G.R. No.

175602               February 13, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, 

vs.
P02 EDUARDO VALDEZ and EDWIN VALDEZ, Accused-Appellants.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The two accused were tried for three counts of murder by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
86, in Quezon City. On January 20, 2005, after trial, the RTC convicted them as charged, prescribed
on each of them the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count, and ordered them to pay to the
heirs of each victim ₱93,000.00 _as actual damages, ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and ₱50,000.00
as moral damages.

The Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the RTC on July 18, 2006, subject to the modification that each of
the accused pay to the heirs of each victim ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages, ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages, and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus costs
of suit.

The two accused then came to the Court on final appeal, but on May 9, 2007, Edwin Valdez filed
a motion to withdraw appeal, which the Court granted on October 10, 2007, thereby deeming
Edwin’s appeal closed and terminated.1

On January 18, 2012, the Court promulgated its judgment on the appeal of PO2 Eduardo Valdez,
finding him guilty of three counts of homicide, instead of three counts of murder, and meting on him
for each count of homicide the indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to
17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum,2 to wit:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on July 18, 2006 is MODIFIED by
finding PO2 Eduardo Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of HOMICIDE, and
sentencing him to suffer for each count the indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as
minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum; and to pay to the respective heirs of the
late Ferdinand Sayson, Moises Sayson, Jr., and Joselito Sayson the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages.

The accused shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Subsequently, Edwin sent to the Court Administrator a selfexplanatory letter3 dated March 12, 2012,
where he pleaded for the application to him of the judgment promulgated on January 18, 2012 on
the ground that the judgment would be beneficial to him as an accused. The letter reads as follows:

HON. MIDAS MARQUEZ

Court Administrator
Office of the Court Administrator
Supreme Court of the Philippines
Manila
SUBJECT: Re. Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of Rules of Court, Request for.

Your honor,

The undersigned most respectfully requesting through your Honorable office, assistance on the
subject mentioned above.

I, Edwin and Eduardo, both surnamed Valdez were both charged before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 86, Quezon City for the entitled Crime of Murder in Criminal Case Nos. Q-00-90718 to Q-
0090720, which convicted us to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua for each of the three (3)
offense.

Then after the decision of the RTC Branch 86, the same was appealed to the Court of Appeals with
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00876 and again on July 18, 2006 the Honorable Court of appeals Ninth
Division issued a Decision AFFIRMED the questioned Decision with MODIFICATION.

Only my Co-principal Accused EDUARDO V. VALDEZ enterposed appealed (sic) the Affirmatory
Decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals to the Highest Tribunal with G.R. Nos. 175602. On my
part, I decided to withdraw my appeal, because I believe that there is no more hope for me, but I was
wrong when I read the Decision of the First Division of the Supreme Court, dated January 18, 2012
signed by the Chief Justice Honorable Renato C. Corona and finally I found hope.

And now I come to your Honorable Office through this letter to seek help and assistance that the
Decision of the Supreme Court to my Brother Eduardo V. Valdez may also benefitted (sic) the
undersigned through Section 11 (a) , Rule 122 of the Rules of Court.

"(a) An Appeal taken by the one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not
appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the Appellate Court is favorable and applicable to the
latter: x x x"

Favorable Humanitarian consideration on this matter.

Thank you very much and more power, God Bless.

Respectfully yours

EDWIN V. VALDEZ

Through a comment filed on September 25, 2012,4 the Solicitor General interposed no opposition to
the plea for the reduction of Edwin’s sentences for being in full accord with the Rules of Court and
pertinent jurisprudence.

We grant the plea for reduction of Edwin’s sentences.

The final judgment promulgated on January 18, 2012 downgraded the crimes committed by Eduardo
from three counts of murder to three counts of homicide, and consequently prescribed lighter
penalties in the form of indeterminate sentences. As a result, Eduardo would serve only an
indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years of reclusion
temporal as maximum, under which he can qualify for parole in due course by virtue of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, instead of suffering the indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua for
each count.
The Court rationalized the result as follows:

x x x The records show that the version of PO2 Valdez was contrary to the established facts
and circumstances showing that he and Edwin, then armed with short firearms, had gone to
the jai alai betting station of Moises to confront Jonathan Rubio, the teller of the betting
booth then busily attending to bettors inside the booth; that because the accused were
calling to Rubio to come out of the booth, Moises approached to pacify them, but one of them
threatened Moises; Gusto mo unahin na kita?; that immediately after Moises replied: Huwag!,
PO2 Valdez fired several shots at Moises, causing him to fall to the ground; that PO2 Valdez
continued firing at the fallen Moises; that Ferdinand (another victim) rushed to aid Moises,
his brother, but Edwin shot Ferdinand in the head, spilling his brains; that somebody shouted
to Joselito (the third victim) to run; that Edwin also shot Joselito twice in the back; and that
Joselito fell on a burger machine. The shots fired at the three victims were apparently fired
from short distances.

The testimonial accounts of the State’s witnesses entirely jibed with the physical evidence.
Specifically, the medico-legal evidence showed that Ferdinand had a gunshot wound in the head;
that two gunshot wounds entered Joselito’s back and the right side of his neck; and that Moises
suffered a gunshot wound in the head and four gunshot wounds in the chest. Also, Dr. Wilfredo
Tierra of the NBI Medico-Legal Office opined that the presence of marginal abrasions at the points of
entry indicated that the gunshot wounds were inflicted at close range. Given that physical evidence
was of the highest order and spoke the truth more eloquently than all witnesses put together, the
congruence between the testimonial recollections and the physical evidence rendered the findings
adverse to PO2 Valdez and Edwin conclusive.

Thirdly, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit the felony. Proof of the actual agreement to commit
the crime need not be direct because conspiracy may be implied or inferred from their acts. Herein,
both lower courts deduced the conspiracy between the accused from the mode and manner in which
they perpetrated the killings. We are satisfied that their deduction was warranted.

Based on the foregoing, PO2 Valdez cannot now avoid criminal responsibility for the fatal
shooting by Edwin of Ferdinand and Joselito. Both accused were convincingly shown to
have acted in concert to achieve a common purpose of assaulting their unarmed victims with
their guns. Their acting in concert was manifest not only from their going together to the
betting station on board a single motorcycle, but also from their joint attack that PO2 Valdez
commenced by firing successive shots at Moises and immediately followed by Edwin’s
shooting of Ferdinand and Joselito one after the other. It was also significant that they fled
together on board the same motorcycle as soon as they had achieved their common
purpose.

To be a conspirator, one did not have to participate in every detail of the execution; neither
did he have to know the exact part performed by his co-conspirator in the execution of the
criminal acts. Accordingly, the existence of the conspiracy between PO2 Valdez and Edwin
was properly inferred and proved through their acts that were indicative of their common
purpose and community of interest.

And, fourthly, it is unavoidable for the Court to pronounce PO2 Valdez guilty of three
homicides, instead of three murders, on account of the informations not sufficiently alleging
the attendance of treachery.
Treachery is the employment of means, methods or forms in the execution of any of the crimes
against persons which tend to directly and specially insure its execution, without risk to the offending
party arising from the defense which the offended party might make. It encompasses a wide variety
of actions and attendant circumstances, the appreciation of which is particular to a crime committed.
Corollarily, the defense against the appreciation of a circumstance as aggravating or qualifying is
also varied and dependent on each particular instance. Such variety generates the actual need for
the state to specifically aver the factual circumstances or particular acts that constitute the criminal
conduct or that qualify or aggravate the liability for the crime in the interest of affording the accused
sufficient notice to defend himself.

It cannot be otherwise, for, indeed, the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not
from the caption or preamble of the information, or from the specification of the provision of
law alleged to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by the actual
recital of facts in the complaint or information. In People v. Dimaano, the Court elaborated:

For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation
of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;
the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the
place wherein the offense was committed. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the
designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these
being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and
the particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such
form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended
to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will
be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every
element of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are
necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and
essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the
information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to
enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no
independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. [emphasis supplied]

The averments of the informations to the effect that the two accused "with intent to kill,
qualified with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength did x x x
assault, attack and employ personal violence upon" the victims "by then and there shooting
them with a gun, hitting [them]" on various parts of their bodies "which were the direct and
immediate cause of their deaths" did not sufficiently set forth the facts and circumstances
describing how treachery attended each of the killings. It should not be difficult to see that
merely averring the killing of a person by shooting him with a gun, without more, did not
show how the execution of the crime was directly and specially ensured without risk to the
accused from the defense that the victim might make. Indeed, the use of the gun as an
instrument to kill was not per se treachery, for there are other instruments that could serve
the same lethal purpose. Nor did the use of the term treachery constitute a sufficient
averment, for that term, standing alone, was nothing but a conclusion of law, not an averment
of a fact. In short, the particular acts and circumstances constituting treachery as an
attendant circumstance in murder were missing from the informations.

x x x. The requirement of sufficient factual averments is meant to inform the accused of the
nature and cause of the charge against him in order to enable him to prepare his defense.
This requirement accords with the presumption of innocence in his favor, pursuant to which
he is always presumed to have no independent knowledge of the details of the crime he is
being charged with. To have the facts stated in the body of the information determine the
crime of which he stands charged and for which he must be tried thoroughly accords with
common sense and with the requirements of plain justice, x x x.

xxxx

x x x. There being no circumstances modifying criminal liability, the penalty is applied in its medium
period (ie., 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months). Under the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence is taken from prision mayor, and the
maximum from the medium period of reclusion temporal. Hence, the Court imposes the
indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years of reclusion
temporal as maximum for each count of homicide.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on July 18, 2006
is MODIFIED by finding PO2 Eduardo Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts
of HOMICIDE, and sentencing him to suffer for each count the indeterminate sentence of 10
years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum; and to
pay to the respective heirs of the late Ferdinand Sayson, Moises Sayson, Jr., and Joselito Sayson
the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱25,000.00 as
temperate damages.

The accused shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.5 (Emphasis supplied)

On his part, Edwin cannot be barred from seeking the application to him of the downgrading of the
crimes committed (and the resultant lighter penalties) despite the finality of his convictions for three
counts of murder due to his withdrawal of his appeal. The downgrading of the crimes committed
would definitely be favorable to him. Worth pointing out is that to deny to him the benefit of the
lessened criminal responsibilities would be highly unfair, considering that this Court had found the
two accused to have acted in concert in their deadly assault against the victims, warranting their
equal liabiliy under the principle of conspiracy.

We grant Edwin’s plea based on Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, which relevantly
provides:

Section 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused. – (a) An appeal taken by one or more of
several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of
the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.

xxxx

In this connection, the Court has pronounced in Lim v. Court of Appeals6 that the benefits of this
provision extended to all the accused, regardless of whether they appealed or not, to wit:

As earlier stated, both petitioner and the OSG laterally argue that in the event of Guingguing’s
acquittal, petitioner should likewise be acquitted, based on Rule 122, Section 11(a) of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, which states:

SEC. 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused.-

(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal,
except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.

Private respondent however, contends that said provision is not applicable to petitioner inasmuch as
he appealed from his conviction, and the provision states that a favorable judgment shall be
applicable only to those who did not appeal.

A literal interpretation of the phrase "did not appeal," as espoused by private respondent, will not
give justice to the purpose of the provision.

It should be read in its entirety and should not be myopically construed so as to defeat its
reason, i.e., to benefit an accused who did not join in the appeal of his co-accused in case where the
appellate judgment is favorable. In fact, several cases rendered by the Court applied the foregoing
provision without regard as to the filing or non-filing of an appeal by a coaccused, so long as the
judgment was favorable to him.

In People v. Artellero, the Court extended the acquittal of Rodriguez’s co-accused to him despite the
withdrawal of his appeal, applying the Rule 122, Section 11(a), and considering that the evidence
against both are inextricably linked, to wit:

Although it is only appellant who persisted with the present appeal, the well-established rule is that
an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review of all its aspects, including
those not raised by the parties. The records show that Rodriguez had withdrawn his appeal due to
financial reasons. However, Section 11 (a) of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that "an
appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except
insofar as the judgment of the appellant court is favorable and applicable to the latter." As we have
elucidated, the evidence against and the conviction of both appellant and Rodriguez are inextricably
linked. Hence, appellant’s acquittal, which is favorable and applicable to Rodriguez, should benefit
the latter.

In People v. Arondain, the Court found accused Arondain guilty only of homicide.  Such verdict was
1âwphi1

applied to his co-accused, Jose Precioso, who was previously found guilty by the trial court of
robbery with homicide, despite the fact that Precioso appealed but failed to file an appellant’s brief.
The Court also modified Precioso’s civil liability although the additional monetary award imposed on
Arondain was not extended to Precioso since it was not favorable to him and he did not pursue the
appeal before the Court.

In People v. De Lara, Eduardo Villas, together with several coaccused, were found by the trial court
guilty of forcible abduction. During pendency of the review before the Court, Villas withdrew his
appeal, hence his conviction became final and executory. Thereafter, the Court found Villas’ co-
accused guilty only of grave coercion. Applying Rule 122, Section 11(a), the Court also found Villas
guilty of the lesser offense of grave coercion since it is beneficial to him.

In People v. Escaño, the Court granted a motion filed by accused Julian Deen Escaño, praying that
the Court’s Decision dated January 28, 2000, acquitting his co-accused Virgilio T. Usana and Jerry
C. Lopez in Criminal Case No. 95-936 for violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425,
as amended, be applied to him. Escaño originally filed a Notice of Appeal with the trial court but later
withdrew the same.

In the foregoing cases, all the accused appealed from their judgments of conviction but for one
reason or another, the conviction became final and executory. Nevertheless, the Court still applied to
them the favorable judgment in favor of their co-accused. The Court notes that the Decision dated
September 30, 2005 in G.R. No. 128959 stated, "'the verdict of guilt with respect to Lim [herein
petitioner] had already become final and executory." In any event, the Court cannot see why a
different treatment should be given to petitioner, given that the judgment is favorable to him and
considering further that the Court's finding in its Decision dated September 30, 2005 specifically
stated that "the publication of the subject advertisement by petitioner and Lim cannot be deemed by
this Court to have been done with actual malice."7

ACCORDINGLY, the Court GRANTS the plea of EDWIN VALDEZ for the application to him of the

judgment promulgated on January 18, 2012 finding P02 EDUARDO VALDEZ guilty of three counts
of homicide, and sentencing him to suffer for each count the indeterminate sentence of 10 years
of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay to the
respective heirs of the late Ferdinand Sayson, the late Moises Sayson, Jr., and the late Joselito
Sayson the amounts of₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and
₱25,000.00 as temperate damages for each count.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 172035               July 4, 2012

FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL, Petitioner, 
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed by Fernando Q. Miguel (petitioner),
1 

assailing the January 25, 2006 and March 27, 2006 resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. These
2 

resolutions (i) ordered the petitioner’s suspension from public office and (ii) denied the petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration of the suspension order.

THE ANTECEDENT FACTS

On May 29, 1996, then Vice Mayor Mercelita M. Lucido and other local officials of Koronadal City,
3 

South Cotabato filed a letter-complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao

(Ombudsman) charging the petitioner, among others, with violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019,
4  5 

in connection with the consultancy services for the architectural aspect, the engineering design, and
the construction supervision and management of the proposed Koronadal City public market
(project).
6 

In a June 27, 1996 order, the Ombudsman directed the petitioner, among others, to submit his
counter-affidavit. On October 23, 1996, after moving for an extension, the petitioner filed his counter-
affidavit. In its July 29, 1999 resolution, the Ombudsman found probable cause against the petitioner
7 

and some private individuals for violation of R.A. No. 3019 and against the petitioner alone for
Falsification of Public Document under Article 171, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code. 8 

On March 1, 2000, the Ombudsman filed the corresponding informations with the
Sandiganbayan. The information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 reads:
9 

That on 10 January 1995 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Koronadal,
South Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the [petitioner], a
high ranking public officer in his capacity as former Municipal Mayor of Koronadal, South Cotabato,
and as such while in the performance of his official functions, committing the offense in relation to his
office, taking advantage of his official position, conspiring and confederating with the private
[individuals] xxx acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted benefits and advantages to said [accused], by inviting
them to participate in the prequalification of consultants to provide the Detailed Architectural &
Engineering Design and Construction Supervision and Management of the proposed Koronadal
Public Market, without causing the publication of said invitation in a newspaper of general circulation,
thereby excluding other consultants from participating in said prequalification. (Emphases and
10 

underscoring added)

On motions separately filed by two of the petitioner’s co-accused, the Sandiganbayan ordered the
11 

Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) to conduct a reinvestigation. On August 21, 2000, the
petitioner, through counsel, followed suit and orally moved for a reinvestigation, which the
Sandiganbayan likewise granted. The Sandiganbayan gave the petitioner ten (10) days within which
to file his counter-affidavit with the OSP.
12 
Instead of submitting his counter-affidavit, the petitioner asked the Sandiganbayan for a thirty-day
13 

extension to submit his counter-affidavit. Shortly before the expiry of the extension requested, the
petitioner asked the OSP for an additional thirty-day period to file his counter-affidavit. Despite the
14 

two extensions asked and granted, the petitioner asked the OSP anew for a twenty-day extension
period.15 

Despite the extension period asked and given, the petitioner failed to file his counter-affidavit,
prompting Prosecutor Norberto B. Ruiz to declare that the petitioner had waived his right to submit
countervailing evidence (April 25, 2001 resolution). On July 31, 2001, then Ombudsman Aniano
Desierto approved the resolution. 16 

On August 7, 2001, Prosecutor Ruiz asked the Sandiganbayan for the arraignment and trial of the
petitioner and of the other accused private individuals. 17 

On August 6, 2002, after several extensions sought and granted, the petitioner filed a Motion to
Quash and/or Reinvestigation for the criminal cases against him. On February 18, 2003, the
Sandiganbayan denied the petitioner’s motion because of the pending OSP reinvestigation – this,
despite the OSP’s earlier termination of the reinvestigation for the petitioner’s continuous failure to
submit his counter-affidavit. The petitioner did not question the denial of his motion.
18 

On November 3, 2004, the petitioner was arraigned; he pleaded not guilty in both criminal cases. 19 

On April 28, 2005, the OSP filed a Motion to Suspend [the petitioner] Pendente Lite. On June 27,
2005, the petitioner filed his "Vigorous Opposition" based on the "obvious and fatal defect of the
[i]nformation" in failing to allege that the giving of unwarranted benefits and advantages was done
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. 20 

On January 25, 2006, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed resolution suspending the
21 

petitioner pendente lite –

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Prosecution’s Motion is GRANTED. As prayed for,

the Court hereby orders the suspension of [the petitioner] from his position as City Mayor, Koronadal
City, South Cotabato, and from any other public position he now holds. His suspension shall be for a
period of ninety (90) days only. 22 

On February 2, 2006, the petitioner moved for reconsideration of his suspension order and
demanded for a pre-suspension hearing. The Sandiganbayan denied his motion, prompting him to
23  24 

file this certiorari petition to challenge the validity of his suspension order.

THE PETITION 

The petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in ordering his
suspension despite the failure of the information to allege that the giving of unwarranted benefits and
advantages by the petitioner was made through "manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence." He alleges that the phrases "evident bad faith" and "manifest partiality"
actually refers not to him, but to his co-accused, rendering the information fatally defective.
25 

The petitioner bewails the lack of hearing before the issuance of his suspension order. Citing
Luciano, et al. v. Hon. Mariano, etc., et al., he claims that "[n]owhere in the records of the [case] can
26 

[one] see any order or resolution requiring the [p]etitioner to show cause at a specific date of hearing
why he should not be ordered suspended." For the petitioner, the requirement of a pre-suspension
27 
hearing can only be satisfied if the Sandiganbayan ordered an actual hearing to settle the "defect" in
the information.

THE OSP’S COMMENT 

The OSP argues for the sufficiency of the information since all the elements of the offense under
Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 are specifically pleaded by way of ultimate facts. These elements are:

1. The petitioner was the Municipal Mayor of Koronadal, South Cotabato at the time material
to the acts complained of;

2. The petitioner acted with manifest partiality and evident bad faith when he invited only his
co-accused private individuals to participate in the prequalification of consultants for the
project instead of publishing it in a newspaper of general circulation; and

3. The petitioner’s actions, performed in relation to his office, gave unwarranted benefits and
advantages to his co-accused. 28 

The OSP faults the petitioner for his attempt to mislead the Court on the sufficiency of the allegations
in the information, by conveniently failing to cite the phrase "acting with evident bad faith and
manifest partiality" when the petitioner quoted the "relevant" portions of the information in his
petition.

Citing Juan v. People, the OSP argues that while no actual pre-suspension hearing was conducted,
29 

the events preceding the issuance of the suspension order already satisfied the purpose of
conducting a pre-suspension hearing – i.e., basically, to determine the validity of the information.
Here, the petitioner was afforded his right to preliminary investigation both by the Ombudsman and
by the OSP (when the petitioner moved for a reinvestigation with the Sandiganbayan); the acts for
which the petitioner was charged constitute a violation of R.A. No. 3019 and Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code; and the petitioner already moved to quash the information, although
unsuccessfully, after he had been declared to have waived his right to submit countervailing
evidence in the reinvestigation by the OSP. 30 

ISSUES

There are only two issues presented for our resolution:

1. Whether the information, charging the petitioner with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019, is valid; and

2. If it is valid, whether the absence of an actual pre-suspension hearing renders invalid the
suspension order against the petitioner.

THE COURT’S RULING

We dismiss the petition for failure to establish any grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the
assailed resolutions.

The information for violation of R.A. No. 3019 is valid

In deference to the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and the cause of
the accusation against him, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
31 

(Rules) requires, inter alia, that the information shall state the designation of the offense given by
32 

the statute and the acts or omissions imputed which constitute the offense charged. Additionally, the
Rules requires that these acts or omissions and its attendant circumstances "must be stated in
ordinary and concise language" and "in terms sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is being charged x x x and for the court to pronounce
judgment." 33 

The test of the information’s sufficiency is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms and
with such particularity with reasonable certainty so that the accused is duly informed of the offense
charged. In particular, whether an information validly charges an offense depends on whether the
material facts alleged in the complaint or information shall establish the essential elements of the
offense charged as defined in the law. The raison d’etre of the requirement in the Rules is to enable
the accused to suitably prepare his defense. 34 

In arguing against the validity of the information, the petitioner appears to go beyond the standard of
a "person of common understanding" in appreciating the import of the phrase "acting with evident
bad faith and manifest partiality." A reading of the information clearly reveals that the phrase "acting
with evident bad faith and manifest partiality" was merely a continuation of the prior allegation of the
acts of the petitioner, and that he ultimately acted with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in
giving unwarranted benefits and advantages to his co-accused private individuals. This is what a
plain and non-legalistic reading of the information would yield.

Notably, in his petition, the petitioner would have us believe that this elemental phrase was actually
omitted in the information when, in his reaction to the OSP’s comment, what the petitioner actually
35 

disputes is simply the clarity of the phrase’s position, in relation with the other averments in the
information. Given the supposed ambiguity of the subject being qualified by the phrase "acting with
evident bad faith and manifest partiality," the remedy of the petitioner, if at all, is merely to move for a
bill of particulars and not for the quashal of an information which sufficiently alleges the elements of
the offense charged. 36 

The pre-suspension order is valid

Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 reads:

Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final
judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he
shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during
suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.

While the suspension of a public officer under this provision is mandatory, the suspension requires
37 

a prior hearing to determine "the validity of the information" filed against him, "taking into account
38 

the serious and far reaching consequences of a suspension of an elective public official even before
his conviction." The accused public official’s right to challenge the validity of the information before a
39 

suspension order may be issued includes the right to challenge the (i) validity of the criminal
proceeding leading to the filing of an information against him, and (ii) propriety of his prosecution on
the ground that the acts charged do not constitute a violation of R.A. No. 3019 or of the provisions
on bribery of the Revised Penal Code. 40 
In Luciano v. Mariano that the petitioner relied upon, the Court required, "by way of broad guidelines
41 

for the lower courts in the exercise of the power of suspension," that –

(c) …upon the filing of such information, the trial court should issue an order with proper notice
requiring the accused officer to show cause at a specific date of hearing why he should not be
ordered suspended from office pursuant to the cited mandatory provisions of the Act. Where either
the prosecution seasonably files a motion for an order of suspension or the accused in turn files a
motion to quash the information or challenges the validity thereof, such show-cause order of the trial
court would no longer be necessary. What is indispensable is that the trial court duly hear the parties
at a hearing held for determining the validity of the information, and thereafter hand down its ruling,
issuing the corresponding order of suspension should it uphold the validity of the information or
withholding such suspension in the contrary case.

(d) No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing. Suffice it to state that the
accused should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the criminal
proceedings against him, e.g. that he has not been afforded the right of due preliminary
investigation; that the acts for which he stands charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions
of Republic Act No. 3019 or of the bribery provisions of the Revised Penal Code which would
warrant his mandatory suspension from office under section 13 of the Act; or he may present a
motion to quash the information on any of the grounds provided in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.
(Emphasis supplied)

The petitioner questions the absence of any show cause order issued by the Sandiganbayan before
his suspension in office was ordered. As clear as the day, however, Luciano considered it
unnecessary for the trial court to issue a show cause order when the motion, seeking the suspension
of the accused pendente lite, has been submitted by the prosecution, as in the present case.

The purpose of the law in requiring a pre-suspension hearing is to determine the validity of the
information so that the trial court can have a basis to either suspend the accused and proceed with
the trial on the merits of the case, withhold the suspension and dismiss the case, or correct any part
of the proceedings that impairs its validity.  That hearing is similar to a challenge to the validity of the
1âwphi1

information by way of a motion to quash. 42 

While a pre-suspension hearing is aimed at securing for the accused fair and adequate opportunity
to challenge the validity of the information or the regularity of the proceedings against him, Luciano
43 

likewise emphasizes that no hard and fast rule exists in regulating its conduct. With the purpose of a
44 

pre-suspension hearing in mind, the absence of an actual hearing alone cannot be determinative of
the validity of a suspension order.

In Bedruz v. Sandiganbayan, the Court considered the opposition of the accused (to the
45 

prosecution’s motion to suspend pendente lite) as sufficient to dispense with the need to actually set
the prosecution’s motion for hearing. The same conclusion was reached in Juan v. People, where 46 

the Court ruled:

In the case at bar, while there was no pre-suspension hearing held to determine the validity of the
Informations that had been filed against petitioners, we believe that the numerous pleadings filed for
and against them have achieved the goal of this procedure. The right to due process is satisfied nor
just by an oral hearing but by the filing and the consideration by the court of the parties' pleadings,
memoranda and other position papers.

Since a pre-suspension hearing is basically a due process requirement, when an accused public
official is given an adequate opportunity to be heard on his possible defenses against the mandatory
suspension under R.A. No. 3019, then an accused would have no reason to complain that no actual
hearing was conducted. It is well settled that "to be heard" does not only mean oral arguments in
47 

court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral
arguments or pleadings, has been accorded, no denial of procedural due process exists. 48 

In the present case, the petitioner (i) filed his Vigorous Opposition (to the OSP’s Motion to Suspend
Accused Pendente Lite), and after receiving an adverse ruling from the Sandiganbayan, (ii) moved
for reconsideration of the suspension order issued against him, and (iii) filed a Reply to the OSP’s
Opposition to his plea for reconsideration. Given this opportunity, we find that the petitioner’s
49 

continued demand for the conduct of an actual pre-suspension hearing – based on the same alleged
"defect in the information," which we have found wanting – has legally nothing to anchor itself on.
50 

Another reason that militates against the petitioner’s position relates to the nature of Section 13 of
R.A. No. 3019; it is not a penal provision that would call for a liberal interpretation in favor of the
accused public official and a strict construction against the State. The suspension required under
51 

this provision is not a penalty, as it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings; in fact, if
acquitted, the accused official shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits
which he failed to receive during his suspension. 52 

Rather, the suspension under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 is a mere preventive measure that arises
53 

from the legal presumption that unless the accused is suspended, he may frustrate his prosecution
or commit further acts of malfeasance or do both, in the same way that upon a finding that there is
probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof, the law requires the judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused. 54 

Suspension under R.A. No. 3019 being a mere preventive measure whose duration shall in no case
exceed ninety (90) days, the adequacy of the opportunity to contest the validity of the information
55 

and of the proceedings that preceded its filing vis-à-vis the merits of the defenses of the accused
cannot be measured alone by the absence or presence of an actual hearing. An opportunity to be
heard on one’s defenses, however unmeritorious it may be, against the suspension mandated by
law equally and sufficiently serves both the due process right of the accused and the mandatory
nature of the suspension required by law.

Lest it be forgotten, Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 reinforces the principle enshrined in the Constitution
that a public office is a public trust. In light of the constitutional principle underlying the imposition of
56 

preventive suspension of a public officer charged under a valid information and the nature of this
suspension, the petitioner’s demand for a trial-type hearing in the present case would only
overwhelmingly frustrate, rather than promote, the orderly and speedy dispensation of justice.

WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 178607               December 5, 2012

DANTE LA. JIMENEZ, in his capacity as President and representative of UNLAD SHIPPING &
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, 
vs.
HON. EDWIN SORONGON (in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 214 of the Regional
Trial Court of Mandaluyong City), SOCRATES ANTZOULATOS, CARMEN ALAMIL, MARCELl
GAZA and MARKOS AVGOUSTIS, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari[ 1] filed by Dante La. Jimenez (petitioner) to

challenge the twin resolutions of the Court of Appeals ( CA) dated November 23, 2006 and June 28,
2 

2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 96584, which dismissed the petitioner's petition for certiorari and denied his
3 

motion for reconsideration, respectively.

The Factual Antecedents

The petitioner is the president of Unlad Shipping & Management Corporation, a local manning
agency, while Socrates Antzoulatos, Carmen Alamil, Marceli Gaza, and Markos Avgoustis
(respondents) are some of the listed incorporators of Tsakos Maritime Services, Inc. (TMSI), another
local manning agency.

On August 19, 2003, the petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
4 

Mandaluyong City against the respondents for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment. The5 

petitioner alleged that the respondents falsely represented their stockholdings in TMSI’s articles of
incorporation to secure a license to operate as a recruitment agency from the Philippine Overseas
6 

Employment Agency (POEA).

On October 9, 2003, respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed their joint counter-affidavit denying the
complaint-affidavit’s allegations. Respondents Avgoustis and Alamil did not submit any counter-
7 

affidavit.

In a May 4, 2004 resolution, the 3rd Assistant City Prosecutor recommended the filing of an
8 

information for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment against the respondents. The City
Prosecutor approved his recommendation and filed the corresponding criminal information with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City (docketed as Criminal Case No. MC04-8514 and
raffled to Branch 212) presided by Judge Rizalina T. Capco-Umali.

Subsequently, in a December 14, 2004 resolution, the City Prosecutor reconsidered the May 4, 2004
resolution and filed a motion with the RTC to withdraw the information. The petitioner and
9 

respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed their opposition and comment to the opposition,
10 

respectively.

In an August 1, 2005 resolution, the RTC denied the motion to withdraw information as it found the
11 

existence of probable cause to hold the respondents for trial. Thus, the RTC ordered the issuance
12 

of warrants of arrest against the respondents.

On August 26, 2005, respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration
and for deferred enforcement of the warrants of arrest. In a September 2, 2005 order, the RTC
13  14 

denied the omnibus motion, reiterating that the trial court is the sole judge on whether a criminal
case should be dismissed or not.

On September 26, 2005, respondent Alamil filed a motion for judicial determination of probable
cause with a request to defer enforcement of the warrants of arrest. 15 

On September 29, 2005, the petitioner filed his opposition with motion to expunge, contending that
respondent Alamil, being a fugitive from justice, had no standing to seek any relief and that the RTC,
in the August 1, 2005 resolution, already found probable cause to hold the respondents for trial.16 

In a September 30, 2005 order, the RTC denied respondent Alamil’s motion for being moot and
17 

academic; it ruled that it had already found probable cause against the respondents in the August 1,
2005 resolution, which it affirmed in the September 2, 2005 order.

On October 10, 2005, respondent Alamil moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition of Judge
Capco-Umali, for being biased or partial. On October 25, 2005, the petitioner filed an opposition with
18 

a motion to expunge, reiterating that respondent Alamil had no standing to seek relief from the
RTC. 19 

In a January 4, 2006 order, Judge Capco-Umali voluntarily inhibited herself from the case and did
20 

not resolve respondent Alamil’s motion for reconsideration and the petitioner’s motion to expunge.
The case was later re-raffled to Branch 214, presided by Judge Edwin D. Sorongon.

The RTC Rulings

In its March 8, 2006 order, the RTC granted respondent Alamil’s motion for reconsideration. It
21 

treated respondent Alamil’s motion for judicial determination as a motion to dismiss for lack of
probable cause. It found: (1) no evidence on record to indicate that the respondents gave any false
information to secure a license to operate as a recruitment agency from the POEA; and (2) that
respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the RTC’s jurisdiction through the filing of pleadings
seeking affirmative relief. Thus, the RTC dismissed the case, and set aside the earlier issued
warrants of arrest.

On April 3, 2006, the petitioner moved for reconsideration, stressing the existence of probable cause
to prosecute the respondents and that respondent Alamil had no standing to seek any relief from the
RTC. 22 

On April 26, 2006, respondent Alamil moved to expunge the motion for being a prohibited pleading
since the motion did not have the public prosecutor’s conformity. 23 

In its May 10, 2006 order, the RTC denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, finding that
24 

the petitioner merely reiterated arguments in issues that had been finally decided. The RTC ordered
the motion expunged from the records since the motion did not have the public prosecutor’s
conformity.

On May 19, 2006, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal. 25 

On May 30, 2006, respondent Alamil moved to expunge the petitioner’s notice of appeal since the
public prosecutor did not authorize the appeal and the petitioner had no civil interest in the case.
26 
On June 27, 2006, the petitioner filed his comment to the motion to expunge, claiming that, as the
offended party, he has the right to appeal the RTC order dismissing the case; the respondents’
fraudulent acts in forming TMSI greatly prejudiced him. 27 

In its August 7, 2006 joint order, the RTC denied the petitioner’s notice of appeal since the petitioner
28 

filed it without the conformity of the Solicitor General, who is mandated to represent the People of
the Philippines in criminal actions appealed to the CA. Thus, the RTC ordered the notice of appeal
expunged from the records.

On October 18, 2006, the petitioner elevated his case to the CA via a Rule 65 petition
for certiorari assailing the RTC’s March 8, 2006, May 10, 2006, and August 7, 2006 orders.

The CA Ruling

In its November 23, 2006 resolution, the CA dismissed outright the petitioner’s Rule 65 petition for
29 

lack of legal personality to file the petition on behalf of the People of the Philippines. It noted that
only the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) has the legal personality to represent the People,
under Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code. It also held that
the petitioner was not the real party in interest to institute the case, him not being a victim of the
crime charged to the respondents, but a mere competitor in their recruitment business. The CA
denied the motion for reconsideration that followed.
30  31 

The Petition

The petitioner argues that he has a legal standing to assail the dismissal of the criminal case since
he is the private complainant and a real party in interest who had been directly damaged and
prejudiced by the respondents’ illegal acts; respondent Alamil has no legal standing to seek any
relief from the RTC since she is a fugitive from justice.

The Case for the Respondents

The respondents submit that the petitioner lacks a legal standing to assail the dismissal of the
32 

criminal case since the power to prosecute lies solely with the State, acting through a public
prosecutor; the petitioner acted independently and without the authority of a public prosecutor in the
prosecution and appeal of the case.

The Issue

The case presents to us the issue of whether the CA committed a reversible error in dismissing
outright the petitioner’s Rule 65 petition for certiorari for lack of legal personality to file the petition on
behalf of the People of the Philippines.

Our Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

The petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case

It is well-settled that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest[,]" "who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled
to the avails of the suit." Interest means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the
33 
decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved. By 34 

real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a
future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. When the plaintiff or the defendant is not a
35 

real party in interest, the suit is dismissible.

36 

Procedural law basically mandates that "[a]ll criminal actions commenced by complaint or by
information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor." In appeals of
37 

criminal cases before the CA and before this Court, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People,
pursuant to Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code. This
section explicitly provides:

SEC. 35. Powers and Functions. — The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any
litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. . . . It shall have the
following specific powers and functions:

(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the
Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. (emphasis added)

The People is the real party in interest in a criminal case and only the OSG can represent the People
in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court. This ruling has been repeatedly stressed
in several cases and continues to be the controlling doctrine.
38 

While there may be rare occasions when the offended party may be allowed to pursue the criminal
action on his own behalf (as when there is a denial of due process), this exceptional circumstance
39 

does not apply in the present case.

In this case, the petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case since
the main issue raised by the petitioner involved the criminal aspect of the case, i.e., the existence of
probable cause. The petitioner did not appeal to protect his alleged pecuniary interest as an
offended party of the crime, but to cause the reinstatement of the criminal action against the
respondents. This involves the right to prosecute which pertains exclusively to the People, as
represented by the OSG. 40 

Respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the RTC’s jurisdiction

As a rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the
court. Filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the
consequent jurisdiction of one's person to the jurisdiction of the court. 41 

Thus, by filing several motions before the RTC seeking the dismissal of the criminal case,
respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC. Custody of the law is not
required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail. 42 

WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the appeal. The twin resolutions of the CoUJt of Appeals dated
November 23, 2006 and June 28, 2007 in CAG. R. SP No. 96584 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179031               November 14, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, 

vs.
BENJAMIN SORIA y GOMEZ, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This case involves a father’s detestable act of abusing his daughter through rape by sexual assault.

Factual Antecedents

Accused-appellant Benjamin Soria y Gomez (appellant) seeks a review of the December 29, 2006
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01442 which affirmed with
1 

modification the June 30, 2005 Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch
2 

94, in Criminal Case No. Q-01-98692. Said RTC Judgment found appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape committed against his daughter "AAA", as described in an Information, the
3  4 

relevant portion of which reads:

That on or about the 26th day of February, 2000, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, who
is the father of private complainant "AAA", did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
with force and intimidation commit an act of sexual assault upon the person of one "AAA", a minor, 7
years of age[,] by then and there inserting his penis into [the] genital of said complainant, all against
her will and consent, which act debases, degrades, or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of
said "AAA", as a human being, in violation of said law.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 5 

Appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Pre-trial and trial thereafter ensued.

Version of the Prosecution

On February 26, 2000, "AAA" and her siblings enjoyed the spaghetti their father (appellant) brought
home for merienda. After eating, "AAA" went to the bedroom to rest. Thereafter, appellant also
entered the room and positioned himself on top of "AAA", took off her clothes and inserted his penis
into her vagina. "AAA" felt intense pain from her breast down to her vagina and thus told her father
that it was painful. At that point, appellant apologized to his daughter, stood up, and left the room.
This whole incident was witnessed by "AAA’s" brother, "BBB".

The pain persisted until "AAA’s" vagina started to bleed. She thus told her aunt about it and they
proceeded to a hospital for treatment. Her mother was also immediately informed of her ordeal.
Subsequently, "AAA" was taken into the custody of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development.

On March 15, 2000, Medico-Legal Officer Francisco A. Supe, Jr., M.D. (Dr. Supe) examined "AAA",
which examination yielded the following results:

GENERAL AND EXTRA-GENITAL: Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female child.
Breasts are undeveloped. Abdomen is flat and soft.

GENITAL: There is absent growth of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex, and coaptated with
light brown labia minora presenting in between. On separating the same, disclosed an elastic, fleshy
type, hyperemic and intact hymen. Posterior fourchette is sharp.

CONCLUSION: The subject is in virgin state physically. There are no external signs of application of
any form of physical trauma. 6 

Version of the Defense

Appellant admitted that he was at home on the day and time of "AAA’s" alleged rape but denied
committing the same. Instead, he claimed that the filing of the rape case against him was instigated
by his wife, whom he confronted about her illicit affair with a man residing in their community.
According to appellant, he could not have molested "AAA" because he treated her well. In fact, he
was the only one sending his children to school since his wife already neglected them and seldom
comes home.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On June 30, 2005, the trial court rendered its Judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable
7 

doubt of the crime of rape against "AAA", his daughter of minor age, as charged in the Information. It
ruled that the lack of tenacious resistance on the part of "AAA" is immaterial considering that
appellant’s moral ascendancy and influence over her substitute for violence and intimidation. It also
8 

held that his wife could not have instigated the filing of the rape case since as the mother of "AAA", it
would not be natural for her to use her child as a tool to exact revenge especially if it will result in her
embarrassment and stigma. The trial court gave credence to the testimony of "AAA" and her positive
9 

identification of appellant as her rapist, and rejected the latter’s defense of denial. The dispositive
portion of the Judgment reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the herein accused,
BENJAMIN SORIA Y GOMEZ − GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime as charged and
sentences him to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH and to indemnify the offended party the
amount of P75,000.00, to pay moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and the amount of
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages to deter other fathers with perverse proclivities for aberrant
sexual behavior for sexually abusing their own daughters.

SO ORDERED. 10 

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision dated December 29, 2006, the CA found partial merit in the appeal. While the
11 

appellate court was convinced that appellant raped "AAA", it nevertheless noted the prosecution’s
failure to present her birth certificate as competent proof of her minority. Thus, the CA concluded
that the crime committed by appellant against his daughter was only simple rape and accordingly
modified the penalty imposed by the trial court from death to reclusion perpetua and reduced the civil
indemnity awarded from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00. The dispositive portion of the appellate court’s
Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby GRANTED and the June 30, 2005
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94, in Criminal Case No. Q-01-98692, is
hereby MODIFIED, in that, the penalty imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua instead of death
and the civil indemnity to be paid by the offender to the victim is hereby reduced to the amount of
P50,000.00 instead of P75,000.00 pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence as explained in this decision.

Pursuant to Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure as amended by A.M.
No. 00-5-03-SC dated September 28, 2004, which became effective on October 15, 2004, this
judgment of the Court of Appeals may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed
with the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals.

SO ORDERED. 12 

Still insisting on his innocence, appellant comes to this Court through this appeal.

Assignment of Errors

Appellant adopts the same assignment of errors he raised before the appellate court, viz:

I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE
CRIME OF RAPE DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO OVERTHROW
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE X X X.

II. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED,
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY UPON
HIM. 13 

Appellant asserts that he should be acquitted of the crime of rape since there is no evidence that
would establish the fact of sexual intercourse. Aside from the prosecution’s failure to prove penile
contact, "AAA’s" testimony was also wanting in details as to how he took off her underwear or
whether she saw his penis during the incident despite leading questions propounded on the matter
by the prosecution. The medical report even revealed that "AAA’s" hymen remained intact and that
there were no notable lacerations or external physical injuries thereon. Appellant therefore surmises
that his wife merely instigated "AAA" to file this baseless rape case against him in retaliation for his
act of confronting her about her illicit relationship with a neighbor.

Our Ruling

The appeal lacks merit.

The crime of rape under Article 266-A of

the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

Republic Act No. 8353, otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, classified the crime of rape
as a crime against persons. It also amended Article 335 of the RPC and incorporated therein Article
266-A which reads:
Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:

a) Through force, threat or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious,

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present;

2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof,
shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or
anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

Thus, rape can now be committed either through sexual intercourse or by sexual assault. Rape
under paragraph 1 of the above-cited article is referred to as rape through sexual intercourse. Carnal
knowledge is the central element and it must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. It is commonly
14 

denominated as "organ rape" or "penile rape" and must be attended by any of the circumstances
15 

enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (d) of paragraph 1.

On the other hand, rape under paragraph 2 of Article 266-A is commonly known as rape by sexual
assault. The perpetrator, under any of the attendant circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1,
commits this kind of rape by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person. It is also called "instrument or
object rape", also "gender-free rape". 16 

The Information did not specify whether

the crime of rape was committed through
sexual intercourse or by sexual assault.

The Information in this case did not specify with certainty whether appellant committed the rape
through sexual intercourse under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A, or rape by sexual assault as
described in paragraph 2 thereof. The Information stated that appellant inserted his penis into the
genital of "AAA," which constituted rape by sexual intercourse under the first paragraph of Article
266-A. At the same time, the Information alleged that appellant used force and intimidation to
commit an act of sexual assault. While these allegations cause ambiguity, they only pertain to the
mode or manner of how the rape was committed and the same do not invalidate the Information or
result in the automatic dismissal of the case. "[W]here an offense may be committed in any of the
different modes and the offense is alleged to have been committed in two or more modes specified,
the indictment is sufficient, notwithstanding the fact that the different means of committing the same
offense are prohibited by separate sections of the statute. The allegation in the information of the
various ways of committing the offense should be regarded as a description of only one offense and
the information is not thereby rendered defective on the ground of multifariousness." Any objection
17 

from the appellant with respect to the Information is held to have been waived failing any effort to
oppose the same before trial. He therefore can be convicted of rape through sexual intercourse or
18 

rape by sexual assault, depending on the evidence adduced during trial.

The findings of the RTC and the CA on

the credibility of "AAA" deserve respect

and great weight.

Both the trial court and the CA held that "AAA" was a credible witness. They ruled that her testimony
deserved credence and is sufficient evidence that she was raped by appellant. We find no cogent
reason to overturn these findings.

It would be highly inconceivable for "AAA" to impute to her own father the crime of raping her unless
the imputation is true. In fact, it takes "a certain amount of psychological depravity for a young
19 

woman to concoct a story which would put her own father in jail for the rest of his remaining life and
drag the rest of the family including herself to a lifetime of shame" unless the imputation is true.
20 

When a rape victim’s testimony on the manner she was defiled is "straightforward and candid, and is
corroborated by the medical findings of the examining physician as in this case, the same is
sufficient to support a conviction for rape."
21 

Appellant is guilty of rape by sexual

assault and not through sexual

intercourse.

The trial court’s conviction of the appellant was for rape through sexual intercourse under paragraph
1(a) of Article 266-A. The CA sustained the trial court’s finding that appellant had sexual intercourse
with "AAA" against her will.

In determining whether appellant is indeed guilty of rape through sexual intercourse under paragraph
1 of Article 266-A, it is essential to establish beyond reasonable doubt that he had carnal knowledge
of "AAA". There must be proof that his penis touched the labia of "AAA" or slid into her female organ,
and not merely stroked the external surface thereof, to ensure his conviction of rape by sexual
intercourse. 22 
1ªvvph!1

We reviewed the testimony of "AAA" and found nothing therein that would show that she was raped
through sexual intercourse. While "AAA" categorically stated that she felt something inserted into her
vagina, her testimony was sorely lacking in important details that would convince us with certainty
that it was indeed the penis of appellant that was placed into her vagina.

When "AAA" was placed on the witness stand, she narrated that:

Q - The earlier statement which you made when you said that you wanted to explain something
about your father, is that true?

A - Yes, sir.

Q - So, you said that you wanted to explain something about your father, what was that?

A - What he did, sir.

Q - What was that?

A - I was raped, sir.

Q - What did he do when you said he raped you?

A - He laid on top of me, sir. 23 

xxxx

Q - So when you said he laid on top of you, did you feel anything? Did you feel any pain in any part
of your body?

A - Yes, sir.

Q - In what part of your body did you feel pain?

A - I felt pain in my breast and my stomach.

Q - What about your private part?

A - Yes, sir.

Q - Did you know why your stomach as well as your body and your private part hurt or become
painful?

A - I don’t know, sir.

Q - Did you feel something inserted into your private part?

A - Yes, sir.

Q - What is that, if you know?

A - The bird of my papa.

Q - Why did you know that?

A - Because my brother, "BBB", told me.

Q - Why? Was "BBB", your brother, present when your father was on top of you?

A - Yes, sir.

Q - Why do you know that he was there?

A - He told me so, sir.

Q - Who?
A - "BBB".

Q - Okay, when you felt pain as something was inserted [into] your private part, what did you say to
your father?

A - He left the room.

Q - Before he went away and left?

A - It was painful, sir.

Q - And what was the answer of your father?

A - He said sorry, sir.

Q - How long was he or how long were you in that position, you were lying down and your father was
on top of you?

A - I do not know, sir. 24 

xxxx

Q - Earlier, you were making reference to your father whom you said abused you. I am asking you
now to tell us if your father is around?

A - Yes, sir.

Q - Will you please point x x x to him?

A - Yes, sir. (Witness pointing to a man who is wearing yellow t-shirt and maong pants who when
asked identified himself as Benjamin Soria.)

Q - Is he the same person who according to you laid on top of you and inserted something into your
vagina or private part?

A - Yes, sir. 25 

It is evident from the testimony of "AAA" that she was unsure whether it was indeed appellant’s
penis which touched her labia and entered her organ since she was pinned down by the latter’s
weight, her father having positioned himself on top of her while she was lying on her back. "AAA"
stated that she only knew that it was the "bird" of her father which was inserted into her vagina after
being told by her brother "BBB". Clearly, "AAA" has no personal knowledge that it was appellant’s
penis which touched her labia and inserted into her vagina. Hence, it would be erroneous to
conclude that there was penile contact based solely on the declaration of "AAA’s" brother, "BBB",
which declaration was hearsay due to "BBB’s" failure to testify. Based on the foregoing, it was an
error on the part of the RTC and the CA to conclude that appellant raped "AAA" through sexual
intercourse.

Instead, we find appellant guilty of rape by sexual assault. It cannot be denied that appellant inserted
an object into "AAA’s" female organ. "AAA" categorically testified that appellant inserted something
into her vagina. She claimed to have suffered tremendous pain during the insertion. The insertion
even caused her vagina to bleed necessitating her examination at the hospital. Both the trial court
and the CA found "AAA’s" testimony to be credible. We find no compelling reason not to lend
credence to the same.

This defilement constitutes rape under paragraph 2 of Article 266-A of the RPC, which provides that
rape by sexual assault is committed "by any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned
in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting x x x any instrument or
object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person."

Moreover, Dr. Supe corroborated her testimony as follows:

Q - Doctor, with respect to Exhibit A, the Medico-Legal Report pertaining to the entry into the genital,
which reads: On separating the hymen, disclosed was an elastic, fleshy type, hyperemic and intact
hymen. Will you please tell us, Doctor, what is this hyperemic hymen?

A - Hyperemic hymen, sir, means that at the time of examination, I found out that it was reddish in
color.

Q - Considering the age of the child or the patient, the victim whom you examined at that time who
was about 6 years old, will you be able to tell us, Doctor, what could have caused this kind of injury,
because this is an injury to the hymen?

A - Hyperemic, sir, is observed whenever there is friction applied to an area, such as in the form of
scratching.

Q - What about insertion of object, would this result into hyperemic hymen?

A - If the object is being rubbed, sir, there is a possibility.

Q - A finger will produce this kind of injury?

A - Possible, sir. 26 

According to Dr. Supe, it is possible that "AAA’s" hyperemic hymen may be the result of the insertion
of a finger or object. While Dr. Supe said that the injury could also be attributed to scratching,
"AAA’s" testimony is bereft of any showing that she scratched her genital organ thus causing the
reddening. Appellant would also want to make it appear that the injury of "AAA" was the result of
friction from playing or riding a bicycle since the doctor testified that this was also possible. However,
there is likewise no evidence that friction was applied on "AAA’s" female organ when she played
hide and seek with her playmates or that she actually rode a bicycle. On the other hand, "AAA" was
categorical in stating that in the afternoon of February 26, 2000, appellant removed her clothes, laid
on top of her, and that she felt something being inserted into her vagina and that thereafter she
experienced pain in her genitals. The foregoing thus proved that appellant inserted an object into
"AAA’s" vagina against her will and without consent. Simply put, appellant committed the crime of
rape by sexual assault.

The following are the elements of rape by sexual assault:

(1) That the offender commits an act of sexual assault;

 (2) That the act of sexual assault is committed by any of the following means:

(a) By inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice; or

(b) By inserting any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another
person;

(3) That the act of sexual assault is accomplished under any of the following circumstances:

(a) By using force and intimidation;

(b) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or

(c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; or

(d) When the woman is under 12 years of age or demented. 27 

In the instant case, it was clearly established that appellant committed an act of sexual assault on
"AAA" by inserting an instrument or object into her genital. We find it inconsequential that "AAA"
could not specifically identify the particular instrument or object that was inserted into her genital.
What is important and relevant is that indeed something was inserted into her vagina. To require
"AAA" to identify the instrument or object that was inserted into her vagina would be contrary to the
fundamental tenets of due process. It would be akin to requiring "AAA" to establish something that is
not even required by law. Moreover, it might create problems later on in the application of the law if
the victim is blind or otherwise unconscious. Moreover, the prosecution satisfactorily established that
appellant accomplished the act of sexual assault through his moral ascendancy and influence over
"AAA" which substituted for violence and intimidation. Thus, there is no doubt that appellant raped
"AAA" by sexual assault.

Appellant’s contentions are untenable.

The failure of "AAA" to mention that her panty was removed prior to the rape does not preclude
sexual assault. We cannot likewise give credence to the assertion of appellant that the crime of rape
was negated by the medical findings of an intact hymen or absence of lacerations in the vagina of
"AAA". Hymenal rupture, vaginal laceration or genital injury is not indispensable because the same
is not an element of the crime of rape. "An intact hymen does not negate a finding that the victim
28 

was raped." Here, the finding of reddish discoloration of the hymen of "AAA" during her medical
29 

examination and the intense pain she felt in her vagina during and after the sexual assault
sufficiently corroborated her testimony that she was raped.

Likewise undeserving of credence is appellant’s contention that his wife merely instigated "AAA" to
file the charge of rape against him in retaliation for his having confronted her about her illicit affair
with another man. This imputation of ill motive is flimsy considering that it is unnatural for appellant’s
wife to stoop so low as to subject her own daughter to the hardships and shame concomitant with a
prosecution for rape, just to assuage her hurt feelings. It is also improbable for appellant’s wife to
30 

have dared encourage their daughter "AAA" to publicly expose the dishonor of the family unless the
rape was indeed committed. 31 

Penalty
Under Article 266-B of the RPC, the penalty for rape by sexual assault is prision mayor. However,
the penalty is increased to reclusion temporal "if the rape is committed by any of the 10
aggravating/qualifying circumstances mentioned in this article". The Information alleged the
qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority. It was alleged that appellant is the father of
"AAA". During the pre-trial conference, the parties stipulated that "AAA" is the daughter of
appellant. During trial, appellant admitted his filial bond with "AAA". "Admission in open court of
32  33 

relationship has been held to be sufficient and, hence, conclusive to prove relationship with the
victim."
34 

With respect to minority, however, the Information described "AAA" as a 7-year old daughter of
appellant. While this also became the subject of stipulation during the pre-trial conference, same is
insufficient evidence of "AAA’s" age. Her minority must be "proved conclusively and indubitably as
the crime itself". "There must be independent evidence proving the age of the victim, other than the
35 

testimonies of prosecution witnesses and the absence of denial by the accused." Documents such
36 

as her original or duly certified birth certificate, baptismal certificate or school records would suffice
as competent evidence of her age. Here, there was nothing on record to prove the minority of "AAA"
37 

other than her testimony, appellant’s absence of denial, and their pre-trial stipulation. The
38 

prosecution also failed to establish that the documents referred to above were lost, destroyed,
unavailable or otherwise totally absent. 39 

It is settled that "when either one of the qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority is
omitted or lacking, that which is pleaded in the information and proved by the evidence may be
considered as an aggravating circumstance." As such, appellant’s relationship with "AAA" may be
40 

considered as an aggravating circumstance.

In view of these, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal which ranges from twelve (12) years
and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty next
lower in degree is prision mayor which ranges from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years. Hence, a penalty of twelve (12) years of prison mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal, as maximum, is imposed upon appellant.

Damages

In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the awards of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as
moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages are each modified to P30,000.00. "AAA" is 41 

also entitled to an interest on all the amounts of damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% per annum
from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
42 

WHEREFORE, the December 29, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
01442 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Benjamin Soria y Gomez is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape by sexual assault and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of twelve (12) years of prison mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal,
as maximum. He is also ordered to pay "AAA" the amounts of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. "AAA" is entitled to an
interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this
judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 154182             December 17, 2004

EDGAR Y. TEVES and TERESITA Z. TEVES, petitioners, 

vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.

The pivotal issue in this petition is whether a public official charged with violation of Section 3(h) of
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
for unlawful intervention, in his official capacity, in the issuance of a license in favor of a business
enterprise in which he has a pecuniary interestmay be convicted, together with his spouse, of
violation of that same provision premised on his mere possession of such interest.

Edgar Y. Teves, former Mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental, and his wife Teresita Z. Teves seeks to
annul and set aside the 16 July 2002 Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 2337
1 

convicting them of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law for possessing direct pecuniary
interest in the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center in Valencia.

The indictment reads: 2 

The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer II, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby
accuses EDGAR Y. TEVES and TERESITA TEVES of violation of Section 3(h) of Republic
Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as
follows:

That on or about February 4, 1992, and sometime subsequent thereto, in Valencia,

Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Edgar Y. Teves, a public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of
Valencia, Negros Oriental, committing the crime-herein charged in relation to, while
in the performance and taking advantage of his official functions, and conspiring and
confederating with his wife, herein accused Teresita Teves, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause the issuance of the appropriate business
permit/license to operate the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center in favor of
one Daniel Teves, said accused Edgar Y. Teveshaving a direct financial or
pecuniary interest therein considering the fact that said cockpit arena is actually
owned and operated by him and accused Teresita Teves.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon their arraignment on 12 May 1997, the petitioners pleaded "not guilty." Pre-trial and trial were
thereafter set.

The petitioners and the prosecution agreed on the authenticity of the prosecution’s documentary
evidence. Thus, the prosecution dispensed with the testimonies of witnesses and formally offered its
documentary evidence marked as Exhibits "A" to "V." 3 

On 23 February 1998, the petitioners filed their Comment/Objections to the evidence offered by the
prosecution and moved for leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence. On 29 July 1998, the
4 

Sandiganbayan admitted Exhibits "A" to "S" of the prosecution’s evidence but rejected Exhibits "T,"
"U," and "V." It also denied petitioners’ demurrer to evidence, as well as their motion for
5  6 

reconsideration. This notwithstanding, the petitioners filed a Manifestation that they were,
7 

nonetheless, dispensing with the presentation of witnesses because the evidence on record are
inadequate to support their conviction.

On 16 July 2002, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision (1) convicting petitioners Edgar and
8 

Teresita Teves of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law; (2) imposing upon them an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of nine years and twenty-one days as minimum to twelve
years as maximum; and (3) ordering the confiscation of all their rights, interests, and participation in
the assets and properties of the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center in favor of the Government,
as well as perpetual disqualification from public office. The conviction was anchored on the finding
9 

that the petitioners possessed pecuniary interest in the said business enterprise on the grounds that
(a) nothing on record appears that Mayor Teves divested himself of his pecuniary interest in said
cockpit; (b) as of April 1992, Teresita Teves was of record the "owner/licensee" of the cockpit; and
(c) since Mayor Teves and Teresita remained married to each other from 1983 until 1992, their
property relations as husband and wife, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, was that of the
conjugal partnership of gains. Hence, the cockpit is a conjugal property over which the petitioners
have pecuniary interest. This pecuniary interest is prohibited under Section 89(2) of R.A. No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, and thus falls under the prohibited
acts penalized in Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law.

The Sandiganbayan, however, absolved the petitioners of the charge of causing the issuance of a
business permit or license to operate the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center on or about 4
February 1992 for not being well-founded.

On 26 August 2002, the petitioners filed the instant petition for review on certiorari seeking to annul
10 

and set aside the 16 July 2002 Decision of the Sandiganbayan.

At first, we denied the petition for failure of the petitioners to sufficiently show that the
Sandiganbayan committed any reversible error in the challenged decision as to warrant the exercise
by this Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction. But upon petitioners’ motion for
11 

reconsideration, we reinstated the petition.

12  13 

The petitioners assert that the Sandiganbayan committed serious and palpable errors in convicting
them. In the first place, the charge was for alleged unlawful intervention of Mayor Teves in his official
capacity in the issuance of a cockpit license in violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law. But
they were convicted of having a direct financial or pecuniary interest in the Valencia Cockpit and
Recreation Center prohibited under Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991, which is essentially different
from the offense with which they were charged. Thus, the petitioners insist that their constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them was transgressed
because they were never apprised at any stage of the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan that they
were being charged with, and arraigned and tried for, violation of the LGC of 1991.
The variance doctrine invoked by the respondent is but a rule of procedural law that should not
prevail over their constitutionally-guaranteed right to be informed of the nature and cause of
accusation against them.

Second, according to the petitioners, their alleged prohibited pecuniary interest in the Valencia
Cockpit in 1992 was not proved. The Sandiganbayan presumed that since Mayor Teves was the
cockpit operator and licensee in 1989, said interest continued to exist until 1992. It also presumed
that the cockpit was the conjugal property of Mayor Teves and his wife, and that their pecuniary
interest thereof was direct. But under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, any interest
thereon is at most inchoate and indirect.

Also assigned as glaring error is the conviction of Teresita Teves, who is not a public officer. In the
information, only Mayor Teves was accused of "having a direct financial or pecuniary interest in the
operation of the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center in Negros Oriental." His wife was merely
charged as a co-conspirator of her husband’s alleged act of "while in the performance and taking
advantage of his official functions, … willfully, unlawfully and criminally caus[ing] the issuance of the
appropriate business permit/license to operate" the said cockpit arena. Teresita Teves could not be
convicted because conspiracy was not established. Besides, the Sandiganbayan had already
absolved the petitioners of this offense.

On the other hand, the Sandiganbayan, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), insists
that the uncontroverted documentary evidence proved that petitioner Edgar Teves had direct
pecuniary interest over the cockpit in question as early as 26 September 1983. That interest
continued even though he transferred the management thereof to his wife Teresita Teves in 1992,
since their property relations were governed by the conjugal partnership of gains. The existence of
that prohibited interest is by itself a criminal offense under Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991. It is
necessarily included in the offense charged against the petitioners, i.e., for violation of Section 3(h)
of the Anti-Graft Law, which proscribes the possession of a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary
interest in any business, contract, or transaction in connection with which the person possessing the
financial interest intervenes in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or
any law from having any interest. The use of the conjunctive word "or" demonstrates the alternative
mode or nature of the manner of execution of the final element of the violation of the provision.
Although the information may have alleged only one of the modalities of committing the offense, the
other mode is deemed included in the accusation to allow proof thereof. There was, therefore, no
violation of the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature or cause of the
accusation against them in view of the variance doctrine, which finds statutory support in Sections 4
and 5 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court.

The petition is not totally devoid of merit.

Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law provides: 

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public

officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of
any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business,

contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his
official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from
having any interest.
The essential elements set out in the afore-quoted legislative definition of the crime of violation of
Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law are as follows:

1. The accused is a public officer;

2. He has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or

transaction;

3. He either 

a. intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with such interest; or

b. is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or by any law.

There are, therefore, two modes by which a public officer who has a direct or indirect financial or
pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction may violate Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft
Law. The first mode is if in connection with his pecuniary interest in any business, contract or
transaction, the public officer intervenes or takes part in his official capacity. The second mode is
when he is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or any law.

We quote herein the Sandiganbayan’s declaration regarding petitioners’ culpability anent the first
mode:

…[T]hat portion of the Information which seeks to indict the spouses Teves

for his causing the issuance of a business permit/license to operate the Valencia cockpit
on or about February 4, 1992 is not well-founded.

… Mayor Edgar Teves could not have issued a permit to operate the cockpit in the
year 1992 because as of January 1, 1992 the license could be issued only by the
Sangguniang Bayan. He may have issued the permit or license in 1991 or even before that
when he legally could, but that is not the charge. The charge is for acts committed in
1992. [Emphasis supplied].
14 

The Sandiganbayan found that the charge against Mayor Teves for causing the issuance of the
business permit or license to operate the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center is "not well-
founded." This it based, and rightly so, on the additional finding that only the Sangguniang Bayan
could have issued a permit to operate the Valencia Cockpit in the year 1992. Indeed, under Section
447(3) of the LGC of 1991, which took effect on 1 January 1992, it is the Sangguniang Bayan that
15 

has the authority to issue a license for the establishment, operation, and maintenance of cockpits.
Unlike in the old LGC, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, wherein the municipal mayor was the presiding
officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, under the LGC of 1991, the mayor is not so anymore and is not
16 

even a member of the Sangguniang Bayan. Hence, Mayor Teves could not have intervened or taken
part in his official capacity in the issuance of a cockpit license during the material time, as alleged in
the information, because he was not a member of the Sangguniang Bayan. 17 

A fortiori, there is no legal basis to convict Teresita Teves as a co-conspirator in the absence of a
finding that Mayor Teves himself is guilty of the offense charged. In short, the Sandiganbayan
correctly absolved the petitioners of the charge based on the first mode. And there is no need to
belabor this point.
The Sandiganbayan, however, convicted the petitioners of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft
Law based on the second mode. It reasoned that the evidence overwhelmingly evinces that Mayor
Teves had a pecuniary interest in the Valencia Cockpit, which is prohibited under Section 89(2) of
the LGC of 1991.

The information accuses petitioner Edgar Teves, then Municipal Mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental,
of causing, "while in the performance and taking advantage of his official functions, and conspiring
and confederating with his wife … the issuance of the appropriate business permit/license to operate
the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center in favor of one Daniel Teves." The last part of the
dispositive portion of the information states that "said accused Edgar Y. Teves having a direct
financial or pecuniary interest therein considering the fact that said cockpit arena is actually owned
and operated by him and accused Teresita Teves."

A careful reading of the information reveals that the afore-quoted last part thereof is merely an
allegation of the second element of the crime, which is, that he has a direct or indirect "financial or
pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction." Not by any stretch of imagination can it
be discerned or construed that the afore-quoted last part of the information charges the petitioners
with the second mode by which Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law may be violated. Hence, we agree
with the petitioners that the charge was for unlawful intervention in the issuance of the license to
operate the Valencia Cockpit. There was no charge for possession of pecuniary interest prohibited
by law.

However, the evidence for the prosecution has established that petitioner Edgar Teves, then mayor
of Valencia, Negros Oriental, owned the cockpit in question. In his sworn application for registration
18 

of cockpit filed on 26 September 1983 with the Philippine Gamefowl Commission, Cubao, Quezon
19 

City, as well as in his renewal application dated 6 January 1989 he stated that he is the owner and
20 

manager of the said cockpit. Absent any evidence that he divested himself of his ownership over the
cockpit, his ownership thereof is rightly to be presumed because a thing once proved to exist
continues as long as is usual with things of that nature. His affidavit dated 27 September 1990
21  22 

declaring that effective January 1990 he "turned over the management of the cockpit to Mrs.
Teresita Z. Teves for the reason that [he] could no longer devote a full time as manager of the said
entity due to other work pressure" is not sufficient proof that he divested himself of his ownership
over the cockpit. Only the management of the cockpit was transferred to Teresita Teves effective
January 1990. Being the owner of the cockpit, his interest over it was direct.

Even if the ownership of petitioner Edgar Teves over the cockpit were transferred to his wife, still he
would have a direct interest thereon because, as correctly held by respondent Sandiganbayan, they
remained married to each other from 1983 up to 1992, and as such their property relation can be
presumed to be that of conjugal partnership of gains in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
And Section 143 of the Civil Code declares all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains to be
owned in common by the husband and wife. Hence, his interest in the Valencia Cockpit is direct and
is, therefore, prohibited under Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991, which reads:

Section 89. Prohibited Business and Pecuniary Interest. – (a) It shall be unlawful for any
local government official or employee, directly or indirectly, to:

(2) Hold such interests in any cockpit or other games licensed by a local

government unit…. [Emphasis supplied].
The offense proved, therefore, is the second mode of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law,
which is possession of a prohibited interest. But can the petitioners be convicted thereof, considering
that it was not charged in the information?

The answer is in the affirmative in view of the variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation to

Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Criminal Procedure, which both read: 

Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. – When there is a
variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and
the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the
accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or
of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.

Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. – An offense charged

necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients
of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitutes the latter. And an
offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients
of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.

The elements of the offense charged in this case, which is unlawful intervention in the issuance of a
cockpit license in violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, are 

1. The accused is a public officer;

2. He has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or

transaction, whether or not prohibited by law; and

3. He intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with such interest.

On the other hand, the essential ingredients of the offense proved, which is possession of prohibited
interest in violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, are as follows:

1. The accused is a public officer;

2. He has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or

transaction; and

3. He is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or any law.

It is clear that the essential ingredients of the offense proved constitute or form part of those
constituting the offense charged. Put differently, the first and second elements of the offense
charged, as alleged in the information, constitute the offense proved. Hence, the offense proved is
necessarily included in the offense charged, or the offense charged necessarily includes the offense
proved. The variance doctrine thus finds application to this case, thereby warranting the conviction of
petitioner Edgar Teves for the offense proved.

The next question we have to grapple with is under what law should petitioner Edgar Teves be
punished. It must be observed that Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law is a general provision, it being
applicable to all prohibited interests; while Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991 is a special provision, as
it specifically treats of interest in a cockpit. Notably, the two statutes provide for different penalties.
The Anti-Graft Law, particularly Section 9, provides as follows:
 SEC. 9. Penalties for violations. – (a) Any public official or private person committing any of
the unlawful acts or omissions enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5, and 6 of this Act shall be
punished by imprisonment of not less than six years and one month nor more than fifteen
years, perpetual disqualification from public office, and confiscation or forfeiture in favor of
the Government of any prohibited interest….

On the other hand, Section 514 of the LGC of 1991 prescribes a lighter penalty; thus:

SECTION 514. Engaging in Prohibited Business Transactions or Possessing Illegal

Pecuniary Interest. – Any local official and any person or persons dealing with him who
violate the prohibitions provided in Section 89 of Book I hereof shall be punished with
imprisonment for six months and one day to six years, or a fine of not less than Three
thousand pesos (P3,000.00) nor more than Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), or both such
imprisonment and fine at the discretion of the court.

It is a rule of statutory construction that where one statute deals with a subject in general terms, and
another deals with a part of the same subject in a more detailed way, the two should be harmonized
if possible; but if there is any conflict, the latter shall prevail regardless of whether it was passed prior
to the general statute. Or where two statutes are of contrary tenor or of different dates but are of
23 

equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed therefor specially should prevail
over the other.24 

Conformably with these rules, the LGC of 1991, which specifically prohibits local officials from
possessing pecuniary interest in a cockpit licensed by the local government unit and which, in itself,
prescribes the punishment for violation thereof, is paramount to the Anti-Graft Law, which penalizes
possession of prohibited interest in a general manner. Moreover, the latter took effect on 17 August
1960, while the former became effective on 1 January 1991. Being the earlier statute, the Anti-Graft
Law has to yield to the LGC of 1991, which is the later expression of legislative will. 25 

In the imposition on petitioner Edgar Teves of the penalty provided in the LGC of 1991, we take
judicial notice of the fact that under the old LGC, mere possession of pecuniary interest in a cockpit
was not among the prohibitions enumerated in Section 41 thereof. Such possession became
26 

unlawful or prohibited only upon the advent of the LGC of 1991, which took effect on 1 January
1992. Petitioner Edgar Teves stands charged with an offense in connection with his prohibited
interest committed on or about 4 February 1992, shortly after the maiden appearance of the
prohibition. Presumably, he was not yet very much aware of the prohibition. Although ignorance
thereof would not excuse him from criminal liability, such would justify the imposition of the lighter
penalty of a fine of P10,000 under Section 514 of the LGC of 1991.

Petitioner Teresita Teves must, however, be acquitted. The charge against her is conspiracy in
causing "the issuance of the appropriate business permit/license to operate the Valencia Cockpit
and Recreation Center." For this charge, she was acquitted. But as discussed earlier, that charge
also includes conspiracy in the possession of prohibited interest.

Conspiracy must be established separately from the crime itself and must meet the same degree of
proof, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt. While conspiracy need not be established by direct
evidence, for it may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the
commission of the crime, all taken together, the evidence must reasonably be strong enough to
show community of criminal design. 27 

Certainly, there is no conspiracy in just being married to an erring spouse. For a spouse or any
28 

person to be a party to a conspiracy as to be liable for the acts of the others, it is essential that there
be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design.
Except when he is the mastermind in a conspiracy, it is necessary that a conspirator should have
performed some overt act as a direct or indirect contribution in the execution of the crime planned to
be committed. The overt act must consist of active participation in the actual commission of the
crime itself or of moral assistance to his co-conspirators. 29 

Section 4(b) of the Anti-Graft Law, the provision which applies to private individuals, states:

SEC. 4. Prohibitions on private individuals. – …

(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause any public official
to commit any of the offenses defined in Section 3 hereof.

We find no sufficient evidence that petitioner Teresita Teves conspired with, or knowingly induced or
caused, her husband to commit the second mode of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law.

As early as 1983, Edgar Teves was already the owner of the Valencia Cockpit. Since then until 31
December 1991, possession by a local official of pecuniary interest in a cockpit was not yet
prohibited. It was before the effectivity of the LGC of 1991, or on January 1990, that he transferred
the management of the cockpit to his wife Teresita. In accordance therewith it was Teresita who
thereafter applied for the renewal of the cockpit registration. Thus, in her sworn applications for
renewal of the registration of the cockpit in question dated 28 January 1990 and 18 February
30 

1991, she stated that she is the Owner/Licensee and Operator/Manager of the said cockpit. In her
31 

renewal application dated 6 January 1992, she referred to herself as the Owner/Licensee of the
32 

cockpit. Likewise in the separate Lists of Duly Licensed Personnel for Calendar Years 1991 and 33 

1992, which she submitted on 22 February 1991 and 17 February 1992, respectively, in compliance
34 

with the requirement of the Philippine Gamefowl Commission for the renewal of the cockpit
registration, she signed her name as Operator/Licensee.

The acts of petitioner Teresita Teves can hardly pass as acts in furtherance of a conspiracy to
commit the violation of the Anti-Graft Law that would render her equally liable as her husband. If
ever she did those acts, it was because she herself was an owner of the cockpit. Not being a public
official, she was not prohibited from holding an interest in cockpit. Prudence, however, dictates that
she too should have divested herself of her ownership over the cockpit upon the effectivity of the
LGC of 1991; otherwise, as stated earlier, considering her property relation with her husband, her
ownership would result in vesting direct prohibited interest upon her husband.

In criminal cases, conviction must rest on a moral certainty of guilt. The burden of proof is upon the
35 

prosecution to establish each and every element of the crime and that the accused is either
responsible for its commission or has conspired with the malefactor. Since no conspiracy was
proved, the acquittal of petitioner Teresita Teves is, therefore, in order.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the 16 July 2002 Decision of the Sandiganbayan, First
Division, in Criminal Case No. 2337 is hereby MODIFIED in that (1) EDGAR Y. TEVES is convicted
of violation of Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for
possession of pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit, which is prohibited under Section 89(2) of
the Local Government Code of 1991, and is sentenced to pay a fine of P10,000; and (2) TERESITA
Z. TEVES is hereby ACQUITTED of such offense.

Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 216824. November 10, 2020 ]
GINA VILLA GOMEZ, PETITIONER, V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT
GESMUNDO, J.:
The crux of the entire controversy is whether, in a criminal case, a trial court is divested of its jurisdiction over the
person of the accused and over the offense charged if the Information filed by the investigating prosecutor does not
bear the imprimatur because of the absence on its face of both the word "approved" and the signature of the
authorized officer such as the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor.

Overview

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed by accused Gina A. Villa Gomez through the Public
Attorney's Office seeking to set aside the October 9, 2014 Decision2 in CA-G.R. SP No. 130290 rendered by the
Court of Appeals (CA) which issued a writ of certiorah (1) annulling the February 13, 20133 and April 29, 20134
Orders issued by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 57 (RTC); and (2) reinstating the criminal case
against the petitioner. The CA held that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in motu proprio dismissing the
charge of corruption of public officials, even after the case had already been submitted for decision, on the ground
that the Information filed was without signature and authority of the City Prosecutor.

Antecedents

On September 17, 2010, police operatives from the Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Group of Makati City
arrested the petitioner.[5]

On September 19, 2010, a Complaint was filed against the petitioner for corruption of public officials under Article 212
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).[6] The same Complaint was received for inquest by the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) of Makati City.[7]

On September 21, 2010, a Resolution[8] was issued by the OCP of Makati City finding probable cause that the
petitioner may have offered P10,000.00 to both PO2 Ronnie E. Aseboque and PO2 Renie E. Aseboque in exchange
for the release of her companion Reynaldo Morales y Cabillo @ "Anoy."[9] The relevant portions10 of the said
Resolution read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Gina Villa Gomes y AiuSayan @ Gina is ndedto be prosecuted: for violation of
The Revised Pmal Code art. 212 in rel. to art. 211-A. The attached Information is recommended to be approved for
filing in court. No bail.

(Sgd.) RAINALD C. PAGGAO

"Assistant City Prosecutor 

Recommending Approval:

(Sgd.) IMELDA L. PORTES-SAULOG

Senior Assistant City Prosecutor

Approved:

(Sgd.) FELICIANO ASPI

City Prosecutor
On September 22, 2010, an Information" for corruption of public officials was filed with the RTC against the petitioner
and docketed as Criminal Case No. 10-1829, the delictual allegations of which read:

On September 17, 2010, in the [C]ity of Makati, Philippines, accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously offer and lender Phpl0,000[.00] to PO2 Ronnie E. Aseboque, PO2 Renie E. Aseboque and PO2 Glen S.
Gonzalvo for and in consideration of the release and non-prosecution of Reynaldo Morales;; Cabillo @ Anoy, who
was arrested for violation of THE REPUBLIC ACT 9165 [S]ec. 5, a non-bailable offense punishable by life
imprisonment.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

(Sgd.)
RAINALD C. PAGGAO
Assistant City Prosecutor

I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing Information is filed pursuant to the REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE [R]ule 112 [S]ec. 6, accused not having opted to avail of her right to a preliminary investigation and not
having executed a waiver pursuant to THE REVISED PENAL CODE [A]rt. 125. I further certify that the Information is
being filed with the prior authority of the City Prosecutor.

(Sgd.)
RAINALD C. PAGGAO
Assistant City Prosecutor
(emphasis supplied)
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued and the case was eventually declared by the RTC as submitted for decision
after both parties had finished presenting their respective evidence-in-chief.[12]

The RTC Ruling

On February 13, 2013, the RTC issued an Order,13 without any motion from either the petitioner or the Prosecution,
perfunctorily dismissing Criminal Case No. 10-1829 because (1) Assistant City Prosecutor Rainald C. Paggao (ACP
Paggao) had no authority to prosecute the case as the Information he filed does not contain the signature or any
indication of approval from City Prosecutor Feliciano Aspi (City Prosecutor Aspi) himself; and (2) ACP Paggao's lack
of authority to file the Information is "a jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured." The dispositive portion of the said
Order reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered and for lack of jurisdiction, this case is hereby dismissed and the Jail Warden of
BJMP Makati City is hereby ordered to release the accused immediately upon receipt hereof unless there is a valid
cause for her continued detention.

SO ORDERED. [14]
Aggrieved, the Prosecution filed a Motion for Reconsideration[15] stating that: (1) it was caught by surprise when, after
more than two (2) years of trial and of the petitioner's detention, the case was suddenly and summarily dismissed by
the RTC without any motion filed by either party;[16]

(2) the RTC "obviously misappreciated the record and misinterpreted the law" as the OCP's September 21, 2010
Resolution was not only signed by City Prosecutor Aspi himself but also contained his approval for the filing of the
attached Information;[17] (3) there is nothing in Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which states that the
authorization or approval of the city or provincial prosecutor should appear on the face or be incorporated in the
Information;[18] and (4) the case laws cited by the petitioner, pertaining to the handling prosecutor's lack of authority
which invalidates an Information, do not apply in the instant case because these rulings involve the delegation of
authority to file, not the validity of, an Information.[19]

On April 29, 2013, the RTC issued an Order[20] denying the Prosecution's motion for reconsideration ratiocinating that
the OCP's September 21, 2010 Resolution merely authorized the handling prosecutor, ACP Paggao, to filethe
subject Information.[21] It explained that there is nothing in the September 21, 2010 Resolution which
authorized ACP Paggao to sign the subject Information.[22] Thus, the RTC concluded that: (I) ACP Paggao was never
authorized to file and sign the subject Information; and (2) courts are not precluded from ruling on jurisdictional issues
even if not raised by the parties.[23] The dispositive portion of said Order reads:
WHEREFORE,    for   utter   lack    of   merit,    the    Motion    for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.[24]
Unsated, the Prosecution, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Petition for Certiorari[25] under
Rule 65 with the CA seeking inter alia to annul the RTC's April 29, 2013 and February 13, 2013 Orders. There, the
OSG argued that: (1) there is only one instance when a city prosecutor (including provincial and chief state
prosecutors) or the Ombudsman (or his or her deputy) may directly file and sign the Information — if the investigating
prosecutor's recommendation for dismissal of the Complaint is disapproved as contemplated in Sec. 4, Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court;[26] (2) there is no provision in the Rules of Court which restricts the signing of the Information only
to the city or provincial prosecutor to the exclusion of their assistants;[27] (3) the case laws cited by the RTC do not
apply in the petitioner's case because, in those cases, those who filed their respective Informations had absolutely no
authority to do so because: (i) in the first case, the special counsel appointed by the Secretary of Justice to perform
prosecutorial functions was not even an employee of the Department of Justice; and (ii) in the second case, the
approving officer was a regional prosecutor whose duties then were limited only to exercising administrative
supervision over city and provincial prosecutors of the region;[28] (4) quashing of the Information can no longer be
resorted to "since the case had already gone to trial and the parties had in fact completed the presentation of their
evidence;"[29] and (5) quashing of the Information can only be done by the trial court upon motion of the accused
signed personally or through counsel under Sec. 2, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.[30]

The CA Ruling

On October 9, 2014, the CA rendered a Decision31 which: (1) granted the Petition for Certiorari; (2) set aside both
the February 13, 2013 and April 29, 2013 RTC Orders; and (3) reinstated Criminal Case No. 10-1829. In that
Decision, it was pointed out that: (1) the records show that the OCP's September 21, 2010 Resolution was
indeed signed by City Prosecutor Aspi himself;32 and (2) the RTC cannot quash an Information and dismiss the
case on its own without a corresponding motion filed by the accused, especially if the latter had already entered a
plea during a previously conducted arraignment.33 The dispositive portion of the same Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the premises considered, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged [O]rders dated 13
February 2013 and 29 April 2013 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 57, Makati City are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Information against Gina Villa Gomez for Corruption of Public Officials and the Criminal Case No. 10-
1829 against her is REINSTATED AND a WARRANT for her ARREST be issued anew.

SO ORDERED.[34]
On November 13, 2014, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[35] essentially arguing that courts may motu
proprio dismiss a case when it finds jurisdictional infirmities (such as lack of authority from the city or provincial
prosecutor on the part of the handling prosecutor in filing a criminal Information) at any stage of the proceedings.

On February 4, 2015, the CA issued a Resolution[36] finding that the petitioner's "reasons and arguments in support of
the motion [for reconsideration] have been amply treated, discussed and passed upon in the subject decision" and
that "the additional arguments proffered therein constitute no cogent or compelling reason to modify, much less
reverse" its judgment.[37] The dispositive portion of the same Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE,   the   Motion   for   Reconsideration   is   hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.[38]
Dissatisfied, the petitioner, by way of a Petition for Review on Certlorari, now assails before this Court the propriety of
the CA's October 9, 2014 Decision and February 4, 2015 Resolution.[39]

Parties' Arguments

The petitioner, in challenging the CA's Decision, insists that: (1) the RTC was correct in ordering the dismissal of the
criminal case due to the absence of authority on the part of the handling prosecutor (ACP Paggao) who signed the
Information;[40] (2) the ground of want of jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage of the proceedings, even if the
accused had already entered a plea during the arraignment or the case had already been submitted for decision;
[41]
and (3) a criminal Information which is void for lack of authority cannot be cured by an amendment for such
authority is a mandatory jurisdictional requirement.[42]

On the other hand, the Prosecution, through the OSG,[43]points out that: (1) the RTC acted with grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing Criminal Case No. 10-1829 due to lack of authority on the part of the handling prosecutor
(ACP Paggao) because the OCP's September 21, 2010 Resolution recommending for the attached Information "to be
approved for filing" bore the signature of City Prosecutor Aspi;[44] (2) the jurisprudence cited by the petitioner do not
apply in this case because they pertain to instances where an Information was filed without the approval or prior
written authority of the city or provincial prosecutor;[45]43 (3) an Information cannot be quashed by the court or judge
motu proprio, especially if the case had already gone to trial and the parties had already completed the presentation
of their evidence;[46] and (4) lack of jurisdiction over the offense charge should still be invoked by the accused in
seeking for the dismissal of the case or quashal of the Information.[47]
Issues

WHETHER THE CA CORRECTLY FOUND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE RTC'S PART FOR
QUASHING THE INFORMATION AND DISMISSING THE CRIMINAL CASE ON THE GROUND OF ABSENCE OF
JURISDICTION RELATIVE TO ACP PAGGAO'S FAILURE TO SECURE A PRIOR WRITTEN AUTFIORITY OR
STAMPED APPROVAL FROM CITY PROSECUTOR ASPI TO FILE THE SAME PLEADING AND CONDUCT THE
PROSECUTION AGAINST THE ACCUSED;

II

WHETHER THE CA CORRECTLY FOUND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE RTC'S PART FOR: (1)
MOTU PROPRIO QUASHING THE INFORMATION; AND (2) DISMISSING THE CRIMINAL CASE DESPITE
HAVING ALREADY BEEN SUBMITTED FOR DECISION AND WITHOUT GIVING THE PROSECUTION AN
OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD.
The Court's Ruling

I.           Procedural Considerations

Decisions, final orders or resolutions of the CA in any case (regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings
involved) may be appealed to this Court by filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
which, in essence, is a continuation of the appellate process over the original case.[48] Being an appellate process,
such remedy is confined to a review of any error in judgment.[49] However, unlike other modes of appeal, the scope of
review is narrower because this Court only entertains pure questions of law,[50] and generally does not re-evaluate the
evidence presented by the parties during the trial stage of the whole proceedings.[51] Furthermore, the scope of review
under Rule 45 for CA decisions, resolutions or final orders in granting or denying petitions for certiorari under Rule 65
is even narrower. Just like in labor cases, this Court will examine the CA's decision, resolution or final order from the
prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion on the lower tribunal's
part and not whether the same tribunal decided correctly on the merits.[52]

In this case, the CA nullified the RTC's February 13, 2013 Order dismissing the case against the petitioner on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion and reinstated Criminal Case No. 10-1829. As a consequence of such
reinstatement, this Court is now confronted with the issue on whether the petitioner's constitutional right against
double jeopardy was violated by the CA.

To resolve such issue, this Court reiterates the general rule that the Prosecution cannot appeal or bring error
proceedings from a judgment rendered in favor of the defendant in a criminal case because an acquittal is
immediately final and executory and the Prosecution is barred from appealing lest the constitutional prohibition
against double jeopardy be violated.[53] However, there are instances where an acquittal may still be challenged
without resulting to double jeopardy, such as:
(1) When the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction due to
aviolation of due process;[54] or

(2)      When the trial was a sham.[55]

In these instances, the dismissal or judgment of acquittal is considered void and assailing the same does not result in
jeopardy.[56]

As to the proper procedure, a judgment of acquittal (or order of dismissal amounting to acquittal) may only be
assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.[57] The reasons being are that: (1) the
Prosecution is barred from appealing a judgment of acquittal lest the constitutional prohibition against double
jeopardy be violated;[58] (2) double jeopardy does not attach when the judgment or order of acquittal is tainted with
grave abuse of discretion;[59] and (3) that  certiorari is a supervisory writ whose function is to keep inferior courts and
quasi-judicial bodies within the bounds of their jurisdiction.[60] Verily, certiorari is a comprehensive[61] and extraordinary
writ wielded by superior courts in criminal cases to prevent inferior courts from committing grave abuse of discretion.
[62]

More importantly, grave abuse of discretion should be alleged and proved to exist in order for such petition to
prosper.[63] The petitioner should establish that the respondent court or tribunal acted in a capricious, whimsical,
arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its jurisdiction as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction whenever grave
abuse of discretion is alleged in the petition for certiorari.[64] Such manner of exercising jurisdiction must be so patent
and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act
at all in contemplation of law.[65] In other words, mere abuse of discretion is not enough - it must be grave.[66] Thus, as
applied in this case, while certiorari may be used to nullify a judgment of acquittal or order of dismissal amounting to
an acquittal, the petitioner seeking for the issuance of such an extraordinary writ must demonstrate clearly that the
lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point that such act is so grave as to deprive it of its very power to
dispense justice.[67]
At this point, it now becomes imperative for this Court to re-assess whether the CA: (1) correctly found grave abuse
of discretion on the RTC's part; and (2) properly reinstated Criminal Case No. 10-1829 without violating the
constitutional prohibition on placing an accused twice in jeopardy.

II.      Effect of Filing an Information Not

Signed by the City Prosecutor or a 
Duly-Delegated Deputy
A.       Grounds for Quashing an 
Information and Prevailing
Jurisprudence
Sees. 3 and 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court read:

Section 3. Grounds.  — The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following
grounds:
(a)  That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;

(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;

(d) That  the   officer  who   filed   the   information   had   no authority to do so;

(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;

(f)  That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by
law;

(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and

(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the o(Tense charged, or the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

xxxx

Section 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor. — The failure of the accused to assert any
ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a
motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those
based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of section 3 of this Rule, (emphases supplied)
Here, Sec. 9 is clear that an accused must move for the quashal of the Information before entering his or her
plea during the arraignment. Failure to file a motion to quash the Information before pleading in an arraignment
shall be deemed a waiver on the part of the accused to raise the grounds in Sec. 3. Nevertheless, failure to move
for a quashal of the Information before entering his or her plea on the grounds based on paragraphs (a), (b), (g) and
(i) of Sec. 3; i.e., (1) that the facts charged do not constitute an offense; (2) that the court tiying the case has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged; (3) that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished; and (4) that the
accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent, will not be considered as a waiver for the accused and the latter
may still file such motion based on these grounds even after arraignment.

Correlatively, the prevailing jurisprudence is of the view that paragraph (d) of Sec. 3, that the officer who filed the
Information had no authority to do so, also cannot be waived by the accused like those in paragraphs (a), (b), (g) and
(i). Even if such ground is not listed in Sec. 9 as among those which cannot be waived, it may still be asserted or
raised by the accused even after arraignment for purposes of quashing an Information and, consequently, having the
criminal case dismissed.

It was first held in Villa v. Ibañez[68] (Villa) that:

x x x It is a valid information signed by a competent officer which, among other requisites, confers jurisdiction on
the court over the person of the accused and the subject matter of the accusation. In consonance with this view, an
infirmity of the nature noted in the information [cannot] be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express
consent.[69] (emphasis supplied)
To date, Villa had never been thoroughly expounded, modified or abandoned during the effectivity of the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions as it relates to the reason why a valid Information signed by a competent officer confers
jurisdiction on the trial court over the person of the accused and over the subject matter of the accusation. It was
merely accepted by the Bench and the Bar that a handling prosecutor's lack of authority to file an Information
adversely affects the personal and subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court in criminal cases.

More so, under the 1987 Constitution, the same ruling was reinforced in People v. Garfin[70] (Garfin) where the Court
enunciated that "lack of authority on the part of the filing officer prevents the court from acquiring jurisdiction over the
case."[71]

Likewise, Garfin was further supplemented by the rulings in Turingan v. Garfin[72] (Turingan) and Tolentino v. Paqueo,
Jr.[73] (Tolentino) where this Court declared that an Information filed by an investigating prosecutor without prior
written authority or approval of the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor (or the Ombudsman or his deputy)
constitutes a jurisdictional defect which cannot be cured and waived by the accused.[74]

Furthermore, this Court in  Quisay v. People[75] (Quisay) also reinforced the doctrines established in Villa, Garfin,
Turingan and Tolentino by unequivocally maintaining that "the filing of an Information by an officer without the
requisite authority to file the same constitutes a jurisdictional infirmity which cannot be cured by silence,
waiver, acquiescence, or even by express consent;" and "such ground may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings."[76] It also added that resolutions issued by an investigating prosecutor finding probable cause to indict
an accused of some crime charged cannot be considered as "prior written authority or approval of the provincial or
city prosecutor."

Finally, this Court in Maximo v. Villapando, Jr.[77] (Maximo) finally institutionalized Villa when it categorically declared
that: (1) "[a]n Information, when required by law to be filed by a public prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by another;"
(2) "[t]he court does not acquire jurisdiction over the case because there is a defect in the Information;" and (3)
"[t]here is no point in proceeding under a defective Information that could never be the basis of a valid conviction."[78]

As deduced from the aforementioned rulings, it now becomes sensible to conclude that the following reasons first laid
down in Villa have been the Court's raison d'etre of why an officer's lack of authority in filing an Information is
considered a jurisdictional infirmity, to wit:
1) Lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused; and

2) Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the offense.

In view of the aforementioned observation, the Court deems it inevitably necessary to revisit the aforementioned
doctrines laid down in Villa, Gar fin, Turingan, Tolentino, Quisay, Maximo and other rulings of similar import on
account of this glaring realization:
Lack of prior written authority or approval on the face of the Information by the prosecuting officers authorized to
approve and sign the same has nothing to do with a trial court's acquisition of jurisdiction in a criminal case.
To start with, the prevailing adjective law at that time of Villa's promulgation was the 1940 Rules of Court[79] with the
following relevant provisions (which were essentially carried over to the 1964 Rules of Court[80] with minor
modifications) that read:

RULE 108
Preliminary Investigation
xxxx
SECTION 6. Duty of Judge or Corresponding Officer in Preliminary Investigation. — The justice of the peace or the
officer who is to conduct the preliminary investigation must take under oath, either in the presence or absence of the
defendant, the testimony of the complainant and the witnesses to be presented by him or by the fiscal, but only the
testimony of the complainant shall be reduced to writing. He shall, however, make an abstract or brief statement of
the substance of the testimony of the other witnesses.
xxxx

RULE 113
Motion to Quash

xxxx
SECTION 2.  Motion to Quash  — Grounds. — The defendant may move to quash the complaint or information on
any of the following grounds:

(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) That    the    court    trying    the    cause    has    no jurisdiction  of the  offense  charged  or  of the person
of the defendant;

(c) That   the   fiscal   has   no   authority   to   file   the information;

(d) That   it   does   not   conform   substantially   to   the prescribed form;

(e) That more than one offense is charged except in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment
for various offenses;

(f) That   the   criminal   action   or   liability   has   been extinguished;

(g) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification;

(h) That the defendant has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted, or acquitted of the offense
charged;

(i)        That the defendant is insane.

If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect in the complaint or information which can be cured by
amendment the court shall order the amendment to be made and shall overrule the motion.
xxxx
SECTION 10. Failure to Move to Quash — Effect of— Exception. — If the defendant does not move to quash the
complaint or information before he pleads thereto he shall be taken to have waived all objections which are grounds
for a motion to quash except when the complaint or information does not charge an offense, or the court is without
jurisdiction of the same. If, however, the defendant learns after he has pleaded or has moved to quash on some other
ground that the offense with which he is now charged is an offense for which he has been pardoned, or of which he
has been convicted or acquitted or been in jeopardy, the court may in its discretion entertain at any time before
judgment a motion to quash on the ground of such pardon, conviction, acquittal or jeopardy, (emphases supplied)
There is nothing in Sec. 6, Rule 108 of the 1940 Rules of Court which requires the handling prosecutor to first secure
either a prior written authority or approval or a signature from the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor before an
Information may be filed with the trial court. Admittedly, Sec. 2(c) of Rule 113 states that a handling prosecutor's lack
of authority to file is a ground for the quashal of an Information. However, in the context of Villa, the Court merely
clarified that, "to be eligible as special counsel to aid a fiscal[,] the appointee must be either an employee or officer in
the Department of Justice." It also did not explain why a handling prosecutor's lack of authority is also intertwined with
Sec. 2(b) of Rule 113 so as to deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the
accused. The only apparent reason why the subject Information in Villa was rendered invalid by this Court was
primarily because the handling prosecutor who signed and filed the same initiatory pleading was not even an officer
of the Department of Justice qualified "to assist a fiscal or prosecuting attorney in the discharge of his [or her] duties"
under Sec. 1686[81] of Act No. 2711[82] amending Sec. 1305 of Act No. 2657[83] - the governing Administrative Code at
that time.

For a clearer understanding, the Court now finds it necessary to dissect the relationship between the concepts
relative to jurisdiction and the handling prosecutor's authority to file an Information.

B. Jurisdiction in General

Semantically, "jurisdiction" is derived from the Latin words "juris" and "died''' which means "I speak by the law."[84] In a
broad and loose sense, it is "[t]he authority of law to act officially in a particular matter in hand."[85] In a refined sense,
it is "the power and authority of a court [or quasi-judicial tribunal] to hear, try, and decide a case."[86] Indeed, a
judgment rendered without such power and authority is void thereby creating no rights and imposing no duties on the
parties.[87] As a consequence, a void judgment may be attacked anytime.[88]

Relatedly, the concept of jurisdiction has several aspects, namely: (1) jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2)
jurisdiction over the parties; (3) jurisdiction over the issues of the case; and (4) in cases involving property, jurisdiction
over the res or the thing which is the subject of the litigation.[89] Additionally, a court must also acquire jurisdiction over
the remedy in order for it to exercise its powers validly and with binding effect.[90] As to the acquisition of jurisdiction in
criminal cases, there are three (3) important requisites which should be satisfied, to wit: (1) the court must have
jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) the court must have jurisdiction over the territory where the offense was
committed; and, (3) the court must have jurisdiction over the person of the accused.[91]

In the case at hand, the relevant aspects of jurisdiction being disputed are: (1) over the subject matter or, in criminal
cases, over the nature of the offense charged; and (2) over the parties, or in criminal cases, over the person of the
accused. At this juncture, the Court will now proceed to determine how these aspects of jurisdiction are supposedly
affected by the handling prosecutor's authority to sign and file an Information.

C.      Jurisdiction Over the Subject 

Matter or Nature of the Offense

Jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which
organizes the court - it is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law.[92]  It is the power to hear and
determine the general class to which the proceedings in question belong.[93]

As applied to criminal cases, jurisdiction over a given crime is vested by law upon a particular court and may not be
conferred thereto by the parties involved in the offense.[94] More importantly, jurisdiction over an offense cannot be
conferred to a court by the accused through an express waiver or otherwise.[95] Here, a trial court's jurisdiction is
determined by the allegations in the Complaint or Information and not by the result of proof.[96] These allegations
pertain to ultimate facts constituting elements of the crime charged.[97] Such recital of ultimate facts apprises the
accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him or her.[98]

Clearly, the authority of the officer in filing an Information has nothing to do with the ultimate facts which describe the
charges against the accused. The issue on whether or not the handling prosecutor secured the necessary authority
from his or her superior before filing the Information does not affect or change the cause of the accusation or nature
of the crime being attributed to the accused. The nature and cause of the accusation remains the same with or
without such required authority.

In fact, existing jurisprudence even allows the Prosecution to amend an Information alleging facts which do not
constitute an offense just to make it line up with the nature of the accusation.[99] In other words, existing rules grant
the Prosecution a chance to amend a fatally and substantially defective Information affecting the cause of the
accusation or the nature of the crime being imputed against the accused. As such, it is with more reason that the
handling prosecutor shall also be afforded with the chance to first secure the necessary authority from the provincial,
city or chief state prosecutor. Viewed   from   a   different   angle,   the   law   conferring   a   court   with jurisdiction
over a specific offense does not cease to operate in cases where there is lack of authority on the part of the officer or
handling prosecutor filing an Information. As such, the authority of an officer filing the Information is irrelevant in
relation to a trial court's power or authority to take cognizance of a criminal case according to its nature as it is
determined by law. Therefore, absence of authority or prior approval of the handling prosecutor from the city or
provincial prosecutor cannot be considered as among the grounds for the quashal of an Information which is non-
waivable.

D.       Jurisdiction Over the Person of the 

Accused

Jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his or her: (1) arrest or apprehension, with or without a
warrant; or (2) voluntary appearance or submission to the jurisdiction of the court.[100] It allows the court to render a
decision that is binding on the accused.[101] However, unlike jurisdiction over the subject matter, the right to challenge
or object to a trial court's jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be waived by silence or inaction before the
entering of a plea during arraignment.[102] Moreover, such right may also be waived by the accused when he or she
files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he or she invokes the special jurisdiction of the
court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person.[103]

Akin to the foregoing discussions on the trial court's acquisition of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the authority of
an officer or handling prosecutor in the filing of an Information also has nothing to do with the voluntary appearance
or validity of the arrest of the accused. Voluntary appearance entirely depends on the volition of the accused, while
the validity of an arrest strictly depends on the apprehending officers' compliance with constitutional and statutory
safeguards in its execution. Here, the trial court's power to make binding pronouncements concerning and affecting
the person of the accused is merely passive and is solely hinged on the conduct of either the accused or the arresting
officers - not on the authority of the handling prosecutor filing the criminal Information. Moreover, if a serious ground
such as jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be waived, so can the authority of the handling prosecutor
which does not have any constitutional underpinning. Therefore, a handling prosecutor's lack of prior authority or
approval from the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor in the filing of an Information may be waived by the
accused if not raised as a ground in a motion to quash before entering a plea.

E.       A    Handling    Prosecutor's    Legal Standing and Authority to Appear

The 1987 Constitution gave this Court the exclusive power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts as well as the power to disapprove procedural rules in special courts and quasi-judicial bodies.
[104]
 Covered by this constitutional power to promulgate rules of procedure is the prerogative to define and prescribe
guidelines on who are qualified to appear before the courts and conduct litigation on behalf of oneself or another. In
other words, legal representation in the form of a court appearance is a component of law practice under this Court's
constitutional power to regulate the legal profession. As such, the conditions or requirements for such representation,
being matters of procedure, are governed by the Rules of Court.

To begin with, the relevant portion of Sec. 23, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court succinctly states that "[a]ttorneys have
authority to bind their clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals,
and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure;" save for compromises or partial receipt of anything which
discharges the whole claim. This is the reason why Sec. 21 of the same Rule presumes that an attorney is
"presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he [or she] appears, and no written power of
attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for his client" unless the presiding judge may, on motion of
any party and on reasonable grounds therefor being shown, "require any attorney who assumes the right to appear in
a case to produce or prove the authority under which he appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue,
the name of the person who employed him, and may thereupon make such order as justice requires." Hence, in the
context of law practice, to "represent" is standing in place, supplying the place, or performing the duties or exercising
the rights, of the party represented; to speak or act with authority on behalf of another; to conduct and control
proceedings in court on behalf of another.[105]

In this jurisdiction, the relevant governing procedures in the conduct of litigation and court appearances are laid out in
Sees. 33 and 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court as follows:
Section 33. Standing in court of person authorized to appear for Government. — Any official or other person
appointed or designated in accordance with law to appear for the Government of the Philippines shall have all the
rights of a duly authorized member of the bar to appear in any case in which said government has an interest direct
or indirect.

Section 34. By whom litigation conducted.  — In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation
in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for the purpose, or with the aid an attorney. In any other
court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either
personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar. (emphasis supplied)
Both aforementioned sections of Rule 138 set out two (2) major categories of representation and clearly delineate the
rules regarding a person's capacity to appear or stand in court depending on who or what is being represented.

In the first category, Sec. 33 states that a person appointed or designated in accordance with law to appear on
behalf of the Government with a direct or indirect interest in a litigation shall have all the rights, of a duly authorized
member of the Bar, to appear before the courts. This means that duly authorized officials, even if they are not
members of the Bar, have the authority to sue in behalf of and bind their principals to the judgment or any disposition
of a competent court in the same manner and capacity as those who are actual members of the Bar. Such category
of legal representation is part of the performance of official acts as mandated by law.

In the second category, Sec. 34 enumerates the modes of appearance for private or non-governmental parties:(1)
by counsel or assisted appearance, where they assign legal representatives to appear on their behalf by virtue of
some contract of engagement or proceed with the litigation through compulsory legal assistance (i.e., appointment as
counsel de officio); and (2) pro se  or personal appearance, where they enter their personal appearance and conduct
their own litigation.

In criminal cases, the filing of a Complaint or Information in court initiates a criminal action.[106]Such act of filing
signifies that the handling prosecutor has entered his or her appearance on behalf of the People of the Philippines
and is presumably clothed with ample authority from the agency concerned such as the Department of Justice or the
Office of the Ombudsman. However, the appearance of a handling prosecutor, in the form of filing an Information
against the accused, is conditioned by Sec. 4 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court with a requirement of a prior written
authority or approval from the city or provincial prosecutor. Since a handling prosecutor is an officer of the
government's prosecutorial arm, the Court also considers it necessary to expound on the nature of prosecutorial
functions in relation to Sec. 33 of Rule 138.

For a clearer understanding of the nature of a prosecutor's duties and corresponding scope of authority, the Court
highlights that the prosecution of crimes pertains to the Executive Branch of Government whose principal duty is to
see to it that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this duty is the right to prosecute their
violators.[107] Concomitant to this duty is the function of conducting a preliminary investigation which is defined as "an
inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial."[108] The purposes of
such inquiry or proceeding are: (1) to inquire concerning the commission of a crime and the connection of the
accused with it, in order that he may be informed of the nature and character of the crime charged against him, and, if
there is probable cause for believing him guilty, that the State may take the necessary steps to bring him to trial; (2) to
preserve the evidence and keep the witnesses within the control of the State; and (3) to determine the amount of bail,
if the offense is bailable.[109] Moreover, such proceeding is also meant to: (1) avoid baseless, hasty, malicious and
oppressive prosecution; and (2) to protect the innocent against the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial as a
result of an open and public accusation of a crime.[110] In essence, a preliminary investigation serves the following
main purposes: (1) to protect the innocent against wrongful prosecutions; and (2) to spare the State from using its
funds and resources in useless prosecutions.[111] Stated succinctly, such proceeding was established to prevent the
indiscriminate filing of criminal cases to the detriment of the entire administration of justice.

In determining the proper officer of the Executive Branch charged with the handling of prosecutorial duties before the
courts, it is noteworthy to point out that the important condition for the valid filing of an Information was first provided
in Sec. 1 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 5180[112] - a statute which first prescribed and outlined a uniform system of
preliminary investigation by state, provincial and city prosecutors - which states that "no assistant fiscal or state
prosecutor may file an [information or dismiss a case except with the prior authority or approval of the provincial or
city fiscal or Chief State Prosecutor."[113] The same provision was eventually incorporated in what is now Sec. 4, Rule
112 of the Rules of Court concerning preliminary investigations which is hereby reproduced in verbatim as follows:
Section 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. — If the investigating prosecutor finds cause to hold
the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and information. He shall certify under oath in the information
that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant and his
witnesses; that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof; that the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him;
and that he was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall recommend the dismissal
of the complaint.

Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the record of the case to the provincial or city prosecutor or
chief state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in
the exercise of its original jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within ten (10) days from their receipt thereof
and shall immediately inform the parties of such action.

No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior
written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman
or his deputy.
Where the investigating prosecutor recommends the dismissal of the complaint but his recommendation is
disapproved by the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy on the
ground that a probable cause exists, the latter may, by himself, file the information against the respondent, or direct
any other assistant prosecutor or state prosecutor to do so without conducting another preliminary investigation.

If upon petition by a proper party under such rules as the Department of Justice may prescribe or motu proprio, the
Secretary of Justice reverses or modifies the resolution of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor,
he shall direct the prosecutor concerned either to file the corresponding information without conducting another
preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or information with notice to the parties.
The same rule shall apply in preliminary investigations conducted by the officers of the Office of the Ombudsman,
(emphasis supplied)
Clearly, Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 5180 (as embodied in Sec. 4 of Rule 112) merely provides the guidelines on howhandling
prosecutors, who are subordinates to the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor, should proceed in formally
charging a person imputed with a crime before the courts. It neither provides for the power or authority of courts to
take cognizance of criminal cases filed before them nor imposes a condition on the acquisition or exercise of such
power or authority to try or hear the criminal case. Instead, it simply imposes a duty on investigating prosecutors to
first secure a "prior authority or approval" from the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor before filing an Information
with the courts. Thus, non-compliance with Sec. 4 of Rule 112 on the duty of a handling prosecutor to secure a "prior
written authority or approval" from the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor merely affects the "standing" of such
officer "to appear for the Government of the Philippines" as contemplated in Sec. 33 of Rule 138.

Moreover, the Court deems it fit to emphasize that, since rules of procedure are not ends in themselves,[114] courts
may still brush aside procedural infirmities in favor of resolving the merits of the case.[115] Correlatively, since legal
representation before the courts and quasi-judicial bodies is a matter of procedure, any procedural lapse pertaining to
such matter may be deemed waived when no timely objections have been raised.[116] This means that the failure of an
accused to question the handling prosecutor's authority in the filing of an Information will be considered as a valid
waiver and courts may brush aside the effect of such procedural lapse.
In effect, the operative consequence of filing of an Information without a prior written authority or approval from the
provincial, city or chief state prosecutor is that the handling prosecutor's representation as counsel  for the  State 
may  not  be  recognized  by  the  trial  court as sanctioned by the procedural rules enforced by this Court pursuant to
its constitutional power to promulgate rules on pleading, practice and procedure. Courts are not bound by the internal
procedures of the Executive Branch, most especially by its hierarchy of prosecution officers. Rightly so because, as
pointed out earlier, the prosecution of crimes lies with the Executive Branch of the government whose principal power
and responsibility is to see that the laws of the land are faithfully executed.[117]

The Court is certain that the purpose of R.A. No. 5180, as well as Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, is neither to
cripple nor to divest duly appointed prosecutors from performing their constitutional and statutory mandate of
prosecuting criminal offenders but to prevent a situation where such powerful attribute of the State might be abused
and indiscriminately wielded or be used as a tool of oppression by just any prosecutor for personal or other reasons.
Holding fewer top officials in the prosecutorial service accountable on command responsibility exhorts, if not ensures,
the implementation of supervisory safeguards and policies, especially in instances when indictments with deficient
indications of probable cause are allowed to reach the courts to the detriment of an otherwise blameless accused.

However, such libertarian safeguard outlined in Sec. 4 of Rule 112 should be balanced with the State's constitutional
duty to maintain peace and order.[118] The Court emphasizes that the prosecution of crimes, especially those involving
crimes against the State, is the concern of peace officers and government prosecutors.[119] Public prosecutors, not
private complainants, are the ones obliged to bring forth before the law those who have transgressed it.[120] They are
the representatives not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a Sovereign whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all.[121] Accordingly, while an Information which is required by
law to be filed by a public prosecuting officer cannot be filed by another,[122] the latter may still be considered as a de
facto officer who is in possession of an office in the open exercise of its functions under the color of an appointment
even though, in some cases, it may be irregular.[123] This is because a prosecutor is ingrained with the reputation as
having the authority to sign and file Informations which makes him or her a de facto officer.[124]

Relatedly, the Court in Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan[125] even had the occasion to point out that "[t]he State should not
be prejudiced and deprived of its right to prosecute the cases simply because of the ineptitude or
nonchalance of the Ombudsman/Special Prosecutor." This doctrine also applies with equal force to cases where
a city or provincial prosecutor fails to sign the Information or duly delegate the signing and filing of the same pleading
with the competent court to the handling prosecutor. A necessary component of the power to execute our laws is the
right to prosecute their violators.[126] The duties of a public office (such as the Department of Justice or the
subordinate Office of the Prosecutor) include all those which: (1) truly lie within its scope; (2) are essential to the
accomplishment of the main purpose for which the office was created; and (3) are germane to and serve to promote
the accomplishment of the principal purposes, although incidental and collateral.[127] This is the reason why even an
irregularity in the appointment of a prosecutor does not necessarily invalidate his or her act of signing complaints,
holding investigations, and conducting prosecutions if he or she may be considered a de facto officer.[128]

To constitute a de facto officer, the following requisites must be present, viz: (1) there must be an office having a de
facto existence or, at least, one recognized by law; (2) the claimant must be in actual possession of the office; and (3)
the claimant must be acting under color of title or authority.[129] As to the third requisite, the word "color," as in "color of
authority," "color of law," "color of office," "color of title," and "colorable," suggests a kind of holding out and means
"appearance, semblance, or simulacrum," but not necessarily the reality.[130] Contrastingly, a mere usurper is one who
takes possession of an office and undertakes to act officially without any color of right or authority, either actual or
apparent, he or she is no officer at all.[131]

In the present case, the Court cogently acknowledges that the de facto doctrine has been formulated, not for the
protection of the de facto officer principally, but rather for the protection of the public and individuals who get involved
in the official acts of persons discharging the duties of an office without being lawful officers.[132] At the very least, an
officer who maliciously insists on filing an Information without a prior written authority or approval from the provincial
or city prosecutor may be held criminally or administratively liable for usurpation provided that all of its elements are
present and are proven, especially the mens rea in criminal cases.[133] However, a handling prosecutor who files an
Information despite lack of authority but without any  indicia of bad faith or criminal intent will be considered as a mere
de facto officer clothed with the color of authority and exercising valid official acts.[134] In other words, the lack of
authority on the part of the handling prosecutor may either result in a valid filing of an Information if not objected to by
the accused or subject the former to a possible criminal or administrative liability—but it does not prevent the trial
court from acquiring jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the person of the accused.

Besides, the OCP's September 21, 2010 Resolution reveals that the subject Information was presumably reviewed by
City Prosecutor Aspi before it was filed by ACP Paggao. The contents of such resolution read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Gina Villa Gomez y Anduyan @ Gina is recommended to be prosecuted for
violation of THE REVISED PENAL CODE [A]rt. 212 in rel. to [A]rt. 211-A. The attached Information is
recommended to be approved for filing in court. No bail, (emphasis supplied)
As such, the Court can reasonably deduce the following facts, to wit:
(1) The accused did not dispute the fact that the subject Information was presumably attached to the September
21,   2010   Resolution,   as   stated   in   the   dispositive portion, when it was forwarded to City Prosecutor Aspi for
approval and Signature.[135]

(2) The   OCP's   September   21,   2010   Resolution,   albeit indicating that that the attached Information was "to be
approved"  for  filing,  was  actually  signed   by  City Prosecutor Aspi himself below the word "Approved.".

(3) The attached Information was signed only by Assistant City   Prosecutor   Paggao   and   did   not   contain   City
Prosecutor Aspi's signature.

(4) Assistant City Prosecutor Paggao merely certified in the subject Information that "is being filed with the prior
authority of the City Prosecutor."
Proceeding from the aforementioned observations, the requirement of securing a prior written authority or approval of
the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor even becomes redundant and inapplicable. The reason
being is that, when the draft September 21, 2010 Resolution was presented to City Prosecutor Aspi for review and
approval, it came with the subject Information presumably attached to the same Resolution. This can be inferred in
the second sentence of the dispositive portion of the OCP's September 21, 2010 Resolution which categorically
states that "[t]he attached Information is recommended to be approved for filing in court."[136] It means that the
Resolution recommending for the indictment of the accused is still subject for approval by the city prosecutor. The
phrase "to be approved" would normally involve a situation where the approving officer has yet to give his or her
imprimatur to a document and its contents before the same is made official either by entering it in the public records
or filing it with an agency or tribunal. This presupposes that such approving officer has yet to examine the document's
content before signifying his or her assent to the contents thereof.

Since a public official enjoys the presumption of regularity in the discharge of one's official duties and functions,[137]it
also becomes reasonable for the Court to assume that the attached or accompanying Information was read and
understood by City Prosecutor Aspi when he affixed his signature on the September 21, 2020 Resolution. The fact
that City Prosecutor Aspi signed the Resolution himself constitutes a tacit approval to the contents of the attached
Information as well as to such pleading/document's resultant filing. Clearly, his actions indicate that he had indeed
authorized ACP Paggao to file the subject Information. Moreover, the requirement of first obtaining a prior written
authority or approval before filing an Information is understood or rendered useless and inoperative when the same
Information is already attached to the Resolution signed by the city prosecutor himself recommending for the
indictment of the accused. There being no factual indication to the contrary, this presupposes that City Prosecutor
Aspi had knowledge of the existence and the contents of the subject Information when he signed the OCP's
September 21, 2010 Resolution. To require City Prosecutor Aspi's signature on the face of the subject Information
under the circumstances would be to impose a redundant and pointless requirement on the Prosecution.

Furthermore, this Court emphatically evinces its observation that what is primarily subjected to review by the
provincial, city or chief state prosecutor in the context of R.A. No. 5180 is the very Resolution issued by an
investigating prosecutor recommending either the indictment or the release of a respondent in a preliminary
investigation from possible criminal charges. In comparison, the Information merely contains factual recitations which
make out an offense; it does not provide for the underlying reasons for such proposed indictment. This means that,
whatever authority that a handling prosecutor may have, as it pertains to the filing of an Information, proceeds from
the review and subsequent approval by the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor of the underlying
Resolutionitself. Therefore, the authority of a handling prosecutor need not be shown in the face of the Information
itself if it is duly established in the records that the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor approved the underlying
Resolution recommending the indictment.

More importantly, the petitioner failed to show that ACP Paggao, the investigating and handling prosecutor, did not
comply with Sec. 7(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which reads:
Section 7. Records. — (a) Records supporting the information or complaint. — An information or complaint filed in
court shall be supported by the affidavits and counter-affidavits of the parties and their witnesses, together with the
other supporting evidence and the resolution on the case, x x x (emphasis supplied)
Under the aforecited provision, the handling prosecutor is required to furnish the trial court the resolution on the
preliminary investigation along with the necessary documents in support of the Information or Complaint. Had the
presiding judge been vigilant and circumspect in his duty to carefully scrutinize the records of the case, he would
have noticed that the September 21, 2010 Resolution filed, together with the Information, bears City Prosecutor
Aspi's signature. This shows that City Prosecutor Aspi not only had knowledge of the contents of the draft
Information, as attached to the September 21, 2010 Resolution, but also gave his consent for ACP Paggao to file the
same pleading with the trial court. The RTC's casual disregard of and dismissive attitude towards the September 21,
2010 Resolution's vital contents make up for a clear case of grave abuse of discretion.

Additionally, the Court also observes that the petitioner-accused was arrested in flagrante delicto during an
entrapment operation and underwent an inquest proceeding instead of the usual preliminary investigation.
Accordingly, there is a need to refer to Sec. 6 of Rule 112 on warrantless arrests and inquests revealing an exception
to the requirement of securing prior written authority or approval from the city or provincial prosecutor which reads:
Section 6. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant.  — When a person is lawfully arrested without a
warrant involving an offense which requires a preliminary investigation, the complaint or information may be filed by
a prosecutor without need of such investigation provided an inquest has been conducted in accordance with existing
rules. In the absence or unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the complaint may be filed by the offended party or a
peace officer directly with the proper court on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or
person.

Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation in accordance
with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in
the presence of his counsel. Notwithstanding the waiver, he may apply for bail and the investigation must be
terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.

After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a preliminary investigation, the accused may, within five
(5) days from the time he learns of its filing, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence
in his defense as provided in this Rule, (emphasis supplied)
Inquest is defined as an informal and summary investigation conducted by a public prosecutor in criminal cases
involving persons arrested and detained without the benefit of a warrant of arrest issued by the court for the purpose
of determining whether said persons should remain under custody and correspondingly be charged in court.[138] The
accelerated process of inquest, owing to its summary nature and the attendant risk of running against Art. 125 of the
RPC, ends with either the prompt filing of an Information in court or the immediate release of the arrested person.
[139]
 This is because a person subject of a warrantless arrest must be delivered to the proper judicial authorities within
the periods provided in Art. 125 of the RPC, otherwise, the public official or employee could be held liable for the
failure to deliver except if grounded on reasonable and allowable delays.[140] Here, time is of the essence when the
arrest is warrantless; especially when it is not planned, arranged or scheduled in advance.[141] And, since Sec. 5 of
Rule 113 mandates that inquest proceedings be conducted pursuant to warrantless arrests,[142] inquest prosecutors
have to take into account that they have to conduct such proceedings in an expeditious matter and in a way which is
not violative of the suspect's constitutional rights; otherwise, they risk releasing such person arrested.

At this point, it bears emphasizing that it is a more prudent jurisprudential policy to allow a suspect arrested
in flagrante delicto (or pursuant to other modes of warrantless arrest) to be lawfully restrained in the interest of public
safety.[143] Moreover, the same rule uses the phrase "may be filed by a prosecutor" without specifying the rank of
such officer. This implies that any available prosecutor conducting the inquest may file an Information with the trial
court.

As a matter of procedure, Sec. 6 of Rule 112 even allows private offended parties or peace officers to file a Complaint
in lieu of an Information   directly   with   the   competent   court   in   the   absence   or unavailability of an inquest
prosecutor in instances involving warrantless arrests. Thus, it is with more reason that inquest prosecutors can
directly file the Information with the proper court without waiting for the approval of the provincial, city or chief state
prosecutor if the latter is unavailable due to the exigent nature of processing warrantless arrests.

This Court also points out that, under Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, both lack of jurisdiction over the offense
charged under Sec. 3(b) and lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused under Sec. 3(c) are listed as grounds
for the quashal of an Information which are separate and distinct from, not as subsets of, the lack of an officer's
authority to file such Information under Sec. 3(d). This means that the various grounds enumerated in Sec. 3 of Rule
117 are separate and distinct from each other, some waivable while others are not.

In sum, a procedural infirmity regarding legal representation is not a jurisdictional defect or handicap which
prevents courts from taking cognizance of a case, it is merely a defect which should not result to the quashal of an
Information. As a result, objections or challenges pertaining to a handling prosecutor's lack of authority in the filing of
an Information may be waived by the accused through silence, inaction or failure to register a timely objection. An
Information filed by a handling prosecutor with no prior approval or authority from the provincial, city or chief state
prosecutor will be rendered as merely quashable, until waived by the accused, and binding on the part of the State
due to the presence of colorable authority.
F.       Nature of the Requirement of 
Obtaining a Prior Written 
Authority or Approval from 
the Provincial, City or Chief State Prosecutor
To understand the nature of the requirement for a handling prosecutor to first secure a written authority or approval
from the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor before filing an Information, it is necessary to analyze such requisite
in the context of the rights accorded by the Constitution to the accused.

At the outset, the Court deems it noteworthy to point out that some of the more serious grounds which tread on the
fine line of constitutional infirmity may even be waived by the accused.

One such example, as mentioned earlier in the discussions pertaining to Sec. 3(c) of Rule 117, is the right of an
accused to question the legality of his or her arrest as being a violation of his or her constitutional right to due
process. It is already established in jurisprudence that "[t]he right to question the validity of an arrest may be waived if
the accused, assisted by counsel, fails to object to its validity before arraignment."[144]

Another example is the right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him or her, a
right which is given life during the arraignment of the accused.[145] The theory in law is that since the accused officially
begins to prepare his defense against the accusation on the basis of the recitals in the Information read to him or her
during arraignment, then the prosecution must establish its case on the basis of the same Information.
[146]
 Accordingly, in instances pertaining to duplicity of offenses (where a single Complaint or Information charges
more than one offense),[147] Sec. 3(f) of Rule 117 makes it a ground for the quashal of a Complaint or Information.
Even then, such ground may still be validly waived by the accused;[148] notwithstanding the serious constitutional
ramification that charging two or more offenses in an Information might confuse the accused in his or her defense,[149] 
a situation affecting a person's perception of the nature and cause of an accusation.

Relatedly, the constitutional requirements for the exercise of the right to be informed of the nature and cause of
accusation are outlined in Sec 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court as follows:
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of
the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place
where the offense was committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information.

In this regard, the Court points out that there is nothing in the aforementioned provision which requires a prior
authority, approval or signature of the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor for an Information to be sufficient. Even
assuming for the sake of argument that such prior authority, approval or signature is required, this Court in its recent
en bane ruling in People v. Solar[150] where all prosecutors were "instructed to state with sufficient
particularity not just the acts complained of or the acts constituting the offense, but also the aggravating
circumstances, whether qualifying or generic, as well as any other attendant circumstances, that would impact the
penalty to be imposed on the accused should a verdict of conviction be reached," held that failure of the accused to
question the insufficiency of an Information as to the averment of aggravating circumstances with specificity
constitutes a waivable defect. Logically, if the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation may be waived by the accused, then it is with more reason that the absence of the requirement pertaining
to a handling prosecutor's duty to secure a prior written authority or approval from the provincial, city or chief state
prosecutor in the filing of an Information may also be waived.

Consistent with the foregoing observations, if some grounds for the quashal of an Information with serious
constitutional implications may be waived, it is with more reason that the ground on securing a prior written approval
or authority from the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor, which has nothing to do with the Bill of Rights or with a
trial court's jurisdiction to take cognizance of a case, can also be waived by the accused.

At this critical juncture, the Court highlights that the right of the accused to a preliminary investigation is merely
statutory as it is not a right guaranteed by the Constitution.[151] Furthermore, such right is personal and may even be
waived by the accused.[152] On this score, it is also noteworthy to point out that the requirement of first securing a prior
written approval or authority from the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor before filing an Information is merely
contained in R.A. No. 5180, the substantive law which first recognized the right of an accused to a preliminary
investigation. Significantly, even such law makes no specific mention of the effect on the validity of an Information
filed without first securing a prior written approval or authority from the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor.
Consequently, such statutory requirement of securing a prior written authority or approval cannot be expanded to also
touch on the validity of an Information. Moreover, the same law also cannot be interpreted as a condition on the
power and authority of trial courts to hear and decide certain criminal cases. Expressium facit cessare taciturn —
where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be
extended to other matters.[153] And since procedural rules should yield to substantive laws,[154] it should be understood
that this Court cannot promulgate a rule of procedure which would defeat the trial courts' power to acquire jurisdiction
in criminal cases as conferred and outlined by Batas Pambansa Bilang 129[155] (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980).

Aside from this observation on the nature of the right of the accused to a preliminary investigation, the Court also
reiterates the rudimentary rule that absence of a preliminary investigation is not a ground to quash a Complaint
or Information under Sec. 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.[156] A preliminary investigation may be done away with
entirely without infringing the constitutional right of an accused under the due process clause to a fair trial.[157] The
reason being is that such proceeding is merely preparatory to trial, not a trial on the merits.[158] An adverse
recommendation by the investigating prosecutor in a concluded preliminary investigation does not result in the
deprivation of liberty of the accused as contemplated in the Constitution.[159] Relatedly, although the restrictive effect
on liberty of those arrested in flagrante delicto is more apparent during the initial stages of prosecution   (inquest  
proceedings),[160]   it   is   merely   indirect   since   the pronouncement on according provisional liberty or imposing
preventive imprisonment ultimately depends on the trial court's action after giving all parties the opportunity to be
heard in a bail proceeding.

Moreover, Sec. 8,[161] Rule 112 of the Rules of Court even enumerates instances where a preliminary investigation is
not required; allowing the complainant (public or private)[162] or handling prosecutor to directly file the Complaint or
Information with the trial court. Significantly, even jurisprudence is settled that the absence of a preliminary
investigation neither affects the court's jurisdiction over the case nor impairs the validity of the Information or
otherwise renders it defective.[163] Hence, if the lack of a preliminary investigation is not even a ground to quash an
Information, what more so the lack of prior written authority or approval on the part of the handling prosecutor which
is merely a formal requirement and part of the preliminary investigation itself? It can only mean that such requirement
of prior written authority or approval is not jurisdictional and may be waived by the accused expressly or impliedly.

In a nutshell, the Court reiterates that even some constitutionally guaranteed rights may be expressly or impliedly
waived by the accused. The perceived right of the accused to question a handling prosecutor's authority in the filing
of an Information does not even have any constitutional or statutory bearing. At best, it is only recognized by this
Court, pursuant to its rule-making power, as a procedural device available for the accused to invoke in aid of the
orderly administration of justice. Accordingly, such requirement  to   obtain  a  prior  written  authority  or  approval  
from  the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor is considered merely a formal, and not a jurisdictional, requisite
which may be waived by the accused.

G. Relationship   Between   Jurisdiction 

and Authority to Appear

Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law[164]—it establishes a relation between the court and the subject matter.
[165]
 This is because Congress has the power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts;
although it may not deprive this Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Sec. 5, Art. VIII of the Constitution.
[166]
 More importantly, the authority of the courts to try a case is not embraced by the rule-making power of the
Supreme Court to promulgate rules of "pleading, practice and procedure in all courts."[167] In other words, only a
constitutional or statutory provision can create and/or vest a tribunal with jurisdiction.

Incidentally, the power to define, prescribe and apportion jurisdiction necessarily includes the power to expand or
diminish the scope of a court's authority to take cognizance of a case, to impose additional conditions or to reduce
established requirements with respect to an adjudicative body's acquisition of jurisdiction. This is because every
statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and
purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and
subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms.[168] In effect, only a law (or
constitutional provision in the case of this Court) may add or take away any requirement affecting jurisdiction. Not
even a rule of procedure or judicial decision can legally accomplish such act as both are not "laws" as used in the
context of the Constitution.[169] The purpose of procedural rules or "adjective law" is to ensure the effective
enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and speedy administration of justice;[170] while judicial decisions
which apply or interpret the Constitution or the laws cannot be considered as an independent source of law and
cannot create law.[171] As such, while the Rules of Court (specifically the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure) may
impose conditions as to the proper conduct of litigation such as legal standing, it cannot by itself (and without any
constitutional or statutory basis) impose additional conditions or remove existing requirements pertaining to a
tribunal's assumption or acquisition of jurisdiction.

Presently, there is no penal law which prescribes or requires that an Information filed must be personally signed by
the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor (or a delegated deputy) in order for trial courts to acquire jurisdiction over
a criminal case. Clearly, the pronouncement in Villa is not sanctioned by any constitutional or statutory provision.
Absence such constitutional or statutory fiat, such pronouncement or ruling cannot operate to create another
jurisdictional requirement before a court can acquire jurisdiction over a criminal case without treading on the confines
of judicial legislation. In effect, Villa is rendered unconstitutional for violating the basic principle of separation of
powers.[172] Hence, it now stands to reason that a handling prosecutor's lack of prior written authority or approval from
the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor in the filing of an Information does not affect a trial court's acquisition of
jurisdiction over the subject matter or the person of the accused.

In this regard, the Court reminds the Bench and the Bar that "substantive law" is that part of the law which creates,
defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action.
[173]
Comparatively, "procedural law" refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of procedure in order
that courts may be able to administer justice.[174] It ensures the effective enforcement of substantive rights by
providing for a system that obviates arbitrariness, caprice, despotism, or whimsicality in the settlement of disputes.
[175]
 And since jurisdiction is conferred upon courts by substantive law,[176] it cannot be accorded to or taken away from
an otherwise competent court for purely procedural reasons. As alluded to earlier, a court's jurisdiction is different
from a government officer's authority to sue as the former fixes the rights and obligations of the parties after
undergoing due process while the latter pertains to internal matters concerning the giving of consent by the State in
its own affairs. All told, the Court is convinced that the CA did not commit any reversible error in not applying Villa,
along with its derivative rulings, and in granting the Prosecution's petition for certiorari.

III.     The State's Right to Due Process in 

Criminal Cases

It is settled that both the accused and the State are entitled to due process.[177] For the former, such right includes the
right to present evidence for his or her defense;[178] for the latter, such right pertains to a fair opportunity to prosecute
and convict.[179] Accordingly, in such context, it becomes reasonable to assume that the Constitution affords not only
the accused but also the State with the complete guarantee of procedural due process, especially the opportunity to
be heard.

Accordingly, in cases involving the quashal of an Information, Sec. 1, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Time to move to quash. — At any time before entering his plea, the accused may move to quash the
complaint or information.
The application of such provision as to who may initiate the quashal was clarified by the Court in People v. Hon.
Nitafan[180]  (Nitafan) as follows:
It is also clear from Section 1 that the right to file a motion to quash belongs only to the accused. There is
nothing in the rules which authorizes the court or judge to motu proprio initiate a motion to quash if no such
motion was filed by the accused. A motion contemplates an initial action originating from the accused. It is the
latter who is in the best position to know on what ground/s he will base his objection to the information. Otherwise, if
the judge initiates the motion to quash, then he is not only pre-judging the case of the prosecution but also takes side
with the accused. This would violate the right to a hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal. Such
independence and impartiality cannot be expected from a magistrate, such as herein respondent judge, who in his
show cause orders, orders dismissing the charges and order denying the motions for reconsideration stated and even
expounded in a lengthy disquisition with citation of authorities, the grounds and justifications to support his action.  
Certainly, in compliance with the orders, the prosecution has no choice but to present arguments contradicting that of
respondent judge. Obviously, however, it cannot be expected from respondent judge to overturn the reasons he
relied upon in his different orders without contradicting himself. To allow a judge to initiate such motion even under
the guise of a show cause order would result in a situation where a magistrate who is supposed to be neutral, in
effect, acts as counsel for the accused and judge as well. A combination of these two personalities in one person is
violative of due process which is a fundamental right not only of the accused but also of the prosecution, (emphases
supplied)
The rule is clear that only an accused may move to quash a Complaint or Information. However, for the guidance of
the Bench and the Bar, the Court deems it imperative to clarify that Nitafan does not apply to paragraphs (a), (b), (g)
and (i), Sec. 3 of Rule 117. It is obvious that proceeding to trial after arraignment would be utterly pointless if: (1) the
Information alleges facts that do not constitute an offense; (2) the trial court has no power and authority to take
cognizance of the offense being charged against the accused; (3) the accused cannot anymore be made to stand
charges because the criminal action or liability had been extinguished under Art. 89 of the RPC or some other special
law; or (4) the accused would be placed in double jeopardy. In these instances, the trial court is allowed to act sua
sponte provided that it shall first conduct a preliminary hearing to verify the existence of facts supporting any of
such grounds. Should the trial court find these facts to be adequately supported by evidence, the case shall be
dismissed without proceeding to trial. Doing so would unburden both the parties and the courts from having to
undergo the rigmarole of participating in a void proceeding.
In the instant case, the RTC, in ordering the dismissal of the case, resultantly quashed the subject Information in
a motu proprio and summary manner despite the fact that: (1) both the accused and the prosecution had already
adduced all of their evidence and both have rested their respective cases; and (2) the same case was already
submitted for decision. In doing so, it failed to notify the Prosecution and give the latter an opportunity to be heard on
the matter. Since, as comprehensively explained in the previous discussions, lack of authority of the handling
prosecutor to file an Information does not affect the trial court's jurisdiction or authority to take cognizance of a
criminal case, it is not among the exceptions of Nitafan where the RTC may sua sponte quash the Information and
dismiss the case.

Besides, assuming argnendo that a non-waivable ground to quash the subject Information existed in this case, what
the RTC should have done was to  conduct  a  preliminary   hearing  to   give  the  parties,   especially  the
Prosecution, a right to be heard. In doing so, the RTC may be able to identify (based on evidentiaiy facts) which
grounds are waivable and which are not so that it may properly proceed or dispose of the case, thereby facilitating an
expeditious resolution of the criminal case. Verily, the summary act of quashing the subject Information and
perfunctorily dismissing the corresponding criminal case is an overt violation of Sec. 1, Rule 117.

As pointed out in Nitafan, a  motu proprio and summary quashal of an Information also violates the State's (and the
Prosecution's) fundamental right to due process as the presiding judge who initiates such quashal would now be
tainted with bias in favor of the accused. In addition, such perfunctory court action also deprives the Prosecution of its
right to be notified and to be accorded the opportunity to be heard regarding such quashal of the Information and
eventual dismissal of the criminal case. Such violation of the State's right to due process raises a serious
jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will for it has the effect of ousting a court of its
jurisdiction.[181]

Finally, a judgment is void when it violates the basic tenets of due process.[182] Since a void judgment creates no
rights and imposes no duties,[183] no jeopardy attaches to a judgment of acquittal or order of dismissal where the
prosecution, which represents the Sovereign People in criminal cases, is denied due process.[184] In this regard, the
CA correctly found the RTC's February 13, 2013 Order to be tainted with grave abuse of discretion necessitating the
latter's annulment for exceeding jurisdictional bounds.

Conclusion

All told, the handling prosecutor's authority, particularly as it does not appear on the face of the Information, has no
connection to the trial court's power to hear and decide a case. Hence, Sec. 3(d), Rule 117, requiring a handling
prosecutor to secure a prior written authority or approval from the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor before filing
an Information with the courts, may be waived by the accused through silence, acquiescence, or failure to raise such
ground during arraignment or before entering a plea. If, at all, such deficiency is merely formal and can be cured at
any stage of the proceedings in a criminal case.

Moreover, both the State and the accused are entitled to the constitutional guarantee of due process - especially
when the most contentious of issues involve jurisdictional matters. A denial of such guarantee against any of the
parties of the case amounts to grave abuse of discretion. Consequently, a judgment of acquittal or order of dismissal
amounting to an acquittal which is tainted with grave abuse of discretion becomes void and cannot amount to a first
jeopardy.

Henceforth, all previous doctrines laid down by this Court, holding that the lack of signature and approval of the
provincial, city or chief state prosecutor on the face of the Information shall divest the court of jurisdiction over the
person of the accused and the subject matter in a criminal action, are hereby abandoned. It is sufficient for the validity
of the Information or Complaint, as the case may be, that the Resolution of the investigating prosecutor
recommending for the filing of the same in court bears the imprimatur of the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor
whose approval is required by Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 5180[185] and is adopted under Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Court DENIES the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by
Gina A. Villa Gomez and AFFIRMS the October 9, 2014 Decision of the Court of Appeals, Seventh Division in CA-
G.R. SP No. 130290 for absence of any reversible error. Moreover, the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 57
is hereby ORDERED to RESUME its proceedings in Criminal Case No. 10-1829 with utmost dispatch.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Department of Justice, National Prosecution Service, Public Attorney's
Office and Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance.
No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 192565               February 28, 2012

UNION BANK OF THE, PHILIPPINES and DESI TOMAS, Petitioners, 

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We review in this Rule 45 petition, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Makati City
1 

(RTC-Makati City) in Civil Case No. 09-1038. The petition seeks to reverse and set aside the RTC-
Makati City decision dismissing the petition for certiorari of petitioners Union Bank of the Philippines
(Union Bank) and Desi Tomas (collectively, the petitioners). The RTC found that the Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch 63, Makati City (MeTC-Makati City) did not commit any grave abuse of discretion
in denying the motion to quash the information for perjury filed by Tomas.

The Antecedents

Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for
making a false narration in a Certificate against Forum Shopping. The Information against her reads:

That on or about the 13th day of March 2000 in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make untruthful statements under oath upon a material matter before a
competent person authorized to administer oath which the law requires to wit: said accused stated in
the Verification/Certification/Affidavit of merit of a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of
replevin docketed as [Civil] Case No. 342-00 of the Metropolitan Trial Court[,] Pasay City, that the
Union Bank of the Philippines has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the
same issues in another tribunal or agency, accused knowing well that said material statement was
false thereby making a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood. 2 

The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union Bank’s two (2) complaints for sum of money with
prayer for a writ of replevin against the spouses Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe. The
first complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-0717, was filed before the RTC, Branch 109, Pasay
City on April 13, 1998. The second complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 342-000, was filed on
March 15, 2000 and raffled to the MeTC, Branch 47, Pasay City. Both complaints showed that
Tomas executed and signed the Certification against Forum Shopping. Accordingly, she was
charged of deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC by falsely declaring under oath in the
Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second complaint that she did not commence any other
action or proceeding involving the same issue in another tribunal or agency.

Tomas filed a Motion to Quash, citing two grounds. First, she argued that the venue was improperly
3 

laid since it is the Pasay City court (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was submitted
and used) and not the MeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was
subscribed) that has jurisdiction over the perjury case. Second, she argued that the facts charged do
not constitute an offense because: (a) the third element of perjury – the willful and deliberate
assertion of falsehood – was not alleged with particularity without specifying what the other action or
proceeding commenced involving the same issues in another tribunal or agency; (b) there was no
other action or proceeding pending in another court when the second complaint was filed; and (c)
she was charged with perjury by giving false testimony while the allegations in the Information make
out perjury by making a false affidavit.

The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has jurisdiction over the case since
the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized in Makati City. The MeTC-Makati City also
4 

ruled that the allegations in the Information sufficiently charged Tomas with perjury. The MeTC-
5 

Makati City subsequently denied Tomas’ motion for reconsideration. 6 

The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC-Makati City to annul and set aside the
MeTC-Makati City orders on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. The petitioners anchored their
petition on the rulings in United States v. Canet and Ilusorio v. Bildner which ruled that venue and
7  8 

jurisdiction should be in the place where the false document was presented.

The Assailed RTC Decision

In dismissing the petition for certiorari, the RTC-Makati City held:

[I]nsofar as the petitioner’s stance is concerned[,] the more recent case of [Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy]
(GR Nos. 174168 & 179438, March 30, 2009) however, reaffirms what has been the long standing
view on the venue with respect to perjury cases. In this particular case[,] the high court reiterated the
rule that the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory
where the offense was committed, or where any of its essential ingredients occurred. It went on to
declare that since the subject document[,] the execution of which was the subject of the charge[,]
was subscribed and sworn to in Manila[,] then the court of the said territorial jurisdiction was the
proper venue of the criminal action[.]

xxxx

x x x Given the present state of jurisprudence on the matter, it is not amiss to state that the city court
of Makati City has jurisdiction to try and decide the case for perjury inasmuch as the gist of the
complaint itself which constitute[s] the charge against the petitioner dwells solely on the act of
subscribing to a false certification. On the other hand, the charge against the accused in the case of
Ilusorio v. Bildner, et al., based on the complaint-affidavits therein[,] was not simply the execution of
the questioned documents but rather the introduction of the false evidence through the subject
documents before the court of Makati City. (emphasis ours)
9 

The RTC-Makati City ruled that the MeTC-Makati City did not commit grave abuse of discretion
since the order denying the Motion to Quash was based on jurisprudence later than Ilusorio. The
RTC-Makati City also observed that the facts in Ilusorio are different from the facts of the present
case. Lastly, the RTC-Makati City ruled that the Rule 65 petition was improper since the petitioners
can later appeal the decision in the principal case. The RTC-Makati City subsequently denied the
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.10 

The Petition

The petitioners pray that we reverse the RTC-Makati City decision and quash the Information for
perjury against Tomas. The petitioners contend that the Ilusorio ruling is more applicable to the
present facts than our ruling in Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy Chim. They argued that the facts in Ilusorio
11 

showed that the filing of the petitions in court containing the false statements was the essential
ingredient that consummated the perjury. In Sy Tiong, the perjurious statements were made in a
General Information Sheet (GIS) that was submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC).

Interestingly, Solicitor General Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz shared the petitioners’ view. In his
Manifestation and Motion in lieu of Comment (which we hereby treat as the Comment to the
petition), the Solicitor General also relied on Ilusorio and opined that the lis mota in the crime of
perjury is the deliberate or intentional giving of false evidence in the court where the evidence is
material. The Solicitor General observed that the criminal intent to assert a falsehood under oath
only became manifest before the MeTC-Pasay City.

The Issue

The case presents to us the issue of what the proper venue of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC
should be – Makati City, where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized, or Pasay City,
where the Certification was presented to the trial court.

The Court’s Ruling

We deny the petition and hold that the MeTC-Makati City is the proper venue and the proper court to
take cognizance of the perjury case against the petitioners.

Venue of Action and Criminal Jurisdiction

Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It determines not only the place
where the criminal action is to be instituted, but also the court that has the jurisdiction to try and hear
the case. The reason for this rule is two-fold. First, the jurisdiction of trial courts is limited to well-
defined territories such that a trial court can only hear and try cases involving crimes committed
within its territorial jurisdiction. Second, laying the venue in the locus criminis is grounded on the
12 

necessity and justice of having an accused on trial in the municipality of province where witnesses
and other facilities for his defense are available. 13 

Unlike in civil cases, a finding of improper venue in criminal cases carries jurisdictional
consequences. In determining the venue where the criminal action is to be instituted and the court
which has jurisdiction over it, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides:

(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court or
municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential
ingredients occurred. [emphasis ours]
The above provision should be read in light of Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure which states:

Place of commission of the offense. – The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be

understood from its allegations that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients
occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place where it was
committed constitutes an essential element of the offense charged or is necessary for its
identification.

Both provisions categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases not only in the
court where the offense was committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients took place. In
other words, the venue of action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged where the
Information states that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at a
place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.

Information Charging Perjury 

Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, contains the requirement for a
Certificate against Forum Shopping. The Certificate against Forum Shopping can be made either by
a statement under oath in the complaint or initiatory pleading asserting a claim or relief; it may also
be in a sworn certification annexed to the complaint or initiatory pleading. In both instances, the
affiant is required to execute a statement under oath before a duly commissioned notary public or
any competent person authorized to administer oath that: (a) he or she has not theretofore
commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-
judicial agency and, to the best of his or her knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending
therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status
thereof; and (c) if he or she should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been
filed or is pending, he or she shall report that fact within five days therefrom to the court wherein his
or her aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed. In relation to the crime of perjury, the
material matter in a Certificate against Forum Shopping is the truth of the required declarations
which is designed to guard against litigants pursuing simultaneous remedies in different fora. 14 

In this case, Tomas is charged with the crime of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC for making a
false Certificate against Forum Shopping. The elements of perjury under Article 183 are:

(a) That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material
matter.

(b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to
receive and administer oath.

(c) That in the statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a
falsehood.

(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for
a legal purpose. (emphasis ours)
15 

Where the jurisdiction of the court is being assailed in a criminal case on the ground of improper
venue, the allegations in the complaint and information must be examined together with Section
15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. On this basis, we find that the
allegations in the Information sufficiently support a finding that the crime of perjury was committed by
Tomas within the territorial jurisdiction of the MeTC-Makati City.

The first element of the crime of perjury, the execution of the subject Certificate against Forum
Shopping was alleged in the Information to have been committed in Makati City. Likewise, the
second and fourth elements, requiring the Certificate against Forum Shopping to be under oath
before a notary public, were also sufficiently alleged in the Information to have been made in Makati
City:

That on or about the 13th day of March 2000 in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make untruthful statements under oath upon a material matter before a
competent person authorized to administer oath which the law requires to wit: said accused stated in
the Verification/Certification/Affidavit x x x.
16 

We also find that the third element of willful and deliberate falsehood was also sufficiently alleged to
have been committed in Makati City, not Pasay City, as indicated in the last portion of the
Information:

[S]aid accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit of merit of a complaint for sum of

money with prayer for a writ of replevin docketed as [Civil] Case No. 342-00 of the Metropolitan Trial
Court[,] Pasay City, that the Union Bank of the Philippines has not commenced any other action or
proceeding involving the same issues in another tribunal or agency, accused knowing well that said
material statement was false thereby making a willful and deliberate assertion of
falsehood. (underscoring ours)
17 

Tomas’ deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was allegedly shown when she made the
false declarations in the Certificate against Forum Shopping before a notary public in Makati City,
despite her knowledge that the material statements she subscribed and swore to were not true.
Thus, Makati City is the proper venue and MeTC-Makati City is the proper court to try the perjury
case against Tomas, pursuant to Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure as all the essential elements constituting the crime of perjury were committed within the
territorial jurisdiction of Makati City, not Pasay City.

Referral to the En Banc 

The present case was referred to the En Banc primarily to address the seeming conflict between the
division rulings of the Court in the Ilusorio case that is cited as basis of this petition, and the Sy Tiong
case that was the basis of the assailed RTC-Makati City ruling.

The Cited Ilusorio and Sy Tiong Cases

The subject matter of the perjury charge in Ilusorio involved false statements contained in verified
petitions filed with the court for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copies of certificates of title.
The verified petitions containing the false statements were subscribed and sworn to in Pasig City,
but were filed in Makati City and Tagaytay City. The question posed was: which court (Pasig City,
Makati City and/or Tagaytay City) had jurisdiction to try and hear the perjury cases?

We ruled that the venues of the action were in Makati City and Tagaytay City, the places where the
verified petitions were filed. The Court reasoned out that it was only upon filing that the intent to
assert an alleged falsehood became manifest and where the alleged untruthful statement found
relevance or materiality. We cited as jurisprudential authority the case of United States. v.
Cañet which ruled:
18 

It is immaterial where the affidavit was subscribed and sworn, so long as it appears from the
information that the defendant, by means of such affidavit, "swore to" and knowingly submitted false
evidence, material to a point at issue in a judicial proceeding pending in the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo Province. The gist of the offense charged is not the making of the affidavit in Manila, but the
intentional giving of false evidence in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo Province by means of such
affidavit. [emphasis and underscoring deleted]

In Sy Tiong, the perjured statements were made in a GIS which was subscribed and sworn to in
Manila. We ruled that the proper venue for the perjury charges was in Manila where the GIS was
subscribed and sworn to. We held that the perjury was consummated in Manila where the false
statement was made. As supporting jurisprudence, we cited the case of Villanueva v. Secretary of
Justice that, in turn, cited an American case entitled U.S. v. Norris. We ruled in Villanueva that –
19  20 

Perjury is an obstruction of justice; its perpetration well may affect the dearest concerns of the
parties before a tribunal. Deliberate material falsification under oath constitutes the crime of perjury,
and the crime is complete when a witness' statement has once been made.

The Crime of Perjury: A Background

To have a better appreciation of the issue facing the Court, a look at the historical background of
how the crime of perjury (specifically, Article 183 of the RPC) evolved in our jurisdiction.

The RPC penalizes three forms of false testimonies. The first is false testimony for and against the
defendant in a criminal case (Articles 180 and 181, RPC); the second is false testimony in a civil
case (Article 182, RPC); and the third is false testimony in other cases (Article 183, RPC). Based on
the Information filed, the present case involves the making of an untruthful statement in an affidavit
on a material matter.

These RPC provisions, however, are not really the bases of the rulings cited by the parties in their
respective arguments. The cited Ilusorio ruling, although issued by this Court in 2008, harked back
to the case of Cañet which was decided in 1915, i.e., before the present RPC took effect. Sy Tiong,
21 

on the other hand, is a 2009 ruling that cited Villanueva, a 2005 case that in turn cited United States
v. Norris, a 1937 American case. Significantly, unlike Canet, Sy Tiong is entirely based on rulings
rendered after the present RPC took effect. 22 

The perjurious act in Cañet consisted of an information charging perjury through the presentation in
court of a motion accompanied by a false sworn affidavit. At the time the Cañet ruling was rendered,
the prevailing law on perjury and the rules on prosecution of criminal offenses were found in Section
3, Act No. 1697 of the Philippine Commission, and in Subsection 4, Section 6 of General Order No.
58 for the procedural aspect.
23 

Section 3 of Act No. 1697 reads:

Sec. 3. Any person who, having taken oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any
case in which a law of the Philippine Islands authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will
testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, disposition, or
certificate by him subscribed is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any
material matter which he does not believe to be true, is guilty of perjury, and shall be punished by a
fine of not more than two thousand pesos and by imprisonment for not more than five years; and
shall moreover, thereafter be incapable of holding any public office or of giving testimony in any
court of the Philippine Islands until such time as the judgment against him is reversed.

This law was copied, with the necessary changes, from Sections 5392 and 5393 of the Revised
24  25 

Statutes of the United States. Act No. 1697 was intended to make the mere execution of a false
26 

affidavit punishable in our jurisdiction.

27 

In turn, Subsection 4, Section 6 of General Order No. 58 provided that the venue shall be the court
of the place where the crime was committed.

As applied and interpreted by the Court in Cañet, perjury was committed by the act of representing a
false document in a judicial proceeding. The venue of action was held by the Court to be at the
28 

place where the false document was presented since the presentation was the act that
consummated the crime.

The annotation of Justices Aquino and Griño-Aquino in their textbook on the RPC interestingly
29 

explains the history of the perjury provisions of the present RPC and traces as well the linkage
between Act No. 1697 and the present Code. To quote these authors: 30 

Art. 180 was taken from art. 318 of the Old Penal Code and art. 154 of Del Pan’s Proposed
Correctional Code, while art. 181 was taken from art. 319 of the old Penal Code and Art. 157 of Del
Pan’s Proposed Correctional Code. Said arts. 318 and 319, together with art. 321 of the old Penal
Code, were impliedly repealed by Act 1697, the Perjury Law, passed on August 23, 1907, which in
turn was expressly repealed by the Administrative Code of 1916, Act 2657. In view of the express
repeal of Act 1697, arts. 318 and 321 of the old Penal Code were deemed revived. However, Act
2718 expressly revived secs. 3 and 4 of the Perjury Law. Art. 367 of the Revised Penal Code
repealed Act Nos. 1697 and 2718.

It should be noted that perjury under Acts 1697 and 2718 includes false testimony, whereas, under
the Revised Penal Code, false testimony includes perjury. Our law on false testimony is of Spanish
origin, but our law on perjury (art. 183 taken from sec. 3 of Act 1697) is derived from American
statutes. The provisions of the old Penal Code on false testimony embrace perjury committed in
court or in some contentious proceeding, while perjury as defined in Act 1697 includes the making of
a false affidavit. The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on false testimony "are more severe and
strict than those of Act 1697" on perjury. [italics ours]

With this background, it can be appreciated that Article 183 of the RPC which provides:

The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period
shall be imposed upon any person, who knowingly makes untruthful statements and not being
included in the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify under oath, or make an affidavit,
upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in
which the law so requires. [emphasis supplied; emphases ours]

in fact refers to either of two punishable acts – (1) falsely testifying under oath in a proceeding other
than a criminal or civil case; and (2) making a false affidavit before a person authorized to administer
an oath on any material matter where the law requires an oath.

As above discussed, Sy Tiong – decided under Article 183 of the RPC – essentially involved
perjured statements made in a GIS that was subscribed and sworn to in Manila and submitted to the
SEC in Mandaluyong City. Thus, the case involved the making of an affidavit, not an actual
testimony in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil. From this perspective, the situs of the
oath, i.e., the place where the oath was taken, is the place where the offense was committed. By
implication, the proper venue would have been the City of Mandaluyong – the site of the SEC – had
the charge involved an actual testimony made before the SEC.

In contrast, Cañet involved the presentation in court of a motion supported and accompanied by an
affidavit that contained a falsity. With Section 3 of Act No. 1697 as basis, the issue related to the
submission of the affidavit in a judicial proceeding. This came at a time when Act No. 1697 was the
perjury law, and made no distinction between judicial and other proceedings, and at the same time
separately penalized the making of false statements under oath (unlike the present RPC which
separately deals with false testimony in criminal, civil and other proceedings, while at the same time
also penalizing the making of false affidavits). Understandably, the venue should be the place where
the submission was made to the court or the situs of the court; it could not have been the place
where the affidavit was sworn to simply because this was not the offense charged in the Information.

The case of Ilusorio cited the Cañet case as its authority, in a situation where the sworn petitions
filed in court for the issuance of duplicate certificates of title (that were allegedly lost) were the cited
sworn statements to support the charge of perjury for the falsities stated in the sworn petitions. The
Court ruled that the proper venue should be the Cities of Makati and Tagaytay because it was in the
courts of these cities "where the intent to assert an alleged falsehood became manifest and where
the alleged untruthful statement finds relevance or materiality in deciding the issue of whether new
owner’s duplicate copies of the [Certificate of Condominium Title] and [Transfer Certificates of Title]
may issue." To the Court, "whether the perjurious statements contained in the four petitions were
31 

subscribed and sworn in Pasig is immaterial, the gist of the offense of perjury being the intentional
giving of false statement," citing Cañet as authority for its statement.
32 

The statement in Ilusorio may have partly led to the present confusion on venue because of its very
categorical tenor in pointing to the considerations to be made in the determination of venue; it leaves
the impression that the place where the oath was taken is not at all a material consideration,
forgetting that Article 183 of the RPC clearly speaks of two situations while Article 182 of the RPC
likewise applies to false testimony in civil cases.

The Ilusorio statement would have made perfect sense had the basis for the charge been Article 182
of the RPC, on the assumption that the petition itself constitutes a false testimony in a civil case. The
Cañet ruling would then have been completely applicable as the sworn statement is used in a civil
case, although no such distinction was made under Cañet because the applicable law at the time
(Act No. 1697) did not make any distinction.

If Article 183 of the RPC were to be used, as what in fact appears in the Ilusorio ruling, then only that
portion of the article, referring to the making of an affidavit, would have been applicable as the other
portion refers to false testimony in other proceedings which a judicial petition for the issuance of a
new owner’s duplicate copy of a Certificate of Condominium Title is not because it is a civil
proceeding in court. As a perjury based on the making of a false affidavit, what assumes materiality
is the site where the oath was taken as this is the place where the oath was made, in this case,
Pasig City.

Procedurally, the rule on venue of criminal cases has been subject to various changes from the time
General Order No. 58 was replaced by Rules 106 to 122 of the Rules of Court on July 1, 1940.
Section 14, Rule 106 of the Rules of Court provided for the rule on venue of criminal actions and it
expressly included, as proper venue, the place where any one of the essential ingredients of the
crime took place.  This change was followed by the passage of the 1964 Rules of Criminal
1âwphi1
Procedure, the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
33  34 

Procedure which all adopted the 1940 Rules of Criminal Procedure’s expanded venue of criminal
actions. Thus, the venue of criminal cases is not only in the place where the offense was committed,
but also where any of its essential ingredients took place.

In the present case, the Certification against Forum Shopping was made integral parts of two
complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against the respondent spouses Eddie
Tamondong and Eliza B. Tamondong, who, in turn, filed a complaint-affidavit against Tomas for
violation of Article 183 of the RPC. As alleged in the Information that followed, the criminal act
charged was for the execution by Tomas of an affidavit that contained a falsity.

Under the circumstances, Article 183 of the RPC is indeed the applicable provision; thus, jurisdiction
and venue should be determined on the basis of this article which penalizes one who "make[s] an
affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in
cases in which the law so requires." The constitutive act of the offense is the making of an affidavit;
thus, the criminal act is consummated when the statement containing a falsity is subscribed and
sworn before a duly authorized person.

Based on these considerations, we hold that our ruling in Sy Tiong is more in accord with Article 183
of the RPC and Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. To
reiterate for the guidance of the Bar and the Bench, the crime of perjury committed through the
making of a false affidavit under Article 183 of the RPC is committed at the time the affiant
subscribes and swears to his or her affidavit since it is at that time that all the elements of the crime
of perjury are executed. When the crime is committed through false testimony under oath in a
proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, venue is at the place where the testimony under oath is
given. If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual testimony made in a proceeding that is neither
criminal nor civil, a written sworn statement is submitted, venue may either be at the place where the
sworn statement is submitted or where the oath was taken as the taking of the oath and the
submission are both material ingredients of the crime committed. In all cases, determination of
venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the Information to be constitutive of the crime
committed.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. Costs against
the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 192123               March 10, 2014

DR. FERNANDO P. SOLIDUM, Petitioner, 

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

This appeal is taken by a physician-anesthesiologist who has been pronounced guilty of reckless
imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of
Appeals (CA). He had been part of the team of anesthesiologists during the surgical pull-through
operation conducted on a three-year old patient born with an imperforate anus. 1

The antecedents are as follows:

Gerald Albert Gercayo (Gerald) was born on June 2, 1992  with an imperforate anus. Two days after
2

his birth, Gerald underwent colostomy, a surgical procedure to bring one end of the large intestine
out through the abdominal wall,  enabling him to excrete through a colostomy bag attached to the
3

side of his body.

4

On May 17, 1995, Gerald, then three years old, was admitted at the Ospital ng Maynila for a pull-
through operation. Dr. Leandro Resurreccion headed the surgical team, and was assisted by Dr.
5

Joselito Luceño, Dr. Donatella Valeña and Dr. Joseph Tibio. The anesthesiologists included Dr.
Marichu Abella, Dr. Arnel Razon and petitioner Dr. Fernando Solidum (Dr. Solidum).  During the
6

operation, Gerald experienced bradycardia,  and went into a coma. His coma lasted for two
7 8

weeks,  but he regained consciousness only after a month.  He could no longer see, hear or move.
9 10 11
Agitated by her son’s helpless and unexpected condition, Ma. Luz Gercayo (Luz) lodged a complaint
for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries with the City Prosecutor’s Office of
Manila against the attending physicians. 12

Upon a finding of probable cause, the City Prosecutor’s Office filed an information solely against Dr.
Solidum, alleging: –
13

That on or about May 17, 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then an
anesthesiologist at the Ospital ng Maynila, Malate, this City, and as such was tasked to administer
the anesthesia on three-year old baby boy GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO, represented by his
mother, MA. LUZ GERCAYO, the former having been born with an imperforate anus [no anal
opening] and was to undergo an operation for anal opening [pull through operation], did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail and neglect to use the care and diligence as the best of
his judgment would dictate under said circumstance, by failing to monitor and regulate properly the
levels of anesthesia administered to said GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO and using 100% halothane
and other anesthetic medications, causing as a consequence of his said carelessness and
negligence, said GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO suffered a cardiac arrest and consequently a defect
called hypoxic encephalopathy meaning insufficient oxygen supply in the brain, thereby rendering
said GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO incapable of moving his body, seeing, speaking or hearing, to
his damage and prejudice.

Contrary to law. 14

The case was initially filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, but was transferred to the RTC
pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997),  where it was
15

docketed as Criminal Case No. 01-190889.

Judgment of the RTC

On July 19, 2004, the RTC rendered its judgment finding Dr. Solidum guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries,  decreeing:
16

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused DR. FERNANDO P. SOLIDUM
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime charged and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of arresto mayor as
minimum to ONE (1) YEAR, ONE (1) MONTH and TEN (10) DAYS of prision correccional as
maximum and to indemnify, jointly and severally with the Ospital ng Maynila, Dr. Anita So and Dr.
Marichu Abella, private complainant Luz Gercayo, the amount of ₱500,000.00 as moral damages
and ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.

Accordingly, the bond posted by the accused for his provisional liberty is hereby CANCELLED.

SO ORDERED. 17

Upon motion of Dr. Anita So and Dr. Marichu Abella to reconsider their solidary liability,  the RTC
18

excluded them from solidary liability as to the damages, modifying its decision as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Dr. Fernando Solidum, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of the crime charged and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor as minimum to one (1)
year, one (1) month and ten (10) days of prision correccional as maximum and to indemnify jointly
and severally with Ospital ng Maynila, private complainant Luz Gercayo the amount of ₱500,000.00
as moral damages and ₱100,000 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.

Accordingly, the bond posted by the accused for his provisional liberty is hereby cancelled. 19

Decision of the CA

On January 20, 2010, the CA affirmed the conviction of Dr. Solidum,  pertinently stating and ruling:
20

The case appears to be a textbook example of res ipsa loquitur.

xxxx

x x x [P]rior to the operation, the child was evaluated and found fit to undergo a major operation. As
noted by the OSG, the accused himself testified that pre-operation tests were conducted to ensure
that the child could withstand the surgery. Except for his imperforate anus, the child was healthy.
The tests and other procedures failed to reveal that he was suffering from any known ailment or
disability that could turn into a significant risk. There was not a hint that the nature of the operation
itself was a causative factor in the events that finally led to hypoxia.

In short, the lower court has been left with no reasonable hypothesis except to attribute the accident
to a failure in the proper administration of anesthesia, the gravamen of the charge in this case. The
High Court elucidates in Ramos vs. Court of Appeals 321 SCRA 584 –

In cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent
upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where the court from its
fund of common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care.

Where common knowledge and experience teach that a resulting injury would not have occurred to
the patient if due care had been exercised, an inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise to
an application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without medical evidence, which is ordinarily
required to show not only what occurred but how and why it occurred. When the doctrine is
appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a nexus between the particular act or omission
complained of and the injury sustained while under the custody and management of the defendant
without need to produce expert medical testimony to establish the standard of care. Resort to res
ipsa loquitur is allowed because there is no other way, under usual and ordinary conditions, by which
the patient can obtain redress for injury suffered by him.

The lower court has found that such a nexus exists between the act complained of and the injury
sustained, and in line with the hornbook rules on evidence, we will afford the factual findings of a trial
court the respect they deserve in the absence of a showing of arbitrariness or disregard of material
facts that might affect the disposition of the case. People v. Paraiso 349 SCRA 335.

The res ipsa loquitur test has been known to be applied in criminal cases. Although it creates a
presumption of negligence, it need not offend due process, as long as the accused is afforded the
opportunity to go forward with his own evidence and prove that he has no criminal intent. It is in this
light not inconsistent with the constitutional presumption of innocence of an accused.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the modified decision of the lower court is affirmed.

SO ORDERED. 21
Dr. Solidum filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied his motion on May 7, 2010. 22

Hence, this appeal.

Issues

Dr. Solidum avers that:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE

LOWER COURT IN UPHOLDING THE PETITIONER’S CONVICTION FOR THE CRIME
CHARGED BASED ON THE TRIAL COURT’S OPINION, AND NOT ON THE BASIS OF
THE FACTS ESTABLISHED DURING THE TRIAL. ALSO, THERE IS A CLEAR
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS WHICH IF CORRECTED, WILL RESULT TO THE
ACQUITTAL OF THE PETITIONER. FURTHER, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE SAID DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT, AS THIS BREACHES THE
CRIMINAL LAW PRINCIPLE THAT THE PROSECUTION MUST PROVE THE
ALLEGATIONS OF THE INFORMATION BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, AND NOT ON
THE BASIS OF ITS PRESUMPTIVE CONCLUSION.

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF RES

IPSA LOQUITOR (sic) WHEN THE DEFENSE WAS ABLE TO PROVE THAT THERE IS NO
NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER, AND NO OVERDOSING IN THE
APPLICATION OF THE ANESTHETIC AGENT BECAUSE THERE WAS NO 100%
HALOTHANE ADMINISTERED TO THE CHILD, BUT ONLY ONE (1%) PERCENT AND
THE APPLICATION THEREOF, WAS REGULATED BY AN ANESTHESIA MACHINE.
THUS, THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR (sic)
CONTRADICTED THE ESTABLISHED FACTS AND THE LAW APPLICABLE IN THE
CASE.

III.

THE AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IS NOT JUSTIFIED

THERE BEING NO NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER. ASSUMING
THAT THE CHILD IS ENTITLED TO FINANCIAL CONSIDERATION, IT SHOULD BE ONLY
AS A FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, BECAUSE THERE WAS NO NEGLIGENCE, AND NO
OVERDOSING OF ANESTHETIC AGENT AND AS SUCH, THE AWARD IS SO
EXCESSIVE, AND NO FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS. 23

To simplify, the following are the issues for resolution, namely: (a) whether or not the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur was applicable herein; and (b) whether or not Dr. Solidum was liable for criminal
negligence.

Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

Applicability of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur

Res ipsa loquitur is literally translated as "the thing or the transaction speaks for itself." The doctrine
res ipsa loquitur means that "where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the
management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not
happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care."  It is simply
24

"a recognition of the postulate that, as a matter of common knowledge and experience, the very
nature of certain types of occurrences may justify an inference of negligence on the part of the
person who controls the instrumentality causing the injury in the absence of some explanation by the
defendant who is charged with negligence. It is grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human
experience and on the basis of such experience or common knowledge, negligence may be
deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself.

Hence, res ipsa loquitur is applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge." 25

Jarcia, Jr. v. People  has underscored that the doctrine is not a rule of substantive law, but merely a
26

mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. The doctrine, when applicable to the facts and
circumstances of a given case, is not meant to and does not dispense with the requirement of proof
of culpable negligence against the party charged. It merely determines and regulates what shall be
prima facie evidence thereof, and helps the plaintiff in proving a breach of the duty. The doctrine can
be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and
not readily available.27

The applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in medical negligence cases was significantly and
exhaustively explained in Ramos v. Court of Appeals,  where the Court said –
28

Medical malpractice cases do not escape the application of this doctrine. Thus, res ipsa loquitur has
been applied when the circumstances attendant upon the harm are themselves of such a character
as to justify an inference of negligence as the cause of that harm. The application of res ipsa loquitur
in medical negligence cases presents a question of law since it is a judicial function to determine
whether a certain set of circumstances does, as a matter of law, permit a given inference.

Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits to prove that a
physician has done a negligent act or that he has deviated from the standard medical procedure,
when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony
is dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof of negligence. The reason is that the
general rule on the necessity of expert testimony applies only to such matters clearly within the
domain of medical science, and not to matters that are within the common knowledge of mankind
which may be testified to by anyone familiar with the facts. Ordinarily, only physicians and surgeons
of skill and experience are competent to testify as to whether a patient has been treated or operated
upon with a reasonable degree of skill and care. However, testimony as to the statements and acts
of physicians and surgeons, external appearances, and manifest conditions which are observable by
any one may be given by non-expert witnesses. Hence, in cases where the res ipsa loquitur is
applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the
patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where the court from its fund of common knowledge can
determine the proper standard of care. Where common knowledge and experience teach that a
resulting injury would not have occurred to the patient if due care had been exercised, an inference
of negligence may be drawn giving rise to an application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without
medical evidence, which is ordinarily required to show not only what occurred but how and why it
occurred. When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a nexus between the
particular act or omission complained of and the injury sustained while under the custody and
management of the defendant without need to produce expert medical testimony to establish the
standard of care. Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed because there is no other way, under usual
and ordinary conditions, by which the patient can obtain redress for injury suffered by him.

Thus, courts of other jurisdictions have applied the doctrine in the following situations: leaving of a
foreign object in the body of the patient after an operation, injuries sustained on a healthy part of the
body which was not under, or in the area, of treatment, removal of the wrong part of the body when
another part was intended, knocking out a tooth while a patient’s jaw was under anesthetic for the
removal of his tonsils, and loss of an eye while the patient plaintiff was under the influence of
anesthetic, during or following an operation for appendicitis, among others.

Nevertheless, despite the fact that the scope of res ipsa loquitur has been measurably enlarged, it
does not automatically apply to all cases of medical negligence as to mechanically shift the burden
of proof to the defendant to show that he is not guilty of the ascribed negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is
not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously applied, depending
upon the circumstances of each case. It is generally restricted to situations in malpractice cases
where a layman is able to say, as a matter of common knowledge and observation, that the
consequences of professional care were not as such as would ordinarily have followed if due care
had been exercised. A distinction must be made between the failure to secure results, and the
occurrence of something more unusual and not ordinarily found if the service or treatment rendered
followed the usual procedure of those skilled in that particular practice. It must be conceded that the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in a suit against a physician or surgeon which
involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment. The physician or surgeon is not
required at his peril to explain why any particular diagnosis was not correct, or why any particular
scientific treatment did not produce the desired result. Thus, res ipsa loquitur is not available in a
malpractice suit if the only showing is that the desired result of an operation or treatment was not
accomplished. The real question, therefore, is whether or not in the process of the operation any
extraordinary incident or unusual event outside of the routine performance occurred which is beyond
the regular scope of customary professional activity in such operations, which, if unexplained would
themselves reasonably speak to the average man as the negligent cause or causes of the untoward
consequence. If there was such extraneous intervention, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be
utilized and the defendant is called upon to explain the matter, by evidence of exculpation, if he
could.

In order to allow resort to the doctrine, therefore, the following essential requisites must first be
satisfied, to wit: (1) the accident was of a kind that does not ordinarily occur unless someone is
negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency that caused the injury was under the exclusive control of
the person charged; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution of the person injured.29

The Court considers the application here of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur inappropriate. Although it
should be conceded without difficulty that the second and third elements were present, considering
that the anesthetic agent and the instruments were exclusively within the control of Dr. Solidum, and
that the patient, being then unconscious during the operation, could not have been guilty of
contributory negligence, the first element was undeniably wanting. Luz delivered Gerald to the care,
custody and control of his physicians for a pull-through operation. Except for the imperforate anus,
Gerald was then of sound body and mind at the time of his submission to the physicians. Yet, he
experienced bradycardia during the operation, causing loss of his senses and rendering him
immobile. Hypoxia, or the insufficiency of oxygen supply to the brain that caused the slowing of the
heart rate, scientifically termed as bradycardia, would not ordinarily occur in the process of a pull-
through operation, or during the administration of anesthesia to the patient, but such fact alone did
not prove that the negligence of any of his attending physicians, including the anesthesiologists, had
caused the injury. In fact, the anesthesiologists attending to him had sensed in the course of the
operation that the lack of oxygen could have been triggered by the vago-vagal reflex, prompting
them to administer atropine to the patient.30

This conclusion is not unprecedented. It was similarly reached in Swanson v. Brigham,  relevant
31

portions of the decision therein being as follows:

On January 7, 1973, Dr. Brigham admitted 15-year-old Randall Swanson to a hospital for the
treatment of infectious mononucleosis. The patient's symptoms had included a swollen throat and
some breathing difficulty. Early in the morning of January 9 the patient was restless, and at 1:30 a.m.
Dr. Brigham examined the patient. His inspection of the patient's air passage revealed that it was in
satisfactory condition. At 4:15 a.m. Dr. Brigham received a telephone call from the hospital, advising
him that the patient was having respiratory difficulty. The doctor ordered that oxygen be
administered and he prepared to leave for the hospital. Ten minutes later, 4:25 a.m., the hospital
called a second time to advise the doctor that the patient was not responding. The doctor ordered
that a medicine be administered, and he departed for the hospital. When he arrived, the physician
who had been on call at the hospital had begun attempts to revive the patient. Dr. Brigham joined
him in the effort, but the patient died.

The doctor who performed the autopsy concluded that the patient died between 4:25 a.m. and 4:30
a.m. of asphyxia, as a result of a sudden, acute closing of the air passage. He also found that the air
passage had been adequate to maintain life up to 2 or 3 minutes prior to death. He did not know
what caused the air passage to suddenly close.

xxxx

It is a rare occurrence when someone admitted to a hospital for the treatment of infectious
mononucleosis dies of asphyxiation. But that is not sufficient to invoke res ipsa loquitur. The fact that
the injury rarely occurs does not in itself prove that the injury was probably caused by someone's
negligence. Mason v. Ellsworth, 3 Wn. App. 298, 474 P.2d 909 (1970). Nor is a bad result by itself
enough to warrant the application of the doctrine. Nelson v. Murphy, 42 Wn.2d 737, 258 P.2d 472
(1953). See 2 S. Speiser, The Negligence Case – Res Ipsa Loquitur § 24:10 (1972). The evidence
presented is insufficient to establish the first element necessary for application of res ipsa loquitur
doctrine. The acute closing of the patient’s air passage and his resultant asphyxiation took place
over a very short period of time. Under these circumstances it would not be reasonable to infer that
the physician was negligent. There was no palpably negligent act. The common experience of
mankind does not suggest that death would not be expected without negligence. And there is no
expert medical testimony to create an inference that negligence caused the injury.

Negligence of Dr. Solidum

In view of the inapplicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the Court next determines whether
the CA correctly affirmed the conviction of Dr. Solidum for criminal negligence.

Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person
that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance that the circumstances justly demand, whereby such
other person suffers injury. Reckless imprudence, on the other hand, consists of voluntarily doing or
32

failing to do, without malice, an act from which material damage results by reason of an inexcusable
lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act. 33

Dr. Solidum’s conviction by the RTC was primarily based on his failure to monitor and properly
regulate the level of anesthetic agent administered on Gerald by overdosing at 100% halothane. In
affirming the conviction, the CA observed:
On the witness stand, Dr. Vertido made a significant turnaround. He affirmed the findings and
conclusions in his report except for an observation which, to all intents and purposes, has become
the storm center of this dispute. He wanted to correct one piece of information regarding the dosage
of the anesthetic agent administered to the child. He declared that he made a mistake in reporting a
100% halothane and said that based on the records it should have been 100% oxygen.

The records he was relying on, as he explains, are the following:

(a) the anesthesia record – A portion of the chart in the record was marked as Exhibit 1-A
and 1-B to indicate the administration at intervals of the anesthetic agent.

(b) the clinical abstract – A portion of this record that reads as follows was marked Exhibit
3A. 3B – Approximately 1 hour and 45 minutes through the operation, patient was noted to
have bradycardia (CR = 70) and ATSO4 0.2 mg was immediately administered. However,
the bradycardia persisted, the inhalational agent was shut off, and the patient was ventilated
with 100% oxygen and another dose of ATSO4 0.2 mg was given. However, the patient did
not respond until no cardiac rate can be auscultated and the surgeons were immediately told
to stop the operation. The patient was put on a supine position and CPR was initiated.
Patient was given 1 amp of epinephrine initially while continuously doing cardiac massage –
still with no cardiac rate appreciated; another ampule of epinephrine was given and after 45
secs, patient’s vital signs returned to normal. The entire resuscitation lasted approximately 3-
5 mins. The surgeons were then told to proceed to the closure and the child’s vital signs
throughout and until the end of surgery were: BP = 110/70; CR = 116/min and RR = 20-22
cycles/min (on assisted ventilation).

Dr. Vertido points to the crucial passage in the clinical abstract that the patient was ventilated with
100% oxygen and another dose of ATSO4 when the bradycardia persisted, but for one reason or
another, he read it as 100% halothane. He was asked to read the anesthesia record on the
percentage of the dosage indicated, but he could only sheepishly note I can’t understand the
number. There are no clues in the clinical abstract on the quantity of the anesthetic agent used. It
only contains the information that the anesthetic plan was to put the patient under general
anesthesia using a nonrebreathing system with halothane as the sole anesthetic agent and that 1
hour and 45 minutes after the operation began, bradycardia occurred after which the inhalational
agent was shut off and the patient administered with 100% oxygen. It would be apparent that the
100% oxygen that Dr. Vertido said should be read in lieu of 100% halothane was the pure oxygen
introduced after something went amiss in the operation and the halothane itself was reduced or shut
off.

The key question remains – what was the quantity of halothane used before bradycardia set in?

The implication of Dr. Vertido’s admission is that there was no overdose of the anesthetic agent, and
the accused Dr. Solidum stakes his liberty and reputation on this conclusion. He made the
assurance that he gave his patient the utmost medical care, never leaving the operating room except
for a few minutes to answer the call of nature but leaving behind the other members of his team Drs.
Abella and Razon to monitor the operation. He insisted that he administered only a point 1% not
100% halothane, receiving corroboration from Dr. Abella whose initial MA in the record should be
enough to show that she assisted in the operation and was therefore conversant of the things that
happened. She revealed that they were using a machine that closely monitored the concentration of
the agent during the operation.

But most compelling is Dr. Solidum’s interpretation of the anesthesia record itself, as he takes the
bull by the horns, so to speak. In his affidavit, he says, reading from the record, that the quantity of
halothane used in the operation is one percent (1%) delivered at time intervals of 15 minutes. He
studiedly mentions – the concentration of halothane as reflected in the anesthesia record (Annex D
of the complaint-affidavit) is only one percent (1%) – The numbers indicated in 15 minute increments
for halothane is an indication that only 1% halothane is being delivered to the patient Gerard
Gercayo for his entire operation; The amount of halothane delivered in this case which is only one
percent cannot be summated because halothane is constantly being rapidly eliminated by the body
during the entire operation.

xxxx

In finding the accused guilty, despite these explanations, the RTC argued that the volte-face of Dr.
Vertido on the question of the dosage of the anesthetic used on the child would not really validate
the non-guilt of the anesthesiologist. Led to agree that the halothane used was not 100% as initially
believed, he was nonetheless unaware of the implications of the change in his testimony. The court
observed that Dr. Vertido had described the condition of the child as hypoxia which is deprivation of
oxygen, a diagnosis supported by the results of the CT Scan. All the symptoms attributed to a failing
central nervous system such as stupor, loss of consciousness, decrease in heart rate, loss of usual
acuity and abnormal motor function, are manifestations of this condition or syndrome. But why would
there be deprivation of oxygen if 100% oxygen to 1% halothane was used? Ultimately, to the court,
whether oxygen or halothane was the object of mistake, the detrimental effects of the operation are
incontestable, and they can only be led to one conclusion – if the application of anesthesia was
really closely monitored, the event could not have happened. 34

The Prosecution did not prove the elements of reckless imprudence beyond reasonable doubt
because the circumstances cited by the CA were insufficient to establish that Dr. Solidum had been
guilty of inexcusable lack of precaution in monitoring the administration of the anesthetic agent to
Gerald. The Court aptly explained in Cruz v. Court of Appeals  that:
35

Whether or not a physician has committed an "inexcusable lack of precaution" in the treatment of his
patient is to be determined according to the standard of care observed by other members of the
profession in good standing under similar circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the
profession at the time of treatment or the present state of medical science. In the recent case of
Leonila Garcia-Rueda v. Wilfred L. Pacasio, et. al., this Court stated that in accepting a case, a
doctor in effect represents that, having the needed training and skill possessed by physicians and
surgeons practicing in the same field, he will employ such training, care and skill in the treatment of
his patients. He therefore has a duty to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably
competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances. It is in this aspect of
medical malpractice that expert testimony is essential to establish not only the standard of care of
the profession but also that the physician's conduct in the treatment and care falls below such
standard. Further, inasmuch as the causes of the injuries involved in malpractice actions are
determinable only in the light of scientific knowledge, it has been recognized that expert testimony is
usually necessary to support the conclusion as to causation.

xxxx

In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing appellant's
negligence and for a reasonable conclusion of negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty on
the part of the surgeon as well as a causal connection of such breach and the resulting death of his
patient. In Chan Lugay v. St Luke's Hospital, Inc., where the attending physician was absolved of
liability for the death of the complainant’s wife and newborn baby, this Court held that:
"In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the ‘injury for
which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection
between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by
intervening efficient causes.’ In other words, the negligence must be the proximate cause of the
injury. For, ‘negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the
proximate cause of the injury complained of.’ And ‘the proximate cause of an injury is that cause,
which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces
the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.’"

An action upon medical negligence – whether criminal, civil or administrative – calls for the plaintiff to
prove by competent evidence each of the following four elements, namely: (a) the duty owed by the
physician to the patient, as created by the physician-patient relationship, to act in accordance with
the specific norms or standards established by his profession; (b) the breach of the duty by the
physician’s failing to act in accordance with the applicable standard of care; (3) the causation, i.e.,
there must be a reasonably close and causal connection between the negligent act or omission and
the resulting injury; and (4) the damages suffered by the patient. 36

In the medical profession, specific norms or standards to protect the patient against unreasonable
risk, commonly referred to as standards of care, set the duty of the physician to act in respect of the
patient. Unfortunately, no clear definition of the duty of a particular physician in a particular case
exists. Because most medical malpractice cases are highly technical, witnesses with special medical
qualifications must provide guidance by giving the knowledge necessary to render a fair and just
verdict. As a result, the standard of medical care of a prudent physician must be determined from
expert testimony in most cases; and in the case of a specialist (like an anesthesiologist), the
standard of care by which the specialist is judged is the care and skill commonly possessed and
exercised by similar specialists under similar circumstances. The specialty standard of care may be
higher than that required of the general practitioner.37

The standard of care is an objective standard by which the conduct of a physician sued for
negligence or malpractice may be measured, and it does not depend, therefore, on any individual
physician’s own knowledge either. In attempting to fix a standard by which a court may determine
whether the physician has properly performed the requisite duty toward the patient, expert medical
testimony from both plaintiff and defense experts is required. The judge, as the trier of fact,
ultimately determines the standard of care, after listening to the testimony of all medical experts.38

Here, the Prosecution presented no witnesses with special medical qualifications in anesthesia to
provide guidance to the trial court on what standard of care was applicable. It would consequently be
truly difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether the first three elements of a negligence and
malpractice action were attendant.

Although the Prosecution presented Dr. Benigno Sulit, Jr., an anesthesiologist himself who served
as the Chairman of the Committee on Ethics and Malpractice of the Philippine Society of
Anesthesiologists that investigated the complaint against Dr. Solidum, his testimony mainly focused
on how his Committee had conducted the investigation.  Even then, the report of his Committee was
39

favorable to Dr. Solidum,  to wit:

40

Presented for review by this committee is the case of a 3 year old male who underwent a pull-thru
operation and was administered general anesthesia by a team of anesthesia residents. The patient,
at the time when the surgeons was manipulating the recto-sigmoid and pulling it down in preparation
for the anastomosis, had bradycardia. The anesthesiologists, sensing that the cause thereof was the
triggering of the vago-vagal reflex, administered atropine to block it but despite the administration of
the drug in two doses, cardiac arrest ensued. As the records show, prompt resuscitative measures
were administered and spontaneous cardiac function re-established in less than five (5) minutes and
that oxygen was continuously being administered throughout, unfortunately, as later become
manifest, patient suffered permanent irreversible brain damage.

In view of the actuations of the anaesthesiologists and the administration of anaesthesia, the
committee find that the same were all in accordance with the universally accepted standards of
medical care and there is no evidence of any fault or negligence on the part of the
anaesthesiologists.

Dr. Antonio Vertido, a Senior Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, was also
presented as a Prosecution witness, but his testimony concentrated on the results of the physical
examination he had conducted on Gerald, as borne out by the following portions of his direct
examination, to wit:

FISCAL CABARON Doctor, what do you mean by General Anesthetic Agent?

WITNESS General Anesthetic Agent is a substance used in the conduction of Anesthesia and in this
case, halothane was used as a sole anesthetic agent.

xxxx

Q Now under paragraph two of page 1 of your report you mentioned that after one hour and 45
minutes after the operation, the patient experienced a bradycardia or slowing of heart rate, now as a
doctor, would you be able to tell this Honorable Court as to what cause of the slowing of heart rate
as to Gerald Gercayo?

WITNESS Well honestly sir, I cannot give you the reason why there was a bradycardia of time
because is some reason one way or another that might caused bradycardia.

FISCAL CABARON What could be the possible reason?

A Well bradycardia can be caused by anesthetic agent itself and that is a possibility, we’re talking
about possibility here.

Q What other possibility do you have in mind, doctor?

A Well, because it was an operation, anything can happen within that situation.

FISCAL CABARON Now, this representation would like to ask you about the slowing of heart rate,
now what is the immediate cause of the slowing of the heart rate of a person?

WITNESS Well, one of the more practical reason why there is slowing of the heart rate is when you
do a vagal reflex in the neck wherein the vagal receptors are located at the lateral part of the neck,
when you press that, you produce the slowing of the heart rate that produce bradycardia.

Q I am pro[p]ounding to you another question doctor, what about the deficiency in the supply of
oxygen by the patient, would that also cause the slowing of the heart rate?

A Well that is a possibility sir, I mean not as slowing of the heart rate, if there is a hypoxia or there is
a low oxygen level in the blood, the normal thing for the heart is to pump or to do not a bradycardia
but a … to counter act the Hypoxia that is being experienced by the patient
(sic).

xxxx

Q Now, you made mention also doctor that the use of general anesthesia using 100% halothane and
other anesthetic medications probably were contributory to the production of hypoxia.

A Yes, sir in general sir. 41

On cross-examination, Dr. Vertido expounded more specifically on his interpretation of the

anesthesia record and the factors that could have caused Gerald to experience bradycardia, viz:

ATTY. COMIA I noticed in, may I see your report Doctor, page 3, will you kindly read to this
Honorable court your last paragraph and if you will affirm that as if it is correct?

A "The use of General Anesthesia, that is using 100% Halothane probably will be contributory to the
production of Hypoxia and - - - -"

ATTY COMIA And do you affirm the figure you mentioned in this Court Doctor?

WITNESS Based on the records, I know the - - -

Q 100%?

A 100% based on the records.

Q I will show you doctor a clinical record. I am a lawyer I am not a doctor but will you kindly look at
this and tell me where is 100%, the word "one hundred" or 1-0-0, will you kindly look at this Doctor,
this Xerox copy if you can show to this Honorable Court and even to this representation the word
"one hundred" or 1-0-0 and then call me.

xxxx

ATTY. COMIA Doctor tell this Honorable Court where is that 100, 1-0-0 and if there is, you just call
me and even the attention of the Presiding Judge of this Court. Okay, you read one by one.

WITNESS Well, are you only asking 100%, sir?

ATTY. COMIA I’m asking you, just answer my question, did you see there 100% and 100 figures, tell
me, yes or no?

WITNESS I’m trying to look at the 100%, there is no 100% there sir.

ATTY. COMIA Okay, that was good, so you Honor please, may we request also temporarily,
because this is just a xerox copy presented by the fiscal, that the percentage here that the
Halothane administered by Dr. Solidum to the patient is 1% only so may we request that this portion,
temporarily your Honor, we are marking this anesthesia record as our Exhibit 1 and then this 1%
Halothane also be bracketed and the same be marked as our Exhibit "1-A".

xxxx
ATTY. COMIA Doctor, my attention was called also when you said that there are so many factors
that contributed to Hypoxia is that correct?

WITNESS Yes, sir.

Q I remember doctor, according to you there are so many factors that contributed to what you call
hypoxia and according to you, when this Gerald suffered hypoxia, there are other factors that might
lead to this Hypoxia at the time of this operation is that correct?

WITNESS The possibility is there, sir.

Q And according to you, it might also be the result of such other, some or it might be due to
operations being conducted by the doctor at the time when the operation is being done might also
contribute to that hypoxia is that correct?

A That is a possibility also.

xxxx

ATTY. COMIA How will you classify now the operation conducted to this Gerald, Doctor?

WITNESS Well, that is a major operation sir.

Q In other words, when you say major operation conducted to this Gerald, there is a possibility that
this Gerald might [be] exposed to some risk is that correct?

A That is a possibility sir.

Q And which according to you that Gerald suffered hypoxia is that correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q And that is one of the risk of that major operation is that correct?

A That is the risk sir. 42

At the continuation of his cross-examination, Dr. Vertido maintained that Gerald’s operation for his
imperforate anus, considered a major operation, had exposed him to the risk of suffering the same
condition.  He then corrected his earlier finding that 100% halothane had been administered on
43

Gerald by saying that it should be 100% oxygen. 44

Dr. Solidum was criminally charged for "failing to monitor and regulate properly the levels of
anesthesia administered to said Gerald Albert Gercayo and using 100% halothane and other
anesthetic medications." However, the foregoing circumstances, taken together, did not prove
45

beyond reasonable doubt that Dr. Solidum had been recklessly imprudent in administering the
anesthetic agent to Gerald. Indeed, Dr. Vertido’s findings did not preclude the probability that other
factors related to Gerald’s major operation, which could or could not necessarily be attributed to the
administration of the anesthesia, had caused the hypoxia and had then led Gerald to experience
bradycardia. Dr. Vertido revealingly concluded in his report, instead, that "although the
anesthesiologist followed the normal routine and precautionary procedures, still hypoxia and its
corresponding side effects did occur." 46
The existence of the probability about other factors causing the hypoxia has engendered in the mind
of the Court a reasonable doubt as to Dr. Solidum’s guilt, and moves us to acquit him of the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries. "A reasonable doubt of guilt," according to
United States v. Youthsey: 47

x x x is a doubt growing reasonably out of evidence or the lack of it. It is not a captious doubt; not a
doubt engendered merely by sympathy for the unfortunate position of the defendant, or a dislike to
accept the responsibility of convicting a fellow man. If, having weighed the evidence on both sides,
you reach the conclusion that the defendant is guilty, to that degree of certainty as would lead you to
act on the faith of it in the most important and crucial affairs of your life, you may properly convict
him. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not proof to a mathematical demonstration. It is not proof
beyond the possibility of mistake.

We have to clarify that the acquittal of Dr. Solidum would not immediately exempt him from civil
liability.  But we cannot now find and declare him civilly liable because the circumstances that have
1âwphi1

been established here do not present the factual and legal bases for validly doing so. His acquittal
did not derive only from reasonable doubt. There was really no firm and competent showing how the
injury to Gerard had been caused. That meant that the manner of administration of the anesthesia
by Dr. Solidum was not necessarily the cause of the hypoxia that caused the bradycardia
experienced by Gerard. Consequently, to adjudge Dr. Solidum civilly liable would be to speculate on
the cause of the hypoxia. We are not allowed to do so, for civil liability must not rest on speculation
but on competent evidence.

Liability of Ospital ng Maynila

Although the result now reached has resolved the issue of civil liability, we have to address the
unusual decree of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, of expressly holding Ospital ng Maynila civilly
liable jointly and severally with Dr. Solidum. The decree was flawed in logic and in law.

In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability that is deemed instituted with
the criminal action refers only to that arising from the offense charged.  It is puzzling, therefore, how
48

the RTC and the CA could have adjudged Ospital ng Maynila jointly and severally liable with Dr.
Solidum for the damages despite the obvious fact that Ospital ng Maynila, being an artificial entity,
had not been charged along with Dr. Solidum. The lower courts thereby acted capriciously and
whimsically, which rendered their judgment against Ospital ng Maynila void as the product of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Not surprisingly, the flawed decree raises other material concerns that the RTC and the CA
overlooked. We deem it important, then, to express the following observations for the instruction of
the Bench and Bar.

For one, Ospital ng Maynila was not at all a party in the proceedings. Hence, its fundamental right to
be heard was not respected from the outset. The R TC and the CA should have been alert to this
fundamental defect. Verily, no person can be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or
proceeding in which he was not made a party. Such a rule would enforce the constitutional
guarantee of due process of law.

Moreover, Ospital ng Maynila could be held civilly liable only when subsidiary liability would be
properly enforceable pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. But the subsidiary liability
seems far-fetched here. The conditions for subsidiary liability to attach to Ospital ng Maynila should
first be complied with. Firstly, pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, Ospital ng Maynila
must be shown to be a corporation "engaged in any kind of industry." The term industry means any
department or branch of art, occupation or business, especially one that employs labor and capital,
and is engaged in industry.  However, Ospital ng Maynila, being a public hospital, was not engaged
49

in industry conducted for profit but purely in charitable and humanitarian work.  Secondly, assuming
50

that Ospital ng Maynila was engaged in industry for profit, Dr. Solidum must be shown to be an
employee of Ospital ng Maynila acting in the discharge of his duties during the operation on Gerald.
Yet, he definitely was not such employee but a consultant of the hospital. And, thirdly, assuming that
civil liability was adjudged against Dr. Solidum as an employee (which did not happen here), the
execution against him was unsatisfied due to his being insolvent.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSES AND SETS
ASIDE the decision promulgated on January 20, 2010; ACQUITS Dr. Fernando P. Solidum of the
crime of reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries; and MAKES no pronouncement
on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 191240               July 30, 2014

CRISTINA B. CASTILLO, Petitioner, 
vs.
PHILLIP R. SALVADOR, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which assails the Decision  dated February 11, 2010 of
1

the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 30151 with respect only to the civil aspect of the case
as respondent Phillip R. Salvador had been acquitted of the crime of estafa. Respondent Phillip
Salvador and his brother Ramon Salvador were charged with estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2
(a) of the Revised Penal Code in an Information  which reads:
2

That during the period from March 2001 up to May 2002, in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to gain
and by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the
complainant CRISTINA B. CASTILLO, in the amount of US$100,000.00 in the following manner, to
wit: Respondents convinced the complainant to invest into the remittance business in the name of
accused PHILLIP R. SALVADOR in Hongkong, representing to her that they will personally take
charge of the operations and marketing of the said business, assuring her with huge profits because
of the popularity of accused PHILLIP R. SALVADOR, knowing very well that the said
manifestations/representations and fraudulent manifestations were false and were intended only to
exact money from the Complainant, and by reason of the said false representations made by both
accused, the Complainant gave and entrusted to the accused the amount of US$100,000.00 as
seed money to start the operations of the business and the said accused, once in the possession of
the said amount of money, misappropriated, misapplied and/or converted the same to their own
personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the Complainant in the aforementioned
amount of US$100,000.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 3

Upon their arraignment, respondentand his brother Ramon pleaded not guilty  to the offense
4

charged.

Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.

Petitioner Cristina B. Castillo testified that she is engaged in real estate business, educational
institution, boutique, and trading business.  She met respondent through a common friend in
5

December 2000 and became close since then. Respondent had told her that his friends, Jinggoy
Estrada and Rudy Fernandez, were engaged in the freight and remittance business and that Jinggoy
even brought him toHong Kong and Singapore to promote the former's business.  Petitioner
6

eventually met respondent’s brother and manager, Ramon Salvador, to whom she volunteered to
financially help respondent in his bid for the Vice-Mayoralty race in Mandaluyong.  It was also in the
7

same meeting that they talked about the matter of engaging in a freight and remittance
business.  Respondent enticed petitioner to go to Hong Kong to see for herself the viability of such
8

business and Ramon suggested to use respondent’s name to attract the overseas contract workers. 9

In March 2001, petitioner and her husband, together with respondent and a certain Virgilio
Calubaquib wentto Hong Kong and they witnessed respondent’s popularity among the Filipino
domestic helpers.  In April 2001, the same group, with Ramon this time, went to Bangkok where
10

respondent’s popularity was again shown among the overseas Filipinos.  In both instances,
11

respondent promoted their prospective business. In both trips, petitioner paid for all the
travelexpenses and even gave respondent US$10,000.00 as pocket money for the Hong Kong trip
and another US$10,000.00 for the Bangkok trip.  Her accountant introduced her to a certain Roy
12

Singun who is into the freight and money remittance business.  In August 2001, respondent initiated
13

a trip to Palau, to observe Singun’s business thereat to which petitioner acceded.  Petitioner paid for
14

the travel expenses and even gaverespondent US$20,000.00.  In October 2001, she and
15

respondent had a training at Western Union at First World Center in Makati City. 16

As petitioner had deeply fallen in love with respondent and since she trusted him very much as
heeven acted as a father to her children when her annulment was ongoing, she agreed to embark on
the remittance business. In December 2001, she, accompanied by her mother, Zenaida G. Bondoc
(Zenaida), and Ramon, went to Hong Kong and had the Phillip Salvador Freight and Remittance
International Limited registered on December 27, 2001.  A Memorandum of Articles of Incorporation
17

and a Certificate of Incorporation were issued.  They also rented an office space in Tsimshatsui,
18

Kowloon, Hong Kong which they registered as their office address as a requirement for opening a
business in Hong Kong, thus, a Notification of Situation of Registered Office was also issued.  She
19

agreed with respondent and Ramon that any profit derived from the business would be equally
divided among them and thatrespondent would be in charge of promotion and marketing in Hong
Kong,while Ramon would take charge of the operations of business in the Philippines and she would
be financing the business. 20

The business has not operated yet as petitioner was still raising the amount of US$100,000.00 as
capital for the actual operation.  When petitioner already had the money, she handed the same to
21

respondent in May 2002 at her mother’s house in Las Piñas City, which was witnessed by her
disabled half-brother Enrico B. Tan (Enrico).  She also gave respondent ₱100,000.00 in cash to
22

begiven to Charlie Chau, who is a resident of Hong Kong, as payment for the heart-shaped earrings
she bought from him while she was there. Respondent and Ramon went to Hong Kong in May 2002.
However, the proposed business never operated as respondent only stayed in Hong Kongfor three
days. When she asked respondent about the money and the business, the latter told her that the
money was deposited in a bank.  However, upon further query, respondent confessed that he used
23

the money to pay for his other obligations.  Since then, the US$100,000.00 was not returned at all.
24

On cross-examination, petitioner testified that she fell deeply in love with respondent and was
convinced thathe truly loved her and intended to marry her once there would beno more legal
impediment;  that she helped in financing respondent’s campaign in the May 2001 elections.  As
25 26

she loved respondent so much, she gave him monthly allowances amounting to hundreds of
thousands of pesos because he had no work back then.  She filed the annulment case against her
27

husband on November 21, 2001 and respondent promised her marriage.  She claimed that 28

respondent and Ramon lured her with sweet words in going into the freight and remittance business,
which never operated despite the money she had given respondent.  She raised the US$100,000.00 29

by means of selling and pawning her pieces of diamond jewelry. 30

Petitioner admitted being blinded by her love for respondent which made her follow all the advice
given by him and his brother Ramon, i.e., to save money for her and respondent’s future because
after the annulment, they would get married and to give the capital for the remittance business in
cash so as not to jeopardize her annulment case. She did not ask for a receipt for the
31

US$100,000.00 she gave to respondent as it was for the operational expenses of a business which
will be for their future, as all they needed to do was to get married.  She further testified that after the
32

US$100,000.00 was not returned, she still deposited the amount of ₱500,000.00 in respondent’s
UCPB bank account  and also to Ramon’s bank accounts.  And while respondent was in the United
33 34

States in August 2003, she still gave him US$2,000.00as evidenced by a Prudential Telegraphic
Transfer Application  dated August 27, 2003.
35

Petitioner’s mother, Zenaida, corroborated her daughter’s testimony that she was with her and
Ramon when they went to Hong Kong in December 2001 to register the freight and remittance
business.  She heard Charlie Chau, her daughter's friend, that a part of his office building will be
36

used for the said remittance business.  Enrico Tan, also corroborated her sister's claim that she
37

handed the money to respondent in his presence. 38

Respondent testified that he and petitioner became close friends and eventually fell in love and had
an affair.  They traveled to Hong Kong and Bangkok where petitioner saw how popular he was
39

among the Filipino domestic helpers,  which led her to suggest a remittance business. Although
40

hesitant, he has friends with such business. He denied that petitioner gave him US$10,000.00
41

whenhe went to Hong Kong and Bangkok.  In July 2001, after he came back from the United States,
42

petitioner had asked him and his brother Ramon for a meeting.  During the meeting, petitioner
43

brought up the money remittance business, but Ramon told her that they should make a study of it
first.  He was introduced to Roy Singun, owner of a money remittance business in Pasay
44

City.  Upon the advise of Roy, respondent and petitioner, her husband and Ramon went to Palau in
45

August 2001.  He denied receiving US$20,000.00 from petitioner but admitted that it was petitioner
46

who paid for the plane tickets.  After their Palau trip, they went into training at Western Union at the
47

First World Center in Makati City.  It was only in December 2001 that Ramon, petitioner and her
48

mother went to Hong Kong to register the business, while he took care of petitioner’s children
here.  In May 2002, he and Ramon went back to Hong Kong but deniedhaving received the amount
49

of US$100,000.00 from petitioner but then admitted receipt of the amount of ₱100,000.00 which
petitioner asked him to give to Charlie Chau as payment for the pieces of diamond jewelry she got
from him,  which Chau had duly acknowledged.  He denied Enrico’s testimony that petitioner gave
50 51
him the amount of US$100,000.00 in his mother’s house.  He claimed that no remittance business
52

was started in Hong Kong as they had no license, equipment, personnel and money to operate the
same.  Upon his return to the Philippines, petitioner never asked him about the business as she
53

never gave him such amount.  In October 2002, he intimated that he and petitioner even went to
54

Hong Kong again to buy some goods for the latter’s boutique.  He admitted that he loved petitioner
55

and her children very much as there was a time when petitioner’s finances were short, he gave her
₱600,000.00 for the enrollment of her children in very expensive schools.  It is also not true that he
56

and Ramon initiated the Hong Kong and Bangkok trips. 57

Ramon testified that it was his brother respondent who introduced petitioner to him.  He learned of 58

petitioner’s plan of a remittance business in July 2001 and even told her that they should study it
first.  He was introduced to Roy Singun who operates a remittancebusiness in Pasay and who
59

suggested that their group observehis remittance business in Palau. After their Palau trip, petitioner
decided to put up a similar business in Hong Kong and it was him who suggested to use
respondent’s name because of name recall.  It was decided thathe would manage the operation in
60

Manila and respondent would be in charge of promotion and marketing in Hong Kong, while
petitioner would be in charge of all the business finances.  He admitted that he wentto Hong Kong
61

with petitioner and her mother to register said business and also to buy goods for petitioner’s
boutique.  He said that it was also impossible for Chau to offer a part of his office building for the
62

remittance business because there was no more space to accommodate it.  He and respondent 63

went to Hong Kong in May 2002 to examine the office recommended by Chau and the warehouse of
Rudy Fernandez thereatwho also offered to help.  He then told Chau that the remittance office
64

should be in Central Park, Kowloon, because majority of the Filipinos in Hong Kong live there.  He 65

concluded that it was impossible for the business to operate immediately because they had no
office, no personnel and no license permit.  He further claimed that petitioner never mentioned to
66

him about the US$100,000.00 she gave to respondent,  and that he even traveled again with
67

petitioner to Bangkok in October 2002, and in August 2003.  He denied Enrico’s allegation that he
68

saw him at his mother’s house as he only saw Enrico for the first time in court. 69

On April 21, 2006, the RTC rendered a Decision,  the dispositive portion of which reads:
70

WHEREFORE, accused PHILLIP SALVADOR is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime ofEstafa under Article 315, par. 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate sentence of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prisyon (sic)
correctional (sic)maximum as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal maximumas
maximum and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
DOLLARS (US$100,000.00) or its equivalent in Philippine currency. With respect to accused
RAMON SALVADOR, he is ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence. SO ORDERED. 71

Respondent appealed his conviction to the CA. The parties filed their respective pleadings, after
which, the case was submitted for decision.

On February 11, 2010, the CA rendered its Decision reversing the decision of the RTC, the decretal
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision of Branch 202 of the RTC of Las Piñas
City, dated April 21, 2006, is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and accused appellant PHILLIP
R. SALVADOR is ACQUITTED of the crime of Estafa. 72

Petitioner files the instant petition onthe civil aspect of the case alleging that:
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN CONVICTING THE RESPONDENT SO THAT EVEN IF
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED TO ACQUIT HIM IT SHOULD HAVE AT LEAST RETAINED
THE AWARD OF DAMAGES TO THE PETITIONER. 73

We find no merit in the petition.

To begin with, in Manantan v. CA,  we discussed the consequences of an acquittal on the civil
74

liability of the accused as follows:

Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused.
First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the actor omission
complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be
not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act
oromission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delictois out of the question, and the civil action, if
any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is
the situation contemplated in Rule III of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal
based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused
has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by
preponderance of evidence only. This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code,
where the civil action for damages is "for the same act or omission." x x x. 75

A reading of the CA decision would show that respondent was acquitted because the prosecution
failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Said the CA:

The evidence for the prosecution being insufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the crime
as charged had been committed by appellant, the general presumption, "that a person is innocent of
the crime or wrong, stands in his favor. The prosecution failed to prove that all the elements of estafa
are present in this case as would overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of appellant. For
in fact, the prosecution's primary witness herself could not even establish clearly and precisely how
appellant committed the alleged fraud. She failed to convince us that she was deceived through
misrepresentations and/or insidious actions, in venturing into a remittance business. Quite the
contrary, the obtaining circumstance inthis case indicate the weakness of her submissions. 76

Thus, since the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, respondent is not exempt from civil liability
which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. In Encinas v. National Bookstore,
Inc.,  we explained the concept of preponderance of evidence as follows:
77

x x x Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either
side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or
"greater weight of the credible evidence." Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last
analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as
worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. 78

The issue of whether petitioner gave respondent the amount of US$100,000.00 is factual. While we
are not a trier of facts, there are instances, however, when we are called upon to re-examine the
factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals and weigh, after considering the records of
the case, which of the conflicting findings is more in accord with law and justice.  Such is the case
79

before us.

In discrediting petitioner’s allegation that she gave respondent US$100,000.00 in May 2002, the CA
found that: (1) petitioner failed to show how she was able to raise the money in such a short period
of time and even gave conflicting versions on the source of the same; (2) petitioner failed to require
respondent to sign a receipt so she could have a record of the transaction and offered no plausible
reason why the money was allegedly hand-carried toHong Kong; (3) petitioner’s claim of trust as
reason for not requiring respondent to sign a receipt was inconsistent with the way she conducted
her previous transactions with him; and (4) petitioner’s behavior after the alleged fraud perpetrated
against her was inconsistent with the actuation ofsomeone who had been swindled.

We find no reversible error committed by the CA in its findings.

Petitioner failed to prove on how she raised the money allegedly given to respondent. She testified
that from December 2001 to May 2002, she was raising the amount of US$100,000.00 as the capital
for the actual operation of the Phillip Salvador Freight and Remittance International Limited in Hong
Kong,  and that she was ableto raise the same in May 2002.  She did so by selling  or pawning  her
80 81 82 83

pieces of diamond jewelry. However, there was no documentary evidence showing those
transactions within the period mentioned. Upon further questioning on cross-examination on where
she got the money, she then said that she had plenty of dollars as she is a frequent traveler to Hong
Kong and Bangkok to shop for her boutique in Glorietta and Star Mall.  Such testimony contradicts
84

her claim that she was still raising the money for 5 months and that she was only able to formally
raise the money in May 2002.

There was also no receipt that indeed US$100,000.00 was given by petitioner to
respondent.  Petitioner in her testimony, both in the direct and cross examinations, said that the
1âwphi1

US$100,000.00 given to respondent was for the actual expenses for setting up the office and the
operation of the business in Hong Kong.  She claimed that she treated the freight and remittance
85

business like any of her businesses;  that she, respondent, and the latter’s brother even agreed to
86

divide whatever profits they would have from the business;  and that giving US$100,000.00 to
87

respondent was purely business to her.  She also said that she kept records of all her business,
88

such that, if there are no records, there are no funds entrusted  . Since petitioner admitted that
89

giving the money to respondent was for business, there must be some records ofsuch transaction as
what she did in her other businesses.

In fact, it was not unusual for petitioner to ask respondent for some documents evidencing the
latter's receipt of money for the purpose of business as this was done in her previous business
dealings with respondent. She had asked respondent to execute a real estate mortgage on his
condominium unit  for the ₱5 million she loaned him in August 2001. Also, when petitioner gave
90

respondent an additional loan of ₱10 million in December 2001, for the latter to redeem the title to
his condominium unit from the bank, she had asked him to sign an acknowledgment receipt for the
total amount of ₱15 million he got from her.  She had done all these despite her testimony that she
91

trusted respondent from the day they met in December 2000 until the day he ran away from her in
August 2003. 92

Petitioner insists that she did not ask for any acknowledgment receipt from respondent, because the
latter told her not to have traces that she was giving money to him as it might jeopardize her then
ongoing annulment proceedings. However, petitioner's testimony would belie such claim of
respondent being cautious of the annulment proceedings. She declared that when she and her
husband separated, respondent stood as a father to her children.  Respondent attended school
93

programs of her children,  and fetched them from school whenever the driver was not around.  In
94 95

fact, at the time the annulment case was already pending, petitioner registered the freight and
remittance business under respondent’s name and the local branch office of the business would be
in petitioner's condominium unit in Makati.  Also, when petitioner went with her mother and Ramon
96

to Hong Kong to register the business, it was respondent who tookcare of her children. She
intimated that it was respondent who was insistent in going to their house.
Worthy to mention is that petitioner deposited the amount of ₱500,000.00 to respondent's account
with United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) in July 2003.  Also, when respondent was in New York
97

in August 2003, petitioner sent him the amount of US$2,000.00 by telegraphic transfer.  Petitioner's
98

act ofdepositing money to respondent's account contradicted her claim that there should be no
traces that she was giving money to respondent during the pendency of the annulment case.

Petitioner conceded that she could have either bought a manager's check in US dollars from the
bank orsend the money by bank transfer, but she did not do so on the claim that there might be
traces of the transaction.  However, the alleged US$100,000.00was supposed to be given to
99

respondent because of the freight and remittance business; thus, there is nothing wrong to have a
record of the same, specially since respondent had to account for the valid expenseshe incurred with
the money. 100

The testimony of Enrico, petitioner's brother, declaring that he was present when petitioner gave
respondent the US$100,000.00 did not help. Enrico testified that when petitioner filed the instant
case in September 2004, another case was also filed by petitioner against respondent and his
brother Ramon in the same City Prosecutor's office in Las Piñas where Enrico had submitted his
affidavit. Enrico did not submit an affidavit in this case even when he allegedly witnessed the giving
of the money to respondent as petitioner told him that he could just testify for the other case.
However, when the other case was dismissed, it was then that petitioner told him to be a witness in
this case. Enrico should have been considered at the first opportunity if he indeed had personal
knowledge of the alleged giving of money to respondent. Thus, presenting Enrico as a witness only
after the other case was dismissed would create doubt as to the veracity of his testimony.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated February 11, 2010, of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30151, is hereby AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 189081, August 10, 2016

GLORIA S. DY, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, MANDY

COMMODITIES CO., INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, WILLIAM
MANDY, Respondent.

DECISION

JARDELEZA, J.:

Our law states that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
This civil liability ex delictomay be recovered through a civil action which, under our
Rules of Court, is deemed instituted with the criminal action. While they are actions
mandatorily fused,1 they are, in truth, separate actions whose existences are not
dependent on each other. Thus, civil liability ex delicto survives an acquittal in a
criminal case for failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, the Rules
of Court limits this mandatory fusion to a civil action for the recovery of civil
liability ex delicto. It, by no means, includes a civil liability arising from a different
source of obligation, as in the case of a contract. Where the civil liability is ex
contractu, the court hearing the criminal case has no authority to award damages.
 The Case

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner Gloria S. Dy (petitioner) seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated February 25, 2009 (Assailed Decision)2 ordering her to pay
Mandy Commodities Company, Inc. (MCCI) in the amount of P21,706,281.00.3 chanrobleslaw

The Facts

Petitioner was the former General Manager of MCCL. In the course of her
employment, petitioner assisted MCCI in its business involving several properties.
One such business pertained to the construction of warehouses over a property
(Numancia Property) that MCCI leased from the Philippine National Bank (PNB).
Sometime in May 1996, in pursuit of MCCI's business, petitioner proposed to
William Mandy (Mandy), President of MCCI, the purchase of a property owned by
Pantranco. As the transaction involved a large amount of money, Mandy agreed to
obtain a loan from the International China Bank of Commerce (ICBC). Petitioner
represented that she could facilitate the approval of the loan. True enough, ICBC
granted a loan to MCCI in the amount of P20,000,000.00, evidenced by a
promissory note. As security, MCCI also executed a chattel mortgage over the
warehouses in the Numancia Property. Mandy entrusted petitioner with the
obligation to manage the payment of the loan.4 chanrobleslaw

In February 1999, MCCI received a notice of foreclosure over the mortgaged

property due to its default in paying the loan obligation.5 In order to prevent the
foreclosure, Mandy instructed petitioner to facilitate the payment of the loan. MCCI,
through Mandy, issued 13 Allied Bank checks and 12 Asia Trust Bank checks in
varying amounts and in different dates covering the period from May 18, 1999 to
April 4, 2000.6 The total amount of the checks, which were all payable to cash, was
P21,706,281.00. Mandy delivered the checks to petitioner. Mandy claims that he
delivered the checks with the instruction that petitioner use the checks to pay the
loan.7 Petitioner, on the other hand, testified that she encashed the checks and
returned the money to Mandy.8 ICBC eventually foreclosed the mortgaged property
as MCCI continued to default in its obligation to pay. Mandy claims that it was only
at this point in time that he discovered that not a check was paid to ICBC.9 chanrobleslaw

Thus, on October 7, 2002, MCCI, represented by Mandy, filed a Compiamt-Affidavit

for Estafa10 before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. On March 3, 2004, an
Information11 was filed against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
Manila.

After a full-blown trial, the RTC Manila rendered a decision12 dated November 11,
2005 (RTC Decision) acquitting petitioner. The RTC Manila found that while
petitioner admitted that she received the checks, the prosecution failed to establish
that she was under any obligation to deliver them to ICBC in payment of MCCFs
loan. The trial court made this finding on the strength of Mandy's admission that he
gave the checks to petitioner with the agreement that she would encash them.
Petitioner would then pay ICBC using her own checks. The trial court further made
a finding that Mandy and petitioner entered into a contract of loan.13 Thus, it held
that the prosecution failed to establish an important element of the crime of estafa
—misappropriation or conversion. However, while the RTC Manila acquitted
petitioner, it ordered her to pay the amount of the checks. The dispositive portion
of the RTC Decision states —
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having failed to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, judgment is hereby rendered ACQUITTING the accused
of the offense charged. With costs de officio.

The accused is however civilly liable to the complainant for the amount of
P21,706,281.00.

SO ORDERED.14 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Petitioner filed an appeal15 of the civil aspect of the RTC Decision with the CA. In the
Assailed Decision,16the CA found the appeal without merit. It held that the acquittal
of petitioner does not necessarily absolve her of civil liability. The CA said that it is
settled that when an accused is acquitted on the basis of reasonable doubt, courts
may still find him or her civilly liable if the evidence so warrant. The CA explained
that the evidence on record adequately prove that petitioner received the checks as
a loan from MCCI. Thus, preventing the latter from recovering the amount of the
checks would constitute unjust enrichment. Hence, the Assailed Decision ruled
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated
November 11, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 33 in Criminal Case
No. 04-224294 which found Gloria Dy civilly liable to William Mandy is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.17 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The CA also denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in a resolution18 dated

August 3, 2009.

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari (Petition). Petitioner argues that since
she was acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove all the elements of the
crime charged, there was therefore no crime committed.19 As there was no crime,
any civil liability ex delicto cannot be awarded.

The Issues

The central issue is the propriety of making a finding of civil liability in a criminal
case for estafa when the accused is acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove
all the elements of the crime charged.

The Ruling of the Court

We grant the petition.

Civil Liability Arising From Crime

Our laws recognize a bright line distinction between criminal and civil liabilities. A
crime is a liability against the state. It is prosecuted by and for the state. Acts
considered criminal are penalized by law as a means to protect the society from
dangerous transgressions. As criminal liability involves a penalty affecting a
person's liberty, acts are only treated criminal when the law clearly says so. On the
other hand, civil liabilities take a less public and more private nature. Civil liabilities
are claimed through civil actions as a means to enforce or protect a right or prevent
or redress a wrong.20 They do not carry with them the imposition of imprisonment
as a penalty. Instead, civil liabilities are compensated in the form of damages.

Nevertheless, our jurisdiction recognizes that a crime has a private civil component.
Thus, while an act considered criminal is a breach of law against the State, our
legal system allows for the recovery of civil damages where there is a private
person injured by a criminal act. It is in recognition of this dual nature of a criminal
act that our Revised Penal Code provides that every person criminally liable is also
civilly liable.21This is the concept of civil liability ex delicto.

This is echoed by the New Civil Code when it recognizes acts or omissions punished
by law as a separate source of obligation.22 This is reinforced by Article 30 of the
same code which refers to the filing of a separate civil action to demand civil
liability arising from a criminal offense.23
chanrobleslaw

The Revised Penal Code fleshes out this civil liability in Article 10424 which states
that it includes restitution, reparation of damage caused and indemnification for
consequential damages.

Rules of procedure for criminal and civil actions involving the same act or omission

The law and the rules of procedure provide for a precise mechanism in instituting a
civil action pertaining to an act or omission which is also subject of a criminal case.
Our Rules of Court prescribes a kind of fusion such that, subject to certain defined
qualifications, when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery
of the civil liability arising from the offense is deemed instituted as well.25cralawredchanrobleslaw

However, there is an important difference between civil and criminal proceedings

that require a fine distinction as to how these twin actions shall proceed. These two
proceedings involve two different standards of proof. A criminal action requires
proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt while a civil action requires a lesser
quantum of proof, that of preponderance of evidence. This distinction also agrees
with the essential principle in our legal system that while a criminal liability carries
with it a corresponding civil liability, they are nevertheless separate and distinct. In
other words, these two liabilities may co-exist but their existence is not dependent
on each other.26 chanrobleslaw

The Civil Code states that when an accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on
the ground that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, a civil
action for damages for the same act or omission may be filed. In the latter case,
only preponderance of evidence is required.27 This is supported by the Rules of
Court which provides that the extinction of the criminal action does not result in the
extinction of the corresponding civil action.28 The latter may only be extinguished
when there is a "finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist."29 Consistent with
this, the Rules of Court requires that in judgments of acquittal the court must state
whether "the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the
accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case,
the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist."30chanrobleslaw

Thus, whether an exoneration from the criminal action should affect the
corresponding civil action depends on the varying kinds of acquittal. In Manantan v.
Court of Appeals,31 we explained —
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability
of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author
of the act or omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability,
for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission
cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission. There being
no delict civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any,
which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained
of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second
instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In
this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he
is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence
only. This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, where the
civil action for damages is "for the same act or omission." Although the two actions
have different purposes, the matters discussed in the civil case are similar to those
discussed in the criminal case. However, the judgment In the criminal proceeding
cannot be read in evidence In the civil action to establish any fact there
determined, even though both actions involve the same act or omission. The reason
for this rule is that the parties are not the same and secondarily, different rules of
evidence are applicable. Hence, notwithstanding herein petitioner's acquittal, the
Court of Appeals in determining whether Article 29 applied, was not precluded from
looking into the question of petitioner's negligence or reckless imprudence.32 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In Dayap v. Sendiong,33 we further said —

The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against
him on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action does not carry
with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court
declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the
accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is
acquitted. However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if
mere is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused
did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.34 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Hence, a civil action filed for the purpose of enforcing civil liability ex delicto, even if
mandatorily instituted with the corresponding criminal action, survives an acquittal
when it is based on the presence of reasonable doubt. In these instances, while the
evidence presented does not establish the fact of the crime with moral certainty,
the civil action still prevails for as long as the greater weight of evidence tilts in
favor of a finding of liability. This means that while the mind of the court cannot
rest easy in penalizing the accused for the commission of a crime, it nevertheless
finds that he or she committed or omitted to perform acts which serve as a
separate source of obligation. There is no sufficient proof that the act or omission is
criminal beyond reasonable doubt, but there is a preponderance of evidence to
show that the act or omission caused injury which demands compensation.

Civil Liability Ex Delicto in Estafa Cases

Our laws penalize criminal fraud which causes damage capable of pecuniary
estimation through estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. In general,
the elements of estafa are: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

(1)  That the accused defrauded another (a) by abuse of confidence, or (b) by means
of deceit; and
(2)  That damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the
offended party or third person.
The essence of the crime is the unlawful abuse of confidence or deceit in order to
cause damage. As this Court previously held, "the element of fraud or bad faith is
indispensable."35 Our law abhors the act of defrauding another person by abusing
his trust or deceiving him, such that, it criminalizes this kind of fraud.

Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code identifies the circumstances which
constitute estafa. Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) states that estafa is committed by
abuse of confidence —
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa) - x x x (b) By misappropriating or converting, to the
prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal property received by the
offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even
though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying
having received such money, goods, or other property.
In this kind of estafa, the fraud which the law considers as criminal is the act of
misappropriation or conversion. When the element of misappropriation or
conversion is missing, there can be no estafa. In such case, applying the foregoing
discussions on civil liability ex delicto, there can be no civil liability as there is no
act or omission from which any civil liability may be sourced. However, when an
accused is acquitted because a reasonable doubt exists as to the existence of
misappropriation or conversion, then civil liability may still be awarded. This means
that, while there is evidence to prove fraud, such evidence does not suffice to
convince the court to the point of moral certainty that the act of fraud amounts
to estafa. As the act was nevertheless proven, albeit without sufficient proof
justifying the imposition of any criminal penalty, civil liability exists.

In this case, the RTC Manila acquitted petitioner because the prosecution failed to
establish by sufficient evidence the element of misappropriation or conversion.
There was no adequate evidence to prove that Mandy gave the checks to petitioner
with the instruction that she will use them to pay the ICBC loan. Citing Mandy's own
testimony in open court, the RTC Manila held that when Mandy delivered the checks
to petitioner, their agreement was that it was a "sort of loan."36 In the dispositive
portion of the RTC Decision, the RTC Manila ruled that the prosecution "failed to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt."37 It then proceeded to
order petitioner to pay the amount of the loan.

The ruling of the RTC Manila was affirmed by the CA. It said that "[t]he acquittal of
Gloria Dy is anchored on the ground that her guilt was not proved beyond
reasonable doubt - not because she is not the author of the act or omission
complained of. x x x The trial court found no trickery nor deceit in obtaining money
from the private complainant; instead, it concluded that the money obtained was
undoubtedly a loan."38

Our jurisprudence on this matter diverges.

Earlier cases ordered the dismissal of the civil action for recovery of civil liability ex
delicto whenever there is a finding that there was no estafa but rather an obligation
to pay under a contract. In People v. Pantig,39 this Court affirmed the ruling of the
lower court acquitting Pantig, but revoked the portion sentencing him to pay the
offended party the amount of money alleged to have been obtained through false
and fraudulent representations, thus —
The trial court found as a fact that the sum of P1,200, ordered to be paid in the
judgment of acquittal, was received by the defendant-appellant as loan. This finding
is inconsistent with the existence of the criminal act charged in the
information. The liability of the defendant for the return of the amount so
received arises from a civil contract, not from a criminal act, and may not
be enforced in the criminal case.

The portion of the judgment appealed from, which orders the defendant-appellant
to pay the sum of Pi ,200 to the offended party, is hereby revoked, without
prejudice to the filing of a civil action for the recovery of the said amount.40chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

This was also the import of the ruling in People v. Singson.41 In that case, this Court
found that "the evidence [was] not sufficient to establish the existence of fraud or
deceit on the part of the accused. x x x And when there is no proven deceit or
fraud, there is no crime of estafa."42 While we also said that the established facts
may prove Singson's civil liability (obligation to pay under a contract of sale), we
nevertheless made no finding of civil liability because "our mind cannot rest easy on
the certainty of guilt"43considering the above finding. The dispositive portion stated
that Singson is acquitted "without prejudice to any civil liability which may be
established in a civil case against her."44chanrobleslaw

However, our jurisprudence on the matter appears to have changed in later years.

In Eusebio-Calderon v. People,45 this Court affirmed the finding of the CA that

Calderon "did not employ trickery or deceit in obtaining money from the private
complainants, instead, it concluded that the money obtained was undoubtedly loans
for which [Calderon] paid interest."46 Thus, this Court upheld Calderon's acquittal
of estafa, but found her civilly liable for the principal amount borrowed from the
private complainants.47 chanrobleslaw

The ruling was similar in People v. Cuyugan.48 In that case, we acquitted Cuyugan
of estafa for failure of the prosecution to prove fraud. We held that the transaction
between Cuyugan and private complainants was a loan to be used by Cuyugan in
her business. Thus, this Court ruled that Cuyugan has the obligation, which is civil
in character, to pay the amount borrowed.49 chanrobleslaw

We hold that the better rule in ascertaining civil liability in estafa cases is that
pronounced in Pantigand Singson. The rulings in these cases are more in accord
with the relevant provisions of the Civil Code, and the Rules of Court. They are also
logically consistent with this Court's pronouncement in Manantan.

Under Pantig and Singson, whenever the elements of estafa are not established,

and that the delivery of any personal property was made pursuant to a contract,
any civil liability arising from the estafa  cannot be awarded in the criminal case.
This is because the civil liability arising from the contract is not civil liability ex
delicto, which arises from the same act or omission constituting the crime. Civil
liability ex delicto is the liability sought to be recovered in a civil action deemed
instituted with the criminal case.

The situation envisioned in the foregoing cases, as in this case, is civil liability ex
contractu where the civil liability arises from an entirely different source of
obligation. Therefore, it is not the type of civil action deemed instituted in the
criminal case, and consequently must be filed separately. This is necessarily so
because whenever the court makes a finding that the elements of estafa do not
exist, it effectively says that there is no crime. There is no act or omission that
constitutes criminal fraud. Civil liability ex delicto cannot be awarded as it cannot be
sourced from something that does not exist.

When the court finds that the source of obligation is in fact, a contract, as in a
contract of loan, it takes a position completely inconsistent with the presence
of estafa. In estafa, a person parts with his money because of abuse of confidence
or deceit. In a contract, a person willingly binds himself or herself to give something
or to render some service.50 In estafa, the accused's failure to account for the
property received amounts to criminal fraud. In a contract, a party's failure to
comply with his obligation is only a contractual breach. Thus, any finding that the
source of obligation is a contract negates estafa. The finding, in turn, means that
there is no civil liability ex delicto. Thus, the rulings in the foregoing cases are
consistent with the concept of fused civil and criminal actions, and the different
sources of obligations under our laws.

We apply this doctrine to the facts of this case. Petitioner was acquitted by the RTC
Manila because of the absence of the element of misappropriation or conversion.
The RTC Manila, as affirmed by the CA, found that Mandy delivered the checks to
petitioner pursuant to a loan agreement. Clearly, there is no crime of estafa. There
is no proof of the presence of any act or omission constituting criminal fraud. Thus,
civil liability ex delicto cannot be awarded because there is no act or omission
punished by law which can serve as the source of obligation. Any civil liability
arising from the loan takes the nature of a civil liability ex contractu. It does not
pertain to the civil action deemed instituted with the criminal case.

In Manantan, this Court explained the effects of this result on the civil liability
deemed instituted with the criminal case. At the risk of repetition, Manantan held
that when there is no delict, "civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the
civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than
the delict complained of."51 In Dy's case, the civil liability arises out of contract—a
different source of obligation apart from an act or omission punished by law—and
must be claimed in a separate civil action.

Violation of Due Process

We further note that the evidence on record never fully established the terms of
this loan contract. As the trial before the RTC Manila was focused on proving estafa,
the loan contract was, as a consequence, only tangentially considered. This
provides another compelling reason why the civil liability arising from the loan
should be instituted in a separate civil case. A civil action for collection of sum of
money filed before the proper court will provide for a better venue where the terms
of the loan and other relevant details may be received. While this may postpone a
warranted recovery of the civil liability, this Court deems it more important to
uphold the principles underlying the inherent differences in the various sources of
obligations under our law, and the rule that fused actions only refer to criminal and
civil actions involving the same act or omission. These legal tenets play a central
role in this legal system. A confusion of these principles will ultimately jeopardize
the interests of the parties involved. Actions focused on proving estafa is not the
proper vehicle to thresh out civil liability arising from a contract.52 The Due Process
Clause of the Constitution dictates that a civil liability arising from a contract must
be litigated in a separate civil action.

Section 1 of the Bill of Rights states that no person shall be deprived of property
without due process of law. This provision protects a person's right to both
substantive and procedural due process. Substantive due process looks into the
validity of a law and protects against arbitrariness.53 Procedural due process, on the
other hand, guarantees procedural fairness.54 It requires an ascertainment of "what
process is due, when it is due, and the degree of what is due."55 This aspect of due
process is at the heart of this case.

In general terms, procedural due process means the right to notice and
hearing.56 More specifically, our Rules of Court provides for a set of procedures
through which a person may be notified of the claims against him or her as well as
methods through which he or she may be given the adequate opportunity to be
heard.

The Rules of Court requires that any person invoking the power of the judiciary to
protect or enforce a right or prevent or redress a wrong57 must file an initiatory
pleading which embodies a cause of action,58 which is defined as the act or omission
by which a party violates a right of another.59 The contents of an initiatory pleading
alleging a cause of action will vary depending on the source of the obligation
involved. In the case of an obligation arising from a contract, as in this case, the
cause of action in an initiatory pleading will involve the duties of the parties to the
contract, and what particular obligation was breached. On the other hand, when the
obligation arises from an act or omission constituting a crime, the cause of action
must necessarily be different. In such a case, the initiatory pleading will assert as a
cause of action the act or omission of respondent, and the specific criminal statute
he or she violated. Where the initiatory pleading fails to state a cause of action, the
respondent may file a motion to dismiss even before trial.60 These rules embody the
fundamental right to notice under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.

In a situation where a court (in a fused action for the enforcement of criminal and
civil liability) may validly order an accused-respondent to pay an obligation arising
from a contract, a person's right to be notified of the complaint, and the right to
have the complaint dismissed if there is no cause of action, are completely
defeated. In this event, the accused-respondent is completely unaware of the
nature of the liability claimed against him or her at the onset of the case. The
accused-respondent will not have read any complaint stating the cause of action of
an obligation arising from a contract. All throughout the trial, the accused-
respondent is made to believe that should there be any civil liability awarded
against him or her, this liability is rooted from the act or omission constituting the
crime. The accused-respondent is also deprived of the remedy of having the
complaint dismissed through a motion to dismiss before trial. In a fused action, the
accused-respondent could not have availed of this remedy because he or she was
not even given an opportunity to ascertain what cause of action to look for in the
initiatory pleading. In such a case, the accused-respondent is blindsided. He or she
could not even have prepared the appropriate defenses and evidence to protect his
or her interest. This is not the concept of fair play embodied in the Due Process
Clause. It is a clear violation of a person's right to due process.

The Rules of Court also allows a party to a civil action certain remedies that enable
him or her to effectively present his or her case. A party may file a cross-claim, a
counterclaim or a third-party complaint.61 The Rules of Court prohibits these
remedies in a fused civil and criminal case.62 The Rules of Court requires that any
cross-claim, counterclaim or third-party complaint must be instituted in a separate
civil action.63 In a legal regime where a court may order an accused in a fused
action to pay civil liability arising from a contract, the accused-respondent is
completely deprived of the remedy to file a cross-claim, a counterclaim or a third-
party complaint. This—coupled with an accused-respondent's inability to adequately
prepare his or her defense because of lack of adequate notice of the claims against
him or her—prevents the accused-respondent from having any right to a
meaningful hearing. The right to be heard under the Due Process Clause requires
not just any kind of an opportunity to be heard. It mandates that a party to a case
must have the chance to be heard in a real and meaningful sense. It does not
require a perfunctory hearing, but a court proceeding where the party may
adequately avail of the procedural remedies granted to him or her. A court decision
resulting from this falls short of the mandate of the Due Process Clause.
Indeed, the language of the Constitution is clear. No person shall be deprived of
property without due process of law. Due Process, in its procedural sense, requires,
in essence, the right to notice and hearing. These rights are further fleshed out in
the Rules of Court. The Rules of Court enforces procedural due process because, to
repeat the words of this Court in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, it provides for
"what process is due, when it is due, and the degree of what is due."64 A court
ordering an accused in a fused action to pay his or her contractual liability deprives
him or her of his or her property without the right to notice and hearing as
expressed in the procedures and remedies under the Rules of Court. Thus, any
court ruling directing an accused in a fused action to pay civil liability arising from a
contract is one that completely disregards the Due Process Clause. This ruling must
be reversed and the Constitution upheld.

Conclusion

The lower courts erred when they ordered petitioner to pay her civil obligation
arising from a contract of loan in the same criminal case where she was acquitted
on the ground that there was no crime. Any contractual obligation she may have
must be litigated in a separate civil action involving the contract of loan. We clarify
that in cases where the accused is acquitted on the ground that there is no crime,
the civil action deemed instituted with the criminal case cannot prosper precisely
because there is no delict from which any civil obligation may be sourced. The
peculiarity of this case is the finding that petitioner, in fact, has an obligation
arising from a contract. This civil action arising from the contract is not necessarily
extinguished. It can be instituted in the proper court through the proper civil action.

We note that while there is no written contract of loan in this case, there is an oral
contract of loan which must be brought within six years.65 Under the facts of the
case, it appears that any breach in the obligation to pay the loan may have
happened between 1996 and 1999, or more than six years since this case has been
instituted. This notwithstanding, we find that the civil action arising from the
contract of loan has not yet prescribed. Article 1150 of the Civil Code states —
Art. 1150. The time for prescription for all kinds of actions, when there is no special
provision which ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the day they may be
brought.
We held in numerous cases that it is the legal possibility of bringing the action that
determines the starting point for the computation of the period of prescription.67 We
highlight the unique circumstances surrounding this case. As discussed in this
decision, there has been diverse jurisprudence as to the propriety of ordering an
accused to pay an obligation arising from a contract in the criminal case where the
accused was acquitted on the ground that there is no crime. Litigants, such as
MCCI, cannot be blamed for relying on prior rulings where the recovery on a
contract of loan in a criminal case for estafa was allowed. We have found the
opportunity to clarify this matter through this decision. As it is only now that we
delineate the rules governing the fusion of criminal and civil actions pertaining
to estafa, it is only upon the promulgation of this judgment that litigants have a
clear understanding of the proper recourse in similar cases. We therefore rule that
insofar as MCCI is concerned, the filing of an action, if any (that may be sourced
from the contract of loan), becomes a legal possibility only upon the finality of this
decision which definitively ruled upon the principles on fused actions.

We add, however, that upon finality of this decision, prospective litigants should
become more circumspect in ascertaining their course of action in similar cases.
Whenever a litigant erroneously pursues an estafacase, and the accused is
subsequently acquitted because the obligation arose out of a contract, the
prescriptive period will still be counted from the time the cause of action arose. In
this eventuality, it is probable that the action has already prescribed by the time
the criminal case shall have been completed. This possibility demands that
prospective litigants do not haphazardly pursue the filing of an estafa case in order
to force an obligor to pay his or her obligation with the threat of criminal conviction.
It compels litigants to be honest and fair in their judgment as to the proper action
to be filed. This ruling should deter litigants from turning to criminal courts as their
collection agents, and should provide a disincentive to the practice of filing of
criminal cases based on unfounded grounds in order to provide a litigant a
bargaining chip in enforcing contracts.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of

the CA dated February 25, 2009 is REVERSED. This is however, without prejudice
to any civil action which may be filed to claim civil liability arising from the contract.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 175256               August 23, 2012

LILY LIM, Petitioner, 
vs.
KOU CO PING a.k.a. CHARLIE CO, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 179160

KOU CO PING a.k.a. CHARLIE CO, Petitioner, 

vs.
LILY LIM, Respondent.

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*

PERLAS-BERNABE,**

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Is it forum shopping for a private complainant to pursue a civil complaint for specific performance
and damages, while appealing the judgment on the civil aspect of a criminal case for estafa?

Before the Court are consolidated Petitions for Review assailing the separate Decisions of the
Second and Seventeenth Divisions of the Court of Appeals (CA) on the above issue.

Lily Lim’s (Lim) Petition for Review assails the October 20, 2005 Resolution of the Second Division
1  2 

in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138, which ruled on the above issue in the affirmative:

Due to the filing of the said civil complaint (Civil Case No. 5112396), Charlie Co filed the instant
motion to dismiss [Lily Lim’s] appeal, alleging that in filing said civil case, Lily Lim violated the rule
against forum shopping as the elements of litis pendentia are present.

This Court agrees. 3 

xxxx

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appeal is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED. 4 

On the other hand, Charlie Co’s (Co) Petition for Review assails the April 10, 2007 Decision of the
5  6 

Seventeenth Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 93395 for ruling on the same issue in the negative:
We find no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent judge. The elements of litis
pendentiaand forum-shopping were not met in this case. 7 

xxxx

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED. This case is  REMANDED to
the court of origin for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED. 8 

Factual Antecedents

In February 1999, FR Cement Corporation (FRCC), owner/operator of a cement manufacturing

plant, issued several withdrawal authorities for the account of cement dealers and traders, Fil-
9 

Cement Center and Tigerbilt. These withdrawal authorities state the number of bags that the
dealer/trader paid for and can withdraw from the plant. Each withdrawal authority contained a
provision that it is valid for six months from its date of issuance, unless revoked by FRCC Marketing
Department.

Fil-Cement Center and Tigerbilt, through their administrative manager, Gail Borja (Borja), sold the
withdrawal authorities covering 50,000 bags of cement to Co for the amount of ₱ 3.15 million or ₱
63.00 per bag. On February 15, 1999, Co sold these withdrawal authorities to Lim allegedly at the
10 

price of ₱ 64.00 per bag or a total of ₱ 3.2 million.

11 

Using the withdrawal authorities, Lim withdrew the cement bags from FRCC on a staggered basis.
She successfully withdrew 2,800 bags of cement, and sold back some of the withdrawal authorities,
covering 10,000 bags, to Co.

Sometime in April 1999, FRCC did not allow Lim to withdraw the remaining 37,200 bags covered by
the withdrawal authorities. Lim clarified the matter with Co and Borja, who explained that the plant
implemented a price increase and would only release the goods once Lim pays for the price
difference or agrees to receive a lesser quantity of cement. Lim objected and maintained that the
withdrawal authorities she bought were not subject to price fluctuations. Lim sought legal recourse
after her demands for Co to resolve the problem with the plant or for the return of her money had
failed.

The criminal case

An Information for Estafa through Misappropriation or Conversion was filed against Co before
Branch 154 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. The accusatory portion thereof reads:

On or about between the months of February and April 1999, in San Juan, Metro Manila and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, with intent to defraud Lily Lim, with grave abuse
of confidence, with unfaithfulness, received in trust from Lily Lim cash money in the amount of ₱
2,380,800.00 as payment for the 37,200 bags of cement, under obligation to deliver the 37,200 bags
of cement to said Lily Lim, but far from complying with his obligation, misappropriated, misapplied
and converted to his own personal use and benefit the said amount of ₱ 2,300,800.00 [sic] and
despite demands, the accused failed and refused to return said amount, to the damage and
prejudice of Lily Lim in the amount of ₱ 2,380,800.00.

Contrary to Law. 12 

The private complainant, Lily Lim, participated in the criminal proceedings to prove her damages.
She prayed for Co to return her money amounting to ₱ 2,380,800.00, foregone profits, and legal
interest, and for an award of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees. 13 

On November 19, 2003, the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 154, rendered its Order acquitting Co of the
14 

estafa charge for insufficiency of evidence. The criminal court’s Order reads:

The first and second elements of the crime of estafa [with abuse of confidence under Article 315,
paragraph 1(b)] for which the accused is being charged and prosecuted were not established by the
prosecution’s evidence.

xxxx

In view of the absence of the essential requisites of the crime of estafa for which the accused is
being charged and prosecuted, as above discussed, the Court has no alternative but to dismiss the
case against the accused for insufficiency of evidence. 15 

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Demurrer to Evidence is GRANTED, and the accused

is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of estafa charged against him under the present information for
insufficiency of evidence.

Insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned, however, set this case for the reception of
his evidence on the matter on December 11, 2003 at 8:30 o’clock [sic] in the morning.

SO ORDERED. 16 

After the trial on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the Pasig City RTC also relieved Co of civil
liability to Lim in its December 1, 2004 Order. The dispositive portion of the Order reads as follows:
17 

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered holding the accused CHARLIE

COnot civilly liable to the private complainant Lily Lim.

SO ORDERED. 18 

Lim sought a reconsideration of the above Order, arguing that she has presented preponderant
evidence that Co committed estafa against her. 19 

The trial court denied the motion in its Order dated February 21, 2005.
20 

On March 14, 2005, Lim filed her notice of appeal on the civil aspect of the criminal case. Her
21 

appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 85138 and raffled to the Second Division of the CA.

The civil action for specific performance

On April 19, 2005, Lim filed a complaint for specific performance and damages before Branch 21 of
the RTC of Manila. The defendants in the civil case were Co and all other parties to the withdrawal
authorities, Tigerbilt, Fil-Cement Center, FRCC, Southeast Asia Cement, and La Farge Corporation.
The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 05-112396, asserted two causes of action: breach of
contract and abuse of rights. Her allegations read:
 ALLEGATIONS COMMON
TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION

xxxx

23. Charlie Co obligated himself to deliver to Lily Lim 50,000 bags of cement of ₱ 64.00 per bag on
an x-plant basis within 3 months from the date of their transaction, i.e. February 15, 1999. Pursuant
to said agreement, Lily Lim paid Charlie Co ₱ 3.2 Million while Charlie Co delivered to Lily Lim FR
Cement Withdrawal Authorities representing 50,000 bags of cement.

24. The withdrawal authorities issued by FR Cement Corp. allowed the assignee or holder thereof to
withdraw within a six-month period from date a certain amount of cement indicated therein. The
Withdrawal Authorities given to Lily Lim were dated either 3 February 1999 or 23 February 1999.
The Withdrawal Authorities were first issued to Tigerbilt and Fil-Cement Center which in turn
assigned them to Charlie Co. Charlie Co then assigned the Withdrawal Authorities to Lily Lim on
February 15, 1999. Through these series of assignments, Lily Lim acquired all the rights (rights to
withdraw cement) granted in said Withdrawal Authorities.

25. That these Withdrawal Authorities are valid is established by the fact that FR Cement earlier
allowed Lily Lim to withdraw 2,800 bags of cement on the basis thereof.

26. However, sometime 19 April 1999 (within the three (3)-month period agreed upon by Charlie Co
and Lily Lim and certainly within the six (6)-month period indicated in the Withdrawal Authorities
issued by FR Cement Corp.), Lily Lim attempted but failed to withdraw the remaining bags of cement
on account of FR Cement’s unjustified refusal to honor the Withdrawal Authorities. x x x

xxxx

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:

BREACH OF CONTRACT

30. Charlie Co committed and is therefore liable to deliver to Lily Lim 37,200 bags of cement. If he
cannot, then he must pay her the current fair market value thereof.

31. FR Cement Corporation is also liable to deliver to Lily Lim the amount of cement as indicated in
the Withdrawal Authorities it issued. xxx FR Cement Corporation has no right to impose price
adjustments as a qualification for honoring the Withdrawal Authorities.

32. Fil-Cement Center, Tigerbilt and Gail Borja as the original holders/ assignees of the Withdrawal
Authorities repeatedly assured Lily Lim that the same were valid and would be honored. They are
liable to make good on their assurances.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION:

ABUSE OF RIGHTS AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT

33. Charlie Co’s acts of falsely representing to Lily Lim that she may be able to withdraw the cement
from FR Cement Corp. caused Lily Lim to incur expenses and losses. Such act was made without
justice, without giving Lily Lim what is due her and without observing honesty and good faith, all
violative of the law, more specifically Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code. Such willful act was also
made by Charlie Co in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, in violation of
Article 21 of the Civil Code.
34. FR Cement Corporation’s unjust refusal to honor the Withdrawal Authorities they issued also
caused damage to Lily Lim. Further, FR Cement Corporation’s act of withholding the 37,200 bags of
cement despite earning income therefor constitutes as an unjust enrichment because FR Cement
Corporation acquired income through an act or performance by another or any other means at the
expense of another without just or legal ground in violation of Article 22 of the Civil Code.

35. Fil-Cement Center, Tigerbilt and Gail Borja’s false assurances that Lily Lim would be able to
withdraw the remaining 37,200 bags of cement caused Lily Lim to incur expenses and losses. x x x
Moreover, Fil-Cement Center admitted receiving payment for said amount of cement, thus they are
deemed to have come into possession of money at the expense of Lily Lim without just or legal
ground, in violation of Article 22 of the Civil Code.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION:

MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES and
ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS OF SUIT 22 

Lim prayed for Co to honor his contractual commitments either by delivering the 37,200 bags of
cement, making arrangements with FRCC to allow Lim to withdraw the cement, or to pay for their
value. She likewise asked that the defendants be held solidarily liable to her for the damages she
incurred in her failed attempts to withdraw the cement and for the damages they inflicted on her as a
result of their abuse of their rights. 23 

Motions to dismiss both actions

In reaction to the filing of the civil complaint for specific performance and damages, Co filed motions
to dismiss the said civil case and Lim’s appeal in the civil aspect of the estafa case or CA-G.R. CV
24 

No. 85138. He maintained that the two actions raise the same issue, which is Co’s liability to Lim for
25 

her inability to withdraw the bags of cement, and should be dismissed on the ground of lis
26 

pendens and forum shopping.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals Second Division in CA-G.R CV No. 85138

The appellate court (Second Division) favorably resolved Co’s motion and dismissed Lim’s appeal
from the civil aspect of the estafa case. In its Resolution dated October 20, 2005, the CA Second
Division held that the parties, causes of action, and reliefs prayed for in Lim’s appeal and in her civil
complaint are identical. Both actions seek the same relief, which is the payment of the value of the
37,200 bags of cement. Thus, the CA Second Division dismissed Lim’s appeal for forum
27 

shopping. The CA denied Lim’s motion for reconsideration.

28  29  30 

Lim filed the instant petition for review, which was docketed as G.R. No. 175256.

Ruling of the Manila Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 05-112396

Meanwhile, the Manila RTC denied Co’s Motion to Dismiss in an Order dated December 6, 2005.
31 

The Manila RTC held that there was no forum shopping because the causes of action invoked in the
two cases are different. It observed that the civil complaint before it is based on an obligation arising
from contract and quasi-delict, whereas the civil liability involved in the appeal of the criminal case
arose from a felony.
Co filed a petition for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 93395, before the appellate court. He
32 

prayed for the nullification of the Manila RTC’s Order in Civil Case No.  05-112396 for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion. 33 

Ruling of the Court of Appeals Seventeenth Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 93395

The CA Seventeenth Division denied Co’s petition and remanded the civil complaint to the trial court
for further proceedings. The CA Seventeenth Division agreed with the Manila RTC that the elements
of litis pendentia and forum shopping are not met in the two proceedings because they do not share
the same cause of action. 34 

The CA denied Co’s motion for reconsideration.

35  36 

Co filed the instant Petition for Review, which was docketed as G.R. No. 179160.

Upon Co’s motion, the Court resolved to consolidate the two petitions.
37  38 

Kou Co Ping’s arguments

Co maintains that Lim is guilty of forum shopping because she is asserting only one cause of action
in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138 (the appeal from the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 116377) and in Civil
Case No. 05-112396, which is for Co’s violation of her right to receive 37,200 bags of cement.
Likewise, the reliefs sought in both cases are the same, that is, for Co to deliver the 37,200 bags of
cement or its value to Lim. That Lim utilized different methods of presenting her case – a criminal
action for estafa and a civil complaint for specific performance and damages – should not detract
from the fact that she is attempting to litigate the same cause of action twice. 39 

Co makes light of the distinction between civil liability ex contractu and ex delicto. According to him,
granting that the two civil liabilities are independent of each other, nevertheless, the two cases
arising from them would have to be decided using the same evidence and going over the same set
of facts. Thus, any judgment rendered in one of these cases will constitute res judicata on the
other.40 

In G.R. No. 179160, Co prays for the annulment of the CA Decision and Resolution in CA-G.R. SP
No. 93395, for a declaration that Lim is guilty of forum shopping, and for the dismissal of Civil Case
No. 05-112396. 41 

In G.R. No. 175256, Co prays for the affirmation of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138
(which dismissed Lim’s appeal from the trial court’s decision in Criminal Case No. 116377). 42 

Lily Lim’s arguments

Lim admits that the two proceedings involve substantially the same set of facts because they arose
from only one transaction. She is quick to add, however, that a single act or omission does not
43 

always make a single cause of action. It can possibly give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the
44 

part of the offender – (1) ex delicto or civil liability arising from crimes, and (2) independent civil
liabilities or those arising from contracts or intentional torts. The only caveat provided in Article 2177
of the Civil Code is that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission. Because the law allows her two independent causes of action, Lim contends that it is not
45 

forum shopping to pursue them. 46 

She then explains the separate and distinct causes of action involved in the two cases. Her cause of
action in CA-G.R CV No. 85138 is based on the crime of estafa. Co violated Lim’s right to be
protected against swindling. He represented to Lim that she can withdraw 37,200 bags of cement
using the authorities she bought from him. This is a fraudulent representation because Co knew, at
the time that they entered into the contract, that he could not deliver what he promised. On the other 47 

hand, Lim’s cause of action in Civil Case No. 05-112396 is based on contract. Co violated Lim’s
rights as a buyer in a contract of sale. Co received payment for the 37,200 bags of cement but did
not deliver the goods that were the subject of the sale. 48 

In G.R. No. 179160, Lim prays for the denial of Co’s petition. In G.R. No. 175256, she prays for the
49 

reversal of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138, for a declaration that she is not guilty of
forum shopping, and for the reinstatement of her appeal in Criminal Case No. 116377 to the CA. 50 

Issue

Did Lim commit forum shopping in filing the civil case for specific performance and damages during
the pendency of her appeal on the civil aspect of the criminal case for estafa?

Our Ruling

A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party may give rise to two separate civil
liabilities on the part of the offender - (1) civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the
51 

criminal offense under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and (2) independent civil liability, that
52 

is, civil liability that may be pursued independently of the criminal proceedings. The independent civil
liability may be based on "an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a
felony," as provided in Article 31 of the Civil Code (such as for breach of contract or for tort ). It may 53 

also be based on an act or omission that may constitute felony but, nevertheless, treated
independently from the criminal action by specific provision of Article 33 of the Civil Code ("in cases
of defamation, fraud and physical injuries").

The civil liability arising from the offense or ex delicto is based on the acts or omissions that
constitute the criminal offense; hence, its trial is inherently intertwined with the criminal action. For
this reason, the civil liability ex delicto is impliedly instituted with the criminal offense. If the action for
54 

the civil liability ex delicto is instituted prior to or subsequent to the filing of the criminal action, its
proceedings are suspended until the final outcome of the criminal action. The civil liability based on
55 

delict is extinguished when the court hearing the criminal action declares that "the act or omission
from which the civil liability may arise did not exist." 56 

On the other hand, the independent civil liabilities are separate from the criminal action and may be
pursued independently, as provided in Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code, which state that:

ART. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings
and regardless of the result of the latter. (Emphasis supplied.)

ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action
shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. (Emphasis supplied.)
Because of the distinct and independent nature of the two kinds of civil liabilities, jurisprudence holds
that the offended party may pursue the two types of civil liabilities simultaneously or cumulatively,
without offending the rules on forum shopping, litis pendentia, or res judicata. As explained
57 

in Cancio, Jr. v. Isip:

58 

One of the elements of res judicata is identity of causes of action. In the instant case, it must be
stressed that the action filed by petitioner is an independent civil action, which remains separate and
distinct from any criminal prosecution based on the same act. Not being deemed instituted in the
criminal action based on culpa criminal, a ruling on the culpability of the offender will have no
bearing on said independent civil action based on an entirely different cause of action, i.e., culpa
contractual.

In the same vein, the filing of the collection case after the dismissal of the estafa cases against the
offender did not amount to forum-shopping. The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple
suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively,
to secure a favorable judgment. Although the cases filed by [the offended party] arose from the
same act or omission of [the offender], they are, however, based on different causes of action. The
criminal cases for estafa are based on culpa criminal while the civil action for collection is anchored
on culpa contractual. Moreover, there can be no forum-shopping in the instant case because the law
expressly allows the filing of a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal
action.59 

Since civil liabilities arising from felonies and those arising from other sources of obligations are
authorized by law to proceed independently of each other, the resolution of the present issue hinges
on whether the two cases herein involve different kinds of civil obligations such that they can
proceed independently of each other. The answer is in the affirmative.

The first action is clearly a civil action ex delicto, it having been instituted together with the criminal
action.60 

On the other hand, the second action, judging by the allegations contained in the complaint, is a civil
61 

action arising from a contractual obligation and for tortious conduct (abuse of rights). In her civil
complaint, Lim basically alleges that she entered into a sale contract with Co under the following
terms: that she bought 37,200 bags of cement at the rate of ₱ 64.00 per bag from Co; that, after full
payment, Co delivered to her the withdrawal authorities issued by FRCC corresponding to these
bags of cement; that these withdrawal authorities will be honored by FRCC for six months from the
dates written thereon. Lim then maintains that the defendants breached their contractual obligations
to her under the sale contract and under the withdrawal authorities; that Co and his co-defendants
wanted her to pay more for each bag of cement, contrary to their agreement to fix the price at ₱
64.00 per bag and to the wording of the withdrawal authorities; that FRCC did not honor the terms of
the withdrawal authorities it issued; and that Co did not comply with his obligation under the sale
contract to deliver the 37,200 bags of cement to Lim. From the foregoing allegations, it is evident
that Lim seeks to enforce the defendants’ contractual obligations, given that she has already
performed her obligations. She prays that the defendants either honor their part of the contract or
pay for the damages that their breach has caused her.

Lim also includes allegations that the actions of the defendants were committed in such manner as
to cause damage to Lim without regard for morals, good customs and public policy. These
allegations, if proven, would constitute tortious conduct (abuse of rights under the Human Relations
provisions of the Civil Code).
Thus, Civil Case No. 05-112396 involves only the obligations arising from contract and from tort,
whereas the appeal in the estafa case involves only the civil obligations of Co arising from the
offense charged. They present different causes of action, which under the law, are considered
"separate, distinct, and independent" from each other. Both cases can proceed to their final
62 

adjudication, subject to the prohibition on double recovery under Article 2177 of the Civil Code.
63 

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Lily Lim’s Petition in G.R. No. 175256 is GRANTED. The
assailed October 20, 2005 Resolution of the Second Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 85138 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Lily Lim’s appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138 is
ordered REINSTATED and the Court of Appeals is DIRECTED to RESOLVE the same
with DELIBERATE DISPATCH.

Charlie Co’s Petition G.R. No. 179160 is DENIED. The assailed April 10, 2007 Decision of the
Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 93395 is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 145391            August 26, 2002

AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULO, petitioners, 
vs.
MARIO LLAVORE LAROYA, respondent.

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the Resolution1 dated December 28, 1999
dismissing the petition for certiorari and the Resolution2 dated August 24, 2000 denying the motion
for reconsideration, both issued by the Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66, in Special
Civil Action No. 17-C (99).

The Facts

Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Llavore Laroya ("Laroya" for brevity) and the other
owned by petitioner Roberto Capitulo ("Capitulo" for brevity) and driven by petitioner Avelino
Casupanan ("Casupanan" for brevity), figured in an accident. As a result, two cases were filed with
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court ("MCTC" for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case
against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 002-99. On the other hand, Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for
quasi-delict, docketed as Civil Case No. 2089.

When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its preliminary investigation stage.
Laroya, defendant in the civil case, filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground of forum-
shopping considering the pendency of the criminal case. The MCTC granted the motion in the Order
of March 26, 1999 and dismissed the civil case.

On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the civil case is a separate
civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal case. The MCTC denied the motion for
reconsideration in the Order of May 7, 1999. Casupanan and Capitulo filed a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 before the Regional Trial Court ("Capas RTC" for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac, Branch
66,3 assailing the MCTC’s Order of dismissal.

The Trial Court’s Ruling

The Capas RTC rendered judgment on December 28, 1999 dismissing the petition for certiorari for
lack of merit. The Capas RTC ruled that the order of dismissal issued by the MCTC is a final order
which disposes of the case and therefore the proper remedy should have been an appeal. The
Capas RTC further held that a special civil action for certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal.
Finally, the Capas RTC declared that even on the premise that the MCTC erred in dismissing the
civil case, such error is a pure error of judgment and not an abuse of discretion.

Casupanan and Capitulo filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the Capas RTC denied the same in
the Resolution of August 24, 2000.

Hence, this petition.

The Issue

The petition premises the legal issue in this wise:

 "In a certain vehicular accident involving two parties, each one of them may think and believe
that the accident was caused by the fault of the other. x x x [T]he first party, believing himself
to be the aggrieved party, opted to file a criminal case for reckless imprudence against the
second party. On the other hand, the second party, together with his operator, believing
themselves to be the real aggrieved parties, opted in turn to file a civil case for quasi-delict
against the first party who is the very private complainant in the criminal case."4

Thus, the issue raised is whether an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence
can validly file, simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the
private complainant in the criminal case.

The Court’s Ruling

Casupanan and Capitulo assert that Civil Case No. 2089, which the MCTC dismissed on the ground
of forum-shopping, constitutes a counterclaim in the criminal case. Casupanan and Capitulo argue
that if the accused in a criminal case has a counterclaim against the private complainant, he may file
the counterclaim in a separate civil action at the proper time. They contend that an action on quasi-
delict is different from an action resulting from the crime of reckless imprudence, and an accused in
a criminal case can be an aggrieved party in a civil case arising from the same incident. They
maintain that under Articles 31 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the civil case can proceed independently
of the criminal action. Finally, they point out that Casupanan was not the only one who filed the
independent civil action based on quasi-delict but also Capitulo, the owner-operator of the vehicle,
who was not a party in the criminal case.

In his Comment, Laroya claims that the petition is fatally defective as it does not state the real
antecedents. Laroya further alleges that Casupanan and Capitulo forfeited their right to question the
order of dismissal when they failed to avail of the proper remedy of appeal. Laroya argues that there
is no question of law to be resolved as the order of dismissal is already final and a petition for
certiorari is not a substitute for a lapsed appeal.

In their Reply, Casupanan and Capitulo contend that the petition raises the legal question of whether
there is forum-shopping since they filed only one action - the independent civil action for quasi-
delict against Laroya.

Nature of the Order of Dismissal

The MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on the ground of forum-shopping under
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The MCTC did not state in its order of
dismissal5 that the dismissal was with prejudice. Under the Administrative Circular, the order of
dismissal is without prejudice to refiling the complaint, unless the order of dismissal expressly states
it is with prejudice.6 Absent a declaration that the dismissal is with prejudice, the same is deemed
without prejudice. Thus, the MCTC’s dismissal, being silent on the matter, is a dismissal without
prejudice.

Section 1 of Rule 417 provides that an order dismissing an action without prejudice is not appealable.
The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a special civil action under Rule 65. Section 1 of Rule 41
expressly states that "where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may
file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65." Clearly, the Capas RTC’s order dismissing the
petition for certiorari, on the ground that the proper remedy is an ordinary appeal, is erroneous.

Forum-Shopping
The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same
cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment.8 Forum-
shopping is present when in the two or more cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights of
action and reliefs sought.9 However, there is no forum-shopping in the instant case because the law
and the rules expressly allow the filing of a separate civil action which can proceed independently of
the criminal action.

Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property based on the
Revised Penal Code while Casupanan and Capitulo filed the civil action for damages based on
Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Although these two actions arose from the same act or omission, they
have different causes of action. The criminal case is based on culpa criminal punishable under the
Revised Penal Code while the civil case is based on culpa aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176
and 2177 of the Civil Code. These articles on culpa aquiliana read:

"Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter.

Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But
the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant."

Any aggrieved person can invoke these articles provided he proves, by preponderance of evidence,
that he has suffered damage because of the fault or negligence of another. Either the private
complainant or the accused can file a separate civil action under these articles. There is nothing in
the law or rules that state only the private complainant in a criminal case may invoke these articles.

Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure ("2000 Rules"
for brevity) expressly requires the accused to litigate his counterclaim in a separate civil action, to
wit:

"SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – (a) x x x.

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the

criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be
litigated in a separate civil action." (Emphasis supplied)

Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to file his counterclaim in a separate
civil action, there can be no forum-shopping if the accused files such separate civil action.

Filing of a separate civil action

Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure ("1985 Rules" for brevity), as amended
in 1988, allowed the filing of a separate civil action independently of the criminal action provided the
offended party reserved the right to file such civil action. Unless the offended party reserved the civil
action before the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution, all civil actions arising from the
same act or omission were deemed "impliedly instituted" in the criminal case. These civil actions
referred to the recovery of civil liability ex-delicto, the recovery of damages for quasi-delict, and the
recovery of damages for violation of Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code on Human Relations.
Thus, to file a separate and independent civil action for quasi-delict under the 1985 Rules, the
offended party had to reserve in the criminal action the right to bring such action. Otherwise, such
civil action was deemed "impliedly instituted" in the criminal action. Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985
Rules provided as follows:

"Section 1. – Institution of criminal and civil actions. – When a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action,
unless the offended party waives the action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and
damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising
from the same act or omission of the accused.

A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the
reservation of the right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the others.

The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the
prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended
party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission of
the accused.

x x x." (Emphasis supplied)

Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules was amended on December 1, 2000 and now provides as
follows:

"SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – (a) When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action
prior to the criminal action.

The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the
prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended
party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

xxx

(b) x x x

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it
may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter
case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with
section 2 of this rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions." (Emphasis
supplied)

Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is "deemed instituted" with the criminal action is only
the action to recover civil liability arising from the crime or ex-delicto. All the other civil actions under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code are no longer "deemed instituted," and may be filed
separately and prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the criminal action. The
failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver of the right to file a separate and
independent civil action based on these articles of the Civil Code. The prescriptive period on the civil
actions based on these articles of the Civil Code continues to run even with the filing of the criminal
action. Verily, the civil actions based on these articles of the Civil Code are separate, distinct and
independent of the civil action "deemed instituted" in the criminal action.10

Under the present Rule 111, the offended party is still given the option to file a separate civil action
to recover civil liability ex-delicto by reserving such right in the criminal action before the prosecution
presents its evidence. Also, the offended party is deemed to make such reservation if he files a
separate civil action before filing the criminal action. If the civil action to recover civil liability ex-
delicto is filed separately but its trial has not yet commenced, the civil action may be consolidated
with the criminal action. The consolidation under this Rule does not apply to separate civil actions
arising from the same act or omission filed under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code.11

Suspension of the Separate Civil Action

Under Section 2, Rule 111 of the amended 1985 Rules, a separate civil action, if reserved in the
criminal action, could not be filed until after final judgment was rendered in the criminal action. If the
separate civil action was filed before the commencement of the criminal action, the civil action, if still
pending, was suspended upon the filing of the criminal action until final judgment was rendered in
the criminal action. This rule applied only to the separate civil action filed to recover liability ex-
delicto. The rule did not apply to independent civil actions based on Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of
the Civil Code, which could proceed independently regardless of the filing of the criminal action.

The amended provision of Section 2, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules continues this procedure, to wit:

"SEC. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. – After the criminal action has been
commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final
judgment has been entered in the criminal action.

If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the
latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the
merits. The suspension shall last until final judgment is rendered in the criminal
action. Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action, the same
may, upon motion of the offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action in the court
trying the criminal action. In case of consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil
action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action without prejudice to
the right of the prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses presented by the offended party
in the criminal case and of the parties to present additional evidence. The consolidated
criminal and civil actions shall be tried and decided jointly.

During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of prescription of the
civil action which cannot be instituted separately or whose proceeding has been suspended
shall be tolled.

x x x." (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, Section 2, Rule 111 of the present Rules did not change the rule that the separate civil action,
filed to recover damages ex-delicto, is suspended upon the filing of the criminal action. Section 2 of
the present Rule 111 also prohibits the filing, after commencement of the criminal action, of a
separate civil action to recover damages ex-delicto.

When civil action may proceed independently

The crucial question now is whether Casupanan and Capitulo, who are not the offended parties in
the criminal case, can file a separate civil action against the offended party in the criminal case.
Section 3, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules provides as follows:

"SEC 3. When civil action may proceed independently. - In the cases provided in Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be
brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party
recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action."
(Emphasis supplied)

Section 3 of the present Rule 111, like its counterpart in the amended 1985 Rules, expressly allows
the "offended party" to bring an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code. As stated in Section 3 of the present Rule 111, this civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case,
however, may the "offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in
the criminal action."

There is no question that the offended party in the criminal action can file an independent civil action
for quasi-delict against the accused. Section 3 of the present Rule 111 expressly states that the
"offended party" may bring such an action but the "offended party" may not recover damages twice
for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action. Clearly, Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to
the offended party in the criminal action, not to the accused.

Casupanan and Capitulo, however, invoke the ruling in Cabaero vs. Cantos12 where the Court held
that the accused therein could validly institute a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the
private complainant in the criminal case. In Cabaero, the accused in the criminal case filed his
Answer with Counterclaim for malicious prosecution. At that time the Court noted the "absence of
clear-cut rules governing the prosecution on impliedly instituted civil actions and the necessary
consequences and implications thereof." Thus, the Court ruled that the trial court should confine
itself to the criminal aspect of the case and disregard any counterclaim for civil liability. The Court
further ruled that the accused may file a separate civil case against the offended party "after the
criminal case is terminated and/or in accordance with the new Rules which may be promulgated."
The Court explained that a cross-claim, counterclaim or third-party complaint on the civil aspect will
only unnecessarily complicate the proceedings and delay the resolution of the criminal case.

Paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 was incorporated in the 2000 Rules precisely to
address the lacunamentioned in Cabaero. Under this provision, the accused is barred from filing a
counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint in the criminal case. However, the same provision
states that "any cause of action which could have been the subject (of the counterclaim, cross-claim
or third-party complaint) may be litigated in a separate civil action." The present Rule 111 mandates
the accused to file his counterclaim in a separate civil actiosn which shall proceed independently of
the criminal action, even as the civil action of the offended party is litigated in the criminal action.

Conclusion
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176
of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the
offended party even without reservation. The commencement of the criminal action does not
suspend the prosecution of the independent civil action under these articles of the Civil Code. The
suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action arising from the crime,
if such civil action is reserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal action.

Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission. The first a criminal
case where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a
civil case for quasi-delict - without violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The two cases can
proceed simultaneously and independently of each other. The commencement or prosecution of the
criminal action will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is that the offended
party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. In most cases,
the offended party will have no reason to file a second civil action since he cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the accused. In some instances, the accused may be insolvent,
necessitating the filing of another case against his employer or guardians.

Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is
accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present
Rule 111 which states that the counterclaim of the accused "may be litigated in a separate civil
action." This is only fair for two reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any
counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal case. The accused is
therefore forced to litigate separately his counterclaim against the offended party. If the accused
does not file a separate civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may set in since the
period continues to run until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed.

Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code,
in the same way that the offended party can avail of this remedy which is independent of the criminal
action. To disallow the accused from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to
recognize his counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due process of law, access to the
courts, and equal protection of the law.

Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan and Capitulo is proper.
The order of dismissal by the MCTC of Civil Case No. 2089 on the ground of forum-shopping is
erroneous.

We make this ruling aware of the possibility that the decision of the trial court in the criminal case
may vary with the decision of the trial court in the independent civil action. This possibility has
always been recognized ever since the Civil Code introduced in 1950 the concept of an independent
civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Code. But the law itself, in Article 31 of the
Code, expressly provides that the independent civil action "may proceed independently of the
criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter." In Azucena vs. Potenciano,13the
Court declared:

"x x x. There can indeed be no other logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil
action contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution — whether it
be conviction or acquittal — would render meaningless the independent character of the civil
action and the clear injunction in Article 31 that this action 'may proceed independently of the
criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.’"

More than half a century has passed since the Civil Code introduced the concept of a civil action
separate and independent from the criminal action although arising from the same act or omission.
The Court, however, has yet to encounter a case of conflicting and irreconcilable decisions of trial
courts, one hearing the criminal case and the other the civil action for quasi-delict. The fear of
conflicting and irreconcilable decisions may be more apparent than real. In any event, there are
sufficient remedies under the Rules of Court to deal with such remote possibilities.

One final point. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure took effect on December 1, 2000 while
the MCTC issued the order of dismissal on December 28, 1999 or before the amendment of the
rules. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure must be given retroactive effect considering the
well-settled rule that -

"x x x statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in
that sense and to that extent."14

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions dated
December 28, 1999 and August 24, 2000 in Special Civil Action No. 17-C (99) are ANNULLED and
Civil Case No. 2089 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 119771 April 24, 1998

SAN ILDEFONSO LINES, INC., and EDUARDO JAVIER, petitioners, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Thirteenth Division) and PIONEER INSURANCE and SURETY
CORPORATION, respondents.

MARTINEZ, J.:

At around 3:30 in the afternoon of June 24, 1991, a Toyota Lite Ace Van being driven by its owner
Annie U. Jao and a passenger bus of herein petitioner San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. (hereafter, SILI)
figured in a vehicular mishap at the intersection of Julia Vargas Avenue and Rodriguez Lanuza
Avenue in Pasig, Metro Manila, totally wrecking the Toyota van and injuring Ms. Jao and her two (2)
passengers in the process.

A criminal case was thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig on September 18, 1991
charging the driver of the bus, herein petitioner Eduardo Javier, with reckless imprudence resulting
in damage to property with multiple physical injuries.

About four (4) months later, or on January 13, 1992, herein private respondent Pioneer Insurance
and Surety Corporation (PISC), as insurer of the van and subrogee, filed a case for damages
against petitioner SILI with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, seeking to recover the sums it paid
the assured under a motor vehicle insurance policy as well as other damages, totaling P564,500.00
(P454,000.00 as actual/compensatory damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; P50,000.00 as
attorney's fees; P10,000.00 as litigation expenses; and P500.00 as appearance fees.) 1

With the issues having been joined upon the filing of the petitioners' answer to the complaint for
damages and after submission by the parties of their respective pre-trial briefs, petitioners filed on
September 18, 1992 a Manifestation and Motion to Suspend Civil Proceedings grounded on the
pendency of the criminal case against petitioner Javier in the Pasig RTC and the failure of
respondent PISC to make a reservation to file a separate damage suit in said criminal action. This
was denied by the Manila Regional Trial Court in its Order dated July 21, 1993,   ruling thus:
2

Answering the first question thus posed, the court holds that plaintiff may legally
institute the present civil action even in the absence of a reservation in the criminal
action. This is so because it falls among the very exceptions to the rule cited by the
movant.

It is true that the general rule is that once a criminal action has been instituted, then
civil action based thereon is deemed instituted together with the criminal action, such
that if the offended party did not reserve the filing of the civil action when the criminal
action was filed, then such filing of the civil action is therefore barred; on the other
hand, if there was such reservation, still the civil action cannot be instituted until final
judgment has been rendered in the criminal action;

But, this rule (Section 2, Rule 111, Revised Rules of Court) is subject to exemptions,
the same being those provided for in Section 3 of the same rule which states:

Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. — In the cases

provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
 Philippines, the independent civil action which was been reserved
may be brought by the offended party, shall proceed independently of
the criminal action, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.

Besides, the requirement in Section 2 of Rule 111 of the former Rules on Criminal
Procedure that there be a reservation in the criminal case of the right to institute an
independent civil action has been declared as not in accordance with law. It is
regarded as an unauthorized amendment to our substantive law, i.e., the Civil Code
which does not require such reservation. In fact, the reservation of the right to file an
independent civil action has been deleted from Section 2, Rule 111 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, in consonance with the decisions of this Court
declaring such requirement of a reservation as ineffective. (Bonite vs. Zosa, 162
SCRA 180).

Further, the Court rules that a subrogee-plaintiff may institute and prosecute the civil
action, it being allowed by Article 2207 of the Civil Code.

After their motion for reconsideration of said July 21, 1993 Order was denied, petitioners elevated
the matter to this Court via petition for certiorari which was, however, referred to public respondent
Court of Appeals for disposition. On February 24, 1995, a decision adverse to petitioners once again
was rendered by respondent court, upholding the assailed Manila Regional Trial Court Order in this
wise:

A separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is
criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party
is not allowed (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger
award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.

To subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles to the result of the
criminal prosecution — whether it be conviction or acquittal — would render
meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the clear injunction in
Art. 31, that this action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter.

In Yakult Phil. vs. CA, the Supreme Court said:

Even if there was no reservation in the criminal case and that the civil
action was not filed before the filing of the criminal action but before
the prosecution presented evidence in the criminal action, and the
judge handling the criminal case was informed thereof, then the
actual filing of the civil action is even far better than a compliance with
the requirement of an express reservation that should be made by
the offended party before the prosecution presented its evidence.

The purpose of this rule requiring reservation is to prevent the offended party from
recovering damages twice for the same act or omission.

Substantial compliance with the reservation requirement may, therefore, be made by

making a manifestation in the criminal case that the private respondent has instituted
a separate and independent civil action for damages.
 Oft-repeated is the dictum that courts should not place undue importance on
technicalities when by so doing substantial justice is sacrificed. While the rules of
procedure require adherence, it must be remembered that said rules of procedure
are intended to promote, not defeat, substantial justice, and therefore, they should
not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense.

Hence, this petition for review after a motion for reconsideration of said respondent court
judgment was denied.

The two (2) crucial issues to be resolved, as posited by petitioners, are:

1) If a criminal case was filed, can an independent civil action based on quasi-delict under Article
2176 of the Civil Code be filed if no reservation was made in the said criminal case?

2) Can a subrogee of an offended party maintain an independent civil action during the pendency of
a criminal action when no reservation of the right to file an independent civil action was made in the
criminal action and despite the fact that the private complainant is actively participating through a
private prosecutor in the aforementioned criminal case?

We rule for petitioners.

On the chief issue of "reservation", at the fore is Section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which
reads:

Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. — In the cases provided for in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil
action which has been reserved may be brought by the offended party, shall proceed
independently of the criminal action, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.

There is no dispute that these so-called "independent civil actions" based on the
aforementioned Civil Code articles are the exceptions to the primacy of the criminal action
over the civil action as set forth in Section 2 of Rule 111.  However, it is easily deducible from
3

the present wording of Section 3 as brought about by the 1988 amendments to the Rules on
Criminal Procedure — particularly the phrase ". . . which has been reserved" — that the
"independent" character of these civil actions does not do away with the reservation
requirement. In other words, prior reservation is a condition sine qua non before any of these
independent civil actions can be instituted and thereafter have a continuous determination
apart from or simultaneous with the criminal action. That this should now be the controlling
procedural rule is confirmed by no less than retired Justice Jose Y. Feria, remedial law
expert and a member of the committee which drafted the 1988 amendments, whose learned
explanation on the matter was aptly pointed out by petitioners, to wit:

The 1988 amendment expands the scope of the civil action which his deemed
impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless waived, reserved or previously
instituted. . . .

Under the present Rule as amended, such a civil action includes not only recovery of
indemnity under the Revised Penal Code and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, but also damages under Article 2176 of the said
code. . . .
 Objections were raised to the inclusion in this Rule of quasi-delicts under Article 2176
of the Civil Code of the Philippines. However, in view of Article 2177 of the said code
which provides that the offended party may not recover twice for the same act or
omission of the accused, and in line with the policy of avoiding multiplicity of suits,
these objections were overruled. In any event, the offended party is not precluded
from filing a civil action to recover damages arising from quasi-delict before the
institution of the criminal action, or from reserving his right to file such a separate civil
action, just as he is not precluded from filing a civil action for damages under Articles
32, 33 and 34 before the institution of the criminal action, or from reserving his right
to file such a separate civil action. It is only in those cases where the offended party
has not previously filed a civil action or has not reserved his right to file a separate
civil action that his civil action is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action.

It should be noted that while it was ruled in Abella vs. Marave (57 SCRA 106) that a
reservation of the right to file an independent civil action is not necessary, such a
reservation is necessary under the amended rule. Without such reservation, the civil
action is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless previously
waived or instituted. (Emphasis ours, Justice Jose Y. Feria [Ret.], 1988 Amendments
to the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, a pamphlet, published by Central Lawbook
Publishing Co., Inc., Philippine Legal Studies, Series No. 3, 5-6). 4

Sharing the same view on the indispensability of a prior reservation is Mr. Justice Florenz D.
Regalado, whose analysis of the historical changes in Rule 111 since the 1964 Rules of Court is
equally illuminating. Thus,

1. Under Rule 111 of the 1964 Rules of Court, the civil liability arising from the
offense charged was impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless such civil
action was expressly waived or reserved. The offended party was authorized to bring
an independent civil action in the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and
2177 of the Civil Code provided such right was reserved.

In the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, the same Rule 111 thereof reiterated said
provision on the civil liability arising from the offense charged. The independent civil
actions, however, were limited to the cases provided for in Articles 32, 33 and 34 of
the Civil Code, obviously because the actions contemplated in Articles 31 and 2177
of said Code are not liabilities ex-delicto. Furthermore, no reservation was required in
order the civil actions in said Articles 32, 33 and 34 may be pursued separately.

2. The present amendments introduced by the Supreme Court have the following
notable features on this particular procedural aspect, viz:

a. The civil action which is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, barring a
waiver, reservation or prior institution thereof, need not arise from the offense
charged, as the phrase "arising from the offense charged" which creates that nexus
has been specifically eliminated.

b. The independent civil actions contemplated in the present Rule 111 include
the quasi-delictsprovided for in Art. 2176 of the Civil Code, in addition to the cases
provided in Arts. 32, 33 and 34 thereof. It is necessary, however, that the civil liability
under all the said articles arise "from the same act or omission of the
accused." Furthermore, a reservation of the right to institute these separate civil
actions is again required otherwise, said civil actions are impliedly instituted with the
 criminal action, unless the former are waived or filed ahead of the criminal action.
(Emphasis supplied.)  5

In fact, a deeper reading of the "Yakult Phils. vs. CA" case  relied upon by respondent court reveals
6

an acknowledgment of the reservation requirement. After recognizing that the civil case instituted by
private respondent therein Roy Camaso (represented by his father David Camaso) against petitioner
Yakult Phils. (the owner of the motorcycle that sideswiped Roy Camaso, only five years old at the
time of the accident) and Larry Salvado (the driver of the motorcycle) during the pendency of the
criminal case against Salvado for reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries, as one
based on tort, this Court said:

The civil liability sought arising from the act or omission of the accused in this case is
a quasi-delict as defined under Article 2176 of the Civil Code as follows:

x x x           x x x          x x x

The aforecited rule [referring to the amended Section l, Rule 111] requiring, such

previous reservation also covers quasi-delict as defined under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code arising from the same act or omission of the accused (emphasis
supplied).

But what prompted the Court to validate the institution and non-suspension of the civil case
involved in "Yakult" was the peculiar facts attendant therein. Thus,

Although the separate civil action filed in this case was without previous reservation
in the criminal case, nevertheless since it was instituted before the prosecution
presented evidence in the criminal action, and the judge handling the criminal case
was informed thereof, then the actual filing of the civil action is even far better than a
compliance with the requirement of an express reservation that should be made by
the offended party before the prosecution presents its evidence.

The distinct factual scenario in "Yakult" simply does not obtain in this case. No satisfactory proof
exists to show that private respondent PISC's damage suit was instituted before the prosecution
presented its evidence in the criminal case pending in the Pasig Regional Trial Court. Neither is
there any indication that the judge presiding over the criminal action has been made aware of the
civil case. It is in this light that reliance on the "Yakult" case is indeed misplaced.

Now that the necessity of a prior reservation is the standing rule that shall govern the institution of
the independent civil actions referred to in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, past pronouncements that
view the reservation requirement as an "unauthorized amendment" to substantive law — i.e., the
Civil Code, should no longer be controlling. There must be a renewed adherence to the time-
honored dictum that procedural rules are designed, not to defeat, but to safeguard the ends of
substantial justice. And for this noble reason, no less than the Constitution itself has mandated this
Court to promulgate rules concerning the enforcement of rights with the end in view of providing a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases which should not diminish,
increase or modify substantive rights.  Far from altering substantive rights, the primary purpose of
7

the reservation is, to borrow the words of the Court in "Caños v. Peralta":  8

. . . to avoid multiplicity of suits, to guard against oppression and abuse, to prevent

delays, to clear congested dockets, to simplify the work of the trial court; in short, the
attainment of justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties-litigants.
Clearly then, private respondent PISC, as subrogee under Article 2207 of the Civil Code,   is not
9

exempt from the reservation requirement with respect to its damages suit based on quasi-
delict arising from the same act or ommission of petitioner Javier complained of in the criminal case.
As private respondent PISC merely stepped into the shoes of Ms. Jao (as owner of the insured
Toyota van), then it is bound to observe the procedural requirements which Ms. Jao ought to follow
had she herself instituted the civil case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated February
24, 1995 and the Resolution dated April 3, 1995 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The "MANIFESTATION AND MOTION TO SUSPEND CIVIL
PROCEEDINGS" filed by petitioners is GRANTED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 112985 April 21, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee 

vs.
MARTIN L. ROMERO and ERNESTO C. RODRIGUEZ, accused-appellants.
 

PARDO, J

The case before the Court is an appeal of accused Martin L. Romero and Ernesto C. Rodriguez from
the Joint Judgment  of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Butuan City, convicting each of them of
1

estafa under Article 315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Presidential Decree No.
1689, for widescale swindling, and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
and to jointly and severally pay Ernesto A. Ruiz the amount of one hundred fifty thousand pesos
(P150,000.00), with interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum, starting September 14,
1989, until fully paid, and to pay ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00), as moral damages.

On October 25, 1989, Butuan City acting fiscal Ernesto M. Brocoy filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Butuan City, in Information against the two (2) accused estafa,  as follows:
2

That on or about September 14, 1989, at Butuan City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being the General
Manager and Operation Manager which solicit funds from the general public for
investment, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping, one another, by
means of deceit and false pretense, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously deliberately defraud one Ernesto A. Ruiz by convincing the latter to invest
his money in the amount of P150,000.00 with a promise return of 800 % profit within
21 days and in the process caused the issuance of Butuan City Rural [sic] Bank
Check No. 158181 postdated to October 5, 1989 in the amount of One Million Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,200,000.00) Philippine Currency, that upon
presentation of said check to the drawee bank for payment the same was dishonored
and that notwithstanding repeated demands made on said accused to pay and/or
change the check to cash, they consistently failed and refused and still fail and
refuse to pay or redeem the check, to the damage and prejudice of the complainant
in the aforestated amount of P1,200,000.00. 3

On the same day, the city fiscal filed with the same court another information against the two (2)
accused for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, arising from the issuance of the same check. 4

On January 11, 1990, both accused were arraigned before the Regional Trial Court, Branch
5,   Butuan City, where they plead not guilty to both informations.
5

The prosecution presented its evidence on January 10, 1991, with complainant, Ernesto A. Ruiz,
and Daphne Parrocho, the usher/collector of the corporation being managed by accused, testifying
for the prosecution.

On August 12, 1991, the defense presented its only witness, accused Martin L. Romero.

On November 13, 1992, the parties submitted a joint stipulation of facts, signed only by their
respective counsels. Thereafter, the case was submitted for decision.

On March 30, 1993, the trail court promulgated a Joint Judgment dated March 25, 1993. The trial
court acquitted the accused in Criminal Case No. 3806  based on reasonable doubt, but convicted
6

them in Criminal Case No. 3808 and accordingly sentenced each of them, as follows:
7
 IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby renders judgments, finding or
declaring —

(a) Accused Martin L. Romero and Ernesto C. Rodriguez innocent on reasonable

doubt in Criminal Case No. 3806, for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22;

(b) Accused Martin L. Romero and Ernesto C. Rodriguez guilty beyond reasonable
doubt in Criminal Case No. 3808 for estafa under P.D. 1689 for wide scale [sic]
swindling and accordingly sentences them to suffer life imprisonment (Section 1 P.D.
1689) and ordered jointly and severally to return to Ernesto A. Ruiz the amount of
One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00) with interest thereon at the rate
of Twelve percent (12%) per annum starting from September 14, 1989 until fully paid
and to pay the amount Of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as moral damages.

In the service of their sentence, the accused pursuant to R.A. 6127, shall be credited
for the preventive imprisonment they have undergone (PP vs. Ortencio, 38 Phil 941;
PP vs. Gabriel, No. L-13750, October 30, 1959, cited in Gregorio's "Fundamentals of
Criminal Law Review", P. 178, Seventh Edition, 1985). 8

On March 31, 1993, accused filed their notice of appeal, which the trial court gave due course on
April 5, 1993. On March 16, 1994, this Court ordered the, accused to file their appellants' brief.

Accused-appellants filed their brief on October 30, 1995, while the Solicitor General filed the
appellee's brief on March 8, 1996.

During the pendency of the appeal, on November 12, 1997, accused Ernesto Rodriguez died.   As a 9

consequence of his death before final judgment, his criminal and civil liability ex delicto, were
extinguished. 10

Complainant Ernesto A. Ruiz was a radio commentator of Radio DXRB, Butuan City. In August,
1989, he came to know the business of Surigao San Andres Industrial Development Corporation
(SAIDECOR), when he interviewed accused Martin Romero and Ernesto Rodriguez regarding the
corporation's investment operations in Butuan City and Agusan del Norte. Romero was the president
and general manager of SAIDECOR, while Rodriguez was the operations manager.

SAIDECOR started its operation on August 24, 1989 as a marketing business. Later, it engaged in
soliciting funds and investments from the public. The corporation guaranteed an 800% return on
investment within fifteen (15) or twenty one (21) days. Investors were given coupons containing the
capital and the return on the capital collectible on the date agreed upon. It stopped operations in
September, 1989.

On September 14, 1989, complainant Ernesto A. Ruiz went to SAIDECOR office in Butuan City to
make an investment, accompanied by his friend Jimmy Acebu, and SAIDECOR collection agent
Daphne Parrocho. After handing over the amount of one hundred fifty thousand pesos
(P150,000.00) to Ernesto Rodriguez, complainant received a postdated Butuan City Rural Bank
check instead of the usual redeemable coupon. The check indicated P1,000,200.00 as the amount
in words, but the amount in figures was for P1,200,000.00, as the return on the investment.
Compliant did not notice the discrepancy.

When the check was presented to the bank for payment on October 5, 1989, it was dishonored for
insufficiency of funds, as evidenced by the check return slip issued by the bank.   Both accused
11
could not be located and demand for payment was made only sometime in November 1989 during
the preliminary investigation of this case. Accused responded that they had no money.

Daphne Parrocho,   testified that on September 14, 1989, complainant, with his friend Jimmy Acebu,
12

approached her to invest the amount of P150,000.00 at SAIDECOR. As she has reached her quota,
and therefore, no longer authorized to receive the amount, she accompanied them to the office of
SAIDECOR at Ong Yiu District, Butuan City. Accused Ernesto Rodriguez accepted the investment
and issued the check signed by him and Martin Romero.

For their defense, accused Martin Romero  testified that on September 14, 1989, he issued a check
13

in the amount of P1,2000,000.00 corresponding to the total of the P150,000.00 investment and the
800% return thereon. He claimed that the corporation had a deposit of fourteen million pesos
(P14,000,000.00) at the time of the issuance of the check and four million pesos (P4,000,000.00) at
the time SAIDDECOR stopped operations. Romero knew these things because he used to monitor
the funds of the corporation with the bank. He was not aware that the check he issued was
dishonored because he never had the occasion to meet the complainant again after the September
14, 1989 transaction. He only came to know about this when the case was already filed in court
sometime in the second or third week of January 1990. 

In this appeal, both accused did not deny that complainant made an investment with SAIDECOR in
the amount of P150,000.00. However, they denied that deceit was employed in the transaction. They
assigned as errors: (1) their conviction under P.D. 1689 due to the prosecution's failure to establish
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and (2) the trial court's failure to consider the joint stipulation of
facts in their favor.  15

There is no merit in this appeal. We sustain accused-appellant's conviction.

Under paragraph 2 (d) of Article 315, as amended by R.A. 4885,   the elements of estafa are: (1) a
16

check was postdated or issued in payment of an obligation contracted at the time it was issued; (2)
lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; (3) damage to the payee thereof.   The prosecution
17

has satisfactorily established all these elements.

Fraud, in its general sense, is deemed to comprise anything calculated to deceive, including all acts,
omissions, and concealment involving a breach of legal equitable duty, trust, or confidence justly
reposed, resulting in damage to another, or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is
taken of another.   It is a generic term embracing all multifarious means which human ingenuity can
18

device, and which are resorted to by one individual to secure an advantage over another by false
suggestions or by suppression of truth and includes all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and any
unfair way by which another is cheated.  19

Deceit is a specific of fraud. It is actual fraud, and consists in any false representation or contrivance
whereby one person overreaches and misleads another, to his hurt. Deceit excludes the idea of
mistake.   There is deceit when one is misled, either by guide or trickery or by other means, to
20

believe to be true what is really false.   In this case, there was deception when accused fraudulently
21

represented to complainant that his investment with the corporation would have an 800% return in
15 or 21 days.

Upon receipt of the money, accused-appellant Martin Romero issued a postdated check. Although
accused-appellant contends that sufficient funds were deposited in the bank when the check was
issued, he presented no officer of the bank to substantiate the contention. The check was
dishonored when presented for payment, and the check return slip submitted in evidence indicated
that it was dishonored due to insufficiency of funds.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the check was dishonored without any fraudulent
pretense or fraudulent act of the drawer, the latter's failure to cover the amount within three days
after notice creates a rebuttable presumption of fraud.  22

Admittedly (1) the check was dishonored for insufficiency of funds as evidenced by the check return
slip; (2) complainant notified accused of the dishonor; and (3) accused failed to make good the
check within three days. Presumption of deceit remained since accused failed to prove otherwise.
Complainant sustained damage in the amount of P150,000.00.

Accused-appellant also contends that had the trial court admitted the Admission and Stipulaion of
Facts of November 9, 1992, it would prove that SAIDECOR had sufficient funds in the bank.

Accused-appellant relies on the fact that there was a discrepancy between the amount in words and
the amount in figures in the check that was dishonored. The amount in words was P1,000,200.00,
while the amount in figures was P1,200,000.00. It is admitted that the corporation had in the bank
P1,144,760.00 on September 28, 1989, and P1,124,307.14 on April 2, 1990. The check was
presented for payment on October 5, 1989. The rule in the Negotiable Instruments Law is that when
there is ambiguity in the amount in words and the amount in figures, it would be the amount in words
that would prevail. 23

However, this rule of interpretation finds no application in the case. The agreement was perfectly
clear that at the end of twenty one (21) days, the investment of P150,000.00 would become
P1,200,000.00. Even if the trial court admitted the stipulation of facts, it would not be favorable to
accused-appellant.

The factual narration in this case established a kind of Ponzi scheme.   This is "an investment
24

swindle in which high profits are promised from fictitious sources and early investors are paid off with
funds raised from later ones." It is sometimes called a pyramid scheme because a broader base of
gullible investors must support the structure as time passes.

In the recent case of People vs. Priscilla Balasa,   this Court held that a transaction similar to the
25

case at hand is not an investment strategy but a gullibility scheme, which works only as long as
there is an ever increasing number of new investors joining the scheme. It is difficult to sustain over
a long period of time because the operator needs an ever larger pool of later investors to continue
paying the promised profits to early investors. The idea behind this type of swindle is that the "con-
man" collects his money from his second or third round of investors and then absconds before
anyone else shows up to collect. Necessarily, these schemes only last weeks, or months at most,
just like what happened in this case.

The Court notes that one of the accused-appellants, Ernesto Rodriguez, died pending appeal.
Pursuant to the doctrine established in People vs. Bayotas,   the death of the accused pending
26

appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability ex delicto. The
criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused,
the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished,
grounded as it is on the criminal case. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding
the death of the accused, if the same may also be predicted on a source of obligation other than
delicit. 
27

Thus, the outcome of this appeal pertains only remaining accused-appellant, Martin L. Romero. The
trail court considered the swindling involved in this case as having been committed by a
syndicate   and sentenced the accused to life imprisonment based on the provisions of Presidential
28

Decree 1689, which increased the penalty for certain forms of swindling or estafa.   However, the
29
prosecution failed to clearly establish that the corporation was a syndicate, as defined under the law.
The penalty of life imprisonment cannot be imposed. What would be applicable in the present case
is the second paragraph of a Presidential Decree No. 1689, Section 1, which provides that:

When not committed by a syndicate as above defined, the penalty imposable shall
be reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua if the amount of the fraud exceeds
100.000 pesos.

Art. 77 of the Revised Penal Code on complex penalties provides that "whenever the penalty
prescribed does not have one of the forms specially provided for in this Code, the periods shall be
distributed, applying by analogy the prescribed rules," that is, those in Articles 61 and 76.   Hence,
30

where as in this case, the penalty provided by Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1689 for estafa
under Articles 315 and 316 of the Code is reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, the minimum
period thereof is twelve (12) year and one (1) day to sixteen (16) years of reclusion temporal; the
medium period is sixteen (16) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal; and
the maximum period is reclusion perpetua.

In the case at bar, no mitigating or aggravating circumstance has been alleged or proved. Applying
the rules in the Revised Penal Code for graduating penalties by degreses   to determine the proper
31

period,   the penalty for the offense of estafa under Article 315, 2(d) as amended by P.D. 1689
32

involving the amount of P150,000.00 is the medium of the period of the complex penalty in said
Section 1, that is, sixteen (16) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. This penalty, being that
which is to be actually imposed in accordance with the therefor and not merely imposable as a
general prescription under the law, shall be the maximum range of the indeterminate sentence.  The 33

minimum thereof shall be taken, as aforesaid, from any period of the penalty next lower in degree
which isprision mayor.

To enable the complainant to obtain means, diversion or amusements that will serve to alleviate the
moral sufferings undergone by him, by reason of the failure of the accused to return his money,
moral damages are imposed against accused-appellant Martin L. Romero in the amount of twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00),   To serve as an example for the public good, exemplary damages
34

are awarded against him in the amount of fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000. 00).  35

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby AFFIRMS WITH MODIFICATION the appealed judgment. The
Court hereby sentences accused-appellant Martin Romero to suffer an indeterminate penalty of ten
(10) years and one (1) day ofprision mayor, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, to indemnify Ernesto A. Ruiz in the amount of one hundred fifty
thousand pesos (P150,000.00) with interest thereon at six (6%)per centrum per annum from
September 14, 1989, until fully paid, to pay twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as moral damages
and fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00), as exemplary damages, and the costs. 1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 148072               July 10, 2007

FRANCISCO MAGESTRADO, Petitioner, 
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ELENA M. LIBROJO Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse the (1) Resolution1 dated 5 March 2001 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63293 entitled, "Francisco Magestrado v. Hon. Estrella T.
Estrada, in her capacity as the Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 83 of Quezon City,
People of the Philippines and Elena M. Librojo," which dismissed petitioner Francisco Magestrado’s
Petition for Certiorari for being the wrong remedy; and (2) Resolution2 dated 3 May 2001 of the same
Court denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

Private respondent Elena M. Librojo filed a criminal complaint3 for perjury against petitioner with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, which was docketed as I.S. No. 98-3900.

After the filing of petitioner’s counter-affidavit and the appended pleadings, the Office of the City
Prosecutor recommended the filing of an information for perjury against petitioner. Thus, Assistant
City Prosecutor Josephine Z. Fernandez filed an information for perjury against petitioner with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City. Pertinent portions of the information are hereby
quoted as follows:

That on or about the 27th day of December, 1997, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and knowingly make an untruthful statement under
oath upon a material matter before a competent officer authorized to receive and administer oath
and which the law so require, to wit: the said accused subscribe and swore to an Affidavit of Loss
before Notary Public Erlinda B. Espejo of Quezon City, per Doc. No. 168, Page No. 35, Book No.
CLXXIV of her notarial registry, falsely alleging that he lost Owner’s Duplicate Certificate of TCT No.
N-173163, which document was used in support of a Petition For Issuance of New Owner’s
Duplicate Copy of Certificate of Title and filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, docketed
as LRC# Q-10052 (98) on January 28, 1998 and assigned to Branch 99 of the said court, to which
said Francisco M. Mag[e]strado signed and swore on its verification, per Doc. 413 Page 84 Book No.
CLXXV Series of 1998 of Notary Public Erlinda B. Espejo of Quezon City; the said accused knowing
fully well that the allegations in the said affidavit and petition are false, the truth of the matter being
that the property subject of Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-173163 was mortgaged to complainant
Elena M. Librojo as collateral for a loan in the amount of ₱ 758,134.42 and as a consequence of
which said title to the property was surrendered by him to the said complainant by virtue of said loan,
thus, making untruthful and deliberate assertions of falsehoods, to the damage and prejudice of the
said Elena M. Librojo.4

The case was raffled to the MeTC of Quezon City, Branch 43, where it was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 90721 entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Francisco Magestrado."

On 30 June 1999, petitioner filed a motion5 for suspension of proceedings based on a prejudicial

question. Petitioner alleged that Civil Case No. Q-98-34349, a case for recovery of a sum of money
pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 84, and Civil Case No. Q-98-
34308, a case for Cancellation of Mortgage, Delivery of Title and Damages, pending before the RTC
of Quezon City, Branch 77, must be resolved first before Criminal Case No. 90721 may proceed
since the issues in the said civil cases are similar or intimately related to the issues raised in the
criminal action.
On 14 July 1999, MeTC-Branch 43 issued an Order6 denying petitioner’s motion for suspension of
proceedings, thus:

Acting on the "Motion for Suspension of Proceedings" filed by the [herein petitioner Magestrado],
thru counsel, and the "Comment and Opposition thereto, the Court after an evaluation of the same,
finds the aforesaid motion without merit, hence, is hereby DENIED, it appearing that the resolution of
the issues raised in the civil actions is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

Hence, the trial of this case shall proceed as previously scheduled on July 19 and August 2, 1993 at
8:30 in the morning.

On 17 August 1999, a motion7 for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but was denied by the
MeTC in an Order8dated 19 October 1999.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari9 under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, with
a prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 83,
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-99-39358, on the ground that MeTC Judge Billy J. Apalit committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying his motion to
suspend the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90721.

On 14 March 2000, RTC-Branch 83 dismissed the petition and denied the prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction, reasoning thus:

Scrutinizing the complaints and answers in the civil cases abovementioned, in relation to the criminal
action for PERJURY, this Court opines and so holds that there is no prejudicial question involved as
to warrant the suspension of the criminal action to await the outcome of the civil cases. The civil
cases are principally for determination whether or not a loan was obtained by petitioner and whether
or not he executed the deed of real estate mortgage involving the property covered by TCT No. N-
173163, whereas the criminal case is for perjury which imputes upon petitioner the wrongful
execution of an affidavit of loss to support his petition for issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy
of TCT No. 173163. Whether or not he committed perjury is the issue in the criminal case which may
be resolved independently of the civil cases. Note that the affidavit of loss was executed in support
of the petition for issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. N-173163 which petition was
raffled to Branch 99 of the RTC. x x x.10

Again, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration11 but this was denied by RTC- Branch 83 in an
Order12 dated 21 December 2000.

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari13 under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 63293. Petitioner alleged that RTC
Judge Estrella T. Estrada committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in denying the Petition for Certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-99-39358, and in effect
sustaining the denial by MeTC-Branch 43 of petitioner’s motion to suspend the proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 90721, as well as his subsequent motion for reconsideration thereof.

On 5 March 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed14 the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 63293 on the
ground that petitioner’s remedy should have been an appeal from the dismissal by RTC-Branch 83
of his Petition for Certiorari in Q-99-39358. The Court of Appeals ruled that:

Is this instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 the correct and appropriate remedy?
We rule negatively.

The resolution or dismissal in special civil actions, as in the instant petition, may be appealed x x x
under Section 10, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and not by petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the same rules. Thus, the said rule provides:

Section 10. Time for filing memoranda on special cases. In certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto and habeas corpus cases, the parties shall file in lieu of briefs, their respective memoranda
within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the notice issued by the clerk that all
the evidence, oral and documentary, is already attached to the record x x x.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, the instant Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is hereby DISMISSED.15

The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration16 in a Resolution17 dated 3 May
2001.

Hence, petitioner comes before us via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court raising the following issues:

1. Whether or not the Orders of Judge Estrella T. Estrada dated March 14, 2000 denying
petitioner’s Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and her subsequent
Order dated December 21, 2000, denying the Motion for Reconsideration thereafter filed can
only be reviewed by the Court of Appeals thru appeal under Section 10, Rule 44 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.

2. Whether or not Judge Estrella T. Estrada of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, Quezon
City, had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of her
jurisdiction in denying the Petition for Certiorari and petitioner’s subsequent motion for
reconsideration on the ground of a prejudicial question pursuant to the Rules on Criminal
Procedure and the prevailing jurisprudence.

After consideration of the procedural and substantive issues raised by petitioner, we find the instant
petition to be without merit.

The procedural issue herein basically hinges on the proper remedy which petitioner should have
availed himself of before the Court of Appeals: an ordinary appeal or a petition for certiorari.
Petitioner claims that he correctly questioned RTC-Branch 83’s Order of dismissal of his Petition for
Certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-99-39358 through a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
Private respondent and public respondent People of the Philippines insist that an ordinary appeal
was the proper remedy.

We agree with respondents. We hold that the appellate court did not err in dismissing petitioner’s
Petition for Certiorari, pursuant to Rule 41, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court (and not under
Rule 44, Section 10, invoked by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 5 March 2001).

The correct procedural recourse for petitioner was appeal, not only because RTC-Branch 83 did not
commit any grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner’s Petition for Certiorari in Civil Case
No. Q-99-39358 but also because RTC-Branch 83’s Order of dismissal was a final order from which
petitioners should have appealed in accordance with Section 2, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
An order or a judgment is deemed final when it finally disposes of a pending action, so that nothing
more can be done with it in the trial court. In other words, the order or judgment ends the litigation in
the lower court. Au contraire, an interlocutory order does not dispose of the case completely, but
leaves something to be done as regards the merits of the latter.18 RTC-Branch 83’s Order dated 14
March 2001 dismissing petitioner’s Petition for Certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-99-39358 finally
disposes of the said case and RTC-Branch 83 can do nothing more with the case.

Under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by the Revised
Rules of Court to be appealable. The manner of appealing an RTC judgment or final order is also
provided in Rule 41 as follows:

Section 2. Modes of appeal. —

(a) Ordinary appeal. — The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial
Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the
court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the
adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases
of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record
on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.

Certiorari generally lies only when there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy or adequate
remedy available to petitioners. Here, appeal was available. It was adequate to deal with any
question whether of fact or of law, whether of error of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion or
error of judgment which the trial court might have committed. But petitioners instead filed a special
civil action for certiorari.

We have time and again reminded members of the bench and bar that a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court lies only when "there is no appeal nor
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."19 Certiorari cannot be allowed
when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that
remedy,20 certiorari not being a substitute for lost appeal.21

As certiorari is not a substitute for lost appeal, we have repeatedly emphasized that the perfection of
appeals in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional,
and that the failure to perfect an appeal renders the decision of the trial court final and executory.
This rule is founded upon the principle that the right to appeal is not part of due process of law but is
a mere statutory privilege to be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions
of the law. Neither can petitioner invoke the doctrine that rules of technicality must yield to the
broader interest of substantial justice. While every litigant must be given the amplest opportunity for
the proper and just determination of his cause, free from constraints of technicalities, the failure to
perfect an appeal within the reglementary period is not a mere technicality. It raises a jurisdictional
problem as it deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction over the appeal.22

The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.23 A
party cannot substitute the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the
remedy of appeal. The existence and availability of the right of appeal are antithetical to the
availability of the special civil action for certiorari.24 As this Court held in Fajardo v. Bautista25 :

Generally, an order of dismissal, whether right or wrong, is a final order, and hence a proper subject
of appeal, not certiorari. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not
alternative or successive. Accordingly, although the special civil action of certiorari is not proper
when an ordinary appeal is available, it may be granted where it is shown that the appeal would be
inadequate, slow, insufficient, and will not promptly relieve a party from the injurious effects of the
order complained of, or where appeal is inadequate and ineffectual. Nevertheless, certiorari cannot
be a substitute for the lost or lapsed remedy of appeal, where such loss is occasioned by the
petitioner’s own neglect or error in the choice of remedies.

On 21 December 2000, petitioner received a copy of the Order of the RTC-Branch 83 denying his
motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of his Petition for Certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-99-39358;
hence, he had until 18 January 2001 within which to file an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The
Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner on 19 February 2001 with the Court of Appeals cannot be a
substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. As petitioner failed to file a timely appeal, RTC-Branch 83’s
dismissal of his Petition for Certiorari had long become final and executory.

For this procedural lapse, the Court of Appeals correctly denied outright the Petition for Certiorari
filed by petitioner before it.

Moreover, there are even more cogent reasons for denying the instant Petition on the merits.

In the Petition at bar, petitioner raises several substantive issues. Petitioner harps on the need for
the suspension of the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90721 for perjury pending before MeTC-
Branch 43 based on a prejudicial question still to be resolved in Civil Case No. Q-98-34308 (for
cancellation of mortgage) and Civil Case No. Q-98-34349 (for collection of a sum of money) which
are pending before other trial courts. 1avvphi1

For clarity, we shall first discuss the allegations of petitioner in his complaint in Civil Case No. Q-98-
34308 (for cancellation of mortgage) and that of private respondent in her complaint in Civil Case
No. Q-98-34349 (for collection of a sum of money).

Civil Case No. Q-98-34308 is a complaint for Cancellation of Mortgage, Delivery of Title and
Damages filed on 8 May 1988 by petitioner against private respondent with RTC-Branch 77.
Petitioner alleges that he purchased a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-
173163 thru private respondent, a real estate broker. In the process of negotiation, petitioner was
pressured to sign a Deed of Sale prepared by private respondent. Upon signing the Deed of Sale, he
noticed that the Deed was already signed by a certain Cristina Gonzales as attorney-in-fact of
vendor Spouses Guillermo and Amparo Galvez. Petitioner demanded from private respondent a
special power of attorney and authority to sell, but the latter failed to present one. Petitioner averred
that private respondent refused to deliver the certificate of title of the land despite execution and
signing of the Deed of Sale and payment of the consideration. Petitioner was thus compelled to
engage the services of one Modesto Gazmin, Jr. who agreed, for ₱100,000.00 to facilitate the filing
of cases against private respondent; to deliver to petitioner the certificate of title of the land; and/or to
cancel the certificate of title in possession of private respondent. However, Mr. Gazmin, Jr., did
nothing upon receipt of the amount of ₱100,000.00 from petitioner. In fact, petitioner was even
charged with perjury before the Office of the City Prosecutor, all because of Mr. Gazmin, Jr.’s
wrongdoing. Petitioner further alleged that he discovered the existence of a spurious Real Estate
Mortgage which he allegedly signed in favor of private respondent. Petitioner categorically denied
signing the mortgage document and it was private respondent who falsified the same in order to
justify her unlawful withholding of TCT No. N-173163 from petitioner. Thus, petitioner prayed for:

1. The cancellation of Real Estate Mortgage dated August 2, 1997 as null and void;

2. As well as to order [herein private respondent] to DELIVER the Owner’s Duplicate Copy of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-173163 to [herein petitioner];
 3. Condemning [private respondent] to pay [petitioner] the sums of

a) ₱100,000.00 as MORAL DAMAGES;

b) ₱50,000.00 as EXEMPLARY DAMAGES;

c) ₱50,000.00 as Attorney’s fees and

d) Cost of suit.

4. A general relief is likewise prayed for (sic) just and equitable under the premises.

Civil Case No. Q-98-34349,26 on the other hand, is a complaint for a sum of money with a motion for
issuance of a writ of attachment filed by private respondent against petitioner on 14 May 1988 before
RTC-Branch 84. Private respondent alleges that petitioner obtained a loan from her in the amount of
₱758,134.42 with a promise to pay on or before 30 August 1997. As security for payment of the
loan, petitioner executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage covering a parcel of land registered under
TCT No. N-173163. Petitioner pleaded for additional time to pay the said obligation, to which
respondent agreed. But private respondent discovered sometime in February 1998 that petitioner
executed an affidavit of loss alleging that he lost the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. N-173163,
and succeeded in annotating said affidavit on the original copy of TCT No. N-173163 on file with the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. Private respondent further alleges that she also discovered that
petitioner filed a petition for issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. N-173163 with the
RTC of Quezon City, Branch 98, docketed as LRC Case No. Q-10052. Private respondent
demanded that petitioner pay his obligation, but the latter refused to do so. Resultantly, private
respondent prayed for the following:

A. That upon filing of this Complaint as well as the Affidavit of attachment and a preliminary
hearing thereon, as well as bond filed, a writ of preliminary attachment is (sic) by the
Honorable Court ordering the Sheriff to levy [herein petitioner] property sufficient to answer
[herein private respondent’s] claim in this action;

B. That after due notice and hearing, judgment be rendered in [private respondent’s] favor as
against [petitioner], ordering the latter to pay the former the sum of ₱758,134.42 plus interest
thereon at 5% per month from September 1997 up to the date of actual payment; actual
damages in the sums of ₱70,000.00 each under paragraphs 11 and 12 of the complaint;
₱200,000.00 as moral damages; ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages; twenty (20%) of the
principal claim as attorney’s fees plus ₱2,500.00 per appearance honorarium; and
₱60,000.00 as litigation expense before this Honorable Court.

[Petitioner] prays for such further relief in law, justice and equity.

As to whether it is proper to suspend Criminal Case No. 90721 for perjury pending final outcome of
Civil Case No. Q-98-34349 and Civil Case No. Q-98-34308, we take into consideration Sections 6
and 7, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court, which read:

Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. – A petition for suspension of the criminal
action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of
the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has
been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any
time before the prosecution rests.
Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. – The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the
previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the subsequent criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.

The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to
avoid two conflicting decisions.27

A prejudial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.
The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try
and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused.28

For a prejudicial question in a civil case to suspend criminal action, it must appear not only that said
case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based
but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of
the accused would necessarily be determined.

Thus, for a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of
the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case, the following requisites must be
present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the
guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said
question must be lodged in another tribunal.29

If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the
accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or there is no necessity "that the civil case
be determined first before taking up the criminal case," therefore, the civil case does not involve a
prejudicial question.30 Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can,
according to law, proceed independently of each other.31

However, the court in which an action is pending may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and upon
proper application for a stay of that action, hold the action in abeyance to abide by the outcome of
another case pending in another court, especially where the parties and the issues are the same, for
there is power inherent in every court to control the disposition of cases on its dockets with economy
of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. Where the rights of parties to the second
action cannot be properly determined until the questions raised in the first action are settled, the
second action should be stayed.32

The power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the
disposition of the cases on its dockets, considering its time and effort, those of counsel and the
litigants. But if proceedings must be stayed, it must be done in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and
prevent vexatious litigations, conflicting judgments, confusion between litigants and courts. It bears
stressing that whether or not the trial court would suspend the proceedings in the criminal case
before it is submitted to its sound discretion.33

Indeed, a judicial order issued pursuant to the court’s discretionary authority is not subject to
reversal on review unless it constitutes an abuse of discretion. As the United States Supreme Court
aptly declared in Landis v. North American Co., "the burden of making out the justice and wisdom
from the departure from the beaten truck lay heavily on the petitioner, less an unwilling litigant is
compelled to wait upon the outcome of a controversy to which he is a stranger. It is, thus, stated that
only in rare circumstances will a litigant in one case is compelled to stand aside, while a litigant in
another, settling the rule of law that will define the rights of both is, after all, the parties before the
court are entitled to a just, speedy and plain determination of their case undetermined by the
pendency of the proceedings in another case. After all, procedure was created not to hinder and
delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice."34

As stated, the determination of whether the proceedings may be suspended on the basis of a
prejudicial question rests on whether the facts and issues raised in the pleadings in the civil cases
are so related with the issues raised in the criminal case such that the resolution of the issues in the
civil cases would also determine the judgment in the criminal case.

A perusal of the allegations in the complaints show that Civil Case No. Q-98-34308 pending before
RTC-Branch 77, and Civil Case No. Q-98-34349, pending before RTC-Branch 84, are principally for
the determination of whether a loan was obtained by petitioner from private respondent and whether
petitioner executed a real estate mortgage involving the property covered by TCT No. N-173163. On
the other hand, Criminal Case No. 90721 before MeTC-Branch 43, involves the determination of
whether petitioner committed perjury in executing an affidavit of loss to support his request for
issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. N-173163.

It is evident that the civil cases and the criminal case can proceed independently of each other.
Regardless of the outcome of the two civil cases, it will not establish the innocence or guilt of the
petitioner in the criminal case for perjury. The purchase by petitioner of the land or his execution of a
real estate mortgage will have no bearing whatsoever on whether petitioner knowingly and
fraudulently executed a false affidavit of loss of TCT No. N-173163.

MeTC-Branch 43, therefore, did not err in ruling that the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-98-34308 for
cancellation of mortgage before the RTC-Branch 77; and Civil Case No. Q-98-34349 for collection of
a sum of money before RTC-Branch 84, do not pose a prejudicial question in the determination of
whether petitioner is guilty of perjury in Criminal Case No. 90721. RTC-Branch 83, likewise, did not
err in ruling that MeTC-Branch 43 did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s
motion for suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90721.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Resolutions dated 5 March 2001 and 3 May
2001of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63293 are hereby AFFIRMED and the instant
petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 43, is hereby directed to proceed with the hearing and trial on the merits of Criminal Case
No. 90721, and to expedite proceedings therein, without prejudice to the right of the accused to due
process. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED

G.R. No. 172060               September 13, 2010

JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL, Petitioner, 
vs.
MARIA CHRYSANTINE L. PIMENTEL and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals, promulgated
on 20 March 2006, in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.

The Antecedent Facts

The facts are stated in the Court of Appeals’ decision: 

On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an action for
frustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner), docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-04-
130415, before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, which was raffled to Branch 223 (RTC
Quezon City).

On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo City, Branch 72 (RTC Antipolo) for the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392 (Maria
Chrysantine Lorenza L. Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under
Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.

On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC
Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since
the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of
Civil Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC
Quezon City. 

The Decision of the Trial Court

The RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May 20053 holding that the pendency of the case
before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal
case before it. The RTC Quezon City held that the issues in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 are the
injuries sustained by respondent and whether the case could be tried even if the validity of
petitioner’s marriage with respondent is in question. The RTC Quezon City ruled:

WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings On the [Ground]
of the Existence of a Prejudicial Question is, for lack of merit, DENIED.

SO ORDERED.4

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22 August 2005 Order,5 the RTC Quezon City
denied the motion.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order before the Court of Appeals, assailing the 13 May 2005 and 22 August
2005 Orders of the RTC Quezon City.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

In its 20 March 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals
ruled that in the criminal case for frustrated parricide, the issue is whether the offender commenced
the commission of the crime of parricide directly by overt acts and did not perform all the acts of
execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. On the
other hand, the issue in the civil action for annulment of marriage is whether petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The Court of Appeals
ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would
be immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts
constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had already been committed. The Court of Appeals
ruled that all that is required for the charge of frustrated parricide is that at the time of the
commission of the crime, the marriage is still subsisting.

Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court assailing the Court of Appeals’ decision.

The Issue

The only issue in this case is whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a
prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against
petitioner.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has no merit.

Civil Case Must be Instituted

Before the Criminal Case

Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure6 provides:

Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the
previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.

The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action. In
this case, the Information7 for Frustrated Parricide was dated 30 August 2004. It was raffled to RTC
Quezon City on 25 October 2004 as per the stamped date of receipt on the Information. The RTC
Quezon City set Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 for pre-trial and trial on 14 February 2005.
Petitioner was served summons in Civil Case No. 04-7392 on 7 February 2005.8 Respondent’s
petition9 in Civil Case No. 04-7392 was dated 4 November 2004 and was filed on 5 November 2004.
Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated
parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure
was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.

Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question

in Criminal Case for Parricide

Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the
suspension of the criminal action.

There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there
exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may
proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of
the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.10 A prejudicial question is defined as:

x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved
therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said
case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based
but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of
the accused would necessarily be determined.11

The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of
parricide,12 which punishes any person "who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate
or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse."13 The relationship between
the offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from murder14 or homicide.15 However,
the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal
case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative
of the guilt or innocence of the accused. 

The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether
petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue
in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with
frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have
killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of petitioner’s will.16 At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and
respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in Civil
Case No. 04-7392 is granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time
of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent
is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the
alleged crime, he was still married to respondent. 1avvphi1

We cannot accept petitioner’s reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals17 that "the judicial declaration
of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned x x x." First,
the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy. There was no
issue of prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that "[t]here is x x x a
recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce
legal consequences."18 In fact, the Court declared in that case that "a declaration of the nullity of the
second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the
State’s penal laws are concerned."19

In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision of the Court of Appeals. The trial in Criminal
Case No. Q-04-130415 may proceed as the resolution of the issue in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is not
determinative of the guilt or innocence of petitioner in the criminal case.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 20 March 2006 Decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 159823               February 18, 2013

TEODORO A. REYES, Petitioner, 
vs.
ETTORE ROSSI, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:
The rescission of a contract of sale is not a prejudicial question that will warrant the suspension of
the criminal proceedings commenced to prosecute the buyer for violations of the Bouncing Checks
Law (Batas Pambansa Blg. 22) arising from the dishonor of the checks the buyer issued in
connection with the sale.

Antecedents

On October 31, 1997, petitioner Teodoro A. Reyes (Reyes) and Advanced Foundation Construction
Systems Corporation (Advanced Foundation), represented by its Executive Project Director,
respondent Ettore Rossi (Rossi), executed a deed of conditional sale involving the purchase by
Reyes of equipment consisting of a Warman Dredging Pump HY 300A worth ₱10,000,000.00. The
parties agreed therein that Reyes would pay the sum of ₱3,000,000.00 as downpayment, and the
balance of ₱7,000,000.00 through four post-dated checks. Reyes complied, but in January 1998, he
requested the restructuring of his obligation under the deed of conditional sale by replacing the four
post-dated checks with nine post-dated checks that would include interest at the rate of
₱25,000.00/month accruing on the unpaid portion of the obligation on April 30, 1998, June 30, 1998,
July 31, 1998, September 30, 1998 and October 31, 1998.1

Advanced Foundation assented to Reyes’ request, and returned the four checks. In turn, Reyes
issued and delivered the following nine postdated checks in the aggregate sum of ₱7,125,000.00
drawn against the United Coconut Planters Bank,2 to wit:

Check No. Date Amount

72807 April 30, 1998 P 25,000.00

79125 May 1, 1998 1,000,000.00

72802 May 30, 1998 2,000,000.00

72808 June 30, 1998 25,000.00

72809 July 31, 1998 25,000.00

72801 August 31, 1998 2,000,000.00

72810 September 30, 1998 25,000.00

72811 October 31, 1998 25,000.00

72903 November 30, 1998 2,000,000.00

Rossi deposited three of the post-dated checks (i.e., No. 72807, No. 79125 and No. 72808) on their
maturity dates in Advanced Foundation’s bank account at the PCI Bank in Makati. Two of the checks
were denied payment ostensibly upon Reyes’ instructions to stop their payment, while the third (i.e.,
No. 72802) was dishonored for insufficiency of funds.3

Rossi likewise deposited two more checks (i.e., No. 72809 and No. 72801) in Advanced
Foundation’s account at the PCI Bank in Makati, but the checks were returned with the
notation Account Closed stamped on them. He did not anymore deposit the three remaining checks
on the assumption that they would be similarly dishonored.4
In the meanwhile, on July 29, 1998, Reyes commenced an action for rescission of contract and
damages in the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City (RTC). His complaint, docketed as Civil Case
No. Q98-35109 and entitled Teodoro A. Reyes v. Advanced Foundation Construction Systems
Corporation, sought judgment declaring the deed of conditional sale "rescinded and of no further
force and effect," and ordering Advanced Foundation to return the ₱3,000,000.00 downpayment with
legal interest from June 4, 1998 until fully paid; and to pay to him attorney’s fees, and various kinds
and amounts of damages.5

On September 8, 1998, Rossi charged Reyes with five counts of estafa and five counts of violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati for the dishonor of Checks
No. 72807, No. 72808, No. 72801, No. 72809 and No. 79125. Another criminal charge for violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was lodged against Reyes in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City for the dishonor of Check No. 72802.6

On September 29, 1998, Reyes submitted his counter-affidavit in the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Makati,7claiming that the checks had not been issued for any valuable consideration; that he had
discovered from the start of using the dredging pump involved in the conditional sale that the
Caterpillar diesel engine powering the pump had been rated at only 560 horsepower instead of the
1200 horsepower Advanced Foundation had represented to him; that welding works on the pump
had neatly concealed several cracks; that on May 6, 1998 he had written to Advanced Foundation
complaining about the misrepresentations on the specifications of the pump and demanding
documentary proof of Advanced Foundation’s ownership of the pump; that he had caused the order
to stop the payment of three checks (i.e., No. 72806, No. 72807 and No. 79125); that Advanced
Foundation had replied to his letter on May 8, 1998 by saying that the pump had been sold to him on
an as is, where is basis; that he had then sent another letter to Advanced Foundation on May 18,
1998 to reiterate his complaints and the request for proper documentation of ownership; that he had
subsequently discovered other hidden defects, prompting him to write another letter; and that
instead of attending to his complaints and request, Advanced Foundation’s lawyers had threatened
him with legal action.

At the same time, Reyes assailed the jurisdiction of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati over
the criminal charges against him on the ground that he had issued the checks in Quezon City; as
well as argued that the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati should suspend the proceedings
because of the pendency in the RTC of the civil action for rescission of contract that posed a
prejudicial question as to the criminal proceedings.8

On November 20, 1998, the Assistant City Prosecutor handling the preliminary investigation
recommended the dismissal of the charges of estafa and the suspension of the proceedings relating
to the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 based on a prejudicial question.9

On January 5, 1999, the City Prosecutor of Makati approved the recommendation of the handling
Assistant City Prosecutor,10 stating:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint for Estafa is respectfully recommended to be

dismissed, as upon approval, it is hereby dismissed.

Further, it is respectfully recommended that the proceedings in the charge for Violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 against the respondent be suspended until the prejudicial question raised in
Civil Case Q-98-35109 for Rescission of Contract and Damages which is now pending with the RTC
of Quezon City, Branch 224, has been duly resolved.
Rossi appealed the resolution of the City Prosecutor to the Department of Justice, but the Secretary
of Justice, by resolution of July 24, 2001, denied Rossi’s petition for review.

After the denial of his motion for reconsideration on April 29, 2002, Rossi challenged the resolutions
of the Secretary of Justice by petition for certiorari in the CA.

Ruling of the CA

In the petition for certiorari, Rossi insisted that the Secretary of Justice had committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in upholding the suspension of the criminal
proceedings by the City Prosecutor of Makati on account of the existence of a prejudicial question,
and in sustaining the dismissal of the complaints for estafa.

On May 30, 2003, the CA promulgated its assailed decision,11 to wit:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the assailed resolution is hereby MODIFIED and the

instant petition is GRANTED in so far as the issue of the existence of prejudicial question is
concerned. Accordingly, the order suspending the preliminary investigation in I.S. No. 98-40024-
29 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the dismissal of the complaint for estafa is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Issues

Hence, this appeal by Reyes.

Reyes asserts that the CA erred in ruling that there was no prejudicial question that warranted the
suspension of the criminal proceedings against him; that the petition suffered fatal defects that
merited its immediate dismissal; that the CA was wrong in relying on the pronouncements in Balgos,
Jr. v. Sandiganbayan12 and Umali v. Intermediate Appellate Court13 because the factual backgrounds
thereat were not similar to that obtaining here; and that the Secretary of Justice did not commit any
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

In his comment,14 Rossi counters that the petition for review should be outrightly dismissed because
of its fatal defect; that the CA did not err in ruling that the action for rescission of contract did not
pose a prejudicial question that would suspend the criminal proceedings.

Reyes submitted a reply,15 declaring that the defect in the affidavit of service attached to his petition
for review had been due to oversight; that he had substantially complied with the rules; that there
existed a prejudicial question that could affect the extent of his liability in light of Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 12-2000; and that the CA erred in finding that the Secretary of Justice
committed grave abuse of discretion.

To be resolved is whether or not the civil action for rescission of the contract of sale raised a
prejudicial question that required the suspension of the criminal prosecution for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22.

Ruling

The petition for review is without merit.

A prejudicial question generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal
action are both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that must first be determined before
the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.16 The
rationale for the suspension on the ground of a prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting decisions.17

Two elements that must concur in order for a civil case to be considered a prejudicial question are
expressly stated in Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:

Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. – The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the
previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.

In Sabandal v. Tongco,18 the concept of prejudicial question is explained in this wise:

For a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the
criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil, the following requisites must be present: (1)
the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of
the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be
lodged in another tribunal.

If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues or the issue in one is intimately related to the
issues raised in the other, then a prejudicial question would likely exist, provided the other element
or characteristic is satisfied. It must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon
which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in
the civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. If the
resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused
in the criminal action based on the same facts, or there is no necessity "that the civil case be
determined first before taking up the criminal case," therefore, the civil case does not involve a
prejudicial question. Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can,
according to law, proceed independently of each other.

Contending that the rescission of the contract of sale constitutes a prejudicial question, Reyes posits
that the resolution of the civil action will be determinative of whether or not he was criminally liable
for the violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. He states that if the contract would be rescinded, his
obligation to pay under the conditional deed of sale would be extinguished, and such outcome would
necessarily result in the dismissal of the criminal proceedings for the violations of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22.

The action for the rescission of the deed of sale on the ground that Advanced Foundation did not
comply with its obligation actually seeks one of the alternative remedies available to a contracting
party under Article 1191 of the Civil Code, to wit:

Article 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the
obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him.

The injured party may choose between the fulfilment and the rescission of the obligation, with the
payment of damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen
fulfilment, if the latter should become impossible.
The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just cause authorizing the fixing of a
period.

This is understood to be without prejudice to the rights of third persons who have acquired the thing,
in accordance with Articles 1385 and 1388 and the Mortgage Law.

Article 1191 of the Civil Code recognizes an implied or tacit resolutory condition in reciprocal

obligations. The condition is imposed by law, and applies even if there is no corresponding
agreement thereon between the parties. The explanation for this is that in reciprocal obligations a
party incurs in delay once the other party has performed his part of the contract; hence, the party
who has performed or is ready and willing to perform may rescind the obligation if the other does not
perform, or is not ready and willing to perform.19

It is true that the rescission of a contract results in the extinguishment of the obligatory relation as if it
was never created, the extinguishment having a retroactive effect. The rescission is equivalent to
invalidating and unmaking the juridical tie, leaving things in their status before the celebration of the
contract.20 However, until the contract is rescinded, the juridical tie and the concomitant obligations
subsist.

To properly appreciate if there is a prejudicial question to warrant the suspension of the criminal
actions, reference is made to the elements of the crimes charged. The violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 requires the concurrence of the following elements, namely: (1) the making, drawing, and
issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or
issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check
by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.21 The issue in the criminal
actions upon the violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 is, therefore, whether or not Reyes issued
the dishonoured checks knowing them to be without funds upon presentment. On the other hand,
the issue in the civil action for rescission is whether or not the breach in the fulfilment of Advanced
Foundation’s obligation warranted the rescission of the conditional sale. If, after trial on the merits in
the civil action, Advanced Foundation would be found to have committed material breach as to
warrant the rescission of the contract, such result would not necessarily mean that Reyes would be
absolved of the criminal responsibility for issuing the dishonored checks because, as the
aforementioned elements show, he already committed the violations upon the dishonor of the
checks that he had issued at a time when the conditional sale was still fully binding upon the parties.
His obligation to fund the checks or to make arrangements for them with the drawee bank should not
be tied up to the future event of extinguishment of the obligation under the contract of sale through
rescission. Indeed, under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the mere issuance of a worthless check was
already the offense in itself. Under such circumstances, the criminal proceedings for the violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 could proceed despite the pendency of the civil action for rescission of
the conditional sale.

Accordingly, we agree with the holding of the CA that the civil action for the rescission of contract
was not determinative of the guilt or innocence of Reyes. We consider the exposition by the CA of its
reasons to be appropriate enough, to wit:

xxxx

We find merit in the petition.

A careful perusal of the complaint for rescission of contract and damages reveals that the causes of
action advanced by respondent Reyes are the alleged misrepresentation committed by the petitioner
and AFCSC and their alleged failure to comply with his demand for proofs of ownership. On one
hand, he posits that his consent to the contract was vitiated by the fraudulent act of the company in
misrepresenting the condition and quality of the dredging pump. Alternatively, he claims that the
company committed a breach of contract which is a ground for the rescission thereof. Either way, he
in effect admits the validity and the binding effect of the deed pending any adjudication which
nullifies the same.

Indeed, under the Jaw on contracts, vitiated consent does not make a contract unenforceable but
merely voidable, the remedy of which would be to annul the contract since voidable contracts
produce legal effects until they are annulled. On the other hand, rescission of contracts in case of
breach pursuant to Article 1191 of the Civil Code of the Philippines also presupposes a valid contract
unless rescinded or annulled.

As defined, a prejudicial question is one that arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.
The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try
and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal.

It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with
it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it
must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil
case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. It comes into play
generally in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in
the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed,
because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de
jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.

In this light, it is clear that the pendency of the civil case does not bar the continuation of the
proceedings in the preliminary investigation on the ground that it poses a prejudicial question.
Considering that the contracts are deemed to be valid until rescinded, the consideration and
obligatory effect thereof are also deemed to have been validly made, thus demandable.
Consequently, there was no failure of consideration at the time when the subject checks were
dishonored. (Emphasis supplied)

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WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review; AFFIRMS the decision the Court of
Appeals promulgated on May 30, 2003; and DIRECTS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED