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Iran and America have been on opposite sides in conflicts in the

Middle East since the days of the Ayatollah Khomeini, who died
25 years ago. But the arrival of ISIS in the region could alter
that relationship. (THE NEW YORK TIMES)

Games and Grand Bargains

NADIM SHEHADI

The conflict between the United States and Iran is now over 35 years old, and the two remain on opposite sides of confrontations
throughout the Arabian Peninsula and beyond. But in the fight against ISIS, the United States sees Iran on the same side, ringing
alarms among American allies who fear Iran’s ambitions.

Those allies, especially in the Persian Gulf region, are nervous, and they have good reason to be. Many are totally dependent on
American support and protection for their sovereignty and security, and they feel that this support is faltering. They fear the
United States’ nuclear talks with Iran, believing that any “grand bargain” may come at their expense. There seems to be a serious
communications problem, and attempts by the United States to reassure them have had limited success.

There is a lack of confidence among these allies that the United States is playing the right game with Iran. The perception is that
while Iran plays the region like a chessboard, the Americans are playing poker.

In Iran’s game, all the moves are interdependent and calculated toward the final aim — checkmate. In the process, some side
battles are opened as diversions, traps are set, pawns or other more important pieces are sacrificed. Opponents are manipulated
by anticipating moves and provoking others. Iran’s chessmen are the Assad regime, Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad and other

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nonstate actors sponsored by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards throughout the region. For Tehran, victory is having the United States
concede control of the region.

In the American poker game, every hand is unconnected to the other. You win some and lose some, and you can limit the damage
by quitting at any time. The game depends on having a strong hand, but it also requires the ability to bluff when you don’t. You
must be able to understand your opponent’s hand. There is no overall aim and no permanent enemy. The perception among some
allies is that the United States could quit the game at any stage and engage with this former opponent.

In the eyes of its opponents, Iran’s regional strategy is clear and best illustrated by the events of the summer of 2006, when it
started an across-the-board regional offensive using all its chessmen. Gaza blew up with the capture of an Israeli soldier, triggered
by Hamas and Islamic Jihad, both part of a resistance axis led by Iran and Syria. In Lebanon, Hezbollah crossed the Israeli
border, killing and capturing two Israeli soldiers, which started the second Lebanon war. Simultaneously, Iraq dived into chaos
caused by Al Qaeda and former Baathists in the north, and facilitated by Syria and Iranian sponsored militias in the south.

In a little more than three months, three American allies in the region, Mahmoud Abbas of the Palestinian Authority, Prime
Minister Fouad Siniora of Lebanon and Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki of Iraq, were in deep trouble. Having created the
fire, President Bashar al-Assad of Syria proceeded to sell the water by offering to facilitate a Hamas-Fatah deal, stabilize Lebanon
and control the border with Iraq. By 2008, Assad was being engaged and rehabilitated, which continued until the game changed
with the Arab Spring and the eruption of the Syrian revolution.

The rise of ISIS, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, is also perceived to be the result of such a game. ISIS was first composed of
Al Qaeda-type terrorists released primarily from Syrian and Iraqi jails in 2011 and 2013. It was perceived to be in a tacit alliance
with Assad, being allowed to exploit the oil wealth of the region it controls and primarily fighting the Syrian opposition rather
than the regime. Now Assad is offering to help fight the monster he created in the first place.

Meanwhile, after the near collapse of the Iraqi Army, southern Iraq is increasingly under the control of militias sponsored by Iran’s
Quds Force. American talk of re-engaging with Assad and Iran to fight ISIS is perceived as falling into the same trap twice, in
2006 and 2014.

While Iran manipulates this board, the United States is struggling at its game. Its ability to bluff is seen to be increasingly limited,
with the Obama administration’s inability to enforce its own red lines akin to playing with an exposed hand. And while Iran plays
aggressively, America is bidding shyly, fearing to get too involved and ready to withdraw from the game at any moment. It is also
seen as perplexed as to who its allies are and who its enemies are.

But one element of poker remains strongly in the United States’ favor: Ultimately, the game requires staying power until your luck
turns. Iran is investing too much and overstretching itself in support of Assad; this is not sustainable, and without a quick win
Tehran is out of the game. The United States has the means and the power to stay on, if it takes this option. It can still win, if only
it plays the game right.

Nadim Shehadi is an associate fellow at the Middle East and North Africa program at Chatham House. Send comments to
intelligence@nytimes.com.

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