Module 8: Globalization of Religion

Introduction

This chapter explores the relationship of globalization and religion, its impact to religious
practices and beliefs and the relationship of religion to global conflict.

Learning Outcomes

1. Explain how globalization affects religious practices and beliefs

2. Explain the relationship of globalization and religion
3. Analyze the relationship between religion and global conflict and, conversely, global peace

Content

As Obadia (2010) argues, theorizing religion and globalization has been subject to two
different lines of interpretation: globalization of religion versus globalization and religion.

Globalization of Religion

In this, the fundamental research question pertains to the spread of religions and specific
genres or forms or blueprints of religious expression across the globe. Beyer (2006)
proposes that the very notion of what constitutes a ‘religion’, as commonly understood, is the
product of a long-term process of inter-civilizational or cross-cultural interactions.

Globalization and Religion

In this second, the position and place of religion is problematized within the context of
globalization. This problematic concerns the relations and the impact of globalization upon
religion. From this point of view, even religions that are not conventionally considered ‘global’
such as Eastern Orthodox Christianity ; are nevertheless influenced by globalization; These face
up to the global condition and reshape their institutional practices and mentalities (Agadjanian
and Roudometof, 2005). In so doing, religious institutions generally tend to adopt either
strategies of cultural defense or strategies of active engagement with globality (Roudometof,
2008). Although a religion can reject globalizing trends and impulses, it is nevertheless shaped
by them and is forced to respond to new-found situations. This problematic incorporates notions
of resacralization as a response to secularizing agendas and views instances of transnational
nationalism cloaked in religious terms as cultural expressions stimulated by globalization (for
examples, see Danforth, 2000; Zubrzycki, 2006). This second problematic does not necessarily
address the historicity of globalization; in large part because it is concerned with theorizing
contemporary events and trends
Transnational Religion and Multiple Glocalizations

Transnational studies emerged gradually since the 1990s in connection to the study of post-
World War II new immigrants or trans-migrants who moved from Third World and developing
countries into developed First World nations. New immigrants no longer assimilated into the
cultures of the host countries but rather openly maintained complex links to their homelands,
thereby constructing, reproducing and preserving their transnational ties. International migration
has provided the means to theorize the relationship between people and religion in a
transnational context (Casanova, 2001; Ebaugh and Chafetz, 2002; Hagan and Ebaugh, 2003;
Levitt, 2003, 2004; van der Veer, 2002).

Concomitant with the movements of peoples, the migration of faiths across the globe has been
a major feature of the world throughout the twentieth century. One of these features is the
‘deterritorialization’ of religion (Casanova, 2001; Martin, 2001; Roy, 2004); that is, the
appearance and, in some instances, the efflorescence of religious traditions in places where
these previously had been largely unknown or were at least in a minority position. Transnational
religion emerged through the post-World War II spread of several religions; of which perhaps
the most prominent example is the explosion of Protestantism in the hitherto solidly Catholic
Latin America. The extensive and widely publicized debates over the public presence of Islam in
Europe are but the most visible manifestation of this process (see Bjorgo, 1997; Raudvere,
Stala, and Willert, 2012). As Modood (1997: 2) notes, ‘Muslims are now emerging as the critical
’“other” in various nationalist discourses and in definitions of Europe in Western Europe', even in
Scandinavian countries, where there is hardly any historical encounter with Muslims.

To the extent that the very label of transnational religion is a means of describing solutions to
new-found situations that people face as a result of migration, it comes as two quite distinct
blends of religious universalism and local particularism. First, it is possible for religious
universalism to gain the upper hand, whereby religion becomes the central reference for
immigrant communities. In such instances, religious transnationalism is often depicted as a
religion ‘going global’. Jenkins (2007), for example, has noted the rapid growth of Christianity in
the global south, countering arguments that Islam would overtake Christianity as the world's
most popular faith. In cases in which immigrants share the same vernacular or are members of
a church with a centralized administration (such as the Catholic Church), the propensity for such
a pattern inevitably increases. Migrants participate in religious multi-ethnic networks that
connect them to their co-religionists locally and globally. Their main allegiance is not to their
original homeland but to their global religious community; religion offers a means for
‘transnational transcendence’ (Csordas, 2009) of identities and boundaries.

Second, it is possible for local ethnic or national particularism to gain or maintain the most
important place for local immigrant communities. In such instances, transnational national
communities are constructed and religious hierarchies perform dual religious and secular
functions that ensure the groups' survival (for examples, see Danforth, 1995; Roudometof,
2000). The above distinction obviously represents two ends of a continuum of a variety of
combinations observed among transnational or immigrant or diasporic groups (see McLoughlin,
2010). For example, diasporas might adopt cultural habits derived from the host country. A
prominent example is the ‘Protestantization’ of various faiths among groups living mostly in
Europe or the United States. But other groups might shed cultural elements in favour of a more
globalist orientation; as suggested by Roy (2010) in his ‘deculturalization of religion’ thesis.
According to Roy, fundamentalist or more precisely revivalist movements attempt to construct
‘pure religion’ that sheds the cultural tradition in which past religious life was immersed.

Transnational religion also has been used to describe cases of institutional transnationalism,
whereby communities living outside the national territory of particular states maintain religious
attachments to their home churches or institutions. This is quite a distinct use of the term
‘transnational’, and in this case it is applied to institutions and not groups of people.

The second major research agenda concerns the interface between religion and culture.
Concern with public expressions of religiosity also brings forth the relationship between religion
and culture (Besecke, 2005).

Instead of attributing fixed essences to cultural units, then, it is possible to concentrate on the
various processes referred to as indigenization, hybridization or glocalization (Burke, 2009;
Pieterse, 2003; for specific examples see Altglas, 2010). These processes register the ability of
religion to mould into the fabric of different communities in ways that connect it intimately with
communal and local relations. Religion sheds its universal uniformity in favour of blending with
locality. Global-local or glocal religion thus represents a 'genre of expression, communication
and legitimation' of collective and individual identities (Robertson, 1991: 282; Robertson and
Garret, 1991: xv). Groups and individuals use this religious tradition symbolically as emblematic
of membership in an ethnic or national group.

Based on a survey of the history of Christianity, Roudometof (2013, 2014) argues that it is
possible to detect four concrete forms of glocalization: (1) indigenization, (2) vernacularization,
(3) nationalization and (4) transnationalization.

Vernacularization involved the rise of vernacular languages (such as Greek or Latin or Arabic
in the case of Islam) endowed with the symbolic ability of offering privileged access to the
sacred, whereas indigenization connected specific faiths with ethnic groups, whereby religion
and culture were often fused into a single unit. Vernacularization was often promoted by
empires, whereas indigenization was connected to the survival of particular ethnic groups. It is
important to stress that this is not an exclusively contemporary phenomenon. The creation of
distinct branches of Christianity; such as Orthodox and Catholic Christianity; bears the mark of
this particularization of religious universalism. Nationalization connected the consolidation of
specific nations with particular confessions and has been a popular strategy both in Western
and Eastern Europe (Gorski, 2000; Hastings, 1997; Roudometof, 2001

Religion in Global Conflict

The contemporary conflicts with which religion has been associated are not solely about
religion, however, if one means by ‘religion’ a set of doctrines and beliefs. The conflicts have
been about identity and economics, about privilege and power – the things that most social
conflicts are about. When these conflicts are religionized – when they are justified in religious
terms and presented with the aura of sacred combat – they often become more intractable, less
susceptible to negotiated settlement. Thus although religion is seldom the problem, in the sense
of causing the tensions that produced the conflicts in the first place, it is often problematic in
increasing the intensity and character of the struggle (Juergensmeyer, 2004b).

An abundant number of new studies argues that this is the case, that religious conflict is a
byproduct of the global age (see Crockett, 2006; Hassner, 2009; Kippenberg, 2012; Lincoln,
2002; Ter Borg and Van Henten, 2010; Toft, Philpott and Shaw 2011; Wellman, 2007; and
Juergensmeyer, 2003, 2008).

Global development of religious conflict in five stages

First Stage: Revolt against Global Secularism

The first stage of the encounter was characterized by isolated outbursts. It began in the 1970s
by a variety of groups – Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh, and Muslim – that were revolting against what
they regarded as the moral failing of the secular state. One of the first of these religious
rebellions was nonviolent – the Gandhian movement in India led by Jayaprakash Narayan, who
called for a ‘Total Revolution’ in 1974 against the corruption of the Indian government.

Examples:

 1979, the Ayatollah Khomeini led a revolt against the secular regime of the Shah of Iran
 Buddhist activists violently resisted attempts by the Sri Lankan government to appease
the growing movement of Tamil separatism that had arisen in that island nation in the
1970s
 The Khalistani movement of Sikh separatism gained momentum and unleashed a reign
of violence in the north Indian state of Punjab throughout the 1980s
 The gathering power of Muslim extremists in Egypt led to the brutal assassination of
President Mohammad Anwar al Sadat in 1981.

The common element that ran through all of these otherwise isolated nonviolent and violent
incidents of Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Shi'ite and Sunni Muslim rebellion in the 1970s and early
1980s was an implicit moral critique of secular politics.

By that time a revived anti-colonial mood had developed against the cultural and political
legacies of European modernity in the Middle East and South Asia that gave the movements a
new force.

Secular authorities treated these rebellious religious movements simply as attempts to usurp
power. The secular leaders left unchallenged the moral critique that the movements conveyed.

In some cases, they regarded the new religious activists as versions of the legendary Robin
Hood – extra-legal though virtuous challengers to the political status quo
Second Stage: Internationalization of Religious Rebellion

The next stage of the developing warfare between religious and secular politics was the
internationalization of the conflict in the 1980s. This stage is best represented by the ad hoc
international coalition of jihadi Muslim radicals that developed in the Afghan war. It is hard to
underestimate the formative power of their experience, shared by thousands of volunteer
soldiers in the Afghanistan struggle against the Soviet regime in the 1980s. In one central
theatre of involvement activists were brought together from throughout the Muslim world. The
fighting force of mujahadin included erstwhile jihadi soldiers who came from Muslim countries
from Pakistan to Northern Africa. It also included some of the Egyptian militants linked to
Sadat's assassination and Saudis who would later be identified with the al Qaeda movement of
Osama bin Laden. Afghanistan became the crucible for creating the international Muslim
political networks that would infuriate global politics for the next two decades.

Third Stage: Invention of Global Enemies

The third stage in the gathering cold war between religious and secular politics was
characterized by a growing anti-American and anti-European sentiment in the 1990s. In this
stage the target of the religious activists' wrath shifted from local regimes to international
centres of power. Increasingly the political and economic might of the United States and Europe
became regarded as the source of problems both locally and worldwide.

The 1990s constituted a decade of social dissent linked with religious traditions of various kinds:
Christianity, Judaism, and Buddhism as well as Islam of both Sunni and Shi'ite varieties.
America was regarded as the fount of secularism and hence often the target. Many who
attacked it were incensed by what they regarded as its economic, cultural and political
oppression under the ‘new world order’ of a secular, America-dominated, post-Cold War
globalized world. Some of the fiercest opponents of the United States' secular power were
themselves Americans. The venom of the Christian militia and other extremist Christian groups
in the United States led to a series of terrorist acts on abortion clinics, gay and lesbian bars, and
individuals perceived as being Jewish or immigrant.

Many radical Muslim groups saw American military and economic power the same way, but with
a more realistic basis for their critique. The United States' economic interests in the oil reserves
of the Middle East, and its unchallenged cultural and political influence in a post-Cold War world
led many Muslim activists to see America as a global bully, a worthy target of their religious and
political anger. It appealed especially to those whose resistance methods had been honed
through the anti-Soviet struggle in Afghanistan which also was seen as a fight against enemies
of Islam.

Fourth Stage: Global War

Originally jihadi leaders like Khalid Shaikh Mohammad and bin Laden had been fixated on local
issues – in bin Laden's case, on Saudi Arabia. He was concerned especially about the role of
the United States in propping up the Saudi family and, in his mind, America's exploitation of the
oil resources of the country. He then adopted a broader critique of Middle Eastern politics,
following the general jihadi perspective of Maulana Maududi, Sayyid Qutb and other Muslim
political thinkers who rejected all forms of Western political and social influence in the region.
Increasingly the goal of bin Laden's and the other jihadi activists was not just to get American
influence out of Saudi Arabia but out of the whole Muslim world. This meant a confrontation of
global proportions on multiple fronts.

Though bin Laden had declared war on the United States in his famous fatwa of 1996 it was
largely an invisible conflict, a great confrontation that lay largely within the imaginations of the
jihadi activists, until 11 September 2001 brought it to public attention.

The response of the American political leadership following the 11 September was dramatic and
historically transformative. The televised pronouncements of President George W. Bush on both
11 September and even more decisively on the following day made clear how he and his
administration were going to interpret the attack: they adopted the jihadi terms. Rather than
viewing the terrorist acts as criminal deeds by a gang of thugs, the US leaders adopted some of
the major elements of bin Laden's view of the world and saw them as skirmishes in a global
war.

The simmering new Cold War of the 1990s had become hot and exploded into a real war, the
first of the twenty-first century. The new Cold War also received a new name. It came to be
known as the ‘Global War on Terror’ by US officials and the American news media. The war
was also characterized as the ‘struggle against radical Islam’, and indeed the Muslim aspects of
the religious encounter with the secular state became the single concern of Western
policymakers, despite the persistence of Christian militants in America, Hindu and Sikh activists
in India, Jewish extremists in Israel, and violent Buddhists in Sri Lanka and Thailand.

Yet only the Muslim activists shared an ideological perspective that was global in its encounter
with the West and transnational in its network of activists. Its actions were brutal and violent. So
too were the American attempts to suppress it, and the heavy-handed approach created further
cycles of violence in response. Terrorist acts associated with jihadi Muslim activists increased
dramatically around the world in this decade. The arena of terror became transnational.

Many of the Muslim activists in Europe were inflamed not only about European countries'
support for the US-led military coalition in Iraq but also about European attitudes toward the
Muslim immigrant community. The resentment of some elements of the expatriate community
boiled over into violence. Among the more incendiary moments were the tensions following the
assassination of the Dutch filmmaker, Theo van Gogh in November 2004; the rage of violence
by North African and Arab youth in France that left over 1,000 automobiles torched across the
country in 2004; and the protests earlier that same year over the French government's attempt
to ban the wearing of headscarves by Muslim women living in France.

In the twenty-first century, the Internet provided a whole new arena for radical religious activism.
The new Cold War was waged not only on a geographical battlefield but also on the intellectual
terrain of cyberspace. Yet, like the old Cold War, the ideological confrontation always carried the
threat of bloodshed.
Fifth Stage: Religious Dimensions Post-Arab Spring

The dramatic popular uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Yemen, and Syria
demonstrated that protests that have been nonviolent in their inception (and became violent
only in response to bloody attempts to repress them) have been far more effective (that would
work against ruthless dictator), and supported with a more widespread moral and spiritual
consensus.

What brought down the tyrants in Egypt and Tunisia, as it turned out, was about as far from
jihad as one could imagine. It was a series of massive nonviolent movements of largely middle
class and relatively young professionals who organized their protests through Facebook,
Twitter, and other forms of electronic social networking.

Yet one cannot underestimate the importance of Tahrir Square, and similar protests in
Alexandria and throughout Egypt. Clearly, they constituted the catalyst for change. The protests
were not the weapons of jihad, nor were the voices of opposition the strident language of
Islamist extremism.

There was also a religious element to the protests. The peak moments came after Friday
prayers, when sympathetic mullahs would urge the faithful into joining the protest as a religious
duty. But theirs was not the divisive, hateful voice of jihadi rhetoric. In a remarkable moment
when the Muslim protestors were trying to conduct their prayers in the square and Mubarak's
thugs tried to attack them as they prayed, a cordon of Egyptian Coptic Christians who had
joined the protests circled around their Muslim compatriots, shielding them. Later a phalanx of
Muslim protestors protected their Christian comrades as they worshipped in the public square,
an urban intersection that was for that time transformed into a massive interfaith sanctuary.

The religiosity of Tahrir Square is far from the religion of radical jihad. Rather than separating
Muslim from non-Muslim, and Sunni from Shi'a, the symbols that were raised on impromptu
placards in Tahrir Square were emblems of interfaith cooperation.

The era of globalization brought with it three enormous problems. The first was identity, how
societies could maintain a sense of homogeneity when ethnic, cultural, and linguistic
communities were spread across borders, in many cases spread across the world. The second
problem was accountability, how the new transnational economic, ideological, political and
communication systems could be controlled, regulated, and brought to justice. The third
problem was one of security, how people buffeted by forces seemingly beyond anyone's
control could feel safe in a world increasingly without cultural borders or moral standards.
Religion provides answers to all three of these problems. Traditional definitions of religious
community provide a sense of identity, a feeling of belonging to those who accept that
fellowship as primary in their lives. Traditional religious leadership provides a sense of
accountability, a certainty that there are moral and legal standards inscribed in code and
enforced by present-day leaders who are accorded an unassailable authority. And for these
reasons, religion also offers a sense of security, the notion that within the community of the
faithful and uplifted by the hands of God, one has found safe harbor and is truly secure.

Critics of religion may observe that all of these religious solutions are illusory. It is a sense of
identity, accountability, and security that religion offers, not solutions that are grounded in an
enduring reality. The critics may be correct. But for the moment the religious imagination
provides a way of coping with the extreme problems of globalization. It also gives a motivation
for engaging in conflicts related to global pressures and images of cosmic war that enlarge
social conflict into the realm of the transcendent and give meaning to those who struggle not
just as rebels but as sacred soldiers. To enter into such global conflicts transcends all of the
complications imposed by the new realities of a globalized world.