Heidegger's Theory of Art

Author(s): William H. Bossart

Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism , Autumn, 1968, Vol. 27, No. 1
(Autumn, 1968), pp. 57-66
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The American Society for Aesthetics

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/428529

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 WILLIAM H. BOSSART

Heidegger's Theory of A

AMONG THE MAJOR philosophical move- inquiry

the pretense of a presuppositionless
ments of the twentieth century, existen-
is itself a presupposition of the most deceit-
tialism in particular has stressed ful kind, for itthe
obscuressig-
the fact that every
nificance of art. For Sartre and the French inquiry moves within a horizon or universe
existentialists the novel and the theater of discourse which determines its meaning.
serve as a means to awaken the individual Thus Heidegger proposes to clarify those
to his existential condition. Heidegger, presuppositions which are involved in any
on the other hand, has attempted to tran-investigation of Being. Sein und Zeit is an
scend his concern with human existence in investigation into just such presuppositions.
order to come to grips with Being itself. It claims to lay bare the structure of man
In this effort art occupies a position of in order to open up a new mode of access
privilege. I shall first summarize Heideg-to Being itself. The main lines of Heideg-
ger's general philosophical position and ger's thought are now well-known, and I
then sketch the relation of the artist and need only indicate them here.
his art to Being as Heidegger conceives ofAs he is given to himself in daily life,
it, I shall conclude by pointing out certain man finds himself in a particular environ-
deficiencies in Heidegger's position asmental he situation which is the stage of his
has stated it up to now. activities. He is fundamentally a Being-
in-the-world. A world, however, presup
I poses the presence of a reflective being
who represents his situation to himself.
Although Heidegger's fundamental con- Hence Being-in-a-world is peculiar to man,
cern has always been with Being, one cannot and, to indicate this, Heidegger names
say that his interest is primarily meta- man Da-sein or "Being-there." In repre-
physical, for in his view traditional meta- senting his situation to himself, man ex-
physics has confused Being with one par- hibits a conscious if unthematic concern
ticular kind of being.l In attributing to for his own Being. He plans for himself
Being the properties of substantiality and and orients his activities toward the realiza-
self-identity, metaphysicians have treated tion of his plans. This brings to light a
Being as a thing, thus obscuring its funda- second aspect of being human, for man
mental nature. But though Heidegger re- does not have the static essence of an animal
jects the presuppositions of such a view, he or a thing. Rather his essence lies in the
does not claim to do away with all presup- dynamic character of his existence. He is
positions. On the contrary, he holds that not an object but a project. Thus Heideg-
ger's task is to uncover those existential
WILLIAM H. BOSSART is associate professor of characteristics which indicate how man is
philosophy at the University of California, Davis,
and a painter and sculptor. Some of his works have placed in the world and what possible ways
been exhibited and he has published several articles of existing are open to him.
on metaphysics and the visual arts. The world becomes accessible when we

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 58
consider man's primary relation to things
within the world. This relation is prac-
tical, not theoretical. In daily life we do
not normally view things as merely present-
at-hand, as objects of a theoretical inquiry
which seeks to comprehend things as they
are "in themselves." We take them as uten-
sils which are ready-to-hand for the accom-
plishment of certain tasks. A utensil, how-
ever, has no being as it is "in itself." It is Dasein is never completely determined by
what it is only within the project of work
in which its user has let it become in-
volved. For the most part, this project
remains in the background of my activity.
It is only when my work is interrupted-
when a utensil is missing or turns out to
be unsuited to its task-that the complex
world in which my activities take place
is rendered explicit. Thus I am brought to
realize that these utensils derive their
meaning from the uses to which I have
put them. Furthermore, the world revealed
by man's practical interests is not merely
subjective. The product of our work is
made of something, and in this way nature
is revealed to us-not as an object of the
natural sciences, but as something which
is useful for something and to someone.
The world in question, then, is the public
world constituted by the communal ac-
tivities of Dasein. Thus the world cannot
be understood as the totality of its objects
or as a container in which these objects are
held together. It is rather the context of
meaning in which these things first appear
as something. As the project of Dasein it is
already there. It is in fact the there of
Dasein which makes the appearance of
things within the world possible. And it is
through a persistent analysis of the there
that Heidegger hopes to uncover the exis-
tential characteristics which are the object
of his inquiry.
The first of these existentials is Dasein's
facticity. It testifies to my having been
thrown into a world not of my own mak-
ing, given over to a situation of which I
am not the originating cause but toward
which I comport myself in a particular man-
ner. Facticity, in turn, involves a second exis-
tential, for man exists for certain purposes
which he represents to himself. This pro-
jection of those goals for the sake of which
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W I L L I A M H. B O S S A RT
the individual exists is understanding in
its most fundamental sense, since it is
through its projects that Dasein first dis-
closes the meaning of the world and of
things within the world. Understanding as
project, then, is the counter-phenomenon
to facticity. It indicates man's existentiality
as a being who transcends his facticity in
thrusting himself into his possibilities. Thus
the situation in which it finds itself. In so
far as it transcends its situation, it is free
to decide how it will develop the potential
ways of existing which are open to it.
Finally, man's facticity is also the source of
his alienation from himself. Because I
am already in a world, the structure of
that world is imposed upon me before I
begin to act. My actions are directed by an
anonymous public voice, the they, which
for all its pronouncements never reveals
itself as anyone or any group in particular.
The more I focus my attention upon the
tasks assigned to me within my situation,
the more I lose sight of the fact that the
appearance of these tasks is possible only
where there is a free transcendent Dasein.
I come to understand myself as one thing
among others and the world as the sum
total of its contents. Thus I forfeit an
authentic understanding of myself. This
forfeiture constitutes the inevitable inau-
thenticity of Dasein.
In contrast to the loss of self which char-
acterizes inauthenticity, authenticity con-
sists in a recognition on the part of the
individual of his existential nature. Since
man is a being who is always in advance
of himself, it is only when the individual
is able to see the range of his possibilities
within the horizon of his no-longer-being-
in-the-world that he can grasp himself as
a whole. This occurs when he comes face-
to-face with his death. Death, then, is not
to be understood as something which will
happen to me at some future date, for as
soon as I am born, I am old enough to die.
Death provides the ultimate and inescap-
able horizon of my activities. It unifies my
possibilities within the context of my fini-
tude. Furthermore, in confronting my
death, I confront my own no-thingness,
and this confrontation brings with it an
Heidegger's Theory of Art 59

unthematic awareness of the fact that I ject. But it is certainly a radical humanism
do not have the Being of a thing. Thus in the
an sense that all knowledge is relative
existential comprehension of one's death to manis and, consequently, finite.
at the same time an awareness of one's The finitude of Being and truth takes
freedom and transcendence. Finally, on a further dimension when Heidegger
death
is the one possibility which is uniquely goes on to ask how the three existentials
mine, for though another can die in my of Dasein are related to one another. Fac-
place, he can never die my death. My ticity points to a past into which I have
Being-unto-death, then, constitutes me as a been thrown, existentiality to a future into
unique individual and delivers me over to which I project myself, and forfeiture points
my situation and my responsibility for to a present which I allow to take over my
what I make of that situation. freedom in exchange for tranquillity and
How, then, does this view of man affect anonymity. The temporal indications are
the question of Being? To understand obvious. The unity of Dasein lies in its
Heidegger's answer, we must first say a temporality. This does not mean that
word about his conception of truth. Truth, Dasein is in time anymore than it is in
he points out, is usually interpreted as the world. Rather it is the original process
correspondence, and its locus is language of temporalization through which a world
or the proposition. Thus, though we may first appears. Hence Being and truth are
on occasion speak of the correspondence of not only finite but historical as well. And
two states of affairs, we usually reserve the it is the task of the authentic thinker to
epithet true for those propositions which appropriate as his own the traditions of
correspond with states of affairs of which the situation into which he has been thrown
they claim to be an accurate report. Truth, and to use them to disclose, in a fresh and
then, is conceived of as a relation between revealing manner, the possible ways of
the cognizing subject and the object of existing which are open to man. Such
which he is aware. But this conception as-thought, Heidegger maintains, is history
sumes that the knower and the known en- in its most original sense, for it originates
joy the same kind of Being, for subject the andworld within which actual historical
object both refer to substantial things. events
Yet come to pass.3
if Heidegger is correct, the knower does not This, in brief, is some of what Sein und
have the Being of a thing but that of a Zeit has to say. However, with the appear-
project. He is not locked up inside him- ance of the essay on truth,4 Heidegger's
self and opposed to a collection of objects. thought undergoes an alteration to which
Rather he is that particular being who we must pay at least passing notice, for it
uncovers things within the world by pro- is in the later development of his thought
viding the contexts of meaning in which that he defines the position of the artist
things first become related to one another. and his art in relation to Being. Once again
Hence Heidegger concludes that in its truth is understood as disclosure or un-
primordial sense truth is this process of concealment; yet the emphasis is no longer
uncovering or disclosure, while in a second- on Dasein but on Being itself. Being,
ary sense it belongs to the beings uncovered. according to Heidegger, is always the Being
What, then, can we say about Being itself? of particular beings; it does not exist
The answer is not far to seek. Since the apart from the particular beings which it
kind of Being which is essential to truth grounds. Thus Being emerges into uncon-
has the character of Dasein, all truth is cealment along with Dasein's disclosure of
relative to Dasein's Being.2 Being appears particular beings. Being and truth are
as meaningful only through human experi- one, for Being is the process of coming into
ence. Hence its manifestations must con- unconcealment through the particular
form to the projective existential nature of disclosed by man. There is also an
beings
that experience. That this is not subjectiv- additional shift in emphasis concerning
ism is clear from Heidegger's insistence the finitude of truth which now finds its
that man does not have the Being of a sub-ground in Being itself. For although Being

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 60 WILLIAM H. BOSSART

comes to unconcealment in and through guage can report only what has already
particular beings, it remains ontologically been disclosed. Disclosure, however, takes
different from them. Because no single place within the context of a world, and it
manifestation of Being fully expresses its is poeticizing which establishes what en-
nature, every disclosure is, at the same dures in experience in and through the
time, a concealing. Hence its positive mani- constitution of a world. The poet names
festations are also an expression of its the gods and all things which are, but this
negativity. Finally, in attracting our atten- naming itself is historical, and the context
tion to its positive manifestations, Being of meaning which he founds becomes,
conceals its negativity. We are led to iden- through the passing down of tradition, the
tify Being with those particular beings world of a particular historical people.
which are familiar to us, and Being itself Hence, initial appearances to the con-
slips into obscurity. trary, poetry is not a game at all-for a
In the Einfuiihrung in die Metaphysik5game brings men together in such a way
Being is identified with physis, the over- that each forgets himself in his play, while
whelming power which is an inscrutable genuine poetry establishes a world in which
unity of motion and rest. Physis is gatheredeach may come to know himself as and how
together in the logos. Man is the violent he is. Furthermore, though it is closely
being who literally breaks into the earth, tied to history, poetry is not the product
the place of concealment, to found a world. of certain historical forces. On the con-
In founding a world, man lets Being trary, it is poetry which first makes history
emerge as the Being of those beings which possible by originating an image or meta-
are brought to stand within the world.phor But which constitutes the world in which
there are not two separate processes. They historical events first come to pass. Finally,
are two aspects of the same process which language is also the most dangerous of
is Being itself. The initial insights of Sein man's possessions, for it tends to conceal
und Zeit are preserved, but now every- as much as it discloses. We are led to confuse
thing is done for the sake of Being. And Being with those particular beings most
there is also a new note. Discourse, which familiar to us, and Being itself falls into
was only mentioned in Sein und Zeit, now oblivion. The task of the poet, according
becomes Dasein's mode of access to Being. to Heidegger, is to put Being back into
Man, we are told in the Letter on Hu- beings, pushing us into the unfamiliar and
manism,6 is the shepherd of Being, and thereby arousing wonder. To do this his
language is its house. work must somehow be an expression of
Being itself. Hence the work of art, in so
far as it too establishes a world and is a
II
form of poeticizing,8 must bring all these
Heidegger's increasing emphasis upon lan- factors to expression in a unique and telling
guage provides the transition to his dis- manner.
cussion of art. This is brought out most At first glance, a work of art seems to be
clearly in the essay, "Holderlin und das closely connected with the concept of a
Wesen der Dichtung." 7 Poetry, Holderlin thing, for although it may be an allegory
tells us, is the most harmless of all occupa-or a symbol, it is its thing-like quality
tions. It invents a world of images and re- which enables the work to convey its sig-
mains within the realm of the imagined. nificance and which appears to be the
Hence poetry appears to be like a game source of its self-sufficiency.9 In its most
which carries us away from stark reality. general sense, however, thing refers to every
Yet language is also the defining char- sort of particular being. More specifically,
acteristic of man. It serves to communicate we distinguish mere things like a granite
his experiences, his moods, and his resolu-block from both living things and artifacts.
tions. But the essence of language is not How, then, are we to characterize this more
exhausted in giving information, for lan- restricted sense of thing and thereby gain

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Heidegger's Theory of Art 61

some insight into the nature of a work of which it is involved. In the present case
art? The conception of a thing as the sub- it is the painting which creates the required
stantial core of reality which underlies interruption. By isolating the shoes it brings
various accidental properties is too gen- the project of work thematically into focus
eral to enable us to distinguish the thing- and reveals the world which is presupposed
like from the non-thing-like. Nor does the by the farmer's activity. The farmer, how-
conception of a thing as a unity of sensible ever, simply relies upon the shoes. He
qualities serve us any better, for things areknows all of this implicitly without ob-
much closer to us than such qualities and servation and reflection. The Being of a
cannot, therefore, be grasped as unities of utensil, then, consists in its serviceability,
abstractions which we never encounter but its serviceability in turn stems from
apart from things themselves. Finally, its the
reliability. Thanks to the latter the
thing has been understood as formedfarmer mat- can accede to the call of the earth
ter. This third conception, however, ac- and yet rest certain of his world.
tually arises from a consideration of arti- In learning what a utensil really is,
facts and not mere things. The form of a we have also learned something about a
granite block, for example, consists merelywork of art, for the painting reveals the
in the distribution of its matter in space, shoes in what and how they are. Thus, if
while the form of a utensil is that which we are careful to distinguish truth as
determines matter for a specific purpose- disclosure from truth as correspondence,
it lets the utensil be what it is by determin-
we may say that in a work of art there comes
ing its serviceability for a specific task.toAs pass the opening up, the disclosure, the
formed matter the work of art is akin to truth of particular beings. This disclosure
the artifact. Yet in another sense the work does not take place through the representa-
is more like the granite block, for though tion of the shoes; rather the painting re-
it has been formed by a human hand, it veals their Being by rendering explicit the
maintains an independence and self-suffi- world in which they take on their service-
ciency which the ordinary artifact lacks. ability. Art, then, is that process in which
Because of their affinity, however, Hei- the truth of beings (i.e., Being itself) comes
degger turns to the task of describing a to pass in a work.
common utensil, a pair of farmer's shoes, in Although they have much in common, a
the hope of clarifying the nature of a work work of art is distinguished from an arti-
of art. To facilitate this task he suggests fact by its independence and self-sufficiency.
that we also consider a depiction of the Hence if we are to comprehend the relation
shoes in a painting by Van Gogh. The between art, truth, and Being more con-
shoes, we know, serve as a covering for cretely,
the we must examine the work of art
feet, and their matter and form may vary as it is in itself and apart from whatever
according to the service for which they extrinsic
are relations it may have to other
destined. The Being of an artifact con- things. This is, of course, the accepted
sists in its serviceability. Hence it would manner of dealing with works of art. In
appear that the utensil-like quality of the museums, galleries, art books-in all the
shoes can be experienced only in their complex and varied activities of the art
actual use. So long as we merely stare at business-we treat works of art as objects
the shoes or at Van Gogh's picture, we (Gegenstdnde); that is, we tend to identify
never experience what kind of Being they the self-sufficiency of a work of art with
actually enjoy. Yet in using his shoes the the self-sufficiency of a thing like the granite
farmer never makes them an object of in- block. To objectify a work of art, then,
quiry. In fact, the shoes serve their user is to isolate it from its setting and treat
best when they are least obtrusive. The it as a thing in itself. But such things,
Being of a utensil, we recall, does not we have learned from Sein und Zeit, are
emerge in its actual use but through an really abstractions. The independence of a
interruption in the project of work in work of art is not identical with the ob-

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 62 WILLIAM H. BOSSART

jectivity of a thing. On the contrary, a work earth. This hiddenness, however, can also
is always the work of a particular historical become concealed. Each canon of taste
people, and it cannot be understood apart which makes itself the sole arbiter of
from the traditions which constitute that artistic value is such a concealment. It is
people. the counterpart in art to the pronounce-
Thus it is Heidegger's problem to re- ments of the they. In such a concealment
think the relations between art and history art takes itself as its own model; it excludes
so as to preserve the independence and alien forms and becomes sheer manner.
self-sufficiency of the work of art. And if
Thus it conceals the fact that world and
we keep in mind the relation between art earth, truth and untruth, are in continual
and truth understood as disclosure, his contention-that in a work of art the
solution is not difficult to anticipate. Par-
struggle between the positivity and neg
ticular beings are disclosed only where tivity of truth comes to pass.
there is a world. In so far as a work of art A work of art, then, is one mode of the
is the coming to pass of the truth, it con-
truth. To uncover the peculiar char-
stitutes a world in which particular beings
acteristics of this mode of truth Heidegger
contrasts the manufacture of an artifact
first appear. The self-sufficiency of the work
consists in the fact that the context in with the creation of a work of art. We have
which it stands is first opened up through
already noted that a work of art is dis-
the work itself. Hence it is not the in- tinguished from an artifact by its unique-
fluence of historical events upon art which ness and self-sufficiency. Heidegger now
ties art to history, but art's function as expresses this difference by observing that
original history, as an event which first the coming to pass of truth in a work is
permits history to emerge. Once again we the production of a particular being
must not think of this process as a form which has never existed before and which
of representation. A Greek temple, for will never exist again. Creation is that
example, depicts nothing at all. And yet mode of production in which what is to be
it establishes the regions of the sacred and produced first illuminates the world in
the profane; it opens up the world in whichwhich it comes forth. The product of
the thoughts, actions, and passions of a creation exhibits two essential characteris-
people take on their significance. At the tics. First, it expresses the conflict between
same time, it illuminates the matter out concealment and unconcealment which lies
of which it is created and which surrounds at the heart of truth itself. It is form which
it. It permits the stone to come forth as stabilizes the conflict between world and
stone, and its form renders the invisible earth in such a way as to preserve it. Thus
air visible. It lights up that on and in creation consists in making use of the earth
which man founds his dwelling, that which in establishing truth in form. In contrast,
we call the earth. the manufacture of a utensil consists in the
This second aspect of the work gives forming of matter as a preparation for its
Heidegger further occasion to distinguish use. Second, in a work of art, unlike a
it from an artifact, for in an artifact, the utensil, the createdness of the work is ac-
more suitable its matter, the less obtrusive tually created into the work. The work is
it is. A work of art, however, holds its marked in some way as the product of
matter, the earth, in the openness of the creation, an act of bringing something into
world. And yet the earth is never wholly Being. We experience createdness in the
illuminated through any particular world, impact which the work has upon us. The
for matter can never be completely speci- more essentially the work opens itself to
fied by form. The triumph of form over us, the more we are struck by the fact that
matter is never complete, for the possi- the work is, that it stands in Being over
bilities latent in matter are never exhausted and against the possibility of its non-Being.
in any particular manifestation of form. This realization is, however, by no means
These latent possibilities testify to what automatic, for the work must be allowed
Heidegger calls the "hiddenness" of the to create its effect. To see the work as uni-

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Heidegger's Theory of Art 63

que, we must permit it to come forth as itnew perspectives within which we may
is in itself, and this means that we must act out our lives. This change of per-
refrain from interpreting it through cate-spective, however, is rooted in Being itself
gories which are alien to it. Indeed, a work
understood as no-thing. For both genuine
of art cannot be categorized at all, for thinking and artistic creation are grounded
categories apply only to objects. The work,
in freedom, and freedom is a spontaneity
however, must be comprehended within which has no further ground. Its origin
the world in which it stands, and that lies in the nothingness of Being itself.
world is not an object, but the project of
a particular historical people. Thus the III
letting-be of the work requires an audience
which conserves the world which is estab- At first glance Heidegger seems to avoid
lished by the work. Just as the work cannot the usual error of the metaphysician writ-
be without those who create, it cannot ing about art, that of fitting art into a
come forth in its Being without its proper theory of reality which has been developed
audience. And it is the conservation of independently of any aesthetic considera-
works of art through the conservation tions.
ofFor despite his emphasis upon the
the traditions they establish which unifies relation between art and history, each work
individuals into a specific historicalof art remains unique, self-sufficient, and
people.
Art, then, considered as the origin of a comprehensible within the historical world
work of art is, according to Heidegger, "the which is constituted by the work itself. It
creative conservation of truth in a work of seems to me that this process of constitu-
art." tion might take place in several ways.
Hence art seems to be another name for Where written records are few or non-
Being itself, for the parallels are too strik-
existent, works of art are often the prin-
ing to be ignored. Being comes to presence cipal source of our knowledge of past civili-
only in and through the particular beings zations. Even where written records abound,
which it grounds. These beings, in turn, an art work may communicate at a stroke
come forth in their Being within a specific the flavor and spirit of an age. Hence a
context of meaning which we call the work of art can also crystallize the present
"world." In short, the appearance of par- to the audience for whom it was originally
ticular beings requires a clearing, an created. Finally, a work of art may disclose
openness, within which they can appear. the future. It may be wholly out of season,
This clearing is provided by the there of like the prophetic images of Goya; or it
Dasein, which Dasein articulates through may provide an image in which contem-
language. Similarly, art is only in and porary man will come to recognize himself
through those works whose origin it is. -as Van Dyck brought to an England still
The work constitutes a world within which crude and violent the image of the gentle-
both nature and the activities of man take man. At this point, however, Heidegger's
on their significance. But the work in turn metaphysical prejudices clearly manifest
is only in and through the creative ac- themselves. To begin with, Heidegger
tivity of the artist and the conserving denies that a work of art can disclose the
activity of its audience. Furthermore, both historical world of another people in an-
art and Being, when contrasted to the other age, for a world is the project of a
particular beings through which they makeparticular historical people. But when we
their appearance, seem to be nothing at all.
look at the art of the past, we treat it as an
This negativity shows itself in the fact object; we isolate it from the setting of its
that any positive manifestation is also a
age, and the effects of this isolation can
limitation, and in the concealment of
never be cancelled out.10 Thus a work of
Being and art behind the particular art
beings
discloses the world in which it stands
through which they first appear. Finally,only to the audience for whom it was orig-
it is the task of the artist, as it is of the
inally created. And because each art work
thinker, to originate history by creatingmust be comprehended within its his-

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 64 WILLIAM H. BOSSART

torical world, the art of the past is lost to of expression which are inherent in all
us. It can be recaptured only in so far as it forms of art. Their works do not so much
serves to disclose our own projects. Nor disclose a historical world as they disclose
would Heidegger be favorably disposed the world of art itself. Thus in ignoring
toward an art which merely presents us these factors by restricting his interest in
with a stable image of the present, for the art to the way in which it constitutes a
world, as Heidegger conceives of it, is a field of action, Heidegger has not offered
field of action, a springboard to the future. us a phenomenological analysis of what
Thus whatever relations art may have to art is but his prescription for what art
history, it is clear that Heidegger's interest ought to be.
lies in its relation to the future and in those Heidegger offers us this prescription be-
exceptional artists who have inaugurated cause he feels that any attempt to separate
new artistic traditions. art from life must inevitably lead to an
Yet among these exceptions Heidegger empty aestheticism which reflects the root-
ignores the great eccentrics whose innova-lessness and inauthenticity of contemporary
tions founded no lasting artistic tradition, life. The aesthetic which develops within
much less the world of a particular his- this separation takes the work of art out
torical people. But it is artists like Redon, of its proper context and treats it as an
Ryder, Fuseli, and Blake who prevent us object of aesthetic contemplation. Thus
from falling prey to the limitations of our objectified, the work becomes a mere orna-
aesthetic categories. As one writer recently ment of our culture, and aesthetic ex-
put it, the eccentric master ".... is, above perience a passive contemplation of sen-
all, the artist hostile to categories, outside suous qualities.'2 For Heidegger, however,
of the 'historical' necessities of tradition. the world constituted by the work is the
Self-justified, he challenges all assumptions "real" world in which we act out our daily
about what is possible and exposes our lives. The world provides things and events
timidities concerning the infinite capac- with a context of relations in which they
ities of man." " This brings us to a further take on meaning, but these things, in turn,
point which Heidegger fails to take into give the world its concrete actuality. It is
account: the fact that in many works of this interplay between the world and the
art their ties to history are the least sig- things which it discloses which is the locus
nificant thing about them. Just as there of truth. And because a work of art con-
are certain qualities of style which mark a stitutes a world it, too, is a mode of truth.
work as originating in a particular period But the constitution of a world is not the
of history, so there are artistic qualities distinguishing feature of a work of art, for
which cut across the boundaries of time, art is only one mode of truth. Nor does
place, and culture. There exist what Henri Heidegger's own account of those char-
Focillon called "families of the mind"- acteristics which mark art as a unique form
artists whose work may be separated by of disclosure seem to square with his criti-
cultural and historical factors but who cism of the separation of art from daily
nevertheless have more in common with life. one
another than with their own contempo- Unlike an artifact, a work of art exhibits
raries. Grunewald is, in important respects, a certain degree of independence and self-
closer to Van Gogh than to Diirer, and Piero sufficiency. Unlike a granite block, the
and Uccello have more in common with work is formed matter. Hence, despite its
Cezanne and Mondrian than with many superficial resemblance to mere things, the
artists of the Italian Renaissance. Finally, source of its self-sufficiency lies elsewhere-
though a successful work of art constitutes in the free act of creation which consti-
a world within which it takes on its sig- tutes it as an irrepeatable being. We ex-
nificance, it is by no means clear that this perience its uniqueness in the impact which
world must always be the world of a par- the work makes upon us. This impact is one
ticular historical people. Many artists are way in which the work discloses Being, for
concerned primarily with the plastic means it makes us realize that the work stands in

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Heidegger's Theory of Art 65

Being over and against the possibility of it establishes the artifex, artist or artisan,
its non-Being. But there is also a second in a world apart, cloistered, defined and
way in which a work reveals Being to us. absolute.... " 14 From this point of view,
Being, we have seen, is a continual conflict
which is supported by much of what Hei-
between hiddenness and unconcealment. degger has to say, a work of art exists
This conflict is expressed in the work within the realm of the imagination rather
through the conflict between matter and than in real life. Yet Heidegger emphati-
form. In a work of art, then, we first ex- cally rejects this view because he feels that
perience the impact of the extraordinary it turns aesthetic experience into a kind of
fact that it is, and then the character of passive contemplation in which the ex-
the conflict between form and matter periencing subject immerses himself in the
which is peculiar to the work in question. object of his attention. Art, however, is-
Hence art must be distinguished from as Heidegger correctly points out-essen-
thought. Thought is concerned with formu- tially a project. It demands the active
lating an adequate conception of Being. Itscooperation of artist and viewer-an ap
success can be measured against that which propriation and conservation on the part
it discloses, the process of Being itself. of the viewer of the artistic tradition in
A work of art, however, expresses Beingwhich the work stands. But this is no rea-
in and through its uniqueness and irre- son to rule out the view in question. On
peatability. Each work, therefore, must the contrary, if every act of appropriation
be assessed in the context which is opened took place within the context of our daily
up by the work itself. Hence there can be lives, aesthetic experience would be limited
no external criteria by which we measure by the scope of our commitments in real
the success or failure of a work of art. Nor life. Our experience of art, however,
can there be any a priori guarantee that testifies to a different state of affairs. When
this context will always be the world of a we pass through the galleries of a museum,
particular historical people. To determine we are continuously called upon to adjust
in advance how a particular work will ex- to different artistic traditions if we are to
press the conflict between hiddenness and comprehend and enjoy the works which
unconcealment would be to deny to we encounter. Yet for the most part, we
the work the freedom which is the source make these adjustments without difficulty
of its uniqueness and self-sufficiency. and without measuring the world of the
Nor is Heidegger correct in suggestingwork against the world of daily life. These
that the independence of art from life is aadjustments are not made within the con-
conception which reflects the rootlessness text of daily life but within the willing
and inauthenticity of contemporary cul- suspension of disbelief which constitutes
ture, for this conception has often servedthe sphere of art. It is because I can sus-
to explain art's unique power of revelation.pend the beliefs which I hold in life that I
It underlies Aristotle's explanation of howcan enter through art a world whose mean-
it is possible to enjoy in art that which is ing and values differ from my own. Hence
unpleasant in life. We do not, he explains,it is because of its independence from life
enjoy the unpleasant itself but its imita- that a work of art can disclose new possi-
tion.13 This same conception is present,ble ways of existing to us. But when we
according to Jacques Maritain, in the commit ourselves to live according to one
thought of the Schoolmen, for whom or more of these possibilities, we put to
"art... remains outside the line of hu- use in life what we have learned from art.
man conduct, with an end, rules, and val- And in so doing we depart from the prov-
ues, which are not those of the man, but ince of art, for the aesthetic is not the
of the work to be produced. That work is practical.
everything for art-one law only governs Heidegger's failure to take these factors
it-the exigencies and good of the work. into account is not, however, due merely
Hence the despotic and all-absorbing powerto an oversight in his analysis of art. It
of art...: it frees from every human care, is grounded in an ambiguity which under-

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 66 WILLIAM H. BOSSART

lies his whole philosophical enterprise. lemma which is not of its

The essence of man, he tells us, lies in his it denies art the freedom
existence. His existence, in turn, testifies from daily life which are both its dis-
to the fact that man is a being who is al- tinguishing characteristics and the source
ways in advance of himself, who, though of its peculiar and significant power of
he is always in a particular situation, never- revelation.
theless transcends that situation. Existence,
then, testifies to human freedom. It is be-
cause man is free that he can choose to
1 Unless otherwise noted, the discussion in sec-
take different attitudes toward beings
tion I refers to the text of Sein und Zeit, 7th ed.
within the world and thereby provide those
(Tubingen, 1953). I have chosen to translate das
beings with different contexts in which Seiende as particular being or, in some cases, simply
they can appear as meaningful. Thus as being to relate it to and contrast it with das
knowing for Heidegger is grounded in free- Sein or Being.
2 Sein und Zeit, p. 227.
dom. Similarly, a work of art, though it 3 These remarks are extremely superficial.
originates in a determinate social-historical Heidegger holds that each extasis of temporality
context, also transcends that context, for it involves the other two. However, he distinguishes
originates through a free act of artistic an authentic comprehension of temporality in
creation. Freedom, then, is the ground of a which time is seen as essentially futural from an
inauthentic comprehension which understands the
possible measure of authenticity on the future and the past in terms of the now.
part of the individual and of the self- 4 Vom Wesen der Wahrheit (Frankfurt a.M., 1954).
sufficiency and independence of the work 6 (Tiibingen, 1953), in particular pp. 88 ff.
of art. Yet freedom, Heidegger tells us else- 6 Uber den Humanismus (Frankfurt a.M., 1957),
pp. 5, 19.
where, is not a possession of man. Rather 7Erliduterungen zu Holderlins Dichtung (Frank-
man is possessed by freedom, and his actsfurt a.M., 1951), pp. 31-45.
of disclosure are performed for the sake of 8 "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes," Holzwege
Being.15 And the work of art is not really (Frankfurt a.M., 1952), pp. 59 ff.
9The remainder of section II refers principally
independent of daily life, for it always
to "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes."
stands in the world of a particular his- 10 "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes," p. 30.
torical people and is an exemplary mani- "1Thomas B. Hess, "Eccentric Propositions," The
festation of that world. The work and the Grand Eccentrics-Art News Annual XXXXII (New
individual are children of their time, and York, 1966), p. 9.
"a E.g., Erlduterungen zu Holderlins Dichtung, pp.
what they disclose, create, and conserve is
32, 40. Also "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes," pp. 29
inevitably tied to history. But how does ff., and Einfiihrung in die Metaphysik, p. 36.
history come to pass-through the free 13 The Poetics, 4.
acts of the artist, the thinker, and the states- 14Art and Scholasticism, trans. J. F. Scanlan (New
York, 1954), p. 6.
man, or through the determination of
15 Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, p. 16. In Sein und
Being itself? Heidegger's answer is am- Zeit Heidegger seems to identify Dasein and man.
biguous. But to remain in this ambiguityIn this essay Dasein appears to be the seizure of man
is to impose upon art a metaphysical di-by Being itself.

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