvi. ii. 18.
but some time in the gos or 80s seems most likely. During the
next twenty years, until the 60s, the Ituraeans expanded their
power in the area over both the cities and the intervening coast.
The expansion was probably not organized in any serious sense,
but was a process of raids, sudden advances, coups d’état. The
precise stages are invisible but by 64 they had gained control
of the whole coast as far south as, and including, Berytos.®
The basis of this reconstruction is, as always, a series of
late and disconnected fragments of information. From them,
however, it is clear that the cities were independent, but only
under Ituraean rule. Tripolis, for example, was ruled by a
tyrant called Dionysios, whom Pompeius executed. Dionysios
was related to the tetrarch Ptolemy of Chalkis by marriage;%
he was thus independent of the lord of Arka. His city continued
to strike coins as an autonomous place, and Dionysios himself
is not commemorated on them.” Two possible interpretations
suggest themselves: that Dionysios was a native Tripolitan who
rose to power in the Ituraean crisis and ensured his city’s
independence by marrying into Ptolemy’s family as a means of
defence against other Ituraeans; or Dionysios was a local
Ituraean who seized power in the city and was then rewarded
by the hand of a lady of Ptolemy’s house. In either case, the
marriage suggests that the relationship of Ptolemy with the lord
of Arka was uncomfortable, to say no more.
Along the coast, another tyrant, called Kinyras, was lord of
Byblos. He is not referred to as an Ituraean, but Strabo sep-
arately notes the fact that Ituraeans had captured Byblos.”
The obvious conclusion is that Kinyras was the leader of the
Ituraeans who had gained control of the city. Between Tripolis
and Byblos, Strabo notes that the Ituraeans had ruled Botrys,
which at times had almost ranked as a city,'!” and a place
called Gigartos. He adds that they had a base in a castle on
Theuprosopon, the great headland north of Botrys, and in some
‘caves of the sea’. The castle is fairly clearly located on the cape,
though the caves have not been. Gigartos is not known, but
Strabo’s words put it between Botrys and Theuprosopon. No
$6 bid: Vos A 7, x1V..30)
% Seyrig, ‘Eres’, 52. %” Strabo, xv1, ii. 18.
100 This episode is ignored by H. Salamé-Sarkis, ‘Matériaux pour une histoire de
Batrun’, Berytus, 35 (1987), 101-19.
doubt it was a small town, certainly more than just a castle,
but not big enough to be thought of as a city.
The Ituraeans had thus captured control ofall the coast from
Orthosia to Byblos. South of Byblos was Berytos, another town
on a promontory. Since its destruction by Tryphon, Berytos
had recovered somewhat, though it does not seem to have
regained its full importance. Coins are, once again, the sole
source. The mint of the city produced bronze coins for Deme-
trios IT in his second reign and for Alexander Zabinas, that is,
in the 120s,'°' and there is a series of bronze issues which have
been dated in the late second and early first centuries.!° This
is not a great deal and suggests a fairly low level of economic
activity. It can be assumed that the grant of autonomy made
by Tigranes in 81-0'” was a means of extending his protection
over the city in the face of the threat from the Ituraeans, but
his withdrawal in 69 gave them a new opportunity. It is clear
from Strabo that the Ituraeans had in fact gained control of
Berytos by the time Pompeius arrived in 64.'%
Pompeius’ campaign through Syria in 64 marks the obvious
beginning of Roman authority in the old Seleukid state. The
situation he found there was confused, summed up by him
as ‘a battleground for Arabs and Jews’.!®° In Phoenicia this
generalization scarcely operated even if the Ituraeans are
counted as Arabs. But it is clear he did come at the last possible
moment. The last sixty years or so had seen a progressive
deterioration in the position of the Phoenician cities, so that
only the strongest survived. In a sense it had been another ‘time
of troubles’, but this time the Phoenicians had succeeded in
evading most of the political problems.. This was partly due to
their own actions, pre-eminently so with Arados, whose firm
and limited policies saw it through the whole period with the
minimum of trouble. It was also, probably, the case with Tyre,
whose geographical position made it the more vulnerable to
political pressures. A certain nimbleness of diplomacy was called
for to survive the conflicting claims and threats of Hasmonae-
ans, Seleukids, Ptolemies, and Ituraeans, not to mention the
'' Houghton, no. 710, redated by Houghton himself in A Survey of Numismatic
Research 1978-1984, i (London, 1986), 180; MacDonald, 91, no. 38 and 96, no. 54.
'? BMC Phoenicia, Berytus, nos. 1-13.
103 Seyrig, ‘Eres’, 38. 10 Strabo, xv. ii. 18.
10 Justin, xi. ii. 2-5; App., Spr., 49; Plut., Pompeius, xxxix. 3.
jealousies of neighbouring Sidonians. Sidon was slower off the
mark than either Arados or Tyre, and again it seems obvious
that the city’s geographical situation and greater military vul-
nerability are a sufficient explanation here.
The smaller cities turned out to be extremely vulnerable. Of
them all, only Gabala survived this troubled period intact and
independent. The other cities, along the whole coastline from
the border of Arados to that of Sidon, fell to the Ituraean attack.
Berytos had been destroyed once during the troubles and had
not recovered fully. Now it fell once more, along with Tripolis
and Byblos and Orthosia. This was almost half of the Phoenician
coast. And the conquest had occurred in not more than twenty
years. There could be no doubt, as well, that the next victim
_ would be Sidon, and then Tyre, which would leave the Iturae-
ans as rulers of everything between the Eleutheros and Galilee,
from the Antilebanon to the coast. Given the relative strengths
of the Ituraeans on one side and Tyre and Sidon on the other,
and remembering the deep-seated animosity between the two
_ cities, there can be no doubt that the Ituraeans would win. In
that case, presumably, we historians, instead of repeating the
old charges by their enemies of brigandage and banditry, would
be lauding them as a constructive political people, bringing
peace and unity to the jealous Phoenician cities.
- =<,
—
.ve wiper!
sone epee
= i : ¥ b — > hou are
E . 2 ney art arts)

; i =
o ‘ ao xPwA
7 ieee
uae
' 7 1 é
: > y
'
, ae
e Fats 4 i
wt A 7] . 7.
oF
ah
fiers. ms
7 bet UJ avs We
7) ‘
)
} f.
yy €
a i tn» Wr a
rar A af dher et }
- ry 4
* . was
4 by t Pint é, ¥
: pee
f se Vas ot
‘
’ j sy on s
- . i a +e | ‘4 — ny >
‘ ' i apsaless vs “f Le oy netted ix baie ney
' , 7 : } “a _ i.
40 cmb ts modi eiriniay inert bareyeoeene
; 7) — ‘ ‘as phies 7 ores ji-stywaen ns teks Srv
a Pratinn bbeedh senehein oni

. p 1 : i a 7 Laake ml: lade Aig adele
eae é —~ A Oo
a Arras ed tay oie Gt ibete
romeu ‘€ os tre. Atua
we : —_ - “¥ a a a A 7 bs
,by) . Ceayrenga
; alad as renbin 7 tthe styrasies
; Jhdea \ bat
6
THE ROMAN TAKE-OVER
64-15 BC
The arrival of Cn. Pompeius Magnus in Syria in 64 Bc marks,

to historians, the point at which the people of Syria became
Roman subjects. Their history is thus now, technically, part of
Roman history, and no longer Hellenistic. To the people of
Syria, however, this distinction would have been largely aca-
demic, had it ever occurred to them. In particular, it would
have seemed ludicrous to them to divide their history at 64
into a preceding disturbed, civil-warring, unpleasant Seleukid
phase, and a succeeding Roman phase, peaceful and _pros-
_ perous, because for over thirty years after 64 they were subject
as never before to a series of the most unpleasant rulers Syria
had faced since the Neo-Babylonian Empire. The year 64
marks, for Syrians, only the arrival of yet another group
preying on their apparent wealth. Syria’s agony continued
and intensified.
Nevertheless, a change did take place in 64, if only for the
worse. Instead of the traditional conflicts involving Seleukids
and Ptolemies, Greeks and Syrians, there were now two new
actors on the stage, from further afield, Romans and Parthians.
In one sense, the next thirty years saw a contest between these
two newcomers for control of Syria. Beneath that contest, the
older rivalry of local forces continued.
Pompeius’ actions had been no more decisive in changing
the political conditions in Syria than had those of Tigranes.
The Armenian king had, essentially, stopped change from
taking place, so that those political units which had been
expanding were halted, and those which were threatened were
_ saved, but only for the moment. As soon as Tigranes pulled
out, the old movements resumed. It seems likely, for example,
that Berytos fell under Ituraean control during the five
years between Tigranes and Pompeius, for Strabo clearly
160 The Roman Take-over, 64-15 BC
distinguishes that city from the other Ituraean conquests.!
Pompeius, therefore, had to do more to achieve a local balance
than simply halt the various movements taking place. He had
to cut more decisively into the roots from which such movements
grew. In Phoenicia this meant reducing the power of the Iturae-
ans.
Pompeius arrived equipped with the built-in Roman preju-
dice against kings and in favour of cities, particularly sub-
ordinate cities which could be easily and cheaply taxed. He was
eager for money, both for himself and for Rome, for wealth
gave power. He removed the remaining Seleukid claimant in
short order,” and then moved south, eliminating those who
could be designated as ‘bandits’ and ‘brigands’, establishing
civic power in oligarchic hands, reducing the powers of the
Syrian native states. The Aradians, as anti-pirate allies, as a
stable city, and as an oligarchy, survived intact and undi-
minished. Tyre and Sidon were similarly confirmed, so it seems.
It must be admitted that it is the absence of change that is the
only evidence for Pompeius’ treatment of the three great cities,
but it seems sufficient, for his whole policy depended on encour-
aging such cities in their autonomy.
The Ituraeans, however, with their reputation as bandits so
firmly fixed that it has implanted itself firmly into the surviving
sources, were clearly a group who could be despoiled with
relative impunity. All the conquered cities on the seaboard
were removed from Ituraean control, and their rulers, termed
‘tyrants’ so as to justify their elimination, were executed,
Kinyras at Byblos, and Dionysios at Tripolis. The subsidiary
forts and strongholds which the Ituraeans had seized or built
at Gigartos and on Theuprosopon were dismantled, the caves
by the sea were cleaned out.? Yet the real centre of Ituraean
power in the area was left undestroyed, for the lord of Arka
survived, as is shown by his participation in the rescue of Caesar
later.* Perhaps he was too well entrenched to be removed,
perhaps he welcomed the elimination of the competing local
Ituraean powers as enhancing his own status, perhaps Pompeius
wanted to leave a threat behind to persuade the rescued cities
to behave. While these are possible factors, the treatment the
' Strabo, xvi. ii. 18. * App., Syr., 49; Justin, xl. 2; Dio Cassius, xxxvii. 7a.
* Strabo, xv. ii. 18; Jos., A7, xiv. 39. * Jos., BF, xv. 185.
The Roman Take-over, 64-15 BC 161
prince of Arka received was essentially the same as that of
Samsigeramos of Emesa and Ptolemy of Chalkis: they were
deprived of some territory—in the cases of Arka and Emesa,
territory containing formerly independent cities—but the basis
of their power remained. Ptolemy son of Mennaias, tetrarch
and high priest of the southern Bekaa and the nearby hills,
survived as well. He paid Pompeius 1,000 talents, after Pom-
peius’ troops had started to ravage his fields, but otherwise
seems to have been unmolested.’ Pompeius was quite prepared
to allow the continued existence of a stable state, in a difficult
area, and the loss of 1,000 talents was a sharp and solid reminder
of Rome’s power. Pompeius himself dealt with Ptolemy, while
his lieutenants sorted out the situation on the coast, a clear
enough indication of where the power in the area really lay.
Pompeius had thus more or less restored the situation in
Phoenicia to what it had been before the interventions of
Tigranes and the Ituraean hillmen, while permitting the con-
tinued existence of two Ituraean principalities, based at Chalkis
and Arka. Along the coast there was now a string of autonomous
cities, from Gabala to Tyre, all of whom owed their continued
autonomy, indeed their continued existence, to Pompeius
himself. The cities which he and his lieutenants had rescued
commemorated their deliverance by adopting a new era, which
we call the ‘Pompeian’ era. This has been traced at Byblos and
Tripolis for certain, and probably also at Orthosia, and just
possibly at Botrys.® The other cities all retained their own
- original eras, even Berytos, which again suggests that its sub-
jugation to Ituraean rule was quite recent and brief.’ The
precise legal status of the cities is impossible to discover, but in
practice—which is what counts—they were self-governing but
subject to the authority of the Roman governor of Syria. That
is, their political position had reverted to what it had been
under the Seleukid monarchy. It seems likely, though it is not
certain, that they were garrisoned, but it is also clear, from
events in the later Roman civil wars, that the cities had their
own armament as well. Indeed, during Pompeius’ campaign in
Judaea, where he once more removed native control over
> Jos., AF, xiv. 40.
° H. Seyrig, ‘Eres pompéiennes des villes de phénicie’, Syria, 31 (1954), 73-80.
’ Seyrig, ‘Eres’, 38.
certain cities, he sent to Tyre for war machines with which to
batter the walls of Jerusalem.® If these were Tyrian machines
it argues a much greater state of military preparedness in the
cities than one would expect, but it is perhaps more likely that
they were Roman machines which had been shipped to Tyre
and were held there in case of need. That, in turn, implies a
Roman military presence in the city, probably temporarily
enlarged by Pompeius’ nearby presence, but surely permanent
if perhaps relatively small under normal circumstances.
A clue to the position of the Phoenician cities may be dis-
cerned in what Josephus reports concerning the terms imposed
by Pompeius on Jerusalem, by which he seems to mean the
area left to the Jews after the freeing of the conquered cities.
Jerusalem was to pay tribute to Rome, and the freed cities were
to become part of the Syrian province.® That is, Judaea was to
be an autonomous area in much the same way as the cities were
autonomous cities, and both were to pay an annual fee to Rome
through the Syrian governor for the privilege of autonomy. An
inscription of 60 Bc from Tyre shows the city as autonomous,
but also shows that it had acquired as patron Pompeius’ lieuten-
ant, M. Aemilius Scaurus.!°
Pompeius’ Syrian campaign was over during 63, and he left,
giving M. Aemilius Scaurus, one of his Syrian experts, the post
of governor as his own legate.'’ Scaurus was followed, at roughly
two-year intervals, by other Roman aristocrats of approxi-
mately praetorian rank and minor abilities.’ Then, in 58, a
new governor arrived, A. Gabinius, of proconsular rank, armed
with a three-year tenure by a special law and possessed of a
great ambition to establish himself as a wealthy man with an
independent political base. His ambitions led to a further Jewish
war, an expedition into Egypt, and intervention in Parthia.
Syria had again become a base from which to expand, though
it is hardly likely that Gabinius saw himself as the successor of
Antiochos VII or Demetrios II. Gabinius was succeeded by
M. Licinius Crassus, of even higher rank, with even greater
ambitions, and who failed utterly. His defeat at Karrhai in 53
brought the Parthians into Syria for the second time, but the
8 Jos., AJ, xiv. 62. 9 Jos.; AJ, xiv. 74-6.
'° E. Renan, Mission de Phénicie (Paris, 1864), 533-
't Jos., AF, xiv. 79; App., Syr., 51. '2 App., Syr., 51.
province was ably defended by C. Cassius Longinus, Crassus’
quaestor.’* Cassius remained in control for two years, even
though he was only of lowly rank, and had to face the usual
internal Jewish problems. Josephus pointedly remarks that he
went to Judaea by way of Tyre.'* This is the first ofa series of
appearances by that city in affairs in these years, and it seems
that Cassius in particular had good relations with the city.
In all this one can be sure that the cities and principalities of
Phoenicia paid their share of exactions, whether they were
called tribute or voluntary offerings or taxes or whatever.
Crassus certainly extracted all he could from the temple at
Jerusalem,’ so there seems no reason to doubt that he would
squeeze everywhere else. Yet no part of Phoenicia was directly
involved in the warfare of the time. The presence of huge
Roman armies in Syria, usually in the north but lungeing into
Palestine every now and again, would persuade any Syrian
prince to keep his head down and pay up like a man.
The Roman system, always precarious in Pompeius’ hands,
finally broke down in 4g. The Phoenician cities, in duty bound
to assist their patron, duly did so. While the fighting continued
in Greece, Pompeius received contingents from most of the
autonomous groups in the east, including, according to Appian,
forces from ‘Kilikia, Syria, Phoenicia, the Hebrews, and their
neighbours the Arabs’.'° This is, as often with Appian, very
vague: one would like to know so much more. The Phoenicians
certainly sent ships as well, and a ‘Syrian’ squadron was part
of Pompeius’ naval force in the Ionian Sea, commanded by
Cassius, who took his force on a raid to Sicily before he heard
of the defeat of Pompeius at Pharsalos.'’ He is next heard of a
year later asking Caesar’s pardon in Kilikia;'* presumably in
the mean time he had either returned his ships to their home
ports or had surrendered them to be returned.'? The governor
of Syria, Q. Caecilius Metellus Scipio, exercised notable ingen-
uity in squeezing money from his subjects,”’ before going on to
do the same in Asia. Not surprisingly, considerable support
emerged for Caesar during his ludicrous Egyptian campaign,
'3 Tbid. for a rapid summary; Jos., AJ, xiv. 82-122 is more leisurely.
i+ Joss Af, xive 120; 'S Ibid. 105-9. Lo ADp: Gh, te pl
7 Caesar, Civil Wars, m. ci. '8 Cicero, Ad Familiares, 174.
19 App., CW, ii, 111. 20 Caesar, Civil Wars ut. xxxi. 2-4.
and he was rescued by an army largely recruited in Syria. It
contained contingents from Hyrkanos the Jewish high priest,
Iamblichos, who must be a member of the Emesan royal line,
and Ptolemy son of Soaimos ‘who lived on Mount Lebanon’.?!
This can only be the Jord of Arka, or perhaps Soaimos sent his
son with the forces to the rescue of the new Roman ruler. These
rulers helped rescue Caesar because they had helped Pompeius
until his death, and this was a suitable way to make recompense.
Josephus includes in his list ‘almost all the cities’.?? This is
tantalizing in the extreme. The failure of Cassius to use his fleet
against Caesar while the latter was so vulnerable in Alexandria
suggests that the fleet he had led had already dispersed soon
after his adventure in Sicily; if so, this would leave the Phoe-
nician cities free to render assistance to Caesar. But if they did
so it was by no means conspicuous, and it does not seem that
their assistance was naval. On the other hand, it does not
appear that Caesar punished these cities, though, since he was
not a vindictive man, the apparent absence of punishment is
scarcely evidence of anything.
The impression one receives ofthe attitude of the Phoenicians
is therefore one of support willingly given to Pompeius and
then an unenthusiastic acquiescence in Caesar’s supremacy.
The greater enthusiasm for Caesar shown by the princes,
particularly at Arka and presumably also at Chalkis, would
probably reinforce the cities’ suspicions. If, further, Cassius had
punctiliously restored the fleets to the cities, then nostalgia for
the beneficence of Pompeius, for his rescue of those Phoenicians
in bondage to the Ituraeans, would be strong. All over the east
the political allegiance of cities and princes was determined less
by the justice of each Roman’s cause or the winning nature of
his personality than by the proximity and size of his army and,
above all, by the attitudes of neighbouring princes and cities.
There is no reason to believe the Phoenicians were any different.
If the lord of Arka supported Caesar voluntarily, then that was
a perfectly good reason for Tripolis to view the Roman with
suspicion. For Caesar would leave, sooner or later, and he was
unlikely to return, but the lord of Arka would still be there, in
his hill-top fortress, surrounded by his tribal warriors, waiting
the moment when it would be safe and profitable to attack.
2! Jos., AJ, xiv. 127-9 and B7, 1. 187-8. 2 Jos., AJ, xiv. 129.
The Roman Take-over, 64-15 Bc 165
No doubt to Caesar the veiled enmity or resigned submission
of the Phoenician cities was a small matter, an attitude he was
prepared to accept since it was unlikely he could do anything
about it, and it was just as unlikely to cause him any trouble.
The sympathetic attitude of Tyre at least towards the lost
Pompeian cause became known, and a group of irreconcilable
Pompeians took refuge there. One, a survivor of Pharsalos
called Caecilius Bassus, became the centre of a conspiracy
against the Syrian governor installed by Caesar during his rapid
transit of the area. Bassus gathered enough supporters to seize
control of Tyre from the Caesarian garrison, and then to attack
the governor himself. The governor, a relative of Caesar’s called
Sextus Julius Caesar, then found that Bassus had also suborned
his soldiers. The mutineers killed the governor and Bassus
claimed the rank of praetor and the governorship of Syria.”
The scene of Bassus’ exploits shifted then to Apamea, where
he stood a siege on and off for three years. Later events make
it clear that he was in general supported by the Phoenicians.
No doubt his partisans had held on to Tyre all the time, but it
seems clear enough that the other cities took his part as well.
After Caesar’s murder in 44 Cassius came back to Syria and
persuaded both sides to join him. With another force which
came up from Egypt also in his grasp, Cassius soon had an
army of twelve legions.** The old relationship between Cassius
and the cities could be reactivated at once. And when Cassius
was attacked by yet another Roman force under P. Cornelius
Dolabella, Cassius was able to rely on all the Phoenician cities’
support.”
Dolabella was besieged in Laodikeia-ad-Mare by Cassius’
superior forces. For a time he had a local naval superiority and
made a naval attack on Arados.”° This failed and Cassius
called on the Phoenician cities to mount a naval blockade of
Laodikeia—presumably Dolabella was able to receive supplies.
Appian reports that at first only Sidon responded,’ though it
is difficult to believe that Arados had not sent ships to revenge
itself for the original attack. A naval battle resulted in the defeat
3 Dio Cassius, XLVI. xxvi. 2—xxvii. 1; Jos., AJ. xiv. 268; Livy, Pertochae, 114; App.,
CW, ii. 77; Cicero, Ad Familiares, 205 (xii. 18).
4 Dio Cassius, xLvul. xxx. 2; App., CW, iii. 78; Jos., AJ, xiv. 271-2.
5 Dio Cassius, xLvul. xxx. 2; App., CW, iii. 78; Livy, Periochae, 121; Strabo, xv1. ii. 9.
26 Dio Cassius, XLVI. xxx. 2-3. 27 App., CW, iv. 61.
of Dolabella’s ships, and then other Phoenician ships arrived.”
The close investment of Laodikeia which resulted soon pro-
duced famine in the city, defeat for Dolabella, and capitula-
tion.”? The activity of the Phoenician naval forces in this siege
shows clearly that the cities controlled their own navies. Since
Cassius had taken ships from them earlier, for Pompeius, and
now received their assistance so willingly, his return of these
ships after Pharsalos seems all the more likely.
Appian is the only ancient historian to show a division in the
response of the Phoenician cities in this affair. He is careless
with details, and his word alone is usually not sufficiently
persuasive. On the other hand, the division he shows, between
Sidon and the rest, is quite believable, though I have doubts
about Arados’ tardy response. The rivalry of Tyre and Sidon
was ancient and well grounded, and it never changed. It was
liable at all times to emerge in differing responses. Partly this
was due to geography, for Tyre faced a more difficult set of
neighbours than did Sidon. In particular at this time (43-42
BC) Tyre faced the problems caused by the constant turmoil in
Palestine.
In this Tyre was at one with Ptolemy son of Mennaias of
Chalkis. Ptolemy had interfered in Judaean affairs in the past,
and was now married to a daughter of Aristoboulos, a member
of the old royal house who had been a Pompeian until murdered
by Caesarians.*” This aligned Ptolemy with the partisans of
the Hasmoneans against the emerging power of the house of
Antipatros, whose son Herod was in control of Galilee for
most of the 40s. Antipatros and Herod deftly changed sides
to accommodate the shifting pattern of Roman politics and
managed to enlist the support of both Sextus Caesar and
Cassius, but their main interest was in local Judaean affairs.
Cassius, as suggested above, may have had a certain patron-
age over Syrians,*' but he does not seem to have felt he could
trust the local political authorities. Accordingly, he fostered the
installation of local tyrants in the cities. This is an obscure
matter, and it is known of largely because his successor as
overlord of Syria, M. Antonius, busied himself with removing
*° App., CW, iv. 61. Dio Cassius, xLvit. xxx. 3-4.
** Dio Cassius, xiv. xxx. 5; App., CW, iv. 62.
5 : . : ie
Jos., AJ, xiv. 126. Dio Cassius, xLvu, xxviii. 1.
these tyrants.** In one case, however, more is known. At Tyre
the tyrant was called Marion, and he used his position to try
to expand his territorial base, which brought him into conflict
with the formidable Herod.** During his personal rule Cassius
had garrisoned Tyre, for he was able to use a group of military
tribunes in the city to murder a Jewish general who was reputed
to have been responsible for the death of Herod’s father.** But
then Cassius had left to join Brutus in the war against Octavian
and Antonius, stripping Syria of virtually all available troops.”
This meant that the local power-seekers were unrestrained.
Both Ptolemy of Chalkis and Marion of Tyre intervened in
the complex struggle going on in Judaea in favour of the
Hasmonaeans. Marion sent troops to occupy three strongholds
in Galilee, Herod’s territory. These strongholds were recap-
tured almost at once, and Herod ostentatiously sent the soldiers
back to Tyre, with gifts.*° Marion’s prestige inevitably fell, and
the news of the defeat and death of both Cassius and Brutus
removed the last remaining prop to his power. Who he was,
where he came from, and what happened to him we do not
know. At a guess he was the leader of the faction leaning
towards Cassius in the city, possibly known to the Roman from
the days of Cassius’ command of the Phoenician fleet. His reign
was brief, and clearly inglorious. It witnessed the only known
attempt by Tyre to expand its territory since the Akhaimenid
period. The fact that the attempt failed perhaps explains why
it is the only example known. The alliance of Tyre and Chalkis
and the Hasmonaeans is not, however, likely to be new.
Josephus comments in regard to these events that Cassius
had controlled Syria through tyrants.*’ If Tyre had one, so
probably had the other Phoenician cities, though none is
attested. The news of Philippi was swiftly followed by the
further news that their new Roman lord was M. Antonius, who
addressed a decree to Tyre requiring the restoration of Jewish
territory. It was addressed to the magistrates, council, and
people of Tyre, thus effectively removing Marion if he was still
there.*® Other decrees went to Sidon and Arados,*? requiring
3 Jos., AF, xiv. 297. ?
33 Ibid. 297-8; M. Chehab, ‘Tyr a Epoque romaine’, MUS] 38 (1962), 24-6.
3 Jos., AJ, xiv. 288-93. 38 App., CW, iv. 63.
38 Jos., AF, xiv. 294, 298. 37 Tbid. 297.
38 Thid. 314-22. 39 Ibid. 323.
the return of Jewish property, though why and when this had
been seized is unknown. The complainant was Hyrkanos, the
Hasmonaean high priest, but by the time Antonius reached
Tyre, some time later, he had come round to favour Herod.”
Antonius had removed the tyrants and indicated support for
Herod, but then he had to return to Athens to deal with a crisis
in his relations with Octavian. As with Cassius’ move westwards
in 42, this allowed the local quarrels to return. In particular,
fighting flared up again in Judaea and this brought about a
Parthian invasion. Northern Syria had seen Parthian invasions
for fifty years, but this was the first time the invaders had
reached as far as Phoenicia and Palestine. The erratic nature
of the Roman occupation attracted Parthian interest, and there
were always groups in Syria willing to use the Parthian con-
nection to further their own ends. The trigger to this episode
seems to have been the death of the aged Ptolemy of Chalkis in
40. He was succeeded by his son Lysanias,*! who gave fuller
backing to his brother-in-law, the Hasmonean Antigonos,* and
these two invited assistance from Pakoros, the Parthian king’s
son, and Barzaphanes, the satrap of, presumably, Mesopo-
tamia. The Parthian forces marched along both routes south,
Pakoros along the coast, and Barzaphanes through the Bekaa.®
Once more the Phoenician cities had to make the choice of
supporting or opposing an invader. And once again Tyre and
Sidon took opposite sides, Sidon opening its gates to Pakoros,
and Tyre keeping him and his army out.** Of the others we are
uninformed, but the weakness of the smaller cities would suggest
that they did not resist, while Arados could perhaps have
afforded to stand aloof, if it had chosen to do so. However,
subsequent events show that Arados joined the Parthian side
more wholeheartedly than any of the others. It would not be
surprising if the Syrians generally had finally despaired of the
Romans. Two civil wars in the past ten years had involved
almost complete evacuations of Syria by Roman troops, and
Antonius’ conduct had scarcely given grounds for optimism
and respect. Disorder had risen, and the Romans had generally
%0 Jos., AJ, xiv. 327.
*! W. Wroth, BMC Galatia, Cappadocia, Syria (London, 1899), 280, no. 6.
* Jos., AJ, xiv. 330.
* Ibid. 330-3; Dio Cassius, xLvm. xxvi. 1-2.
* Jos., AZ, xiv. 333.
shown themselves more likely to feed that disorder than to quell
it. Their greed for cash to fuel their civil wars was draining the
land of movable wealth. In 44, for example, the retiring
governor Antistius Vetus handed over some of the Syrian rev-
enues to Brutus.” The sum Brutus received was two million
sesterces, which was over eight hundred talents. This was
perhaps two years’ revenues, after the tax farmers had taken
their profits, and it was still only part of what Vetus had
collected. And Vetus was not the worst. It was the twentieth
year of Syria’s provincial status, and no one in Syria could see
any possible improvement.
One of the most noticeable effects of this Roman greed for
movable, spendable wealth is the gradual cessation of minting
in Phoenicia. Arados, for instance, which had produced a long
series of silver and bronze coins since independence in 128,
stopped minting silver in 61/0, and then produced only two
more mintings, in 49/8 and 46/5.*° Significant dates, for the
first was the year Pompeius needed as much support as he could
get, and the second was the year Caecilius Bassus began his
revolt against Caesar. Sidon, while being a much less prolific
mint than either Arados or Tyre, shows a similar pattern to
that at Arados: intermittent minting of silver till 64/3, then
mintings of half-shekels in 53/2 and 46/5; full shekels were not
minted at all until 40/39. Even the minting of bronze slowed
down, with fewer mintings per decade—four in the 70s and 50s
(though none in the 60s) and only two in the 4os and 30s.
Tyre is the exception, perhaps, as has been suggested, because
of Judaean requirements; certainly it is Tyrian shekels which
are the commonest currency in coin hoards found in Palestine
of this period.*® Tyre’s silver coinage continues all through the
period from the end of the Seleukids to the rule of Augustus.
Even here, though, the annual minting which lasted until 61/o
(again) was replaced by an average of four or five mintings per
decade from 61 to 11 Bc.*? The explanation must be, at least in
part, a reduction in wealth caused by the abstraction of cash
from Phoenicia to Rome. It is the same problem which occurred
* Cicero, Ad M. Brutum, 16 (i. 11). 46 BMC Phoenicia, Aradus, nos. 290, 291.
47 BMC Phoenicia, Sidon, nos. 124—7, 140-1, 144-9.
*8 e.¢. Inventory of Greek Coin Hoards, 1614 (Samaria, ¢. 74 Bc), 1616 (Ascalon, c. 62
BC), 1617 (‘Palestine’, c.61 Bc) which have nothing but coins minted in Tyre.
49 BMC Phoenicia, Tyre, nos. 160-88.
170 | The Roman Take-over, 64-15 BC
during the Akhaimenid period, with the difference that the
Romans spent their loot, whereas the Persians hoarded theirs.
Thus, there was a chance for the money to return to Phoenicia
by the purchase of Phoenician products. Some, for instance,
must have returned in the pockets of Cassius’ sailors after his
cruise to Sicily.
For some in Syria and Phoenicia, the Roman performance
was so unpleasant that rescue was looked for from the east.
Even Parthian rule might be preferable to the exactions of
Roman nobles and tax-farmers, particularly when they were
accompanied by continuous and rising levels of disorder and
repeated bouts of civil warfare. Tyre, however, was determined
to stay out of Parthian control. This might simply be a mani-
festation of the city’s rivalry with Sidon, but it does not seem a
strong enough reason by itself. It might suggest a more far-
seeing attitude on the part of the Tyrian government, but this
seems equally unlikely. It is possible that the city was actually
garrisoned by Roman troops. There is no evidence for this at
this particular time, but Tyre had figured largely in Rome’s
intermittent rule in the past few years, and if there were Roman
soldiers anywhere in the south, Tyre was the place for them.
Most likely the Tyrian oligarchy made their decision to oppose
Pakoros because of their alliance with Herod, who was himself
opposed to the Parthians’ ally Antigonos.
If this reconstruction is correct, the Tyrians had chosen their
allies sensibly. For Herod’s political antennae were the most
acutely sensitive of any in the eastern Mediterranean, and
alliance with him would automatically provide protection.
Lysanias, on the other hand, had remained loyal to his father’s
attachment to the Hasmonean cause—the two dynasties were
intermarried, of course—and this would lead him to disaster.
It seems also that Arados’ political footwork was no longer
deft enough to avoid disaster. Arados had survived well enough
during the long agony of the Seleukid disintegration by opting
out of the problem into independence; by being anti-pirate the
city had become an ally of Pompeius, which provided protection
until 48. But then things began to go wrong. Caesar, though
not vindictive, had reason to be displeased generally with the
Phoenician cities, and Arados’ resistance to Dolabella had
aligned that city decisively with Cassius, Just in time to par-
ticipate in his ruin. This was, of course, a record no worse than
most other eastern cities, but the arrival of the Parthians on the
scene, in Syria and in strength, appears to have precipitated a
firm decision by Arados to join them.
The evidence for Arados’ history at this time is much less
clear cut than it is for Tyre, where it is possible to detect shifts
in political alignment because of the Palestinian connections of
that city, which are documented in the pages of Josephus.
Arados was far enough from Palestine to be largely unaffected
by events there, which may have been a relief to Arados, but
leaves later historians deplorably short of information. A clue
does exist, however, in Tyre’s history. The connection which
can be traced with the lords of Chalkis and the Jewish rulers of
Palestine is one which aligned those political elements on one
side of the Greco-Syrian divide. On the other side were the
Greek cities. In Judaea this meant that the Greeks suffered
severely, to the extent that Greek cities were destroyed. Feelings
were not so strong in T’yre, but it seems a reasonable hypothesis
that Tyre’s choice of allies was partly determined by language
and culture and religion.
If such a concept of political alignment is applied to Arados,
then it is possible to detect a similar situation. Inland of Arados,
no more than 80 km. from the coast, was the capital of the
kings of Emesa. These rulers were Arabic-speaking, originally
nomads from the desert.°? They had controlled land to the
north along the Orontes, but Arethusa had been removed from
their control by Pompeius. West, their boundary enclosed some
at least of the newly resettled land at the foot of the Antilebanon
range and towards the Eleutheros gap, and their boundary
may well have coincided with that of Arados.°' To the east
their lands went deep into the desert and their boundary ran
with that of Palmyra, another Arabic-speaking city, set in the
midst of the desert, whose wealth came from running caravans
between Syria and Babylonia. In 41 Antonius tried to steal
Palmyra’s wealth by a swift cavalry raid. The city was warned
of his coming and removed the wealth before he got there.”
Palmyra’s Syrian connection, then as now, was through Emesa,
°° -H. Seyrig, ‘Caractéres de histoire d’Emése’, Syria, 36 (1959), 184-92; C. Chad,
Les Dynastes d’Emése (Beirut, 1972), ch. t. 5! Seyrig, ‘Caractéres’.
52 App., CW, v. 9.
and no doubt the warning of Antonius’ raid went from Emesa.
There is thus a clear connection in geographical terms between
Arados, Emesa, and Palmyra, and a close economic connection
between Emesa and Palmyra. It would be reasonable to suppose
just as close a connection between Arados and Emesa, with
Arados being the trade port for these inland cities. Upon that
base it is not difficult to erect in one’s imagination a political
connection. There is also some evidence that the Emesan kings
and the lords of Chalkis were friends, for there are Emesan
dedications at Heliopolis-Baalbek, in Chalkis’ territory.**
Further, when Caesar was in trouble in Alexandria, the force
which rescued him included a contingent led by Iamblichos;**
Josephus does not locate him geographically, but the name is
a common one in the Emesan house,” and he was presumably
of some importance if Josephus feels the need to mention him.
Thus, there seems to exist, in the 40s, a network linking many
of the ‘native’ Syrian political authorities. Some are missing,
particularly Sidon, but also the Phoenician cities between Sidon
and Arados. However, if Tyre was part of the network, Sidon
would not be, and the nearby Phoenician cities were also appar-
ently excluded. Within the network some links were stronger
than others, but I would suggest that the Arados-Emesa—
Palmyra link was one of the strongest, since it was based on
a strong economic mutual interest and an absence of conflict-
ing territorial disputes. The only one of the three which was
expansion-minded was Emesa, and Pompeius seems to have
stopped that for good.
The Parthians had already established a tenuous contact
with Emesa when both were involved in Bassus’ revolt.°° There
may also have been a connection through Palmyra. When
Pakoros’ invasion came, the Parthian army could only reach
Palestine along the two routes they chose, the coast and the
Bekaa, by traversing the territories of Arados and Emesa. It is
fair to assume that they did so by agreement. Indeed in the
case of Arados the agreement seems to have been enthusiastic,
for when the Parthians were driven out of Syria by a series of
8 IGLS, vi. 2747, 2760. = Jos. AZ, xiv. 120:

° R. D. Sullivan, ‘The Dynasty of Emesa’, ANRW 11/8, 198-219, has two on
his
genealogical table; Chad, Dynastes has five in his index.
56 App., CW, iv. 58.
defeats inflicted on them by Antonius’ commander P. Venti-
dius,’ Arados held out in hostility to the Romans. Another of
Antonius’ capable generals, C. Sosius, besieged and captured
Arados in 37.°8
Sosius went on to besiege and capture Jerusalem in the same
year, and in effect he was the man who placed Herod firmly
on the Judaean throne. It is this siege which is the more promi-
nently mentioned both in our sources and in modern accounts.°?
This is partly a matter of the subject of the book, in which
Arados is often peripheral. Much more so it is a matter of
sources, yet we know a siege of Arados occurred, and a moment’s
thought and imagination would suggest the difficulties and
dangers of the enterprise. After all, Jerusalem has been repeat-
edly captured; Arados only once. But the siege of Jerusalem is
as nothing compared to the siege of Arados. Sosius seems to
have been the only general ever to have taken Arados in war,
as opposed to those who attacked the city’s peraia but then
succumbed to negotiation. Normally, of course, the city was
agile enough to avoid the need either for a siege or for nego-
tiations conducted under a threat of one. Normally, also, if the
situation did reach the stage of violence, the city’s rulers were
sensible enough to give in quickly, as in the cases of, for example,
Seleukos II, Antiochos III, and Caesar. This time the willpower
was stronger, or the besiegers were more determined, or exas-
peration was greater—for whatever reason, neither negotiation
nor defiance averted a complete defeat for the city. The siege’s
success argues not just land superiority on the Roman side, but
naval superiority as well. No doubt the Romans were the more
determined to inflict a major defeat because Antonius planned
a Parthian war and there must be no possible source of danger
in his rear. If so, the lesson was taken. He was not, however,
vindictive. Some territory was taken from Arados, for the town
of Balanaia dated a new era from 37.° The place had been
97 A. N. Sherwin-White, Roman Foreign Policy in the East (Norman, Okla., 1984), 303-
5, points out the originality of Ventidius’ achievement.
°8 Dio Cassius, XLIX. xxii. 3.
°° R. Syme, The Roman Revolution (Oxford, 1939), 224, gives Jerusalem a sentence
but ignores Arados; Sherwin-White, Roman Foreign Policy, 306, gives Arados a mention,
but Jerusalem a long sentence; E. G. Huzar, Mark Antony (Minneapolis, Minn., 1978),
164, gives Jerusalem half a paragraph, and Arados is not mentioned.
6° Head, HN, 780 and 785; RE, ii. 2816-7, Balanaia.
Aradian since 128, but its lands had not been distributed at
that time, as had those of Marathos. So Arados retained the
major part of its mainland territory, that part incorporated in
128, and Balanaia became free. No doubt all Syria took note.
Combined with the siege and capture of Jerusalem in the same
year, that of Arados was a stunning demonstration of Roman
war-ability and determination.
Antonius’ return in defeat from Parthia next year, however,
showed the other side of the Roman coin, for his new depen-
dence on the wealth and resources of Egypt led him to make
political concessions to Kleopatra, at the expense of his Syrian
subjects. Once more the various communities of Syria were
being used as political pawns in a Roman game. There is no
evidence that they liked it.
Kleopatra met Antonius on his return at a place called White
Village in Phoenicia, where his army was recuperating at a safe
distance from Parthian attacks and close to the supplies which
could be provided by the Phoenician cities, by Herod, and
by Egypt.®’ No doubt as a reward for her timely assistance,
Kleopatra was given substantial tracts of land in Syria, which
from her point of view was the start of a reconstitution of the
old Ptolemaic empire. The weakest of the Phoenicians suffered
most, and Ptolemaic rule returned to the land from Berytos to
Orthosia—exactly the same territory rescued from the Iturae-
ans by Pompeius thirty years before. Coins celebrating the fact,
with the head of Kleopatra on one side and local emblems on
the other, were issued at Orthosia, Tripolis, and Berytos, though
apparently not at Botrys or Byblos.”
The Ituraeans also occupied some former Ptolemaic territory.
The lord of Arka had proved to have a deft political sense
already. He had also, it seems, made friends with Herod by
lending troops to Herod to pursue the war in Palestine, for the
men are called eight hundred men ‘of Mount Lebanon’, and
this can only mean Arka.® Lysanias of Chalkis, on the other
hand, had incriminated himself once too often. Our source says
he was accused of supporting Pakoros, which he had done, but
he did not suffer for it until after the Parthian victory in
Media. In the mean time Lysanias had been openly supporting
Antigonos against Herod. This would seem to have been the
§' Plut., Antonius, 50. ® Seyrig, ‘Eres’, 43-6. 8 Jos., AJ, xiv. 452.
The Roman Take-over, 64-15 Bc 175
last straw for Antonius. Antigonos having been eliminated
by Herod, partly by the use of the eight hundred Ituraeans,
Antonius now removed Lysanias, who was executed, and gave
the Chalkis principality to Kleopatra. Once more there seems
to be revealed here a persistent division, between Arka and
Chalkis, similar to that between Tyre and Sidon. No wonder
Syria was conquered so often.
Just in case he was feeling too confident of his position,
Herod was also punished for Kleopatra’s benefit, being forced to
surrender some rich balsam groves in eastern Judaea.” But this
new Ptolemaic empire was a wan thing. Neither in the fragrant
groves of Jericho nor in the Bekaa valley was Egyptian rule
actually reimposed. Instead, Kleopatra leased these lands out
to their former owners, so Herod retained actual control but
paid a rent for the Jericho land.® At Chalkis, after Lysanias
had been executed, it was Zenodoros, his son, who became the
lessee.’ The Phoenician cities, as the coins show, retained their
own identities and no doubt their own local governments,
though local dating was now by a new era beginning with the
arrival of Kleopatra as ruler.®’ None of these measures was
designed to increase Egyptian popularity; perhaps Antonius
planned it that way, for what he could give, he could also
remove.
Arados, Sidon, and Tyre were excluded from this Egyptian
imperialism, but they were none the less under Antonius’ final
authority. Thus they were obviously involved in the great effort
_ which Antonius made to defend his eastern possessions against
Octavian’s invasion in 31. There was a great minting of coins.
All the cities which had minted during the Roman provincial
rule did so in 31/o—Arados, Berytos, Sidon, Tripolis, Tyre®°—
to provide cash for the army and the fleet. It must also be
assumed that Antonius’ fleet of 500 ships, of which only 200 were
Egyptian, included contingents from the three great Phoenician
cities. It certainly included land contingents from the Syrian
kings and princes—lIamblichos was executed by Antonius
6 Thid. xv. 92; Bf, i. 440; Dio Cassius, xL1x, xxxii; Jones, CERP, 270.
8 Jos., AF, xv. 96; BT, i. 362. % Jos., AF,xv. 106-7.
87 Jones, CERP, 270. 68 Seyrig, ‘Eres’, 43-6.
°° BMC Phoenicia, Aradus, no. 292, Berytos, nos. 14, 15, Sidon, no. 110, Tripolis, no.
19 (not dated to 50/49 Bc), Tyre, nos. 179, 180.
during the campaign’’—but numbers are as elusive as usual.
As participants in the campaign and the battle they will have
suffered casualties, and they will have further feared the ven-
geance of Octavian.
Such fears as were entertained were more or less groundless.
To the victor of Antium, the conqueror of Antonius, and the
lord of all those legions, the petty affairs of minor eastern kings
and cities were of small importance. It was quite possible to
extend mercy to those who, after all, had had little choice but
to do as they were told. All that was now required of them
was that they continue doing as they were told. The three
Phoenician cities survived, therefore, with their privileges con-
firmed.”!
The Ptolemaic state fell to Octavian personally, and so he
had to dispose of Kleopatra’s later acquisitions. Generally there
was no difficulty, for those from whom she had taken them were
usually still around to claim them back. Thus Herod could be
given back the Jericho balsam groves.’? Lysanias was dead, but
Zenodoros, Kleopatra’s tenant at Chalkis, could be confirmed
as tetrarch. He immediately advertised his new position by a
coin issue.”?
The Phoenician communities along the coast from Berytos
to the Eleutheros could also be disposed of easily had Octavian
so chosen, for the four cities could simply have been awarded
their freedom, as before. This certainly happened to Orthosia,
Tripolis, and Byblos. The fact that none of them rushed to mint
new coins suggests a certain weariness, if not a wariness, with
all the recent changes. After all, these cities had been lorded
over by Pompeius, Caesar, Cassius, Antonius, the Parthians,
Antonius again, and Kleopatra, in less than two decades. To
wait and see if the new regime lasted, and meantime keep one’s
head down, might well seem a good idea. Tripolis, using the
old Seleukid era, coined by 28/7,’* but Byblos did not do so
until 22/1.’° By that time, and especially with Augustus on a
personal visit to the east, it may well have seemed intelligent
® Dio Cassius, L. xiii. 7: ‘lamblichos, a king of the tribe of the Arabians’.
1M Jos., AJ, xv. 217; BF 1. 396.
~
> Chehab, ‘Tyr’, 27-8, a note on Tyre’s autonomy by H. Seyrig.
™ Head, HN, 783-4.
™ BMC Phoenicia, Tripolis, nos. 21, 22.
® Tbid., Byblos, no. 18.
The Roman Take-over, 64-15 BC iy7
to use the era of the battle of Actium. Orthosia, however, did
not coin even then.
Berytos, however, was different. Octavian organized there a
Roman colony, a settlement of veteran soldiers, apparently
selected from two legions, which appear to be the Fifth Mace-
donica, and the Eighth Gallica.’° The purpose ofthis settlement
was clearly to introduce a specifically Roman presence force-
fully into central Syria, and particularly into Phoenicia. This
was, no doubt, part of a carefully considered reconstruction of
Roman authority throughout Syria. In the south that authority
was located in the person of Herod of Judaea, whose territory
was expanded so that he ruled virtually everything between
Egypt and Phoenicia. In the north, the power lay with the
Roman governor and his army, consisting of three or four
legions, plus their associated auxiliary troops.’’ Berytos lay
exactly between these two, at a crucial traffic constriction on the
coast road which has forced battle on invaders and traversing
armies for several thousand years.
The precise date of the original settlement is in dispute. The
legions from which the colonists came are recorded on the
colony’s coins,” and there are a couple of funerary inscrip-
tions.” The Eighth legion is recorded in one inscription as
having the cognomen ‘Gallica’, but it was later known as
‘Augusta’.®° Since this latter name could not have been awarded
before Octavian became Augustus in 27 BC, it is assumed that
the use of the old name implies a veteran being settled there
before 27, which means, in effect, during Octavian’s first visit
to the east after Actium. This is, of course, a fragile foundation.
The alternative date is 15 or 14 Bc, when Octavian’s co-ruler
M. Vipsanius Agrippa was in the east, and is known to have
planted more veterans at Berytos*'—unless this was the only
planting. In that case ‘Gallica’ is thought to be a memory of
earlier campaigns.
Yet it is not sufficient to rely only on such details of evidence.
The earlier date of 30 Bc has other arguments in its favour. A
© Head, HN, 790; Strabo, xv1. ii. 19.
77
H. M. D. Parker, The Roman Legions (Cambridge, 1928), 92 and 119.
78 Head, HN, 790. PIGIE iia 56:
2
° Ibid. 1. 6; R. Mouterde, ‘Regards sur Beyrouth, Phénicienne, Hellénistique et
Romaine’, MUS7 40 (1964), 161-5.
81 Strabo, XVI. ii. 19.
veteran colony was installed partly to have a place to put time-
expired soldiers, of which Octavian had huge numbers in 30,
but its main purpose was geopolitical. It established a fortified,
martial settlement in an area where Roman governmental
power was needed. It provided a population from which legion-
ary recruiting could be conducted. It produced a formidable
military reserve, at least in the short term. And in the case of
Berytos, there was no other colony closer than central Asia
Minor. The geopolitical case for a powerful Roman military
and political presence in Syria from 30 is very strong.
There was also a local reason: the Ituraeans. Their reputation
as brigands, robbers, and bandits was well established, whether
deserved or not. Zenodoros, confirmed as tetrarch by Octavian
in 30," was apparently unable to control his people, and some
of his lands were handed over to Herod in 24.** When Zenodoros
died in 20 it is unclear what happened to Chalkis, though
Herod took over a small area around the sources of the Jordan.**
Since we know this happened, it is clear that the southern Bekaa
did not go to Herod. Probably another member of the Ituraean
house became tetrarch, but over only a smaller area. The
opportunity was taken, perhaps at this time, to hand over
territory to the nearby cities, Damascus and Sidon, and perhaps
to Tyre. The best time for this is after Zenodoros’ death in 20.”
Berytos colony also took in some of the tetrarchy, for the
temple-town of Heliopolis-Baalbek was part of the colony’s
territory.®° When this happened is not known, but the only two
occasions which look likely are 30, during Octavian’s visit, and
15/14, when Agrippa was there. The death of Zenodoros does
not seem the likely occasion, though it is possible. When Zeno-
doros became tetrarch in 30 he issued coins proclaiming
himself as tetrarch and high priest as had his father and grand-
father, and this suggests that he controlled Heliopolis-Baalbek
at that time. What seems the most likely sequence, then, is that
the colony was founded in 30, Zenodoros being confirmed in
® Wroth, BMC Syria, 281, no. 7.
% Strabo, xvi, ii. 20; Jos., AF, xv. 344-5; BF, 1. 398.
8 Jos., AJ, xv. 360.; BJ, 1. 400. 8° Jones, CERP, 270.
86 C. Ghadban, ‘Les Frontiéres du territoire d’Heliopolis-Baalbek a la lumiere de
nouveaux documents’, in La Géographie administrative et politique d’Alexandre a Mahomet
(Strasburg, n.d.), 143-68, together with the comments by J.-P. Rey-Coquais, ‘Les
Fronti¢res d’Heliupolis: quelques remarques’, at 169-72.
office at the same time, and that the colony was reinforced in
15, which is also the most likely time for the colony to acquire
land at Baalbek, for it is at that time that Sidon and Damascus
acquired slices of the Ituraean lands. Whatever interpretations
can be extracted from the exiguous sources, the strategic import-
ance of establishing Roman control in Phoenicia from the
beginning seems quite compelling. There was no reason for
Octavian to believe that there was any goodwill towards him
in Syria—or towards any other Roman, for that matter. So a
local Roman power base seems a requisite.
The basic reason for the lack of goodwill was the result of
bitter experience. Rome’s performance in Syria had been both
erratic and dangerous so far. For Syrians to withhold goodwill
would seem to be the intelligent and prudent attitude. Yet, as
time passed, Octavian became Augustus, he and Agrippa lasted
longer and longer, no more wars came, and the Parthians were
appeased—-so all these developments slowly accustomed Syrians
to the novel experience of a peaceful Roman rule. The punish-
ment of Zenodoros and the reduction of his tetrarchy will
also have convinced his neighbours of Roman goodwill towards
them, so that Strabo could comment, in connection with Zeno-
doros, that Rome had brought a good government to the
area;®’
In these circumstances revival began. The replacement of an
erratic extortionate system of taxation akin to plunder by a
predictable system, no matter how heavy, was one benefit.®
The smaller regular army was another. The presence in Syria
of three or four legions helped the local economy by recycling
some of the tax revenue back into the hands of the local suppliers
and providers of goods and services. The establishment of a
widely accepted and stable currency assisted the process. In 19
Bc the Roman mint at Antioch began to produce a prolific
silver coinage, and that year or the next all the other Syrian
mints were closed. (The only exception was Jerusalem, where
copies of Tyrian shekels of a particular fineness began to be
minted in 18 for use in the temple there.*’) Only occasional
87 Strabo, xvI. ii. 20.
88 A.H. M.Jones, ‘Taxation in Antiquity’, in id. The Roman Economy, ed. P. A. Brunt
(Oxford, 1974), 171.
89 ‘Y. Meshorer, ‘One Hundred Ninety Years of Tyrian Shekels’, Festshrift fiir Leo
Mildenburg (Wetteren, 1984), 171-9.
commemorative coins were issued from other mints from now
on.”
Another source of wealth and a stimulus to local economic
activity was king Herod. Josephus puts together into one
passage”’ all the information he has gathered concerning
Herod’s building activities throughout the east, with the result
that it is not clear exactly when much of it took place. It can
be assumed that much of his generosity only began after the
establishment of Octavian’s rule, when the surplus of cash in
his coffers was not syphoned off into the Roman civil wars. In
Phoenicia Herod provided cash for buildings in all the cities
from Tyre to Tripolis, and the actual buildings are instructive.
Byblos, for instance, was given a city wall, which is a reflection
on the city’s vulnerability to its Ituraean neighbours, and
perhaps to the continuing need for the city to be on its guard.”
The other cities were given items of equipment which were the
sort of buildings to be expected of any Hellenistic city—a
gymnasium at Tripolis, a theatre at Sidon. But it was Tyre and
Berytos which received the most generous gifts. Josephus lists
them as ‘large rooms, cloisters, temples, and market-places’, all
public buildings, well placed no doubt in the centres of the
cities, and bearing inscriptions to record the king’s generosity.
Berytos was probably in need of these buildings, for its desig-
nation as a colony would force a major expansion of the city’s
size. For Herod it was also, of course, a political gesture, aimed
at pleasing Augustus, to whom Herod owed his throne, a fact
which, to his credit, he never forgot.”
Herod’s generosity to Tyre, however, must flow from a
different motive. The city was not popular with the Romans,
given its habit of supporting losing causes, from Pompeius
to Antonius. Julius Caesar had punished it, and Augustus
frequently followed his great-uncle’s lead in such matters,
90
e.g. BMC Phoenicia, Aradus, nos. 356-8, Byblos, no. 19, Sidon, no. 207, are all
issues for the visit of the Imperial prince Gaius to the east.
5! Jos., BT, 1. 422.
* The continued insecurity in the area is suggested by the building in ap 44 of
a
tower at Qalaat Fakra in the north, as protection; cf. P. Collart, ‘La Tour de Qalaat
Fakra’, Syria, 50 (1973), 137-61.
°° J. Lauffray, ‘Forums et Monuments de Beryte’, BMB 7 (1944-5), 13-80; id,
‘Beyrouth, archéologie et histoire, époques greco-romaines: I. Période hellénistiqu
e et
haut empire’, ANRW u/8, 145-7.
especially where, as in this case, it was not an important issue.
So for Herod there was no benefit to be gained, in Roman
political terms, from his generosity towards Tyre. The motive
must therefore lie in another direction, though it can be pre-
sumed that politics is at the heart of it. The connection between
Herod and Tyre went back to the 40s, when he was his father’s
representative in Galilee, and the connection between Tyre and
the previous Hasmonaeans goes back much earlier. It was
Tyrian shekels which were the only silver currency acceptable
as offerings in the Jerusalem temple, and when Tyre ceased
minting them in 18 Bc, a new mint was set up in Jerusalem to
continue the series. Herod’s generosity to Tyre therefore had as
its motive the need to maintain a connection with the Phoe-
nician city for religious and economic reasons; politically it
would also do no harm for the king to keep a warm contact
alive with a city which was perhaps less than enthusiastically
regarded by the Roman government. He could always claim
that he was doing it to help control the city’s attitudes and to
be able to warn the Roman governor of any political problems.
Herod was agile enough to be able to do something ofthe sort for
a whole variety of reasons, which might well be contradictory.
Since Herod’s generosity can only be understood in political
terms, it is surely important to note not just who received his
gifts, but who did not. It is very noticeable that every major
Phoenician city except Arados received his gifts. In the context
this is clearly significant, though the reason is less clear. Pre-
-sumably it was a result of the alignment of political forces in
Syria brought about by the Parthian invasion. Then Arados
had been on the Parthian side, and had been besieged by Sosius
afterwards, falling to the Romans in the end through famine.
This was in the same year that Jerusalem had been besieged by
the same man and the same Roman army. Arados’ fate will
have been a lesson to all Phoenicians. The continued cold war
between Romans and Parthians after Antonius’ return from his
invasion, combined with the bitter feelings among the Aradians
as a result of the siege and their defeat, will have made the city
an object of Roman suspicion. Not until the Romano-Parthian
détente of 20 Bc will the international position have become less
frosty, and Arados’ feelings may well have taken much longer
to be assuaged. In the Roman province, no one could afford to
show sympathy for Arados, for to do so would bring about
Roman suspicion. And Herod would avoid that at all costs.
Herod’s. gifts of public buildings were presumably
accomplished by contracting with local builders to construct
them, with Herod paying the subsequent bills. That is, money
was spent, by Herod, in the various cities. This was an economic
stimulus of the first importance. In addition, the pacification
of the whole Mediterranean area, the lavish expenditure of tax
revenues for new construction and for the settlement of veterans,
and most of all the lightening and new regularity of taxation,
all acted in their various ways to stimulate trade and
production. The Phoenician cities were well placed to take
advantage of these new economic conditions.
One particular development had taken place during the
Roman upheavals. Glass had been one of the industrial products
for which Sidon had been known all through the Hellenistic
period. The manufacturing method in use had been casting
and polishing, and this was copied in other centres, including
Rhodes and Alexandria.** Alexandria, indeed, specialized in
producing varieties of glasswork which can only be called luxur-
ious, and it seems that the work involved in all glass-making
rendered the price so high as to limit the market to the wealthy
classes. Some time about 50 Bc, however, the technique of glass-
blowing was invented, almost certainly in Phoenicia, or rather
Sidon, for that was the main producer. This new technique
produced glass vessels quickly and cheaply, and it was an
instant success. The variety of shapes and forms which could be
produced was very much greater, and hence the utility of glass
was greatly increased just as the cost was decreased. The result
was a huge expansion of the potential market, and glass finds
in late first century Bc contexts in archaeological excavations
show that it had quickly become a common article on Roman
sites. It appears that the Sidonian glass-masters established
branches of their business in Italy and that further expansion
took the technique to Gaul and Germany by the end of the first
century AD. The location of the glass-houses appears to be partly
* D. B. Harden, ‘Ancient Glass: I, Pre-Roman’, Archaeological Journal, 125 (1968),

46-72, and ‘II, Roman’, ibid. 126 (1969), 44-77, and D. F. Grose, ‘Glass Forming
Methods in Classical Antiquity: Some Considerations’, Journal of Glass Studies, 26
(1984), 25-34.
determined by the availability of suitable sand. Strabo records
the Sidonians collecting sand from the long beach north of
Ptolemais-Ake.®°
This set of developments provides a typical example of indus-
trial expansion in the ancient world, where transport costs were
so high”® that it was better to establish a new production centre,
even at the risk of destroying part of the market for the original
centre.*’ Some products, on the other hand, were locally so
distinctive that they could not be transplanted. Thus, although
fruit trees could be transplanted to Italy,°* the local wines were
sufficiently notable to be in demand for themselves, and Syria
as a whole was a major wine producer; in Phoenicia Pliny
records particularly wine of Berytos, Tripolis, and Tyre being
exported to Italy. Pliny’s testimony on this is important
because his compilation took place in the mid-first century AD,
from older sources, and so he reflects the situation as it was in
the first half century after Octavian’s victory, that is, he shows
the development which took place soon after the restoration of
peace in the Roman world.
Another manufacture which remained largely localized in
Phoenicia was dyeing and textile finishing, of which Tyre was
always seen as the centre, but which was practised wherever
the murex shellfish could be collected and processed. The
Roman poets habitually call the purples “Tyrian’,’” but Sidon
is also mentioned and Pausanias later reports them as ‘Phoe-
nician’ '°' This, of course, was only the most obvious and most
famous of the textile works, which included silk-weaving and
linen, though only the former is recorded for the early period.
®° Strabo, xvi. ii. 25. D. F. Grose, ‘The Syro-Palestinian Glass Industry in the Later
Hellenistic Period’, Muse, 13 (1979), 54-67, is rather more limited than the title would
suggest, and does not consider seriously the Sidonian element in the industry.
%° A. Burford, ‘Heavy Transport in Classical Antiquity’, Economic History Review, 13
(1960), 1-18.
°” The most studied industry of this type is probably Arretine/Samian pottery, but
the same process occurs with wine, and now glass.
°° Martial, xm. 29 (Syrian plums from Damascus), Pliny, WH, xv. 47 (Syrian
jujube), 83 (figs); cf. L. B. West, ‘Commercial Syria under the Roman Empire’, TAPA
55 (1924), 162.
® Pliny, NH, xiv. 74.
1 e.g. Martial, u. 43; Horace, Epistles, 1. vi. 18; Ovid, Ars Amatoria, ii. 297; West,
‘Commercial Syria’, 169-72, collects the references.
101 Pausanias, I. xxi. 6.
lee) uucan, x. 144.
Phoenicia was not a great source of exportable raw materials,
and the cities were centres more for the trading-on of other
countries’ products—they were, that is, entrepots. Spices and
incense from the east and the south went westwards’ along
with re-woven silk from China. Slaves were gathered at the
ports; although only Tyre and Berytos are specifically noted
among the Phoenician cities, and then only in the fourth century
AD, the ubiquity of the trade ensured that all participated.’
Men from Phoenicia also went abroad, of their own free will,
and groups of merchants are known in the great port cities of
Italy from an early date.’
It is once again noticeable that the cities included in the
sources which record all these activities are Tyre, Sidon, and
Berytos above all, with Tripolis being mentioned occasionally—
but never Arados. The island situation of Arados which had
served it so well during the Hellenistic and Persian periods had
become a liability with the cleansing of the seas of pirates and
the establishment of the Roman peace on the mainland. It may
also be that the acquisition and retention of the neighbouring
mainland had converted the oligarchy of Arados from a mer-
chant community into one of landowners. This change would
involve the concentration into fewer hands of the lands orig-
inally distributed in 128, but that would scarcely be unusual.
One may speculate further: the destruction wrought by the
siege by Sosius in 37 would be concentrated in the city itself, and
the landowners would survive, thus reinforcing the tendency
to concentration by eliminating the competing mercantile
groups.
Tyre might now be grateful to Alexander the Great for
connecting the city with the mainland, and so avoiding the
dichotomy visible to Arados, though the benefits must have
seemed a long time coming, and bought at a high price.
'8 "West, ‘Commercial Syria’, 177-9;J.I. Miller, The Spice Trade of the Roman Empire
(Oxford, 1969), passim; E. H. Warmington, The Commerce between the Roman Empire and
India (Cambridge, 1928), ch. 1.
'* West, ‘Commercial Syria’, 181-2.
' Dating is difficult, for the inscriptions are too often undated, but there were
‘Syrians’ in Pompeii before the eruption of ap 79 (CIL, iv. 4831) and nearby Puteoli
has evidence of merchants (presumably) from Berytos (CIL, x. 1634), Sarepta (JGR,
420), Tyre (CIL, x. 1601—of ap 183—and JG, x1v. 830) and Heliopolis (CIL, x. 1578
and 1579). The majority of these, perhaps all of them, are probably of imperial date,
cf. M. Frederiksen, Campania, ed. N. Purcell, (Rome, 1984), 330.
There is no doubt that the twin southern cities, Tyre and
Sidon, prospered greatly after the establishment of the Augu-
stan peace, and the cities to the north of Sidon, particularly
Berytos and Tripolis, also prospered and expanded. It may be
assumed, perhaps, that Byblos, Botrys, and Orthosia similarly
participated in the economic expansion. Arados perhaps did
not, or not so much. The absence of the city’s name in any of
the economic references, the ending of the city’s mint, and its
awkward geographical and political situation all suggest that
the city declined. Yet this may only be a relative decline. It
seems clear enough that Tyre and Sidon did exceptionally
well; it may only be that Arados only did well. But we cannot
tell.
This wealth was undoubtedly translated into cultural
display. Sidon had long been the Phoenician city which had
taken most enthusiastically to Hellenic sports, with a series of
winners in various Greek games in the second century, a series
which extended into the next century.'°° Herod’s gifts of theatres
and gymnasia furthered the cause of Hellenization. Not sur-
prisingly it was Sidon from which the earliest contributors of
Roman culture emerged, in the persons of Boethus,!” at the
time of Augustus, and the doctor Meges, in the first century
Ap.’ Tyre did not produce such men for another century, nor
Berytos, but it was in the early Roman period that the begin-
nings were made in Berytos’ later reputation for teaching law,
Sidon’s for medicine, Tyre’s for geography, and all of them, of
course, for rhetoric and philosophy. That is to say, it was only
during the Roman period that these cities can be said to have
become fully Hellenized. No doubt the Roman peace helped in
this, as it did in economic affairs, but it seems likely it was more
of a psychological shift, in that the removal of Greek political
domination permitted the acceptance of Greek cultural values.
In 25 Bc at Arados, an inscription was cut in both Greek and
Phoenician commemorating a gymnasiarch.'°’ The inscription
sums up the whole Hellenistic cultural history of Phoenicia, for,
106 Zeno won the Asklepeia in 44/3 Bc, (SEG, xxxi. 1646); Asklepiades of Sidon was
an Olympic victory in 24 Bc and Kallikles of Sidon in ap 57 (L. Moretti, Olympionikai
(Rome, 1957), nos. 114 and 372).
107 Strabo, xvI. li. 24. LOC RES Keg 20.
109 IGLS, vii. 4001.
by being a gymnasiarch, the man was overseeing the replace-
ment of his Phoenician culture by that of the Greeks from whom
his city had struggled to escape for two centuries.
7
THE PHOENICIANS OVERSEAS
The Phoenicians were a small, divided people living in a world

dominated by immensely more powerful forces whose unpre-
dictability could replace favour with hostility at any twist of
the political wheel. The Persians had been succeeded by the
Macedonians, whose collapse had sucked in Roman power. In
moments of peril whole cities could be destroyed, and the favour
of one ruling group could mean the vindictive hostility of the
next conqueror.
This circumstance, of living in a world dominated by others,
evoked varying reactions from the victims. The Jews rebelled,
repeatedly, but with only momentary success. Others adapted
themselves to the moods of their conquerors. All would have
preferred independence, and when they got the chance of it,
seized it. The Phoenicians did so, not as a people, as the Jews
did, but as separate cities. The Phoenicians also had other
traditions which could provide alternative solutions to this
problem, traditions of trading, of voyaging overseas, of colon-
ization; all these could become methods of survival when the
need arose.
Some of this has been alluded to already, but it is perhaps
worth while to bring together into one chapter the evidence for
Phoenicians’ activity outside their homeland. The Phoenician
reputation in the modern world, in so far as they have one, is,
after all, mainly as traders. This is, of course, due to our viewing
them through Greek eyes. Since one of the objects of this book
is to emancipate the Phoenicians of the Hellenistic period—the
time of the Greeks’ power par excellence—it is thus requisite to
do the same for the Phoenician people outside their homeland.
The questions which need to be addressed in this chapter are
those which are implied by the very concept of Phoenicians
travelling abroad: where did they go, why, what did they do
there, when, what changes can be detected in all this during
auelsJeW-Ul-elay
e oonuy
VIdLyVa
elaynajas
e SijOdasiad
Yay
NIVYHVE
002 ddr 009 008 Wwx000T

ie eee eeere [ese
dvjw
‘GS sueIostus0yg
Ul oy} sey
Phoenicians Overseas 189
the Hellenistic period’s three centuries? Given the title of the
book as a whole, also: what connections can be traced between
events at home and Phoenician activities abroad? These ques-
tions have to be asked, whether or not clear answers emerge
from the sources; if they do, well and good; if not, other measures
of a less direct kind will be necessary.
The Phoenicians are typically thought of as seamen and
voyagers because we see them as the Greeks saw them,
approaching in ships. Within the Akhaimenid Empire,
however, they were also landsmen, merchants using the inland
caravan routes. In fact, of course, there is no contradiction
between the two, rather the two viewpoints emphasize the
geographical situation of the Phoenician cities, on the western
edge of the Asian continent and at the same time at the eastward
_ extreme of the Mediterranean. They thus existed at the inter-
face of sea and land, and this was one of their strengths (as it
was for the Greeks of Asia Minor as well). Immediately, there-
fore, the whole subject of this chapter divides itself geographi-
cally, into expansion to the east and to the west. It will be seen
also that, despite a certain overlap, this is a chronological
division as well. If we begin in the late Persian period, it
will be apparent that the Phoenicians were as active in the
continental interior as in the maritime west, but that one of
the effects of the Macedonian conquest was to reduce the
possibilities presented by the interior. This was despite initial
encouragement, and despite the widespread conception of the
‘opening-up’ of the Akhaimenid empire which Alexander’s
career is said to have produced—but that was, again, a Greek
view. Phoenicians had a different viewpoint.
The Phoenicians were not just traders, they were also crafts-
men of inventiveness and ingenuity, and they were artists (in
so far as the two can be separated). Phoenician artistic work
has been recognized at the Great King’s palace at Persepolis,
in a building dating to about 500 Bc.' The route from their
home to the palace was through northern Syria, along the
Euphrates, through Babylonia and Susiana, exactly the route
which traders will have taken. The Persian practice of using
''W. Culican, The Medes and Persians (London, 1965), 105 and 110; Dareios the
Great noted in his ‘Foundation Tablet’ that he had imported cedar wood from Lebanon
(quoted p. 104).
190 Phoenicians Overseas
islands in the Persian Gulf as places of exile for undesirables’
and their blockage of the entrance to Babylonia from the Gulf
to deter seaborne raids,’ both show that the Gulf was well
frequented and that trade between Babylonia and the Gulf
was well established.‘By reaching Persepolis, therefore, the
Phoenician traders were linking into another seaborne trading
system. Elsewhere there are traces of Phoenicians in Palestine,
at Marisa* and Samaria.” It is difficult to believe they were not
present at Damascus where the governor’s court was placed for
at least part of the year.® Their ships were able to provision
Kyros the Younger at Myriandros, before he took the route
— ’ Skylax refers to the Orontes river as the Thapsakos
river,® implying that there was a route connecting the Orontes
mouth and the crossing of the Euphrates at Thapsakos. All this
is indirect evidence of connections between the Phoenician
coastal cities and the interior.
There is another, even more indirect, connection. The
Aramaic language, with its alphabetic script, had been spread-
ing throughout the Fertile Crescent for centuries. The spread
was powerfully assisted by the Assyrian practice of deporting
rebellious subjects, so that when the Akhaimenids began to rule
the old Assyrian territories, Aramaic was the language which
was most widely spread. By the fifth century it was used in
Egypt,? and deportees such as the Hebrews took it to
Babylonia.'° It became the official Persian administrative lan-
guage,'' and it was well enough established in eastern Iran to
be used by the Indian emperor Asoka and to be the basis for
other alphabetic scripts in the area.’
2 Strabo, XVI. iil. 5. 3 Arr., Anab., vil. vii. 6-7.
* OGIS, 593. > Jos., AF, xii. 258.
° The satrap of Syria retreated to Damascus in the face of Alexander’s invasion
(Arr., Anab., 1. xi. 10 and xv. 1), and the city was walled (Polyainos, iv. 16). It will
also have contained a satrapal palace, perhaps a rebuilding of the old Assyrian
governor’s residence. Damascus in its oasis has always, for good geographical reasons,
been a centre of political power and will have required the attention of any governor.
7 Xenophon, Anabasis,i. 4.
8 G. Muller, Geographi Graeci Minores, Skylax, 104.
° By the Jewish soldiers at Elephantine: A. E. Cowley, Aramaic Papyri of the Fifth
Century B.C. (Oxford, 1923), and B. Porten, Archives from Elephantine (Cambridge, 1968).
'© Cf. the Psalms composed there, especially, of course, Ps. 137; Culican (n. 1), 102-3.
'! A. T. Olmstead, History of the Persian Empire (Chicago, 1948), 116.
"A. H. D. Bivar, “The Seleucid Period’, Cambridge History of Iran, iii. i (Cambridge,
1983), 16.
Phoenicians Overseas 1QI
Now Phoenician was an Aramaic dialect. The Phoenician
traders and travellers thus had a much easier linguistic time of
it than, say, the cuneiform-writing Babylonians, or the syllabic-
writing Egyptians, or the barely literate Iranians. The only
language which could compete with Aramaic in ease of writing
and fluency was Greek, and Greek was barely known in western
Asia—still less in eastern—before Alexander. The widespread
and widening use of Aramaic in the Akhaimenid state provided
the Phoenicians with a congenial linguistic environment. This
is something they will have known, appreciated, and made use
of. The Phoenician craftsmen in Persepolis were the eastern tip
of a Phoenician mercantile endeavour which was, we may
assume, as adventurous and profitable as their seaward expan-
sion to the west.
The Phoenicians were clearly favoured by the Persians within
the empire, and benefited from their inclusion in it. The Sidon-
ians could be excused for not seeing these benefits during the
sack of their city in 345, but the city’s obvious prosperity and
size, together with the ability of the Phoenician cities as a whole
to launch a major fleet during the war with Alexander,’? show
that their prosperity during the fourth century was no fiction.
Alexander clearly also appreciated their power and wealth, and
was prepared to use Phoenicians in the furtherance of his own
imperial ambitions. There were Phoenicians among the camp-
followers who accompanied the Macedonian army on its long
march eastwards. They are mentioned by Arrian, usually
quoting Aristoboulos, in India, where they helped crew the
ships which were built to carry the army down to the Ocean
along the Indus river.'* They were not the only sailors available,
for Egyptians, Karians, and Cypriots are also noted, as well as
Greeks. In the Anabasis Arrian suggests these men were serving
with the forces, but in the Jndike he makes it clear that they
were conscripted on the spot from among the followers. Perhaps
they were reasonably pleased to sail rather than walk—
especially as the alternative was to be left behind—and they
continued as sailors in the fleet which Nearchos led from the
Indus to the Euphrates.
13 The fleet was at least 300 ships strong (Diod., xxrx. ii and XxxI. ili) or even 400
(Arr., Anab., 1. xviii. 5), see also Ch. 1.
4 Arr., Anab., vi. i. 6, and Indike, xviii. 1.
Other Phoenicians had to march, and are recorded as
accompanying Alexander on his desert march through Gedro-
sia, where they eagerly gathered myrrh and nard.!° Their
familiarity with these products, and with the methods of harvest-
ing them, is indicative of previous experience with such plants,
not necessarily in Gedrosia, but more likely in southern Arabia.
These Phoenicians were clearly being useful to Alexander in
his marches, and were eagerly acquisitive in their individual
merchant capacities.
When Alexander returned to Babylonia, other Phoenicians
had been active in increasing his naval strength. There were,
according to Arrian, again citing Aristoboulos, almost fifty ships
at Babylon which had been brought from ‘Phoenicia’ overland,
dismantled. Two of these were quinqueremes, and three were
quadriremes. Unlikely though this sounds, it is perfectly
possible. Alexander was also using Phoenicians to man these
and other ships. Combined with the fleet brought by Nearchos,
this force was adequate for one of Alexander’s reported plans:
to navigate the Persian Gulfand round Arabia. The subjugation
of the incense lands of south Arabia would be to the Phoenicians’
taste, no doubt. Further crews were to be recruited in Phoenicia
by the agent Mikkalos of Klazomenai.'® Since the ships in
Babylon and those from India were at least partly manned by
Phoenicians, this new recruiting drive is a sign that Alexander
had appreciated the value and expertise of the Phoenicians as
much and as rapidly as had the Persians. It is also clear that
the Phoenicians had been quick to seize the opportunities
for profit and for action presented by Alexander and his
campaigns.
There is a relic of all this in a citation by Strabo. He reports
the existence of two islands in the Persian Gulf called Tyre and
Arados, on which Phoenician-style temples could be recognized,
and whose inhabitants claimed that the Phoenician cities of
those names were their colonies.'’ Strabo’s source seems to be
Eratosthenes,'* which puts these Phoenician-inhabited islands
in the third century Bc, within a generation of the deaths of
'° Arr., Anab., vi. xxii. 4. '© Ibid. vu, xix. 3-5. '7 Strabo, xv1. iii. 4.
'® Strabo ends his section by referring to Eratosthenes (xvi. iii. 7) but he
has also
referred to Nearchos and Orthagoras, though they are less likely to be the basis
for the
whole account.
Alexander’s companions. The connection is reasonably close,
so that we can accept that these islands were (to reverse Strabo’s
comment) colonized by Phoenicians, and that this was a result
of the activities and plans of Alexander in the Gulf, either as a
direct result of Alexander’s preparations for the voyage, or due
to a private Phoenician initiative at any time in the generation
following Alexander’s death. There seems to have been plenty
of Phoenician manpower available in the east for such a project
to have been mounted.
The islands’ precise position is not clear. Strabo, presumably
relying on Eratosthenes, locates them one day’s sail west of
Ras Mussandam, and ten days’ sail from the mouth of the
Euphrates. This is very vague, and there are numerous islands
both in the midst of the sea and close to the Arabian coast in
_ that area.!® The archaeological exploration of the coasts and
islands of the Gulf has only just begun;” if Phoenician temples
existed, their remains will eventually be located.
The distances given by Strabo are important, for they elim-
inate one interpretation of his account which is sometimes
adopted. Pliny called Bahrain ‘Tyros’, though the name was
actually Tylos.*! Strabo’s island of Tyre is certainly not Bahrain,
for that is more than one day’s sail from Ras Mussandam. This
raises the problem that Strabo omits Bahrain from his account,
but then he omits other places too, and is clearly selective.
Pliny, on the other hand, is very informative on Bahrain, and
provides a mass of names of islands and coastal towns, few or
none of which have been located. He is clearly using a later
source than is Strabo, and has conflated ‘Tyros’ and ‘Tylos’,
using the more familiar form. ‘Arados’ has vanished altogether.
If an explanation is needed (and it can only be a conjecture) it
'9 Most maps, indeed many atlases, ignore the islands in the eastern half
of the Gulf,
but there are many, scattered over the whole area. This, of course, would be an ideal
situation for Phoenician voyagers, moving from island to island, able to land every
night. See The Times Atlas, ii, sheets 32 and 33.
0 For a recent account, with reference to some of the archaeological work in the
Gulf, see J. F. Salles, “The Arab-Persian Gulf under the Seleucids’ in A. Kuhrt and
S. M. Sherwin-White (eds., Hellenism in the East (London, 1988), 75-109.
21 Pliny, WH, vi, 148. G. W. Bowersock, “Tylos and Tyre: Bahrain in the Greco-
Roman World’, in Shaikha H. Ali al Khalifa and M. Rice (eds.), Bahrain Through the
Ages (Manama, Bahrain, 1986), 399-406, regards the two as ‘one place’, and that
Bahrain; I do not agree with his interpretation of the evidence, largely because he
ignores the quite specific distances stated by Strabo.
is probable that the inhabitants had forgotten their Phoenician
connections (it was clearly already vague in Eratosthenes’ time)
and their islands’ names had changed—perhaps reverted to
their original form. The passage of time is sufficient to account
for the change, and it is necessary to bear in mind the obvious
differences between the accounts of Pliny and Strabo. The
absence of the Phoenician islands in Pliny does not invalidate
Strabo’s account. Indeed, Strabo’s account has so many details
which ring true that it seems reasonable to accept that there
were two Phoenician-colonized islands in the eastern Gulf.
The details Strabo/Eratosthenes gives of the inhabitants of
these islands suggests that either their original informant or
the inhabitants themselves had become confused about their
origins. Their claim to be the colonizers of the Phoenician Tyre
and Arados may have been a joke, or maybe a mistranslation,
but the comment does indicate that the people on the islands
knew of their original homeland.” Given their geographical
position and given their Phoenician-ness, these colonies were
obviously commercial settlements, involved in the trade
between Babylonia and Oman and India. Again, archaeo-
logical investigation will eventually provide details of this
commerce when the islands are located. One would guess at
cotton, incense (nard and myrrh from Gedrosia, no doubt),
metals such as copper from Oman, pearls from the Gulf itself,23
Indian spices and, no doubt, food. And if the Phoenicians were
commercially active in the Gulf, they will have been active as
far as India, for the only commercial reason, in Alexander’s
time, for such colonies was to develop the trade with India.
To the Indians, these Phoenicians would be indistinguishable
from Greeks. One possible fragment of information may point
to Phoenician activity in India: Stephanos records a town called
Tyros in India.** This has been interpreted as a Phoenician
foundation.” The exact site is not known, and this could be
important: if it was in the middle of the sub-continent, it can
hardly be accepted as Phoenician. Even if it is so accepted, this
»? Bowersock links this with other tales of a Gulf origin for the Phoenicians
, going
back to 2750 Bc (‘Tylos and Tyre’, 399-406). He dismisses another
tradition of
autochthony; others, including myself, would choose to reverse these decisions.
8 Athenaeus, iii. 93. *4 Stephanos of Byzantium, ‘Tyros’.
*° By W. W. Tarn, The Greeks in Bactria and India (Cambridge,
1966), 10 and 329.
still does not prove continued Phoenician activity in India,
for the place could be named by others, for other reasons—a
similarity in appearance, for example. Above all, it is surely
hazardous to base all on a name in a late compilation. Names
can sound alike, but can originate in entirely different
situations. It is best to reject the Indian Tyros as being merely
a sound-alike, not a Phoenician foundation. Yet this does not
invalidate the presumption that the route to India had seen
Phoenician traders; that is as likely as ever.
The differences between the accounts of Strabo, based on
early third century sources, and Pliny, based on a later source
or sources, is a clear sign of change. Briefly, Pliny’s source had
nothing on the Phoenicians which Strabo’s source reports. This
can be seen to be a further development of the fading of the
Phoenician-ness of the Gulf islanders which is evident already
in Strabo’s account. By Pliny’s source’s time that had gone all
the way, and no memory of the Phoenician origin remained.
This took place, therefore, after the early third century but
before, say, the time of Augustus, though the date of Pliny’s
source is unknown.
If this interpretation, that the Phoenician colonies in the Gulf
faded away, is correct, then this leads on to broader conclusions.
The activity of Phoenicians from Phoenicia into the eastern
lands must be presumed to have also faded away. Yet a profit-
able and established trade would not be abandoned except under
circumstances of force majeure, of which there is no sign, and
which is clearly most unlikely. Thus, the eastward trade
withered, and its colonies faded, because of a lack of support
from the homeland. This returns us to the situation in the home-
land. Only Arados of the homeland cities was free to trade into
the interior of the Seleukid empire in the third century, for the
other cities were locked into the Ptolemaic state and its exclusive
economic system, and would scarcely be welcomed in the east.
Further, even Arados was not really a full member of the
Seleukid state for much of the second half of the third century,
from c.242 to 218. Under such circumstances the mercantile
energies of the various homeland cities would be directed to the
westward, over the Mediterranean, rather than to the east, over
the difficult, dangerous, and hostile land. The development of
the incense entrepot at Gerrha in Arabia, which Antiochos III
raided in 205,°° might well be the local Arabian response to a
rich trade which had been developed by the Phoenicians and
was then in danger of collapsing as a result of their increasing
difficulties. A trade shown to be profitable could well be taken
over by a local network if the originator withdrew. For the
Phoenicians the situation would not necessarily be tragic, for
the trade route still reached to the Mediterranean and their
cities, even if it was now under local management.
The incense trade is one which it is exceptionally difficult to
discern during the Hellenistic period. The fact that Gerrha,
close to the Persian Gulf, was a well-attested incense market in
205 BC suggests that an alternative market to Egypt was being
sought for the trade from South Arabia. Egypt would perhaps
absorb all the incense it could import, yet other areas would
also want supplies. Gerrha thus developed as an entrepot
between the South Arabian producers and the consumers of,
say, Babylonia and Iran. The conquest of Phoenicia and Pales-
tine by Antiochos III in 202-198 would then open up the trade
by providing competing markets in the Ptolemaic and Seleukid
frontages on the Red Sea.
The Phoenicians, therefore, can be seen as the developers of
the trade routes between India and South Arabia on the one
hand, and Babylonia and the North Syrian ports in the Seleukid
empire on the other. The profits would attract local partici-
pation, as at Gerrha, and the Phoenician interest would then
be restricted to the marketing of the products further west. The
basis of the whole system had been laid in the Akhaimenid
peace, and developed by Alexander’s impulses. The parti-
cipation of the Phoenicians would be limited in number, and
those few who settled in the east would be easily absorbed into
the local populations. Their monument was not so much Gulf
islands and Phoenician temples, but rather a fully functioning
trade system.
By Roman times the Phoenician cities certainly provided the
great markets for incenses on their way westwards,”’ but in the
Asian interior their participation was minimal. The Nabataean
kingdom, whose geographical organization can best be under-
26 Pol., xi. xi. 4-5.
*” L. C. West, ‘Commercial Syria under the Roman Empire’, TAPA, 55 (1924),
159-89.
stood as attemipting to control much of the incense route in
western Arabia, had made itself the middleman between pro-
ducers in South Arabia and the Phoenician cities.2 The Naba-
taeans were in the same relative position as the Palmyrenes,
and with those states running the trades it was perhaps unneces-
sary for Phoenicians to be involved personally.
This accounts for the evidence for Phoenician activity in the
east in the Hellenistic and Akhaimenid periods, but there are
also some indications of settlement by ‘Syrians’ in the east, and
these have been assumed to be Phoenicians. Antiocheia-in-
Margiane (Merv) is referred to as ‘Syriam’ by Pliny;?9 a Syrian
title for Apollo has been used to suggest settlement by Syrians
in Susa;*° there was a community of Syrians at Seleukeia-
on-the-Tigris.*' In listing these instances Tarn put them in
quotation, thus: ‘Syrians’, and went on to identify them as
Phoenicians.** This seems unnecessary. The three cities were all
in the Seleukid state, as was Syria itself. There seems no reason
to imagine that these instances denoted anything but the pres-
ence of Syrians. Indeed, one could argue just as strongly that
they were Greeks who had moved from Seleukid Syrian cities.
A devotee of Apollo at Susa is more likely to be a Greek than
anything else, even if he used a Syrian title for the god. And
‘Syrians’ at Seleukeia could well be local rural inhabitants, for
the area was, after all, close to Assyria. There is nothing
especially Phoenician in any of this.
The evidence, therefore, for Phoenician activity in the lands
to the east fades away as the Hellenistic period passes. It is only
reasonable to ignore the very dubious suggestion of a Tyros in
India and of ‘Syrians’ here and there, but the Persian Gulf
islands seem well attested, at least in the third century. The
Phoenician presence in the east had begun back in the Persian
period, and continued into the third century as a result prin-
cipally of Alexander’s sponsorship. But the Ptolemaic control
of most of the Phoenician home-cities cut the Phoenicians of
the east from their roots, and their expansion was thus thwarted.
By the time the Seleukid victory in the Fifth Syrian War had
8 For a recent discussion of this trade, see C. Edens and G. Bawden, ‘History of
Tayma and Hejazi trade during the First Millenium sc’, Journal of the Economic and
Social History of the Orient, 32 (1989), 48-102.
29 Pliny NH, vi. 47. 3° SEG, vii. 12.
3! Jos., AF, xviii. 372. * Tarn, Greeks in Bactria and India, 329.
transferred the Phoenician homeland to Seleukid control, the
impetus to expand to the east had faded, and such Phoenicians
as had settled there had been assimilated by the indigenous
populations. There is no clear evidence of any Phoenicians in
the east in the second or first centuries Bc. Their activity in
the east had not been numerically well based. Instead, the
Phoenicians of Phoenicia largely concentrated on expansion, in
both trade and settlement, to the west.
The western world, for the Phoenicians, was as radically
different from the east as it could be. The east was land,
mountains, deserts, empires, the Great King; the west was
water, islands, cities, and Greeks. The two had to be tackled in
different ways, they produced and required different goods,
their opportunities and dangers were both different. Not sur-
prisingly, the sources are different as well, more numerous but
not necessarily better in quality.
Of course, the west, the lands around the Mediterranean,
was an old area of activity for Phoenicians. In particular, the
connection between Phoenicia and the productiveness of the
Nile Valley was age old,** and their mutual inclusion in the
Akhaimenid state cannot have diminished contact. The Egyp-
tian secession from the empire does not seem to have cut the
connections. Phoenicians are known to have lived in Memphis
in the fifth century,** and one of the main themes of eastern
Mediterranean political and military history in the fourth
century is the continued vibrancy of the contacts between the
two lands. It may be that one of the reasons for the repeated
failures of Persian attempts to reconquer Egypt lay in the
reluctance of the Phoenicians to participate in the war. Being
identified as an active enemy of Egypt was likely to damage
their mutual commerce, one main element of which was surely
corn, exported from the Nile Valley to the hungry cities of the
Lebanese coast.
The Hellenistic connections of Egypt and Phoenicia were
nevertheless very close, as traders and as mutual subjects of
3 Tt goes back to the very beginning of written records, when Byblos was the
main city and prospered on trade (characteristically) with Egypt; see the convenient
summary by M. Chehab, ‘Relations entre |’Egypte et la Phénicie des origines 4 Oun
Amon’, in W. A. Ward (ed.), The Role of the Phoenicians in the Interaction of Mediterranean
Civilisations (Beirut, 1968), 1-8.
* D. J. Crawford, Memphis under the Ptolemies (Princeton, NJ, 1988).
Ptolemy. There is some evidence of Phoenicians living in
Egypt,” characteristically working in shipping, but their
numbers are few. It is likely that some are hidden under the
description of ‘Syrians’, as in Seleukid Asia, of whom there is a
considerable number.*° The pre-Ptolemaic connection is almost
as strong, though, and movement of population from the Syrian
lands into Egypt is a constant feature from Egypt’s earliest
days. Nothing more specifically Phoenician, bar a couple of
inscriptions, is known.
Phoenicia’s inclusion in the Akhaimenid Empire would not
be a great advantage when trading with that empire’s enemies,
such as Egypt or Athens. The attested connections with these
places, however, do suggest that a distinction was drawn
_between the Phoenicians as traders and the Phoenicians as
agents of Persian imperialism. True, the distinction could be
easily blurred, and probably took long to develop. The Athen-
ians who voted proxeny rights to King Strato and extra-
territoriality to the Sidonian merchants*’ also knew full well that
the Phoenician fleet had been one of the main agents in the
attempts of Dareios and Xerxes to conquer Athens a century
earlier. Similarly, and more immediately, Phoenician naval
and merchant fleets were active on the Persian side in the
repeated invasions of Egypt, and Pharaoh Nektanebo’s coup
at Sidon is an example of an attempt to pre-empt another
invasion—so demonstrating the importance of Sidon in the
attempts. In the eastern Mediterranean, therefore, the role of
the Phoenicians during the Akhaimenid period was distinctly
ambiguous, even if for most of the time and to most communi-
ties, they would appear in the form of merchants.
This reputation extended throughout the Mediterranean.
The combined Phoenician fleets had threatened Greece at least
three times between 480 and 330. Phoenician colonies dotted
the southern coast of the sea from Tripolitania to the Atlantic,
and the coasts of Spain and Sardinia and Sicily. It may have
been Phoenicians who first sparked the fire which became
Classical Greece; it was certainly Phoenicians who introduced
-the Greeks to the mysteries and wonders of the art of alphabetic
39 Athenaeus, v. 204C; Crawford, Memphis, 93.
3° G. Vaggi, ‘Siria e Siri documenti dell’Egitto greco-romano’, Aegyptus, 17 (1937),
29-51.
37 IG, u/2, 141.
TE MOV V4IS
e
NOG3OVIN
awoy
1084Nd VISV YONI
sajdey
Sue
S, VLIVI
YNIONAO
* SONV1SI
00v
te
Le
ii,
dVIN
‘9 sURIOTUI0Yg
Ul 9) SIA
asa
writing, their own invention.** Their language was as requisite
for communication in the Mediterranean as was Greek, and,
at least until c.200 Bc, much more so than Latin.
The fate of Punic- and Phoenician-speakers in the Medi-
terranean world during the Hellenistic period, however, meant
that the sources we have to use for their presence and activities
are less useful than this preceding history might have implied.
The destruction and subjugation of several of the Phoenician
homeland-cities was repeated in a characteristically even more
drastic form in the west, where Carthage’s downfall was even
more complete than Sidon’s or Tyre’s or Berytos’ or even
Kition’s. To be sure, other Phoenician communities survived—
Utica, Sardinia, Gades—but the heart was cut out by Car-
thage’s destruction, and the survivors survived largely by means
of transfusions of Roman vigour.
The Latin overlay has hidden much of the (presumed) evid-
ence for Phoenician activity. The destruction and later Roman
colonization of the city of Carthage has removed such literary
evidence of Carthago-Phoenician connections as existed in those
languages, and much of the epigraphic evidence is intractable.
Nevertheless, some does still exist. The situation is similar else-
where, except that in the eastern half of the Mediterranean
basin it is not Roman swamping which has suppressed the
evidence, but rather the all-enveloping power of Greek. Never-
theless, the epigraphic habit of the Greeks has resulted in the
survival of a considerable quantity of inscriptional evidence
of individual Phoenicians. In sheer quantity the evidence for
Phoenicians and their activity in the lands around the Medi-
terranean is, in fact, not unimpressive. But quantity is not
enough. As an illustration of the problems and difficulties posed
by the inscriptions the Phoenician presence in Carthage and its
area may be considered.
Carthage had been founded by Tyrians four or five centuries
before the time of Tyre’s sack by Alexander. It is known that
Carthage maintained a formal connection with the mother-city
by sending a religious offering to the Melqart temple in Tyre
every year. At least it is presumed to have been sent annually.
It is referred to in the siege by Alexander, for the Carthaginian
envoys were present in the city at the time, survived, and were
38 Millar, ‘Phoenician Cities’, 67.
sent off home by Alexander after his victory.*? Polybios refers
to the practice a century and a halflater, in 162, when he writes
of a ship as being like the one used by Carthage to deliver
the first fruits to Tyre.*® So there is reasonable evidence of a
continuing religious connection between the two cities, and we
can assume that this had carried on from the foundation of
Carthage, and that it came to an abrupt end in 146, or more
likely in 148 or 147, when Carthage itself was besieged and
destroyed.
Attempts have also been made to expand this undoubted
religious connection into something greater, something more
overtly political. One suggestion is that the physical expansion
which evidently took place at Carthage somewhere about the
end of the fourth century Bc was caused by an influx of Tyrian
refugees.*! This is based on little more than conjecture, and
cannot be accepted. The expansion of Carthage, if it actually
occurred, is more likely to be due to natural increase, and to
local migration.
A second suggestion, very intriguing, depends on a ques-
tionable restoration of an inscription at Athens. The document
is, in form, a proxeny decree of the city, that is, the record of
the award of the status of proxenos to two men who appear
to be Tyrians. The disputed restoration would make them
Carthaginians, would date the decree to 333/2 Bc and would
then extrapolate from there a visit by Carthaginian envoys to
Athens to make an alliance between Carthage, Athens, and
Tyre (loyal, of course, to the Great King, as the siege and sack
demonstrated) in the face of Alexander’s successful campaign
through Asia Minor and into Syria during 334/3.*? This is, to
say the least, a fascinating scenario, but we must not be carried
away by the fascination. The whole interpretation is based on
a fragmentary inscription, and is very speculative. Further, the
Tyrian section of this connection may be no more than the
chance presence of the two Tyrians at Athens at the time
transport was needed for the envoys. There may, thus, not be
any official involvement of the city of Tyre, or its king, in the
% Arr., Anab., 11, xxiv. 5. MP Poliexxxt xii. 1112,
*! J. Elayi, “The Relations between Tyre and Carthage in the Persian Period’,
JANES 13 (1981), 25-6.
® The original is JG, 1/2, 342; comments are by M. B. Walbank (‘Athens, Carthage
and Tyre’, PE 59 (1985), 107-11); see also SEG, xxiv. 104 and xxxy. 70.
affair at all. Yet it is a fact that two Tyrians were honoured in
Athens in the late 330s—the usual date for this decree is ‘before
332/1’—and it is legitimate to recall that Athens had other
connections of a political nature with Phoenicia, going back
well into the previous century.
It must be said, therefore, that the evidence for political
connections between Carthage and Phoenicia is poor, just as
that for the religious connections is strong, but there remains
also the economic link. Here there is one piece of unequivocal
evidence which is very telling. Livy reports that when Hannibal
came under serious threat in Carthage in 196, he fled first to
the Cercina Islands in the bay of Syrtis Minor, where he found
a whole group of ships from Phoenicia. He gave a dinner for
_the captains and merchants and plied them with sufficient
wine so that he was able to escape while they slept off their
over-indulgence.** Now it cannot be pretended that Cercina
was a major port, though the account in Livy makes it clear
that it was of some importance, perhaps as an entrep6ot and
gathering-place for goods. If there were ‘many’ ships from
Phoenicia at Cercina, there were surely others at the greater
ports in the area, such as Carthage and Utica. We have
here, therefore, excellent evidence, all the better for being
inadvertent, for a flourishing trade between Phoenicia and
North Africa in the early second century Bc. This was, no
doubt, one of the foundations of the apparent wealth of
Carthage at the time.
The inscriptions from the Punic phase of Carthage’s history
are largely uninformative. There are few with any sort of detail
of public affairs, and fewer still which can be dated. But, from
the point of view of this study, there is a group of about twenty,
all recording devotion to the goddess Tanit, which appear to
be set up by Sidonians. Several of them are set up by decree of
the people of Carthage, which suggests that they are late in the
city’s history, dating to the third or second century. However,
the crucial phrase, ‘a man of Sidon’, has to be restored in all
but one case, and so the evidence is tainted.** But there does
remain that one unequivocal example, and that is enough to
provide evidence of a connection between the two cities, of a
$ Livy, xxxi. xviii. 3-8.
** CIS, i. 272-93; the one unrestored example is 290.
uvasoy UI oy)
sueToIUs0yg dv“1
Sl...
atte
oe
ot
OST
Oot
0S
S3GOHUY
= Oo p ° Ss ta 20 x)
6M SOSYOWNY/Z™a,07 ‘-
< VINMOWIN % ‘ae
so0 a0 sous Que a
8
SG
ore a4 NB
ee
3
cc
00
>
wes are eeSOay ©

eaway
es
G
SOYGNV
Suave
soseydy
ew
Souawoyjoig
10
reldsay)
‘Y
44ed
°
°
seljawed
group of Sidonians living and dying at Carthage. One is
tempted to suggest an emigration following the Persian sack of
Sidon in 345, but there is no more evidence for that than for a
migration from Tyre after 331, and the dating of these inscrip-
tions is far too vague.
This, therefore, is the evidence, and the problem. One literary
reference provides more, and more certain, evidence than
twenty or more inscriptions. The one citation in Livy is both
precise as to date and content, and provides a firm basis for
extrapolation. The twenty inscriptions are vague as to date,
oblique as to purpose, and repetitive, and provide no more than
minimal information. And this is the difficulty with sources for
the whole of the Hellenistic Mediterranean with regard to
Phoenician activity and presence: occasional literary references,
much more numerous inscriptions, but the total stubbornly
refuses to gel into a convincing picture more elevated than the
banal.
This banality begins with the location of the inscriptions.
They have been found in the very places where one would
expect them to be found, Athens and Delos, above all, but also
other parts of the Aegean. This just happens to be the area
where the density of inscriptions is greatest. In other words the
appearance of Phoenicians in inscriptions is to a large extent a
reflection of our knowledge of inscriptions as a whole. This is
not surprising, but it is also in a sense reassuring: the Phoenicians
in the Hellenistic world went where one would expect them to
go, where everyone else went.
The connection between Phoenicians and the Aegean was,
by the Hellenistic period, ancient. During the recent past,
not only had Phoenicians participated enthusiastically in the
Persian invasions of the Aegean area, but there had been com-
mercial contacts as well. Trade is attested with Athens in the
first half of the fourth century, for an amendment to the grant
of proxeny-rights to king ‘Strato’ of Sidon—Abdastart I, that
is—gave Sidonian traders extra-territorial rights while at
Athens.* These traders from Sidon presumably traded between
_ Phoenicia and the Aegean. Athens was such a dominant city
in international commerce that it can be assumed that foreign
traders settled there in order to tap the trade of the whole
48 IG, 1/2. 141
Aegean area; similarly Sidon’s dominance in Phoenicia at the
time was such that traders from there would be likely to trade
with the whole of the Levant.*®
The Macedonian conquests resulted in destruction and occu-
pation in both Greecé and Phoenicia, and it is only somewhat
later that clarity returns to the relationship. Literary references
are extremely few, but there is a respectable quantity of inscrip-
tions identifying Phoenicians, and these are the basis for the
following comments.
One aspect which is a constant throughout the Hellenistic
period is the origins of the Phoenicians who appear in the
inscriptions. Considering the totality of people involved, the
largest contingents are from Sidon, Tyre, and Arados, in that
order. Almost half of the Phoenicians whose origins are known
came from Sidon, about a quarter from Tyre, and about a fifth
from Arados, making more than four out of five from these
three cities alone.*” At the other extreme, only two inscriptions
record men from Byblos, only two men from Tripolis are
noted,*” and none from the smaller places such as Sarepta,
Trieres, and so on.
The single example of a reference to Marathos, however,
requires more discussion. The city is identified as ‘Marathos
behind Arados’ in a record of a gift to the ‘Syrian gods’ by a
woman called Kleopatra daughter of Philostratos, in 103/2.°°
She shared the dedication with a Roman, who is not identified
as her husband. It is worth pointing out that it is Philostratos,
the father, who is identified as a Marathian, not Kleopatra
herself, and that this took place in Delos. It seems likely enough
that Kleopatra was a Delian, and that her devotion to the
‘Syrian gods’ was at second hand, rather than something
brought by her from her ‘home’.
*° For an analysis of certain aspects of Phoenician activity in the Aegean, see M. F.
Baslez, ‘Le Role et la place des phéniciens dans la vie économique des ports de l’Egée’,
St. Phoen., v. 267-85.
*” The numbers recorded for the four cities are: Arados 35 (19 dated, 16 undated);
Berytos 23 (16 dated, 7 undated); Sidon 94 (52 dated, 42 undated); Tyre 48 (29 dated,
1g undated).
*° IG, x1/2, 203, naming a games victor.
© IG, 1/2, 1028 of 100/88, two epheboi from Tripolis (but this may not necessarily be
Phoenician Tripolis, of course) and W. R. Paton and E. L. Hicks, The Inscriptions of
Cos (Oxford, 1891), 126, undated, and the place name could be either Tripolis or
Laodikeia-in- Phoenicia. °° I. Delos, 2245.
The Syrian gods were Atargatis and Hadad, the resident
deities of Hierapolis in north Syria.°' As such they were only
indirectly connected with Phoenicia. The sanctuary at Delos
was officiated over by priests from Syria, and it attracted, so
far as we can see from the surviving inscribed dedications,
devotees from many areas. The largest number of dedications
came from Athenians, with almost as many from the cities of
north Syria. Together these account for almost three quarters
of the dedicators. Of the rest one is from Damascus, three from
Ionian cities, but no fewer than nine were Romans, includ-
ing one Neapolitan.** Kleopatra was the sole Phoenician. In
the face of that, this lone Phoenician woman (with a Greek
name, be it noted, and a father with a Greek name) has
little or no significance. The Syrian gods clearly appealed
mainly to Greeks and Romans, not to Syrians, and not at all
to Phoenicians.*?
The concentration of origins for overseas Phoenicians on the
three main cities might be explained in several ways. It may be
due to the fact that the people actually came from those cities,
which is the obvious and simplest explanation, and surely
applies in most cases. But the absence of other cities as origins
needs to be explained. To claim a Sidonian or Tyrian or
Aradian origin was to give oneself a certain prestige which an
origin from, say, Sarepta, would not command. At the same
time, many of these smaller places were actually within the
territories of the larger cities during the Hellenistic period. The
test is Marathos, which we know was independent of Arados
for long stretches of the time (c. 230-218 and 166-129) and
yet no man is recorded from there in any inscription—unless
Kleopatra’s father Philostratos is counted. It may be, of course,
that Arados exerted some sort of blockade, but since Arados
needed a mainland port for its own trade to be effective, this is
unlikely, even if the Seleukid kings would have permitted it. The
easiest explanation is that they claimed Aradian citizenship, or
that they did not go overseas at all. It is perhaps significant
that the one inscriptional reference to Marathos identifies it by
5! Cf. G. Goossens, Hierapolis de Syrie (Louvain, 1943).
°2 T. Delos, 2220-304; not all are legible or show origins.
53. Will, Le Sanctuaire de la déesse Syrienne, Exploration Archéologique de Delos
XXXV (Paris, 1985).
reference to Arados. It would appear to be little known, in
other words.**
A further test lies in the inscriptions recording people whose
origin was Berytos, a city which grew to importance during the
Hellenistic period, suffered destruction in the later 140s by
Tryphon, and then existed in a reduced state until a Roman
colony was planted there. This is clearly reflected in—and
to some degree confirmed by—the evidence of the overseas
inscriptions. There is no instance in the fourth or third centur-
ies of any Berytian being recorded overseas.” The first
dated example is at Delos in the reign of Antiochos IV (175-
164), a dedication by an association of merchants of Berytos
(‘Laodikeia-in-Phoenicia’) in honour of Heliodoros, the king’s
minister.°° Some years later, Hieron son of Gorgios, also of
Laodikeia-in-Phoenicia, won the horse race at the Panathenaic
Games in Athens in 166/5.°’ The destruction of the city,
however severe it was, seems to have removed the need to
refer to the city by its dynastic name. Perhaps the men who
commissioned inscriptions were exiles, but where the inscription
was for a private rather than a public purpose, they now
referred to Berytos rather than Laodikeia, as in the various
ephebos inscriptions in Athens in the very late second century,
where Berytians appear on several occasions.*® At Delos another
association, called the Poseidoniastai, formed of men on the
island from Berytos, dedicated a sanctuary, equipped with a
portico and other necessary items, in 110/9.°° Another group at
Delos had honoured the city of Athens by paying for a statue
of Apollo ten years before.® Both of these groups noted their
home-city as Berytos, but in another dedication in the same
year as the sanctuary (110/9) in honour ofAntiochos VIII, they
referred to themselves as the people of Laodikeia-in-Phoenicia,
using the official name.°!
All this looks impressive when listed in this way, but it is
worth considering just what it all amounts to. In the first place,
the three commemorations in Delos took place in the space of
** Unless the qualification is to distinguish it from the Athenian Marathon.
55 Fouilles de Delphes, wt. i. 435, is a proxeny decree of
the third century ofa ‘Sidonian
from Berytos’, a clear indication of the latter’s unimportance.
°° Durrbach, Choix, 72. 57 1G, u/2, 2316.
8 Tbid. 1011 (two examples). °° Durrbach, Choix, 119.
6° Tbid. 118. $1 Thid. 122.
little more than ten years and were clearly produced by the
same group of people in the guise of ‘Poseidoniastai’ or ‘people
of Laodikeia’ or ‘merchants of Berytos’. Further, the records of
ephebor from Berytos graduating at Athens covers about the
same length of time, but ten years earlier. That is, the whole
lot can be fitted into the generation between 128 and 106.
Again, no more than six men are known by name, and suspicion
must exist that at least two are related, and perhaps more.
Beyond that, of course, these inscriptions come from only two
places, and those, Athens and Delos, were not only two of the
busiest places in the Mediterranean, but were even part of the
same state.
If we widen the search for evidence to take in the undated,
but Hellenistic, inscriptions recording the presence of Berytians,
the picture is less restricted geographically, but equally instruc-
tive commercially. Delos and Athens, once more, produce two
examples each.’ On Tenos, next door to Delos, is a single
example of a Berytian, a woman who died there. In the south-
east corner of the Aegean there are possible examples from
Rhodes, and from next door Kos, but neither is certain.® And
finally, just to add a touch of geographical variety, a woman
called Poseidonia died at Naples and her grave stele recorded
her origin as Berytos.®
This is not as impressive as it might seem. It is clear that the
Berytians who went abroad, and were capable of recording
their presence epigraphically, went exclusively to the centres of
commercial enterprise. This is what one would expect of the
citizens of a city which was growing but still relatively small.
Inevitably they would insert themselves into an existing com-
mercial network. It is noticeable that the only two examples
of Berytians who are recorded away from the great Aegean
commercial centres were women, presumably married to men
6? It is not possible to prove this, but the names recorded of Berytians have some
interesting correspondences. These are a Zenon son of Eirenaios, a Dionysios son of
Zenon, and a Mnaseas son ofDionysios, for example (JG, 11/2, 94 and Durrbach, Choix,
11g); and a Nikon son of Alexidas and a Dionysios son of Nikon (JG, 1/2, 1960 and
Durrbach, Choix, 122). Of course, the smaller one imagines the society of Berytians on
Delos to have been the more telling one would find these correspondences.
83 Athens: JG, u/2, 8408 and SEG, iii. 146; Delos: L. Delos, 2633.
64 SEG, xxv. 971 (=IG, xu/5, 986).
6 Rhodes: SEG, ii. 676; Kos: see n. 48.
°° IG, xiv. 805.
from Naples and Tenos. There is also a certain gap after the
140s, though this is scarcely significant in so small a sample.
Similarly, the apparent concentration of numbers in the short
period between 128 and 106 is misleading to some extent,
because that happened to be a period exceptionally rich in
epigraphic evidence from both Delos and Athens. It is, in other
words, a result of the type of evidence we have to rely on, rather
than a result of a real growth in numbers. It could be equally
argued that we have evidence for only a very few Berytians, to
be numbered in single figures only, but this would be to take
the inscriptional evidence too literally. We have to assume that
the people we know of are no more than the absolute minimum,
and that there were numbers of other Berytians who are not
recorded on stone. It therefore follows that there was a greater
number of Berytians abroad than we know of, and that their
activities were spread over a longer period of time than we
know of. Yet we must not allow such an assumption to distort
the picture produced by a study of the actual evidence. The
general development is clear enough—none before, say, c.200,
then a growth during the next century, with an interruption in
mid-century, then renewed slow growth into the one following,
and with a precise concentration on tapping into the com-
mercial nexus at its most expansive points, Athens and Delos.
This pattern can be partly explained by the known history of
the home-city itself, and this will be one of the themes to be
considered for the other cities.
The number of Aradians abroad is half as large again as that
of Berytians,”” but the pattern of geographical spread is very
similar. Delos dominates with over half the records, though
Athens this time has produced only two.® The rest are spread
around the Aegean, with three examples from Rhodes, two
from nearby Iasos, one from Naxos in the central Aegean, and
one from Demetrias in Thessaly.”” There are no examples from
anywhere else in the Mediterranean. Plotted on the map these
find-places strongly suggest that Arados’ merchants travelled
*’ In IGLS, vii. 87-90, J.-P. Rey-Coquais has collected basic information and
references to Aradians abroad.
°° IG, x1/4, 601, 776, 816, 1203 (two people); I. Delos, 1923, 1937, 2140, 2497, 2598.
°° SEG, xiii. 150 (=IG, 1/2, 9205, but uncertain) and 1028.
” Rhodes: JG, xu/1, 32 and 104; Iasos: W. Blumel, Die Inschriften von Tasos, ii (Bonn,
1985), 58 and 408; Naxos: JG, xm/5, 85; Demetrias: SEG, xxv. 683.
between Arados and the Aegean almost exclusively, and that
they had a substantial connection with the eastern Aegean as
well as Delos.
An inscription from Kition in Cyprus provides a different
view of the geography of the eastern Mediterranean. It is a
games table, marked with an odd selection of ethnic names.
There were ten originally, but two are illegible. Of the rest two
are in Cyprus, one in Greece, one is probably Alexandria,
and another the very common Herakleia. Two are Phoenician
places, Arados and Sidon.”' The selection presumably reflects
in some way the view of the world from Cyprus. It would be
hazardous to draw further conclusions, but the choice of Arados,
the Phoenician city closest to Cyprus, is interesting.
The connections between Arados and the Aegean must be
presumed to be commercial, but there is precious little indi-
cation on the inscriptions of any specific activity. There are
records of proxenoi at Rhodes and Delos,” and such men could,
as between Arados and those states, have no other functions
than one connected with trade. One Aradian ephebos is recorded
at Athens,’* and a family at Delos.’* At Iasos, on the other
hand, the inscription is unclear as to the occupations of the men
recorded. The stone records the names of a group of men
who had formed a burial club. Their origins are remarkably
diverse—two Antiochenes as well as the Aradian, a Sidonian
and a Kilikian, four men from the Black Sea area, two from
Galatia, and one from Media. The first suggestion was that
these were a group of mercenaries, which was countered by the
alternative suggestion of a group of metics.’? Since they do not
tell us what they were, that problem is unsolvable, but they
were Clearly settled in Iasos, and so the suggestion of a group
of metics seems to be the more plausible—unless, of course, they
were a group of mercenaries who had retired and become
businessmen. An artist from Arados is recorded at Delos;’° his
occupation was different, but for an artist to gravitate to Delos
was scarcely unusual.
7 SEG, xxii. 620 and refs. there.
” Rhodes: JG, xu/1, 32; Delos: JG, x1/4, 601, 776, 816.
3 1G, n/2, 1028.
™ Thid. 1203.
7° Blumel, /asos, ii. 408 and refs. there, and SEG, xviii. 450.
78 TI. Delos, 2497.
The predictability of the locations to which overseas Aradians
went—Athens, Delos, Rhodes—is varied only slightly by their
existence at Demetrias, a major city in its corner of the Aegean.’
The existence of Naxos in the list is, like Tenos in the Berytian
list, due to the presence of a woman, presumably married to a
man of the island. She may in fact have been from elsewhere,
for it was her father who was described as Aradian. The greater
number of Aradians, therefore, does not mean a greater geo-
graphical spread, and the chronological spread is only a little
greater: from c.250 to ¢c.100, with none in the first century Bc.
There are three times as many Sidonians recorded abroad in
inscriptions as there are Aradians, yet with one major exception,
the remarks made about Arados could be transferred more or
less intact to Sidon. But the exception is instructive. There is a
group of six inscriptions recording Sidonians which stand out
from the rest, and which emphasize the importance of Sidon as
a political and economic force in the fourth and early third
centuries. The philhellenic king of Sidon, Abdastart I, was
made an honorary citizen of Athens in the 360s under the
Hellenized name of Strato.’® This is not a record, of course, of
his visit, but it must indicate considerable traffic between what
at that time were the two most important commercial cities
in the eastern Mediterranean. This importance of Sidon is
emphasized by an inscription from Samos where a Sidonian
grain-dealer was honoured some time in the fourth century.”
For much of that century the island was Athenian. The con-
nection continues with an Athenian decree of 323/2 granting
proxenos status to a Sidonian.®° The date may well be significant,
apparently following the receipt of the news of the death of
Alexander, and more or less contemporary with the Lamian
War. The other four inscriptions take up the theme of the
Atheno-Sidonian friendship begun by Abdastart, but ironically,
for they are all decrees honouring Philokles, king of Sidon and
general of Ptolemy. One is from Athens, one from Delos, a third
from the small island of Nikouria, next to Amorgos, and the
fourth from Samos.*' The connection was thus maintained in
” O. Masson, ‘Recherches sur les phéniciens dans le monde hellénistique’, BCH 93
(1963), 679-700.
78 IG, u/2, 141. 9 CIG, 2256 (=SEG, xxxi. 751). 8° 1G, 11/2, 343.
*! Athens: JG, m/2, 3425; Delos: Durrbach, Choix, 85; Nikouria: JG, xu/7, 506; Samos:
SEG, i. 363.
a way, but both cities were well and truly under control by
this time. That it was more than just a political aspiration is
suggested by the fact that three inscriptions found in Athens
and the Peiraios record individual Sidonians who settled and
died there, and two of the grave stelai show names recorded in
both Greek and Phoenician script. For this to be possible, a
regular community of Sidonians must have lived in Athens,
including, one assumes, a lapicide.
The connection thus made in the pre-Hellenistic period con-
tinues later. From the evidence of the inscriptions it seems that
the major centres to which Sidonians went were Athens® and
Delos, again, together with Carthage, whose Sidonians I have
already discussed. Since there are more Sidonians noted, it is
equally unsurprising that they should be spread somewhat more
widely, yet the heavy concentration on the two main centres is
quite inescapable. A Sidonian is noted on Kos and one on Iasos
(the burial club mentioned before), two proxenoi at Oropos, one
across the water at Histiaia in Euboia and one at Kourion in
Cyprus (a garrison commander).*° All these, it may be noted,
are dated to the period of Ptolemaic influence in the Aegean in
the third century. After the removal of Ptolemaic power, from
200 BC on, the Sidonians stuck mainly to Athens and Delos,
just as the Aradians and Berytians did. Undated evidence finds
other Sidonians at Demetrias in Thessaly, Chalkis in Euboia,
and Rhodes, and at Amathos in Cyprus, none of which is
seriously different from the range found among Aradians and
Berytians. For Sidon, however, there are, apart from Carthage,
new places to note. One Sidonian is recorded in Crete, and two
on the island of Zakynthos.®’ There are also two examples to
note in Egypt.** Crete and Egypt fit in well with the apparent
8? GIS, i. 115 and 117 (Athens), 118 (Piraios).
% IG, 1/2, 141, 343, 482, 960, 1043 (two names), 2316, 2946, 3425, 5249, 10266.
8 T. Delos, 1923, 1925, 2549 (=SEG, xvii. 358), 2598.
®° Kos: Paton and Hicks, /. Cos, 194; Iasos: see n. 70; Oropos: JG, vn, 4260 and
4262; Histiaia: JG, xu/g, 1187; Kourion: T. B. Mitford, The Inscriptions of Kourton
(Philadelphia, Pa., 1971), 32.
*° Demetrias: SEG, xxv. 682, 683, 684 (three men); Chalkis: JG, xm/9, 900; Rhodes:
P. M. Fraser, Rhodian Funerary Monuments (Oxford, 1977), n. 242; Amathos: SEG, xxiii.
626.
87 Crete: SEG, xxxii. 875; Zakynthos: SEG, xxiii. 366, 367.
%° SEG, xxiv. 1200 from Memphis, and SEG, xiii. 731 from the Thebaid, though the
place name is restored.
Ptolemaic connection noted earlier; the Zakynthian Sidonians
were both women.
The evidence for Tyrians overseas is much the same as that
for Sidon, though the early state documents are fewer, restricted
to the contentious decree for the Tyrian merchants in the 330s.
In the Hellenistic period the usual Athens and Delos records
dominate,®? with three each from Kos and Rhodes.” There are
rather more Aegean islands with records of Tyrians—Andros,
Syros, Keos?'—but given the distribution noted in other cities
none of this is very surprising. Oropos was the scene of a Tyrian
victory in the local games just as Sidonians won at Thespiai
and Orchomenos,” though these were only fleeting visits. More
permanently there was a Tyrian proxenos at Oropos at the same
time as a Sidonian there.®?
There is, however, one Phoenician inscription, from Malta
of the third century, a religious dedication by a Tyrian, which
emphasizes that Tyre was a larger, more adventurous com-
munity than the northern cities of Phoenicia, and that it had
old connections with the middle Mediterranean.* This fits in
well with the fact that Tyrian ships and merchants could be so
easily located by Hannibal on his flight from Carthage in 196.
It seems clear that Tyrians regularly sailed to Carthage and
the surrounding lands and islands, though the evidence does
not permit us to take them further. Indeed it is perhaps more
likely that the development of Carthage had had the effect of
restricting Tyrian enterprise in the west, for the goods of the
west could more easily be found in Carthage itself, and in such
convenient entrepots as the Cercina islands.
The relatively large numbers of Sidonians and Tyrians which
are known about overseas are not therefore evidence of greater
enterprise or geographical range by the citizens of those places.
The people of the four cities whose citizens are noted overseas
are found in much the same places, and doing much the same
*° Delos: JG, x1/4, 777, 1925, 1937, 2169, 2245, 2429, 2598; Athens: JG, n/2, 342,
1134 (two men), 2315, 3147, 4698.
° IG, xu/1, 109; Fraser, Rhodian Funerary Monuments, nn. 242 and 261; Paton
and
Hicks, J. Cos, 1, 165 and 341.
*! Andros: JG, xu/5, 719; Syros: IG, xm/5, 712; Keos: I. Corsten, Die Inschriften von
Kios (Bonn, 1985), 71.
*” Oropos: JG, vit, 417; Thespiai: ibid. 1760; Orchomenos: ibid. 3226.
°° Thid. 4262. * CIS, i. 122 (=JG, xiv, 600).
things. Overwhelmingly they were merchants, though some
were artisans,” some mercenary soldiers, and some wives. But
they went to be these things in the same places. The odd unique
place—a Tyrian in Malta, Sidonians at Carthage and Egypt,
and so on—only emphasizes the similarity of all their desti-
nations. Overwhelmingly they went to the Aegean, to its coasts
and islands, and within the Aegean they concentrated above
all at Delos and Athens.”
This geographical conclusion is scarcely a surprise, and may
be thought to be simply the result of much greater epigraphic
researches in those places. To some extent there is truth in this,
but it is not the whole story. For one thing the epigraphic
researches in Athens and Delos are the greater because their
epigraphic resources are the greater, and this is due to the very
great importance of those two places in the Hellenistic world.
The great predominance of Athens and Delos as destinations
for the Phoenicians is only an exaggeration, not an invention.
Epigraphic research in the rest of the Aegean—in the rest of
the Mediterranean—has scarcely stood still, yet the appearance
of Phoenicians is rare indeed. Few places can produce more
than two examples and when they do it is because, like Athens
and Delos, they were especially important in international
commerce at the time. This obviously applies to Carthage and
to Rhodes, and even to Demetrias in Thessaly. Other places,
islands and cities, might produce one Phoenician for the whole
of the Hellenistic period, and at times that Phoenician was a
wife or a temporary visitor such as a games victor.
There were also large areas with no records of any Phoe-
nicians, temporary or permanent. Drawing conclusions based on
the absence of records is always a tricky matter, and they are
deservedly suspect. Yet epigraphic hunts have been going on
for centuries now, and intensively in all the lands of the Medi-
terranean for a hundred years. If by now there is a blank in the
records of Phoenicians overseas, it is at the least worth pointing
it out, and in some areas where the epigraphic quality and
% J.-P. Rey-Coquais, ‘Une prétendue “‘dynastie” syrienne dans la Delos hellén-

istique’, MUSF 37 (1960-1), 249-54.
% For discussions of Delos see esp. P. Roussel, Delos, Colonie Athénienne (Paris, 1916),
and M. Lacroix, ‘Les étrangers a Delos pendant la période de l’indépendence’, in
Mélanges Gustave Glotz, ii (Paris, 1932), 501-25.
quantity are very great and research has been intensive, some
further conclusions may be appropriate.
For instance, Phoenicians were not located evenly through-
out the Aegean and Greece. There are no records of them at
any point in the Peloponnese, for example, unless one counts
the temporary visit of the chariot winner at the Nemean Games
about 200 Bc.’ But there are precious few recorded at Delphi,
which is scarcely a neglected epigraphic area: only a record of
Tyre’s promotion as ‘holy and asylos’®* and of a man recognized
as a proxenos.*? Occasional visitors to towns in Boiotia, as proxenot
at Oropos, or as games victors at Orchomenos and so on, only
emphasize their total absence from Thebes; and the presence
of half a dozen at Demetrias cannot compensate for their total
absence from the rest of Thessaly and all of Macedon and
Thrace. In the Aegean, Demetrias and Samos are the northern-
most penetrations—there is none in Lesbos or Thasos or
Samothrace or the Thracian Chersonese. One Aradian and one
Sidonian on the same inscription at Iasos, and one literary
reference to a Tyrian at Ephesos,'”° contrast with the complete
absence of other records in the well-searched cities of the western
coast of Asia Minor. Going further north we find a complete
blank in the commercial cities of the Straits and not a single
Phoenician recorded in the whole of the Black Sea area. All
these were busy trading areas which might be expected to
attract enterprising merchants, but there is no record of Phoe-
nicians there, none at all. This is scarcely the result of a lack
of searching: it must therefore be the result of their actual
absence from the area.
It is perhaps less surprising to find them absent from the
interior of Asia Minor. They came from seaports, after all,
though the great land areas of the interior of the Persian empire
had not put them off too much. West of Greece, however, it is
very noticeable that the great rich productive lands of Sicily,
Italy, and Spain have scarcely a single Phoenician recorded
there until the arrival of the Sidonian glass-makers in the
first century. One woman at Naples is not much to go on. If
anywhere, one would expect to find Phoenicians at Rome, or
*’ E. Bikerman, ‘Sur une inscription grecque de Sidon’, Meélanges Syriens offerts a M.
René Dussaud (Paris, 1939), 91-9.
% SEG, ii. 330. °° Fouilles de Delphes, m1. i. 435. 100) Taiviyan texan A
Phoenicians Overseas O17
in southern Spain. Their absence from those places demands
an explanation.!°!
These blank areas—the Black Sea, interior Asia Minor, the
west—were in fact the traditional areas of enterprise of Greeks
and Carthaginians. The best explanation for the apparent
failure of the Phoenicians to reach those lands in the Hellenistic
period is that the lands were in effect closed to them. This does
not necessarily imply a deliberate governmental policy, still less
does it mean widespread prejudice, though there may have
been some anti-Carthaginian prejudice in Italy, especially after
Hannibal, which spilled over into anti-Phoenician feelings. It is
more easily explained by the fact that merchants and customers
tend to form cosy cartels, into which it is very difficult for
outsiders to break. Thus the grain traders of the Black Sea had
been selling their products to the cities of the Aegean coasts for
centuries, and a well-established and well-regulated trade had
developed. There was little room for an interloper. Similarly
Carthaginian trade with Spain was effectively closed, though
that did not mean that Carthage itself was inaccessible, quite
the reverse. Again, the trade of the Tyrrhenian sea was tra-
ditionally one for the Greeks of Sicily and Italy, and now for
the Romans. As the Romans enriched themselves, so their
traders spread to the heart of the commercial system, the
Aegean, and there they were found in the same places as the
Phoenicians—Athens and Delos.
In other words, the quantity of commercial enterprise is
partly dependent on the size and political importance of the
original homes of the traders: Rome and Italy were com-
mercially important because they were politically powerful and
had a large population. We have the record of something over
two hundred individual Phoenicians spread over the Medi-
terranean from Cyprus to Carthage during the three Hellenistic
centuries. This is not many. It can also be reduced further if
we eliminate the games victors as being transients. But the small
number is not necessarily all that misleading. If my earlier
calculations of the total Phoenician population in the fourth
century are anything like accurate (chapter 1), then we must
further envisage the situation that there never were very many
'°! There are records of Phoenicians at Puteoli, of course, but they seem to be ap
rather than Bc (see ch. 6, n. 105).
Phoenicians, at least in comparison with other, more dominant

groups. The Phoenician cities, all together, perhaps had a
total population about the same as fourth-century Athens. The
Phoenician disasters of the late fourth century undoubtedly
reduced their numbers, and, while the peace of the next two
centuries undoubtedly allowed them to recover, they never
numbered anything like the total of Greeks, or Italians, or
Carthaginians, or Egyptians. And of the total of Phoenicians,
only a tiny percentage would ever leave their home cities, even
considering those cities’ high commercial profile. The argument
deployed to explain the limited distribution of Berytians over-
seas applies as strongly to Phoenicians as a whole: they would
go to the areas where it was possible at once to enter into
commercial practice. That immediately limited the possibilities
to those cities which were already cosmopolitan, like Athens
or, later, Delos. It was much more difficult to penetrate the
commercial life of smaller cities, where foreigners were unlikely
to be welcomed or patronized, unless, like Metrodoros the
Phoenician grain-dealer at Samos, they performed a life-saving
function. Hence the absence of Phoenicians from large homo-
geneous areas, hence also their absence from areas which were
largely self-sufficient, like Macedon or Egypt, hence also their
exclusion from some well-established trades and routes. On
the whole, given their disadvantages in terms of their obvious
alienness and lack of numbers, their penetration seems sub-
stantial, if not particularly adventurous.
The numerical predominance within the Phoenician records
of the Sidonians is a reflection of that city’s greater importance
within the Phoenician homeland. It also tends to confirm an
interpretation developed above concerning the differential Hel-
lenization of the Phoenician cities. Sidon was the most open to
outside influence, and was, it seems, the source of most of the
traders, as well as being the largest and richest and most inven-
tive of the cities. The whole package is interdependent, for
commercial enterprise clearly involved an openness to outside
cultural influences, and the pursuit of those required wealth.
Yet even Sidon was only a medium-sized city compared with
Alexandria and Antioch and Rome and Carthage and Athens.
And its people concentrated their overseas activities in the same
places as everyone else.
This interpretation perhaps contradicts the general view of
Phoenicians as adventurous traders and bold seamen, a view
developed mainly from their achievements in the early years of
their history, comprised of far-ranging colonial foundations,
stories from Herodotos ofsilent-trading in Africa and the circum-
navigation of that continent, hypothetical voyages to Britain
for tin, and so on. These things they certainly did or may have
done, but they had been done centuries before the Hellenistic
period. Since then the Phoenicians had been enveloped in the
Akhaimenid empire, and had then fallen foul first of the Per-
sians, then of the Macedonians. For small peoples the Hellenistic
period was an extremely dangerous time. It was not a time to
be too adventurous. To become rich was a sufficient ambition,
and to do that one became a trader in the area where trade was
carried on. Exploration and discovery were left to the Greeks,
such as Pytheas in the Atlantic or Megasthenes in India or
Hippalos in the Indian Ocean. The known world provided
opportunities enough for commerce without the need to delve
into the unknown. Phoenicians contented themselves with trade.
In any case, the pioneers had done the job pioneers do, by
opening up a sequence of trade routes, west to the Atlantic and
east to India and south to the Yemen. These routes had been
taken up by the local inhabitants, with the development of
intermediate centres at places such as Carthage and Gerrha,
where the various segments of the routes intersected. In the
Hellenistic period, it was not necessary for traders to make long,
hazardous voyages to the ends of the earth to gain wealth; a
voyage from Sidon to Athens, or from Tyre to Carthage, was
quite sufficient. Eastwards it was only necessary to receive
the goods brought overland by Palmyrenes or Nabataeans or
Greeks from the Asian interior: Phoenicians could move the
goods on, at a profit, with enterprise and expertise, in their
ships. They developed a network of trade, and no other people,
except for the Greeks, had developed a network to rival it.
When the Phoenicians settled comfortably into the Roman
empire, after the ruin of Greece and the Aegean in the Roman
civil wars, they were able to extend that trading area further
to the west, especially to Italy, the new economic heart of the
Mediterranean. They were a people who had foresworn the
possibility of power and empire, and settled merely for riches.
au o4i
; ae
ay. ]
7 ie en
NS Oe jad i stesso
; debs Pebasics cin Mi
a ry Saas a ;
U's EVV eee rer
tind we
r oa) va3 saisnw Tedd i.
; ; wT ares yet re rr sal
meets Brie ee eer ve Pre ss
inw wy ps a if EY
7)
at! il TL S49) era Prat! yn a “ek
4
= Wik jel ad ba ih Med dhl Met i + ids
RS alg “a>, ‘ te wit mrefir - i
*.
‘ Ten e reyes oF me" ;
7
GAEDE — . aA —
“aa aa
ee gore es
tas
aan ‘aa vill cp Mace IE b ehtenteanne
mai pe
wk nine nat “
4 7 e ih ¥ at ebay utdbirth end aki
“Cg
oh Fis ie Tak ae. Te '
caaping Comin west
iat?
ies “tetany
pe sna
‘sl teatro ie ave a at my ‘ier what
_ " = ee, Ra a iw F sm reroaee A pactess
ia) a ee een ee vet UiMOTE odon

eo Boe ie ha ons
Aik
bendy! orig ncn+ Lee eats meritsxe ;
. SAL CeRS Pee eee vsti ascecrt ai cry ee

1 at ean ny ae ci tc ie
ab as eae iE gtr
© = i é
} hoe a AD ts Tt a = tesredeyeruece a)
*Pebaatieattb sebee Bearse fo Oe.
Abertayrene
|
AP: nee
nA ‘Ww
* x atthe ar i. a“ fs
aes Ps ts aot ia¥

Ae Dear i“fe as
, $tei.ane
°, ., “ape
V4: seraita eT fiaedeek:vemies’ Patni
eeeee
ie
: Te ‘slatve ing Srittnieone eulny
«op ficheageniiaay in sayeth aes
Sapliises Honeetieatealoe assatvar: 91 awe
i
/ 4 “
ocd Has llepees
: a4 piety ai vayy z ney
ii =
ae
. 7 Beadtahi nie 3 ahrae ars tebe “oneal
=H Yah Li RN BE Rroincapciee
a tirePOG aeYd
tle bsal ou *optus me
ats. 3 “4 yy) Dee “ rs
eek REVIT TI — keCPs tage ww
ay Bh PE AAS AEE OPO alone rns

SRA ate a doy ‘atl Aa te Ait ee
Sea goed “iting }me a we ee .
"s
ae a ae Bealrei¥ wi
my Not M Ae a
“=p os re iW rity.
X¢ yO 7
j’ f i “a
INDEX
Abdalonymos, king of Sidon 34-5, 61-2 Amphoteros, Macedonian commander

Abdastart I, king of Sidon 22-3, 62, 80, 32
199, 204, 212 Amyntas, Macedonian renegade 32, 36
Abdastart II, king of Sidon 30, 62, 63 Andronikos, commander at Tyre 45, 59
Abdastart III, king of Sidon 30, 34, 62, Andros, Aegean 214.
63 Antarados, Aradian town 118, 141
Abdastart, prince of Arados 33-4 Antigoneia, Syria 47
Abila, Batanea 102 Antigonos I Monophthalamos,
Abila, Bekaa valley 113, 150 Macedonian general and king, and
Achaios, Seleukid rebel g1 Cyprus 43-4; and Phoenicia 42-7, 55,
Adaros, Palestine 12 63; fleet 42-3, 54, 72; siege of Tyre 42,
Adonis, river 16 44
Adonis, temple of 16 Antigonos, Jewish prince 168, 174-5
Aegean sea 31-3, 36, 48, 75, 77; Antilebanon, mountains 19-20, 37, 58,
Phoenicians in islands of 205-16 100, 113, 115, 139, 146, 149-50
Aemilius Paullus, L. 127 Antioch, Syria 118, 122, 152, 179
Aemilius Scaurus, M. 162 Antiocheia-in-Margiane (Merv) 197
Agathokles, Ptolemaic minister 98, 99 Antiochos I Soter, king 60, 100
Agesilaos, Antigonid envoy 43 Antiochos II Theos, king 83
Agis, king of Sparta 36 Antiochos III Megas, king 116, 149, 195—
agriculture 69-70, 75, 183 6; and Arados 55, 90, 91, 94, 97-8,
Ainel, king of Byblos 36, 58 104, 102; and Byblos 93, 94; and Fifth
Ake, Phoenician city 12, 24, 31; and Syrian War 99-103, 114; and Fourth
Ptolemy I 45; see also Ptolemais-Ake Syrian War 89-96; and Palestine 93,
Akhaimenid empire: and Arados 25, 27; 95, 99-103; and Sidon 95; and Tripolis
and Byblos 25; and Cyprus 26, 27, 32; 94; and Tyre 57; fleet 95
and Egypt 22-4, 29-30, 36; and Kition Antiochos IV Epiphanes, king 92-3, 105,
15-16, 20, 26; and Palestine 25, 31; Iii, 114, 116, 117-18, 119-20, 122,
and Sidon 9g, 11, 23-31, 191; and 208; coinage policy 120-1; policy
Tripolis 7-9, 10, 27, 31; and Tyre 11, towards Syrians 117-20
36; policy in Phoenicia 20, 23-4, 31-2; Antiochos V Eupator, king 122
see also Artaxerxes IIT Antiochos VII Sidetes, king 124, 126,
Akkar, plain of 6, 9, 10, 17 129
Alexander the Great, king, 31, 36, 39, 40, Antiochos VIII Grypos, king 137-41, 208
100; and Arados 26, 33-4, 52, 55; and Antiochos IX Kyzikenos, king 138-41,
Byblos 26, 34, 58; and Cyprus 39; and 147-8
India 191; and Phoenicians 191-2; Antiochos X Philopator, king 141
and Sidon 26, 34-5, 61, 191; and Tyre Antipatros, Judaean ruler 166
19, 26, 32, 58, 201 Antipatros, Macedonian regent 41
Alexander Balas, king 122-3, 124, 128, Antipatros of Sidon, poet 110
131 Antistius Vetus, M. 169
Alexander Iannaios, Jewish king 144, 151 Antonius, M. 166-8, 171-6
Alexander Zabinas, king 135-7 Apamea, Syria 113, 146, 152, 165
Alexandretta, gulf of 13 Aphaka, Phoenicia 16
Alexandria, Egypt 96, 98, 164, 172, 182 Apollonios, Ptolemaic minister 76
Amanus mountains 49 Arabia 76, 192, 195-7
Amathos, Cyprus 213 Arabs (Ituraeans) 58, 146
Ammonios, Seleukid minister 124. Aradians overseas 206, 210-12
222 Index
Arados, Phoenicia 10, 195, 207-8; and Babylonian empire 10, 158
Akhaimenids 25, 27; and Alexander Bahrain, see Tyios
26, 33-4, 52, 55; and Antigonos I 55; Baitokaike, Syria 16, 115, 132
and Antiochos III 55, 90, 91, 94, 97- Baktria 72, 84
8, 104, 120; and Antiochos IV 119-20; Balanaia, Aradian town 9, 131-2, 173-4
and Antonius 167; and Baitokaike 16, Barada, river 139
115, 132; and Herod 180-1; and Bargylos, mountains 9, 16, 132
Ituraeans 154; and peraia 9, 12-13, 16, Barouk, river 16
17, 52, 54-5, 56, 83-9, 94, 115, 119- Barzaphanes, Parthian satrap 168
20, 124, 129-35, 141; and Parthians Batanea 102, 150
168, 170; and Ptolemy I 41; and Rome Bekaa valley, Ptolemaic control 58, 96,
160, 165-6, 170-1, 173; and Seleukos 100, 103; invasion of 90, 92, 172-3;
I 52-3, 55-6, 65, 67; and Seleukos IT Ituraeans in 127, 139, 142, 149-52;
83-9, 91; and Tripolis 7; fleet 53, 90, settlement 113-15
91, 93, 94; Hellenization 185-6; Beroea, Syria 118
independence 129-35, 156; mint 52, Berytians overseas 208-10
97-8, 120-1, 125, 169, 175; monarchy Berytos 11, 25, 76, 92-3, 94, 99; 125, 201,
25, 55-6; oligarchy 65-6; revolution at 208-10; and Herod 180-1; and
129-35, 137; Semitic city 171-2; Ituraeans 155-6, 158-60; and
shipbuilding 71; ships 31-3; site 6, 13, Kleopatra VII 174-6; autonomy 153,
53, 184; sport 110-11; trade 72-3, 184; 156, 161; coins 111; destruction 123-4,
see also Abdastart, Girastart 126; mint 121, 122, 124, 138-9, 156,
Arados, Persian Gulf island 192-4 175; Roman colony 177-9; slave trade
Aramaic, language 190-1 184; sport 110
Archelaos, Macedonian commander at Black Sea 216-17
Tyre 40 Boethos of Sidon, philosopher 110, 185
architecture 79 Bogaia, basin, 132
Aretas, Nabataean king 151 Borinos, Phoenicia 11
Aristoboulos, Jewish ruler 143-4 Botrys, Phoenicia 11, 25, 93, 94, 148-9,
Ariston, Phoenician merchant 106 155, 161, 174
Arka, Phoenicia 57, 93; Ituraean Bourama, Phoenicia 153
principality 154-5, 160-1, 164, 174; Brochoi, Bekaa valley, Ptolemaic fort 58,
see also Ptolemy son of Soaimos, 90, 92, 93, 95, 96, 101, 113
Soaimos, Tell Arka bronze industry 72, 150
Arsinoe, wife of Ptolemy IV 96 Byblos, Phoenicia 6, 206; and
Artaxerxes III Okhos, Great King, and Akhaimenids 25; and Alexander 26,
Egypt 22-4; and Sidon 23, 24-31 34, 58; and Antiochos IIT 93, 94; and
Askelon, Palestine 11, 12, 20, 31, 144 Demetrios II 123; and Egypt 6; and
Asoka, Indian emperor 190 Herod 180; and Ituraeans 142, 149,
Assyrian empire 10 155; and Kleopatra 174; and
Astarte, temple of 68-9, 77; Wasta shrine Pompeius 161; and Ptolemy I 47;
78 autonomy 176; coins 111; hyparchy
Atargatis, goddess 117, 207 67; kings of 6; mint 99, 121, 123, 176;
Athens 33, 76; Phoenicians in 199, 202— monarchy 21~2, 58-9; plan 14-15;
3, 204-6, 208-15 ships 31-2, 43; site 6; territory 11, 17,
Attalos, Macedonian commander 40 148; weakness 6, 10, 11; see also Ainel,
Augustus, emperor, see Octavian Kinyras
Azemelek, king of Tyre 36-7, 38, 59
Caecilius Bassus 165, 172
Baal Shamin, temple of 16 Caecilius Metellus Scipio, Q. 163
Baalbek, see Heliopolis Caesar, see Julius, Octavian
Babylon, city 30 Caesarea, Palestine 12; see also Dor,
Babylonia 24, 90, 188-go, 192, 196 Strato’s Tower
Index 223
Carmel, Mount, Palestine 12 Dor, Palestine 12, 144; see also Caesarea,
Carthage 26, 37-8, 44, 77, 105, 106, 112, Strato’s tower
127, 201-5, 213, 214, 217
Cassius Longinus, C. 163-7 education 79-80, 109
Cercina islands 203, 214 Egypt; and Akhaimenids 22-4, 29-30,
Chalkis, Bekaa valley 113-14; Ituraean 36; and Alexander 36, 40; and Byblos
principality 149-52, 158, 164, 172, 6; and Rome 163-4; and Sidon 22, 24;
174-5, 178; see also Lysanias, Phoenicians in 74-5, 198-9, 213;
Mennaias, Monikos, Ptolemy son of rebellion 98-9; trade 74-5
Mennaias, Zenodoros Ekdippa, Palestine 12
Chalkis, Euboia 213 Eleutheros, river g, 10, 16, 54, 132, 154;
Chalkis, Syria 146 Ptolemaic boundary 41, 47, 52, 95-6
Chalybon, Antilebanon 150 Emesa 115, 146, 161, 171-2; see also
China 107 Iamblichos, Samsigeramos
coins 72-3, 107 Enydra, Aradian naval base 9, 140
colony, Roman 177-9 Ephesos 106, 216
Corinth 127 Epiphaneia, see Hama
Cornelius Dolabella, P. 165-6 Eshmun, temple of 16-17, 69, 77, 79
cotton 107, 194 Euphrates, river 12, 189
Crete 57, 81, 82, 213 Evagoras, king of Salamais 23
Cyprus 133; and Akhaimenids 26, 27, 32;
and Alexander 39; and Antigonos I ‘Federal council’ 25
43-4; and Demetrios I 47, 48; and Felastart, Phoenician at Memphis 74-5
Ptolemies 43-5, 48, 58, 64, 76, 144; fleets, Phoenician 53, 90, 91, 94, 95, 163,
Phoenicians in g, 15-16, 20, 44-5, 49- 199
50, 73-4; rebellion in 26, 27, 31 forest, Lebanon 17, 71-2
Gabala, Phoenicia 9, 12, 20, 132; and

Damascus, Syria 58, 95, 100-1, 135, 138— Arados 54; independence 134-5; mint
9, 142, 148, 150-2, 178, 190, 207 87-9
Damour, river 92 Gabinius, A. 162
Dareios I, Great King 20 Gadara, Transjordan 102, 110
Dareios III, Great King 35-6 Gades, Spain 201
Datames, Akhaimenid commander 32 Galilee 126, 150, 167
Delos, Aegean 80, 110, 124; Phoenicians Galilee, Sea of 95
in 74, 205, 206-15 Gaza, Palestine 31, 43, 45, 76, 95, 101,
Delphi 146, 216 144
Demetrias, Thessaly, Phoenicians in 210— Gedrosia 192, 194
II, 213 Gerrha, Arabia 195-6
Demetrios I Poliorketes, Antigonid king; Gerrha, Bekaa valley, Ptolemaic fort 58,
and Cyprus 47, 48; and Sidon 47, 48- 90; 92, 93; 95, 96, 101, 113, 149
g, 63; and Tyre 44, 46, 47, 48-9, 59; Gigartos, Phoenicia 155, 160
capture 48, 52; death 52; defeat at Girastart (Gerosratos) king of Arados,
Gaza 45 33-4,36
Demetrios I Soter, Seleukid king 122-3 glass industry 72, 106, 182-3, 216
Demetrios II Nikator, Seleukid king 122— Greece, Phoenicians in 199
6, 129, 135-7 Greek, education 109; immigrants 108—
Demetrios, Ptolemaic agent 76 g; language 108-9
Dinon, Ptolemaic commander 100 Gytheion, Lakedaimon 82
Diodotos of Kasiana, see Tryphon
Dionysios, tyrant of Tripolis 155, 160 Hadad, god 117, 207
Diotimos of Sidon, chariot victor 81, 82, Hadrian, emperor 17
III Hama (Hamath), Syria 96, 113-14
224 Index
Hannibal 105, 106, 203, 214, 217 121, 122, 123, 125, 128; wars 162, 163,
harbours 13-14, 53 168; see also Antipatros, Aristoboulos,
Hegelochos, Macedonian commander 32 Herod, Hyrkanos, John Hyrkanos,
Heliodoros, Seleukid minister 116 Jonathan Maccabaeus, Judaea, Onias,
Heliopolis—Baalbek, Bekaa valley 113— Simon Maccabaeus
14, 150, 172; Roman colony 178-9 John Hyrkanos, Jewish ruler 126, 141,
Hellenization 77-83, 108-11, 117-18, 143-5, 148
127-8, 145-7, 185-6, 218 Jonathan Maccabaeus, Jewish rebel 123
Herakleides, Phoenician at Delos 74 Joppa, Palestine 12, 43, 102
Hermippos, comic poet 76 Jordan, river 101, 102, 142
Herod, Jewish king 166-8, 170, 173, 174- Judaea 122, 125, 128, 141, 171; and
5, 178, buildings 180-2 Ituraeans 143-4; and Pompeius 161—
Hierapolis, Syria 117, 207 2; and Tyre 142-3, 145-6, 163
Hieron, son of Gorgios 208 Julius Caesar, C. 163-5, 172
Histiaia, Euboia 213 Julius Caesar, Sex. 165
Huleh valley 142
hyparchies 67
Kalamos, Phoenicia 94, 95
Hyrkanos, Jewish high priest 164, 168
Karia 26
Karne, Aradian town 54; mint 87-9, 131-
Iabruda, Antilebanon 150
2
Iamblichos, Emesan prince 164, 172,
Karrhai, Mesopotamia, battle 162
175-6
Kassandros, Macedonian king 47
Iasos, Aegean 210-11, 213, 216
Kedasa (Kedesh Naphthali) 142-3
Idalion, Cyprus, Phoenician control of
Keos, Aegean 214
15, 16, 39 Kharayeb, temple at 68-9, 77
Idrieus, Persian satrap 26, 31
Kilikia 26, 43, 47, 48, 133, 163
Idumaea, Palestine 141
Kinyras, tyrant of Byblos 155, 160
incense 76, 196-7
Kition, Cyprus, 9, 201, 211; and
India 191; Alexander in 191; Phoenicians
Akhaimenids 15-16, 20; and
in 194-5 Alexander 39; and Ptolemy I 43, 65;
Indus river 191
siege and destruction 43-5, 46, 73;
industry 107-8, 182-3; bronze 72, 150;
monarchy 15-16, 20-2, 64-5; origin of
glass 72, 106, 182—3, 216; olive oil 69—
15, 26, 112; site 15; see also Pumyaton
70, 75, 106; purple dye 70-1, 183;
Kleopatra, wife of Ptolemy V 104
shipbuilding 31-3, 54, 70-2, 106;
Kleopatra III, Ptolemaic queen 144
textiles 106-7, 183-4; timber 71-2;
wine 183 Kleopatra VII, Ptolemaic queen 174-6
inflation 107 Kleopatra Thea, Seleukid queen 122-4,
Isis, goddess 69, 77, 96 US Oar e
Issos, battle 32, 33 Kleopatra daughter of Philostratos 206—
Italy 216-17 7
Ituraeans 19-20, 113, 115; and Berytos
Kos, Aegean 209, 213, 214
Kourion, Cyprus 213
155-6, 158-60; and Byblos 142, 149,
155; and Kleopatra VII 174; and Kyros the Younger, Akhaimenid
Judaea 143-4; and Orthosia 154; and pretender 13, 190
Tripolis 164; and Tyre 143; expansion
142, 149-52, 153-7, 158-60; language, Aramaic 190-1; Greek 108-9;
principalities 144, 149-52, 178; see also Phoenician 108-11, 191, 199-201
Arka, Chalkis Laodikeia-ad-Libanum, Syria 100, 113-
14
Jerusalem 102, 116—19, 120, 162, 163, Laodikeia-ad-Mare, Syria 53, 84, 91,
173, 179-80 134, 152, 164-5
Jews, Hellenization 111, 127-8; rebellion Laodikeia-in-Canaan, see Berytos
Index 225
Laomedon of Mitylene, Macedonian monarchy 15-16, 20-2, 25, 28, 30, 45,
satrap 41 58-65; abolition of 55-6
Lapithos, Cyprus 15, 74 Monikos, Ituraean ruler 151
Larissa, Syria 100, 113-14, 115 Myriandros, Syria 13, 20, 190
Larnaca, Cyprus 73 myrrh 192, 194
Lasthenes, Cretan mercenary 123
Lebanon, mountains 9, 19, 142, 149-50, Nabataean kingdom 196-7
1534 Naples 209-10
Lesbos, Aegean 32, 216 nard 192, 194
Libo, Bekaa valley 96, 113 Naxos, Aegean 210, 212
Licinius Crassus, M. 162-3 Nearchos, Macedonian commander 191,
Licinius Lucullus, L. 153 192
Litani, river 19, 68 Nektanebo, pharaoh 24, 26, 27, 199
Lysanias, Ituraean ruler 168, 170, 174-5 Nemean games 81, 110, 111, 216
Lysimachos, Macedonian king 46, 47 Nikanor, Ptolemaic general 41
Nikolaos, Ptolemaic general 92-3
Nikokreon, king of Salamis 43, 45
Macedon 216, 218 Nikouria, Aegean 212
Mahrud, island 13
Malta 214 Octavian (Augustus) 167, 176-80
manufactures, see industry oligarchy 65-6
Marathos, Phoenicia 206—7; and olive oil industry 69-70, 75, 106
Alexander 34, 36; and Arados 54, 87— Oman, Arabia 194
9, 94, 124; destruction 124, 129-35; Onias, Jewish High Priest 118
mint 41-2, 52, 54-5, 87-9, 120-1; plan Orchomenos, Boiotia 214, 216
15; shipbuilding 72; stadium 111, 118; Ornithopolis, Palestine 11
temple 16 Orontes, Persian satrap and rebel 23
Mariamme, Syria 9, 54, 115, 127, 132 Orontes, river 12, 19, 103, 113, 127, 190
Marion, Cyprus, Phoenician control of Oropos, Boiotia 214, 216
15 Orthosia, Phoenicia 121, 125, 148, 174;
Marion, tyrant 167 and Ituraeans 154; and Pompeius 161;
Marisa, Palestine, Sidonians in 123, 190 autonomy 176; capture 94; garrison 55,
Marsyas, Ptolemaic official 96 93; siege 57
Masyaf, Syria 127
Mazday, Persian satrap 21, 23, 30 Pakoros, Parthian general 168, 170, 172
Meges of Sidon, doctor 185 Palaibyblos; Phoenicia 6, 11
Meleagros of Gadara, poet, 110 Palaityros, Phoenicia 6, 12, 35
Melgart, god 77; temples of, at Larnaca Palestine 6; and Akhaimenids 25, 31; and
73; at Tyre 14, 35, 38, 40, 118, 146, Antiochos III 93, 95, 99-103; and
201 Ptolemies 40-4, 46-9, 76, 104;
Memphis, Egypt 74-5, 198-9 Phoenicians in 12, 18-19, 31, 50, 123
Menekles, Ptolemaic agent 76 Palmyra, Syria 171-2
Menelaos, brother of Ptolemy I, and Paltos, Aradian town 9, 131-2
Cyprus 43-4, 64 Panathenaia, games 110, 146, 208
Mennaias, Ituraean ruler 151 Panaitolos, commander at Tyre 92, 98
Mentor of Rhodes, mercenary captain, Panion, battle 101; city (Paneas) 142
27 Parmenio, Macedonian commander 100,
mercenary soldiers 57, 82-3 139
Mesopotamia 47, 138 Parthia 84, 124, 129, 138, 162-3, 168,
Metrodoros, Phoenician at Samos 218 170, 172-3
Mikkalos of Klazomenai, Macedonian pearls 194
agent 192 Peiraios, Athens 213
Milk-Astart, temple of 68 Peloponnese 216
226 Index
Perdikkas, Macedonian regent 40 118, 121, 122-3, 126, 135-6, 144, 153,
Perrhaibia 82 183; see also Ake
Persepolis 189-91 Ptolemy I Soter, king, and Cyprus 43, 48,
Persian gulf 190, 192-6 65; and Phoenicia 40-4, 45, 46-9, 56,
Persians, see Akhaimenid empire 58-9, 99, 103; and Sidon 42, 48-9, 63-
Pharsalos, battle 163 4; and Tyre 40, 42, 48-9, 60-1
Philip, Seleukid minister 122 Ptolemy II Philadelphos, king 56; and
Philippi, battle 167 Phoenicia 64-5; and Sidon 64; and
Philo of Byblos 50 Tyre 60-1
Philokles, king of Sidon 62-4, 212 Ptolemy III Euergetes, king 83
Philostratos, Marathian at Delos 206-7 Ptolemy IV Philopator, king, and Fourth
Philotas, Macedonian governor of Tyre Syrian war go-6; and Phoenicia 96,
38 99, 113; great ship of 75
Phoenicia, and Akhaimenids 20, 23-4, Ptolemy V Epiphanes, king 98, 102, 104
31-2, 187-91, 199; and Alexander 19, Ptolemy VI Philometor, king 122-3
26, 32-4, 39-40, 52, 55, 58, 191-2, 201; Ptolemy IX Lathyros, king 135, 144, 149
and Antiochos III 55, 57, 90, 91, 94, Ptolemy son of Mennaias, Ituraean ruler
97-8, 99-103, 114; and Caesar 163-5; 151-2, 153, 155, 161, 166-8
and Herod 180-2; and Kleopatra VII Ptolemy son of Soaimos, Ituraean ruler
174-6; and Pompeius 158-64; and 164
Ptolemy I 40-4, 45, 46-9, 56, 58-60, Ptolemy son of Thraseas, Ptolemaic and
63-4, 99, 103; and Ptolemy II 60-1, Seleukid governor 98, 102-3
64-5; and Ptolemy IV 96; and Pumyaton, king of Kition 37; and
Seleukid civil wars 126; and Seleukos Akhaimenids 15-16, 26; and
I 46, 48, 52; class divisions 82-3, 111; Alexander 39; and Ptolemy I 43; death
coinages 111-12, 120-1; fleet 163, 199; 44, 51, 58; kingdom of 15-16
fortification 57-8; geography 5-7; purple dye industry 70-1, 183
government of 57-8, 66-7, 96-7, 103—
4; Hellenization 218; independence Raphia, Palestine, battle 95
112; industry 69-72, 106-8; language Ras el-Bassit, Syria 13
108-11, 191, 199-201; monarchies 60— Ras el-Sadiyatt, Phoenicia 95
5; oligarchies 65-6; population 33, 50, Ras Ibn Hani, Syria 13
192, 218; religion 77-8, 108-9; tyrants Ras Mussandam, Arabia 193
167-8 Ras Nebi Younis, Phoenicia 95
Phoenicians, at Athens 199, 202-3, 204— Ras Shamra, Syria 13
6, 208-15; at Delos 74, 205-15; in religion 77-8, 79, 108-9
Aegean area 204-15; in Cyprus 9, 15- Rhodes 182, 209-12, 214
16, 20, 44-5, 49-50, 73-4; in Egypt Roman empire 5
74-5, 198-9, 213; in India 194-5; in Rome 98, 116, 119, 216-17
Palestine 12, 18-19, 31, 50, 123; in
Persian Gulf 192-6; traders 189-90, Salamis, Cyprus, and Alexander 39; and
218-19 Ptolemy I 43, 45, 48; battle 46;
piracy 133, 140 Phoenician control of 15, 16, 23;
Platanos, battle 95 rebellion 26
Pleistarchos, Macedonian ruler 47 Samaria, Palestine 48, 141-2, 148, 190
Pompeius Magnus, Cn. 152, 155, 156, Samos, Aegean 212, 218
158-64, 165 Samothrace, Aegean 216
population, of Phoenicia 33, 55, 192, Samsigeramus, Emesan king 161
218 Sanchuniathon, Phoenician historian 50
Porcius Cato, M. 112 Sarapis, god 96
Porphyrion, battle 11, 95 Sardinia 199, 201
Poseidoniastai, at Delos 208 Sarepta, Phoenicia 11, 68, 121
Ptolemais-Ake, Palestine 92-3, 95, 103, Satraps’ Revolt 23
Index 227
sculpture 80-1 Simyra, Aradian town 87-9, 124, 129-30
Seleukeia-in-Pieria, Syria 53, 84, 90-1, Sinna, Phoenicia 153
140-1 Skopas, Ptolemaic general 99, 101-2
Seleukeia-on-the-Tigris, Babylonia 197 slave trade 76, 184
Seleukos I Nikator, Macedonian general Soaimos, Ituraean ruler 164
and king 46, 63; and Arados 52-3, 55- Sosius, C. 173
6, 65, 67; and Cyprus 43-4; and Kilikia Spain 72, 77, 199, 216-17
48; and Phoenicia 46, 48, 52; and Syria sport 80-1, 110-11, 117-18, 146, 208, 216
47 Strato, see Abdastart
Seleukos II Kallinikos, king 90; and Stratonike, wife of Seleukos I 47
Arados 83-9, 91 Strato’s Tower, Palestine 12, 18, 144; see
Seleukos III Soter, king go also Dor, Caesarea, Zoilos
Seleukos IV Philopator, king 116 Susa, Susiana 30, 197
Seleukos V, king 135 Susiana 189
Semitic policy of Phoenicians 171-2 Sykaminos, Palestine 12
settlement, expansion of 10, 17-18, 96-7, Syria 5, 10, 26; Roman province 161-3
112-15 Syros, Aegean 214
Shechem, Palestine, Sidonians at 123
Sheikh Zenad, Syria ro Tabnit, king of Sidon 62
shipbuilding 31-3, 54, 70-2, 106 Tamassos, Cyprus, Phoenician control of
ships, 31-3, 43 15, 16, 39
Sicily 37, 163, 199, 216 Taurus, mountains 43, 46
Sidon, Phoenicia 201, 218; and taxation 115~16, 169-70, 179
Akhaimenids 9, 11, 23-31, 191; and Tell Arka, see Arka
Alexander 26, 34-5, 61, 191; and Tell Kazel, see Simyra
Antiochos III 95; and Antonius 167; temples 16-17; of Adonis 16; of Astarte
and Athens 199; and Demetrios I 68-9, 78; of Baal Shamin 16; of
Poliorketes 47—9, 63; and Demetrios II Eshmun 16-17, 69, 77, 79; of Isis 69;
123, 126; and Egypt 22, 24; and of Melquart 14, 35, 38, 40, 45, 73, 118,
Parthians 168; and Ptolemy I 42, 48— 146, 201; of Milk-Astart 68; Marathos
9, 63-4; and Ptolemy II 64; and Rome 16
165-6; and Tripolis 6; and Tyre 38, Tennes, king of Sidon, 22-3, 27-30, 62,
63-4, 144, 166; coins 112; garrison 57, 63
64, 93; glass industry 106, 182-3; Tenos, Aegean 209-10
harbour 14; Hellenization 80-1, 110, textiles 106-7, 183-4
146, 185; hyparchy 67; independence ‘Thapsakos’, river 12
139-40, 147-8, 156; mint 99, 120-3, Thapsakos, Syria 12, 190
138-40, 175; monarchy 28, 30, 61-4; Thasos, Aegean 216
oligarchy 65-6; plan 14; rebellion 7, Thebes, Boiotia 81, 216
24-31, 49; royal necropolis 61-2, 80; Theodotas, attempted coup at Tyre 56
shipbuilding 71; ships 31~3, 43; siege Theodotos, archon at Sidon 76
101-9; slave trade 76; social structure Theodotos of Aitolia, general g1—2, 98
28-30; sport 146; territory 11-12, 17; Theseia, games 110
trade 76, 185; see also Abdalonymos, Thespiai, Boiotia 214
Abdastart I, II and III, Philokles, Thettalion, Sidonian messenger 27
Tennes) Theuprosopon, Mount, Phoenicia 11, 94,
Sidonians, in Athens 205; in Carthage 155, 160
203-5; in Marisa 123, 190; in Shechem Thrace 36, 216
123; overseas 206, 212-14 timber 71-2
Sigon, Aradian town 17 Tigranes, Armenian king 152-3, 158
silk 107, 183 Timokrates of Byblos, boxer 80
Sillis of Sidon, boxer 80 Tlepolemos, Ptolemaic minister 99
Simon Maccabaeus, Jewish ruler 125-6 Trachonitis 150
228 Index
trade, 69-70, 72-7, 106-8; exports 69—- games 117-18; garrison 57; harbour
70, 72-3, 106, 183; imports 72-3, 78— 13-14, 71; Hellenization 110, 117~-18,
g, 106; in Palestine 18, 76; metal 77; 145-7, 185; hyparchy 67;
re-exports 184; slave 76, 184 independence 135-8, 147, 156; mint
Trieres, Phoenicia 9, 94, 95 59, 99, 103-4, 120-3, 125-6, 136, 145,
Triparadeisos, Syria, conference at, 41 169, 175, 181; monarchy 21-2, 59-61;
Tripolis, Phoenicia 32, 122, 216; and oligarchy 66; plan 14; purple dye
Akhaimenids 7-9, 10, 27, 31; and industry 70-1; Semitic city 145-7, 171—
Arados 7; and Antiochos III 94; and 2; shipbuilding 71; ships 31-3; sieges
Ituraeans 164; and Kleopatra 174; 35-40, 42, 44, 45, 49; site 6, 13-14, 184;
and Pompeius 161; and Ptolemy I 47; slave trade 76, 184; sport 146; territory
and Sidon 6; and Tyre 7; autonomy II-12, 24, 142-3, 178; trade 76, 106,
176; ‘council’ at 7-9, 25; cavalry 185; tyrant 167; see also Azemelek,
commander at 57; hyparchy 67; Marion
independence 147-8; mint 99, 121, Tyre, Persian Gulf island 192-4
138-9, 175, 176-7; rebellion 7, 24-5, Tyrians overseas 206, 214-15
31; shipbuilding 43, 71; site 6-7, 26, Tyros, India 194-5
71, 148; territory 9-10, 148; trade 184—
5; see also Dionysios Umm el-Amed, Phoenicia 67-8, 70, 81-
Tripolitania 199 2, 127
Troodos mountains, Cyprus 15 Utica, Africa 201, 203
Tryphon, king 123-5, 128, 133, 146, 208
Tylos (Bahrain) 193-4
Ventidius, P. 173
tyrants 167-8
Vipsanius Agrippa, M. 177
Tyre, Phoenicia 10, 201; and
Akhaimenids 11, 36; and Alexander 19,
26, 32, 35-40, 59, 201; and Antiochos War, First Syrian 60, Third Syrian 83-4;
III 57, 92-3, 105; and Antiochos IV Fourth Syrian 89-96; Fifth Syrian 97—
117-18; and Antonius 167; and 103, 198
Carthage 201-2; and Demetrios I Wasta, Phoenicia, shrine 78
Poliorketes 44, 46, 47, 48-9, 59; and White Village, Phoenicia 174
Demetrios IT 123, 125; and Herod wine industry 183
180-1; and Ituraeans 143; and Judaea
142-3, 145-6, 163; and Parthians 168, Zakynthos 213
170; and Pompeius 161~2, 165; and Zeno of Kition, philosopher 79
Ptolemy I 40, 42, 48-9, 60-1; and Zeno of Sidon, philosophers 79, 110
Ptolemy II 60-1; and Sidon 38, 63-4, Zenodoros, Ituraean ruler 175-6, 178-9
144, 166; and Tripolis 7; archives 50; Zenon, Ptolemaic agent 75-6 —
coins 112; coup by Theodotas 56; Zoilos, tyrant 144
» CLAREMONT RARY
CA

Phoenicia: 15 Hellenistic

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

You might also like

Phoenicia: 15 Hellenistic

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Phoenicia: 15 Hellenistic

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

)

CLARENDON PRESS, OXFORD

Oxford is a trade mark of Oxford University Press

Published in the United States

© fj. D. Grainger 1991

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Typeset by Butler and Tanner Ltd, Frome and London

Ws The Time of Troubles, 360-287 Bc

5 Autonomy and Independence, 129-64 Bc 129

AAAS Annales Archéologiques Arabes Syriennes

Explaining the title of a book may well be a mistake, for, if it

50 100 150 200 km

Phoenician cities etc. in italic typeface

The coastlands of the eastern Mediterranean can be described

Map 2. Akhaimenid Phoenicia

'® Diod., xvi. xli. 2 and 5.

* Elayi, ‘Phoenician Geography’, 100-2.

Diod., xvt. xlv. 6.

"5 Arr., Anab., 11. xxiv. 5.

'3 Diod., xx. exiii. 1. ee Nbidaios

'®° Eusebius, Chronicorum, ed. A. Schoene, ii. 118.

1S Jos., AF vill. 55.

THE PTOLEMAIC PEACE

The Ptolemaic acquisition of four-fifths of mainland Phoenicia

27 Polen ve lxwiiey 7: 38 1G, 1/2, 1335b.

106 Seyrig, ‘Aradus’, 215; Will, Histoire Politique, 1. 234-43.

'8 P. Gurob (=FGH, 160, = Austin, 220); M. Holleaux, Etudes d’épigraphie et

Map 3. Phoenicia and Antiochos III

After two generations of peace for most of Phoenicia, warfare

> Seyrig, ‘Aradus’, 216.

°° Jos., AF, xii. 136, quoting Polybios.

The inclusion of the Phoenician cities in the huge Seleukid

pny eupe Cities, 107-8. 35 Jos., AJ, xiv. 40.

aio Miace.<5? 15: * Diod., xxx, xviiia; 1 Macc. 6: 1-4.

In 130 Bc Antiochos VII, having reduced his inheritance to

E . 2 ney art arts)

a Pratinn bbeedh senehein oni

The arrival of Cn. Pompeius Magnus in Syria in 64 Bc marks,

8 IGLS, vi. 2747, 2760. = Jos. AZ, xiv. 120:

* D. B. Harden, ‘Ancient Glass: I, Pre-Roman’, Archaeological Journal, 125 (1968),

The Phoenicians were a small, divided people living in a world

002 ddr 009 008 Wwx000T

wes are eeSOay ©

% J.-P. Rey-Coquais, ‘Une prétendue “‘dynastie” syrienne dans la Delos hellén-

Phoenicians, at least in comparison with other, more dominant

ia) a ee een ee vet UiMOTE odon

. SAL CeRS Pee eee vsti ascecrt ai cry ee

aes Ps ts aot ia¥

ay Bh PE AAS AEE OPO alone rns

Abdalonymos, king of Sidon 34-5, 61-2 Amphoteros, Macedonian commander

Gabala, Phoenicia 9, 12, 20, 132; and

You might also like