Preparedness

Without Paranoia

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 A New Paradigm for Maximizing Workplace Security

B Y K AT H L E E N L . K I E R N A N

W orkplace violence is an all-too-common factor in modern society.

Consequently, facility managers face an array of challenges to
maximize safety and security of personnel. Although practical solutions
must be customized to meet the needs of each particular organization, useful
FMJ insights can be obtained from conceptual frameworks crafted by experienced
EXTRA practitioners in the security space.
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A recently formulated concept, known as Preparedness Without Paranoia
Workplace (PWP), emphasizes the importance of understanding the current threat
Violence environment, recognizing telltale signs of an evolving threat and empowering
and people to take effective action on their own.
Terrorism:
Best
Practices The notion that security is a personal responsibility based on knowledge
for a New and confidence, not fear, and that proactive individual action can change the
Reality
outcome of an incident and reduce the likelihood of becoming a victim, is
foundational. The sole reliance on the arrival of law enforcement to mitigate
an incident does not constitute a security plan, especially since — depending
on the scenario — many fatalities may have already been caused.

TODAY’S WORKPLACE THREAT ENVIRONMENT

The first element of PWP involves understanding a workplace’s particular
threat environment.

Four types of workplace violence exist:

TYPE I Criminal intent TYPE III Worker-on-worker

TYPE II Customer/client TYPE IV Personal relationship

External threats can be mitigated by limiting access to a facility using a

variety of measures, ranging from the simplicity of assigned key cards to the
sophisticated use of biometrically enabled access requiring multiple levels of
security and continuous vetting.

Internal threats can be much harder to prevent, in part because of the

familiarity of coworkers and a reluctance to report a problematic colleague
even after anomalies in behavior or work responsibilities. The fear of being
wrong or being perceived as a troublemaker often prevents early warning that
could enable early intervention or identification of the behavior that seemed
different at the time.

In a study of 152 fatal shootings attributed to workplace violence, analysts

at Kiernan Group Holdings (KGH) determined 68 percent were committed
by workers on other workers.1 With appropriate planning and preparation,
at least some threats can be mitigated or even prevented, especially with an
understanding of a potential attacker’s pre-incident pathway to violence.

J U LY/A U G U S T 2 0 1 7 79
Fatal workplace violence incidents have declined
in the past decade, but they continue to threaten
the safety and livelihoods of many employers. In
2015, the latest year for which data is available,
8.6 percent of workplace fatalities were caused by
homicide, according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics. Workplace homicides rose by 2 percent
to 417 in 2015 over the previous year, with shootings
up by 15 percent.2
Incidents such as former Major Nidal Hasan’s 2009
attack at U.S. military post, Fort Hood, in which he
deliberately targeted his fellow military personnel,
highlight the prevalence of workplace violence as a
major concern.
Although the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) has issued general guidance
to employers about preventing workplace violence,
it does not require employers to comply.3 OSHA’s
General Duty Clause requires employers to provide
a safe work environment; however, employers are
not strictly liable under the statute, according to the
American Bar Association.4
Given that a significant percentage of workplace
violence is worker-on-worker, businesses and
organizations of all sizes and sectors are vulnerable.
Most incidents examined in the KGH study include
a disgruntled employee taking out a perceived
grievance against supervisors, usually after
disciplinary action has been taken. In many cases,
the employee has left the premises and returned
with a weapon. In others, the employee has come to
disciplinary meetings armed.
In at least one incident in the study, a fired
employee returned and fatally shot the security
guard (who had been informed to watch for the
employee) to gain entry to the building and kill
former supervisors. The access provided to these
individuals to enter the venue for an intended
attack, even when limited, exacerbates the
challenge in preventing such violent actions.
TAKING EFFECTIVE ACTION
The third element of PWP stresses that when
those in immediate surroundings hear or observe
an individual’s ideas and plans for violence,
understanding how to pick up this “leakage” is critical
to preempt violence at the earliest stage possible.
Facility managers might draw some inspiration from
lessons implemented at colleges and universities
following the April 16, 2007 massacre at Virginia
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TELLTALE SIGNS OF AN EVOLVING THREAT
This leads to the next element of PWP: Identifying and
recognizing the signs of an evolving threat to counter. The
progressive escalation of risky mindsets and behaviors
culminating in a violent attack can be portrayed in a model
composed of seven stages.
The first three stages generate significant externally observable
signs manifested by the individual’s problematic psychology.
ƒ Stage I (Cognitive Opening) describes the individual’s mental
predispositions that can foster either an adaptive or a maladaptive
response to a particular set of stressors and traumatizing events.
ƒ Stage II (Triggering Events) entails the experience of a
traumatizing event — a failure at the workplace or in a personal
relationship.
ƒ Stage III (Violent Ideation/Fantasy) includes concrete
thoughts of committing homicide, suicide or both. It’s important
to note that, in a majority of cases, individuals who feel strongly
aggrieved will keep such feelings to themselves and not follow up
with a violent physical response. It is only when the threshold is
crossed that the subsequent four stages come into play.
ƒ At Stage IV (Planning an Attack), violent thoughts are
translated into active steps toward a violent act. Some potentially
observable activities during the planning stage include social
withdrawal, research on target selection, researching and
sympathizing with or glorifying past mass murderers, deciding the
type of weapon to be used, threatening communication against the
target and, in some instances, surrounding oneself with like-minded
individuals (who may share one’s sense of grievance).
ƒ Stage V (Preparation for Attack) commences when the
potential attacker begins preparing and is signified by a monetary
and/or time investment in attaining such capability. The shooter will
attempt to obtain the weapons, ammunition and supplies necessary
to carry out the attack. The weapons will be obtained legally or
by theft and may require modification for the attack plan. The
weapons will usually be hidden in a designated place. The shooter
will attempt to become proficient in using the weapons, and surveil
the target, if necessary. Some potentially observable activities at this
stage may include collecting elements of an attack day “costume”
through purchasing symbolic clothing (such as battle fatigues),
practicing at a shooting range, weapon/ammunition acquisition
and last resort behaviors such as preparing a will and giving away
personal possessions. Conducting physical surveillance of the
potential target location may also attract scrutiny, however, so it is
likely to be done surreptitiously.
ƒ Stage VI (Approach Target) is the most immediate,
compressed and threatening timeframe prior to the actual attack.
It may take several days (e.g., traveling from another city to the
location of the intended target) or a matter of a few hours or
minutes. The attacker will be armed, unless the weapons have
already been positioned close to the attack location.
ƒ Finally, at Stage VII (Conduct Attack), the attacker will breach
and penetrate the target and execute the attack, whether through
a shooting, knifing or bombing tactic, with the attack occurring
indoors or outdoors.
Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech)
that resulted in the murder of 32 people and wounding of 17
others. The tragedy served as a catalyst for institutions of
higher learning to boost security throughout the risk cycle.
Many U.S. campuses now arm their police departments,
according to a National Public Radio report,5 and some
states allow college employees and even students to carry
concealed weapons.
Virginia Tech itself has led the way in improving
campus security, according to the Collegiate Times.6
When a university police officer was shot on campus
in December 2011, Tech officials notified stakeholders
via multiple communication channels. The school also
implemented threat assessment teams to coordinate
warning signs of potentially violent behavior, a model
that has been copied elsewhere. These teams coordinate
information among various sources, such as professors,
administrators, security officials and behavioral
professionals, to identify and mitigate potentially
threatening behavior.
Sometimes, despite an organization’s best preparatory
and preventative security efforts, it will be targeted by an
active threat incident, resulting in loss of life, injuries and
damage. Staff and employees are often unprepared for the
stresses and uncertainties that emanate from such critical
incidents, once the immediate scene is cleared.
To achieve post-incident resilience, organizations must be
able to adapt to changing conditions and withstand and
rapidly recover from disruption caused by the emergency.
The tasks associated with recovery can include providing
psychological first aid to those affected, managing legal
and insurance liabilities, retaining personnel, establishing
an alternate facility and regaining reputational branding.
Such resilience can be achieved during the immediate
aftermath of an event through effective response and
recovery actions viewed as a series of “waves.”
ƒ Day 1: Response Wave—involves stabilizing an
emergency situation in the immediate hours after
an attack.
ƒ Days 2 to 7: Mitigation Wave—entails lessening
the near-term impact of the critical incident.
ƒ Day 8 and onward: Recovery Wave—involves
restoring pre-incident operational functioning and the
well-being of those affected by the incident.
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Numerous tasks need to be accomplished during the
three transitional waves to ensure resilience and recovery.
Each wave has its own tasks, and other tasks overlap
multiple waves. The key is to have a game plan for each
wave, listing each task and assigning them to specific
officers in the organization. Many of the tasks have been
identified through after-action reports produced by those
who have been affected by and recovered from incidents.
The value for facility managers and the emergency response
community will be to identify and provide the sequence of
tasks to help organizations anticipate and respond to all
possible scenarios and shorten response and recovery time.
Adapting insights from the PWP paradigm when
formulating more specific plans for responding to
potential and actual workplace violence could prove
helpful to facility managers charged with ensuring the
safety and security of their organizations. These lessons
are important to individual employees outside of work
environments as well, reducing fear and increasing
individual confidence and resilience. FMJ
REFERENCES
1. Maxwell, Sally. “Workplace Violence: What You Should Know.” Active
Threat Intelligence Digest. November 2016. kiernan.co/sites/default/files/
Active%20Threat%20Intelligence%20Digest%20Vol.2%20November%20
2016.pdf
2. Bureau of Labor Statistics. “National Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries
in 2015.” December 16, 2016. www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/cfoi.pdf
3. Occupational Safety and Health Administration. “Workplace Violence:
Enforcement.” www.osha.gov/SLTC/workplaceviolence/standards.html
4. American Bar Association. “Workplace Violence (Practical Law Practice
Note 7-505-7511 (2014).” www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
events/labor_law/am/2014/1g_workplace_violence2.authcheckdam.pdf
5. Kaste, Martin. “Many Colleges Have Armed Police Squads, But Are They
Worth The Risk?” July 30, 2015. www.npr.org/2015/07/30/427806790/
many-colleges-have-armed-police-squads-but-are-they-worth-the-risk
6. Crizer, Zach. “Virginia Tech Leads Campus Safety Revolution.” Collegiate
Times. April 15, 2012. www.collegiatetimes.com/news/virginia_tech/
virginia-tech-leads-campus-safety-revolution/article_4b577132-3984-
541f-8f0f-8fcc3aa42e5d.html
KATHLEEN L. KIERNAN, Ed.D. is CEO and
founder of Kiernan Group Holdings Inc.
(KGH). She oversees KGH’s work as an
intelligence, law-enforcement and national
security consulting, training and problem-
solving firm that provides tailored solutions to today’s most
complex challenges.