Chapter One Election Monitoring and Electral Credibility in Nigeria in The Four Republic

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background to the Study
Elections globally are very important practice for both developed and developing
country, as it serves as one of the means for sustainable development of a countries (Attahiru,
2011). It encourages the practice of democracy, giving the citizens chance to participate in the
governance of their country.
Election monitoring is the observation of an election by one or more independent parties,

typically from another country or a non-governmental organization (NGO), primarily to assess
the conduct of an election process on the basis of national legislation and international election
standards. There are national and international election observers. Monitors do not directly
prevent electoral fraud, but rather record and report such instances. Election observation
increasingly looks at the entire electoral process over a longer period of time, rather than at
election-day proceedings only. The legitimacy of an election can be affected by the criticism of
monitors, provided that they are themselves seen as unbiased. A notable individual is often
appointed honorary leader of a monitoring organization in an effort to enhance its own
legitimacy
Over some decades now, international observers have been witnessing elections in
Nigeria and reporting to the global community on how it went in their host community (Obi and
Abutudu, 1999). Election monitoring in Africa has gradually been adopted by almost all African
countries including Nigeria as a way of strengthening their political processes(Geisla, 1993).
International observers are usually seen as being objective and non-partisan, and this is why their
presence is highly needed in the assessment of the performance of the activities of a country
during her election.
International observers are not only seen in Africa during elections, but also other western
countries of the world (Stack, 1993). International observers include governmental and non-
governmental institutions like Economic Communities of West African States (ECOWAS),
United Nations, etc.
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The claim that election monitoring can reduce election-related fraud appears frequently in
the literature ( Schimpp & McKernan 2001, Binder 2009, Global Commission, 2012). This claim
is most commonly based on the assumption that since electoral fraud may reduce electoral
credibility, monitoring that reduces fraud may increase electoral credibility (Global Commission
2012). Other studies assert that the presence of observers helps to encourage losers to accept the
legitimacy of elections, or to participate in elections they might have otherwise boycotted,
thereby reducing the likelihood of the anxiety that may result to election fraud (Carothers, 1997,
Schimpp & McKernan, 2001, Atwood, 2012).
The perennial skepticisms, apprehensions and rancorous situation that usually

characterise elections in Nigeria have engendered interest of the international community in the
elections with the presence of international observers during election periods. Election
observation has become a highly regulated political instrument based on international best
practices. Election observation is crucial to the electoral process because it enhances public
confidence and contributes to the integrity of the elections and more importantly, has the
potential of exposing irregularities and fraud.
Electoral credibility refers to International standards and global norms governing the
appropriate conduct for free and fair elections (Morris, 2014). These globally International best
practices, standards, norms have been endorsed in a series of authoritative conventions, treaties,
protocols, regimes etc. Garber (1993), article 25, of 1948 Universal Declaration of Human.
Rights laid down the basic premises for election rights, later developed by article 25 of
the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Declaration of 1994 at Paris. The right and
opportunity to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through the chosen
representatives, to vote, and to be elected at a genuine periodic elections held on the basis
of .reversal and equal suffrage and by secret ballot.
According to Goodwin-Gil (1998), “experience confirms that electorates are more likely to be
actively engaged in political life if, it has a confidence in the system". Article 19, rights to hold
opinion without interference; Article 21, the right for peaceful assembly; Article 22, right to
freedom of Association/collective entitlement for free and fair elections etc. These provided legal
basis for a representative government. Article 25, Universal Declaration of Human Rights
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(ICCPR,) of 1966, also added 'reasonableness' of political rights standard in the matter
concerning voting, candidature, conflict of interest, election expenditure, and constituency
limitations (HRC, 1996). These International organizations that set the standard include; United
Nation General Assembly; regional bodies, such as Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE), Organization of American States (OAS), African Union (AU) (Young. 2009).
This global standards UDHR, 1948 (EU, 2007:), stated that the will of the people shall be the
basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine
elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by
equivalent free voting procedures.
It was further explained in Articles 3, 5, 6, 7 of the Economic Community of West

African States (ECOWAS), Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. This relate to
secrecy of vote, universal franchise, independence and neutrality of the election administration.
The transparency and disposal of petitions were also made to ensure free, fair, credible elections
(EU, 2007). The ICCPR, was ratified in Nigeria in 1993. The Economic Community of West
African States' (ECOWAS) protocol on democracy and good governance was adopted in 2001.
The Commonwealth is a signatory to both the declaration of principles for International Election
Observation and the associated Code of Conduct for International Election Observation
Missions. These were commemorated on 27 October, 2005 at the United Nations in New York.
Periodic elections at regular intervals are universal suffrage that includes all sectors of
society. equal suffrage, in the idea of one-person, one-vote; the right to stand for public office
contest elections; the rights of all eligible electors to vote; the use of secret ballot process;
genuine elections; Elections that reflect the free expression of the will of the people (CWEOM,
2011).
Goodwin-Gil (1994),this is in conformity with the voting and political right declaration
of 26 march, 1994 for criteria for free and fair elections in Paris that every adult has the right to
vote in elections in non-discriminatory basis; that every adult citizen has the right to access an
effective impartial and non-discriminatory procedure for the registration of voters; eligible voter
shall be denied the right to vote or disqualified from registration as a voter objectively verifiable
criteria prescribed by law, provided such measures are consistence with the State's obligations
under International law; Every individual who is denied the right vote, to be registered as a voter
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shall be entitled to appeal to a jurisdiction competent to review decisions and to correct errors
promptly and effective; Every voter has the right to equal effective polling station in order to
exercise his or her right to vote; Every voter is entitled to exercise his or her right equally with
others and to have his or her voter accorded equiv weight to that of other; the right to vote in
secret is absolute and shall not be restricted in manner whatsoever right to vote in secret is
absolute and shall not be restricted in manner whatsoever.
Elections in Nigeria in recent times have witnessed findings and recommendations of

international Election Observers. The International Election Observers included, European
Union Election Observers Mission (EU EOM): National Democratic Institute (NDI),
International Republican Institute (IRI), Commonwealth Observer Group (CWOG), and African
Union (AU), Others are the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the
Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDSA) among others.
One of the primary aims of election observers in the world, whether domestic or
international, is to strengthen and expand democratic values worldwide. They also provide
practical assistances, to political leaders, institutions, internal democracy and nations in
advancing in their democratic values and cultures. They help either in commending elections or
exposing election flaw(s). They advocate for free and fair elections in line with global norms.
They also advice for electoral body, security, judicial, and media neutralities in an electoral
process. These observers safeguard elections by encouraging openness, periodic elections,
citizen participation, and accountability. They condemn imposition of candidates, insecurity,
political thuggery, and lack of internal democracy among others. The study examined election
monitoring and electoral credibility in Nigeria in the forth Republic.
1.2 Statement of the Problem
Election observation has become a highly regulated political instrument based on

international best practices. Election observation is crucial to the electoral process because it
enhances public confidence and contributes to the integrity of the elections and more
importantly, has the potential of exposing irregularities and fraud.
The challenges of incredibility rocking the conduct of elections in Nigeria and many
countries of the world necessitated for International Election Monitoring. These challenges not
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only hampered free and fair elections but puts doubt in the mind of the electorates. The
International Election Observers in bid to promote democratic values and strengthen the electoral
processes, observer elections with the major aims to support the democratic process of the
country, to deter fraud and expose the electoral irregularities, enhance the public confidence and
determine the level of implementation of rule of law. These will ensure the general acceptability,
voters' confidence and transparency of the election to the domestic and international community.
Article 19, rights to hold opinion without interference; Article 21, the right for peaceful
Assembly; Article 22, right to freedom of Association/collective entitlement for free and fair
elections etc. These provided legal basis for a representative government. Article 25, Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (ICCPR,) of 1966, also added 'reasonableness' of political rights
standard in the matter concerning voting, candidature, conflict of interest and constituency
limitations. (HRC, 1996). The recommendation of improved electoral frame work, genuine
election effective time preparation and election administration, education campaign, equal level
ground for political actors, enabling environment for voters exercise of their franchise,
democracy to ensure elections without undue influence or coercion of any kind which distort or
inhibit the free expression of the electors will - Voters should be able to form independently, free
of violence or threat of violence, compulsion, inducement or manipulative interference of any
kind over the years were based on the general reform of the process to reflect the International
standard appropriate for conduct of free and fair as stated by the theory of International norms
for appropriateness. The study is poised to investigate the impact of the election monitoring in
promoting credibility of electoral process in line with global standard and electoral norms in
Nigeria.
1.3 Objectives of the Study
The main objective of the study is to investigate the impact of the election monitoring on
the credibility of electoral process in Nigeria. The specific objectives include:
i. To establish the impact of election monitoring on electoral credibility in Nigeria's forth

republic.
ii. To evaluate public perception of on the role of election observers / monitors in electoral
process in Nigeria forth republic.
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iii. To examine the challenges affecting election monitoring and electoral credibility in
Nigeria forth republic
1.4 Research Question
The following question are to answered in the course of the study
i. What are the impacts of election monitoring on electoral credibility in Nigeria's forth
republic.
ii. What are public perception on role of election observers / monitors in electoral process in
iii. What are the challenges election monitoring and electoral credibility in Nigeria forth
republic.
1.5 Significance of the study
This research will be will be significant to Electoral body, law makers Stakeholders in
elections, general public and the Academician as the finding will reveal the significance of
monitoring on electoral credibility in Nigeria's forth republic; to the law makers the study will
help the to make law that will facilitate the election monitoring in Nigeria; to the election
stakeholder like political parties civil society group, the finding guide to understand the role of
election monitoring in enduring the credibility of an election. to the academician, the study will
serve as reference point for further study.
1.6 Scope of the study
The scope of the study is determine the role of election monitoring in the electoral in Nigeria
forth republic, it does not cover first, second and third republic. the study is made of two
variables the election monitoring which is the independent variable while electoral credibility.
The study also covers the six general elections that have been held so far in the forth republic
which includes: 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015 and 2019 general elections.
1.7.0 Methodology
1.7.1 Research Design
Research design means the structuring or investigation aimed at identifying variables

and their relationship to one another. For the purpose of this study, a descriptive survey design
will be used for the study. The method is considered adequate and most appropriate because it
helps the researcher to describe, examine, record, and interpret the variables that exist in the
study Kothari (2004).
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1.7.2 Population of the Study
The population of the study is made up of Staff of independent National electoral commission
(INEC) in Makurdi the State capital of Benue and external publics which includes adults
Males and Females of 18 years above who may be stakeholders of election process. This
population is broken down as follows, Staff of independent National electoral commission
(INEC) in Makurdi which were 207 and adult of 18 years above who may be election stake
holders are residing in Makurdi Metropolis which were 300,377 (National Population Census
2006). Thus the actual pollution is 300584
1.7.3 Sample Size
The study makes use of four hundred (400) sample. The sample size was determined using
Taro-Yamane formula. The mathematical expression is given as:
N
n=
1+ Ne2
When
n = Sample size desired
N = Population size
e = maximum acceptable margin of error (0.05).
1 = Theoretical constant.
Applying this formula in determining the sample size for this study.
We substitute as follow.
N
n= 2
1+ Ne
300584
n= 1+ 300,377(0.05)2
300584
n= 1+ 300,377 X 0.0025
7
300584
n= 751.943
n=399.467 = 400
The Taro Yamane formula was used to determine the sample size from a finite population;
therefore the formula is adopted in this study because the study has a finite population of 300584
1.7.4 Sampling Techniques and Procedure
The study used stratified sampling technique, because of the heterogeneous nature of the
population, the population was divided into different sub-populations which are called ‘strata’
which include; INEC staff and the general public this group of persons were chosen because of
their ability to generate relavant information for the study.
Proportionate sampling technique was used to determine the sample sizes for each of the four
strata. This was done using Bowleys (1964) proportional formula as cited in Kothari (2004).
Nh
nh¿ nx
N
Where;
nh = The sample size in stratum.
n = The total sample size
Nh = The population in each stratum.
N = The total population size
Applying this formula we have
206
INEC Staff. nh¿ 400 x =3
300584
300,377 1
External Public. nh¿ 400 x = 397
300584
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Table1. Population and sample size from the study variables
S/N Variables Population Sample

3 INEC Staff 206 3
4 External Public 3003771 397
Total 300584 400
Source: field survey 2019
Proportionate sampling technique was used because the population from the strata were not
equal.
The first stratum comprises INEC Staff. However, the researcher used a purposive sampling
technique to select few staff. The choice of the staff was base on their interest and knowledge on
the subject matter in the study area
second stratum were external publics which comprises of adult male and female of 18 years
above, who may be stake holder of elections process in Makurdi. The respondents in this stratum
were selected from Makurdi dwellers because of their accessibility by the researcher and because
class of life of the metropolitan nature of the two that accommodate people from all class of life
. Hence, they stand a better chance to know much about the subject understudy
1.7.5 Research Instruments and Administration

The instruments used in the study were the questionnaire and personal interview. Personal
interview was quite appropriate because of the wealth of the detailed information it could
provide (Wimmer& Dominick, 2011).
A structured questionnaire was design to get the view of the respondent on the subject under
study. this questionnaire were divided into sections A and B. section A was for the Demographic
data of respondents while section B contains questions meant to source information on election
monitoring and electoral credibility in Nigeria's forth republic.
A total of 400 questionnaires will be administered to respondents who were selected from the
various strata. The questionnaires meant INEC Staff, were administered during the working
hours, in their offices, While the questionnaire meant for the general public were administered by
the researcher to the respondents in their various homes and offices. The entire respondent will
be approached by the researcher on face to face basis and the questionnaire will be introduced to
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him/her with clear instruction and guidelines. The researcher will be available to clear any
misconception arises from the questionnaire in the course of answering the questions. The
questionnaire were responded to and collected immediately by the researcher to avoid any loss.
The distribution of the questionnaire will last for three days.
1.7.6 Sources of Data Collection
The data to be used for this research work will be obtained, specifically from two sources
namely primary and secondary sources.
Primary data are facts that were collected by the researcher herself specifically for the
research project through instruments: such as questionnaires, interviews, observation and
telephone etc. In this study, questionnaires will be used to get information from the
respondents.
Secondary data used in this study were statistical facts or materials collected from
independent National electoral commision by the researcher, other information were from text
books, articles, journals and internet materials.
1.7.7 Method of Data Analysis
The data gathered for this study were presented in tables where descriptive statistic such as
simple percentages and mean were worked out for easy analysis.
CHAPTER TWO
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LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1.0 Conceptual Framework
2.1.1 Election
Elections lie at the heart of representative governance giving meaning to the modern
conception of democracy (Joseph, 1987). To Ogunsanwo (2003:11) there is no superior method
for selecting the leadership of a democratically ruled society apart from election. Undoubtedly,
election is the only acceptable institutionalized process enabling some or all of the recognized
members of a democratic society choose office holders (Olaitan, 2005:44). Election is the
process of choosing people for particular jobs by voting (Ojo, 2007:5). In the words of Nwolise
(2007:157) election can be defined as ‘the process of selecting the officers or representatives of
an organization or group by the vote of its qualified members’.
2.1.2 Election monitoring
Election monitoring is also often referred to as election observation. Election monitoring

is the observation of an election by one or more independent parties, typically from another
Country or a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO), primarily to assess the conduct of an
election process on the basis of national legislation and international election standards. Election
observers can be national or international (Wikipedia 2010).
Election observation is a process of systematically gathering information on the electoral

process as the basis for making an informed decision on the integrity and credibility of the
process (African Union Election Observation Manual, 2013).
Furthermore, monitoring and observation of election is a process through which an

election is scrutinized and evaluated “for purposes of determining its impartiality in terms of
organization and administration”. It involves “stationing of independent missions, officials or
individuals representing international or local organizations for a specified time in a country
which is in the process of organizing a national election with a mandate to closely observe and
pronounce on the entire process and outcome”( Adututu,2002:2)
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Election monitoring in a nutshell covers missions where delegations assessed pre-
election, election-day and post-election conditions (Kurtzberg, 2012).
Over the past decade, international monitoring and observation of election have increasingly
become a necessity in the democratization processes in Nigeria and other developing countries.
Whilst it can be argued that international monitoring exercise are not an entirely new
development in Africa (Obi and Abutudu, 1999), it is fair to maintain, however, that electoral
monitoring and observation have, in recent years becomes something of a “growth business”
(Geisla, 1993) especially in African countries that are in the process of transforming their
political systems from military or one party dictatorship to multiparty democracy. Beyond
Africa, however, elections have also been monitored in Europe, South America and Asia, in
developing and industrial societies, as well as open and closed economies (Stack, 1993). Indeed,
a number of well-known organizations such as the United Nations, the European Union, the
Commonwealth, the Organization of American states, the African Union and the Economic
Community of West African States, as well as individual country such as United State of
America, France and Britain have all been involved in this practice; as are various non-
governmental organizations, notably among which are the Carter Center, the International
Republican Institute and National Democratic Institute for International Affairs.
In many countries where attempts are being made to install democratic political systems,
home-based or local monitoring organizations or groups are involved in monitoring. The
activities of these local monitoring and observing organizations complement those of their
foreign counterparts. For example, in Nigeria, which is the focus of this study, several election
monitoring groups can be indentified that worked alongside their foreign counterparts during the
2003 general elections. Such group that easily come to mind include the Transition Monitoring
Group (TMG), Freedom Organization of Nigeria (FON), Justice Development of Peace
Committee (JSPS), Civil Society Organization (CSO), Nigeria Labor Congress (NLC), and the
Civil Liberty Organization (CLO), amongst others. Invariably, many of these domestic monitors
received training as well as financial support from donor nations in Europe and North America.
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2.1.3 Election Monitors
Many international actors have taken on the challenge of monitoring elections in these
difficult circumstances. States, both bilaterally and through international organizations (IGOs),
have been frequent participants as have a growing number of non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) with an interest in spreading democracy and human rights.
Building on its historical participation in election monitoring outlined above, the UN has
accelerated its important contribution since 1989. In that period, it has received over 140 requests
for electoral assistance from member states.( Brahm, 2004)The UN maintains a roster of election
experts that can be called upon on relatively short notice. It provides not only technical
assistance to help governments conduct their elections, to major operations to essentially conduct
the elections as part of a broader peacekeeping operation. In these sophisticated operations, the
UN takes on roles normally fulfilled by national electoral authorities. It often requires creating an
entire system of laws, procedures and administrative measures in order to hold the election and
then actually conducting the entire process. This more extensive mission is, of course, costly and
has only been applied to perceived "unique" circumstances. For example, the United Nations
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was responsible for the organization and
execution of national elections there in May 1993 as part of a comprehensive peace plan. In the
Balkans, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western
Sirmium (UNTAES) was asked to organize elections for all local government bodies in April
1997 in cooperation with Croatian authorities.
Other IGOs have become actively involved in election monitoring as well. The
Commonwealth Secretariat, European Union (EU), Organization of African Unity (OAU),
Organization of American States (OAS), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE), and the Council of Europe, amongst others, have all been involved in election
monitoring in recent years. The OSCE, for example, offers its members Needs Assessment
Missions, long-term observation in the weeks prior to the election, and a coordinating office.
Long-term observers are sent into the field several weeks before an election, in order for the
OSCE to properly evaluate developments leading up to the election. Then, the OSCE
Parliamentary Assembly sends parliamentarians, generally for short-term missions at critical
points to provide political leadership to the monitoring operation. It seems likely that countries
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prefer the UN to regional bodies, as it is more likely to be seen as impartial and detached from
regional and local politics.
NGOs have rapidly expanded their work in democratic assistance and possess a number
of advantages. (Brahm, 2004) Their independence leaves them relatively free from political
pressure. They are seen as unbiased. Because they typically have more limited resources, they
are often more shrewd in using funds. They are smaller and more flexible to meet the unique
challenges presented by each election. They also often have more connections with grassroots
organizations helping to increase the long-term benefits of monitoring. Some of the more
important NGOs involved in election monitoring are:
i. International Human Rights Law Group

ii. National Endowment for Democracy
iii. National Democratic Institute for International Affairs
iv. International Republican Institute
v. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA)
vi. The Carter Center
vii. International Foundation for Electoral Systems
viii. La Federation Internationale des Droits de l'Homme
ix. International Commission of Jurists
x. Inter-Parliamentary Union
xi. Center for Democracy
xii. Centre for Electoral Promotion and Advice (CAPEL)
2.1.4 Problems with Election Monitoring
Outsiders are often ignorant of local circumstances related to history, culture, and the
like.[6] Monitors often arrive shortly before the vote and usually lack language or cultural
training to allow them to effectively evaluate the vote. To compound the problem of ignorance,
monitors often forego working with domestic observers in order to avoid the appearance of bias.
Monitors are also not entirely independent, but have a number of important limitations. For
instance, monitors have ties to the entity that has funded their mission. Reports may be tailored
to the demands of the funding, source rather than fulfilling the mission of monitoring the
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election. It has been tempting, particularly for IGOs, to verify most elections as to do otherwise
would be destabilizing, and it would be politically and tactically difficult to "re-do" the election.
[7] The fact that IGOs are made up of states means representatives cannot entirely ignore the
interests of other nation-states in the election. Many NGOs also are not entirely independent, so
it is beneficial to draw NGOs from a variety of countries. Some are tied to national parliaments
or in other ways receive government funding. Others have connections to particular political
parties, trade unions, or religious-affiliated organizations. Although this has begun to change,
NGOs early on were predominantly American,[8] and could be accused of serving American
interests.
2.1.6 Election Observation: Purposes, Risks and Benefits
The major purposes of election observation as enunciated by the African Union Election
Observation Manual (2013) include: safeguarding the integrity of the electoral process;
promoting the openness and transparency of the process; enhancing public confidence; diffusing
potential tensions; deterring improper practices and attempts at fraud; increasing political
credibility; contributing to the acceptance of election results; and disseminating and
strengthening international standards and electoral best practices.
However, observing election is not a straightforward exercise as it appears. At times, it

becomes problematic for the observers and the observed which may eventually lead to
acrimonious situations. Some reasons for election observation, whether local or international
include the following. First, elections in fledgling democracies are conducted in a high-stake
environment where winning an election is equal to capturing the state and controlling access to
its resources. The zero-sum nature of elections and the acrimony that accompanies in these
climes make it necessary for a third party to observe the elections.
Second, another reason which could emanate environmentally is the culture and values of
the country concerned. The political culture that is notorious for electoral corruption and
violence calls for election observation and makes election observation difficult and risky. As
regards the benefits of election observation, Adebisi & Loremikan (2013) identified some
benefits. First, the presence of election observers has created the atmosphere of confidence in the
electorate who would have ignored voting as an exercise in futility as their votes may not count.
15
In other words, it has been established that the presence of election observers, especially the
international ones, has increased greater as well as wider political participation and thereby
reduced electoral corruption. Second, election observation has been able to curb the excesses of
the electoral institutions’ officials. Third, sometimes, the findings of the observers, usually
summarised in a formal report, have not only helped in refocusing on matters of electoral reform
but have also served as evidence for the aggrieved contestants to seek redress and prove their
cases before the law court or before Election Petition Tribunal. For instance, the electoral
reforms embarked upon by the attempt by Nigeria’s late president Shehu Musa Yar’Adua was
partly due to the wanton electoral corruption that was made obvious by election observers in
their 2007 general election report (Adebisi & Loremikan, 2013). Fourth, as stated by Hyde and
Kelley (2011), election observation has been viewed to shore up government legitimacy in the
eyes of citizens and international community. Hence, international monitoring of elections has
become so universal that declining foreign observers’ invitation is viewed as an aberration and
signals that such government has something to conceal. Finally, the task of election observation
has also reduced the rate of election rigging with observers serving as “whistleblowers” and
promoters of code of conduct among politicians (Adebisi & Loremikan, 2013).
2.1.7 Trajectories of Election Observation and Electoral Corruption in Nigeria
General elections in Nigeria have never been held without serious doubt about its
credibility. Starting from 1964 to date, elections have been conducted without recourse to severe
contestation and acrimonious fallouts. It is hardly contested that elections in Nigeria exhibit
common traits of corruption and irregularities (Agbor, Okoro & Adams, 2011, Omilusi, 2013).
Before the June 12, 1993 Presidential elections, the media and political party agents were used to
observing and monitoring elections. However, the observations of the media organisations and
party agents were visibly partial or not fair due to the fact some media organisations had either
apparent or concealed sympathy for one or more of the parties. Similarly, the party agents were
also biased by giving reports in favour of their respective parties (Adebisi & Loremikan, 2013).
The June 12 Presidential election of 1993 marked the beginning of election observation in
Nigeria when the observer groups appeared on the electoral scene to observe the said election.
Though the idea was considered to be completely unusual then, it has since thrived to become
part and parcel of the country’s electoral process, not excluding the local observer groups (Banjo,
16
2004). That election was believed and adjudged by the 3000 accredited local and international
observers to be fairest and the best in Nigeria’s political history (Awopeju, 2011; Adebisi &
Loremikan, 2013).
During the 27 February 1999 Presidential election between Nigeria’s former President
Olusegun Obasanjo and Olu Falae, former Finance Minister, close to 12,000 accredited election
observers assessed the election out of when about 2,000 foreign observers were drawn from
various organisations. The European Union, (EU) sent 100 observers while the Commonwealth
sent a 23-member Commonwealth Observer Group (COG). Also, over 10,000 local observers
were sent by different non-governmental organisations, (NGOs) (Banjo, 2004).
Their presence was to observe the election based on the invitation of General Abdul
Salam Abubakar, former military Head of State and Ephraim Akpata, former Chairman of the
Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) (Ofuoku, 1999). In spite of the conspicuous
presence of the election observers during the 1999 General Elections and peaceful atmosphere,
observers reported that all sorts of electoral corruption took place. Instances of electoral abuse
abound which included falsification of voters registers and stuffing of ballot papers into boxes.
In fact, Jimmy Carter opined that members of his observing group witnessed worrying
irregularities and blatant electoral fraud (National Democratic Institute, 1999; Banjo, 2004;
Awopeju, 2011). As stated in its report, the US-based Jimmy Carter Centre for Democracy
which monitored the presidential election concluded that it is impossible for it judge accurately
regarding the outcome of the presidential election (Abubakar, 2015).
The number of observers who witnessed the 1999 presidential election far outnumbered
the observers that monitored the 1993 Presidential election. There were 12,000 foreign and local
monitors who were accredited by the INEC in the 1999 election (Ofuoku, 2004 cited in
Awopeju, 2011). In the same vein, the 2003 General Elections were also observed by more local
and foreign observers than the previous ones. For instance, in the 2003
Presidential/Gubernatorial elections, the European Union Observers Mission (EU-EOM)
deployed 118 observers throughout Nigeria, International Republican Institute (IRI) deployed 42
monitors covering 12 states, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) came with 50 observers
from 12 countries in Africa, Europe and North America, while the Transition Monitoring Group
(TMG), a coalition of 170 human rights and civil society organisations deployed 10,000
17
observers (Banjo, 2004). Just what occurred in the 1999 elections, the 2003 General Elections
did not fare better because it had semblance of rigged elections. The various post-election reports
of the international observers attested to the fact that Nigeria’s 2003 elections were also marred
by corruption (Carl Le Van, Pitso & Alao, 2003; Human Rights Watch (HRW), 2007; Awopeju,
2011) and hence Nigeria then could not yet pass Huntington’s two-turnover test where there
could be two peaceful transitions of power. Nigeria’s TMG submitted that “It is doubtful
whether (…the) elections can be considered to be reflective of the will of the people” (HRW,
2004:11).
By many accounts, the 2007 General Elections were devoid of being “free and fair” by any
international standards (Collier and Vicente, 2010). This position agrees with the assessment of
three major institutional observation teams including European Union Election Observation
Mission (EU EO), the Human Rights Watch (HRW), and Transition Monitoring Group.
According to EU EO, the 2007 elections depicted significant evidence of fraud (Collier &
Vincente, 2010) while the HRW reported inter alia that:
Rigging, violence and intimidation were so pervasive and on such naked display
that they made a mockery of the electoral process...where voting did take place,
many voters stayed away from the polls…By the time voting ended, the body
count had surpassed 300 (Agbor et al, 2011).
Therefore, the 2007 General Elections observers’ reports were awash with a
gloomy picture of electoral corruption. In the history of the Nigerian electoral process,
the April 2007 elections appear to be the most deficient.
For the first time in the Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, the scorecard on the 2011 General
Elections was good by the reckoning election observers. According to them, the elections were
free, fair devoid of fraud and other forms of malpractices. However, this position had been
controverted by some analysts. According to Agbor et al (2011) and Awowole-Browne (2011),
this could be possible in some state capitals where they concentrated their observation exercises.
However, there were several cases of numerous thumb printing, ballot box stuffing, bargains by
electoral and security officials and misconduct by the dominant parties. In other words, elections
were heavily rigged in many towns and rural areas of Nigeria. As enunciated by Obineche (2011)
18
“beneath the veneer of the clean bill of health given to the presidential election lie the allegations
of monumental fraud, and irregularities perpetrated by Jonathan’s PDP”.
2.1.8 Electoral Corruption and Election Observation
Electoral corruption comes in varied forms such as electoral malpractice, electoral

misconduct, electoral malfeasance, electoral fraud, and electoral manipulation (Birch, 2011).
These terms are incidentally useful in this conceptual overview. However, electoral corruption
has been conceived to be an illegal intrusion or interference with the process of an election
exhibited by parties, electoral bodies, observers or voters (Myagkov, 2009). It is concealed and
unlawful efforts to influence election results. Thus it is the misrepresentation or alteration of the
true results of an election. Acts of corruption affect vote counts to bring about doctored election
result, whether by increasing the vote share of the favoured candidate, depressing the vote share
of the rival candidates, or both. However, it is not always the case that electoral corruption
assures political victory (Cantu, 2013).
Electoral law varies from country to country, but purposely tilts towards achieving
sanctity of elections. Hence, most electoral laws frown at the violation of general laws which
could resort to rigging, assault, harassment or violence. According to Birch (2011), the
distinguishing feature of this activity is that it encompasses the manipulation of electoral
institutions for personal or political gain. Birch (2011) also identified three types of electoral
corruption which include the manipulation of rules (the legal framework), the manipulation of
voters (preference-formation and expression) and the manipulation of voting (electoral
administration).
As a corollary from the foregoing and within the Nigerian context, electoral corruption is
mostly viewed as a direct sabotage of the electoral process by individuals or groups, who are
desirous of personal or group aggrandizement that electoral success guarantees. The type of
electoral corruption that is common in Nigeria is illegal interference with the process of election
which has eventually compromised the choice of the people via vote switching, inflation of
ballot votes for the favoured candidate and vote reduction for the opposing candidates or parties
(Casimir, Omeh & Ike, 2013). Specifically, techniques of electoral corruption in Nigeria include
but is not limited to underage voting, mass voting by unregistered citizens (neither qualified to
19
register nor even registered to vote), snatching of ballot boxes to be stuffed with thumb-printed
votes for party candidates, intimidation at the polls using thugs or even state security personnel,
scaring away of genuine registered voters from exercising their franchise at polling booths,
deliberate, one-sided and improper counting of votes and media manipulation of vote
count/result, announcement or publication of the wrong results and the wrong candidates as
winners before the proper collation of results by the Electoral Commission (Ani, Omeh & Ike,
2013).
As for election observation, there has been controversy in the extant literature concerning
the concepts of electoral observation and election monitoring. According to the Independent
National Electoral Commission (INEC) Guidelines on Election Observation (2011:5), “an
election monitoring is an integral part of the election management structure and has a role in the
administration of the election.” In Nigeria, only INEC and its duly authorised personnel are
empowered to monitor elections. This view is also shared by Momoh (n.d) cited in Abebisi &
Loremikan (2013) who averred that monitoring involves an upbeat role of the monitor, who
possesses power as protected in statutory books/laws; but a monitor is not an observer because
he has power in law to put political parties on the right course.
However, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) (1999:3) views
election observation as:
The purposeful gathering of information regarding an electoral process and the making of
informed judgments on the conduct of such a process on the basis of the information collected by
persons who are not inherently authorised to intervene in the process, and whose involvement in
mediation or technical assistance activities should not be such as to jeopardise their main
observation responsibilities
In the same vein, the INEC Guidelines for Election Observation (2011:3) views election
observation as:
the process whereby elections in a particular country or locality are observed against set
standards by an independent and impartial body of observers with the aim of identifying whether
the elections conform to accepted guarantees of democratic participation, identifying flaws and
challenges, and also making recommendations on how the process can be improved in the future.
20
The INEC Guidelines for Election Observation (2011), further simplified election
observation to include three main activities, namely: to observe processes and activities
organised during elections to collate facts and observations; to interpret the facts gathered against
the laws governing elections as well as basic democratic standards, in order to see whether or not
the elections meet the threshold of credibility as defined by law and accepted by the international
community; and to outline the findings so collated and the interpretation based on them in a
document or report. Therefore, involving domestic and international observers in election
processes in emerging democracies has become one of the solutions to election problems that
have plagued such countries.
There are also two main types of observers, domestic and international. Domestic
observers are those sponsored by civil society organisations located, formed or based in a
particular country and whose activities are regulated by such country’s laws. International
observers are those deployed by or under the authority of intergovernmental agencies,
international organisations and other non-governmental organisations not based in the country
conducting elections.
2.1.9 Importance of Election Monitoring
Monitoring is important because elections are the cornerstone of creating a democratic political
system. (Krishna,1998) As such, monitoring can assist democratic consolidation by instilling
domestic and international legitimacy. Peaceful elections may also promote reconciliation
between former adversaries. Post conflict societies, however, are often poorly equipped to
conduct elections. Despite a formal end to the fighting, instability often persists. A continued
lack of security makes campaigning difficult, to say nothing of actually conducting a vote.
Institutions needed to conduct elections are often nonexistent, or damaged by the conflict. Where
contentious elections present fears of vote tampering and other irregularities, the presence of
election monitors may serve to prevent shenanigans and give parties greater confidence that the
vote was free and fair. The key to achieving this outcome is monitors who are seen by all sides as
neutral. Because of this, monitors are often foreigners that arrive prior to the vote at the
invitation of a sovereign state. (Brahm, 2004)
21
Monitoring can enhance the credibility and legitimacy of elections, thereby helping to reduce
electoral violence. It can help maintain a working peace agreement because losers lack the ability
to shout "fraud!" and disrupt a country's democratization. One way in which monitors do this is
by taking independent vote tallies, which prevents governments from manipulating the vote.
Even before this, some monitors arrive long before the vote to observe campaigning and voter
registration efforts. In addition, foreign funding contributes to planning and conducting the vote.
What is more, it can provide technical expertise and training for locals who may never have
conducted an election before. As such, in the long-term, monitoring can assist in building and
strengthening domestic electoral institutions. For example, over 50,000 Cambodians were trained
as election officials by the UN Transitional Authority for the 1993 elections. Finally, it can also
help in the long-range development of political parties and civil society.
2.2 Theoretical Framework
2.2.1 Theory of Institutionalism
This study is anchored on theory of institutionalism which was much dwelled upon by
Martha Finnemore (1996), who is of the opinion that sociology’s theory of institutionalism
possesses utility relevance especially in international relations and political science. Though its
similarity in substance is not doubt in relation to the English school in the context of the
relationships between organisations and culture, institutionalism is dissimilar in terms of the
typical international relations theories (Finnemore 1996: 328). Hence, institutionalism “provides
a much richer and more detailed theoretical framework than has constructivism” (Finnemore
1996: 327). Unlike constructivists that stress the value of social structures, institutionalists
explore profoundly to analyse the ensuing interactions between diverse norms in all several
areas.
Finnemore (1996) emphasises that institutionalism absorbs change by admitting that

states’ identities and interests change subject to prevailing norms at a particular point in time and
their general acceptability in the system, whether domestic or international (Finnemore 1996).
This of the spread of norms as espoused by institutionalists is traceable to the circulation of ideas
spreading from the West (Finnemore 1996) as Western countries try hard to dominate the system
22
politically, economically and ideologically while the Western cultural value of individualism has
pervaded the human and legal rights spheres (Finnemore 1996).
In relation to international election monitoring started in the West, especially in Britain and
Americas and “became an export commodity of the new ‘system of interests’” (Santa-Cruz,
2005:59). Election monitoring and observation thus signify the importance of value in the
context of individuals’ freedom of expression and upholding of participatory rights including
strong Western ties as a pro-democracy norm (Gillis, 2013).
Assumptions about actors’ interests and how these interests stimulate the actors’
behaviours are attributed to realism and liberalism whereby states with different interests will act
differently. However, institutionalism concludes differently claiming that norms permit actors
possessing contrasting interests to have very corresponding behaviour (Finnemore 1996). This
idea of state behaviour is relevant to the state of affairs of international election monitoring and
observation. For instance, some fraudulent governments cheat in elections to maintain power, as
the case in many.
2.2.1 Structural Functionalism Theory
As there are many theories related to election matters, the researcher uses structural
functionalism theory and system theory in explaining and discussing the subject matter of this
research work. System theory as suggested by Adams Easton, system theory is an input – output
method(Brian. C.; Bothamley, 2008). According to these theorist, it is the value of input invested
in the society or organization that controls what the organization would realize. it is the argument
of this theory that bad input will affect the electoral output negatively, so also, good input will
affect the electorate output positively, to have effective election exercise in Nigeria. The
electoral body should not politicized recruitment of permanent and the ad-hoc staff, etc. make
sure the electoral body and some of the security agencies are not likely to corruption which, will
later affect the output of the election, the government should provide the electoral body with all
the necessary election materials on time (Idowu, 2013).
The contention of the work that the government, should provide all the necessary election
material to the INEC to enable the electoral body distributes the necessary Materials to the
various polling units. Security agent should also be provided in large number in order to
23
discharge their duty without fair or favor and to ensure free fair and credible election in Nigeria,
is related to theoretical postulation of structural functionalism (Idowu, 2010).
The theoretical expectations of this study are link to the theory of structural functionalism. As a
construct, this theory has two important concerns. On one side, it is concerned with the group in
the society in terms of the association amongst different parts that make up the whole society
Remigios (2010). On the other part, it is also concerned with how the electoral body function to
ensures the welfare of the citizens and survival of democracy in any given society (Idowu, 2010)
24
CHAPTER THREE
3.1 Appraising Election Observation in the Nigeria’s Fourth Republic
The preceding section has shown that the Nigeria’s past elections have generated
controversies, conflicts, litigations and cynicism in spite of recent improvements. However, just
as holding periodic elections has become a major feature of democracy, so also has observing the
conduct of the election process and election itself become a novel undertaking in fledgling
democracies and cannot be dismissed with just a wave of the hand.
As noted earlier, though the presence of international observers has generally been
associated with improved election quality (Bjornlund, 2004; Beaulieu & Hyde, 2008), however,
this position appears to contradict the international election observation in Nigeria since the
emergence of democratic practice in the Fourth Republic. As stated by Hartlyn and McCoy
(2006 cited in Cantu, 2009) and supported by Hyde (2011), electoral manipulation or corruption
often appears out of sight of observers, or perpetrated in their presence. That is why international
election observation (IEO) is being more and more criticised for not adding much to the integrity
and transparency of elections. This has been the case with Nigeria where there has been a
disconnect between election observation and sanctity of elections.
In essence, electoral observation has had marginal effect on conduct or outcome of

elections in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic. Hyde (2011:162), in two innovative natural experiments,
concludes that “even for the best-intentioned observers, evaluating election quality remains a
serious challenge, particularly when pseudo-democrats work to manipulate elections subtly,
without attracting observer criticism.” Similarly, Lynge-Mangueira (2012) argued that extension
or expansion of IEO missions will not enable them to detect and deter electoral irregularities.
Certainly, electoral corruption that manifested in the 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015 and 2019
General Elections exposed the inadequacies of election observation in the Nigeria’s fledgling
democracy. It is an unassailable fact that the presence of the observers could not indeed prevent
the most electoral manipulations that occurred in those periods.
Based on the field reports of some scholars such as Kew (1999), Obi (2008), who had on
different occasions witnessed different elections in Nigeria, opined that some observers were not
objective in their assessments. A number of them have shown partisanship, partiality and non-
25
independence in their conduct. As argued by Jason (1991), “neither the objectivity nor the
independence of IEO organisations ought to be assumed; they, too, have an agenda” (Lynge-
Mangueira, 2012, p.6). Jason’s postulation was aptly demonstrated in the 2011 general elections
in that despite the presence of some observers in the election, they failed to raise red alarm when
a number of states in the South-South geo-political zone recorded between 95%-100% voters’
turnout on Election Day with most voters voting for a single political party (Adebisi &
Loremikan, 2013). Campbell (2015) also noted that in the 2011 presidential election, ballot box
stuffing remained and Nigerian civil organisations (election observers) witnessed electoral fraud
at the collation centres, but they largely played down for unknown reasons. Many Nigerian
political parties similarly accused the INEC of aiding and abetting rigging in the 2011 elections
(Awofadeji, 2011). No wonder Lynge-Mangueira (2012) argued that “…while training might
teach election observers how to act impartially, it will not ensure that election observers in fact
act impartially when deployed” (p.5).
Kew (1999) in a study of the 1999 elections in Nigeria also submitted that most IEO
missions “had generally decided beforehand that they were willing to accept, and indeed
preferred an Obasanjo outcome to the Abubakar transition” (p. 33). In the same vein, Obi (2008)
concluded that “although most election observer missions are driven by a desire to promote free
and fair elections as the driver of democracy in Africa, in reality they must contend with
powerful national, political and diplomatic vested interests.” Therefore, he maintained that their
assessments “are subordinated to the hegemonic, strategic and economic calculations of the
dominant political elites and post-Cold War powers rather expediently” (p. 82).
Also, as espoused by Hyde and Kelley (2011), due to poor or delayed funding, many
missions are too understaffed to cover the substantial part of election terrain. Truly, the failure of
most election observers to adequately cover the entire scope of the Nigerian national
constituencies while monitoring elections has cast doubt over the credibility of their reports. In
the most Nigeria’s Fourth Republic’s elections, election observation was undertaken in the cities
while the rural areas where much of electoral corruption was usually perpetrated were largely left
unobserved. When the report of such incomplete observation was made public, the electorate
who witnessed and understood the depth of election corruption in their domains usually got
confused and allegations of complicity against the observers were usually levied. No wonder that
26
“a number of post-election statements made by international observers appeared questionable
and even misleading” (Shkolnikov, 2009).
What the foregoing reveals, with the benefit of hindsight, about elections in Nigeria’s
Fourth Republic is that “most times elections are won and lost before Election Day” (INEC
Guidelines on Election Observation, 2011, p.5), whereas the attention of election observers is not
adequately focused on this period. Many electoral malpractices such as the appointment of
electoral officers some of whom are loyal to parties in power; misconducts during registration of
voters exercise in the form of falsifying registration documents and voters cards; inflating names
of voters in areas thought to be parties’ stronghold, while under-registering in opponents
constituencies; multiple registration; disqualification of opposition candidates; denial of freedom
of movement and threat to life of opponent and in some extreme cases assassination or outright
imprisonment (Kia, 2013) and the unfair use of government resources by the party in power are
capable of determining the results of elections before or after the election day.
Thus, it has been observed that though election-day scrutiny has increased dramatically in
the Nigeria’s past elections, some desperate politicians with the connivance of electoral officials
have perfected strategies by moving their fraudulent efforts to pre and post-election periods (Ojo,
Adewunmi & Oluwole, 2013; Onapajo, 2015). This was visible during the Nigeria’s 2007
General Elections where voter cards and registers were manipulated. This could have been
curbed with the regular presence of observer groups. In some cases, they arrived too late in most
electoral occasions or were too understaffed due to poor or delayed funding. A similar situation
occurred after the votes were cast, as observers and donors often shift their focus too quickly to
elections elsewhere. This could be probable reason for post-election violence in some parts of the
Northern Nigeria in the 2011 presidential election and elsewhere.
It has also been established by different scholars that the prevalence and persistence of
corruption in a particular country has the corrosive and contagious effect (Smith, 2008;
Moyosore, 2015; Adeola, 2015). Perhaps, the widespread of corruption in Nigeria could have
possibly influenced some of the observers to come up with bias or subjective findings and
conclusions which in most cases favoured the incumbent government. Hence, there had been
growing concerns that election observers in the Nigeria’s past elections might have been
predisposed to bribery and corruption due to the corruption ridden environment they found
27
themselves. For instance, it was discovered that “some groups are covertly sponsored by the state
authority and as such take brief from the state” in the Nigeria’s 2011 General Election (Adebisi
& Loremikan, 2013).
3.2 Historicity of Electoral Corruption and Observation
The idea of foreign monitors observing elections is not also recent. The first election
accompanying international monitoring was in 1857. This was when French, British, Prussian,
Russian, Austrian and Turkish representatives oversaw a plebiscite in Moldavia and Wallachia
(Beigbeder, 1994, cited in Brahm, 2004). Aside other intervening factors, the post-World War II
paved the way for more prospects and the practice of election observation. Aside the monitoring
of elections by the United Nations (UN) in Korea and Germany, the decolonisation process
accelerated it in the 1950-60s, also was the UN's "first generation" involvement in funding
elections to ensure they were free and fair (Brahm, 2004) The "second generation" election
monitoring missions were more far-reaching and have become more widespread with the end of
the Cold War and the increasing global consensus on the importance of democracy (Brahm,
2004). In the post-Cold War period, as a number of regions, Africa in particular and post-
Communist Eastern Europe, engaged in multiparty elections for the first time, election
observation took a firm shape (Hyde & Kelly, 2011).
Incidents of electoral corruption are neither peculiar to the African nor the Nigerian electoral
process. As far back as 1927, the then Liberian President, Charles D. B. King, won the country’s
election with 240,000 votes in a country of 15,000 eligible registered voters in that year. The
election most rigged ever was reported in the 1982 Guinness Book of Records (The Global
Security, 2011). Electoral corruption has continued to manifest itself globally. For instance, in
Zimbabwe, Cameroun, Kenya, Rwanda, Central African Republic (CAR), among others, the
cases of electoral corruption are all the same (Straus & Taylor 2012; Hyde & Marinov, 2012).
Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe has continuously won re-election in his country in unprecedented
number of times and these were usually marred with massive rigging and violence.
More lately, the integrity of United Kingdom (UK) elections has been called to question.
Concerns have arisen over insecure postal ballots, proxy voting, and fraudulent practices
involving “ethnic kinship” voting in British Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities, a practice
28
thought to make these areas particularly vulnerable to electoral fraud (Buckley, 2011; Norris,
2015). Even in the United States (US), the Republican Party has raised allegations over voter
fraud (impersonation) and the Democratic Party equally alleged many claims of voter
suppression; all these continue to resonate in every election period (Minnite, 2010). The US
Florida disease of 2000 where electoral fraud was always alleged has seems to have caught on
other Anglo-American democracies, generating controversies and leading to the Fair Elections
Act in Canada. Reforms of the process of electoral administration to deter electoral corruption
are also currently underway in Ireland (Norris, 2015).
Starting with Namibia's 1989 vote, election monitoring has since become an important aspect of
a wider mandate of peacekeeping. Here, election observation remains an important aspect of a
multi-dimensional global effort to aid a peace agreement and help with the rebuilding of political
systems and economies (Brahm, 2004). Currently, the most active international election monitors
emanate from the European Union and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE), but some organisations such as the Carter Centre, the International Republican Institute,
the National Democratic Institute, and the Organisation of American States dispatch observers to
five or more elections each year (Hyde & Kelly, 2011).
3.3 Election Monitoring: A Brief History
The importance of history cannot be overemphasized in view of the fact that history
bridges the gap between the past and present and charts a path into the future (Ojo, 2014:5). The
idea of monitors observing elections actually has a fairly long history. Historically plebiscites in
disputed territories were firstly internationally supervised in Moldavia and Wallachia by most of
the major European powers (Wikipedia, 2010; Brahm, 2004; Beigbeder, 1994). Santa-Cruz
(2005) averred that Organization of American States (OAS) was the first international
organization to monitor an election.
Be that as it may, election monitoring as a practice was unpopular until after World War
II. In fact until the 1960s (Precisely 1962) there were no recorded cases of international election
observation in sovereign states (Kurtzberg,2012). Election observation activities expanded
significantly following the end of the cold War, with the development of international standard
29
on the conduct of democratic elections and the process of monitoring elections by both
international and domestic observing organizations (Wikipedia, 2010).
Furthermore, election observation related activities at the initial stage were centered on
countries undergoing transitions to democracy. “The idea is that given the transition situation,
both institutions and the culture supporting free and fair elections are weak(Adututu,2002:3).
In recent years, there have been an increasing number of observer mission monitoring
elections in long-standing democracies, including the United States, France, the United Kingdom
and Switzerland (Wikipedia, 2010). Many international actors have taken on the challenge of
monitoring elections. States, both bilaterally and through International Governmental
Organizations (IGOS) have been frequent participants to have a growing number of Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOS) with an interest in spreading democracy and human rights
(Brahm, 2004).
A wide array of NGOS participate in monitoring efforts, the Carter Center, played a key
role with the United Nations Electoral Assistance Division and the National Democratic Institute
in building consensus on a common act of international principles for election observation. In
addition to international organization monitoring elections, citizen organizations or coalitions of
organizations also monitor elections in their own country. (Cited in Wikipedia, 2010).
Historically, in Africa parlance, the first election observation/monitoring in Africa could

be traced to the Namibia 1989 elections. (AUEOM, 2013:19; Adututu, 2002:3). From the 1989
Namibia election, there has been an increase in the number of international election observation
groups, particularly from the 1990s, attention has been on elections in countries with weak
democracies or democracies in transition as stated abinition. Apart from the international
election observation missions, there is great increase in the numbers of local election observers
across Africa as different civil society organizations have been up to the task in terms of
monitoring election in their respective countries.
In Nigeria, the first election observation took place in the 90’s. Thus, the monitoring and
observation process that attended the Nigeria presidential elections of 1993 that was annulled
happens to be the first in Nigeria. The then military Head of State, Ibrahim Babangida set up
30
Nigerian Election Monitoring Group (NEMG) as a governmental organ made up of civil society
groups to monitor the 1993 elections (Abutudu, 2002).
Its genesis was a problem as it was difficult for the political parties to accept its
neutrality. Some of the civil society organizations invited to join the body as local monitors
bluntly refused to do so, preferring instead to make their own independent arrangements for
monitoring. For example, the Civil Liberties Organization, CLO rejected the invitation to be part
of the NEMG “because it considered election monitoring a non-governmental affair.”(Abutudu,
2002).
However, since the return to democratic rule in 1999 in Nigeria, Independent National
Electoral Commission (INEC) has always extended formal invitation to local monitors and
international election observers. Thus, all elections conducted from 1999 to the 2019 elections by
INEC at different times were monitored by local and international observers, from the general
elections of 1999 to 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015 and 2019 general elections, including off season
elections in some states of the federation.
In the words of Adutudu (2002:4) a basic distinction usually made between Observers
and Monitors is in their functions with reference to elections. Monitors are citizens and can
supposedly intervene in the actual conduct of the election, at whatever stage should they detect
any anomaly. Observers on the other hand are international groups and individual who can only
watch proceedings, but must not interfere. Their observations can only come in later in the form
of reports.
3.4 Rationale for Election Monitoring
Elections are the cornerstone for creating democratic political system (Brahm, 2004). As
such, monitoring is imperative as verdict of election observers can make or mar the electoral
process. Election monitoring both international and domestic, contributes to democratic progress
in a number of ways (Brett, 2009).
Bjornland & Gibson (1992:406) succinctly documented that election monitoring is:
Designed to boost confidence in the fairness of the electoral process, to help deter
fraud in the balloting and counting procedures, and to report to the country’s
31
citizens and the international community on the overall integrity of the elections.
In addition, if requested and if appropriate, observers can mediate disputes
between competing political groups in an effort to reduce tensions before, during
and after elections.
Merloe stance also corroborates Bjornland & Gibson submission. To Pat Merloe (2009) election
monitoring when done properly, can promote electoral integrity and the warranted degree of
public confidence in the electoral process. Election monitoring also exposes violations of
election-related rights, which violation can subvert electoral integrity and deny legitimacy to
those who falsely claim electoral victory.
In the view of Brahm (2004) election monitoring can assist democratic consolidation by
instilling domestic and international legitimacy. He further stresses that the presence of election
monitors prevents deviltry act in relation to the electoral process, thereby enhancing credibility
and legitimacy of elections.
In Hyde and Marinov’s (2014) insightful essay the scholars averred that reputable
international election observers can facilitate self-enforcing democracy by providing credible
information about the quality of elections, thus increasing citizens’ ability to coordinate against a
regime when election fraud occurs. As Przeworski argues, the concept of self-enforcing
democracy means that, generally elected leaders are motivated to obey the rules of the game and
govern in a manner responsive to the peoples’ wishes by implicit threat of mass uprising (Hyde
& Marinov, 2014).
The African Union produced manual for election monitoring within Africa continent cap
it up by outlining the rationale one after the other. According to the blueprint of Africa Union
Election Observation Manual (2013:7) Election Observation serves the following purposes:
i. Safeguarding the integrity of the electoral process;

ii. Promoting the openness and transparency of the process;
iii. Enhancing public confidence;
iv. Defusing potential tensions;
v. Deterring improper practices and attempts at fraud;
vi. Increasing political credibility;
32
vii. Contributing to the acceptance of election results and
viii. Disseminating and strengthening international standards and electoral best practices.
33
CHAPTER FOUR
DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

In this section the result were presented in the table and analyzed using percentages and mean the
explanation were given for each table
The four Hundred questionnaires were administered to the general public and officials of
Independent National Electoral Commission in Nigeria at in Makurdi. The response to the
questionnaires were based on Agree or Disagree, below is the result from respondent, code in
mean and the mean criterion to accept the a particular assertion was 2.5 otherwise rejected
Table 4.1: Demographic Characteristic of the Respondents

Variables No of Respondents Percentage of Respondents
Sex
Male 291 72.75
Female 109 27.25
Total 400 100
Age
18-27 34 8.5
28-37 56 14
38-49 109 27.25
50-59 135 33.75
60-above 66 16.5
Total 400 100
Highest Educational qualification
Non formal 0 0
Primary education 2 0.5
Secondary education 29 7.25
Tertiary education 369 92.25
Total 400 100
Categories of Respondents
INEC staff 3 0.75

General Public 397 99.25
Total 400 100
Source: Filed Survey 2021
The result in table 4.1 shows the demographic data of the respondents. The result indicated that
72.75% of the respondents were male, while the female constituted 27.25% . the result also
34
shows that majority of the respondents 33.75% of the respondent were in the age range of 50-59
year this indicate that the respondent were adult how have witness several election process in
Nigeria and can make valid arguments. On the educational qualification most of the respondents
92.25% were graduates of tertiary institution who had required knowledge to participate in the
study. The study sample constitutes of INEC staff and the General public was 99. 25% of the
respondents were the general public while the INEC staffs constitute 0.75
Table 4.2: The impacts of election monitoring on electoral credibility in Nigeria's forth republic.
Impacts of election Monitoring on Electoral SA A D SD Total Mean Decision
Credibility
1 Do you agree that the participation of elections 200 92 58 50 400 3.11 Agreed
35
observers/monitor in general elections in
Nigeria’s Forth republic have made the
elections free and fair?
2 Do you agree that elections observers/monitor 231 117 24 28 400 3.38 Agreed
has made Independent National Electoral
Commission to improve on the conduct of
general elections in Nigeria’s fourth republic?
3 Do you agree that elections 182 122 54 42 400 3.11 Agreed
observers/monitors’ participation in the
general elections contribute to the acceptance
of election results in Nigeria’s fourth republic?
observers/monitors’ assistance to the
Independent National Electoral Commission
has adequately contributed to the success of
general elections in Nigeria’s fourth republic?
general elections promote the openness and
transparency of the process?
general elections deter improper practices and
attempts at fraud?
general elections enhance credibility and
legitimacy of elections?
8 The findings of the observers and monitors, 254 125 12 9 400 3.56 Agreed
helps in refocusing on matters of electoral
reform in the country
9 The findings of the observers and monitors 237 119 43 1 400 3.48 Agreed
can also serve as evidence for the aggrieved
contestants to seek redress and prove their
cases before the law court and Election
Petition Tribunal.
Clustered Mean 3.27 Agreed
The result in table 4.2 show the view of the respondents on the impacts of election monitoring on
electoral credibility in Nigeria's forth republic. The respondents agreed that the participation of
elections observers/monitor in general elections in Nigeria’s Forth republic have made the elections free
and fair Further, the elections observers/monitor has made Independent National Electoral
Commission to improve on the conduct of general elections in Nigeria’s fourth republic also the
respondents agree that elections observers/monitors’ participation in the general elections contribute to
36
the acceptance of election results in Nigeria’s fourth republic elections. The respondents also agreed that
findings of the observers and monitors can also serve as evidence for the aggrieved contestants to seek
redress and prove their cases before the law court and Election Petition Tribunal. This implied that the
monitoring of election by elections monitors and observer have impacted positively on the outcome of
general elections in Nigeria and for the survival of democracy in the country.
Table 4. 3: Public Perception on Role of Election Observers and Monitors in Electoral Process in Nigeria Forth
Republic
37
Public Perception on Role of Election Observers and
Monitors in Electoral Process SA A D SD Total Mean Decision
1 Do you agree that there is need for Elections Monitors and 212 134 30 24 400 3.34 Agreed
Observers to cover the conduct of general elections in
Nigeria?
2 Do you agree those Elections Monitors and Observers are 235 123 37 5 400 3.47 Agreed
partners in progress for Nigeria’s durable democracy in
Nigerians’ forth republic?
3 Do you agree that the Independent National Electoral 256 99 34 11 400 3.50 Agreed
Commission decision of inviting elections Monitors and
Observers to cover general election in Nigerians’ forth
republic is right?
4 Do you agree that the Elections Monitors and Observers 199 192 6 3 400 3.47 Agreed
role in monitoring general elections in Nigeria’s forth
republic is in tandem with the global standard and practice?
5 Do you agree that the elections observers/monitors’ role in 156 211 17 16 400 3.27 Agreed
monitoring general elections in Nigeria’s forth republic is to
safeguard the integrity of the electoral process?
6 Do you agree that the Elections Monitors and Observers 167 215 10 8 400 3.35 Agreed
role in monitoring general elections in Nigeria’s forth
republic is to enhance public confidence?
7 Do you agree that the elections observers/monitors’ role in 203 134 52 11 400 3.32 Agreed
monitoring general elections in Nigeria’s forth republic is to
defuse potential tensions?
8 Election monitoring also exposes violations of election- 194 202 3 1 400 3.47 Agreed
related rights, which violation can subvert electoral integrity
and deny legitimacy to those who falsely claim electoral
victory?
9 Election Monitor/Observers helps to report to the country’s 180 179 29 12 400 3.32 Agreed
citizens and the international community on the overall
integrity of the elections?
1 Election Monitors and Observers help maintain a working 127 198 47 28 400 3.06 Agreed
0 peace agreement because losers lack the ability to shout
"fraud!" and disrupt a country's democratization?
1 Election Monitors and Observers can provide technical 145 189 42 24 400 3.14 Agreed
1 expertise and training for locals who may never have
conducted an election before.
1 Election Monitors and Observers can also help in the long- 198 127 48 27 400 3.24 Agreed
2 range development of political parties and civil society.
Clustered Mean 3.33 Agreed
The result in table 4.3 revealed public perception on role of election observers and monitors in
electoral process in Nigeria forth republic. The respondents agreed that there is need for
Elections Monitors and Observers to cover the conduct of general elections in Nigeria, Elections
Monitors and Observers are partners in progress for Nigeria’s durable democracy in Nigerians’ forth
38
republic, the Independent National Electoral Commission decision of inviting elections Monitors and
Observers to cover general election in Nigerians’ forth republic is right, the Elections Monitors and
Observers role in monitoring general elections in Nigeria’s forth republic is in tandem with the global
standard and practice, the elections observers/monitors’ role in monitoring general elections in Nigeria’s
forth republic is to defuse potential tensions, election Monitor/Observers helps to report to the country’s
citizens and the international community on the overall integrity of the elections and election Monitors
and Observers can also help in the long-range development of political parties and civil society the mean
responses were above 2.5
Table 4.4 Challenges Election Monitoring and Electoral Credibility in Nigeria Forth Republic.
39
Mea
SA A D SD Total n Decision
3
1 Inadequate manpower to conduct general election 212 134 0 24 400 3.33 Agreed
3
2 Uneven distributions of election materials 235 123 7 5 400 3.47 Agreed
3
3 Cards reader machine failure 256 99 4 11 400 3.50 Agreed
Non use of card reader machine during the
4 accreditation process 199 192 6 3 400 3.48 Agreed
1
5 Non collection of voter card by potential voters 156 211 7 16 400 3.27 Agreed
Inadequately funding for security measures for 1
6 the conduct of general election in Nigeria 167 215 0 8 400 3.35 Agreed
In adequate training for INEC ad hoc staff for the 5
7 conduct of the general elections 203 134 2 11 400 3.32 Agreed
Clustered mean 194 202 3 1 400 3.47 Agreed
The result in table 4.4 shows the views of the respondent on the challenges election monitoring
and electoral credibility in Nigeria forth republic, the respondents agreed that the major
challenges affecting the conduct of credible elections in Nigeria include: Inadequate manpower
to conduct general election, uneven distributions of election materials, cards reader machine
failure, non use of card reader machine during the accreditation process, non collection of voter
card by potential voters, inadequately funding for security measures for the conduct of general
election in Nigeria, in adequate training for INEC ad hoc staff for the conduct of the general
elections
40
CHAPTER FIVE
Discussion Conclusion and Recommendations
5.1 Discussion
Nigeria had witness several elections with mix filling but the role of the election monitoring and
observers in ensuring democratic consolidation in Nigeria will linger in the memory of many
Nigerians particularly because of impact of these election monitors and observer in the
consolidation of democracy and ensuring credibility of the electoral process. The observer teams
also have become credible pillar for the management of global elections and ensuring that states
conform to the universal best practices. The global electoral principles have become useful
guidelines for performance judgment. Furthermore, understanding the internationalization of
elections is now of research interest in democratization and democratic transitions since 1999
and academic discourse.
The finding of this study that revealed the great impact of election observers in ensuring
credibility of the electoral process in Nigeria this finding s are in line with several other study by
notable scholars. Hyde and Marinov’s (2014) argue that international election observers can
facilitate self-enforcing democracy by providing credible information about the quality of
elections, thus increasing citizens’ ability to coordinate against a regime when election fraud
occurs. In the view of Brahm (2004) election monitoring can assist democratic consolidation by
instilling domestic and international legitimacy. He further stresses that the presence of election
monitors prevents deviltry act in relation to the electoral process, thereby enhancing credibility
and legitimacy of elections. Also Pat Merloe (2009) reviewed that election monitoring when
41
done properly, can promote electoral integrity and the warranted degree of public confidence in
the electoral process. Election monitoring also exposes violations of election-related rights,
which violation can subvert electoral integrity and deny legitimacy to those who falsely claim
electoral victory.
5.2 CONCLUSION
The impact of elections monitors and observers particularly in Nigerian forth republic cannot be
overemphasized due to their role in ensuring free and fair elections. The election monitors
Observers came to observe the election and ascertain its conformity with international best
practice and credibility. Their effort, action and roles are commendable. Their overseeing the
election and the acceptance of the results without rancor and acrimony, has chalked up Nigeria’s
stature in the African Continent.
The Observers role made Nigeria Government realize that the state cannot compromise with
democracy while democracy and good governance are sine quanon for Nigeria’s growth and
development. To a reasonable extent, the Nigeria general elections did conform to tenets of
democracy such as ‘Transparency’, free conduct of elections, freedom of movement during the
election, counting of votes and announcement of result, and choice of contesting the election
result at the Elections Tribunal. The elections observers’ role shows that they are partner in
progress and their action and assistances are commendable in the history of democracy and
election management in the continent.
Despite the role played by these observers in ensuring credible elections there are some
challenges that are needed to addressed to ensure total free and fairest election in Nigeria
therefore government and the INCE should Collaboration with International Organizations to
42
ensure credibility of national election in Nigeria, the Independent National Electoral Commission
(INEC) need to work with elections Monitoring team and implement their genuine advices on
election in Nigeria.
5.3 Recommendations
The following recommendation were made base on the study finding:
1. State and federal government support: the state government need to work in tandem with
local government areas to ensure that voters registration list is ready and submit the same
to the state electoral office before the electoral commission deadline. This will minimize
pressure on the INEC in preparing the master list for election
2. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) need to take cognizance of the
constraints encountered in the conduct of general election and put in place measures to
forestall the mistakes of the future general elections.
3. The national government should ensure that budget for the general election is approved
and released in time for the electoral commission.
4. More centres should be created in the states for easy collection of the permanent voters
cards (PVCs). It should be every year and collection within two weeks
5. There is need to employ more staff to cope with the General conduct of Election. The
Electoral Commission should organize training for them at least six weeks before the
election date. This would enhance their competence and performance during the election.
6. The INEC office should ensure that it is tested okay before dispatch to the polling
stations.
43
7. To ensure credibility of national election in Nigeria, the Independent National Electoral
Commission (INEC) need to work with International Monitoring team and implement
their genuine advices on election in Nigeria.
References
Agbor, U.I., Okoro, J. & Adams, J. A. (2011). Elections and letting the votes count in Nigeria:
Implications for democratic stability in an emerging third world society. African Journal
of Social Sciences 1 (3), 92-106.
Awopeju, A. (2011). Election rigging and the problems of electoral act in Nigeria. Afro Asian
Journal of Social Sciences 2 (2.4), 1-17.
Awowole-Browne, F. (Tuesday April 19, 2011). Cpc rejects results from s’east, s’south, others.
Daily Sun, p.5.
Birch, S (2008) Pattern of Electoral Malpractice in New and Semi Democracies. Working
Paper. Colchester: University of Essex.
Brahm, E (2004) Election Monitoring: Beyond Intractability. Boulder: University of

Colorado
EU Election Observation Mission (2009). Final report on the presidential, legislative and
provincial assembly elections 2009 in Mozambique. Accessed on 11thDecember, 2018 -
http://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/africa/MZ/mozambiqu
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International Organisation 52 (04), 887-917
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Observations and Democratic, p.46-47.e-final-report-presidential-legislative/view
Gilliss, L. E. (2013). The effects of the norm of international election monitoring on voters'
confidence levels in Francophone West Africa’s presidential elections 1990-2011.
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IDEA International (2004) Election and the Good Governance. Stockholm: IDEA
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Idowu, Olawale (2010) “Corruption, the Police and the Challenges of a Free and Fair Election in
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Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa. Volume 12, No.7
Kelley, J. (2011). ‘International Inflences on Election Quality and Turnover’. Paper

prepared for the 106th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
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inNigeria. Lagos: NPSA.
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limits-ofelectionmonitoring?page=show
45
APPENDICES A
Questionnaire
What are the impacts of election monitoring on electoral credibility in Nigeria's forth republic.
SA A D SD
1 Do you agree that the participation of elections observers/monitor in
general elections in Nigeria’s Forth republic have made the elections free
and fair?
2 Do you agree that elections observers/monitor has made Independent
National Electoral Commission to improve on the conduct of general
elections in Nigeria’s fourth republic?
3 Do you agree that elections observers/monitors’ participation in the general
elections contribute to the acceptance of election results in Nigeria’s fourth
republic?
4 Do you agree that elections observers/monitors’ assistance to the
Independent National Electoral Commission has adequately contributed to
the success of general elections in Nigeria’s fourth republic?
5 Do you agree that elections observers/monitors’ participation in the
general elections promote the openness and transparency of the process?
general elections deter improper practices and attempts at fraud?
general elections enhance credibility and legitimacy of elections?
8 The findings of the observers and monitors, helps in refocusing on matters

of electoral reform in the country
9 The findings of the observers and monitors can also serve as evidence for
the aggrieved contestants to seek redress and prove their cases before the
law court and Election Petition Tribunal.
What are public perception on role of election observers / monitors in electoral process in
SA A D SD
1 Do you agree that there is need for Elections Monitors and Observers to
cover the conduct of general elections in Nigeria?
46
2 Do you agree those Elections Monitors and Observers are partners in
progress for Nigeria’s durable democracy in Nigerians’ forth republic?
3 Do you agree that the Independent National Electoral Commission decision
of inviting elections Monitors and Observers to cover general election in
Nigerians’ forth republic is right?
4 Do you agree that the Elections Monitors and Observers role in monitoring
general elections in Nigeria’s forth republic is in tandem with the global
standard and practice?
5 Do you agree that the elections observers/monitors’ role in monitoring
general elections in Nigeria’s forth republic is to safeguard the integrity of
the electoral process?
6 Do you agree that the Elections Monitors and Observers role in monitoring
general elections in Nigeria’s forth republic is to enhance public confidence?
7 Do you agree that the elections observers/monitors’ role in monitoring
general elections in Nigeria’s forth republic is to defuse potential tensions?
8 Election monitoring also exposes violations of election-related rights, which
violation can subvert electoral integrity and deny legitimacy to those who
falsely claim electoral victory?
9 Election Monitor/Observers helps to report to the country’s citizens and the
international community on the overall integrity of the elections?
10 Election Monitors and Observers help maintain a working peace agreement
because losers lack the ability to shout "fraud!" and disrupt a country's
democratization?
11 Election Monitors and Observers can provide technical expertise and
training for locals who may never have conducted an election before.
12 Election Monitors and Observers can also help in the long-range
development of political parties and civil society.
Do you agree with the following as challenges affecting election monitoring and electoral
credibility in Nigeria forth republic
SA A D SD
1 Inadequate manpower to conduct general election
2 Uneven distributions of election materials
3 Cards reader machine failure
Non use of card reader machine during the

4 accreditation process
5 Non collection of voter card by potential voters
6 Inadequately funding for security measures for
47
the conduct of general election in Nigeria
In adequate training for INEC ad hoc staff for the

7 conduct of the general elections
48

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CHAPTER ONE

1.1 Background to the Study

Election monitoring is the observation of an election by one or more independent parties,

The perennial skepticisms, apprehensions and rancorous situation that usually

It was further explained in Articles 3, 5, 6, 7 of the Economic Community of West

Elections in Nigeria in recent times have witnessed findings and recommendations of

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Election observation has become a highly regulated political instrument based on

1.3 Objectives of the Study

i. To establish the impact of election monitoring on electoral credibility in Nigeria's forth

Research design means the structuring or investigation aimed at identifying variables

1.7.3 Sample Size

n = Sample size desired

e = maximum acceptable margin of error (0.05).

nh = The sample size in stratum.

n = The total sample size

Nh = The population in each stratum.

N = The total population size

Applying this formula we have

S/N Variables Population Sample

1.7.5 Research Instruments and Administration

1.7.7 Method of Data Analysis

2.1.0 Conceptual Framework

2.1.2 Election monitoring

Election monitoring is also often referred to as election observation. Election monitoring

Election observation is a process of systematically gathering information on the electoral

Furthermore, monitoring and observation of election is a process through which an

i. International Human Rights Law Group

2.1.4 Problems with Election Monitoring

2.1.6 Election Observation: Purposes, Risks and Benefits

However, observing election is not a straightforward exercise as it appears. At times, it

2.1.7 Trajectories of Election Observation and Electoral Corruption in Nigeria

2.1.8 Electoral Corruption and Election Observation

Electoral corruption comes in varied forms such as electoral malpractice, electoral

2.1.9 Importance of Election Monitoring

2.2 Theoretical Framework

2.2.1 Theory of Institutionalism

Finnemore (1996) emphasises that institutionalism absorbs change by admitting that

2.2.1 Structural Functionalism Theory

3.1 Appraising Election Observation in the Nigeria’s Fourth Republic

In essence, electoral observation has had marginal effect on conduct or outcome of

3.2 Historicity of Electoral Corruption and Observation

3.3 Election Monitoring: A Brief History

Historically, in Africa parlance, the first election observation/monitoring in Africa could

3.4 Rationale for Election Monitoring

i. Safeguarding the integrity of the electoral process;

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

explanation were given for each table

Table 4.1: Demographic Characteristic of the Respondents

INEC staff 3 0.75

responses were above 2.5

Source: Filed Survey 2021

guidelines for performance judgment. Furthermore, understanding the internationalization of

and academic discourse.

facilitate self-enforcing democracy by providing credible information about the quality of

stature in the African Continent.

election management in the continent.

The following recommendation were made base on the study finding:

pressure on the INEC in preparing the master list for election

forestall the mistakes of the future general elections.

and released in time for the electoral commission.

their genuine advices on election in Nigeria.