NORTH SEA CONTINENTAL SHELF CASES ICJ REPORTS, 1969

FACTS
That the boundaries between their respective areas of the continental shelf in the north sea
and the area claimed by the federal republic of germany , should be determined by the
application of the principle of equidistance as set forth in article 6 of the geneva convention
of 1958 on the continental shelf, which by january 1, 1969 had been ratified or acceded to by
39 states but to which germany was not a party, was the basis of denmark’s and the
netherland’s contention.

Because the use of the delimitation method was not merely a conventional obligation, but a
rule that was part of the corpus of general international law and like other rules of general or
customary international law, which was binding automatically on germany (d), independent
of any specific assent, direct or indirect, given by germany (d), denmark (p) and the
netherland’s (p) contended that germany (d) was bound to accept the delimitation on an
equidistance basis.

ISSUE 

1. Must delimitation be the object of an equitable agreement between the states

involved?

HELD 

Yes. Delimitation must be the object of an equitable agreement between the states involved.
As stipulated in article 6 of the geneva convention, equidistance principle is not part of
customary international law. Article 6 makes the obligation to use the equidistance method a
secondary one which comes into play only when agreements between the parties are absent.
Although the principle of equidistance is not given a fundamental norm-creating character by
article 6, which is necessary to the formation of a general rule of law.In this case, after taking
into consideration all relevant circumstances, the delimitation here is to be excused by
equitable agreement.

RATIONALE

Not only the states who are parties to the convention on the continental shelf have accepted
the principles and rules enshrined in the convention including the equidistance rule, but by
other states who that have subsequently followed it in agreements, or in their legislation, or
have acquiesced in it when faced with legislative acts of other affecting them. This can be
seen as evidence of a practice widespread enough to satisfy the criteria for a general rule of
law. The concept of opinion juris analyzed by the dissent is in consonance with the position
taken by some legal scholars who maintain that opinio juris may be presumed from
uniformities of practice regarding matters viewed normally as involving legal rights and
obligations. A contrary position maintains that the practice of states must be accompanied by
or consist of statements that something is law before it can become law