WORKING PAPER

Misinformed or Overconfident? Fake News and

Youth Voting Likelihood in the Philippines

Gabrielle Ann S. Mendoza

Ateneo Policy Center, School of Government, Ateneo de Manila University

Kier Jesse Ballar

Ateneo Policy Center, School of Government, Ateneo de Manila University

Jurel K. Yap
Ateneo Policy Center, School of Government, Ateneo de Manila University

Imelda B. Deinla, PhD

School of Government, Ateneo de Manila University

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Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4064584

 Misinformed or Overconfident? Fake News and
Youth Voting Likelihood in the Philippines

Imelda B. Deinla, PhD

School of Government, Ateneo de Manila University

Gabrielle Ann S. Mendoza

Ateneo Policy Center, School of Government, Ateneo de Manila University

Kier Jesse Ballar

Ateneo Policy Center, School of Government, Ateneo de Manila University

Jurel K. Yap
Ateneo Policy Center, School of Government, Ateneo de Manila University

March 2022
The authors would like to thank Ateneo de Manila University, through the Ateneo Policy Center, for supporting this
study. The authors would also like to thank Rex P. Bringula, Clarissa David, and Hansley Juliano for giving
feedback to an earlier version of the study. Much thanks as well to Bea de Castro for leading the operations and
administrative aspects of the project.

This working paper is a draft in progress that is posted online to stimulate discussion and critical comment. The
purpose is to mine the reader's additional ideas and contributions for completion of a final document.

The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Ateneo de Manila
University.

Corresponding authors:
Imelda B. Deinla, PhD - School of Government, Ateneo de Manila University. E-mail: ideinla@ateneo.edu
Jurel K. Yap - School of Government, Ateneo de Manila University. E-mail: jkyap@ateneo.edu

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 Misinformed or Overconfident? Fake News and
Youth Voting Likelihood in the Philippines

ABSTRACT
How can online misinformation affect the Filipino youth’s likelihood to vote? While the youth is
recognized as a crucial sector for Philippine democracy, disillusionment towards the government
can compromise participation. We examine how social media, by facilitating the spread of
misinformation and incivility, inhibits voting likelihood among the youth. Using ordered logistic
regression on survey data comprising 23,996 college students across the country, we find that
citizens who can accurately identify real political news from fake and have high confidence in their
ability to detect misinformation are more likely to vote in the upcoming Philippine presidential
elections. Thus, contrary to previous empirical work, both confidence and information accuracy
are crucial predictors of voter likelihood.

Keywords: Misinformation, Voting Likelihood, Media, Youth, Philippines

1 INTRODUCTION
Fake news are defined as “news articles that are intentionally and verifiably false, and could
mislead readers” (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017, p. 4). These are shared for profit wherein the source
of fake news earns income by drawing users to visit pages or to make donations as well as for
ideological goals wherein fake news are skewed to favor politicians or policies. While news that
is known to be false and is created with an intent to harm is classified as disinformation, it often
turns to misinformation in the online sphere where it is shared by citizens who are unaware that it
is false and even believe that they are raising awareness about an important issue (Wardle, 2019).
The Philippines has been labeled as ‘patient zero’ in the global infodemic by Facebook executive
Katie Harbath (Mendoza et al., 2021). This comes after the overwhelming wave of disinformation
that compromised electoral integrity in the country's 2016 elections, which poses a threat of similar
strategies in democracies across the globe. The 2016 presidential elections has indeed been dubbed
as a “social media election” (Quitzon, 2021) as discussions, campaign strategies, and even memes

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on social media defined the victory of President Duterte. With the ongoing pandemic and rising
accessibility of the internet, campaigning and government information campaigns are expected to
be more reliant on social media than ever.
Online misinformation is a threat to elections since it skews votes for candidates that field
disinformation and manipulate public opinion, thus eroding the very foundation of democracy
being ruled by the genuine interests of the people. This threat is amplified as misinformed citizens
are also found to be more likely to participate in politics (White et al., 2006). This points to the
Dunning-Kruger effect wherein poor performers overestimate their performance (Dunning, 2011).
Evidence suggests that the Dunning-Kruger effect is much more pronounced for issues that citizens
are exposed to on a daily basis such as political news (Dunning, 2011; Lyons et al., 2021). The
advent of campaigning on social media, a platform known to reinforce echo chambers and isolate
citizens from dissenting views (Rhodes, 2021), could heighten the Dunning-Kruger effect among
voters. As a result, voters are not only exposed to false political information but are even
conditioned to be confident of their ability to determine the truthfulness of fake news given its
resounding support from within their networks.
The problem with online misinformation therefore seems to be twofold. On one hand, it
espouses false political information that skews political opinion to favor those who have the means
to manipulate information. On the other hand, it cultivates a sense of confidence in false narratives
that influence political attitudes and behavior. Conventionally, there are three classifications that
divide citizens on how they use or perceive information. These are: (1) those that are informed,
citizens who hold onto accurate political information and are confident that these are true, (2) the
uninformed who are generally not confident about the truthfulness of their political information
with little or no access to political information, and (3) the misinformed citizens who are both
confident in the truthfulness of their information but hold onto inaccurate political information
(White et al., 2006). In this study, we found a different category, or at least a different effect of
misinformation. This study shows that voters can hold onto false political information, the
misinformed, while at the same time reluctant of their ability to spot misinformation. In December
2021, the Social Weather Stations survey reported that the majority or 51% of Filipinos admit that
they cannot spot fake news (Tuquero, 2022). This points to an alternative case where citizens can
be misinformed and insecure of their ability to detect fake news. In this case, the absence of a
Dunning-Kruger effect can impair the participation-inducing effect of misinformation on voters.

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Instead, these voters who are not confident of the veracity of their political opinions may be less
inclined to act on their political beliefs through voting.
We then explore empirical evidence on how exactly online misinformation can affect the
Filipino youth’s political participation – particularly in voting. This study contributes towards the
nascent but growing body of literature in the Philippines exploring the links between
misinformation on various aspects of Philippine democracy. We explore a unique survey dataset
featuring a novel ‘fake news quiz’ adapted from academic literature (Grace & Hone 2019;
Micallef, Menczer, and Patil 2021), in which over 24,622 Filipino youth from various colleges and
universities all over the country answered the survey. Moreover, we attempt to delineate what
exactly it is about misinformation, whether it is belief in the false statement or misplaced
confidence in political opinions, that affects political behavior. To do this, the survey contains a
‘fake news quiz’ that tests for the respondents’ ability to detect fake news as well as a confidence
feeling thermometer that gauges how confident they are in their ability to detect the truth or falsity
of information. We then relate this to their likelihood of voting in the coming national elections.
We proceed with the study in four parts. The first section provides a brief literature review
on social media, misinformation and its links to voting behavior among citizens. The second
section discusses the methodology of the study by laying down key variables gathered from the
survey and our empirical model. Third, we discuss the rationale behind the statistical analysis we
used to generate the study’s findings. We then proceed with the key findings and results, focusing
on the effects of their scores on the fake news quiz, self-rated accuracy in their ability to detect
misinformation, and perceived exposure to fake news, among other control variables, on the
respondents’ likelihood to vote in the fourth section. Finally, we conclude the paper by discussing
its key findings, possible policy implications, and consequences for the role of the Filipino youth
in electoral democracy.

2 VOTER LIKELIHOOD AND SOCIAL MEDIA

Political Participation is defined as “those activities by private citizens that are more or less
directly aimed at influencing the selection of government personnel and/or the actions they take”
(Verba & Nie, 1972, p.2). Studies have shown how social media is a promising area for
intervention since it has the capacity to redefine political participation among the Filipino youth
(Lim, 2009). In this paper, we study it in its most direct form through their likelihood to vote.

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Scholars have stated that growing cynicism and apathy towards politics among the Filipino youth
can be an obstacle to youth participation (Velasco, 2005; Sta. Maria & Diestro, 2009). According
to the National Youth Commission, citizens from 15 to 30 years of age can be considered as the
youth.1 The Philippines now also has the largest youth sector in its history.2 Comelec data showed
that the youth comprised more than half of the registered voters in the previous elections (Pastor,
2021). In the 2019 midterm elections however, members of the Filipino youth have expressed that
they have lost faith in the political system and that their votes would not really matter.3
Voting behavior is anchored on the citizens’ access to complete, comprehensible, and
diverse information. Citizens, by default, remain uninformed about politics (Downs, 1957). This
state of ‘rational ignorance’ is due to the costly nature of acquiring and processing political
information. A freeriding problem also occurs wherein, despite the low costs of voting, citizens
cannot be bothered to vote due to the indivisible nature of its returns. Citizens are therefore reliant
on information elites such as political parties, lobbyists, and mass media as a way to make sense
of politics. Aside from political opinions and policy choices, the nature of information provided
by these information elites can also pave the way for other political behavior such as their
likelihood to vote (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Snyder III, 2011). The source and way citizens
consume information can therefore be an avenue for incentivizing voting among the youth.
Social media has democratized the way citizens gather information. Citizens can bypass
information gatekeepers by selecting the type of information they receive (Hong & Nadler, 2015)
and even participating in the production of information themselves (Lupia & Sin, 2003; Coleman
& Blumler, 2009; Yang & Su, 2020). This is especially important for authoritarian states where
government censorship and media ownership skew news to favor the more powerful narrative. In
these countries, social media can become an avenue to spread awareness on government
malpractice and mobilize citizens against them (Breuer, 2012; Belknap, 2015). Social media can
also become a tool for civic education in democracies. In the United States, Bae (2014) provided
empirical evidence that the youth are exposed to political information even as they carry out
apolitical activities on social media. By providing the youth with crucial and easily understandable
political information, scholars argue that social media can motivate greater interest and

1
National Youth Commission (https://nyc.gov.ph/republic-act-8044/).
2
United Nations Development Programme in the Asia and Pacific (https://www.asia-
pacific.undp.org/content/rbap/en/home/democratic-governance-and-peacebuilding/empowering-youth.html).
3
https://www.dw.com/en/philippine-youth-losing-faith-in-political-system/a-48816118

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engagement in politics among the youth (Chan & Guo, 2013; McAllister, 2015; Abdulrauf et al.,
2015).
A crucial weakness in this analysis is that it overlooks the perverse effect of misinformation
online. The online sphere can be ‘too democratic’ when it gives space to unqualified sources and
inaccurate political information (Hindman, 2009). In addition, the autonomy of choice provided
by social media can narrow down the perspectives of voters to focus on information that only
supports their predisposed bias (Sunstein, 2001). As a result, online misinformation is not just able
to move past censorship and correction but also attract a considerable audience that lends itself a
sense of legitimacy and authority. This study therefore attempts to illustrate the potential effect of
online misinformation in the Philippines, a country known as patient zero in the global infodemic
(Mendoza et al., 2021), on likelihood to vote among the Filipino youth. A survey on college
freshmen students in 2018 shows that 44% rely on the internet for information and that 88% agree
that social media is the best source of news. 4 Yet in the same survey, only 8% said that they
evaluate the information that they receive critically. This could make the youth highly susceptible
to misinformation which puts the Filipino youth’s voter turnout, hailed as a signal of strong
democracy in the Philippines and having great potential power in determining electoral
outcomes,56 at risk.
Indeed, online misinformation erodes democracy by manipulating the candidate and policy
preferences of citizens (Tucker et al., 2018; Colomina et al., 2021). However, little is known about
the influence of online misinformation on a citizen’s willingness to vote in the first place. This
study contributes to growing literature on the political impact of misinformation by providing
empirical evidence on its influence over the Filipino youth’s likelihood to vote. Conventional
trajectory warns against misinformation as a deterrent to voting since it fuels resentment towards
the democratic political system (Colomina et al., 2021) and is often accompanied by an incivil
landscape for online political participation (Hameleers et al., 2021). Yet empirical evidence shows

4
https://www.rappler.com/voices/thought-leaders/217787-analysis-does-generation-z-care-about-social-political-
issues/
5
Department of Education (2021, July 26). DepEd leads youth voter registration campaign for 2022 elections.
Department of Education. https://www.deped.gov.ph/2021/07/26/deped-leads-youth-voter-registration-campaign-
for-2022-elections/
6
Perez, A. (2021). DepEd: Youth vote has 'potential power' to influence elections. ABS-CBN News.
https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/07/02/21/deped-youth-vote-2022-elections

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that being misinformed or confidently holding beliefs based on inaccurate information can
motivate citizens to participate in politics (White et al., 2006).
In line with the Dunning-Kruger effect, overestimating confidence in detecting
misinformation can make citizens vulnerable to subscribing to networks of misinformation and
participating in its spread online (Metzger et al., 2015; Lyons et al., 2021). This can also lead to
behavioral outcomes as citizens are the ones most likely to be invested in politics and least likely
to seek out information that goes against their inferences. This is known as the ‘I know I’m right’
syndrome (Kuklinski, 2000): citizens who believe that they are correctly informed about a topic
have a tendency to participate in the topic and reject information that contradicts their views.
Similar to the mechanisms that push informed citizens to vote (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996;
Snyder III, 2011), misinformed citizens understand what is at stake in elections and are eager to
voice out their opinions. Thus, it is possible that it is not misinformation per se that fuels the
citizens’ likelihood to vote but their misplaced confidence in their false political knowledge.
Moreover, this points to an alternative case where misinformed citizens who lack confidence in
the truthfulness of their political information can behave similarly to uninformed citizens and have
little to no interest in voting. We therefore test for this by delineating the impact of information
accuracy and confidence. For confidence, we hypothesize that:
H1: Higher self-rated accuracy in the ability to detect fake news increases
likelihood to vote.
To test for information accuracy, we examine the results of the real and fake news sections
of the fake news quiz launched through the Pinoy Voters’ Vibe: Youth Edition survey conducted
by the Ateneo School of Government (ASOG). We separate the fake and real news sections to
account for those who believe in all news, thus scoring high in the real news quiz but failing the
fake news quiz, as well as those who reject all news as fake thus failing the real news quiz but
scoring high in the fake news quiz. We can say that a citizen is informed if they can accurately
detect news that are real from fake news which translates to a high score in both the real and fake
news quizzes, thus scoring high for the real news test, and detect news that are false thus scoring
high for the fake news test. Meanwhile, a misinformed citizen is someone unable to differentiate
between real and fake thus scoring lower for both tests. Because we assume that misinformed
citizens that are not confident in their opinions behave similarly to uninformed citizens and are not
that interested to vote, we hypothesize that:

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 H2: A higher real news score increases likelihood to vote.
H3: A higher fake news score increases likelihood to vote.
As discussed, citizens tend to underestimate their susceptibility to believing in fake news.
Jang and Kim (2018) find that citizens also exaggerate the influence of misinformation on others.
This leads to a third person effect (TPE) wherein the perceived gap between one’s own knowledge
and the others lead to behavioral outcomes that aim to protect the vulnerable from manipulation
such as support for censorship (Rojas et al., 1996; Xu and Gonzenbach, 2008; Guo and Johnson,
2020) and caution in sharing online news (Yang and Horning, 2020). In voting, Banning (2006)
goes as far as saying that TPE can be considered as an “analgesic for apathy” (p. 787). Citizens
with higher TPE are motivated to vote in an attempt to counter the votes of the misinformed. With
this, we hypothesize that:
H4: Increased frequency in perceived exposure to fake news increases likelihood
to vote.

3 METHODOLOGY
To test the four primary hypotheses mentioned earlier, a statistical model was used.
Specifically,
Likelihood to Vote = Accuracy in detecting Fake News + Accuracy in detecting Real News
+ Job Approval Rating for Philippine President Duterte + Age + Gender + Income +
Region of Respondent's University + Frequency in coming across almost completely fake
news + Self-reported ability in detecting fake news + Trust in Mainstream Media + Trust
in Social Media + Voting Intention + Polling Precinct Knowledge
The model includes key variables to test the four hypotheses, namely — accuracy in
detecting fake news, accuracy in detecting real news, self-reported ability in detecting fake news,
and frequency in coming across almost completely fake news.
Further, controls from conventional literature were used. First, both strong approval and
disapproval towards the incumbent president is shown to be correlated with voter turnout in the
United States (Cebula, 2005). It is likely that those who have strong sentiments towards the
incumbent president are more politically engaged. This makes them determined to influence the
outcome of the following elections by voting for a candidate that would either continue or reverse
the president’s policies. Second, those who do not trust democratic institutions, such as the

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mainstream media, perceive no benefit to voting (Grönlund & Setälä, 2007). Conversely,
conspiratorial thinking, which is shown to be highly correlated to trust in social media, dissuades
citizens from participating in politics (Kim, 2019). Finally, we also take into account demographic
differences among our respondents namely age, gender, region (proxied as the area of their
universities), and income.
Data from the second round of the Pinoy Voters’ Vibe Initiative: Youth Edition (PVV),
was used for the statistical model. The PVV project is an initiative of ASOG to investigate the
issues affecting the Filipino youth regarding the 2022 Philippine Elections. The first round of the
PVV project was conducted from May to June 2021. The second round of the PVV project was
conducted from August to September 2021.

3.1 Survey Overview and Sampling

Through the second round of the PVV project, a five-minute survey through Google Forms
was disseminated to college students (18 years old and above) in the project’s partner universities
and colleges across the Philippines. A total of 25 universities and colleges partnered with the PVV
project for the second round. Target respondents were identified using snowball sampling, a non-
probability sampling technique. The survey was distributed through the social media and learning
management platforms of the partner universities. We note that the survey respondents were
sampled using snowball sampling and as such, the results of the study does not represent college
students in the Philippines nor any grouping of the youth in the Philippines — it only represents
the 18 year old and above college students who participated in the survey.

3.2 The Fake News Quiz

To measure the fake news susceptibility and real news accuracy of the respondents, the
survey contained a fake news quiz. The fake news quiz contained ten quiz items — five fake news
items and five real news items. Respondents were then asked to rate the quiz item as true or false.
The fake news quiz in the survey was a modified version of the fake news quiz used by Deinla et
al. (2021) from the results of the first round of the PVV project. The quiz items were in the form
of Facebook quote cards. As noted by Deinla et al. (2021), Facebook quote cards are relevant in
assessing disinformation campaigns in the Philippines since quote cards are one of the widely used
tools used by disinformation agents in the Philippines.

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 The fake news quiz section followed the methodology of Deinla et al. (2021), which
includes the selection process of the fake & real news items, and question format, but with changes
to the content. As with Deinla et al. (2021), Leeder’s (2019) approach in selecting fake news was
used. Fake news stories, from January 2020 to July 23, 2021 involving Cabinet Members in the
Philippine Government, gathered by Vera Files and Rappler were initially selected. Vera Files and
Rappler are both signatories as fact-checkers in the nonpartisan International Fact Checking
Network of the Poynter Institute.
Cabinet Members were then ranked based on their frequency in being mentioned in the
gathered fake news stories. The top five most frequently mentioned Cabinet Members were then
selected — Secretary of Education Leonor Briones, Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process
Carlito Galvez Jr., Secretary of Foreign Affairs Teddy Locsin Jr., Chief Presidential Legal Counsel
Salvador Panelo, and presidential spokesperson Harry Roque.
One fake news story per Cabinet Member was randomly selected and a corresponding real
news story was also selected based on (Roozenbeck et al 2019) — following Deinla et al. (2021).
In total, the fake news quiz consisted of five real news stories and five fake news stories.
The survey asked respondents “Do you think the quote by Cabinet Member X in the photo
(enclosed in red) is false or not?” with the response options a) “The quote in the above photo is
true” or b) “The quote in the above photo is false”.

3.3 Descriptive Statistics

As mentioned earlier, the data used in this paper are from the second round of the PVV
project. After filtering for invalid responses, a total of 24,622 respondents were recorded in the
survey. In Table 1, we can view the 14 variables in the statistical model that will be used in this
study. The main variable of interest will be Likelihood to Vote, which measures a respondent’s
likelihood to vote. In Figure 1, we can observe that most of the respondents indicated that they
“definitely will vote” with a few saying that they “definitely will not vote” or “probably will not
vote”. Further, we also note that there were no zero cells in the cross tabulations between voting
likelihood and the other variables.

Variable Description

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Likelihood to Vote An ordinal variable, which measures the responses to
the following question:

“How likely are you to vote in the 2022 Philippine

Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections this May
9, 2022?”

Four responses were available: 1 = Definitely will not

vote, 2 = Probably will not vote, 3 = Probably will
vote, and 4 = Definitely will vote.

This measures the respondent’s likelihood to vote.

Accuracy in detecting Fake News (Fake News A continuous variable, which measures the
Score) respondent’s accuracy in detecting fake news quiz
items. Values are from 0 to 5.

Accuracy in detecting Real News (Real News A continuous variable, which measures the
Score) respondent’s accuracy in detecting real news quiz
items. Values are from 0 to 5.

Job Approval Rating for Philippine President An ordinal variable, which measures the respondent’s
Duterte job approval rating towards Rodrigo Duterte, President
of the Philippines,

Five responses were available: 1 = Strongly

Disapprove, 2 = Slightly Disapprove, 3 = Undecided if
approve or not, 4 = Slightly Approve, and 5 = Strongly
Approve.

Age (18-19, 20-21, 22-23) A categorical variable, which indicates the

respondent’s age bracket.

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Gender (LGBTQIA, Male, Female) A categorical variable, which indicates the
respondent’s gender identity.

Income A categorical variable, which indicates the

respondent’s self-reported household total monthly
income.

Region of Respondent's University A categorical variable, which indicates the location of

the respondent’s university.

Universities were classified based on their location into

i) Balance Luzon, 2) National Capital Region (NCR),
iii) Visayas, and iv) Mindanao.

Frequency in coming across almost An ordinal variable, which measures a respondent’s

completely fake news self-reported frequency in coming across political news
stories that are almost completely fake.

Values from: 1 = Never, 2 = Hardly ever, 3 =

Sometimes, and 4 = Often.

Self-reported ability in detecting fake news An ordinal variable, which measures a respondent’s
self-reported ability in recognizing fake news.

Values from: 1 = Not at all confident, 2 = Not very

confident, 3 = Somewhat confident, and 4 = Very
confident.

Trust in Mainstream Media A continuous variable, which measures a respondent’s

trust in mainstream media as a source of information.
The average of a respondent’s trust towards Print
Media, Radio, Television, and Online Media.

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 Trust in Social Media A continuous variable, which measures a respondent’s
trust in mainstream media as a source of information.
The average of a respondent’s trust towards Facebook,
Youtube, and Social Media excluding Facebook and
Youtube (Twitter, Tiktok, Viber).

Voting Intention A categorical variable, which indicates a respondent’s

voting intentions.

Values from: 1 = I am not registered to vote and do not

plan to register, 2 = Don't know or refuse to answer, 3
= I am not registered but plan to register to vote by
September 30, 2021, and 4 = I am currently registered
to vote.

Polling Precinct Knowledge A categorical variable, which indicates if a respondent

is aware of their polling precinct location for the 2022
Elections.

Values: 1 = No (not aware), 2 = Not yet (not yet

aware), 3 = Yes (aware)

Table 1. Variables used in the study

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Figure 1. Frequency of Voting Likelihood among the survey respondents

4 Statistical Methods

As mentioned in Section 3, to account for the ordinal nature of the dependent variable,
ordered logit models were used (Gujarati, Porter, and Gunasekar 2009, 580). This paper focuses
on the proportional odds model, a cumulative link model (also referred to as ordered logit models)
with a logit link (Christensen 2018). Additionally, we note that an important assumption of the
proportional odds model is the proportional odds assumption (Christensen 2018). To check for the
proportional odds assumption, the graphical method described by Harrell (2001, 335-336) was
implemented. Modified R code from the UCLA: Statistical Consulting Group (n.d.) was used to
conduct Harell’s method.
To deal with scenarios where the proportional odds assumption was not met, the partial
proportional odds model was used (Peterson and Harrell , 1990). Further, to identify explanatory
variables that should not be assumed to have proportional odds in the model, we refer to Harell’s
graphical method. The package ordinal (Christensen 2018) in R was used to implement the partial
proportional odds model.
In this paper, residual diagnostics were conducted through residual plots generated by
surrogate residuals using the sure R package — a type of residual which is appropriate for the

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 proportional odds model (Greenwell et al. 2018). For comparing different models, this paper used
the Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) as discussed by Gujarati, Porter, and Gunasekar (2009,
494) following (Akaike 1974) — models with low AICs relative to other models were considered.

5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

In this section, we discuss the results of the study. When selecting the final regression
model, a baseline proportional odds model was selected — following the statistical model
mentioned in Section 3. Residual plots were then examined to determine potential misspecification
in the mean structure — quadratic terms were then not included following the residual plots.
Then, the proportional odds assumption was relaxed in the baseline proportional odds
model in various configurations — with Harell’s graphical method as a guide for determining
variables which might violate the proportional odds assumption. We note that the respondents in
the age groups, 24-25, 26-30, and 31 & above, were removed to mitigate for the violation of the
Age variable to the proportional odds assumption — with the total number of respondents used in
the models at 23,996.
Table 2 shows the different models considered with their corresponding AIC. A likelihood
ratio test was then conducted between the models in Table 2 to select the final model. The Partial
Proportional Model 3 was then selected as the final model due to its low AIC relative to Models 4
& 5 and relative parsimony compared to Models 1 & 2. Additionally, we note that, in the final
model, no regression coefficients were estimated for Voting Intention and Polling Precinct
Knowledge but threshold coefficients were obtained instead — as such, p-values and standard
errors were not computed (Christensen 2018).

Model Specification AIC

Baseline Model Likelihood to Vote = Accuracy in detecting Fake News + Accuracy 26, 677.63
in detecting Real News + Job Approval Rating for Philippine
President Duterte + Age + Gender + Income + Region of
Respondent's University + Frequency in coming across almost
completely fake news + Self-reported ability in detecting fake news
+ Trust in Mainstream Media + Trust in Social Media + Voting

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 Intention + Polling Precinct Knowledge

Partial Proportional Model 1 Partial effects considered in Job Approval Rating for Philippine 26, 474.8
President Duterte, Income, Frequency in coming across almost
completely fake news, Voting Intention, Polling Precinct
Knowledge, and Region of Respondent's University

Partial Proportional Model 2 Partial effects considered in Frequency in coming across almost 26, 522.65
completely fake news, Voting Intention, and Polling Precinct
Knowledge

Partial Proportional Model 3 Partial effects considered in Voting Intention, and Polling Precinct 26, 563.22
(Final Model) Knowledge

Partial Proportional Model 4 Partial effects considered in Polling Precinct Knowledge 26, 647.17

Partial Proportional Model 5 Partial effects considered in Voting Intention 26, 580.28

Table 2. Considered models with their corresponding AIC for model selection

Dependent variable:

Likelihood to Vote
(Odds Ratio)

Fake News Score 1.08***

(1.05, 1.10)

Real News Score 1.09***

(1.07, 1.12)

Job Approval Rating for Philippine President Duterte_Slightly 0.57***

disapprove (0.52, 0.62)

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Job Approval Rating for Philippine President Duterte_Neither 0.40***
approve nor disapprove (0.36, 0.44)

Job Approval Rating for Philippine President Duterte_Slightly 0.43***

approve (0.39, 0.48)

Job Approval Rating for Philippine President Duterte_Strongly 0.57***

approve (0.51, 0.65)

Age_20-21 years old 1.04

(0.97, 1.11)

Age_22-23 years old 1.10

(0.96, 1.25)

Gender_LGBTQIA 1.03
(0.90, 1.18)

Gender_Male 0.74***
(0.68, 0.79)

Gender_Others 0.37*
(0.14, 1.09)

Income less than PhP 10,957 per month 0.99

(0.91, 1.08)

Income between PhP 10,957 to PhP 21,914 per month 1.10*

(1.00, 1.22)

Income between PhP 21,914 to PhP 43,828 per month 1.09

(0.97, 1.22)

Income between PhP 43,828 to PhP 76,699 per month 1.11

(0.96, 1.28)

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Income between PhP 76,699 to PhP 131,484 per month 1.01
(0.82, 1.25)

Income Between PhP 131,483 to PhP 219,140 per month 1.08

(0.89, 1.32)

Location_Mindanao 1.09
(0.98, 1.21)

Location_National Capital Region 0.94

(0.86, 1.02)

Location_Visayas 1.06
(0.97, 1.15)

Self-reported ability in detecting fake news_Not very confident 1.28*

(0.98, 1.67)

Self-reported ability in detecting fake news_Somewhat confident 1.74***

(1.34, 2.25)

Self-reported ability in detecting fake news_Very confident 2.52***

(1.93, 3.30)

Frequency in coming across almost completely fake 0.88

news_Hardly ever sees fake news (0.68, 1.15)

Frequency in coming across almost completely fake 1.06

news_Sometimes sees fake news (0.83, 1.33)

Frequency in coming across almost completely fake news_Often 1.26*

sees fake news (0.99, 1.61)

Trust in Mainstream Media 1.16***

(1.12, 1.20)

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Trust in Social Media 0.92***
(0.89, 0.96)

ᐩ
Threshold Coefficients (Odds Ratio)

1|2 (Intercept) 1.99

2|3 (Intercept) 28.97

3|4 (Intercept) 116.36

1|2 Voting Intention2 4.7

2|3 Voting Intention2 6.96

3|4 Voting Intention2 3.57

1|2 Voting Intention3 31.68

2|3 Voting Intention3 51.49

3|4 Voting Intention3 11.85

1|2 Voting Intention4 94.34

2|3 Voting Intention4 357.38

3|4 Voting Intention4 58.02

1|2 Polling Precinct Knowledge2 5.21

2|3 Polling Precinct Knowledge2 4.42

3|4 Polling Precinct Knowledge2 2.38

1|2 Polling Precinct Knowledge3 5.42

2|3 Polling Precinct Knowledge3 6.7

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3|4 Polling Precinct Knowledge3 4.19

Observations 23,996

Log Likelihood -13,235.61

*
Note: p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

ᐩConfidence Intervals not computed for Threshold Coefficients see Christensen (2018). We note
that for the baseline model, Voting Intention and Polling Precinct Knowledge, were found to
have p-values less than 0.001 under likelihood ratio tests using the drop1 function in the ordinal
R package.
Table 3. Odds Ratios of the final partial proportional odds model with 95% profile
confidence intervals in the parentheses

Table 3 shows the results of our study. We note that likelihood to vote was measured
through a question with four ordered response levels: 1 = Definitely will not vote, 2 = Probably
will not vote, 3 = Probably will vote, and 4 = Definitely will vote. Among the controls, job approval
rating towards President Duterte, media trust, and gender were significant. The odds of male
college students being more likely to vote by one more level (note that likelihood is measured in
4 levels, with 4 being highest) decreases by 26% compared to the odds of female college students.
Therefore, male college students are less likely to vote compared to female college students.
Further, the odds of being more likely to vote by one more level increase by 16% for every
point increase in trust in mainstream media, while the odds of being more likely to vote by one
more level decrease by 8% for every point increase in trust in social media. Among the Filipino
youth, we also find that the odds of being more likely to vote by one more level for those who
strongly approve of the president decreases by 43% compared to those who strongly disapprove
of the president. This pattern can also be observed for the other levels of the president’s approval
rate. The odds of voting continues to fall by 57% for those who slightly approve and 60% for those
undecided. Those who are more dissatisfied with the president are probably motivated by their
desire for a brand of leadership that they identify with and consider the elections an opportunity to

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reverse unsavory policies by the current administration. Thus, strong dissatisfaction with the
current political administration can mobilize voters to the polls.
The results also show evidence supporting Hypothesis 1. The odds of being more likely to
vote by one more level for those very confident in their ability to detect fake news is higher by
152% compared to those who are not at all confident. This pattern can also be observed for the
other levels of the self-rated confidence in detecting fake news, although at a lower magnitude
with an increase of 28% and 74% for those not very confident and somewhat confident,
respectively. Confidence in one’s ability to detect misinformation can definitely be a byproduct of
political awareness and engagement. But it could also be a measure of the ‘I know I’m right’
syndrome (Kuklinski, 2000) since those confident in their political opinions are the citizens who
are less likely to seek correction for their information processing habits. Indeed, this is the
argument that anchors the findings of White et al. (2006) in the United States. Citizens who are
confident of the truthfulness of their political information regardless of its accuracy are more likely
to participate in politics to push for what they believe is right. We take exception to the findings
of White et al. (2006). When analyzing purely based on information accuracy and controlling for
confidence, we find that only informed members of the Filipino youth are more likely to participate
in voting. A point increase in the Real News Score increases the odds of being more likely to vote
by one more level by 9% while a point increase in the Fake News Score of the respondent increases
their odds of being more likely to vote by one more level by 8% — these results provide evidence
in favor of Hypotheses 2 & 3. Thus, informed members of the Filipino youth (those with high Real
News and Fake News Quiz Scores) are found to be more inclined to vote whereas misinformed
members of the Filipino youth (those with low Real News and Fake News Quiz Scores) are found
to be less inclined to vote.
When controlling for the respondent’s confidence in their own ability to detect
misinformation, misinformed citizens are found to be less inclined to vote compared to informed
citizens. Misinformed citizens with no confidence in the truthfulness of their political information
yet behave similarly to uninformed citizens in that they have little desire to voice out their political
opinions through voting. While uninformed citizens are disinterested or unable to access political
information resulting in few opinions on politics, misinformed voters who hold onto wrong
political opinions are unsure of whether they are correct or not and are hesitant to express these
opinions publicly through voting. There is therefore no ‘I know I’m right syndrome’ that pushes

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them to vote commonly found among confident citizens (Kuklinski, 2000) nor the civic
engagement that typically encourages politically informed citizens (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996;
Snyder III, 2011) to compel them to vote. Evidence supporting Hypothesis 4 is also indicated in
the results. The odds of being more likely to vote by one more level increase by 26% for those
who indicated that they see fake news often compared to those who never see fake news. Members
of the Filipino youth who believe that misinformation is spread online and are aware of their
exposure to it are more likely to vote. The third person effect is a self-preserving psychological
mechanism where one undermines their impressionability while exaggerating the vulnerability of
others, thus triggering protective behavior. Those aware of the spread of disinformation campaigns
on social media tend to assume that others are easily influenced by fake news and that this can lead
them to undesired political opinions (Jang & Kim, 2018). This can make the upcoming elections
more crucial and push the Filipino youth to the polls. Beyond the education for vigilance in news
consumption online, raising awareness about the spread of disinformation tactics in the country is
also a good strategy in making the youth recognize the importance of elections and encouraging
higher voter turnout.

6 CONCLUSION
Through a survey conducted on 23,996 college students across the country, we find that
confidence, measured as self-rated accuracy in detecting misinformation, and information
accuracy, measured through the real and fake news quiz, are key factors that contribute to the
youth’s likelihood to vote. The quality of information online as well as the perceived political
efficacy of the youth therefore matters in their decision to vote. We also find that presidential
approval, perceived exposure to fake news online, and trust in mainstream media and social media
also help shape voter likelihood among the youth.
These results, however, are limited in that the study only captures a snapshot of the link
between misinformation and voting. It is also possible for continuous exposure to misinformation
to foster greater confidence in the accuracy of fake news, and even cultivate stronger political
sentiments among voters. This could be ascribed to disinformation networks created intentionally
emotional and repetitive in order to mobilize support for politicians (Ong & Cabanes, 2018).
Future studies can then look into how overconfidence manifests among voters and its influence on

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the way political engagement evolves over time. We also recommend looking into how
misinformation shapes other facets of political participation aside from voting such as online
political engagement, protest behavior, and membership in political organizations. Finally, future
studies can examine the concept of misinformed but reluctant voters further and its potential
implications for voter apathy.
Nevertheless, this study shows that there is a need for a more nuanced understanding of
misinformation and its impact on political behavior. The power of misinformation to mold public
opinion and shape political behavior is not solely rooted in the availability of fake news online.
The Filipino youth’s susceptibility to believing in fake news, on its own, is only weakly associated
with their likelihood to vote. Instead, it is their confidence in the accuracy of their political
information that drives voters to the polls. Thus, campaigns to combat misinformation should not
be restricted to the disinformation producers. This is especially since the digital disinformation
industry is likely to stay and circumscribe censorship. Disinformation campaigns are an expanding
and highly profitable industry in the Philippines with politicians and media insiders complicit in
its production (Ong & Cabanes, 2019). Thus, while censorship and transparency measures are
important, these efforts should be coupled with media literacy efforts for all citizens. Raising
awareness on the pitfalls of the ‘I know I’m right’ syndrome and how easily citizens can fall for
fake news can lead to more critical news consumers. As consumers become vigilant of the
information they receive, the effectiveness of disinformation campaigns in molding public opinion
around fake news can be mitigated. In the end, sustaining democracy is not simply anchored on
the citizens’ propensity to vote. It also involves voicing citizens’ genuine concerns through various
forums in the elections (Manin, 1997). As this study demonstrates, highlighting awareness against
disinformation in voter education campaigns across the country is of pivotal importance to
allowing voters to make well-informed choices.

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